Holding

Appointments of law officers must be made through a fair, reasonable, non‑discriminatory and objective process; the States' existing ad‑hoc method is arbitrary and violative of Art.14.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined whether the Punjab and Haryana governments could be challenged for appointing law officers without a transparent, merit‑based process, alleging arbitrariness violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. The petitioners, who were law officers on contract, claimed that the States had no realistic assessment of need, no policy or norms, and that appointments were made arbitrarily for political or personal reasons. The Court held that the power to appoint law officers is a public function and must be exercised fairly, reasonably, non‑discriminatory and objectively, and that the existing ad‑hoc system was unconstitutional. It directed the States to conduct a realistic needs assessment, constitute a selection committee, formulate norms, submit a panel of names to the Chief Justice, and obtain the Chief Justice’s view before appointment or extension. The directions do not affect the appointment of Advocate Generals under Art.165. The appeal and the transferred writ petition were dismissed with costs.

Issues considered

Whether the appointment of law officers by the States of Punjab and Haryana can be challenged on the ground of arbitrariness violating Art.14 of the Constitution.
Whether the States made a realistic assessment of the requirement before appointing law officers.
Whether the States formulated any scheme, policy, norms or standards for such appointments.
Whether appointments must be made on a fair, reasonable, non‑discriminatory and objective basis.
If the answer to the above is negative, what procedural reforms are required?

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. Section 24, s. Section 24(4)
Constitution of Indias. Art.14, s. Art.165

Subjects

appointment of law officersArticle 14arbitrarinesspublic interestjudicial reviewselection committeestate counselfairnessnon‑discriminationgovernment contracts

Judgment

[2016] 4 S.C.R. 685

STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. A
v.
BRIJESHWAR SINGH CHAHAL & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 3194 of2016)
MARCH 30, 2016 B

[T.S. THAKUR, CJI AND KURIAN JOSEPH, J.]
Advocates - Law Officers - Appointment of - By the State
Government - Whether the appointment of Law Officers can be
questioned or the process, by which such appointments are made, c
can be assailed on the ground of being arbitrary and hence violative
of Art. 14 of the Constitution - Held: The Government as well as
the public bodies are trustees of the power vested in them and
custodians ofpublic interest - Therefore, the nature of their functions
and duties (including the power to engage, employ or recruit
servants, agents, advisors and representatives) must be exercised D
in a fair, reasonable, non-discriminatory and objective manner -
Duty to act fairly is a facet of law and Art. 14 of the Constitution is
intolerant towards arbitrariness - The States in discharge of their
public duty and power to select and appoint State Counsel, cannot
disregard either the guarantee contained in Art.14 or the duty to E
protect public interest by picking up the best, nor can the States
frustrate, delay or negate the judicial process of administration of
;ustice which heavily banks upon the assistance rendered by the
Bar - The States (States of Punjab and Haryana) in the present
case have neither made any realistic assessment of their requirement,
before making appointment of law Officers, nor haw: formulated F
any scheme, policy, ,.urms or standards for appointing such officers
- There should bP a check on the appointment of State Counsel
especially in situwions where the appointment is unregulated by
any constitutional or statutory provision - The States of Punjab
and Haryana are directed (1) To undertake a realistic assessment
G
of their need; (2) Based on the assessment so made, constitute a
Selection Committee; (3) The Committee on the basis of norms and
criteria (formulated by the Government or the Committee) conduct
selection of Law Officers and submit a panel of names to the Chief
Justice of High Court; (4) The Chief Justice to set up a Committee
of Judges to review the panel and make recommendations; (5) The H
685
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 4 S.C.R.

A Chief Justice to record his views regarding the suitability of the
recommended candidate - Clarified that the present judgment will
not effect appointment of Advocate General in terms of Art. 165 of
the Constitution - Constitution of India - Art. 14.
Disposing of the appeal and the petition, the Court
B HELD: 1.1 For a fair and objective system of appointment,
there ought to be a fair and realistic assessment of the
requirement, for otherwise the appointments may be made not
because they are required but because they come handy for
political aggrandisement, appeasement or personal benevolence
c of those in power towards those appointed. The dangers of such
an uncanalised & unregulated system of appointment are multi-
dimensional resulting in erosion of the rule of law, public faith in
the fairness of the system and injury to public interest and
administration of justice. [Para 9] [700-C-D]

D 1.2 No such assessment has been made nor any material
disclosed by the State Governments to demonstrate that they
were sensitive to the need for any such assessment. Power to
appoint Law Officers was all the same exercised on a totally tu!
hoc basis without any co-relation between the work load in the
Courts and the number of Law Officers appointed to handle the
E same. If the power to appoint is exercised not because such
exercise is called for but because of some extraneous or other
reason, the legitimacy of the exercise will itself become
questionable. [Para 8] [696-G-II; 697-A-B)
2.1 When the appointments are made to offices heavily
F remunerated from the public exchequer, the same cannot or ought
not to remain unregulated. That is particularly so when those
appointed arc expected by the very nature of their appointment
to discharge important public function affecting not only State
interest but the quality of justice which the courts administer.
G [Para 15] [704-D-E)
2.2 In the case of Punjab and Haryana, there is not even a
semblance of any selection process in the matter of appointment
of those chosen for the job leave alone a process that is credible
in terms of its fairness and objectivity. The practice of making
appointments in disregard of what is expected of a functionary
H
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. BRIJESHWAR SINGH CHAHAL 687
&ANR.

sensitive to the demands of fairness and equality of opportunity A
even when in vogue for long, runs contrary to the true legal
position. The dominant purpose which ought to permeate any
process of selection and appointment namely "protection of
public interest" in courts by availing services of the most
meritorious is clearly defeated by the method that the States
B
have been following and continue to follow. Even after the
pronouncements of this Court have settled the principles on
which public authorities are required to act while discharging
their functions, the States continue to harp on the theory that
in the matter of engagement of State counsel they are not
accountable and that the engagement is only professional and/or c
contractual hence unquestionable. [Para 15) [704-E-ll)
2.3 Ifa Government counsel discharges an important public
function and if it is the primary duty of those running the affairs
of the Government to act fairly, objectively and on a non-
discriminatory basis, there is no option for them except to choose D
the best at the bar out of those who are willing and at times keen
to work as State counsel. It is also their duty to ensure that the
process by which the best are selected is transparent and
credible. Abdicating that important function in favour of the
Advocate General of the State who, in turn, has neither the
assistance of norms or procedure to follow nor a mechanism for E
assessment of merit will be self-defeating. In the matter of
appointment of State Counsel, the States of Punjab and Haryana
have much to do to reform the prevalent system which reform
is long overdue. [Para 15) (705-A-C]
3.1 Not only the Government but all public bodies arc F
trustees of the power vested in them and custodians of public
interest. Discharge of that trust in the best possible manner is
the primary duty of those in charge of the affairs of the State or
public body. This.necessarily implies that the nature of functions
and duties including the power to engage, employ or recruit G
servants, agents, advisors and representatives must be
exercised in a fair, reasonable, non-discriminatory and objective
manner. Duty to act fairly and reasonably is a facet of 'Rule of
Law' in a constitutional democracy like India. Arbitrariness has
no place in a polity governed by rule of law and Article 14 of the
H
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 4 S.C.R.

A Constitution oflndia strikes at arbitrariness in every State action.
11,'ara 16] 1705-D-F]
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 2 SCR
621 - followed.
S G Jaisinghani v. Union of India AIR 1967 SC 1427 :
B 1967 SCR 703; E P Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu
and Anr. 1974 (2) SCR 348 : (1974) 4 SCC 3; Ramana
Shetty v. International Airport Authority 1979 AIR
(SC) 1628 : 1979 (3) SCR 1014; D.S. Nakra v. Union
of India 1983 (2) SCR 165 : 1983 (1) SCC 305;
Dwarkadas Marfatia v. Board of Trustees of the port
c of Bombay 1989 (2) SCR 751 :1989 (3) SCC 293; Som
Raj & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. 1990 (1)
SCR 535 : (1990) 2 SCC 653; Neelima Misra v.
Harinder Kaur Paintal & Ors. 1990 (2) SCR 84 :
(1990) 2 SCC 746; Sharma Transport v. Governmem
D of A.P & Ors. 2001 (5 ) Suppl. SCR 390 : (2002) 2
sec 188 - relied on.
United States v. Wunderlick 1951 342 US 98:96 Law
Ed 113 - referred to.
3.2 Recognition of power exercisable by the functionaries
E of the State as a trust which will stand discharged only if the
power is exercised in public interest is an important milestone
just as recognition of the Court's power of judicial review to be
wide enough to strike at and annul any State action that is
arbitrary, unguided, whimsical, unfair or discriminatory. [Para 36)
[714-B-C)
F
3.3 A fair, reasonable or non-discriminatory process of
appointment of State Counsel is not thus demanded only by the
rule of law and its intolerance towards arbitrariness but also
. by reason of the compelling need for doing complete justice.
which the Courts are obliged to do in each and every cause. The
G States cannot in the discharge of their public duty and power to
select and appoint State counsel disregard either the guarantee
contained in Article 14 against non-arbitrariness or the duty to
protect public interest by picking up the best among those
available and willing to work nor can the States by their action
H frustrate, delay or negate the judicial process of administration
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. BRJJESHWAR SINGH CHAHAL 689
&ANR.

