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Supreme Court of India

STATE OF ORISSA & ORS.versusBHAGYADHAR DASH

Citation
2011 INSC 449
Decided
4 July 2011
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

The proviso to Clause 10 is not an arbitration agreement; it merely provides an administrative method for rate determination and does not bind the parties to arbitration.

Summary

The State of Orissa entered into construction contracts that contained Clause 10, which dealt with additions, alterations and the execution of non‑tendered items of work, and provided that any dispute over the rate for such work would be finally decided by the Superintending Engineer. Contractors, dissatisfied with the Engineer‑in‑Charge’s rate determination, filed applications under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking arbitration; the Orissa High Court held that the last sentence of the proviso to Clause 10 was an arbitration agreement and appointed arbitrators. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the clause truly manifested an intention to refer disputes to arbitration and whether the Superintending Engineer’s decision was binding in the sense required by an arbitration agreement. The Court found that the clause merely provided an administrative mechanism for rate fixation, did not refer disputes to a private tribunal, and did not make the Engineer’s decision binding as an arbitral award; moreover, the original arbitration clause (Clause 23) had been deleted from contracts after 24‑12‑1981, precluding any implication that Clause 10 was an arbitration provision. Relying on earlier precedents defining the essentials of an arbitration agreement, the Court concluded that Clause 10’s proviso is not an arbitration agreement. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, the High Court’s appointment of arbitrators was set aside, and the applications for arbitration were dismissed.

Issues considered

  • The last sentence of the proviso to Clause 10 of the contract is an arbitration agreement within the meaning of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
  • Whether the decision of the Superintending Engineer is binding and constitutes a reference to arbitration.
  • Effect of the deletion of the original arbitration clause (Clause 23) on the interpretation of Clause 10.

Legislation cited

Subjects

arbitration agreementcontract clause interpretationSection 11Superintending Engineernon‑tendered workArbitration and Conciliation Actbinding decision

Judgment

                    [2011) 8 S.C.R. 967

                STATE OF ORISSA & ORS.                             A
                              v.
                    BHAGYADHAR DASH
              (Civil Appeal No. 4933 of 2011)
                      . JULY 04, 2011
                                                                   B
      [R.V. RAVEENDRAN AND A.K. PATNAIK, JJ.]

     Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - s.11 - Clause
 10 of the conditions of contract (forming part of the
agreements between the State and the contractors) related to       C
power of the Engineer-in-Chief to make adciitions and
alterations in the drawings and specifications and execution
of non-tendered additional items of work - The last sentence
of the proviso to cfause 10 provided that where in regard to a
non-tendered additional work executed by the contractor, if the    D
contractor was not satisfied with the unilateral determination.
of the rate therefor by the Engineer-in-Charge the rate for such
work will be finally determined by the Superintending Engineer
- Disputes raised by contractors against the State
Government - Applications filed by contractors u/s. 11 - _Chief    E
Justice of High Court held that the last sentence of the proviso
to the said clause 10 was an arbitration agreement and
appointed arbitrators to decide the disputes - On appeal,
held: The last sentence of the proviso to clause 10 did not
make the decision of the Superintending Engineer binding on        F
either party - The decision of Superintending Engineer was·
not a judicial determination, but decision of one party which
was open to challenge by the other party in a court of law -
 That clause 10 was never intended to be an arbitration
agreement is evident from the contract itself - The Standard
Conditions of Contract of the state government, as originally      G
formulated consisted of a provision (Clause 23) relating to
settlement of disputes by arbitration- The.said clause was
deleted by the State Government fr.om the Standard

                             967                                   H
    968       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2011] 8 S.C.R.

A Conditions of Contract by official Memorandum dated
  24.12.1981 - Contracts entered by the State Government
  subsequent to 24.12.1981, as in the instant cases, did not
  have the saic! arbitration clause, though the other Conditions
  of Contract remained the same - When the State
B Government consciously and intentionally deleted the
  provision for arbitration from its contracts, it will be a travesty
  of justice to read another clause in the contract providing for
  execution of non-tendered items and the method of
  determination of the rates therefor, as a provision for
c arbitration - Orders of the High Court appointing the arbitrator
  set aside and applications for appointment of arbitrator
  dismissed.

         Clause 10 of the conditions of contract (forming part
    of the agreements between the State and the contractors)
D   related to power of the Engineer-in-Chief to make
    additions and alterations in the drawings ~nd
    specifications and execution of non-tendered additional
    items of work. The last sentence oi the proviso to clause
    10 provided that where in regard to a non-tendered
E   additional work executed by the contractor, if the
    contractor was not satisfied with the unilateral
    determination of the rate therefor by the Engineer-in-
    Charge the rate for such work will be finally determined
    by the Superintending Engineer. The Chief Justice of
F   Orissa High Court held that the last sentence of the
    proviso to clause 10 was an arbitration agreement and
    allowed the applications filed by the contractors under
    Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996
    and appointed arbitrators to decide the disputes raised
G   by them against the State Government.
        The appellants challenged the said orders on the
    ground that there was no arbitration agreement and
    therefore the applications under section 11 of the Act filed
    by the contractors ought to have been dismissed.
H
 STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. v. BHAGYADHAR DASH 969


