STATE OF PUNJABversusBHAG SINGH

A                            STA TE OF PUNJAB
                                     v.
                               BHAG SINGH

                             DECEMBER I 6, 2003

B           [DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.]

         Practice and Prrxedure :

         Judgment-Reasons-Giving of-Accused acquitted by trial court-
C High Court refused to grant leave to appeal under S. 378(3) Cr.P.C.
     without giving reasons-Correctness of-Held: Reasons substitute subjec-
    tivity by objectivity-Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound
    judicial system-High Court order set aside-State granted leave to
    appeal.

D        Constitution of India, 1950:

         Article 141-Declaration of law-Judicial discipline to abide by-
    Held: cannot be forsaken even by the highest Court in a State.

          The respondent-accused was tried for an offence under Section
E   18 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The
    trial court held that the prosecution version was entirely dependent
    upon the testimony of official witnesses and since no independent
    witness was involved, the prosecution version was vulnerable and,
    therefore, acquitted the accused. The appellant-State filed an applica-
F   tioit before the High Court under Section 378(3) of the Code of
    Criminal Procedure, 1973 for grant of leave to appeal. The High Court
    dismissed application without giving any reasons. Hence the appeal.

         On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that it was imperative
G on the High Court to indicate reasons as to why the prayer for grant
    of leave to appeal was found untenable.

         Allowing the appeal, .the Court

         HELD: I.L The trial Court was required to carefully appraise the
H   entire evidence and then come to a conclusion. If the trial Court was at
                                        904
                 STATE OF PUNJAB v. BHAG SINGH                         905

a lapse in this regard, the High Court was obliged to undertake such an A
exercise by entertaining the appeal. The trial Court on the facts of this
Case did not perform its duties, as enjoined on it by law. The High Court
ought to have in such circumstances granted leave and thereafter as a
first Court of appeal, re-appreciated the entire evidence on the record
independently and returned its findings objectively as regards guilt or B
otherwise of the accused. It has failed to do so. The questions involved
were not trivial. The requirement ofindependent witness and discarding
the testimony of official witnesses even if it was reliable, cogent or
trustworthy needed adjudication in appeal. The High Court has not
given any reasons for refusing to grant leave to file an appeal against the C
acquittal, and seems to have been completely oblivious to the fact that
by such refusal, a close scrutiny of the order of acquittal, by the
appellate forum, has been lost once and for all. Reasons introduce
clarity in an order. On plainest consideration of justice, the High Court
ought to have set forth its reasons, howsoever brief, in its order indicative D
of an application of its mind, all the more when its order is amenable to
further avenue of challenge. The absence of reasons has rendered the
High Court order not sustainable. (907-G-H; 908-A-Dl

     State of UP. v. Battan, [2001] 10 SCC 607; State of Maharashtra
v. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan, AIR (1982) SC 1215 and Jawahar Lal E
Singh v. Naresh Singh, (19871 2 SCC 222, relied on.

     1.2. Judicial discipline to abide by declaration of law by this
Court, cannot be forsaken, under any pretext by any authority or
Court, be it even the highest Court in a State, oblivious to Article 141 F
of the Constitution. 1988-E-F)

      2. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on
recording reasons is that ifthe decision reveals the "inscrutable face of
the sphinx", it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the G
Courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power ofjudicial
review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an
indispensable part of a sound judicial system, reasons at least sufficient
to indicate an application of mind to the matter before the Court. Another
rnt\{)M\I~ is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone H
    906                SUPREME-COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling
    out the reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking out. The
    "inscrutable force ofa sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial
    or quasi-judicial performance. [908-H; 909-A-C]

B        Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union, (1971) I All E.R. 1148
    and Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree, (1974} LCR 120,
    referred to.

           3. The impugned judgment of the High Court is unsustainable and
    is set aside. The appellant-State is granted leave to file appeal. (909-C~D)
c
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
    778 of 1997.

          From the Judgment and Order dated 24.4.97 of the Punjab and
D Haryana High Court in Crl. M. No. 163-MA of 1997.
          Bimal Roy Jad and Ms. Sumita Pandit for the Appellant.

          R.C. Kaushik (NP) for the Respondent.

E         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. : Refusal to grant leave to question acquittal
    in terms of Section 378(3} of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in
    short the 'Code') is the subject matter of challenge. According to the
F   appellant-State of Punjab the one line "No merit. Dismissed" order of the
    High Court without assigning reasons therefor does not meet the require-
    ments of law.

