Holding

The husband’s conduct amounted to instigation and intentional aid, satisfying Section 306 IPC, and his conviction was reinstated; the sister’s conviction was not upheld due to insufficient evidence.

Summary

The wife of Iqbal Singh set herself and her three children on fire on 7 June 1983 after prolonged dowry harassment by her husband, his mother and sister. She had previously complained to police and written letters detailing the abuse and her fear for her life. The husband, his mother and sister were charged under Section 306 IPC for abetment of suicide; the trial court convicted them, but the High Court acquitted on the ground that no abetment was proved. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the definition of abetment under Sections 107 and 108 IPC, the meaning of "instigate" and "aid", and the legislative intent behind the dowry‑death provisions of Sections 304B IPC and Sections 113A/113B of the Evidence Act. The Court held that the husband’s conduct—continuous dowry demands, physical abuse, and creating a situation that forced the wife to kill herself—constituted instigation and intentional aid, satisfying Section 306, and reinstated his conviction. The sister’s involvement was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, so her conviction was left untouched. The State's appeal was allowed, restoring the conviction of Iqbal Singh.

Issues considered

Whether the husband and his sister can be held liable for abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC.
Whether the conduct of the accused amounts to "instigation" or "aid" as defined in Sections 107 and 108 IPC.
Whether the presumption under Sections 113A/113B of the Evidence Act can be invoked in the absence of a precise marriage date.
Whether the legislative intent behind the dowry‑death provisions influences the interpretation of abetment.

Legislation cited

Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 1138, s. 113A, s. 113B
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 107, s. 108, s. 302, s. 304B, s. 306, s. 498A

Subjects

abetmentsuicidedowry deathSection 306 IPCIndian Evidence Actpresumptiondowry harassmentcriminal appealconviction reinstated

Judgment

A
STATE OF PUNJAB..
v.
IQBAL SINGH AND ORS.

MAY 10, 1991 -.,.

B [A.M. AHMADI, V. RAMASWAMI AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ.)

Indian Penal Code, 1860-Sections 107, 108-'Abetment'
Abettor'-Definition of.

Words and Phrases-"Jnstigate", "aid"-Meaning of.
c Indian Evidence Act, 1872-Sections 113-A and 113-B-Dowry
death-Presumption-Legislative intention of-Duty of Court indicated.

lndian Penal Code, 1860-Sections 107-120, 302, 304-B, 306 and
498-A-Married woman, subjected to cruelty or harassment-Death-
D Presumption of-Punishment of persons responsible.

Respondent No. l's wife setting herself and her three children
ablaze, died at her husband's house on 7.6.1983. The marriage had
taken place seven or eight years before the incident. The deceased wife
was working as a teacher while her husband was a clerk.
E
Soon after the marriage there were disputes between them on the
question of dowry. The demand for extra dowry strained the relations
between them and the husband began to ill-treat the deceased wife.

The deceased had written a letter to the Deputy Superintendent of
F Police on 12.10.1977 complaining about the ill-treatment meted out to
her and apprehending danger to her life and the lives of her children.
When the police came to inquire into the matter there was some under~
standing, as a result of which she had informed the police that no
further action be taken for the present but her application may be kept
pending. Later, a divorce deed was executed but not acted upon. The
G situation did not improve.

On 7 .6.1983, the very morning of incident, the deceased wife
wrote a letter addressed to Deputy Commissioner of Police, wherein she
narrated how she and her children were ill-treated by her husband,
mother-in-law and sister-in-law for dowry and why she took the deci·
H sion to put an end to her life and the lives of her children. Another letter

790
STATE OF PUNJAB v. IQBAL SINGH 791

of e_v en date was addre~d to her mother stating the reasons for her
A
such act.

