Holding

The accused was not protected by section 79 as there was no good faith, and was convicted under section 304 Part II IPC.

Summary

The State of Orissa appealed the acquittal of Bhagaban Barik, who had struck a man with a lathi on the head, causing death. Barik claimed he acted in private defence of his property, believing the deceased to be a thief, and invoked section 79 of the IPC as a defence of mistake of fact. The Supreme Court examined whether Barik acted in good faith and whether the circumstances justified a claim of private defence. It held that there was no good faith, the mistake of fact claim was untenable, and the assault was not justified. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s acquittal, affirmed the conviction under section 304 Part II (culpable homicide not amounting to murder), and sentenced Barik to three years of rigorous imprisonment.

Issues considered

Whether the accused is protected under section 79 of the IPC on the ground of mistake of fact and good faith.
Whether the circumstances amounted to a lawful claim of private defence.
Whether the conviction under section 304 Part II of the IPC is justified.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 304 Part II, s. 52, s. 79

Subjects

mistake of factgood faithsection 79 IPCculpable homicide not amounting to murderprivate defencemiscarriage of justice

Judgment

STATE OF ORISSA A
v.
BHAGABAN BARIK
-{
\ APRIL 2, 1987

[A.P. SEN AND V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI, JJ.] B

Indian Penal Code, 1860-s. 79 or 304 Part JI-Strained relations

-A I
between deceased and respondent-Lathi blow inflicted with full force
on deceased's head causing his death-Respondent claiming to have
acted in private defence of his property believing the deceased to be a
~
• thief-Incident took place near the house of Respondent--Whether right c
of private defence available-Mistake of fact and good faith not
established-Whether s. 79 attracted or conviction under s. 304 Part II
justified.
-~
Words and Phrases: 'Mistake of fact' and 'good faith'-Mean· D
ingof.

On the date of incident when the deceased was returning from the
house of PW 2 after reciting Bhagbat, where some other villagers in-
eluding the respondent were also present, and reached near the house of
the respondent he was assaulted by the respondent. On hearing a hue
.~ E
and cry several villagers including PWs. 2, 3, 4 and 5 ran to the place
and saw the deceased lying on the ground in a pool of blood with a head
injury. The respondent along with his mother and wife were tending the
deceased and wiping out blood. The deceased told the villagers that the
respondent had assaulted him. The respondent stated that during the

- ~·

--1
'
day time his bell-metal utensils had been stolen and he was keeping a F
watch for the thief, he saw a person coming inside his premises and
thinking him to be a thief he dealt a lathi blow but subsequently dis-
covered that it was the deceased. The deceased also told his wife that he
had been assaulted by the respondent. On the basis of the evidence on
record the trial court convicted and sentenced the respondent under
s. 304 Part II of the IPC.
G

On appeal the High Court accepted the defence plea and held
-{ that the respondent had not committed any offence and was protected
under s. 79 of the IPC and acquitted him.

Allowing the appeal of the State, H

785
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

HELD: 1. The judgment of acquittal entered hy the High Court
A was apparently erroneous and has caused manifest miscarriage of t-
justice. It is surprising that the High Court should have given credence
to the defence plea of mistake of fact under s. 79 of the IPC 1860. [787E-F]

2. Under s. 79 of the IPC although an act may not be justified by
B law, yet if it is done under a mistake of fact, in the belief of good faith
that it is justified by law it will not be an offence. The question of good
~-
faith must be considered with reference to the position of the accused
and the circumstances under which he acted. In view of s. 52 of the IPC
"good faith" requires not logical infallibility but due care and atten- ~' ~

tion. The question of good faith is always a question of fact to be de-
termined in accordance with the proved facts and circumstances of each
c case. It may be laid down as general rule that an alleged offender is
deemed to have acted under that state of things which he in good faith ~
and on reasonable grounds believed to exist when he did the act alleged
to be an offence. Section 79 is attracted where the circumstances
showed that the accused acted under a bona fide belief that he was
D legally justified in doing the act owing to ignorance of the existence of
relevant facts, or mistake as to them. [789A-E; 790A]