of justice which so heavily banks upon the assistance rendered A
by the members of the Bar. [Para 37) [715-C-E)
3.4 Appointment of Government cn:msel at the district level
and equally so at the High Court level, is not just a professional
engagement, but such appointments have a "public element"
attached to them. Appointment of Government Counsel must B
like the discharge of any other function by the Government
and public bodies, be only in public interest unaffected by any
political or other extraneous considerations. The Government
and public bodies are under an obligation to engage the most
competent of the lawyers to represent them in the Courts for it
is only when those appointed are professionally competent that c
public interest can be protected in the Courts. The Government
and public bodies are free to choose the method for selecting
the best lawyers bnt any such selection and appointment process
must demonstrate that a search for the meritorious was
undertaken and that the process was unaffected by any D
extraneous considerations. Appointments made in an arbitrary
fashion, without any transparent method of selection or for
political considerations will be amenable to judicial review and
liable to be quashed. Judicial review of any such appointments
will, however, be limited to examining whether the process is
affected by any illegality, irregularity or perversity/irrationality. E
The Court exercising the power of judicial review will not sit in
appeal to reassess the merit of the candidates, so long as the
method of appointment adopted by the competent authority does
not suffer from any infirmity. [Para 38) [716-B-E, G-H; 717-A]
Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. 1990 (1) Suppl. F
'-';CR 625 : 1991 (1) SCC 212; State of U.P. and
Jrs. etc. v. U.P. State Law Officers Association and
Ors. etc. 1994 (1) SCR 348 : (1994) 2 SCC 204; State
of U.P. and Am: v Johri Mal 2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 560
: (2004) 4 sec 714 - relied on. G
Ramuna Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport
Authority of India 1979 (3) SCR 1014 : (1979) 3 SCC
489; Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of Jammu and
Kashmir 1980 (3) SCR 1338 : (1980) 4 SCC 1;
Dwarkadas Mmfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of
H
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 4 S.C.R.

A the Port of Bombay 1989 (2) SCR 751 : (1989) 3 SCC
293; Mahabir Auto Stores and Others v. Indian Oil
Corporation and others 1990 (1) SCR 818 : (1990) 3
sec 752 - referred to.
Law Commission 197'h Report - referred to.
B 4.1 Taking a cue from the provisions of Section 24 Cr.P.C.,
it is held that what serves as a check on the power of the
Government to appoint a Public Prosecutor, can as well be a check
on the appointment of the State Counsel also. That is because,
while the Public Prosecutor's power under the Code of Criminal
Procedure Code gives him a distinctive position, the office of a
c State Counsel, in matters other than criminal, are no less
important. A State Counsel by whatever designation called,
appears in important civil and constitutional matters, service
and tax matters and every other matter where substantial stakes
are involved or matters of grave and substantial importance at
D times touching public policy and security of State are involved.
To treat such matters to be inconsequential or insignificant is to
trivialise the role and position of a State Counsel at times
described as additional and even Senior Additional Advocate
General. What holds good for appointment of a Public Prosecutor
as a check on arbitrary exercise of power must, therefore, act as
E a check on the State's power to appoint a State Counsel as well
especially in situations where the appointment is unregulated by
any constitutional. or statutory provision. [Para 441 [ 7 1 9- E - II;
720-A)
4.2 Such a requirement is implicit in the appointing power
F of the State which power is in trust with the Government or the
public body to be exercised only to promote public interest. The
power cannot be exercised arbitrarily, whimsically or in an un-
canalised manner for any such exercise will fall foul of Article 14
of the Constitution of India and resultantly Rule of law to which
the country is committed. [Para 44) [720-A-B)
G
4.3 No lawyer has a right to be appointed as State
Government counsel or as public prosecutor at any level nor does
he have a vested right to claim extension in the term for which
he/she is initially appointed. They can at best claim consideration
for any such appointment or extension upon expiry of their
H respective terms. Such consideration shall, however, have to be
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. BRIJESHWAR SINGH CHAHAL 691
&ANR.

in accordance with the norms settled for such appointments and A
on the basis of their inter se merit, suitability and performance if
they have already worked as State counsel. (Para 45) [720-B-C,
D-E)
4.4 With regard to the mechanism for such consideration,
there are two major aspects that need to be kept in mind. The B
first is the need for assessment and requirement of the State
Governments having regard to the workload in different courts.
The second aspect is about the process of selection and
assessment of merit of the candidates by a credible process.
The process of selection can be primarily left to the State
Government who can appoint a Committee of officers to carry c
out the same. The process and selection of appointment
would be fair and reasonable, transparent and credible if the
Government or the Committee as the case may be also stipulates
the norms for assessment of merit and suitability. [Paras 45
and 46) [720-E-F, H; 721-A, B-C] D
4.5 The third stage of the process of selection and
appointment shall in the absence of any statutory provisions
regulating such appointments involve consultation with the
District & Sessions Judge if the appointment is at the district
level and the High Court if the appointment is for cases conducted E
before the High Court. The Chief Justice could constitute a
Committee of Judges to review the names recommended for
appointment and offer his views in regard to professional
competence and suitability of candidates for such appointments.
Appointments made after such a consultative process would
inspire confidence and prevent any arbitrariness. The same F
procedure could be followed where candidates are granted
extension in their terms of appointment in which case the
Committee appointed by the Government and that constituted
by the Chief Justice could also look into the performance of the
candidates during the period they have worked as State counsel. G
[Para 47) [721-D-FJ
5.1 The Court directed the States of Punjab and Haryana to
undertake a realistic assessment of their need in each category
in which State counsel are proposed to be appointed. Based
on the assessment so made, the States shall constitute a Selection
H
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 4 S.C.R.

A Committee with such number of officers as the State Government
may determine to selel-: suitable candidates for appointment as
State counsel. The Secretary, Department of Law in each State
shall be the Member-Secretary of the Selection Committee. The
Committee shall on the basis of norms and criteria which the
Government concerned may formulate and in the absence of any
B
such norms, on the basis of norms and criteria which the
Committee may themselves formulate conduct selection of law
officers for the State and submit a panel of names to the Chief
Justice of Punjab and Haryana who may set up a Committee of
Judges to review the panel and make recommendations to the
c Chief Justice. The Chief Justice may based on any such
recommendations record his views regarding suitability of the
candidates included in the panel. The Government shall then be
fr.,., to appoint the candidates having regard to the views
expressed by the Chief Justice regarding their merit and
suitability. The procedure for assessment of merit of the
D
candidates and consideration by the High Court will apply in all
cases where the candidates are already working as State counsel
but are being given an extension in the term of their appointment.
[Para 48) [721-G-H, 722-A-D)
5.2 The writ-petitioners shall also be free to offer
E themselves for consideration before the Committee appointed
by the State Government in which event their claims may also
be considered having regard to their merits, suitability and
performance as State counsel for the period they have worked
as State counsel. [Para 48) [722-F)
F 6. It is clarified that nothing said in this judgment shall
affect the right of the State Governments to appoint any person
eligible for such appointment as the Advocate General of the
State in terms of Article 165 of the Constitution of India. It is
further clarified that although the Court is primarily concerned
with the procedure regarding selection and appointment of law
G
officers in the States of Punjab and Haryana and although the
directions are confined to the said two States only, yet other States
would do well to reform their system of selection and appointment
to make the same more transparent, fair and objective if
necessary by amending the relevant LR Manuals/Rules and
H Regulations on the subject. [Para 48) [722-G-H; 723-A-B)
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. BRJJESHWAR SINGH CHAHAL 693
&ANR.

Case Law Reference A
1967 SCR 703 relied on Para 17
1951 342 US 98:96 Law Ed 113 referred to Para 17
1974 (2) SCR 348 relied on Para 18
(1978) 2 SCR 621 followed Para 19 8

