Holding

Section 152 CPC is limited to correcting clerical or arithmetical mistakes and cannot be used to alter the substantive terms or merits of a judgment; therefore the order exercised under Section 152 was beyond its scope.

Summary

The respondent, a former senior compositor, was removed from service in 1977 and later reappointed as a junior compositor on a temporary basis. He filed a declaratory suit challenging the removal and seeking pay adjustments, which was dismissed by the trial court. The First Appellate Court reversed the dismissal and, besides granting relief, directed the department to decide on increments and promotion, later deleting those directions under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The State appealed both the original appellate judgment and the order made under Section 152; the High Court dismissed both appeals. The Supreme Court held that Section 152 is confined to correcting clerical or arithmetical errors and cannot be used to alter substantive terms or merits of a judgment, rendering the order under Section 152 invalid. Consequently, the appeal concerning the Section 152 order was allowed, while the appeal concerning the original appellate judgment was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 can be invoked to modify or delete substantive directions that go to the merits of a case.
Whether the order passed under Section 152 in this case was within the statutory scope.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 100, s. 152
Limitation Act, 1963

Subjects

Section 152 CPCclerical mistake correctionjudgment amendmentreview jurisdictioncivil proceduredeclaratory suitappellate jurisdiction

Judgment

A STA TE OF PUNJAB
v. • I

DARSHAN SINGH

OCTOBEI,l.)9, ·2003

B
-
[DORAISWAMY
. RAJU AND,ARIJIT
- .
PASAYAT,
- ,,- . . JJ.] ~

Code of Civil Procedure, l908-Section 152-Exercis~ pf po,wer
under-Scope of-Held, the exercise of power under this Section
contemplates correction ofmistakes by Court.of it~ ministerial actions and
• . ~ - ~ ,I. . ' - , .
C does not contemplate ofpassing effective judicial orders after the judgment,
decree or order-It is neither' to be equated ·~ith ihe power ofr.;iew nor
can be said to be akin to revi~w;_The pr~vision 'cannot be invoked t~
t •', • -- 'I •" j • '. :! '

modify, alter or add to the terms of the original judgment, decree or
order-Omission sought to.be corrected which goes to the merits of the
D case is beyond the scope 1of Section .152.

Maxim : 'actus curriae neminem gravabit'-An act of Court shall
prejudice no man-Jn the context ofSection 152, Code ofCivil Procedure,
1908, Discussed

E , Respondent was initially employed as a Senior Compositor in the
Govt. Press having been appointed in 1970. He was removed form
service by order dated 13.3.77. Respondent made several representations
to the Govt. and by order dated 14.2.79 he was appointed as a Junior
Compositor on temporary basis as a new appointee. Sebsequently
F respondent filed a suit in the Court of Senior Subordinate Judge for
a declaration that the order dated 13.3. 77 removing him from service
was unconstitutional, illegal, malafide and discriminatory with a
further prayer for a declaration that he was entitled to have his pay
fixed in the appropriate scale by counting the period of his alleged
forced absence. The suit was dismissed. Pursuani thereto, an appeal
G was filed before Additional District Judge, being the First Appellate
Court, which was allowed. The First Appellate Court made a further
order that it was for the department to grant him or not to grant him
increments for the past service rendered by him or to decide regarding
his promotion. Subsequently the First Appellate Court deleted the
H aforesaid directions on an application by the respondent under Section
1042
STATE v. DARSHAN SINGH 1043
152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Two second appeals were A
filed by the State, one against the original judgment of the First
Appellate Court being RSA 3618/87 and the other against the order
under Section 152 of the Code modifying the judgment being RSA ,
1472/88. By a consolidated judgment, High Court dismissed both the
appeals. Hence the present appeals.
B
On behalf of the State, it was contended that there was no ,
challenge in fact to the fresh order of appointment; that it was not open
to the First Appellate Court or the High Court to make out a new case
for interference; that the declaratory suit was filed by the respondent
beyond the period of limitation; that there was no scope for amending 'C
the order in the manner done in purported exercise of power under
Section 152 of the Code.