     The question· that therefore arose for consideration      A
in the present appeal was whether the said clause 10 of
the conditions of contract was an arbitration agreement.
     Allowing the appeals, the Court
     HELD:1.1. The clause for consideration in the instant     B
case i.e. Clause 10 of the Conditions of Contract provides
for the following: a) that the Engineer-in-charge could
make additions and alterations in the drawings/
specifications; and that such alterations and additions
will not invalidate the contract, but will entitle the         C
contractor to extension of time for completion of work
proportionately; b) that if the additional work be executed
is an item for which the rate is not specified in the
contract (or in the schedule of rates for the district), the
contractor shall specify the rate and the Engineer-in-         D
charge may either accept the rate or cancel the order to
execute that particular work; and c) that if the contractor
commences the work with reference to an item for which
there is no rate in the contract and there is no agreement
in regard to the rate for execution of such work, he shaU      E
be paid at the rates fixed by the Engineer-in -Charge; and
d) that if the contractor disputes the rate fixed by the
Engineer-in-Charge, the decision of the Superintending
Engineer in regard to rate for such non-scheduled item
shall be final. [Para 14) [987-A-F]                            F

      1.2. The last sentence of the proviso to clause 10
 does not refer to arbitration as the mode of settlement of
 disputes. It does not provide for reference of disputes
 between the parties to arbitration. It does not make the
 decision of the Superintending Engineer binding on            G
·either party. It does not provide or refer to any procedure
 which would show that the Superintending Engineer is
 to act judicially after considering the submissions of both
 parties. It does not disclose any intention to make the
                                                               H
   970      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2011] 8 S.C.R.

A Superintending Engineer an arbitrator in respect of
   disputes that tnay arise between the Engineer-in-Charge
   and the contractor: It does not make the decision of the
   Superintending Engineer final on any dispute, other than
   the claim for increase in rates for non-tendered items. It
B operates in a limited sphere, that is, where in regard to a
   non-tendered additional work executed by the contractor,
   if the contractor is not satisfied with the unilateral
   determination of the rate therefor by the Engineer-in-
   Charge the rate for such work will be finally determined
c by the Superintending Engineer. It is a provision made
   with the intention to avoid future disputes regarding rates
   for non-tendered item. It is not a provision for reference
   of future disputes or settlement of future disputes. The
   decision of superintending Engineer is not a judicial
0 determination, but decision of one party which is open
   to challenge by the other party in a court of law. The said
   clause can by no stretch of imagination be considered
  ·to. be an arbitration agreement. The said clause is not,
   and was never intended to be, a provision relating to
E settlement of disputes. [Para 15] [987-G-H; 988-A-E]

       1.3. That clause 10 was never intended to be an
  arbitration agreement is evident from the contract itself.
  The Standard Conditions of Contract of the state
  government, as originally formulated consisted of a
F provision (Clause 23) relating to settlement of disputes,
  by arbitration. The said clause was deleted by the State
  Government from the Standard Conditions of Contract by
  official Memorandum dated 24.12.1981. Contracts entered
  by the State Government thereafter did not have the said
G arbitration clause, though the other Conditions of
  Contract remained the same. The contracts in all these
  cases are of a period subsequent to 24.12.1981 and the
  Conditions of Contract forming part of these contracts do
  not contain the arbitration clause. When the State
H Government has consciously and intentionally deleted
STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. v. BHAGYADHAR DASH 971


 he provision for arbitration from its contracts, it will be a   A
 ravesty of justice to read another clause in the contract
 Jroviding for execution of non-tendered items and the
 nethod of determination of the rates therefor, as a
.>rovision for arbitration. In Executive Engineer RCO vs.
 Suresh Chandra Panda, this Court considered the effect          8
of the said clause relating to execution of non-tendered
items, vis-a-vis clause 23 in a pre-1981 contract. This
.:ourt held that the said clause (then numbered as clause
11, numbered as clause 10 in subsequent contracts) was
a provision which excluded the issue relating to finality        C
of rates, from the scope of arbitration agreement
contained in clause 23. Thus, even when the Standard
Conditions of Contract contained a provision for
arbitration (vide clause 23), clause 10 was considered to
be a provision dealing with a matter excepted from
arbitration. The proviso to clause 10, which provides that       D
the decision of the Superintending Engineer is 'final',
merely discloses an intention to exclude the rates for
extra items decided by the Superintending Engineer from
the scope of arbitration, as an excepted matter, when
there was an arbitration agreement (clause 23) in the            E
contract. When the arbitration agreement was deleted,
provision dealing with non-tendered items cannot be
described as an arbitration agreement. [Paras 16, 17]
[988-F; 989-D-H; 990-G-H; 991-A]
                                                                 F
     1.4. The orders of the High Court appointing the
arbitrator are therefore set aside and the applications for
appointment of arbitrator are dismissed. [Para 18] [991-
B]

     K K Modi vs.KN Modi 1998 (3) sec 573: 1998 (1).SCR          G
601; Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation v. Encon
Builders (IP) Ltd.- 2003 (7) sec 418: 2003 (2) Suppl. SCR
812; Jagdish Chander vs. Ram Chandra 2007 (5) SCC 719:
2007 (5) SCR 720; State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Tipper Chand
                                                                 H
       972       .SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2011) 8 S.C.R.


