STATE OF N.C.T. OF DELHIversusAJAY KUMAR TYAGI

                       [2012] 8 S.C.R. 208


A                  STATE OF N.C.T. OF DELHI
                                v.
                      AJAY KUMAR TYAGI
               (Criminal Appeal No. 1334 of 2012)

                        AUGUST 31, 2012
B
      [R.M. LODHA, CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD AND
          SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, JJ.]

        Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 482 - Criminal
C proceedings against accused under Prevention of Corruption
  Act for demand and acceptance of illegal gratification -
  Departmental proceedings also initiated on the same charges
  - Report of enquiry officer observing that charges not proved
  - Disciplinary proceedings kept in abeyance due to pendency
o of criminal case - High Court in a writ petition holding that
  keeping the departmental proceedings in abeyance was
  justified - In a petition uls. 482 High Court quashed the
   criminal proceedings holding that as the accused has been
   exonerated in disciplinary proceeding, criminal proceeding
E deserved to be quashed - In appeal Division Bench of
   Supreme Court referred the question whether criminal
  proceedings to continue, if the accused exonerated of the
  charges in departmental proceedings, to Larger Bench -
  Larger Bench, held: The criminal proceedings were quashed
F erroneously by the High Court because the accused cannot
   be said to have been exonerated in departmental
  proceedings as the report of the enquiry officer was yet to be
   decided by the disciplinary authority - Further, exoneration
   in departmental proceeding ipso facto would not lead to
G quashing of a criminal prosecution - Prevention of Corruption
  Act, 1988 - ss. 7113 - Service Law - Disciplinary Proceedings.

        For demand and acceptance of illegal gratification,
    criminal prosecution uls.7113 of Prevention of Corruption

H                              208
 STATE OF N.C.T. OF DELHI v. AJAY KUMAR TYAGI 209


Act, as well as departmental proceedings were initiated     A
against the respondent-accused.

    The enquiry officer, after conducting the
departmental inquiry, in its report observed that charges
against the accused was not proved due to lack of           8
evidence on record. Due to pendency of the criminal
case, no action was taken on the report.

    The respondent-accused filed writ petition before
High Court praying for concluding the departmental
proceedings. High Court dismissed the petition              C
observing that keeping the departmental proceedings in
abeyance was not unjustified.

     Thereafter, the respondent-accused filed petition u/
s. 482 Cr.P.C. praying for quashing the criminal            o
proceedings u/s. 7/13 of Prevention of Corruption Act on
the ground that since the accused had been exonerated
in the disciplinary proceedings, criminal proceedings
deserved to be quashed on that ground alone. High
Court quashed the criminal proceedings. Thereafter the      E
disciplinary authority exonerated the accused of the
charges subject to the condition that if appellate court
passed an order contrary to the order of the High Court,
the matter would be reopened.

     State filed appeal to this Court. The Division Bench   F
of this Court, finding a conflict in the decision of two
Division Benches of this Court on the question whether
criminal      proceedings      against    an     accused,
notwithstanding his exoneration on the identical charge
in the departmental proceeding could continue, referred     G
the matter to three Judge.s Bench of this Court.

    The appellant-State intera/ia contended that the
assumption of the High Court that the accused had been
exonerated in the disciplinary proceedings was              H
    210       SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A unfounded on facts because the report of the enquiry
  officer was not the final verdict and the same was yet to
  be considered by the disciplinary authority.