1979 (3) SCR 1014 relied on Para 20
1983 (2) SCR 165 relied on Para 21
1989 (2) SCR 751 relied on Para22
1990 (l) SCR 535 relied on Para 23
c
1990 ( 2 ) SCR 84 relied on Para23
2001 (5 ) Suppl. SCR 390 re!ied on Para 23
1990 (1) Suppl. SCR 625 relied on Para 25
D
1979 (3) SCR1014 referred to Para28
1980 (3) SCR 1338 referred to Para 28
1989 (2) SCR 751 referred to Para 28
1990 (1) SCR 818 referred to Para28
E
1994 (1) SCR 348 relied on Para 30
2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 560 relied on Para34
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3194 of
2016.
F
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.09.2013 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Letters Patent Appeal No.
1458 of2013 (O&M)
WITH
T. P. (C) No. 1073 of2015.
G
Nikhil Nayyar, Saurabh Ajay Gupta, AAGs, P. P. Rao, Sr. Adv.,
Kuldip Singh, J. S. Chhabra, Pardeep Kumar Rapria, Abhishek Sharma,
Advs. for the Appellants.
Anil Grover, AAG, Satish Kapoor, Dr. Monika Gusain, Advs. for
the _Respondents. H
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 4 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
T.S. THAKUR, CJI. I. Leave granted.
2. Th is appeal and the accompanying transferred petition raise a
question of considerable public importance. The question precisely is
whether appointment of law officers by the State Governments can be
B questioned or the process by which such appointments are made, can be
assailed on the ground that the same are arbitrary, hence, violative of the
provisions ofArticle 14 of the Constitution oflndia. Before we advert to
the juristic dimensions of that question, we may briefly set out the factual
backdrop in which the same falls for our consideration.
c 3. Petitioner No. I to the writ petition was initially appointed as an
Assistant Advocate General in terms of an order dated 23rd April, 2002.
The appointment was on contractual basis valid upto 31st March, 2003,
but the same was continued by an order dated 19th July 2003 upto 31st
March, 2004. He was four years later appointed as Deputy Advocate
D General in the pay scale of Rs.18,400-22,400/- by an order dated 11th
January, 2008. 1-1 is tenure was later extended upto the year 2011-2012 in
terms of a memo dated 19th April, 2011.
4. Petitioner No.2 to the writ petition was similarly appointed as
an Assistant Advocate General on contract basis and then to the post of
Deputy Advocate General by orders issued in his favour from time to
E
time. In Civil Writ Petition No.20000 of2011 filed by the respondents
before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh they made
a grievance against their non-absorption on regular basis while Smt.
Sonu Chahal-respondent No.3 in the writ petition was appointed as Senior
Deputy Advocate General on contract basis inthe pay scale ofRs.37,400-
F 67,000/- and a grade pay of Rs. I 0,000/-. The writ petitioner/respondent
No. I herein questioned the fairness and legality of the approach adopted
by the appellant herein/State in picking and choosing candidates for regular
appointment and/or for absorption. It was contended that while
respondent No. I herein had statted his career as an Assistant Advocate
General and was re-designated as Deputy Advocate General in the year
G
2008 in which capacity he was working for the past nearly eight years,
petitioner No.2 in the writ petition had just about six years of such
experience while respondent No.2 herein had no more than four years
and five months experience before she was absorbed as Senior Deputy
Advocate General in the office of the Advocate General. The grievance
1-1 of the writ petitioners/respondent No.1 herein was that the State
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. BRIJESHWAR SINGH CHAHAL 695
& ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, CJI.]

Government had formulated no criterion and followed no norms for A
absorption on a non-discriminatory basis of those working as Law Officers
of the State. The absorption of petitioner No.2 and respondent No.3
was dubbed as illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory in the writ petition;
and a direction to the appellantto frame a policy, laying down guidelines
for making appointment/absorption/re-designation in the office of the
B
Advocate General and to evolve and prescribe suitable criterion for
regularisation or absorption of those working in that office prayed for. A
certiorari quashing order dated 23rd September 2011 by which respondent
No.3 was absorbed on the post of Senior Deputy Advocate General
was also prayed for, besides a mandamus directing the State to consider
the case of the writ petitioners for absorption. c
5. A Single Judge of the High Court before whom the writ petition
came up for hearing, issued notice to the respondent in the writ petition
and stayed the termination of the services of petitioner No. I in the
meantime. The State Government appeared in response to the notice to
contest the writ petition, inter alia, on the ground that the appointment D
of petitioner No. I was contractual in nature terminable at any point of
time. It was also urged that petitioner No.2 in the writ petition had been
absorbed considering her good performance.
6. By an order dated 18th October, 2012 the writ petition ti led by
the respondent was admitted to hearing and the interim direction
E
restraining the State Government from terminating the services of the
writ petitioner-rt-spondent No. I continued. With the contractual tenure
of respondent No. I as Deputy Advocate General coming to an end on
31st October, 2012 his name does not appear to have figured in the list
of Deputy Advocates General appointed by an order dated 3 I st October,
2012. Petitioner No. I/Respondent No. I herein alleged this to be a breach F
of the order passed by the High Court restraining the termination of his
services and filed contempt petition No.3421 of 2012. The State also
filed CM No.17076of2012 for clarification of the interim orders dated
21st October, 2011 and 18th October, 2012, inter alia, contending that
the contract period of respondent No.1 's appointment having expired,
G
he was not entitled to the benefit of the interim orders passed by the
Court. That application was dismissed by the learned Single Judge in
terms of an order dated !st December, 2012 as misconceived for in the
opinion of the Court no clarification of interim order dated 21st October,
2011 restraining termination was necessary. Aggrieved by order dated
I st December, 2012 passed by the Single Judge, the State preferred H
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2016] 4 S.C.R.

A LPANo.1458 of2013 which was dismissed by a Division Bench of the
High Court by its order dated 25th September, 2013 impugned in the
present appeal.
7. In transferred writ petition No.24 7 of 2015 (renu111bered as
T.P (C) No.1073 of 2015), the petitioner had prayed for quashing of
B certain State Government orders besides a mandamus directing the State
ofHaryana to engage him as a Law Officer. The petitioner has, however,
given up his challenge to the orders impugned in the writ petition and
confined his prayer to a direction for consideration of his case. It was
submitted that the issues raised in the writ petition were generally the
same as have been raised in connected SLP (C) No. (CC) No.5470 of
c 2014 and the writ petition out of which the said appeal arises. Those
submissions were recorded and Writ Petition No.24 7 of2015 transferred
from the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh to this Court
for final disposal. That is precisely how the appeal and the writ petition
have been heard together for disposal by this common order. The
D following questions fall for our dete1mination:
(1) Whether the States of Punjab and Haryana have 111ade
any realistic assessment of their requirement before
making appointments of Law Officers.
(2) Whether the States of Punjab and Haryana have
E formulated any scheme, policy, nor111s or standards for
appointing Law Officers.
(3) Whether appointment of Law Officers by the State
Governments need to be made on a fair, reasonable,
non-discriminatory and objective basis; and
F
(4) If answer to question Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are found in the
negative, what is the way forward?
Re: Question No.1
8. A realistic assessment of the requirement is the first and foremost
G step that one would expect the State to take for any prudent exercise of
the power of appointment of law officers. No such assessment has
been made nor any material disclosed by the State Governments to
demonstrate that they were sensitive to the need for any such assessment.
Power to appoint Law Officers was all the same exercised on what
appears to us to be a totally ad hoc basis without any co-relation between
H
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. BRIJESHWAR SINGH CHAHAL 697
& ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, CJ!.]

the work load in the Courts and the number of Law Officers appointed A
to handle the same. There is no gainsaid that ifthe power to appoint is
exercised not because such exercise is called for but because of some
extraneous or other reason the legitimacy of the exercise will itself
become questionable. That is precisely what has been brought out by
the Comptroller and Auditor General in his report of Social, General and
B
Economic sectors (non PSUs) for the year ended 31-03-2012 for the
State of Haryana. The report is a telling indictment of the system of
appointment followed in the State of Haryana which does not provide
for assessment of the manpower requirement leave alone any worthwhile
process of selection of those appointed. The result is that more than
half of those appointed were without any work during the test check c
period resulting in payment of idle salary in crores. The CAG has while
finding fault with the entire process recommended a realistic assessment
of the number oflaw officers required on the basis of the workload and
selection of the appointees in a transparent manner.. The report also
found the explanation offered by the State Government to be
D
unacceptable keeping in view the daily duty roster regarding the Law
Officer's work and performance. The report of the CAG makes
interesting reading and may be extracted at this stage :
"4.2.2 Faulty selection of Law Officers

Engagement of Law Officers without assessing worklolUl and E
without inviting appliclllions resultetl in payment of idle wages of
' 2.22 crore.

In order to deal with legal cases on behalf of Haryana
Government in various Courts of Law, Tribunals and
Commissions, the Additional Chief Secretary to Haryana F
Government, Administration of Justice Department engages
Law Officers in various capacities on contract basis as per
terms and conditions prescribed by the State Government.
With a view to verijj; the work assigned to these law officers
and work actually performed by them, the complete records G
relating to daily duty rosters, vetting registers and cause lists
of Courts for six months between December 2009 and January
20/ 2 maintained in the office of the Advocate General,
Haryana selected randomly was test checked (May 2012) and
following irregularities were noticed:
H
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 4 S.C.R.

A > There was no prescribed procedure for assessment of work
for engagement of Law Officers on contract. The number of
Law Officers on roll to plead legal cases in various courts at
Chandigarh increased from 98 in December 2009 to 179 in
January 2012 although the number of courts where they were
to defend the cases remained the same during the above
B
period.
> The Law Officers were engaged without giving any
advertisement or wide publicity.
> Jn the test-checked months, on an average, more than 50 per
c cent Law Officers remained without work. As detailed in Table
2, on an average the percentage of idle Law Officers with
total available strength had arisen from 54 in December 2009
to 78 in January 2012. There was no monitoring of work
assigned to these Law Officers by the Department.
D Table 2: Detail of Law Officers (LOs) without work and
payment of idle salary
Nurrher Working ~ Percentc,ge NunVer kiesa/(l}y
ifLoson ~ morherif ifLOrnlv iflos paidtolOi
rolls available Los »itlvit renvimi »rx-kfcr uitlvit
intk Clf!JI »Ol7< »illvit 17!)' mrplete »DI*fer
E nmh (XI »DI* nvnth wvlesale
(exchdng fXY(icular nmh (in )
Courl «~i.siftk
lvlkb;i.s nvnth
ad
va:atiOlri)
F Dx:eniJer 98 JI 54 55 20 10,33,872
2(ff)
Augt6t 137 21 70 51 27 19,40,983
2010
Nuveniier 151 18 l(X) ()6 42 30,88,534
2010
G M1rch 153 22 97 63 58 42,21,554
2011
Nuveniier 169 21 123 73 63 49,51,S&J
2011
Januay 1'79 20 140 78 87 69,~786
2012
T<Xal /<le sa/(UV naiL/ to law Officers nitllOltl assiJ.mi11f! mzv HVrk
H
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. BRIJESHWAR SINGH CHAHAL 699
& ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, CJ!.]