 ~     1980 (2) SCC 341; State of Orissa vs. Damodar Das 1996
       (2) SCC 216: 1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 800 and Bharat Bhushan
       Bansal vs. Uttar Pradesh Small Industries Corporation Ltd.,
       Kanpur 1999 (2) SCC 166: 1999 (1) SCR 181; Rukmanibai
       Gupta v. Collector, Jabalpur 1980 (4) SCC 566; Punjab State
 8     v. Dina Nath 2001 (5) sec 28: 2001 (6 ) SCR 536;
       Mallikarjun v. Gulbarga University 2004 (1) SCC 372: 2003
       (5) Suppl. SCR 272 and Executive Engineer RCO vs. Suresh
       Chandra Panda 1999 (9) SCC 92 - referred to.

        Hudson on 'Building and Engineering Contracts' 11th
 C Edition, Volume II and Russell on Arbitration 19th Edn. -
   referred to.

                            Case Law Reference:
             1998 (1) SCR 601           referred to        Para 3
 D
             2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 812 referred to           Paras 3, 11
             2007 (5) SCR 720           referred to        Para 4
             1980 (2) sec 341           referred to        Para 7
 E           1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 800 referred to           Para 8
             1999 (1) SCR 181           referred to        Para 9
             1980 (4) sec 566           referred to        Para 10

 F           2007 (6 ) SCR 536          referred to        Para 11
             2003 (5) Suppl. SCR 272 referred to           Para 12
             1999 (9) sec s2            referred to        Para 17

 G         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
       4933 of 2011.

           From the Judgment & Order dated 15.02.2008 of the High
       Court of Orissa at Cuttack in Arbitration Application No. 36 of
       2005.
Ji._
STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. v. BHAGYADHAR DASH 973


                                WITH                                 A
':-.A. Nos. 4935, 4936, 4934, 4937, 4939, 4940, 4941. 4942,
4943, 4944, 4945, 4946 of 2011.

    S.B. Upadhyay, Shibashish Misra, R.C. Kohli, Ashok
Kumar Singh, Sapam Biswajit Meitei, Surender Dutt Sharma,            8
Param Kr. Mishra, Pawan Kishore Singh, Rana S. Biswas,
Mattugupta Mishra, Amitab Narendra, Sunil .Sharma, Anurag
Sharma, K.N. Tripathy, Manoj K. Das, Nikilesh Ramachandran,
M.R. Mishra, Rutwik Panda for the appearing parties.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                     c
    R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J. 1. Leave granted. ·

     2. These appeals by special leave are by the State of
Orissa aggrieved by the orders of the Chief Justice of Orissa        D
High Court allowing the applications filed under Section 11 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 ('Act' for short) filed
by contractors and appointing arbitrators to decide the disputes
raised by them against the State Government. The learned
Chief Justice held that the last sentence of the proviso to clause   E
10 of the conditions of contract (forming part of the agreements
between the state and the contractors) is an arbitration
agreement. The appellants challenge the said orders on the
ground that there is no arbitration agreement and therefore the
applications under section 11 of the Act filed by the contractors    F
ought to have been dismissed. Therefore the short question that
arises for our consideration in these appeals is whether the said
clause .is an arbitration agreement.

The essentials of an arbitration agreement
                                                                     G
    3. In K K Modi vs. KN Modi [1998 (3) SCC 573] this court
enumerated the following attributes of a valid arbitration
agreement:

     "(1) The arbitration agreement must contemplate that the        H
    974        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011) 8 S.C.R.

A         decision of the Tribunal will be binding on the parties to
          the _agreement,

          (2) that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide the rights
          of parties must derive either from the consent of the parties
          or from an order of the Court or from a statute, the terms
B
          of which make it clear that the process is to be an
          arbitration,                                       ·

          (3) the agreement must contemplate that substantive rights
          of parties will be determined by the agreed tribunal,
c
          (4) that the tribunal will determine the rights of the parties
          in an impartial and judicial manner, with the tribunal owing
          an equal obligation of fairness towards both sides,

          (5) that the agreement of the parties to refer their disputes
D         to the decision of the Tribunal must be intended to be
          enforceable in law, and lastly,

          (6) the agreement must contemplate that the tribunal will·
          make a decision upon a dispute which is already
E         formulated at the time when a reference is made to the
          Tribunal."

  Following K.K. Modi and other cases, Bihar State Mineral
  Development Corporation v. Encon Builders (IP) Ltd. - 2003
F (7) sec 418, this court listed the following as the essential
  elements of an arbitration agreement:

          "(i) There must be a present or a future difference in
          connection with some contemplated affair;

G         (ii) There must be the intention of the parties to settle such
          difference by a private tribunal;

          (iii) The parties must agree in writing to be bound by the
          decision of such tribunal; and

H         (iv) The parties must be ad idem."
STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. v. BHAGYADHAR DASH 975
           [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
     4. In Jagdish Chander vs. Ram Chandra [2007 (5) SCC            A
719), this Court, after referring to the cases on the issue, set
out the following principles in regard to what constitutes an
arbitration agreement :

    "(i) The intention of the parties to enter into an arbitration 8
    agreement shall have to be gathered from the terms of the
    agreement. If the terms of the agreement clearly indicate
    an intention on the part of the parties to the agreement to
    refer their disputes to a private tribunal for adjudication and
    an willingness to be bound by the decision of such tribunal C
    on such disputes, it is arbitration agreement. While there
    is no specific form of an arbitration agreement, the words
    used should disclose a determination and obligation to go
    to arbitration and not merely contemplate the possibility of
    going for arbitration. Where there is merely a possibility
    of the parties agreeing to arbitration in future, as contrasted D
    frQm an obligation to refer disputes to arbitration, there is
    no valid and binding arbitration agreement.                     ·