          Allowing the appeal, the Court
B        HELD: 1. The order of the High Court is
    unsustainable, both on facts and law. Though the inquiry
    officer has submitted its report and found the allegation
    to have not been proved but, that is not the end of the
    matter. It is well settled that the disciplinary authority is
C   not bound by the conclusion of the inquiry officer and,
    after giving a tentative reason for disagreement and
    providing the delinquent employee an opportunity of
    hearing, can differ with the conclusion and record a
    finding of guilt and punish the delinquent employee. In
D   the present case, before the said stage reached, the
    accused filed an application u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. for
    terminating the criminal proceedings and the High Court
    fell into error in quashing the said proceedings on the
    premise that the accused has been exonerated in the
E   departmental proceeding. As the order of the High Court
    is founded on an erroneous premise, the same cannot be
    allowed to stand. As the impugned order of the High
    Court suffers from an apparent illegality, the same
    deserves to be set aside so also the order of the
F   disciplinary authority founded on that and, in the light of
    the direction of the High Court, the departmental
    proceeding has to be reopened and kept in abeyance till
    the conclusion of the criminal case. [Paras 28, 14 and 16]
    (224-F; 217-8-D; 217-G-H; 218-A]
G     2.1. The decision in the case of P.S. Rajya* does not
  lay down any proposition that on exoneration of an
  employee in the departmental proceeding, the criminal
  prosecution on the identical charge or the evidence has
  to be quashed. It is well settled that the decision is an
H authority for what it actually decides and not what flows
 STATE OF N.C.T. OF DELHI v. AJAY KUMAR TYAGI          211

from it. Mere fact that in P.S. Rajya* this Court quashed     A
the prosecution when the accused was exonerated in the
departmental proceeding would not mean that it was
quashed on that ground. From the reading of the
judgment, it is evident that the prosecution was not
terminated on the ground of exoneration in the                B
departmental proceeding but, on its peculiar facts. [Paras
22 and 23] [220-H; 221-A-B, G]
     2.2. The High court quashed the prosecution on total
misreading of the judgment in the case of P.S. Rajya*.
Exoneration in departmental proceeding ipso facto would       C
not lead to exoneration or acquittal in a criminal case. It
is well settled that the standard of proof in departmental
proceeding is lower than that of criminal prosecution. It
is equally well settled that the departmental proceeding
or for that matter criminal cases have to be decided only     o
on the basis of evidence adduced therein. Truthfulness
of the evidence in the criminal case can be judged only
after the evidence is adduced therein and the criminal
case can not be rejected on the basis of the evidence in
the departmental proceeding or the report of the Inquiry      E
Officer based on those evidence. [Para 26] [223-H; 224-
A-C]
    2.3. The exoneration in the departmental proceeding
ipso facto would not result into the quashing of the
criminal prosecution. However, if the prosecution against     F
an accused is solely based on a finding in a proceeding
and that finding is set aside by the superior authority in
the hierarchy, the very foundation goes and the
prosecution may be quashed. But that principle will not
apply in the case of the departmental proceeding as the       G
criminal trial and the departmental proceeding are held
by two different entities. Further they are not in the same
hierarchy. [Para 27] [224-D-F]
   State v. M. Krishna Mohan (2007) 14 SCC 667: 2007 (11)
SCR 570;Supdt. of Police (C.B.I.) v. Deepak Chowdhary         H
    212       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A   (1995) 6 SCC 225:1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 818; Central
    Bureau of Investigation v. V.K. Bhutiani (2009) 10 SCC 674
    - relied on.

       *P. S. Rajya v. State of Bihar 1996 (9) SCC 1: 1996 (2)
    Suppl. SCR       631 - distinguished.
B
        State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC
    335:1990 (3)Suppl. SCR 259- referred to.

                          Case Law Reference:
c      1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 259         Referred to.       Para 20

       1996 (2) Suppl. SCR 631         Distinguished. Para 22

       2007 (11) SCR 570               Relied on.         Para 24

D      1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 818         Relied on.         Para 24

       (2009) 10 sec 674               Relied on.         Para 25

        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
    No. 1334 of 2012.
E
        From the Judgment & Order dated 25.8.2008 of the High
    Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Crl. MC No. 183312007.