A First Information Report was lodged against the Respondent
No. 1 by the mother of the deceased. After investigation the Respondent
No. 1, his mother and sister were put up for trial. The Trial Court on an
examination of the prosecution evidence convicted all the three accused B
persons under Section 306, IPC and sentenced the husband to rigorous
imprisonment for seven years and a fine of Rs.5,000, in default, rigor-
ous imprisonment for one year and sentenced the two others to rigorous
imprisonment for three years and a fine of Rs.I,000 each, in default,
rigorous imprisonment for three months, against which order' accused
persons preferred an appeal before the High Court.
c
The High Court on a reappreciation of the evidence and having
regard to the language of Section 306, IPC came to tht conclusion that
there was no evidence to show that any of the accused was guilty of
abetment and allowed the appeal.
D
The State has, therefore, approached this Court by way of special
leave. In the meantime the Respondent No. 1's mother had passed away.
The appeal was, therefore, limited to the Respondent No. 1 and his
sister.

Allowing the appeal, this Court, E

HELD: 1. 'Abetment' as defined by Section 107 comprises (i)
instigation to do that thing which is an offence, (ii) engaging in any
conspiracy fot" the doing of that thing and (iii) intentionally aiding by
any act or illegal omission the doing of that thing. An abettor is a person
who abets an offence or who abets either the commission of an offence F
or the commission of an act which would be an offence. [798C-DJ

2. The word ' instigate' in the literary sense means to incite, set or
urge on, stir up, goad, foment , stimulate, provoke, etc. The dictionary
meaning of the word, "aid" is to give assistance, help, etc. {7980-E)
G
3. Where the death of a woman is caused by burns or bodily
injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within
I
seven years of her marriage and evidence reveals that soon before her

l
death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any
of bis relative for or in connection with any demand for dowry, such
death is described as dowry death under Section 304 B for which the H
792 SUPREME COURT REPO RTS [1 991] 2 S.C.R.

punishment extends to imprisonment for life. but not Jess than impri-
A sonment for seven years. By Section J 138, Evidence Act, the court.has to
raise a presumption of dowry death, if the same has taken place within
seven years of marriage and there is evidence of the woman having been
subjected to cruelty and/or harassment. [800A-C]

B 4. The legislative intent is clearly to curb the menance of dowry
deaths, etc., with a firm hand. Court must keep in mind this legislative
intent. It must be remembered that since such crimes are generally
committed in the privacy of residential homes and in secrecy, indepen-
dent and direct evidence is not easy to get. That is why the legislature
has by introducing sections 113A and 1138 in the Evidence Act tried to
strengthen the prosecution's hands by permitting a presumption to be
c raised if certain foundational facts are established and the unfortunate
event has taken place within seven years of marriage. This period of
seven years is considered to be the turbulent one after which the legisla-
ture assumes that the couple would have settled down in life. [800D-E]

o 5. If a married woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment by
her husband or his family members section 498-A, IPC would be
attracted. If such cruelty or harassment was inflicted by the husband or
his relative for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry
immediately preceding death by burns and bodily injury or in abnormal
circumstances within seven years of marriage, such husband or relative
E is deemed to have caused her death and is liable to be punished under
section 3048 IPC. (800£-F]

6. When the question at issue is whether a person is guilty of
dowry death of a woman and the evidence discloses that immediately
before her death she was subjected by such person to cruelty and/or
F harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, sc~tion
1138 Evidence Act provides that the Court shall presume that such
person had caused the dowry death. (800F-G)

1. In the present case section 113A or I 138, Evidence Act cannot be
invoked as the prosecution has not brought the exact date of marriage
G on record. Yet where the husband or his relative by his wilful conduct
creates a situation which he knows will drive the woman to commit
suicide and she actually does so, the case would squarely fall within the
ambit of section 306, IPC. In such a case the conduct of the person
would tantamount to inciting or provoking or virtuaUy pushin& the
woman into a desperate act. In this case it would seem from past events
H that it was a carefully chalked out strategy to provoke the woman into
killing herself. [800H-801A, 801EJ
STATE OF PUNJAB v. IQBAL SINGH [AHMADI, J.) 793

8. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the trial
court had rightly convicted the husband under se<:tion 306 IPC. The. A
High Court committed an error: in reversing the conviction. The plea
for reduction of his sentence cannot be countenanced. (801F-G]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 325of1987. B

From the Judgment and Order dated 9 .11.1984 of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court in Crl. Appeal No. 132-SB of 1984.
_:.,I

Arnita Gupta and R.S. Suri for the Appellant.