    (ii) Even if the words 'arbitration' and 'arbitral tribunal (or
    arbitrator)' are not used with reference to the process of E
    settlement or with reference to the private tribunal which
    has to adjudicate upon the disputes, in a clause relating
    to settlement of disputes, it does not detract from the
    clause being an arbitration agreement if it has the
    attributes or elements of an arbitration agreement. They are F
    : (a) The agreement should be in writing. (b) The parties
    should have agreed to refer any disputes (present or future)
    between them to the decision of a private tribunal. (c) The
    private tribunal should be empowered to adjudicate upon
    the disputes in an impartial manner, giving due opportunity G
    to the parties to put forth their case before it. (d) The
    parties should have agreed that the decision of the Private
    Tribunal in respect of the disputes will be binding on them.

    {iii) Where the clause provides that in the event of disputes
    arising between the parties, the disputes shall be referred     H
    976        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2011) 8 S.C.R.


A         to Arbitration, it is an arbitration agreement. Where there
          is a specific and direct expression of intent to have the
          disputes settled by arbitration, it is not necessary to set
          out the attributes of an arbitration agreement to make it
          an arbitration agreement. But where the clause relating to
B         settlement of disputes, contains words which specifically
          excludes any of the attributes of an arbitration agreement
          or contains anything that detracts from an arbitration
          agreement, it will not be an arbitration agreement. For
          example, where an agreement requires or permits an
c         authority to decide a claim or dispute without hearing, or
          requires the authority to act in the interests of only one of
          the parties, or provides that the decision of the Authority
          will not be final and binding on the parties, or that if either
          party is not satisfied with the decision of the Authority, he
          may file a civil suit seeking relief, it cannot be termed as
D
          an arbitration agreement.

          (iv) But mere use of the word 'arbitration' or 'arbitrator' in
          a clause will not make it an arbitration agreement, if it
          requires or contemplates a further or fresh consent of the
E         parties for reference to arbitration. For example, use of
          words such as "parties can, if they so desire, refer their
          disputes to arbitration" or "in the event of any dispute, the
          parties may also agree to refer the same to arbitration" or
          "if any disputes arise between the parties, they should
F         consider settlement by arbitration" in a clause relating to
          settlement of disputes, indicate that the clause is not
          intended to be an arbitration agreement. Similarly, a clause
          which states that "ifthe parties so decide, the disputes
          shall be referred to arbitration" or "any disputes between
G         parties, if they so agree, shall be referred to arbitration"
          is not an arbitration agreement. Such clauses merely
          indicate a desire or hope to have the disputes settled by
          arbitration, or a tentative arrangement to explore
          arbitration as a mode of settlement if and when a dispute
          arises. Such clauses require the parties to arrive at a
H
STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. v. BHAGYADHAR DASH ·977
           [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

    further agreement to go to arbitration, as and when the A
    disputes arise. Any agreement or clause in an agreement
    requiring or.contemplating a further consent or consensus.
    before a reference to arbitration, is not an arbitration
    agreement, but an agreement to enter into an arbitration
    agreement in future."                                      B

    5. The following passage from Russell on Arbitration (19th
Edn. Page 59) throws some light on this issue:

     "If it appears from the terms of the agreement by which a
     matter is submitted to a person's decision, that the intention C
     of the parties was that he should hold an enquiry in the
     nature of a judicial enquiry and hear the respective cases
     of the parties and decide upon evidence laid before him,
     then the case is one of an arbitration. The intention in such
     case is that there shall be a judicial inquiry worked out in D
     a judicial manner. On the other hand, there are cases in
     which a person is appointed to ascertain some matter for
     the purpose of preventing differences from arising, not of
     setting them when they have arisen".
                                                                    E
Cases whel'e the tests were applied to different clauses
to find out whether they could be termed as 'arbitration
agreement'

    6. In K.K. Modi, the clause that arose for consideration was
as under:                                                          F

    "9. Implementation will be done in consultation with the
    financial institutions. For all disputes, clarification etc., in
    respect of implementation of this agreement, the same shall
    be referred to the Chairman, IFCI or his nominees whose G
    decisions will be final and binding on both the groups".

This Court held tha.t the said clause was not an arbitration
agreement on the following reasoning:

    "Therefore our Courts have laid emphasis on (1) existence H
    978        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 8 S.C.R.


          of disputes as against intention to avoid future dispute; (2)
          the tribunal or forum so chosen is intended to act judicially
          after taking into account relevant evidence before it and
          the submissions made·by the parties before it; and (3) the
          decision is intended to bind the parties. Nomenclature
B         used by the parties may not be conclusive.