          J.S. Attry, Anjani Aiyagari, Gargi Khanna, B.V. Bairam Das
    for the Appellant.
F
         Chelan Sharma, Bake Bihari Sharma (for Asha Gopalan
    Nair) for the Respodent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

G        CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J. 1. Ajay Kumar
    Tyagi, at the relevant time, was working as a Junior Engineer
    with the Delhi Jal Board. Surinder Singh, a Constable with the
    Delhi Polic~ applied to the Delhi Jal Board, hereinafter referred
    to as 'the Board', for water connection in the name of his wife
H
  STATE OF N.C.T. OF DELHI v. AJAY KUMAR TYAGI               213
        [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
Sheela Devi. The application for grant of water connection was       A
cleared by the Assistant Engineer and the file was sent to said
Ajay Kumar Tyagi (hereinafter refered to as 'the accused').

      2. Constable Surinder Singh lodged a report with the Anti
Corruption Branch alleging that the accused demanded bribe           8
of Rs. 2000/- for clearing the file and a sum of Rs. 1000/- was
to be paid initially and the balance amount after the clearance
of file. On the basis of the information lodged, a trap was laid
and, according to the prosecution, the accused demanded and
accepted the bribe of Rs. 1000/-. This led to registration of the    C
first information report under Section 7/13 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act.

     3. After investigation, charge-sheet was submitted on 19th
of September, 2002 and the accused was put on trial. Charges
were framed by the Special Judge.                                    D

     4. In respect of the same incident, a departmental
proceeding was also initiated against the accused and the
Article of Charges was served on him. In the departmental
proceeding it was alleged that the accused "being a public           E
servant in discharge of his official duties by corrupt and illegal
means or otherwise, abusing his official position, demanded,
accepted and obtained Rs. 1000/- (One Thousand) as illegal
gratification other than legal remuneration from Sh. Surinder
Singh S/o Shri Ram Bhajan r/o H.No. 432-A, Gali No. 2, 80 Sq.
                                                                     F
Yards, Village Mandoli, Delhi in consideration for giving a report
on the water connection".

       5. The enquiry officer conducted the departmental inquiry
  and submitted its report. The inquiry officer observed that "the
  evidence on record does not substantiate the charge of demand      G
  and acceptance of bribe" by the accused and, accordingly,
· recorded the finding that the charge against the accused has
  not been proved due to lack of evidence on record.

     6. It seems that no action was taken on the report of the       H
    214       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A inquiry officer due to pendency of the criminal case pending
  against the accused. Accordingly, he filed writ petition before
  the Delhi High Court inter alia praying for conclusion of the
  departmental proceeding. The submission made by the
  accused did not find favour with the High Court and by the
B judgment and order dated 2nd of February, 2007, it dismissed
  the writ petition inter alia observing as follows:

          "Hence, I do not find the action of the respondents in
          keeping the departmental proceedings in abeyance to be
          in any manner unjustified specially when the petitioner
c         inspite of the pendency of the criminal case against him
          has not been suspended from service and is continuing
          to perform his duties."

       7. Thereafter, the accused resorted to another remedy
D under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and
  prayed for quashing of the first information report lodged
  against him under Section 7/13 of the Prevention of Corruption
  Act. The prayer for quashing of the first information report was
  founded on the ground that since the accused has been
E exonerated in the disciplinary proceeding by a detailed
  speaking order, the first information report deserves to be
  quashed on that ground alone. Reliance was placed on a
  decision of this Court in the case of P.S. Rajya v. State of
  Bihar, 1996 (9) sec 1.
F      8. The High Court referred to the allegation made in the
  criminal case and the departmental proceeding and observed
  that "there is not even an iota of doubt that the charges framed
  in both the proceedings are the same". Accordingly, it quashed
  the criminal proceedings and while doing so, observed as
G follows:

          "Considering the foregoing discussion, I am of the view that
          if the departmental proceedings end in a finding in favour
          of the accused in respect of allegations which form basis
H         for criminal proceedings then departmental adjudication
  STATE OF N.C.T. OF DELHI v. AJAY KUMAR TYAGI                  215
        [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
     will remove very basis of criminal proceedings & in such          A
     situation continuance of criminal proceedings will be a futile
     exercise & an abuse of the process of Court. I find that the
     charge in the present case is based on the same
     allegations which were under consideration before the
     Enquiry Officer of the Jal Board. If the charge could not be      B
     proved in the departmental proceedings where the
     standard of proof was much lower it is very unlikely that
     the same charge could be proved in a criminal trial where
     the standard of proof is quite stringent comparatively. Thus,
     the prosecution of the petitioner in criminal proceedings         c
     would only result in his harassment."

