STATE OF ODISHA & ORS.versusMANAGING COMMITTEE OF NAMATARA GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL

          [2026] 3 S.C.R. 103 : 2026 INSC 148

            State of Odisha & Ors.
                       v.
Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School
   (Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 54941 of 2025)
                        09 February 2026
 [Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.]


                     Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as regards the applications for condonation of delay
in filing the special leave petition and condonation of delay in
re-filing the same.

                            Headnotes†
Limitation Act, 1963 – Condonation of delay – Respondent-
Managing Committee of the School filed application for release
of grant-in-aid – Tribunal allowed the application by directing
the State and the Director to release grant-in-aid in favour of
the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school – State filed
appeal which was time-barred as also not accompanied by
the certified copy of the impugned order – For a period of 8
years, the State did not file the certified copy of the impugned
order – High Court dismissed the appeal for failure to file the
certified copy of the tribunal’s order – Thereafter, the State
obtained the certified copy of the tribunal’s order and filed
application seeking recall of the order by the High Court,
alongwith the application for condonation of delay of 291
days – High Court rejected the application for condonation of
delay resulting in the application for recall being dismissed
as time-barred – Challenge to:
Held: Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right –
It is entirely the discretion of the Court whether or not to condone
delay – No cause, much less sufficient cause, has been shown
for exercise of discretion in favour of the State of Odisha – Nature
of explanation in the application for condonation of delay is such
that with much ado, the proceedings could be closed – However,
since the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature
in s.5 is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in
a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice and in
view of the submission made, the matter was considered in some
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       depth – State of Odisha utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent not only
       before the High Court but also before this Court – Notwithstanding
       that its appeal was dismissed as time-barred by the High Court, this
       Court was approached by the State of Odisha four months after
       expiry of the period of limitation – Despite all the latitude shown
       to a “State”, the cause sought to be shown here by the State of
       Odisha is not an explanation but a lame excuse – No case for
       exercise of discretion set up – Applications for condonation of delay
       in filing the special leave petition and condonation of delay in re-
       filing the same, rejected, and the special leave petition dismissed
       as time-barred – Odisha Education Act, 1969. [Paras 12, 13, 20-22]

                                Case Law Cited
       Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji [1987] 2 SCR
       387 : (1987) 2 SCC 107; G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer
       [1988] 3 SCR 198 : (1988) 2 SCC 142; Postmaster General v.
       Living Media India Limited [2012] 1 SCR 1045 : (2012) 3 SCC
       563; University of Delhi v. Union of India [2019] 16 SCR 1259 :
       (2020) 13 SCC 745; Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA)
       [2024] 4 SCR 241 : (2024) 12 SCC 336; Sheo Raj Singh v. Union
       of India [2023] 13 SCR 743 : (2023) 10 SCC 531; Commissioner
       of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay (1994)
       Supp. 2 SCC 603 – referred to.

                                   List of Acts
       Odisha Education Act, 1969; Limitation Act, 1963.

                                List of Keywords
       Condonation of delay in filing the special leave petition; Condonation
       of delay in re-filing; Release of grant-in-aid; Certified copy of the
       order; Recall of the order by High Court; Expression ‘sufficient
       cause’.

                               Case Arising From
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (C)
       Diary No. 54941 of 2025
       From the Judgment and Order dated 21.02.2025 and 26.04.2023
       of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in IA No. 126 of 2025 in
       FAO No. 582 of 2015, respectively
[2026] 3 S.C.R.                                                          105

                           State of Odisha & Ors. v.
                Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School

                                  Appearances for Parties
      Advs. for the Petitioner(s):
      Ms. Sanjana Saddy, Ms. Shailja Singh.
      Advs. for the Respondent(s):
      Nagendra Kasana, Mahendra Kumar Sahoo, A Deb Kumar,
      Mrs. A Deepa, Mrs. Neeta Kasana, Mrs. Anjana Kasana,
      Binod Ch Sabat.