> In the test-checked months, the number of Law Officers ranging A
between 20 and 87 had not been allotted any work for whole
of the month resulting in idle salary payment of 2.22 crore
to these Law Officers for six months as detailed above.
In January 2012, out of 179 Law Officers on the roll on an
average, 140 Law Officers had not been allotted any work B
and 87 Law Officers were without work for whole of the month.
However, later on the Department discontinued the services
of 26 Law Officers in June 2012. This shows that Law Officers
were engaged without assessing the requirement on the basis
of work or work norms or workload prevailing in the
Department. No such exercise was found to be done while c
·engaging such Law Officers.
The matter was discussed in detail with the Additional Chief
Secretary to Government of Haryana, Administration of Justice
Department in an exit conference held on 23 October 2012.
During the meeting it was stated that some guidelines should D
be in place to assess the vacancies on the basis of workload
and selection of Law Officers should be made in a transparent
manner. The Department was doubtful about the high
percentage of Law officers without assigning any work and
stated (November 2012) that though the work was generally
assigned to a team comprising more than one Law Officer but E
in the daily duty roster name of only one Law Officer was
mentioned. It was further added that these Law Officers
perform multifarious duties/functions such as research of law
for particular pending cases, for general updating of latest
case law, preparing factual and legal notes, preparing F
compendium or judgments, etc. However, no requirement or
need was felt to keep record of such assignments as the
concerned Law Officers were responsible to deal with the
cases entrusted to them.
The contention of the Department that the names of all team
members were not mentioned in daily duty roster was not G
acceptable as during re-verification of daily duty rosters, after
the exit conference, it was found that wherever a team was
deputed for a specific work, names of all the team members
were mentioned therein.
H
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 4 S.C.R.

A Thus, the engagement of excess Lmv Officers without assessing
the quantum of work and without resorting to fair and
transparent selection method, resulted in allowing more than
50 per cent Law Officers without work and payment of idle
salary of 2.22 crore."
B 9. We are not sure whether a similar study has been conducted
qua the State of Punjab, but given the fact that the number of law officers
appointed by that State is also fairly large, we will not be surprised if any
such study would lead to similar or even more startling results. The
upshot of the above discussion is that for a fair and objective system of
appointment, there ought to be a fair and realistic assessment of the
c requirement, for otherwise the appointments may be made not because
they are required but because they come handy for political
aggrandisement, appeasement or personal benevolence of those in power
towards those appointed. The dangers of such an uncanalised &
unregulated system ofappointment, it is evident are multi-dimensional
D resulting in erosion of the rule of law, public faith in the fairness of the
system and injury to public interest and administration of justice. It is
high time to call a halt to this process lest even the right thinking become
cynical about our capacity to correct what needs to be corrected.
10. Question No.1 is accordingly answered in the negative.
Re: Question No.2
E
11. The question whether the States of Punjab and Haryana follow
any procedure for selecting practising advocates for appointment as law
officers have troubled us throughout the hearing. We had, therefore,
solicited information from the State of Punjab on certain specific questions
that we formulated in terms of our order dated 1lth April, 2014 and
F asked the State to file an affidavit indicating the following:-
]) What is the procedure followed by the State Government for
selecting practising Advocates for appointment as Law
Officers for the State of Punjab?
2) ls there any selection or Search Committee constituted for the
G purpose of making such selections? If so, what is the
composition of the Committee?
3) If a Selection/Search Committee has been constituted, the
. proceedings of the Committee regarding any appointment of
Law Officers from time to time be filed along with the affidavit.
H 4) Does the Government consult the High Court before finalizing
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. BRIJESHWAR SINGH CHAHAL 701
& ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, CJ!.]

the list of appointments? If the High Court is not consulted, A
what is other method by which the Government ensures that
those picked up are the best at the Bar?
5) Total number of Law Officers appointed and currently working
and the terms on which the appointments are made shall also
be filed along with the affidavit. B
12. We had, by a subsequent order dated 2nd September, 2015
passed in Transferred Petition No. I 073 of 2015, asked the State of
Haryana also to file an affidavit answering the above queries. Both the
States have in compliance with the said orders filed their respective
affidavits. In the affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Punjab it is,
inter alia, stated that there is no definite procedure statutory or otherwise c
governing the selection and appointment of advocates practising as law
officers in the State of Punjab. Conventionally, these officers are engaged
on contractual basis on the recommendations of the Advocate General
or in consultation with him. At times, even the Government engages law
officers after making "discreet enquiries" about their suitability for such D
engagements. A sizeable number of law officers so engaged are
designated as Public Prosecutors in consultation with the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana. The affidavit sets out in paragraph 4 answers to
the questions on which the State was required to respond. For the sake
of convenience we may extract verbatim the questions and the replies
to the same: E
"l) What is tile procedure followed by the State Govemment for
selecting practicing Advocates for appointment as Law
Officers for the State of Punjab.
As stated hereinabove, the engagement of law officers to defend
the State Government in cases assigned to them cannot be regulated F
by Statute or policy. Law officers are engaged on the
recommendation of the Advocate General of the State, based,
interalia, on the assessment of individuals by the Advocate General
as well as on recommendations made by colleagues, peers and
others. In some cases, the State Government engages law officers G
after making discreet inquiries as to the suitability of the individual
as a law officer.
2) ls there any selection or searclz Committee constituted for
the purpose of making suclt selections. If so, what is the
composition of tlze Committee.
H
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 4 S.C.R.

A Th~re is no selection or search committee constituted for making
such selections.
3) If a Selection/Search Committee has been com·tituted, the
proceedings of the Committee regarding any appointment of
Law Officers from time to time be filed along with the affidavit.
B Not applicable, in view of response to item 2 above.
4) Does the Government consult the High Court before finalizing
the list of appointments. If the High Court is not consulted,
what is other method by which the Government en.~ures that
those picked up are the best at the Bar.
c It is submitted that the Government does not consult the Hon'ble
High Court before finalizing the list of appointments, except in the
case of public prosecutors appointed under Section 24 of Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. It is submitted that this practice has
continued over the years by convention and is also followed by
other State Governments. It is further submitted that "best at the
D bar" is a subjective concept. In any event, as is commonly known,
most "successful" lawyers are unwilling to take-up the
responsibilities of holding such a position and make sacrifices since
it impinges of their private practice.
5) Total number ofLaw Officers appointed and currently working
E and the terms on which the appointments are made shall also
be .filed alon1: with the affidavit.
(i) In reply to above, Point No. S, the details of total numbers of Law
Officers currently working is given below:

Sr. Designation No. of Law Officers
F
No.
I. Additional Advocate General, 74
Punjab
2. Senior Deputy Advocate 05
General, Punjab
G
3. Deputy Advocate General, 40
Punjab
4. Assistant Advocate General, 55
Punjab
5. Advocate-on-Record 02
11
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. BRIJESHWAR SINGH CHAHAL 703
& ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, CJ!.]

The terms and conditions of engagement of the above Law A'
Officers, who have been engaged on contract basis on year to
year basis, are yet to be finalized by the Government as is clear
from their sample engagement letters and copies of sample
engagement letters issued in respect of each category of posts
are attached herewith as Annexure P-16 to P-19 (Page Nos. 136
B
to 142).
(ii) It is stated that in four cases an exception was made and persons
were absorbed as Sr. DAG/DAG. With regard to these four cases
it is submitted that it would be wholly illogical to suggest that other
advocates engaged by the State as law officers, (who are required . C
to work under the Advocate General and to be guided in the
discharge of their professional duties as per the instructions and
guidance of the Advocate General) should be treated as "regular"
employees of the Government merely because they are paid a
fixed fee or on a monthly basis calculated with reference to a pay
scale." D
13. The State ofHaryana has also filed an affidavit in compliance
with the directions issued by us. In answer to question no. I the State of
Haryana has stated that the appointments are made on contractual basis
on the recommendations of the learned Advocate General and that it is
the Advocate General who assesses their suitability for such appointments. E
Neither a Selection nor Search Committee is constituted for the purpose
nor is the High Court consulted before the names are finalised.
14. From the two affidavits filed by the States it is manifest that
no procedure for selecting practising advocates for appointment as law
officers has been prescribed in the States of Punjab and Haryana. No F
Selection or Search Committee is constituted or is even envisaged. It is
also clear that the two Governments do not consult the High Court before
finalizing the list of appointees. The affidavits do not at the same time
indicate as to how in the absence of any Selection or Search Committee
the State Government ensures a fair selection in which they pick-up the
best available and willing to accept the assignment as State counsel. G
The affidavits place the burden of making the process of fair selection
upon the wisdom of the Advocates General of the two States. The
affidavits do not state whether the Advocate General, has, in turn,
constituted a Committee or followed any procedure or prescribed or
formulated any norms for assessing the merit of those willing to work as H
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2016) 4 S.C.R.