Rattan Lal and Dhirajlal's Law of Crimes, 23rd edn., p. 199 and
Russel on crimes, vol. 1, p. 76; 79 relied upon and Emperor v. Jag- +'
mohan Thukral & Anr., AIR (1947) All. 99, Dhara Singh v. Emperor,
E AIR (1947) Lahore 249 and Chiranji v. State, AIR (1952) Nag. 282,
distinguished. -
3. But the present case was not the one where a person being ·~.
ignorant of the existence of the relevant facts or mistaken as to them is
.'r-- ....
\
guilty of conduct which may produce harmful result which he never
F intended. There W3.'> complete absence of good faith on the part of the
respondent. Undoubtedly the deceased and the respondent were having
strained relations. From the dying declaration as well as the extra-
judicial confession it is apparent that the deceased after the recital of
Bhagbat had gone near to the pond to take the bell-metal utensils.
Apparently, the respondent was waiting for an opportunity to settle the
G account when he struck the deceased with the lathi blow and there was ,__
no occasion for him in the circumstances proved to have believed that
he was striking at a thief. Even if he was a thief, that fact by itself would
not justify the respondent dealing a lathi blow on the head of the
deceased. The deceased had not effected an entry into the house nor he
was anywhere near it. It appears that the respondent stealthily followed
H him and took the opportunity to settle score by dealing him with lathi
ORISSA v. ll. BARIK [SEN. J.] 787

with great force on a vulnerable part of the body like the head which
A
-{ resulted in his death. There is no suggestion that he wielded the lathi in
the right of self defence. The respondent, therefore, must face the con-
sequences. Although it cannot be said from the circumstances appear-
ing that the respondent had any intention to kill the deceased, he must
in the circumstances be attributed with knowledge when he struck the
deceased on the head with a lathi that it was likely to cause his death. B
' Therefore, the respondent is convicted under s. 304 Part II of the IPC
-~. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years. [791C-G]

• "fC CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 405 of 1978.

From the Judgment and Order dated 9.8.1977 of the High Court
c
~ of Orissa in Criminal Appeal No. 131of1975.

Prithvi Raj and R.K. Mehta for the Appellant.

G.S. Chatterjee for the Respondent. D

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

J_. SEN, J. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are
' satisfied that the judgment of acquittal entered by the High Court was
apparently erroneous and has caused manifest miscarriage of justice. E
4
We are rather surprised that the High Court should have given ere-
dence to the defence plea of mistake of fact under s. 79 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860. The evidence on record shows that the respondent
) and the deceased had strained relations over grazing of catties. On the
~~
date of incident the deceased had gone to the house of PW 2 for recital
~ of Bhagbat. Some other villagers including the respondent was also F
present there. At about 10 p.m. recital of Bhagbat was over and the
·deceased returned to the house. Some time thereafter, a hue and cry
l, was raised from near the house of the respondent. Several villagers
including PWs 2, 3, 4 and 5 ran to the place. They saw the deceased
lying on the ground in a pool of blood with a head in jury. The respon-
dent along with his mother and wife were tending the deceased and G

~ wiping out blood. The deceased was till then in his senses and on query
by the villagers stated that the respondent had assaulted him. On being
' questioned, the respondent stated that during the daytime his bell-
metal utensil had been stolen and he was keeping a watch for the thief.
He saw a person coming inside his premises and thinking him to be a
thief he dealt a lathi blow but subsequently discovered that it was the H
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