                     Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                          Order
1.    Respondent-Managing Committee of Namatara Girls’ High School1
      had approached the State Education Tribunal2, Bhubaneswar, Odisha
      with an application3 under Section 24B of the Odisha Education Act,
      1969 for release of grant-in-aid.
2.    By an order dated 30th December, 2013, the Tribunal allowed the
      application by directing the State of Odisha and the Director of
      Secondary Education, Odisha to release grant-in-aid in favour of the
      teaching and non-teaching staff of the school in the manner as directed.
3.    The order dated 30th December, 2013 was carried in appeal4 by
      the State of Odisha before the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack5 on
      16th October, 2015. The appeal was time-barred. Not only that, the
      appeal was not accompanied by the certified copy of the impugned
      order. Since presentation of the appeal, for a period of 8 years to
      be precise, the State of Odisha had not filed the certified copy of
      the impugned order. By an order dated 26th April, 2023, the High
      Court dismissed the appeal citing failure to file the certified copy of
      the Tribunal’s order as the reason.
4.    Stung by such order, the State of Odisha woke up from its slumber.
      It obtained the certified copy of the Tribunal’s order dated 30 th
      December, 2013 on 13th February, 2024. A week later, the State of



1    school
2    Tribunal
3    G.I.A. Case No.623 of 2011
4    FAO No. 582 of 2015
5    High Court
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       Odisha filed an application6 seeking recall of the order dated 26th
       April, 2023. Together with such application was filed an application
       for condonation of delay7 seeking condonation of 291 days’ delay.
5.     The application for condonation of delay was taken up for
       consideration by the High Court on 21st February, 2025. Having
       noted that the certified copy of the impugned order was filed only
       on 13th February, 2024, the High Court correctly observed that the
       appeal filed on 16th October, 2015 was inherently defective and the
       delay in presenting the appeal is in excess of 11 years. Considering
       the aforesaid position, the application for condonation of delay was
       rejected resulting in the application for recall being dismissed as
       time-barred.
6.     The order of the High Court dated 21st February, 2025 is challenged
       by the State of Odisha in this special leave petition.
7.     It is noted that there is a delay of 123 days in filing the special
       leave petition and a further delay of 96 days in re-filing the same
       after curing defects. In the application for condonation of delay8, the
       State of Odisha seeks to explain the delay by pleading as follows:
              “3. It is submitted that the Petitioner on receipt of order
              of the Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 26.04.2023
              and order dated 21.02.2025 in F.A.O. No. 582 of 2015
              and in I.A. No. 126 of 2025 in F.A.O. No. 582 of 2015 the
              petitioner considered the matter and sent it to the law
              department opined that it is a fit case for filing the present
              SLP against the impugned judgements dated 26.04.2023
              and order dated 21.02.2025.
              4. That the delay in filing the appeal was on account
              of procedural delay in obtaining approval from the
              higher authority. The delay caused is not deliberate and
              intentional.”
8.     Ms. Sanjana Saddy, learned counsel appearing for the State of
       Odisha, submits that the delay in presenting the special leave petition
       is not deliberate and having regard to the long line of decisions of


6    I.A. No.165 of 2024
7    I.A. No.126 of 2025
8    I.A No.34867 of 2026
[2026] 3 S.C.R.                                                           107

                       State of Odisha & Ors. v.
            Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School