    9. Aggrieved by the same, the State has preferred this
special leave petition.

     Leave granted.                                                    D
      10. It is relevant here to state that after quashing of the
criminal proceeding by the High Court, the disciplinary authority,
by order dated 25th of March, 2009, exonerated the accuse~
of the charges "subject to the condition that if any appeal is filed   E
by the State and an order contrary to the impugned High Court
order dated 25.08.2008 is received, the matter will be re-
opened". The disciplinary authority had referred to the order of
the High Court quashing the criminal prosecution and
exonerated the accused on that ground alone.
                                                                       F
     11. When the matter came up for consideration before a
Bench of this Court on 13th of September, 2010, finding conflict
between two-Judge Bench decisions of this Court, it referred
the matter for consideration by a larger Bench and, while doing
so, observed as follows:                                               G

         'The facts of the case are that the respondent has
    been accused of taking bribe and was caught in a trap
    case. We are not going into the merits of the dispute.
    However, it seems that there are two conflicting judgments
                                                                       H
    216       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A         of two Judge Benches of this Court; (i) P.S. Rajya vs.
          State of Bihar reported in (1996) 9 SCC 1, in which a two
          Judge Bench held that if a person is exonerated in a
          departmental proceeding, no criminal proceedings can be
          launched or may continue against him on the same subject
B         matter, (ii) Kishan Singh Through Lrs. Vs. Gurpa/ Singh
          & Others 2010 (8) SCALE 205, where another two Judge
          Bench has taken a contrary view. We are inclined to agree
          with the latter view since a crime is an offence against the
          State. A criminal case is tried by a Judge who is trained
c         in law, while departmental proceeding is usually held by
          an officer of the department who may be untrained in law.
          However, we are not expressing any final opinion in the
          matter.

                In view of these conflicting judgments, we are of the
D         opinion that the matter has to be considered by a larger
          Bench."

          This is how the matter is before us.

       12. Mr. J.S. Attry, Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the
E appellant submits that the very assumption, on which the High
  Court had proceeded, that the accused has been exonerated
  in the disciplinary proceeding is unfounded on facts. He points
  out that the inquiry officer had submitted its finding and found
  the allegation to have not been proved but that would not mean
F that the accused has been exonerated in the disciplinary
  proceeding also. He points out that the report of the inquiry
  officer was yet to be considered and nothing prevented the
  disciplinary authority to disagree with the finding of the inquiry
  officer and punish the accused after following the due process
G of law. On this ground alone the order of the High Court is fit to
  be quashed, submits Mr. Attry.

        13. Mr. Chelan Sharma, Sr. Advocate representing the
  respondent-accused, however, submits that at such a distance
H of time, the disciplinary authority is precluded from passing any
 STATE OF N.C.T. OF DELHI v. AJAY KUMAR TYAGI                  217
       [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
order and the disciplinary proceeding shall be deemed to have          A
been ended in exoneration.

     14. We have bestowed our corisideration to the rival
submissions and we find substance in the submission of Mr.
Attry. True it is that the inquiry officer has submitted its report    B
and found the allegation to have not been proved but, that is
not the end of the matter. It is well settled that the disciplinary
authority is not bound by the conclusion of the inquiry officer
and, after giving a tentative reason for disagreement and
providing the delinquent employee an opportunity of hearing,           C
can differ with the conclusion and record a finding of guilt and
punish the delinquent employee. In the present case, before the
said stage reached, the accused filed an application under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for terminating
the criminal proceedings and the High Court fell into error in
quashing the said proceedings on the premise that the accused          D
has been exonerated in the departmental proceeding. As the
order of the High Court is founded on an erroneous premise,
the same cannot be allowed to stand.