R.L. Kohli, R.C. Kohli, G.S. Rao and Ms. C. Markandeya for c
the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

AHMADI, J. Mo hinder Kaur set herself and her three children D
ablaze on the afternoon of 7th June, 1983, at the residence of her
husband Iqbal Singh. The marriage had taken place seven or eight
years before the incident. She had given birth to two daughters and a
. son. The deceased was working as a teacher while her husband was a
clerk in the Punjab State Electricity Board office at Amritsar. Soon
after the marriage there were disputes between them on the question E
of dowry. The demand for exrta dowry strained the relations between
them and the husband began to ill-treat the deceased wife. It appears
that in course of time there was further deterioration in their relation-
ship as a result whereof the deceased had written a letter to the Deputy
Superintendent of Police on 12th October, 1977 complaining about the
ill-treatment meted out to her and apprehending danger to her life and F
the life of her children. She had, therefore , sought police protection.
However, by the time the police came to inquire into the matter there
was some understanding as a result of which she had informed the
police that no further action be taken for the present but her applica-
tion may be kept pending. Then on 31st December, 1977 a divorce
deed Exh. D-2 was executed but was not acted upon. It seems that the G
situation did not improve and as a result she took the extreme step of
putting an end to her life as well as the Jives of her three children since
she apprehended that their fate would be worse after her death. How-
ever, before putting an end to her life she wrote a letter that very
morning which has been reproduced in extenso in paragraph 13 of the
judgment of the trial court. The text of that letter dated 7th June, 1983 H
794 Sl'PREME CO URT REPORTS [ 1991] 2 S.C.R.

A addressed to the Deputy Commissioner of Police. Public Dealing
Branch, Amritsar, shows that her husband was demanding Rs.35,000
to Rs'.40,000 by way of additional dowry and was ill-treating her under
the influence of alcohol on that account. She also alleged that her
mother-in-law and sister-in-law also conspired and made false accusa-
tions against her and instigated her husband to beat her if she _refused
B to bring the additional dowry. She alleges that they had conspired to
kill her on the night of 6th June, 1983 by sprinkling kerosene/petrol on
her but their plan misfired. She was fed up on account of the beating
given to her that night. She further alleged that her children were also
ill-treated by her husband and his family members. On account of
these developments she states that she had takeri the decision to put an
end her life and the lives of her children to spare them of the present
c and future agony. At the foot of the Jetter she appended a note to the
effect that even after their death she apprehended that her husband
and his family members may try to cause physical harm to her mother
and younger brother and requested the police to extend to them the
necessary protection. She implores that her salary, G.P. Fund and
D other monetary benefits to which she may be entitled from the school
authorities should not fall in the hands of her husband and his relatives
and may be given to some school or orphanage and her ornaments,
etc. may be recovered from her in-laws and be returned to her parents.
Another letter of even date was addressed to her mother (her father
having since died) stating that she was fed up of the continuous
E tension, suffering and agony that her mother had to go through on her
account as she could not meet the demand for extra dowry. She also
states that. apart from her husband demanding extra dowry he has
started making false accusations against her and beating her time and
again on that account. She further alleges that her husband's mother
and sister were privy to this beating by her husband but she had some-
F how survived. Then she adds 'today I alongwith three children am
sacrificing by fire'. She ends the Jetter by stating that her mother need
not think that her daughter was dead, in fact she will gain freedom
from seven years of hell. In the letter addressed to the Deputy Com-
missioner of Police there is reference to the earlier application/letter
dated 12th October, 1977 by which she had complained about possible
G risk to life. It appears from the said Jetter that the police had gone to
inquire into the matter two months later on 11th December, 1977 but
:.:during that intervening period the relatives of her husband had
.)11tervened and had temporarily patched up the matter. It was for that
, reason that she informed the police that no action was immediately
~-n~cessary but still she insisted that her application may be kept pend-
H '· ing, Thus this subsequent letter contains intrinsic evidence about her
STATE OF PUNJAB v. IQBAL SINGH !AHMADI , J.) 795