Allowing the appeal against RSA 1472/88 and dismissing the
appeal against RSA 3618/87, the Court D

HELD : 1.1. Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
provides for correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments,
decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or
omission. The exercise of this power contemplates the correction of E
mistakes by the Court of its ministerial actions and does not contemplate
of passing effective judicial orders after the judgment, decree or order.
The settled position of law is that after the passing of the judgment,
decree or order, the same becomes final subject to any further avenues
of remedies provided in respect of the same and the very court or the
tribunal, on mere change of view, is not entitled to vary the terms of F
the judgments, decrees and orders earlier passed except by means of
review, if statutorily provided specifically therefor and subject to the
conditions or limitations provided therein. The powers under Section
152 of the Code are neither to be equated with the power of review
nor can be said to be akin to review or even said to clothe the Court G
concerned under the guise of invoking alter the result of the judgment
earlier rendered, in its entirety or any portion or part of it. The
corrections contemplated are of correcting only accidental omissions
or mistakes and not all omissions and mistakes which might have been ,
committed by the Court while passing the judgment, decree or order. H
1044 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A The omission sought to be corrected which goes to the merits of the
case is beyond the scope of Section 152 as if it is looking into it for the
first time, for which the proper remedy for the aggrieved party if at
all is to file appeal or revision before the higher forum or review
application before the very forum, subject to the limitations in respect
B of such review. It implies that the Section cannot be pressed into service
to correct an omission which is intentional, however erroneous that
_may be. [1048-C-G)

Dwaraka Das v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr., [1999) 3 SCC
500 and Jayalakshnd Coelho v. Oswald Joseph Coelho, (2001) 4 SCC 181,
C relied on.

1.2. The basis of the provision under Section 152 of the Code is
founded on the maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit' i.e. an act of
Court shall prejudice no man. The maxim "is founded upon justice and
D good sense, and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration
of the law." The arithmetical mistake is a mistake of calculation, a
clerical mistake is a mistake in writing or typing whereas an error
arising out of or occurring from accidental slip or omission is an error
due to careless mistake on the part of the Court liable to be corrected.
No new arguments or re-arguments on merits can be entertained to
E facilitate such rectification of mistakes. The provision cannot be
invoked to modify, alter or add to the terms of the original order or
decree so as to, in effect, pass an effective judicial order after the
judgment in the case. [1049-B-E]

Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR (1966) SC
F 1047, relied on.
Freeman v. Tranah, 12 C.B. 406, referred to.

2. As regards the plea of the State Government that the suit was
G belatedly filed, since neither any specific issue was framed- nor any
specific plea was raised before the High Court in this regard, this Court
·is not inclined to go into the questiOn of belated filing of the suit.
[1047-H; 1048-A-B)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. 8479-
H 8480 of 2003.
STATE v. DARSHAN SINGH [PASAYAT, .I.] 1045
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.4.2002 of the Punjab and A
Haryana High Court in R.S.A. Nos. 3618/87 and 1472 of 1988.

Atul Nanda, Addi. Advocate General for Punjab and R.S. Suri for the
Appellant.

Balbir Singh Gupta for the Respondent. B

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ARIJJT PASAYAT, J.: Leave granted.

Both the appeals are taken up together for disposal.
c
The State of Punjab questions correctness of judgment rendered by
learned Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Second Appeals
Nos. 361811987 and 1472/1988 affirming the judgment and decree passed
in appeal by the learned Additional District Judge, Patiala. The First D
Appellate court had reversed the judgment and decree passed by learned
Senior Subordinate Judge, Patiala dismissing the suit filed by the respondent-
employee. Factual background giving rise to these appeals in a nutshell
is as follows:
E
Respondent as plaintiff filed a suit in the Court of Senior Subordinate
Judge, Patiala for a declaration that the order dated 13.3.1977 passed by
the State through the Collector, Patiala removing him from service is
unconstitutional, illegal, null and void, malafide, ineffective, inoperdive,
improper and discriminatory. A further prayer was for a declaration that F
he was entitled to have his pay fixed in the appropriate scale by counting
the period of his alleged forced absence. Averments in the plaint were to
the following effect: He was employed as a Senior Compositor in the
Government Press, Printing and Stationary Department, Patiala. He was ·
appointed in 1970 and was removed from service by order dated 13 .3 .1977.
He made several representations to the Government and by order dated G
14.2.1979 the Government passed an order for appointing him as a Junior
Compositor and consequentially the Additional Controller, Patiala issued
fresh order of appointment appointing him as a Junior Compositor on
temporary basis as a new appointee. Three issues were framed which read
as follows: H
1046 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A "I. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration prayed
for?