      15. It is worthwhile to mention here that in the writ petition   E
filed by the accused himself seeking conclusion of the
departmental proceeding, the High Court had observed that
keeping the departmental proceeding in abeyance till the
pendency of the criminal case is not unjustified, and that order
has attained finality. Further, the order dated 25th of March,         F
2009 passed by the disciplinary authority exonerating the
accused from the charges, is founded on the ground of
quashing of the criminal proceedings by the High Court and in
that, it has clearly been observed that if an order contrary to
the High Court order is received, the matter will be re-opened.        G

    16. As we have taken the view that the impugned order of
the High Court suffers from an apparent illegality, the same
deserves to be set aside so also the order of the disciplinary
authority founded on that and, in the light of the direction of the
                                                                       H
    218        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A   High Court, the departmental proceeding has to be reopened
    and kept in abeyance till the conclusion of the criminal case.

          17. Now we proceed to consider the question of law
    referred to us, i.e., whether the prosecution against an accused,
8   notwithstanding his exoneration on the identical charge in the
    departmental proceeding could continue or not!

        18. Mr. Sharma, with vehemence, points out that this
  question has been settled and set at rest by this Court in the
  case of P.S. Rajya (Supra), which has held the field since 1996,
C hence at such a distance of time, ii is inexpedient to reconsider
  its ratio and upset the same. Mr. Attry, however, submits that
  this Court in the aforesaid case has nowhere held that
  exoneration in the departmental proceeding would ipso facto
  terminate the criminal proceeding.
D
         19. We have given our anxious consideration to the
  submissions advanced and in order to decipher the true ratio
  of the case, we have read the judgment relied on very closely.
   In this case, the allegations against the delinquent employee
E in the departmental proceeding and criminal case were one and
  the same, that is, possessing assets disproportionate to the
  known sources of income. The Central Bureau of Investigation,
  the prosecutor to assess the value of the assets relied on the
  valuation report given later on. This Court on fact found that "the
  value given as basis for the charge-sheet is not value given in
F the report subsequently given by the valuer." This would be
  evident from the following passage from paragraph 15 from the
  judgment:

          "15 ....... According to the learned counsel the Central
G         Vigilance Commission has dealt with this aspect in its
          report elaborately and ultimately came to a conclusion that
          the subsequent valuation reports on which CBI placed
          reliance are of doubtful nature. The same view was taken
          by the Union Public Service Commission. Even otherwise
H
 STATE OF N.C.T. OF DELHI v. AJAY KUMAR TYAGI                219
       [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]
    the value given as basis for the charge-sheet is not the         A
    value given in the report subsequently given by the valuers."

     20.Thereafter, this Court referred to its earlier decision in
the case of State of Haryana v. Bhaj8(1 Lal, 1992 Supp (1)
SCC 335, and reproduced the illustrations laid down for              B
exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India or the inherent powers under Section 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the criminal
prosecution. The categories of cases by way of illustrations,
wherein power could be exercised either to prevent the abuse         C
of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice read as follows:

     "(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
     report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
     value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie         D
     constitute any offence or make out a case against the
     accused.

     (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
     other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
                                                                     E
     disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
     by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
     under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
     Section 155(2) of the Code.

     (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR        F
     or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
     same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
   . make out a case against the accused.

     (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a       G
     cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
     offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
     without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
     Section 155(2) of the Code.

     (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are      H
    220       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A         so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which
          no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that
          there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
          accused.

          (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
B
          of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under
          which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
          and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is
          a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned,
          providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
c         aggrieved party.

          (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
          with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
          instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
D         on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
          and personal grudge."