previous application dated 12th October, 1977.
A
After the unfortunate incident which took place on the afternoon
of 7th June, 1983 a First Information Report was lodged against the
husband Iqbal Singh, by the mother of the deceased. After investiga-
tion the husband, his mother and sister wyre put up for trial. The Trial
Court on an examination of the prosecution evidence convicted all the B
three accused persons under Section 306, IPC and sentenced the
husband Iqbal Singh to rigorous imprisonment for seven years and a
fine of Rs.5,000, in default, rigorous imprisonment for one year. So far
as the other two accused were concerned , having regard to their role
and the fact that the mother was an aged and frail woman , he sentenced
them t.o rigorous imprisonment for three years and a fine of Rs.1,000
each, in default, rigorous imprisonment for three months. c
Against this order of conviction and sentence all the three
accused persons preferred an appeal before the High Court. The High
Court on a reappreciation of the evidence and having regard to the
language of Section 306, IPC came to the conclusion that the prosecu- D
tion evidence did not establish the ingredients of the section, in tha·t ,
there was no evidence to show that any of the accused was guilty of
abetment. In this view that the High Court took, it allowed the
appeal and set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed against
the appellants. The State has, therefore, approached this Court by way
of special leave. In the meantime the accused Manjit Kaur has passed E
away. The appeal is, therefore, limited to Iqbal Singh and his sister
Kulwant Kaur.

Counsel for the State of Punjab took us through the evidence on
record, particularly the letters dated 7th June, 1983 and submitted that
this was a clear case of the husband and his sister creating conditions F
which compelled the deceased to take the extreme step of burning her-
self and her children. T he evidence of Dr. Harjinder Singh who
performed autopsy has not be.en disputed before us. His evidence
shows that the deaths of all had resulted on account of shock sustained
due to excessive burns. PW 2 Jasbir Kaur, the mother of the deceased,
says that her daughter complained to her from time to time about the G
ill-treatment meted out to her by her husband on his own and at the
instigation of his mother and sister. She has also stated that this ill-
treatment was due to failure of the deceased to meet his demand for
extra dowry. She received a message about the incident while she was
at her brother's residence in Amritsar. She and her son went to the
hospital and learnt that her daughter and grand children had passed H
796 Sl.J PREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 2 S.C.R.

away. She then deposed to have received a letter of 7th June, 1983 on
A
9th June, 1983. In her cross-examination it was brought out that she
had not pointed an accusing finger at the mother and sister of accused
Iqbal Singh. She tried to explain the absence of allegation against the
said two persons on the ground that she was confused on account of
the tragedy. She further deposed that she had omitted the names of
B two ladies because of pressure exerted on her by Iqbal Singh. Obvi-
ously her explanation cannot carry conviction because it is difficult to
believe that she would submit to the pressure of Iqbal Singh whom she
considered primarily responsible for the death of her daughter and
grand children. It may also be mentioned at this stage that accused. \._ ..•
Kulwant Kaur is a married woman who lives with her husband in
another village. There is no evidence on record to show that she was at
c the residence of her brother on the date of the incident or immediately
prior thereto to instigate her brother. PW Santosh Singh, brother of
the deceased, has maintained that accused Iqbal Singh was ill-treating
his sister soon after marriage as the latter was not able to meet his
demand for extra dowry. He further deposed that after the death of his
D father his mother had received a sum of Rs.60,000 or thereabouts by
way of provident fund and gratuity and when the accused Iqbal Singh
learnt about the same he pressurised the deceased to secure a sum of
Rs.40,000 or thereabouts from that amount to meet his demand for
extra dowry . He had gone with his mother PW 2 Jasbir Kaur to the
hospital after learning about the incident. In cross-examination he was
E questioned about the purchase of a plot in the name of the deceased by
Iqbal Singh. He, however, stated that his father had given a sum
Rs.20,000 or 21,000 for purchase of this plot although he could not
state the exact price at which it was purchased. The two letters, one
'(
addressed to the Deputy Commissioner of Police and the other to the
mother dated 7th June 1983, have been duly proved by the prosecu-
F tion. These letters were written immediately before she put an end to
her life and the lives of her three children. These letters reveal her
plight immediately before the incident. There is a mention about an
attempt on the part of her husband to kill her on the preceding day.
She apprehended that her children would suffer intolerable miseries if
they survived her and, therefore , she took the extreme decision to put
G an end to their lives also along with her. This letter clearly brings out
her turmoil where under she took the extreme step of putting an end to
her life. The earlier letter of 12th October, 1977 also shows that she
was being ill-treated soon after her marriage. The divorce deed pro-
duced at Exh. D-2 is dated 30th November, 1977. This would show
that by that time the relatives had intervened and, therefore, when the
H police came to inquire on 11th December, 1977 she told them that
STATE OF PUNJAB v. IQBAL SINGH [AHMADI, J.) 797