deceased. On being taken back to his house the deceased told his wife
A
PW 6 that he had been assaulted by the respondent in the presence of 'r-·
his son and grandson PWs 8 and 7. The Doctor PW 9 who performed
the post-mortem examination found multiple injuries on the body. On
dissection he found a depressed comminuted fracture over the right
perietal bone and a transverse fracture extending below left parietal
B prominence. As per the doctor, the head injury could have been
caused by a single stroke by means of a lathi if the stroke was dealt
with great force. On this evidence, the learned Sessions Judge very
rightly and properly held the respondent guilty of culpable homicide ""
not amounting to murder punishable under s. 304 Part II of the Indian
Penal Code.
~.
-
c According to the High Court, the dying declaration made by the
deceased as also the extra-judicial confession made by the respondent
showed that the deceased had kept the bell-metal utensil under water
~
in the pond. At the time of occurrence, the deceased had been to the
p:>nd to take out the bell-metal utensil. Admittedly, it was a dark
D night. The defence plea was that the respondent had been apprehen-
sive of further theft of his bell-metal utensils. When he found someone
near the pond, he asked who the person was. As there was no re-
sponse, believing that person to be a thief, he assaulted him but there-
after discovered that it was the deceased. The High Court held that in -f.
the circumstances, the respondent had not committed any offence and
E was protected under s. 79 of the Indian Penal Code. It accepted that
the onus to establish the facts to sustain the plea of mistake of fact
under s. 79 lay on the respondent and he had to establish his plea of
-
reasonable probability or, in other words, on preponderance of proba-
-~
..
bility either by adducing evidence or by cross-examining the prosecu-
tion witnesses. It referred to some cases where different High Courts
·~
F under the facts and circumstances of the particular case appearing ~
extended the benefit of s. 79 of the Indian Penal Code to the accused
where it was proved that the accused had acted under a mistake of fact
i.e. an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of circumstances
which, if proved, would make the act for which the accused is indicted
an innocent act.
G
Section 79 of the Indian Penal Code provides that nothing is an
..__
offence which is done by any person who is justified by law, or who by
reason of mistake of fact and not by reason of mistake of law, in good
faith, believes himself to be justified by law, in doing it. Under this
section, although an act may not be justified by law, yet if it is done
H under a mistake of fact, in the belief in good faith that it is justified by
ORISSA v. B. BARIK [SEN, J.J 789

law it will not be an offence. Such cases are not uncommon where the
Courts in the facts and circumstances of the particular case have ex- A
/

i onerated the accused under s. 79 on the ground of his having acted in
good faith under the belief, owing to a mistake of fact that he was
justified in doing the act which constituted an offence. As laid down in
s. 52 of the Indian Penal Code, nothing is said to be done or believed in
good faith which is done or believed without due care and attention. B
The question of good faith must be considered with reference to the
-~ position of the accused and the Circumstances under which he acted.
'Good faith' requires not logical infallibility but due care and atten-
.~ tion. The question of good faith is always a question of fact to be
•
determined in accordance with the proved facts and circumstances of
each case. 'Mistake of fact' as put succinctly in Ratanlal and Dhirajlal's
Law of Crimes, 23rd edn, p. 199 means: c
--{ " 'Mistake' is not mere forgetfulness. It is a slip 'made, not
by design, but by mischance'. Mistake, as the term is used
in jurisprudence, is an erroneous mental condition, con-
ception or conviction induced by ignorance, misapprehen- D
sion or misunderstanding of the truth, and resulting in
some act or omission done or suffered erroneously by one
or both of the parties to a transaction, but without its
+' erroneous character being intended or known at that time.··

It may be laid down• as a general rule that an alleged offender is E
~
deemed to have acted under that state of things which he in good faith
and on reasonable grounds believed to exist when he did the act
alleged to be an offence. In the classical work Russel on Crime, vol. I,
~ p. 76, the concept of mistake of fact is tersely stated thus:

' -{ "When a person is ignorant of the existence of relevant F
facts, or mistaken as to them, his conduct may produce
harmful results which he neither intended nor foresaw."
,
At p. 79, the law is stated in these words:

"Mistake can be admitted as a defence provided (!) that G

i the state of things believed to exist would, if true, have
justified the act done, and (2) the mistake must be reason-
able, and (3) that the mistake relates to fact and not to
law."