          The purport of Clause 9 is to prevent any further disputes
          between Groups A and B. Because the agreement
          requires division of assets in agreed proportions after their
          valuation by a named body and under a scheme of division
c         by another named body. Clause 9 is intended to clear any
          other difficulties which may arise in the implementation of
          the agreement by leaving it to the decision of the Chairman,
          IFCI. This clause does not contemplate any judicial
          determination by the Chairman of the IFCI . .. Thus,
D         clause 9 is not intended to be for any different decision
          than what is already agreed upon between the parties to
          the dispute. It is meant for proper implementation of the
          settlement already arrived at. A judicial determination,
          recording of evidence etc. are not contemplated .. ."
E
                                                 (emphasis supplied)

       7.ln State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Tipper Chand - 1980 (2)
    sec 341, the following clause fell for consideration:
F         "Except where otherwise specified in the contract the
          decision of the Superintending Engineer for the time being
          shall be final, conclusive and binding on all parties to the
          contract upon all questions relating to the meaning of the
          specifications, design, drawing and instructions
G         hereinbefore mentioned. The decision of such Engineer as
          to the quality of workmanship, or materials used on the
          work, or as to any other question, claim, right, matter or
          things whatsoever, in any way arising out of or relating to
          the contract, designs, drawing specifications, estimates,
H         instructions, orders, or these conditions, or otherwise
 STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. v. BHAGYADHAR DASH 979
            [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

     concerning the works, or the execution or failure to execute     A
     the same, whether arising during the progress of the work,
     or after the completion or abandonment of the contract by
     the Contractor, shall also be final, conclusive and binding
     on the Contractor".
                                                                      B
 The High Court held that the clause was not an arbitration
 agreement, as it merely conferred power on the Superintending
 Engineer to take a decision on his own and did not authorise
 parties to refer any matter to his decision. This court clarified
 that in the absence of a provision for reference of disputes         C
 between parties for settlement, clause merely stating that the
 "decision of the Superintending Engineer shall be final" was not
 an arbitration agreement. This Court clarified that an arbitration
 agreement can either be in express terms or can be inferred
 or spelt out from the terms of the clause; and that if the purpose
 of the clause is only to vest in the named Authority, the power      D
 of supervision of the execution of the work and administrative
 control over it from time to time, it is not an arbitration
 agreement. It also held that the clause did not contain any
 express arbitration agreement, nor spelt out by implication any
 ~rbitration agreement as it did not mention any dispute or           E
~reference of such dispute for decision.

     8. In State of Orissa vs. Damodar Das [1996 (2) SCC
216], a three Judge Bench of this court considered whether the
following clause is an arbitration agreement:                         F

     "25. Decision of Public Health Engineer to be final.-
     Except where otherwise specified in this contract, the
     decision of the public Health Engineer for the time being
     shall be final, conclusive and binding on all parties to the
     contract upon all questions relating to the meaning of the       G
     specifications; drawings and instructions hereinbefore
     mentioned and as to the quality of workmanship or material
     use on the work, or as to any other question, claim, right,
     matter or thing, whatsoever in any way arising out of, or
     relating to, the contract, drawings, specifications,             H
     980        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011) 8 S.C.R.


A·         estimates, instructions, orders or these conditions, or
           otherwise concerning the works or the execution of failure ~
           to execute the same, whether arising during the progress
           of the work or after the completion or the sooner
           determination thereof of the contract".
B
     Following the decision in Tipper Chand, this Court held that the
     said clause did not amount to an arbitration agreement, on the
     following reasoning:

          "It would, thereby, be clear that this Court laid down as a
C         rule that the arbitration agreement must expressly or by
          implication be spelt out that there is an agreement to refer
          any dispute or difference for an arbitration and the clause
          in the contract must contain such an agreement. We are
          in respectful agreement with the above ratio. It is obvious
D         that for resolution of any dispute or difference arising
          between two parties to a contract, the agreement must
          provide expressly or by necessary implication, a reference
        · to an arbitrator riamed therein or otherwise of any dispute
          or difference and in its absence it is difficult to spell out
E         existence of such an agreement for reference to an
          arbitration to resolve the dispute or difference contracted
          between the parties."

                                                 (emphasis supplied)

F         9. In Bharat Bhushan Bansal vs. Uttar Pradesh Small
     Industries Corporation Ltd., Kanpur (1999 (2) SCC 166), the
     following clauses fell for consideration of this Court:

           "Decision of the Executive Engineer of the UPSIC to
G          be final on certain matters
           Except where otherwise specified in the contract, the
           decision of the Executive Engineer shall be final, conclusive
           and binding on both the parties to the contract on all
           questions relating to the meaning, the specification, design,
H          drawings and instructions hereinbefore mentioned, and as
STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. v. BHAGYADHAR DASH 981
           [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
    to the quality of workmanship or materials used on the             A
    work or as to any other question whatsoever in any way
    arising out of for relating to the designs, drawings,
    specifications, estimates, instructions, orders or otherwise
    concerning the works or the execution or failure to execute
    the same whether arising during the progress of the work,          B
    or after the completion thereof or abandonment of the
    contract by the Contractor shall be final and conclusive and
    binding on the Contractor.
    Decision of the MD of the UPSIC on all other matters
    shall be final                                                     C
    Except as provided in Clause 23 hereof, the decision of
    the Managing Director of the UPSIC shall be final,
    conclusive and binding on both the parties to the contract
    upon all questions relating to any claim, right, matter or thing   D
    in any way arising out of or relating to the contract or these
    conditions or concerning abandonment of the contract by
    the Contractor and in respect of all other matter arising out
    of this contract and not specifically mentioned herein".
    · This Court held that the said clauses did not amount to          E
arbitration agreement on the following reasoning:
    "In the present case, reading Clauses 23 and 24 together,
     it is quite clear that in respect of questions arising from or
    relating to any claim or right, matter or thing in any way
                                                                       F
    connected with the contract, while the decision of the
    Executive Engineer is made final and binding in respect
    of certain types of claims or questions, the decision of the
    Managing Director is made final and binding in respect of
    the remaining claims. Both the Executive Engineer as well          G
    as the Managing Director are expected to determine the
    question or claim on the basis of their own investigations
    and material. Neither of the clauses contemplates a fu/1-
    fledged arbitration covered by the Arbitration Act".