            Respondent (hereinafter referred to as the 'accused') faced trial for
    alleged commission of offence punishable under Section 18 of the
G   Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (in short the
    'Act'). Prosecution version was that on 26.4.1995 accused was found in
    illicit possession of a large quantity of opium weighing one kilogram which
    was being carried in a bag. The officer who apprehended the accused
    informed him that if he wanted the bag to be searched in the presence of
H   a gazetted officer of police or a magistrate, he could indicate his choice.
            STATE OF PUNJAB v. BHAG SINGH [PASAYAT, J.]                     907

    The accused however reposed confidence on the Sub-Inspector of Police A
    who had apprehended the accused. Samples ·were collected and sent ~or
    chemical examination. As the samples were found to contain opium, on
    completion of investigation accused was challaned io face trial. During his
    examination under Section 313 of the Code the accused denied the
    allegations and pleaded false implication.
                                                                                    B
         The trial Court held that the prosecution version was entirely
    dependent upon the testimony of official witnesses and since no independ-
    ent witness was involved, the prosecution version was vulnerable. It was
    noted that the search and seizure was made at a through fare and it is
    unbelievable that no independent witness was available. The trial Cou1t C
    therefore directed acquittal. The appellant-State filed an appeal before the
    Punjab and Haryana High Court which refused to grant leave and disposed
    of the application for leave in the following manner:


•                 "Heard. No merit.
                  Dismissed."
                                                                                    D

         According to learned counsel for the appellant-State it was imperative
    on the High Court to indicate reasons as to why the prayer for grant of
    leave was found untenable. In the absence of any such reasons the order
    of the High Court is indefensible. Section 378(3) of the Code deals with E
    the power of the High Court to grant leave in case of acquittal. Section
    378(1) and (3) of the Code reads as follows:

                  "378(1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2) and
             subject to the provisions of sub-section (3) and (5), the State        p
             Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to
             present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate
             ord~r of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court
             or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision.

                  (3) No appeal under sub-section (I) or sub-section (2) shall G
             be entertained except with the leave of the High Court".

         The trial Court was required to carefully appraise the entire evidence
    and then come to a conclusion. If the trial Court was at lapse in this regard
    the High Comt was obliged to undertake such an exercise by entertaining H
    908                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A the appeal. The trial Comt on the facts of this case did not perform its
    duties, as was enjoined on it by law. The High Court oughtto have in such
    circumstances granted leave and thereafter as a first comt of appeal, re-
    appreciated the entire evidence on the record independently and returned
    its findings objectively as regards guilt or otherwise of the accused. It has
B   failed to do so. The questions involved were not trivial. The requirement
    of independent witness and discarding testimony of official witnesses even
    if it was reliable, cogent or trustworthy needed adjudication in appeal. The
    High Comt has not given any reasons for refusing to grant leave to file
    appeal against acquittal, and seems to have been completely oblivious to
    the fact that by such refusal, a close scrutiny of the order of acquittal, by
C   the appeilate forum, has been lost once and for all. The manner in which
    appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by the High Court leaves much
    to be desired. Reasons introduce clarity in an order. On plainest consid-
    eration of justice, the High Court ought to have set forth its reasons,
    howsoever brief, in its order indicative of an application of its mind, all
D   the more when its order is amenable to further avenue of challenge. The
    absence of reasons has rendered the High Court order not sustainable.
    Similar view was expressed in State of U.P. v. Battan and Ors., [2001] 10
    SCC 607. About two decades back in State of Maharashtra v. Vithal Rao
    Pritirao Cho.wan, AIR ( 1982) SC 1215 the desirability of a speaking order
E   while dealing with an application for grant of leave was highlighted. The
    requirement of indicating reasons in such cases has been judicially
    recognized as imperative. The view was re-iterated in Jawahar Lal Singh
    v. Naresh Singh and Ors., [1987] 2 SCC 222. Judicial discipline to abide
    by declaration of law by this Comt, cannot be forsaken, under any pretext
F   by any authority or Court, be it even the Highest Court in a State, oblivious
    to Article 141 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitu-
    tion').

          Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning M.R. in Breen
    v. Amalgamated Engineering Union, [ 1971] 1 All E.R. 1148 observed
G   "The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration".
    In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree, (1974) LCR 120 it was
    observed: "Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice". _Reasons
    are live links between the mind of the decision taker to the controversy
    in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at". Reasons substitute
H   subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the
         STATE OF PUNJAB v. BHAG SINGH [PASA YAT, J.]                   909

decision reveals the "inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can, by its silence, A
render it virtually impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate
function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity
of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial
system, reasons at least sufficient to indica~e an application of mind to the
matter before Court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know B
why the decision has.gone against him. One of the salutary requirements
of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words,
a speaking out. The "inscrutable face ofa sphinx" is ord!narily incongruous
    <
with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.

       In view of the aforesaid legal position, the impugned judgment of the C
High Court is unsustainable and is set aside. We grant leave to the State
to file the appeal. The High Court shall entertain the appeal and after formal
notice to the respondents hear the appeal and dispose of it in accordance
with law, uninfluenced by any observation made in the present appeal. The
appeal is allowed to the extent indicated.                                     D
v.s.s.                                                     Appeal allowed.