A State counsel. The affidavits do not even say if any applications are
invited for appointment as State counsel. All told, the appointments are
based entirely on how the Advocate General advises the State
Government on the subject without the Advocate General in turn
conducting a selection process, assessing inter se merit on an objective
basis or maintaining any record of any such process having been
B
undertaken. The affidavits also do not rule out the possibility of the
Governments themselves appointing persons over and above those
recommended by the Advocate General on the basis of what the Affidavit
of the State of Punjab describes as "discreet enquiries". The affidavits
suggest that the process has been going on for past many years. The
c States also claim that the engagement of State counsel is a professional
engagement meaning thereby that the States have no obligation either to
prescribe a procedure or follow any definite method while making such
appointments. State of Punjab has asserted that the process of selection
and appointment cannot be regulated either by policy or by any statute.
D 15. We have not been able to persuade ourselves to accept the
view that even when the appointments are made to offices heavily
remunerated from the public exchequer the same can or ought to remain
unregulated. That is particularly so when those appointed are expected
by the very nature of their appointment to discharge important public
function affecting not only State interest but the quality ofjustice which
E the courts administer. There is in the case of Punjab and Haryana not
even a semblance of any selection process in the matter of appointment
of those chosen for the job leave alone a process that is credible in terms
of its fairness and objectivity. The practice of making appointments in
disregard of what is expected of a functionary sensitive to the demands
F of fairness and equality of opportunity even when in vogue for long, runs
contrary to the true legal position settled by a long line of decisions to
which we shall presently refer. The dominant purpose which ought to
permeate any process of selection and appointment namely "protection
ofpublic interest" in courts by availing services of the most meritorious
is clearly defeated by the method that the States have been following
G and continue to follow. What is regrettable is that even after the
pronouncements of this Court have settled the principles on which public
authorities are required to act while discharging their functions, the States
continue to harp on the theory that in the matter of engagement of State
counsel they are not accountable and that the engagement is only
H professional and/or contractual hence unquestionable. It is, in our view,
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. BRIJESHWAR SINGH CHAHAL 705
& ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, CJI.]

too late in the day for any public functionary or Government to advance A
such a contention leave alone expect this Court to accept the same. If a
Government counsel discharges an important public function and if it is
the primary duty of those running the affairs of the Government to act
fairly, objectively and on a non-discriminatory basis, there is no option
for them except to choose the best at the bar out of those who are
B
willing and at times keen to work as State counsel. It is also their duty to
ensure that the process by which the best are selected is transparent
and credible. Abdicating that important function in favouroftheAdvocate
General of the State who, in tum, has neither the assistance of norms or
procedure to follow nor a mechanism for assessment of merit will be
self-defeating. We regret to say that in the matter of appointment of c
State Counsel, the States of Punjab and Haryana have much to do to
reform the prevalent system which reform is in our opinion long overdue.
Question No.2 is also answered in the negative.
Re: Question No.3
16. It is by now, fairly well settled that not only the Government D
but all public bodies are trustees of the power vested in them and
custodians of public interest. Discharge of that trust in the best possible
manner is the primary duty of those in charge of the affairs of the State
or public body. This necessarily implies that the nature of functions and
duties including the power to engage, employ or recruit servants, agents, E
advisors and representatives must be exercised in a fair, reasonable,
non-discriminatory and objective manner. It is also fairly well settled
that duty to act fairly and reasonably is a facet of 'Rule of Law' in a
constitutional democracy like ours. A long line of decisions of this Court
over the past five decades or so have ruled that arbitrariness has no
place in a polity governed by rule of law and that Article 14 of the F
Constitution of India strikes at arbitrariness in every State action. We
may gainfully refer to some of these decisions, not so much to add to
their content as to remind ourselves that we have come a long way in
the matter of settling the contours of the doctrine of Rule of Law of
which equality is one significant feature. G
17. In S G Jaisinglzani v. Union of India AIR 1967 SC 1427,
this Court held that absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of
"Rule of Law" upon which rests our Constitutional system. This Court
ruled that in a system governed by rule oflaw, any discretion conferred
upon the executive authorities must be confined within clearly defined
H
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 4 S.C.R.

A limits. This Court quoted with approval, the following observations of
Douglas J. in United States vs. Wunderlick 1951 342 US 98:96 Law Ed
113:
"Law has reached its finest moments when it has freed man
from the unlimited discretion of some ruler ... Where discretion
B is absolute, man has always siiffered. "
I 8. A similar sentiment was expressed by this Court in E P Royappa
v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. (1974) 4 SCC 3 where this Court
declared that Article 14 is the genus while Article 16 is a specie and the
basic principle which infonns both these Articles is equality and inhibition
against discrimination. Equality, declared this Court, was antithetic to
c arbitrariness. The Court described equality and arbitrariness as sworn
enemies, one belonging to the rule of law in a republic and the other to
the whims and caprice of an absolute monarch. Resultantly if an act is
found to be arbitrary, it is implicit that it is unequal both according to
political logic and constitutional law, hence violative ofArticle 14 and ifit
D affects any matter of public employment it is also violative of Article 16.
This Court reiterated that Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in
State action and ensure fairness and inequality of treatment.
19. Then came the decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v.
Union of India (1978) 2 SCR 621, where this Court held that the
E principle ofreasonableness both legally and philosophically is an essential
element of equality and that non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 with
brooding omnipresence. This implies that wherever there is ~rbitrariness
in State action whether, it be legislative or executive Article 14 would
spring into action and strike the same down. This Court held, that the
concept of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness pervades the
F
constitutional scheme and is a golden thread, which runs through the
entire Constitution.
20. In Ranuma Sltetty v. Intemational Airport Authority 1979
AIR (SC) 1628, this Court relying upon the pronouncements of E.P.
Royappa and Maneka Gandhi (supra) once again declared that state
G
action must not be guided by extraneous or irrelevant considerations
because that would be denial of equality. This Court recognized that
principles of reasonableness and rationality are legally as well as
philosophically essential elements of equality and non-arbitrariness as
projected by Article 14, whether it be authority of law or exercise of
H executive power without the making of a law. This Court held that State
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. BRJJESHWAR SINGH CHAHAL 707
& ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, CJI.]

cannot act arbitrarily in the matter of entering into relationships be it A
contractual or otherwise with a third party and its action must conform
to some standard or norm, which is in itself rational and non-
discriminatory.
21. In D.S. Nakra v. Union of India 1983 (1) SCC 305, this
Court reviewed the earlier pronouncements and while affirming and B
explaining the same held that it must now be taken to be settled that
what Article 14 strikes at is arbitrariness and that any action that is
arbitrary must necessarily involve negation of equality.
22. In Dwarkadas Marfatia v. Board of Trustees of the port of
Bombay 1989 (3) SCC 293, this Court had an occasion to examine c
whether Article 14 had any application to contractual matters. This court
declared that every action of the state or an instrumentality of the State
must be informed by reason and actions that are not so informed can be
questioned under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution.
23. Subsequent decisions of this Court in Som Raj & Ors. v. D
State of Haryana & Ors. (1990) 2 SCC 653, Neelima Misra v.
Harinder Kaur Paintal & Ors. (1990) 2 SCC 746 a11d Sharma
Transport v. Govemme11t of A.P & Ors. (2002) 2 SCC 188 have
simply followed, reiterated and applied the principles settled by the
pronouncements in the earlier mentioned cases.
E
24. We have thus far referred to decisions that are not subject
specific and settle the legal position in the context of varied fact situations.
The case at hand attracts the application of the principles that are
authoritatively settled by the decisions to which we have referred above.
Application of those principles, apart from the question, is whether
appointment of lawyers by the State Government simply signifies F
professional engagement of those appointed or has any public element
also and if such appointments have a public element, whether the making
of the same can itself be the subject matter ofjudicial review. The extent
and nature of such review is an incidental question that would fall for
determination in the facts of the case before us. We shall presently G
advert to those questions but before we do so we must state that we are
not on virgin ground. A few decisions to which we shall presently refer
have examined at considerable length, the very same questions and
answered them with considerable aplomb. We may gainfully refer to
some of those pronouncements if not all.
H
•
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 4 S.C.R.

A 25. In Slirilekfla Vidyartlli v. State of U.P. 1991 (1) SCC 212,
which happens to be the first of these decisions, this Court had an occasion
to examine whether Government Counsel in the districts are holders of
an 'office or post' or such appointments are no more than professional
engagements like the one between a private client and his lawyer. That
case arose out of a challenge mounted by Government Counsel who
B
were engaged throughout the State of Uttar Pradesh to handle civil,
revenue or criminal cases and whose services were en masse terminated
by the State only to be replaced by fresh appointments on the basis of a
new panel prepared for that purpose and communicated to the District
Magistrates concerned. On behalf of the State, it was argued that the
c engagement of Government Counsel was nothing but a professional
engagement between a client and his lawyer with no public element
attached to it.
26. Rejecting that contention, this Court held that the appointment
of the District Government Counsel by the State Government was not
D merely a professional engagement but had a public element attached to
it. This Court noted that Government Counsel were paid remuneration
out of the public exchequer and that having regard to Sections 24, 25
and 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the public prosecutors were
entrusted the responsibility ofacting only in the interest of administration
of justice. In the case of Public Prosecutors, declared this Court, the
E additional public element flowing from the statutory provisions in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, clothed the public prosecutors with the
attribute of the holders of a public office which cannot be whittled down
by the assertion that their engagement is purely professional between a
client and his lawyer with no public element attached to it. This was
F according to this Court, sufficient to attract Article 14 and bring the
question of validity of the impugned circular within the scope ofjudicial
review.
27. The decision in Shrileklw's case (supra) is noteworthy for
the additional reason that the same held judicial review of State action
G pennissible even when the engagement of the Government counsel may
be contractual in nature. This Court observed :
"The State cannot be attributed the split personality of Dr.
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde in the contractual field so as to impress
on it all the characteristics of the State at the threshold while
H making a contract requiring it to fulfil the obligation ofArticle
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. BRJJESHWAR SINGH CHAHAL 709
& ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, CJI.]