there was no immediate danger but her application should be kept
A
pending. ·considerable emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for
the respondents on the statement in Exh. D-2 attributed to the
deceased that she had been forced to marry Iqbal Singh. Emphasis was
also laid on the post-script at the foot of the said document made by
Iqbal Singh to the effect that he has agreed to a divorce since his wife
desires it. From these two statements counsel for the respondents B
argued that the accused Iqbal Singh had no grudge against his wife and
had expressed his willingness to put an end to the marital relationship
as his wife so desired. He also submitted that the statement of the
deceased that she was forced to marry Iqbal Singh went to show that it
was she who was keen to put an end to the relationship as she did not
desire to live with Iqbal Singh. But counsel overlooks the fact that
there is intrinsic evidence in the divorce deed that their marital life was c
unhappy and she apprehended blood shed as well as harm to the
children even after they parted company. Counsel then referred to
letter Exb. D-1 dated 17th April, 1983 written by the deceased to one
Gopal Singh complaining about the behaviour of the Headmaster
towards her. By that letter she expressed her desire to secure a transfer D
from the school to get rid of the harassment meted out to her by the
Headmaster. In this letter there is a mention that her husband Iqbal
Singh was spending considerable time in correspondence with the
Headmaster. From this letter counsel for the respondents submitted
that the .deceased could have committed suicide on account of the
harassment caused to her by the Headmaster of the school. But that E
does not explain the killing of the children. This letter was written on
17th April , 1983 whereas the incident in question occurred on 7th
June, 1983 i.e. more than 1-1/2 months thereafter. The immediate
cause for the extreme step taken by the deceased is clearly reflected in
the two letters of 7th June, 1983. Therefore, the inference drawn by
the learned counsel for the respondents from the letter of 17th April, F
1983 cannot advance the defence set up by the accused persons. Iqbal
Singh filed a written statement jointly with Kulwant Kaur wherein he
stated that he had not helped his wife to secure a transfer as the family
was having a good residence in the village and this was the real cause of
quarrel between the two. The statement shows that the factum of
quarrel between the husband and wife is not seriously disputed. The G
nature of correspondence he was carrying on ·with the Headmaster is
not difficult to judge. He then states that he had purchased the plot in
the name of his wife for Rs.12,500 but he does not di'sclose the source
from which the consideration for the plot came. He further states that
his wife was earning Rs.900 per month and, therefore, he could never
have entertained an intention to push her to committing suicide. It H
798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1991] 2 S.C.R.

A would, therefore, appear from the evidence placed on record that the
relations between the deceased and Iqbal Singh were strained because
of the latter's demand for extra dowry and they worsened to such an
extent that the deceased decided to put an end to her life.