                                             {emphasis supplied)       ~
    982        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2011) 8 S.C.R.


  This Court while noting the distinction between a 'P.reventer of
  disputes' and an 'adjudicator of disputes', observed that the
  Managing Director under clause 24 of the agreement, was more
  in the category of an expert who will decide claims, rights, or
  matters in any way pertaining to the contract and the object of
B his decision is to avoid disputes and not decide disputes in a
  quasi-judicial manner. This court also referred to an illustration
  given in Hudson on 'Building and Engineering Contracts' (11th
  Edition, Volume II, para 18.067) stating that the following clause
  was not an arbitration clause and that the duties of the Engineer
c mentioned therein were administrative and not judicial:
          "(E)ngineer shall be the exclusive judge upon all matters
          relating to the construction, incidents and the
          consequences of these presents, and of the tender
          specifications, schedule and drawings of the Contract, and
D         in regard to the execution of the works or otherwise arising
          out of or in connection with the contract, and also as
          regards all matters of account, including the final balance
          payable to the contract, and the certificate of the engineer
          for the time being, given under his hand, shall be binding
E         and conclusive on both parties".

         10. We may next refer to the three decisions of this Court
    relied on by the respondents, where on interpretation, cl~u..ises
    though not described as 'arbitration clauses', were held to be
F   arbitration clauses, by applying the tests as to what constitute
    an arbitration agreement. In Rukmanibai Gupta v. Collector,
    Jabalpur - 1980 (4) SCC 566, this Court considered whether
    the following clause amounted to an arbitration agreement :

           "15. Whenever any doubt, difference or dispute shall
G          hereafter arise touching the construction of these presents
            or anything herein contained or any matter or things
           connected with the said lands or the working or non-
           working thereof or the amount or payment of any rent or
          . royalty reserved or made payable hereunder the matter in
H
 STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. v. BHAGYADHAR DASH 983
            [RV. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
      difference shall be decided by the lessor whose decision          A
      shall be final".
  This Court held that Arbitration agreement is not required to be
  in any particular form. What is required to be ascertained is
  whether the parties have agreed that if disputes arise between        8
  them in respect of the subject-matter of contract such dispute
  shall be referred to arbitration; and if the answer was in the
  affirmative, then such an arrangement would spell out an
  arbitration agreement. Applying the said test, this court held
  that the aforesaid clause is an arbitration agreement, as it (a)      C
  made a provision for referring any doubt, difference or dispute
  to a specified authority for decision and (b) it made the
  "decision" of such authority final. While we respectfully agree
  with the principle stated, we have our doubts as to whether the
  clause considered would be an arbitration agreement if the
  principles mentioned in the said decision and the tests               D
. mentioned in the subsequent decision of a larger bench in
  Damodar Das are applied. Be that as it may. In fact the larger
  bench in Damodar Das clearly held that the decision in
  Rukmanibai Gupta was decided on the special wording of the
  clause considered therein. "The ratio in Rukmanibai Gupta vs.         E
  Collector does not assist the respondent. From the language
  therein this court inferred, by implication, existence of a dispute
  or difference for arbitration."

     11. In Encon Builders (supra), this court proceeded on the         F
 assumption that the following clause was an arbitration
 agreement, as that issue was not disputed:
      "In case of any dispute arising out of the agreement the
      matter shall be referred to the Managing Director, Bihar
      State Mineral Development Corporation Limited, Ranchi,            G
      whose decision shall be final and binding."
 The clause specifically provided for 'disputes being referred to
 the Managing Director' and made the said authority's decision
 not only final, but also binding on the parties. Therefore it can      1-1
    984        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2011] 8 S.C.R.


A be said that it answers the tests of an arbitration agreement.
  The issue considered .therein was whether the High Court
  committed an error in refusing to refer the dispute to arbitration,
  even after finding the clause to be an arbitration agreement,
  by presuming bias in view of the fact that the named arbitrator
B was an employee of one of the parties to the dispute. This Court
  held that disputes were arbitrable in terms of the said clause.
  Be that as it may. A similar clause was also considered in
  Punjab State Vs. Dina Nath [2007 (5) SCC 28] and held to
  be arbitration agreement.
c        12. In Mallikarjun v. Gulbarga University - 2004 (1) SCC
    372, this court held the following clause was a valid arbitration
    agreement:

          "The decision of the Superintending Engineer of the
D         Gulbarga Circle for the time being shall be final,
          conclusive, and binding on all parties to the contract upon
          all questions relating to the meaning of the specifications,
          designs, drawings and instructions herein before
          mentioned and as to the quality of workmanship or material
E         used on the work, or as to any other question, claim, right,
          matter, or thing whatsoever, in any way arising out of, or
          relating to the contract, designs, drawings, specifications,
          estimates, instructions, orders or those conditions, or
          otherwise concerning the works of the execution, or failure
F         to execute the same, whether arising during the progress
          of the work, or after the completion or abandonment
          thereof in case of dispute arising between the contractor
          and. Gulbarga University."