       21. The aforesaid illustrations do not contemplate that on
  exoneration in the departmental proceeding, the criminal
E prosecution on the same charge or evidence is to be quashed.
  However, this Court quashed the prosecution on the peculiar
  facts of that case, finding that the said case can be brought
  under more than one head enumerated in the guidelines. This
  would be evident from paragraphs 21 and 22 of the judgment,
  which read as follows:
F
       "21. The present case can be brought under more than
       one head given above without any difficulty.

          22. The above discussion is sufficient to allow this appeal
G         on the facts of this case."

         22. Even at the cost of repetition, we hasten to add none
    of the heads in the case of P.S. Rajya (Supra) is in relation to
    the effect of exoneration in the departmental proceedings on
    criminal prosecution on identical charge. The decision in the
H
 STATE OF N.C.T. OF DELHI v. AJAY KUMAR TYAGI               221
       [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]

case of P.S. Rajya (Supra), therefore does not lay down any         A
proposition that on exoneration of an -employee in the
departmental proceeding, the criminal prosecution on the
identical charge or the evidence has to be quashed. It is well
settled that the decision is an authority for what it actually
decides and not what flows from it. Mere fact that in P.S. Rajya    B
(Supra), this Court quashed the prosecution when the accused
was exonerated in the departmental proceeding would not
mean that it was quashed on that ground. This would be evident
from paragraph 23 of the judgment, which reads as follows:

     "23. Even though all these facts including the Report of the C
     Central Vigilance Commission were brought to the notice
     of the High Court, unfortunately, the High Court took a view
     that the issues raised had to be gone into in the final
     proceedings and the Report of the Central Vigilance
     Commission, exonerating the appellant of the same D
     charge in departmental proceedings would not conclude
     the criminal case against the appellant. We have already
     held that for the reasons given, on the peculiar facts of
     this case, the criminal proceedings initiated against the
     appellant cannot be pursued. Therefore, we do not agree E
     with the view taken by the High Court as stated above.
     These are the reasons for our order dated 27-3-1996 for
     allowing the appeal and quashing the impugned criminal
     proceedings and giving consequential reliefs."
                                                                   F
                                                (underlining ours)

     23. From the reading of the aforesaid passage of the
judgment it is evident that the prosecution was not terminated
on the ground of exoneration in the departmental proceeding
but, on its peculiar facts.                                         G

      24. It is worth mentioning. that decision in P.S. Rajya
 (supra) came up for consideration before a two-Judge Bench
 of this Court earlier, in the case of State v. M. Krishna Mohan,
 (2007) 14 SCC 667. While answering an identical question i.e.      H
    222      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A whether a person exonerated in the departmental enquiry would
  be entitled to acquittal in the criminal proceeding on that ground
  alone, this Court came to the conclusion that exoneration in
  departmental proceeding ipso fact would not lead to the
  acquittal of the accused in the criminal trial. This Court
B observed emphatically that decision in P.S. Rajya (supra) was
  rendered on peculiar facts obtaining therein. It is apt to
  reproduce paragraphs 32 and 33 of the said judgment in this
  connection:
              "32. Mr Nageswara Rao relied upon a decision of
c       this Court in P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar [1996 (9) SCC
        1]. The fact situation obtaining therein was absolutely
        different. In that case, in the vigilance report, the delinquent
        officer was shown to be innocent. It was at that juncture,
        an application for quashing of the proceedings was filed
D       before the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of
        Criminal Procedure which was allowed relying on State of
        Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335]
        holding: (P.S. Rajya case [1996 (9) SCC 1, SCC p.9, para
       .23)]
E
              "23. Even though all these facts including the report
       of the Central Vigilance Commission were brought to the
       notice of the High Court, unfortunately, the High Court took
       a view that the issues raised had to be gone into in the
       final proceedings and the report of the Central Vigilance
F      Commission, exonerating the appellant of the same
       charge in departmental proceedings would not conclude
       the criminal case against the appellant. We have already
       held that for the reasons given, on the peculiar facts of
       this case, the criminal proceedings initiated against the
G      appellant cannot be pursued."