The charge against the accused was under section 306, I.P.C.
B That section must be read in the backdrop of the above facts. Under
that sectfon if any person commits suicide the person who abets the
commission of suicide shall be liable to be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and fine.
The question is whether on the facts proved it can be said that either
lq bal Singh or his sister were guilty of abetment. Chapter V of the
c Penal Code is entitled 'Of Abetment' and comprises sections 107 to
120 of which we may notice sections 107 and 108 only. 'Abetment' as
defined by section 107 comprises (i) instigation to do that thing which
is an offence (ii) engaging in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing
and (iii) intentionally aiding by any act or illegal omission the doing of
that thing. Section 108 defines an abettor as a person who abets an
D offence or who abets either the commission of an offence or the com-
mission of an act which would be an offence. The word 'instigate' in

- E
the literary sense means to incite, set or urge on, stir up, goad, foment,
stimulate, provoke, etc. Since there is no question of parties being
engaged in any sort of conspiracy we have to consider whether there
was any intentional aiding for committing suicide. The dictionary
meaning of the word aid is to give assistance, help, etc.

Before we come to grips with the question at issue it is necessary
to notice a few legislative changes introduced in the Penal Code to v
combat the menance of dowry deaths. The increasing number of such l
deaths was a matter of serious concern to our law-makers. Cases of
F cruelty by the husband and his relatives culminated in the wife being
driven to commit suicide or being done to death by burning or in any
other manner. In order to combat this menace the legislature decided
to amend the Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and the Evidence
Act by the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 (No. 46 of
1983). So far as the Penal Code is concerned, Section 49Jl,.\\. came to be
G introduced whereunder 'cruelty' by the husband or his relative to the
former's wife is made a penal offence punishable with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to three years and fine. The explanation
to the section defines 'cruelty' to mean (i) wilful conduct which is of
such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to
cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb or health or (ii) causing
H harassment of the woman with a view to coercing her or any person
STATE OF PUNJAB v. IQBAL SINGH (AHMADI, J.] 799

related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valu-
A
able security. Thus, under this newly added provision if a woman is
subjected to cruelty by her husband or his relative it is a penal offence
and by the insertion of section 198A in the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure a Court can take cognizance of the offence upon a police report
or upon a complaint by the aggrieved party or by the woman's parents,
brother, sister, etc. The offence is made non-bailable. In so far as the B
Evidence Act is concerned, a new section 113A came to be introduced
which reads as under:

"113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married
woman. When the question is whether the commission of
suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or
any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had c
committed suicide within a period of seven years from the
date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative
of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may
presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of
the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband D
or by such relative of her husband.

Explanation-For the purposes of this section, 'cruelty'
shall have the same meaning as in Section 498A of the
Indian Penal Code (45of1860)."
E
On a plain reading of this provision it is obvious that if a wife is shown
to have committed suicide within a period oheven years from the date
of marriage and there is evidence that she was subjected to cruelty by
her husband or his relative, it would be permissible for the court to
presume that such suicide was abetted by her husband or by such
· relative of her husband. The Amendment Act 46 of 1983 received the F
assent of the President on 25th December, 1983 and was published in
the Gazette of India, Extra, dated 26th December, 1983. The trial
court rendered its Judgment on 23rd February, 1984 and it does not
appear if the prosecution concentrated on section 113A, Evidence
Act, for otherwise it would have tried to place on record the exact date
of marriage to take advantage of the presumption arising thereunder. G
The High Court referred to this provision but did not say anything in
regard to its application. Being a rule of evidence ii could perhaps
have been invoked if proof regarding the exact date of marriage was
laid. Since there is no cogent evidence that the marriage was solem-
nised within seven years from the date of incident we need not dilate
on that point. H
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1991] 2 S.C.R.
The law underwent a further change with the introduction of
A
section 304B in the Penal Code and section 113B in the Evidence Act
by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986. Where the death
of a woman is caused by bums or bodily injury or occurs otherwise
than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage
and evidence reveals that soon before her death she was subjected to
B cruelty or harassment by her husband or any of his relative for or in
connection with any demand for dowry, such death is described as
dowry death under section 304B for which the punishment extends to
imprisonment for life but not less than imprisonment for seven years.
By section 113B, Evidence Act, the court has to raise a presumption of
dowry death if the same has taken place within seven years of marriage
and there is evidence of the woman having been subjected to cruelty
c and/or harassment.