  This court after referring to the essentials of an arbitration
G agreement laid down in Encon Builders held that the above
  clause is an arbitration agreement as it answered the test of
  reference of dispute for decision and made the decision of the
  authority final and binding. This court held :

H         "Applying the aforesaid principle to the present case,
STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. v. BHAGYADHAR DASH 985
           (R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

    Clause 30 requires that the Superintending Engineer,          A
    Gulbarga Circle, Gulbarga, to give his decision on any
    dispute that may arise out of the contract. Further we also
    find that the agreement postulates present or future
    differences in connection with some contemplated affairs
    inasmuch as also there was an agreement between the           B
    parties to settle such difference by a private tribunal,
    namely, the Superintending Engineer, Gulbarga Circle,
    Gulbarga. It was also agreed between the parties that they
    would be bound by the decision of the tribunal. The parties
    were also ad idem."                                           c
The clause for consideration in this case

    13. Clause 10 of the Conditions of Contract which is the
subject of controversy reads thus:
                                                                  D
    "Clause 10: The Engineer-in-Charge shall have power to
    make any alterations in or additions to the original
    specifications, drawings, designs and instructions that may
    appear to him necessary and advisable during the
    progress of work, and the contractor shall be bound to        E
    carry out the work in accordance with any instructions
  , which may be given to him in writing signed by the
    Engineer-in-Charge and such alterations shall not
    invalidate the contract, and any additional work which the
    contractor may be directed to do in the manner above
    specified as part of the work shall be carried out by the
                                                                  F
    contractor on the same conditions in all respects on which
    he agreed to do the main work, and at the same rates as
    are specified in the tender for the main work. The time for
    the completion of the work shall be extended in the
    proportion that the additional work bears to the original     G
    contract work and the certificate of the Engineer-in-Charge
    shall be conclusive as to such proportion. And if the
    additional work includes any class of work for which no
    rate is specified in this contract, then such class of work
                                                                  H
    986        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011) 8 S.C.R.


A         shall be carried out at the rates entered in the sanctioned
          schedule of rates of the locality during the period when the
          work is being carried on and if such last mentioned class
          of work is not entered in the schedule of rates of the district
          then the co~tractor shall within seven days of the date of
B         the rate which it is his intention to charge for such class of
          work, and if the Engineer-in-Charge does not agree to this
          rate he shall be noticed in writing be at liberty to cancel
          his order to carry out such class of work and arrange to
          carry it out in such manner as he may consider advisable.
c         No deviations from the specifications stipulated in the
          contract nor additional items of work shall ordinarily be
          carried out by the contractor, nor shall any altered,
          additional or substituted work be carried out by him, unless
          the rates of the substituted, altered or additional items
D         have been approved and fix~d in writing by the Engineer-
          in-Charge, the contractor shall be bound to submit his claim
          for any additional work done during any month on or before
          the 15th days of the following month accompanied by a
          copy of the order in writing of the Engineer-in-Charge for
E         the additional work and that the contractor shall not be
          entitled of any payment in respect of such additional work
          if he fails to submit his claim within the aforesaid period.

          Provided always that if the contractor shall commence work
F         or incur any expenditure in respect thereof before the r~tes
          shall have been determined as lastly hereinbefore
          mentioned, in such case he shall only be entitled to be paid
          in respect of the work carried out or expenditure incurred
          by him prior to the date of the determination of the rates
          as aforesaid according to such rate or rates as shall be
G
          fixed by the Engineer-in-Charge. In the event of a dispute,
          the decision of the Superintending Engineer of the Circle
          will be final. n

                                                  (emphasis supplied)
H
 STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. v. BHAGYADHAR DASH 987
            [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
       14. A reading of the said clause shows that it is a clause      A
 relating to power of the Engineer-in-Chief to make additions
 and alterations in the drawings and specifications and execution
 of non-tendered additional items of work (that is items of work
 which are not found in the bill of quantities or schedule of work).
 It provides for the following:                                        B

       (a)   that the Engineer-in-charge could make additions
             and alterations in the drawings/specifications; and
             that such alterations and additions will not invaliqate
             the contract, but will entitle the contractor to          C
             extension of time for completion of work
             proportionately;

       (b)   that if the additional work be executed is an item
             for which the rate is not specified in the contract (or
             in the schedule of rates for the district), the           D
             contractor shall specify the rate and the Engineer-
             in-charge may either accept the rate or cancel the
             order to execute that particular work;

       (c)   that if the contractor commences the work with            E
             reference to an item for which there is no rate in the
             contract and there is no agreement in regard to the
             rate for execution of such work, he shall be paid at
             the rates fixed by the Engineer-in -Charge; and

       (d)   that if the contractor disputes the rate fixed by the     F
             Engineer-in-Charge, the decision of the
             Superintending Engineer in regard to rate for such
             non-scheduled item shall be final.

       15. We may next examine whether the last sentence of the·       c:
  proviso to clause 10 could be considered to be an arbitration
  agreement. It does not refer to arbitration as the mode of
  settlement of disputes. It does not provide for reference of
. disputes between the parties to arbitration. It does not make
  the decision of the Superintending Engineer binding on either        I-{
    988        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 8 S.C.R.