       Ultimately this Court concluded as follows:
             "33. The said decision was, therefore, rendered on
       the facts obtaining therein and cannot be said to be an
H      authority for the proposition that exoneration in
 STATE OF N.C.T. OF DELHI v. AJAY KUMAR TYAGI 223
       [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]

    departmental proceeding ipso facto would lead to a                A
    judgment of acquittal in a criminal trial."
    This point also fell for consideration before this Court in
the case of Supdt. of Police (C.B.I.) v. Deepak Chowdhary,
(1995) 6 sec 225, where quashing was sought for on two
grounds and one of the grounds urged was that the accused             B
having been exonerated of the charge in the departmental
proceeding, the prosecution is fit to be quashed. Said
submission did not find favour with this Court and it rejected
the same in the following words:
          "6. The second ground of departmental exoneration
                                                                      c
    by the disciplinary authority is also not relevant. What is
    necessary and material is whether the facts collected
    during investigation would constitute the offence for which
    the sanction has been sought for."
                                                                      D
     25. Decision of this Court in the case of Central Bureau
of Investigation v. V.K. Bhutiani, (2009) 10 SCC 674, also
throws light on the question involved. In the said case, the
accused against whom the criminal proceeding and the
departmental proceeding were going on, was exonerated in the          E
departmental proceeding by the Central Vigilance Commission.
The accused challenged his prosecution before the High Court
relying on the decision of this Court in the case of P.S. Rajya
(supra) and the High Court quashed the prosecution. On a
challenge by the Central Bureau of Investigation, the decision        F
was reversed and after relying on the decision in the case of
 M. Krishna Mohan (supra), this Court came to the conclusion
that the quashing of the prosecution was illegal and while doing
so observed as follows:
            "In our. opinion, the reliance of the High Court on the   G
     ruling of P. S. Rajya was totally uncalled for as the factual
     situation in that case was entirely different than the one
     prevalent here in this case."
     26. Therefore, in our opinion, the High court quashed the
                                                                      H
     224      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2012] 8 S.C.R.


A prosecution on total misreading of the judgment in the case of
  P. S. Rajya (S.upra). In fact, there are precedents, to which we
  have referred to above speak eloquently a contrary view i.e.
  exoneration in departmental proceeding ipso facto would not
  lead to exoneration or acquittal in a criminal case. On principle
B also, this view commends us. It is well settled that the standard
  of proof in department proceeding is lower than that of criminal
  prosecution. It is equally well settled that the departmental
  proceeding or for that matter criminal cases have to be decided
  only on the basis of evidence adduced therein. Truthfulness of
c the evidence in the criminal case can be judged only after the
  evidence is adduced therein and the criminal case can not be
  rejected on the basis of the evidence in the departmental
  proceeding or the report of the Inquiry Officer based on those
  evidence.
D       27. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the exoneration
  in the departmental proceeding ipso facto would not result into
  the quashing of the criminal prosecution. We hasten to add,
  however, that if the prosecution against an accused is solely
  based on a finding in a proceeding and that finding is set aside
E by the superior authority in the hierarchy, the very foundation
  goes and the prosecution may be quashed. But that principle
  will not apply in the case of the departmental proceeding as
  the criminal trial and the departmental proceeding are held by
  two different entities. Further they are not in the same hierarchy.
F       28. For the reasons stated above, the order of the High
    Court is unsustainable, both on facts and law.
      29. Accused shall appear before the trial court within four
  weeks from to-day. As the criminal proceeding is pending since
  long, the learned Judge in sesin of the trial shall make
G endeavour to dispose off the same expeditiously and avoid
  unnecessary and uncalled for adjournments.
        30. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the order of the High
    Court is set aside with the direction aforesaid.
H K.K.T.                                            Appeal allowed.