14 of the Constitution and thereafter permitting it to cast off A
its garb of State to adorn the new robe of a private body
during the subsistence <f the contract enabling it to act
arbitrarily subject only tJ the contractual obligations and
remedies flowing from it. It is rerilly the nature of its personality
as State which is significant .md must characterize all its
B
actions, in whatever field, and not the nature of function,
contractual or otherwise, which is decisive of the nature of
scrutiny per111itted for examining the validity of its act. The
requirement of Article 14 being the duty to act fairly, justly
and reasonably, there is 11othi11g which militates against the
concept of requiring the State always to so act, even in c
contractual matters. There is a basic difference between the
acts of the State which must invariably be in public interest
and those of a private individual, engaged in similar activities,
being pri111arily for personal gain, which may ()I' may not
promote public interest. Viewed in this manner, in which we
D
find no conceptual difficulty or anachronism, we find no
reason why the requirement of Article 14 should 1101 extend
even in the sphere of contractual matters for regulating the
conduct of the State activity. "
28. Relying upon the decisions of this Court in Ramana Dayaram
Shelly v. International Airport Authority ofllldia (1979) 3 SCC 489; E
Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1980)
4 SCC I; Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trust.!es of tile
Port of Bombay (1989) 3 SCC 293 and Mahabir Auto Storel· mu/
Others v. I11dill11 Oil Corporation mu/ others (1990) 3 SCC 752, this
Court held that the power ofjudicial review and the sweep of Article 14 F
was wide enough to take within its fold the impugned circular issued by
the State in exercise of its executive powers irre5pective of the precise
nature of appointment of the Government Counsel in the districts or the
rights, contractual or statutory, which the appointees may have. This
Court reiterated the well settled principle that State action can survive
only if it does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness which is the very G
essence of Article 14 of the Constitution and Ruk of law. This Court
observed:
"It is 11ow too well-settled that every State action, in order to
survive, must not be susceptible to the vice of arbitrariness
H
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 4 S.C.R.

A which is the crux of Article 14 of the Constitution and basic
to the rule of law, the system which governs us. Arbitrariness
is the very negation of the rule of law. Satisfaction of this
basic test in every State action is sine qua non to its validity
and in this respect, the State cannot claim comparison with a
private individual even in the field of contract. This distinction
B
between the State and a private individual in the field of
contract has to be borne in the mind. "
29. Applying the above principle to the circular under challenge,
this Court held that arbitrariness was writ large on the same as it gave
an impression as ifthe State action was taken under a mistaken belief of
c applicability of"spoils system" under our constitution. This Court held
that even though in the case of State, public interest should be the guiding
consideration while considering the suitability of the appointees yet the
impugned State action appeared to have been taken with the sole object
of terminating all existing appointments irrespective of the subsistence
D or expiry of the tenure or the suitability of the incumbents. The following
passage from the judgment sums up the trend of the judicial
pronouncements which increasingly favour State activity even in
contractual matter being brought within the purview ofjudicial review:
"In our view, bringing the State activity in contractual matters
also within the purview ofjudicial review is inevitable and is
E a logical corollary to the stage already reached in the
decisions of this Court so far. Having fortunately reached
this point, we should not now turn back or take a turn in a
different direction or merely stop there.
In our opinion, two recent decisions in Mis Dwarkadas
F Marfatia and Sons, (supra) and Mahabir Auto Stores &
Ors., (supra) also lead in the same direction without saying
so in clear terms. This appears to be also the trend of the
recent English decisions. It is in consonance with our
commitment to openness which implies scrutiny of every State
action to provide an effective check against arbitrariness and
G
abuse of power. We would much rather be wrong in saying so
rather than be wrong in not saying so. Non-arbitrariness.
being a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. it is
imperative that all actions of every public functionary. in
whatever sphere. must be guided by reason and not humour.
H whim. caprice or personal predilections of the persons
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. BRIJESHWAR SINGH CHAHAL 711
& ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, CJJ.]

entrusted with the task on behalf of the State and exercise of A
all power must be for public good instead of being an abuse
of the power. ··
(emphasis supplied)
30. In State of U.P. a/Uf Ors. etc. v. U.P. State Law Officers
Association and Ors. etc. (1994) 2 SCC 204, also law officers were B
removed by the State Government, aggrieved whereof, the affected
officers approached the High Court contending, inter alia, that their
removal was against the principles of natural justice and that they could
be removed from their offices only for valid reasons. The High Court
agreed with that contention, al lowed the petition and quashed the orders
ofremoval. The State assailed that order before this Court in which this
c
Court examined the issue from three different dimensions viz., (i) the
nature of the legal profession; (ii) the interest of public; and (iii) the
modes of appointment and removal.
31. While dealing with the nature of the legal profession, this
D
Court observed that legal profession was essentially a service-oriented
profession and.that the relationship between the lawyer and his client is
one of trust and confidence. As a responsible officer of the court and an
important adjunct of the administration ofjustice, the lawyer also owes a
duty to the court as well as to the opposite side. He has to be fair to
ensure that justice is done. He demeans himself if he acts merely as a E
mouthpiece of his client. Having said that, this Court noted the changed
profile of the legal profession because of the expansion of public sector
activities necessitating maintenance of a common panel oflawyers, some
of whom are in full-time employment of the government or public
institutions as their law officers.
F
32. On the question of public interest involved in the appoillfment
of lawyers, this Court unequivocally declared that the government or
the public body represents public interest and whoever is in charge of
running their affairs is no more than a trustee or a custodian of public
interest. Protection of public interests in the best possible manner is
their primary duty. It follows that public bodies are under an obligation G
to the society to take the best possible steps to safeguard such interests.
That obligation in turn casts on them the duty to engage the most
competent servants, agents, advisers etc. Even in the matter of selection
of lawyers, those who are running the government or the public bodies
are under an obligation to make earnest efforts to select the best from H
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 4 S.C.R.

A the available lot. This is more so because the claims made by and/or
against the public bodies are monetarily substantial and socially crucial
with far-reaching consequences.
33. This Court while dealing with the third dimension touching the
mode of appointment of lawyers declared that in conformity with the
B obligation cast upon them those handling the affairs of the State are duty
bound to select the most meritorious, whatever the method adopted for
such selection and appointment may be. It must be shown that a search
for the meritorious was undertaken and that appointments were made
only on the basis of the merit and not for any other consideration. The
following passage is in this regard apposite.
c
"18. The mode of appointment of lawyers for the public bodies,
therefore. has to be in conformity with the obligation cast on
them to select the most meritorious. An open invitation to the
lawyers to compete (or the posts is by far the best mode of
such selection. But so111eti111es the best 111ay not compete or a
D competent candidate may not be available from among the
competitors. In such circumstances, the public bodies may
resort to other methods such as inviting and appointing the
best available, although he 111ay not have applied for the post.
Whatever the 111ethod adopted. it 111ust be shown that the search
E for the meritorious was undertaken and the appointments were
111ade only on the basis of the merit and not (or any other
consideration. "
(emphasis supplied)
34. In State of U.P. and Anr. v Joltri Mal (2004) 4 SCC 714 a
F three-Judge Bench of this Court had an occasion to deal with somewhat
similar question that arose once again in relation to appointment of
government lawyers in the State of U.P. This Court reviewed the
decisions earlier delivered and ruled that public interest would be
safeguarded only when good and competent counsel are appointed by
the State. No such appointments should, declared this Court, be made
G
for pursuing a political purpose or for giving some undue advantage to
any particular section. The State should replace an efficient, honest and
competent lawyer only when it is in a position to appoint a more competent
lawyer in his place, observed this Court. The following passage is apposite
in th is regard:
H
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. BRIJESHWAR SINGH CHAHAL 713
& ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, CJJ.]