The legislative intent is clear: to curb the menance of dowry
deaths, etc., with a firm hand. We must keep in mind this legislative
intent. It must be remembered that since such crimes are generally
D committed in the privacy of residential homes and in secrecy, indepen-
dent and direct evidence is not easy to get. That is why the legislature
has by introducing sections 113A and 113B in the Evidence Act tried
to strengthen the prosecution hands by pecmitting a presumption to be
raised if certain foundational facts are established and the unfortunate
event has taken place within seven years of marriage. This period of
E seven years is considered to be the turbulent one after which the legis-
lature assumes that the couple would have settled down in life. If a
married woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband
or his family members section 498A, 1.P.C. would be attracted. If such
cruelty or harassment was inflicted by the husband or his relative for,
or in connection with, any demand-for dowry immediately preceding
F death by burns and bodily injury or in abnormal circumstances within
seven years of marriage, such husband or relative is deemed to have
caused her death and is liable to be puni,shed under section 304B,
I.P.C. When the question at issue is whether a person is guilty of
dowry death of a woman and the evidence discloses that immediately
before her death she was subjected by such person to cruelty and/or
G harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, section
113B, Evidence Act provides that the court shall presume that such
person had caused the dowry death. Of course if there is proof of the
person having intentionally caused her death that would attract section
302, I.P.C. Then we have a situation where the husband or his relative
by his wilful conduct cr.eates a situation which he knows will drive the
H woman to commit suicide and she actually does so, the case would
I STATE. OF PUNJAB v. IQBAL SINGH [AHMADI, J,] 801

squarely fall within the ambit of section 306, I.P.C. In such a case the
A
conduct of the person would tantamount to inciting provoking or virtu-
ally pushing the woman into a desperate situation of no return which
would compel her to put an end to her miseries by committing suicide.
In the present case the facts clearly reveal from the divorce deed Exh.
D-2 that the relations between the husband and the wife were strained
even in 1977. There is intrinsic evidence in that document that the wife B
apprehended blood shed and harm to her children. Before the execu-
tion of this document she had sought police protection by her
application/letter dated 12th October, 1977. Then in April, 1983 her
-J.. ..
efforts to secure a transfer from the school where she was harassed by
the Head Master were frustrated by her husband. Her husband had
kept up the pressure for extra-dowry since her marriage and had step-
ped it up after the demise of her father on learning that her mother had c
received the G.P. Fund, Gratuity, etc., due to her father. Since she
and her mother and brother were not able to meet this demand she was
subjected to considerable torture. Added to that was the llJIXiety
caused by her husband's conduct at trying to frustrate her efforts to
seek a transfer from the school where she was serving. The last straw D
on the camel's back fell when she was severely beaten on the pr~vious
day, i.e. 6th June, 1983 as is evident from her letter of 7th June, 1983.
An atmosphere of terror was created to push her into taking the
extreme step. It would seem it was a carefully chalked out strategy to
provoke her into taking the extreme step to kill herself and her
children as she apprehended that they will be much more miserable E
after she is dead and gone. In this fact/situation can it be said that the
husband had not been responsible in creating circumstances which
would provoke or force her into taking the only alternative left open to
her, namely suicide? Can it be said that the husband did not realise
where he was leading her by his wilful conduct? We think in the pecu-
liar facts and circumstances of the case, the trial court had rightly F
convicted the husband under section 306 I.P.C. We think that the High
Court committed an error in reversing the conviction. We, therefore.
allow this appeal, set aside the High Court's order and restore the
order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court. We cannot
countenance the plea for reduction of his sentence. No order on his
C.M.P. G
So far as his sister's involvement is concerned, we think the
evidence falls short of proof beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore,
we see no reason to interfere with the High Court's order. We, there-
fore, dismiss the State's appeal directed against her. Her bail bonds
will stand cancelled.
V.P.R. Appeal allowed.