The cases on which the High Court has relied were cases where H
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

the circumstances showed that the accused had acted under a bona fide
A
belief that he was legally justified in doing the act owing to ignorance
of the existence of relevant facts, or mistake as to them. There is no
need to encumber the judgment with many citations. We would only
refer to three illustrative cases. In Emperor v. Jagmohan Thukral &
Anr., AIR 1947 All. 99 the accused while travelling from Saharanpur
B to Dehradun near the Mohand pass picked up the loaded gun when he
saw the eyes of an animal and fired at it which unfortunately hit two
military officers. There was nothing to show that the accused knew
that there was a military camp or that any military exercise was going
on. The question was whether the accused was liable for having com-
mitted an offence punishable under s. 307 of the Indian Penal Code.
C The Court held that the accused was protected bys. 79 observing.

"If he mistook something else as an animal, then s. 79
Penal Code comes to his rescue."

That was a case where the accused under a bona fide mistake shot at an
D object thinking him to be an animal and the mistake was held to be one
made in good faith. In Dhara Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1947 Lahore 249
it was held that the accused was labouring under a mistake of fact with
regard to the identity of the persons who had surrounded his house
followed by an exchange of fire, thinking them to be his adversaries
and by reason of that mistake of fact, Explanation I to s. 99 gave to
E him a right of private defence. This again was a case where the accused
shot and killed another person under a mistaken belief, in good faith,
that such person had intruded his house for the purpose of killing him
and that he has a reasonable belief that he was entitled to open fire in
exercise of his supposed right of private defence. In Chirangi v. State,
AIR (1952) Nag. 282 where an accused under a moment of delusion,
F considered that his own son, to whom he was attached, was a tiger and
he accordingly assaulted him with an axe, thinking by reason of mis-
take of fact that he was justified in destroying the deceased whom he
did not regard to be a human being but a dangerous animal. It was held
that the accused was protected under s. 79 of the Indian Penal Code. '
The Court held that the poignant case which resulted in a tragedy was
G due to delusion of mind, and stated:

"It is abundantly clear that if, Chirangi had for a single
moment thought that the object of his attack was his son.
he would have desisted forthwith. There was no reason of
any kind why he should have attacked him and, as shown,
H they were mutually devoted. In short, all that happened
ORISSA '- B. BARIK [SEN. J.J 791

was that the appellant in a moment 01'._ delusion had con-
sidered that his target was a tiger and he accodingly A
assailed it with his axe."

These considerations do not arise in the present case. There was comp-
lete absence of good faith on the part of the respondent. It cannot be
doubted that the deceased and the respondent were having strained B

-~
relations and the respondent knew full well that the deceased had
come for the recital of Bhagbat at the house of PW 2 which he
attended along with others. From the dying declaration as well. as the
- ~ extra-judicial confession it is apparent that the deceased after the
recital of Bhagbat had gone near the pond to take the bell-metal
utensil. Apparently, the respondent was waioting for an opportunity to
settle the account when he struck the deceased with the lathi blow and c
.J,
there was no occasion for him in the circumstances proved to have
believed that he was striking at a thief. This is not a case where a
person being ignorant of the existence of the relevant facts or mistaken
as to them is guilty of conduct which may produce harmful result which
he never intended. Even if he was a thief, that fact by itself would not D
justify the respondent dealing a lathi blow on the head of the
deceased. The deceased had not effected an entry into the house nor
was he anywhere near it. He had gone to the pond to fetch his bell-
+ metal utensil. It appears that the respondent stealthily followed him
and took the opportunity to settle score by dealing him with a lathi
with great force on a vulnerable part of the body like the head which E
' resulted in his death. There is no suggestion that he wielded the lathi in
the right of self-defence. The respondent therefore must face the con-

" -(
•sequences. Although it cannot be said from the circumstances appear-
ing that the respondent had any intention to kill the deceased, he must
in the circumstances be attributed with knowledge when he struck the
deceased on the head with a lathi that it was likely to cause his death. F
The respondent was therefore guilty of culpable homicide not amount-
ing to murder under s. 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code.

We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and
order of the High Court .and convict the respondent for having com-
mitted an offence punishable under s. 304 Part II of the Indian Penal G
Code. The respondent is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for a term of three years. The bail bonds of the respondent shall stand
cancelled and he shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the
remaining part of the sentence. ·

A.P.J. Appeal allowed.