44. Only when good and competent counsel are appointed A
by the State, the public interest would be safeguarded. The
State while appointing the public prosecutors must bear in
mind that for the purpose of upholding the rule of latt\ good
administration of justice is imperative which in turn would
have a direct impact on sustenance of democracy. No
B
appointment of Public Prosecutors or District Counsel should,
thus. be made either (or pursuing a political purpose or for
giving some undue advantage to a section of people. Retention
of its counsel bv the State must be weighed on the scale of
public interest. The State should replace an efflcient. honest
and competent lawyer. inter alia. when it is in a position to c
appoint a more competent lawyer. In such an event, even a
good performance by a lawyer may not be of much
importance. "
(emphasis supplied)
35. While dealing with the nature of office the government counsel D
hold, this Court declared that the State Government Counsel holds an
office of great importance. They are not only officers of the court but
also the representatives of the State and that_ courts repose a great deal
of confidence in them. They are supposed to render independent, fearless
and non-partisan views before the court irrespective of the result of E
litigation which may ensue. So also the public prosecutors have great
responsibility. They are required to perform statutory duties independently
having regard to various provisions contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The State Government counsel represents the State and
thereby the interest of the general public before a court of law. This
requires that government counsel have character, competence, sufficient F
experience as also standing at the Bar. The need for employing meritorious
and competent persons to maintain the standard of the high office cannot
be minimized, observed the court, particularly, when the holders of the
post have a public duty to perform. The Court also expressed anguish
over the fact that in certain cases the recommendations are made by the
G
District Magistrate having regard to the political affinity of the lawyers
to the party in power and that State is hot expected to rescind the
appointments with the change in the government because a new party
__ _J}as taken over charge of the Government. This Court also recognized
the age-old tradition of appointing the District Government Counsel on
H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 4 S.C.R.

A the basis of the recommendations of the District Collector in consultation
with the District Judge. The fact thatthe DistrictJ udge, who is consulted
while making such appointment knows the merit, competence and
capability of the lawyer concerned, was also recognized by the Court.
36. The development oflaw in this country has taken strides when
B it comes to interpreting Articles 14 and 16 and their sweep. Recognition
of power exercisable by the functionaries of the State as a trust which
will stand discharged only ifthe power is exercised in public interest is
an important milestone just as recognition of the Court's power ofjudicial
review to be wide enough to strike at and annul any State action that is
arbitrary, unguided, whimsical, unfair or discriminatory. Seen as important
c dimensions of the rule of law by which we swear the law as it stands
today has banished from our system unguided and uncanalised or arbitrary
discretion even in matters that were till recently considered to be within
the legitimate sphere ofa public functionary as a repository-0fExecutive
Power. Those exercising power for public good are now accountable
D for their action, which must survive scrutiny or be annulled on the first
principle that the exercise was not for public good in that the same was
either malafide, unfair, unreasonable or discriminatory. Extension of the
principle even to contractual matters or matters like engagement oflaw
officers is symbolic of the lowering of the threshold of tolerance for
what is unfair, unreasonable or arbitrary. The expanding horizons of the
E jurisprudence on the subject both in terms of interpretation of Article 14
of the Constitution as also the court's willingness to entertain pleas for
judicial review is a heartening development on the judicial landscape
that will disentitle exercise of power by those vested with it as also
empower those affected by such power to have it reversed if such
F reversal is otherwise merited.
37. The question whether a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory
method of selection should or should not be adopted can be viewed from
another angle also equally if not more important than the need for
preventing any infringement of Article 14. The State counsel appears
G for the State Government or for public bodies who together constitute
the single largest litigant in our Court system. Statistics show that nearly
80% of litigation pending in the courts today has State or one of its
instrumentalities as a party to it. State Counsel/counsel appointed by
public bodies thus represent the largest single litigant or group engaged
in litigation. It is also undeniable that for a fair, quick and satisfactory
H
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. BRIJESHWAR SINGH CHAHAL 715
& ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, CJI.]

adjudication of a cause, the assistance which the Court gets from the A
Bar is extremely important. It is at times said thatthe quality ofjudgment
or justice administered by the courts is directly proportionate to the quality
of assistance that the courts get from the Counsel appearing in a case.
Our system of administration ofjustice is so modelled that the ability of
the lawyers appearing in the cause to present the cases of their respective
B
clients assumes considerable importance. Poor assistance at the Bar by
counsel who are eithernot sufficiently equipped in scholarship, experience
or commitment is bound to adversely affect the task of administration of
justice by the Court. Apart from adversely affecting the public interest
which State counsel are supposed to protect, poor quality of assistance
rendered to the cqurts by State Counsel can affect the higher value of c
justice itself. A fair, reasonable or non-discriminatory process of
appointment of State Counsel is not thus demanded only by the rule of
Jaw and its intolerance towards arbitrariness but also by reason of the
compelling need for doing complete justice which the Courts are obliged
to do in each and every cause. The States cannot in the discharge of
D
their public duty and power to select and appoint State counsel disregard
either the guarantee contained in Article 14 against non-arbitrariness or
the duty to protect public interest by picking up the best among those
available and willing to work nor can the States by their action frustrate,
delay or negate the judicial process ofadministration ofjustice which so
heavily banks upon the assistance rendered by the members of the Bar. E
3 8. To sum up, the following propositions are legally
un~xceptionable:

(i) The Government and so also all public bodies are trustees
of the power vested in them.
F
(ii) Discharge of the trust reposed in them in the best possible
manner is their primary duty.
(iii) The power to engage, employ or recruit servants, agents,
advisors and representatives must like any other power be
exercised in a fair, reasonable, non-discriminatory and G
objective manner.
· (iv) The duty to act in a fair, reasonable, non-discriminatory
and objective manner is a facet of the Rule of Law in a
constitutional democracy like ours.
H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 4 S.C.R.

A (v) An action that is arbitrcry has no place in a polity governed
by Rule of Law apart ji-0111 being offensive to the equality
clause guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution <if India.
(vi) Appointment of Gover.11nent counsel at the district level
and equally so at the High Court level, is not just a
B professional engagement, but such appointments have a
"public element" attached to them.
(vii) Appointment of Gove;·nment Counsel 111ust like the
discharge of any other function by the Govern111ent and
public bodies, be only in public interest unaffected by any
c political or other extraneous considerations.
(viii) The governme/lf and public bodies are und:!r an obligation
to engage the 111ost competent of the lawyers to represent
them in the Courts for it is only when those appointed are
professionally competent that public interest can be
D protected in the Courts.
(ix) The Gorermnent and public bodies are free to choose the
method for selecting the best lawyers bi.t any such selection
and appointment process must demonstrate that a search
for the meritorious was undertaken and that the process
E was unaffected by any extraneous considerations.
(x) No lawyer has a right to be appointed as a State!
Government counsel or as Public Prosecutor at any level,
nor is there any vested right to claim an extension in the
term for which he/she is initially appointed. But all such
F candidates can offer themselves for appointment, re-
appointment or extension in which event their claims can
and ought to be considered on their merit, uninfluenced
by any political or other extraneous considerations.
(xi) Appointments made in an arbitrary jashion, without any
transparent 111ethod of selection or for political
6 considerations will be amenable to judicial review and
. liable to be quashed.
(xii) Judicial review of any such appoi11t111e11ts will, however,
be limited to exa111ining whether the process is affected by
any illegality, irregularity or perversity/irrationality. The
H Court exercising the power ofjudicial review will not sit in
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. BRIJESHWAR SINGH CHAHAL 717
& ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, CJ!.]

appeal to reassess the merit of the candidates, so long as A
the method of appointment adopted by the competent
authority does not suffer from any infirmity.
39. Question No.3 is accordingly answered in the affirmative.
Re: Question No.4
40. What then are the ways out of the situation which has been as B
a governmental fiefdom that is immune to judicial review and correction?
The Law Commission has, it is heartening to note, addressed a similar
question at some length and made meaningful recommendations in its
l 97th Report. The Commission while examining issues concerning
appointment of public prosecutors observed:
"The Sessions Judge who has knowledge of the caliber,
c
experience and character of!awyers practicing in the Sessions
Courts is well suited to suggest the best names of lawyers so
that the interests of prosecution, the interests of the accused
are fully taken care ol This being the logic behind the
provision for consultation. any amendment by the States D
deleting the check .on arbitrary appointments of Public
Prosecutors, will be violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
The fundamental point - which has to be remembered - is that
any law made by the Centre or State Legislature in regard to
appointment of Public Prosecutors must conform to the
E
principles governing administration of criminal justice in
which the public prosecutor has an independent and special
role as stated in Chapter JI . In as much as the Public
Prosecutor is a 'limb of the judicial process' and 'an officer
of Court' as stated by the 18 Supreme Court (see Chapter I!),
any method of appointment which sacrifices the quality of . F
the prosecution or which enables State Governments to make
appointments at their choice without proper screening. proper
assessment of the qualifications. experience or integri(JI of
the individuals. be they the Public Prosecutors selected from
the Bar or appointed from among the Prosecuting Officers.
G
will not stand the test of non-arbitrariness under Art. 14 of
the Constitution of India. The scheme 1111lst provide for
appointing Public Prosecutors who shall bear all the qualities
mentioned in Chapter II".
(emphasis supplied)
H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 4 S.C.R.