A party. It does not provide or refer to any procedure which would
  show that the Superintending Engineer is to act judicially after
  considering the submissions of both parties. It does not
  disclose any intention to make the Superintending Engineer an
  arbitrator in respect of disputes that may arise between the
B Engineer-in-Charge and the contractor. It does not make the
  decision of the Superintending Engineer final on any dispute,
  other than the claim for increase in rates for non-tendered items.
  It operates in a limited sphere, that is, where in regard to a non-
  tendered additional work executed by the contractor, if the
c contractor is not satisfied with the unilateral determination of
  the rate therefor by the Engineer-in-Charge the rate for such
  work will be finally determined by the Superintending Engineer.
  It is a provision made with the intention to avoid future disputes
  regarding rates for non-tendered item. It is not a provision for
0 reference of future disputes or settlement of future disputes.
  The decision of superintending Engineer is not a judicial
  determination, but decision of one party which is open to
  challenge by the other party in a court of law. The said clause
  can by no stretch of imagination be considered to be an
  arbitration agreement. The said clause is not, and was never
E intended to be, a provision relating to settlement of disputes.

      16. That clause 10 was never intended to be an arbitration
  agreement is evident from the contract itself. It is relevant to
  note the Standard Conditi9ns of Contract of the state
F government, as originally formulated consisted a provision
  (Clause 23) relating to settlement of disputes by arbitration,
  which is extracted below :

          "Except where otherwise provided in the contract, all
          questions and disputes relating to the meaning of the
G
          specifications, designs, drawings and instructions herein
          before mentioned and as to the quality of workmanship,
          or materials used on the work, or as to any other question,
          claim, right, matter or thing whatsoever, in any way arising
          out of or relating to the contract, designs, drawing,
H
STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. v. BHAGYADHAR DASH 989
           [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

    specifications, estimates, instructions, orders or these           A
    conditions, or otherwise concerning the work, or the
    execution, or failure to execute the same, whether arising
    during the progress of the work or after the completion or
    abandonment thereof shall be referred to the sole
    arbitration of a Superintending Engineer of the State              B
    Public Works Department unconnected with the work at
    any stage nominated by the Chief Engineer concerned~ If
    there be no such Superintending Engineer, it should be
    refereed to the sole arbitration of Chief Engineer
    concerned. It will be no objection to any such appointment         c
    that the arbitrator so appointed is a government servant.
    The award of the arbitrator so appointed shall be final,
    conclusive and binding on all parties to this Contract."

The said clause was deleted by the State Government from the
Standard Conditions of Contract by official Memorandum dated           D
24.12.1981. Contracts entered by the State Government
thereafter did not have -the said arbitration clause, though the
other Conditions of Contract remained the same. The contracts
in all these cases are of a period subsequent to 24.12.1981
and the Conditions of Contract forming part of these contracts         E
do not contain the arbitration clause. When the State
Government has consciously and intentionally deleted the
provision for arbitration from its contracts, it will be a travesty
of justice to read another clause in the contract providing for
 axecution of non-tendered items and the method of                     F
determination of the rates therefor, as a provision for arbitration.

      17. In fact, in Executive Engineer RCO vs. Suresh
Chandra Panda [1999 (9) SCC 92], this Court considered the
effect of the said clause relating to execution of non-tendered C:
items, vis-a-vis clause 23 in a pre-1981 contract. This court held
that the said clause (then numbered as clause 11, numbered_
as clause 10 in subsequent contracts) was a provision which
excluded the issue relating to finality of rates, from the scope
of arbitration agreement contained in clause 23 on the following
    990         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011) 8 S.C.R.


~   reasoning :

           "Under Clause 11 of the contract, there is an elaborate
           provjsion dealing with the power of the Engineer-in Charge
          to make any alterations or additions to the original
          specifications, drawings, designs and instructions. It, inter
B
          alia, provides that if for such alterations or additions no rate
          is specified in the contract, then the rates which are
          entered in the sanctioned schedule of rates of the locality
          during the period when the work is being carried out, would
          be paid. However, if this class of work, not provided for in
c         the sanctioned schedule of rates then the contractor has
          the right, in the manner specified i~ that dause, to inform
          the Engineer-in-Charge of the rate at which he intends to
          carry out that work. If the Engineer-in-Charge does not
          agree to this rate he is given the liberty to cancel his order
D         and arrange to carry out such class of work in such manner
          as he may consider advisable. The clause further provides
          that if the contractor commences such additional work or
          incurs any expenditure in respect of it before the rate are
          determined as specified in that clause, then the rate or
E         rates shall be as fixed by the Engineer-in-Charge. In the
          event of a dispute, the decision of the Superintendent
          Engineer of the circle will be final. Under Clause 23, except
          as otherwise provided in the contract, all disputes are
          arbitrable as set out in that clause. The finality of rates,
F         therefore, under Clause 11 is a provision to the contrary
          in the contract which is excluded from Clause 23."

  Thus, even when the Standard Conditions of Contract contained
  a provision for arbitration (vide clause 23), clause 10 was
  considered to be a provision dealing with .a matter excepted
G from arbitration. Be that as it may. The proviso to clause 10,
  which provides that the decision of the Superintending Engineer
  is 'final', merely discloses an intention to exclude the rates for
  extra items decided by the Superintending Engineer from the
  scope of arbitration, as an excepted matter, when there was
H
STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. v. BHAGYADHAR DASH 991
           [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
;m arbitration agreement (clause 23) in the contract. When the    A
lrbitration agreement was deleted, provision dealing with non-
(endered items can not be described as an arbitration
agreement. Be that as it may.

     18. We therefore allow these appeals, set aside the orders   8
of the High Court appointing the arbitrator and dismiss the
applications for appointment of arbitrator.

8.8.B.                                      Appeals allowed.


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