      this Court advocating a liberal approach when an authority under
      Article 12 of the Constitution is the petitioner seeking condonation
      of delay, she urges that the delay be condoned and this Court may
      direct the High Court to examine the challenge to the order dated
      30th December, 2013 of the Tribunal on merits, upon revival of the
      appeal.
9.    We had, upon hearing Ms. Sanjana, started dictating an order of
      dismissal of the special leave petition. It was then that she prayed
      for withdrawal of the special leave petition. We had so recorded.
      However, when we were about to rise for the day, Ms. Sanjana
      prayed for recall of the order of dismissal of the special leave petition
      as withdrawn; she also submitted, on instructions, that the State
      of Odisha would invite a detailed order with reasons in support of
      dismissal of the special leave petition.
10. We recalled the order dismissing the special leave petition as
    withdrawn and, instead, dismissed the same as time-barred
    considering paragraphs 3 and 4 of the application for condonation
    of delay, excerpted above, with the observation that reasons would
    follow.
11. We now proceed to assign our reasons.
12. No cause, much less sufficient cause, has been shown for exercise of
    discretion in favour of the State of Odisha. The nature of explanation
    in the application for condonation of delay is such that with much
    ado, the proceedings could be closed.
13. However, since there is a long line of decisions of this Court
    propounding the law that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed
    by the legislature in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately
    elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner
    which subserves the ends of justice and in view of the submission
    of Ms. Sanjana, we have considered it appropriate to consider the
    matter in some depth.
14. Almost four decades back, in Collector, Land Acquisition,
    Anantnag v. Mst Katiji9, a coordinate Bench noting that the justifiably
    liberal approach which this Court has been adopting in matters



9    (1987) 2 SCC 107
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       instituted before it is not being followed by the courts lower in the
       hierarchy, mandated that a justice oriented approach is indeed called
       for when a ‘State’ seeks condonation of delay as distinguished from
       ‘a private party’.
15. Close on the heels of Katiji (supra), Hon’ble Justice M.N.
    Venkatachaliah speaking for the coordinate Bench in G. Ramegowda v.
    Land Acquisition Officer10 had referred to Katiji (supra) in paragraph
    14 and quoted the following passage therefrom:
             “When substantial justice and technical considerations
             are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice
             deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim
             to have vested right in injustice being done because of a
             non-deliberate delay …
             It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on
             account of its power to legalise injustice on technical
             grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice
             and is expected to do so.”
       Immediately thereafter, in paragraphs 15 to 17, it was held as under:
             15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is
             yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored.
             If appeals brought by Government are lost for such
             defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the
             ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions
             of Government are collective and institutional decisions
             and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private
             individuals.
             16. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private
             citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like
             any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts
             or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different
             complexion is imparted to the matter where Government
             makes out a case where public interest was shown to
             have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the
             part of its officers or agents and where the officers were
             clearly at cross-purposes with it.


10   (1988) 2 SCC 142
[2026] 3 S.C.R.                                                             109

                       State of Odisha & Ors. v.
            Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School

             17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case,
             constitutes “sufficient cause” for purposes of Section 5, it
             might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from
             the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these
             factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the
             functioning of the government. Governmental decisions
             are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a
             considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process
             of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore,
             not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear
             responsibility of Government must have “a little play at the
             joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on governmental
             functioning — of course, within reasonable limits — is
             necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered
             unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to
             put government and private parties on the same footing
             in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature
             of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental
             to the decision-making process. In the opinion of the High
             Court, the conduct of the law officers of the Government
             placed the Government in a predicament and that it was
             one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers
             should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and
             trusted its law officers. …
16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) were consistently followed by
    this Court until adoption of a different and seemingly strict approach
    while dealing with applications for condonation of delay during the
    last decade and a half became discernible starting with the decision
    in Postmaster General v. Living Media India Limited11, where a
    delay of 427 days in filing the relevant special leave petition was
    not condoned. University of Delhi v. Union of India12 is another
    decision (of a three-Judge Bench of this Court) where delay of
    916 days was not condoned. While upholding the decision of the
    relevant high court under challenge refusing to condone the delay
    of 5659 days in presentation of an appeal under Section 54 of the