A 41 . Dealing with the appointment procedure of Public Prosecutors
and the need to provide for proper checks as also the validity of any
state amendment to section 24, removing these checks from the scheme
of Section 24, the Commission observed:
"Appointment procedure laid down in any legislation cannot
B give arbitrary discretion to State Governments. There must be
proper checks in the matter of appointment of Public
Prosecutors/Addi. Public Prosecutors in 22 the Sessions Court
so that they can be e(ficient in their functioning. objective
and independent of the Police and the Executive. Any scheme
of appointments without proper checks will be violative of
c Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. If the central legislation
expressly requires consultation with Sessions Judge and that
he should assess merit. experience and good character as a
necessary condition for appointment as Public Prosecutors
under sec. 24(4). then any State Amendment which deletes
D the provision relating to consultation with the Sessions Judge
and to the above qualities required of the appointee. then
such deletion by the State Legislature amounts giving a licence
for arbitrary appointments and will violate Art. 14. In such
cases. assent of the President to the State Amendment can be
justifiably refused."
E (emphasis supplied)
42. The Commission unequivocally supported the need for
consultation with the Sessions Judge and with the High Court, as the
case may be, for appointment of the public prosecutors for those Courts
in the following words:
F
"We may reiterate that, so far as sec. 24(4) is concerned. the
Public Prosecutor :S selection and appointment at the level of
the Districts and the High Court cannot be left to the sweet
will of the Government. Such a procedure has the danger of
persons without adequate experience of conducting Sessions
G cases. or who lack in adequate knowledge of criminal law
being appointed. There is even the likelihood of some of such
appointees not maintaining the highest standards of conduct
expected of a Public Prosecutor. Thus, while consultation
under sec. 24(4) with the Sessions Judge cannot be dispensed
with, we propose some extra provisions in sec. 24(4) requiring
H
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. BRIJESHWAR SINGH CHAHAL 719
& ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, CJI.]

that the Session Judge must give importance to experience in A
Sessions cases, merit and integrity. If such a provision is
dispensed with by State Legislatures, obviously such
amendments will violate Art. 14. This is so far as the posts of
Public Prosecutor and 50% of posts of Addi. Public
Prosecutor in the District are concerned. "
B
(emphasis supplied)
43. Consultation with the Sessions Judge for a Public Prosecutor
in the District judiciary and with the High Court for one in the High
Court is statutorily prescribed because of the importance of the
appointment and the significance of the opinion of the Courts where the c
appointee has to work, as to his or her capacity and'professional ability.
The statute does not admit of an appointment in disregard of the
requirement of consultation. The Law Commission has, therefore, rightly
held the consultative process to be a check on the power of appointment
which cannot be left unregulated or uncontrolled, lest a person not suited
or competent enough gets appointed to the position for other reasons or D
considerations. Consultation, in that sense, lends reassurance as to the
professional ability and suitability of the appointee. The Commission has
on that premise placed a question mark on the validity of State amendment
that deletes from Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code
the need for consultation with the Sessions Judge or the High Court. E
44. Taking a cue from the provisions of Section 24, we are inclined
to hold that what serves as a check on the power of the Government to
appoint a Public Prosecutor can as well be a check on the appointment
of the State Counsel also. That is because, while the Public Prosecutor's
power under the Code of Criminal Procedure Code gives him a distinctive
F
position, the office of a State Counsel, in matters other than criminal, are
no less important. A State Counsel by whatever designation called,
appears in important civil and constitutional matters, service and tax
matters and every other matter where substantial stakes are involved or
matters or grave and substantial importance at times touching public
policy and security of State are involved. To treat such matters to be G
inconsequential or insignificant is to trivialise the role and position of a
State Counsel at times described as additional and even Senior Additional
Advocate General. What holds good for appointment of a Public
Prosecutor as a check on arbitrary exercise of power must, therefore,
act as a check on the State's power to appoint a State Counsel as well
H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 4 S.C.R.

A especially in situations where the appointment is unregulated by any
constitutional or statutory provision. Such a requirement is implicit in the
appointing power of the State which power is in trust with the government
or the public body to be exercised only to promote public interest. The
power cannot be exercised arbitrarily, whimsically or in an un-canalised
manner for any such exercise will fall foul ofArticle 14 of the Constitution
B
oflndia and resultantly Rule of law to which the country is committed.
45. We have while dealing with question No. I held that no lawyer
has a right to be appointed as State Government counsel or as public
prosecutor at any level nor does he have a vested right to claim extension
in the term for which he/she is initially appointed. We have also held
c that all candidates who are eligible for any such appointment can offer
themselves for re-appointment or extension in which event their claims
can and ought to be considered on their merit uninfluenced by any political
orother extraneous consideration. It follows that even the writ-petitioners
cannot claim appointment or extension as a matter of right. They can at
D best claim consideration for any such appointment or extension upon
expiry of their respective terms. Such consideration shall, however,
have to be in accordance with the norms settled for such appointments
and on the basis of their inter se merit, suitability and performance if
they have already worked as State counsel. To that extent, therefore,
there is no difficulty. The question is what should be the mechanism for
E such consideration. There are in that regard two major aspects that
need to be kept in mind. The first is the need for assessment and
requirement of the State Governments having regard to the workload in
different courts. As noticed earlier, appointments appear to have been
made without any realistic assessment of the need for State counsel at
F different levels. Absence of a proper assessment of the requirement for
State counsel leads to situations that have been adversely commented
upon by the CAG in his report to which we have made a reference in
the earlier part of this judgment. The problem gets compounded by
those in power adding to the strength of government advocates not
because they are required but because such appointments serve the
G object of appeasement or ptivate benevolence shown to those who qualify
for the same. The CAG has in that view rightly observed that there
ought to be a proper assessment of the need before such appointments
are made.
46. The second aspect is about the process of selection and
H assessment of merit of the candidates by a credible process. This process
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. BRIJESHWAR SINGH CHAHAL 721
& ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, CJI.]

can be primarily left to the State Government who can appoint a Committee A
of officers to carry out the same. It will be useful if the Committee of
officers has the Secretary to Government, Law Department, who is
generally a judicial officer on deputation with the Government as its
Member-Secretary. The Committee can even invite applications from
eligible candidates for different positions. The conditions of eligibility for
B
appointment can be left to the Government or the Committee depending
upon the nature and the extent of work which the appointees may be
effected to handle. The process and selection of appointment would be
fair and reasonable, transparent and credible if the Government or the
Committee as the case may be also stipulates the norms for assessment
of merit and suitability. c
47. The third stage of the process of selection and appointment
shall in the absence of any statutory provisions regulating such
appointments involve consultation with the District & Sessions Judge if
the appointment is atthe district level and the High Court ifthe appointment
is for cases conducted before the High Court. It would, in our opinion, D
be appropriate and in keeping with the demands of transparency,
objectivity and fairness if after assessment and finalisation of the selection
process a panel is sent to the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned
for his views on the subject. The Chief !ustice could constitute a
Committee of Judges to review the names recommended for appointment
and offer his views in regard to professional competence and suitability E
of candidates for such appointments. Appointments made after such a
consultative process would inspire confidence and prevent any
arbitrariness. The same procedure could be followed where candidates
are granted extension in their terms of appointment in which case the
Committee appointed by the government and that constituted by the F
Chief Justice could also look into the performance of the candidates
during the period they have worked as State counsel.
48. In the result, therefore, we dispose ofTransfer Petition No. I 073
of2015 and Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 8416 of2016 (CC
No.54 70of2014) with the following directions: G
(1) The States of Punjab and Haryana shall undertake a realistic
assessment of their need in each category in which State
counsel are proposed to be appointed.
(2) Based on the assessment so made, the States shall constitute
a Selection Committee with such number of officers as the H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 4 S.C.R.

A State Government may determine to select suitable candidates
for appointment as State counsel. The Secretary, Department
of Law in each State shall be the Member-Secretary of the
Selection Committee.
(3) The Committee shall on the basis of norms and criteria which
B the Government concerned may formulate and in the absence
of any such norms, on the basis of norms and criteria which
the Committee may themselves formulate conduct selection
of law officers for the State and submit a panel of names to
the Chief Justice of Punjab and Haryana who may set up a
Committee of Judges to review the panel and make
c recommendations to the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice may
based on any such recommendations record his views regarding
suitability of the candidates included in the panel. The
Government shall then be free to appoint the candidates having
regard to the views expressed by the Chief Justice regarding
D their merit and suitability. The procedure for assessment of
merit of the candidates and consideration by the High Court
will apply in"all cases where the candidates are already working
as State counsel but are being given an extension in the term
of their appointment. Having said that we must hasten to add
that we are not interfering with the appointments already made
E
in the States of Punjab and Haryana which can continue to
remain valid for the period the same has been made but any
extension or re-appointment shall go through the process
indicated by us in the foregoing paragraphs.
(4) The writ-petitioners shall also be free to offer themselves for
F consideration before the Committee appointed by the State
Government in which event their claims may also be considered
having regard to their merits, suitability and performance as
State counsel for the period they have worked as State counsel.
(5) We make it clear that nothing said by us in the foregoing
G paragraphs of this judgment shall affect the right of the State
Governments to appoint any person eligible for such
appointment as the Advocate General of the State in terms of
Article 165 of the Constitution oflndia.
(6) We further clarify that although we are primarily concerned
H with the procedure regarding selection and appointment oflaw
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. v. BRIJESHWAR SINGH CHAHAL 723
& ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, CJI.]

officers in the States of Punjab and Haryana and although we A
have confined our directions to the said two States only yet
other States would do well to reform their system of selection
and appointment to make the same more transparent, fair and
objective if necessary by amending the relevant LR Manuals/
Rules and Regulations on the subject.
B
49. Since the issues that fell for determination in the Writ Petition
No.20000of2011 also stand comprehensively determined by this order,
the said petition shall also stand disposed of in the above terms. The
parties are left to bear their own costs.
Kljlpana K. T~ipat)ly Transfer petition and Appeal disposed of. C