2. Whether suit is not -maintainable?

3. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis-joinder
B of necessary parties?"

After considering the evidence on record the suit was dismissed. An
appeal was preferred before the Additional District Judge who held that
the dismissal was bad. Though it was the stand of the State that the work
C of the respondent-employee was not up to the required mark, the first
Appellate Court held that the rhiew of performance should have been done
every year, and since it was done after several years, the order of
termination was bad and when the plaintiff was taken_ back in service it
could not have been ordered that he wili be taken back as fresh recruit.
D The order being whimsicaHn'nature, no reason was forthcoming as to why
his representations were -not rejected altogether and why he was allowed
to be taken back as' fresh recruit. While granting this relief the following
order was also passed:

"It is made clear that it is up to the department to grant him
E or not to grant him increments for the past service rendered by
him. It will be again for the departm'ent tci decide whether he is
or he is not fit to be promoted after takirig his past service into
account".

F The, respondent-employee filed an application purported to be made
under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the
'Code') claiming that the afore-quoted directions were not in order and
deserve ,to be deleted. By order dated 3:2.1988 learned Additional District
Judge, Patiala deleted the afore-quoted portion on the ground that if the
said portion remains, it would have the effect of neutralizing the relief
G granted to the plaintiff-appellant -before it. In the aforesaid manner, the
judgment and decree passed on 4.6.1987 in-appeal was reviewed. The State
filed Second Appeals Nos. 3618/87 and 1472/1988 under-Section 100,of -
the' :Code before the High Court which by the· impugned' judgment
dismissed the same. It is relevant to note that first appeafrelated to original
H judgment of the .first appellate Court while second one related to the order
STATE v. DARSHAN SINGH [PASAYAT, J.] 1047

dated 3.2.1988 passed under Section 152 of the Code modifying the A
judgment.

The High Court by the impugned consolidated judgment in the two
appeals came to hold that the decision of this Court in Central Inland Water
Transport Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Anr., AIR B
( 1986) SC 1571 was clearly applicable. When the employee was taken back
to service it could not have been ordered that he will be taken back as fresh
recruit. The plaintiff-employee's services should not have been terminated
without assigning any reason after six to seven years of service.

In support of the appeals, learned counsel for the State of Punjab C
submitted that the respondent-employee did not approach the Court with
clean hands. He was appointed on 22.12.1970 and was terminated by order
dated 18.3.1977. He went on making representations and finally an order
was passed by the Government on 14.2.1979 for taking him back as a fresh
recruit on temporary basis. The consequential order was issued on 23.2.1979. D
The suit was filed more than five years of the fresh appointment on
8.12.1984, with a prayer to declare the termination in 1977 to be bad.
Specific stand of the department had not been taken note of that there was
no challenge in fact to the fresh order of appointment. It was not open to
the First Appellate Court or the High Court to make out a new case for E
interference. The period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act,
1963(in short the 'Limitation Act') for filing a declaratory suit is 3 years
and admittedly a suit was filed after seven years. In any event, there was
no scope for amending the order in the manner done in purported exercise .
of power under Section 152 of the Code.
F
In response, learned counsel for the respondent-employee submitted
that the decision in Central Water Transport's case (supra) is clearly
applicable in view of the unblemished conduct of the employee. There was
scope for applying Section 152 of the Code when the original order did
not reflect the true intention of the Court passing the order. G

We shall first deal with the case relating to the suit being belated.
It appears that no specific issue was framed in that regard though the
Government in its written statement specifically took the plea. Learned
counsel for the State submitted that issue No.(2) was wide enough to take H
1048 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A note of the plea relating to limitation. If the issue. was not framed
specifically a different course was available to be adopted by the respondent
which does not appear to have been done. In Second Appeals preferred
before the High Court also there was no specific plea regarding the question
of limitation. That being so, we are not inclined to go into the question
B as to belated filing of the suit.

But learned counsel for the appellant is on terra firma so far as the
submission relating to the scope of exercising power under Section 152 is
concerned.

C Section 152 provides for correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes
in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental
slip or omission. The exercise of this power contemplates the correction
of mistakes by the Court ofits ministerial actions and does not contemplate
of passing effective judicial orders after the judgment, decree or order. The
D settled position of law is that after the passing of the judgment, decree or
order, the same becomes final subject to any further avenues of remedies
provided in respect of the same and the very Court or the tribunal cannot,
on mere change of view, is not entitled to vary the terms of the judgments, ·
decrees and orders earlier passed except by means ofreview, if statutorily
E provided specifically therefor and subject to the conditions or limitations
provided therein. The powers under Section 152 of the Code are neither
to be equated with the power of review nor can be said to be akin to review
or even said to clothe the Court concerned under the guise of invoking after
the result of the judgment earlier rendered, in its entirety or any portion
or part of it. The corrections contemplated are of correcting only accidental
F omissions or mistakes and not all omissions and mistakes which might have
been committed by the Court while passing the judgment, decree or order.
The omission sought to be corrected which goes to the merits of the case
is beyond the scope 'of Section 152 as if it is looking into it for the first
time, for which the proper remedy for the aggrieved party if at all is to
G file appeal or revision before the higher forum or review application before
the very forum, subject to the limitations in respect of such review. It
implies that the Section cannot be pressed into service to correct an
omission which is intentional, however erroneous that may be. It has been
noticed that the courts below have been liberally construing and applying
H the provisions of Sections 151 and 152 of Code even after passing of
STATE v. DARSHAN SINGH [PASAYAT, J.] 1049
- I
effective orders in the !is pending before them. No Court can, under the A
cover of the aforesaid sections, modify, alter or add to the terms of its
original judgment, decree or order. Similar view was expressed by this
Court in Dwaraka Das v. State ofMadhya Pradesh andAnr., [1999] 3 SCC
500 and Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald Joseph Coelho, [2001] 4 SCC 181.,

The basis of the provision under Section 152 of the Code is founded
B
on the maxim 'actus curiae neminem gravabit' i.e. an act of Court shall
prejudice no man. The maxim "is founded upon justice and good sense,,
and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law'', said
Cresswell J. in Freeman v. Tranah, (12 C.B. 406). An unintentional
mistake of the Court which may prejudice the cause of any party must anel C
alone could be rectified. In Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of
Orissa, AIR (1966) SC 1047 it was observed that the arithmetical mistake
is a mistake of calculation, a clerical mistake is a mistake in writing or
-- typing whereas an error arising out of or occurring from accidental slip or
omission is an error due to careless mistake on the part of the Court liable D
to be corrected. To illustrate this point it was said that in a case where the
order contains something which is not mentioned in the decree, it would
be a case of unintentional omission or mistake as the mistake or omission
is attributable to the Court which may say something or omit to say
something which it did not intend to say or omit. No new arguments or E
>
. re-arguments on merits can be entertained to facilitate such rectification of
mistakes. The provision cannot be invoked to modify, alter or add to the
terms of the original order or decree so as to, in effect, pass an effective
judicial order after the judgment in the case.

Above being the position, the first Appellate Court was not justified F
in exercising power under Section 152 of the Code and the High Court was
equally in error by putting its seal of approval thereon. Therefore, t4e
appeal relatable to the judgment in Second Appeal No.3618/1987 is
dismissed while the one relating to Second Appeal No.1472/1988 is
allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. G
M.P. Appeals dismissed/allowed.