11   (2012) 3 SCC 563
12   (2020) 13 SCC 745
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       Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the heirs of a deceased landowner,
       a coordinate Bench in Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA)13
       very recently reiterated that the law of limitation is founded on public
       policy, the object is that a legal remedy is put to an end so that no
       litigation remains pending for an indefinite period. It was also held,
       departing from the earlier view, that the merits of the case cannot be
       considered at the stage of considering the application for condonation
       of delay.
17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of
    India14 authoring the judgment for a coordinate Bench adopted the
    view taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a host of other
    decisions following the same while not interfering with an order of
    condonation of delay passed by the relevant high court. However,
    it was observed that a distinction ought to be drawn between an
    ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ that is proffered as cause for condonation
    of delay. It was also emphasized that a different approach has to be
    adopted while this Court is considering an application for condonation
    of delay in presentation of an appeal/application and when it sits
    in appeal over a discretionary order of the high court granting the
    prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former, whether
    to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the latter,
    whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of
    grant of the prayer for condonation has to be examined.
18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in any of the decisions
    post Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) adopting a liberal
    approach is the exasperation and consequent lament expressed
    by none other than Hon’ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course of
    authoring a brief order in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v.
    Amateur Riders Club, Bombay15 and admonishing officers of the
    “revenue” in not acting with promptitude. This order was made within
    six years of the decision in Ramegowda (supra). We can do no
    better than quoting the same in its entirety hereunder:
             1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda, learned senior
             counsel for the Revenue.


13   (2024) 12 SCC 336
14   (2023) 10 SCC 531
15   (1994) Supp. 2 SCC 603
[2026] 3 S.C.R.                                                             111

                     State of Odisha & Ors. v.
          Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High School

           2. This special leave petition filed on November 16, 1993
           is delayed by 264 days. For quite some time in the past,
           this Court has been making observations as to the grave
           prejudice caused to public interest by appeals brought
           on behalf of the Government being lost on the point of
           limitation. Such observations have been made for over a
           few years in the past. But there seems to be no conspicuous
           improvement as is apparent in the present petition which
           is filed in November 1993. The explanation for the delay,
           had better be set out in petitioner’s own words:
                “(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave
                petition drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent
                the same for approval to the Board on June 24, 1993
                along with the case file.
                (h) The Board returned the case file to the Advocate-
                on-Record on July 9, 1993 who re-sent the same to
                the Board on September 20, 1993 requesting that
                draft SLP was not approved by the Board. The Board
                after approving the draft SLP sent this file to CAS
                on October 1, 1993.”
           3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially
           acceptable ground for condonation of delay. After the
           earlier observations of this Court made in several cases in
           the past, we hoped that the matters might improve. There
           seems to be no visible support for this optimism. There is
           a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant
           even if the litigant is Government which is itself under the
           shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the
           law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any
           way of granting relief. It is true that Government should not
           be treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in the
           case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute
           appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions
           necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But
           there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the
           explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves
           to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue
           in protecting its common interests. The affidavit is again
           one of the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to
           the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach
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               any importance to the need for promptitude even where
               it affects its own interest.
               4. The application for condonation of delay is, accordingly,
               dismissed. The special leave petition is, therefore,
               dismissed as barred by time.
                                                         (emphasis ours)

19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur Riders (supra), one after
    the other, leaves none in doubt that it did not take much time for this
    Court to lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the law was laid down
    in Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra), with much optimism
    that matters would improve. Their Lordships, however, found no visible
    support for such optimism and the Court’s patience having been
    tested to the extreme limit, held that there is a point beyond which
    even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant labouring
    under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference is the Government.
20. We have found the State of Odisha to be utterly lethargic, tardy and
    indolent not only before the High Court but also before this Court.
    Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as time-barred by the
    High Court, this Court has been approached by the State of Odisha
    four months after expiry of the period of limitation.
21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It
    is entirely the discretion of the Court whether or not to condone
    delay. Despite all the latitude that is shown to a “State”, we are of
    the clear opinion that the cause sought to be shown here by the
    State of Odisha is not an explanation but a lame excuse. No case
    for exercise of discretion has been set up.
22. The applications for condonation of delay in filing the special leave
    petition and condonation of delay in re-filing the same, thus, stand
    rejected, with the result that the special leave petition stands dismissed
    as time-barred.

       Result of the case: Special Leave Petition dismissed.




       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain