Holding

The Supreme Court held that the cumulative circumstantial evidence, including eyewitness testimony, a valid identification parade, forensic findings, and the accused’s silence and false statements, formed a complete chain pointing unerringly to the accused’s guilt, thereby reinstating the conviction.

Summary

The State of Maharashtra charged Suresh with the rape and murder of a four‑year‑old girl, Sneha, alleging that he abducted her, sexually assaulted her and concealed her body in a farm. The trial court convicted him on the basis of circumstantial evidence, including eyewitnesses who saw the accused with the child, a test identification parade, forensic findings of semen and blood on his clothing, and injuries on his genitalia, and sentenced him to death. The High Court acquitted Suresh, holding the eyewitness testimony unreliable, the identification parade improperly conducted, and the forensic evidence vitiated by delay. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the totality of the circumstances formed a complete, unbroken chain of evidence that unerringly pointed to the accused’s guilt, that the identification parade was valid despite minor lapses, and that the accused’s silence and false denial regarding the concealed body and his injuries gave rise to a presumption of his culpability. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court judgment, restored the conviction and altered the death sentence to life imprisonment for murder, leaving other sentences unchanged.

Issues considered

Whether the circumstantial evidence presented establishes a complete chain sufficient to convict the accused of rape and murder.
Whether the testimony of the three eyewitnesses and the test identification parade are admissible despite alleged procedural irregularities.
Whether the accused’s failure to explain his knowledge of the concealed body creates a presumption of his involvement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
Whether the injuries on the accused’s male organ and his false denial constitute an incriminating circumstance completing the chain of evidence.
Whether the death penalty is appropriate after the High Court’s acquittal, or should be reduced to life imprisonment.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 27
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 376

Subjects

rapemurderchild victimcircumstantial evidenceidentification paradepresumption under Evidence Actfalse statementsdeath penaltylife imprisonment

Judgment

ST A TE OF MAHARASHTRA A
v.
SURESH

DECEMBER 10, 1999

[G.T. NANA VA TI AND K.T. THOMAS, JJ.] B

·· Penal Code, 1860 :

·' Sections 302 and 376-Rape and murder' of .minor child-No eye-
witnesses-Reliable and formidable circumstances established by C
prosecution-Such circumstances forming into complete chain and unerringly
pointing to the accused-Held, accused guiltY' of said offence-Criminal
Trial-Circumstantial Evidence. '•i

Criminal Trial-Circumstantial Evidenc.e-Appreciation of- D
Incriminating material recovered at the instance of a,ccused-No explanation
offered by accused about source of such knowledge-Effect of-Held,
presumption arises against accused that concealment made by him only--
False answer by accused to an incriminating circumstance-Held, .such
circumstance capable of inculpating him-False answer providing a missing
link for completing the chain. E
Prosecution charged respondent-accused with rape and murder of four
year old female child whose house he frequently visited as her uncle was his
acquaintance. Trial court convicted respondent and imposed death sentence
for the said offence on the ground that after visit
l
of respondent
'
on
. '
the fateful.
day, the child disappeared; that PWs. 3, 8 and 14 saw respondent with female F
child on the fateful day and also identified respondent in test identification
parade; that respondent after.arrest took police to the spot wherefrom dead
body of the child was recovered; that post-mortem report indicated injuries
on her private parts and that death was due to asphyxia caused by rape and
smothering; that medical examination of respondent by doctor revealed G
injuries on his male organ; and that stains of blood and semen were detected
on under-clothes of accused when he was arrested.
Ii
In appeal, High Court acquitted respondent on the ground that evidence
I . . l

o,fthree witn~sses, PWs-3, 8 and 14, who h~d seen accused with the girl was
\
I not reliable; that test identification parade was not conducted properly; that H
215
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A body recovered at the behest of respondent was capable of explanation; and
the circumstance that semen and blood were detected on the under clothes of
respondent was vitiated by delay in their seizure. Aggrieved by the judgment
of High Court, State has filed the present appeals.

Allowing the appeals, the Court
B
HELD : 1. A human mind, on hearing about any shocking incident, would
have the tendency to recollect any previous event which could have had a
connection with that incident. If as a matter of fact PWs-3, 8 and 14 had
occasion to see a crying girl of that age on the very day of the gruesome episode,
there is nothing improbable in those witnesses remembering the person who
C was seen in the company of that girl. If they had immediately informed the
police that they noticed a similarly aged girl crying in the company of an
utter stranger of that locality that cannot be brushed aside as a doubtful
conduct. [221-D-E]

D 2.1. Identification parades are not primarily meant for the court. They
are meant for investigation purposes. The object of conducting test
identification parade is two fold. First is to enable the witnesses to satisfy
themselves that the prisoner whom they suspect is really the one who was
seen by them in connection with the commission of the crime. Second is to
satisfy the investigating authorities that the suspect is the real person whom
E the witnesses had seen in connection with the said occurrence. So the officer
conducting the test identification parade should ensure that the said object of
the parade is achieved. [223-B-C]

Budhsen v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1970) 2 SCC 128 and Ramanathan
v. State o/Tami/ Nadu, [1978] 3 SCC 86, relied on.
F
2.2. The minutes of the test identification parade reveal that the
safeguards adopted by the Executive Magistrate were quite sufficient for
ensuring that the parade was conducted in a reasonably foolproof manner as
all precautions were taken to ensure that the witnesses could not see the
G suspect before the parade. (223-D)

3. If the accused declines to tell the court the source of his knowledge
about the concealment of dead body or an incriminating material recovered at
his instance, court can presume that it was concealed by the accused himself.
This is because accused is the only person who can offer the explanation as
H
I
to how else he came to lmow of such concealment and if he chooses to refrain -'
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. SURESH [THOMAS, J.] 217

from telling the court as to how else he came to know of it, the presumption A
is a well justified course to be adopted by the criminal court that the
concealment was made by the accused himself. Such an interpretation is not
inconsistent with the principle embodied in Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
[224-B; C-D)
,>
4. The accused could not give any explanation whatsoever for the injuries B
on his male organ and therefore be had chosen to say that he did not sustain
any such injury at all. There is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of the
doctor who examined the accused. False answer offered by the accused when
his attention was drawn to the aforesaid circumstance _renders that
circumstance capable of inculpating him. In such a situation, a false answer C
can also be counted as providing "a missing link" for completing the chain.
(224-E-F)

5. The prosecution has presented reliable and formidable circumstances
forming into a completed chain and pointing unerringly to the irresistible
conclusion that the little girl was raped and killed by none other than the D
respondent himself. The case is perilously near the region of "rarest of the
rare cases", but as the accused was once acquitted by the High Court, the
extreme penalty of death sentence is not imposed. Hence the sentence is
altered to life sentence. However the sentences imposed by the trial court on
all other counts shall remain unaltered. (224-G-H; 225-A-BJ
E
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, [1980) 2 SCC 684, referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 1092-
1093of1998.

From the Judgment and order dated 5.5.1998 by the High Court of F
Mumbai, Benchaat Nagpur in Confirmation Case No. 2 of 1997 with Criminal
Appeal No. 348 of 1998.

S.V. Deshpande, Mis. A.P. Mayee, S.S. Shinde, G. Sathe, Ms. Promila,
and Ms. Hemantika Wahi for the appearing parties.
G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

THOMAS, J. A gory episode is narrated in this case the gravamen of
which is a grisly perpetrated rape and murder of a four year old female child.
The rapist had abducted the child from her house and· decoyed her to a field
at Arvi (in Wardha district of Maharashtra State). After the rape and murder H
----------------

218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999) SUPP. 5 S.~.R.

A the mangled body of the child was dumped in the field where pulses and
cotion were cultivated. The man whom the police challaned as a culprit was
convicted and condemned to death penalty by the sessions court but he" now
. stands exonerated as a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay proclaimed
him not guilty. The State of Maharashtra is not prepared to reconcile with the
B clean chit granted to him by the High Court and hence this appeal by special
leave has been filed by the State.

Sneha is the name of the little child who was subjected to the beastly
sexual ravishment. She was endearingly called Gangu by her kith and kin. She
had a brother younger to her the children were living in the family house
C which is pre5umably a joint family house. The life of Gangu was snuffed off
on 2212.1995.

As per the prosecution version the accused (who is respondent in this
appeal) was already an accused in another case facing anallegation that he
committecl'rape and murder of one eight year old female child by name
D Ujawala! While he was in Jail in connection with that case he came into
acquaintance with a prisoner (PW6-Sanjay) who is the brother of Gangu"s
father (PW5-Rameshwar). Both of them were later released from prison. (We
aie told that respondent was acquitted in that case). ·' ·.
. . -~

After such. release from jail respondent visited Sanjay's house,. and
E subsequently he paid frequent visits to the said house. During such visits
· he made him'self familiar to Gangu. On 22.12.1995 respondent went to that
house and when he was told that Sanjay had gone out, he left the house.
Sneha was then playing ~ear the gate of her house. Respondent would have
moved away by alluring the little child to go with him. The fact remains that
p·, after, responde?t left the house in. the afternoon no one .in that house had
s~en Gangu ahv~. . -. .. . ; .

Respondent took Gangu to the shop of PW8 Mahad~o. and later to the
shop of.PW14 Motirarn, and thereafter to a farm whereon pulses and cotton
were cultivated. He chose that venue fo(sexually ravishing thai little child
G and smothering her to death. · · ·

As Gangu was not seen in the house or its precincts till nightfalls the
panic-stricken membe~ of her family began to make hectic searches for h_er. As
all such efforts failed her uncle Raju went to the police station and reported _.
that Gangu.was missing from that house. Next morning her father Rameshwar
H (PW-5) went to the police station and lodged Ext. 22-complaint in which he
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. SURESH.[THOMAS, J.] 219

expressed strong .suspicion against the re.spondent reg~rding the A
disappearance of his chil_d., ,

Respondent was arrested on the evening of 23.12.95. During interrogation
the police came to know that dead b~dy of the child was concealed in a farm'.
Though a secµ:ch ~as ma.de in .the night to find out the spot w_here the body
was concealed it did not fructify due to darkness. Hence the police resumed B
the' sear~h operation on the next rpoming and die .spot was pointed out by
the .resp,ondent wherefrom_ th_e dead body of Gangu was traced out.

. when autopsy was conducted on the body by two doctors of the local
\1 ~ ~ -
hospital a·woeful picture ·of sexual molestation was etched by them. Ext. 68
(Post-mdrtem Report) contains the aata, interalia, that-the vagina was torn C

- down at the pe~eruiial region by l" with irregular lacerations and a fleshy tom
portioh w~ found 'protruding ·out therefrom. Contusions and abrasions on
the labia majora of both sides besides swelling were also noticed,by-the
doctor. There were number of contusions and abrasions on her face also. Dr.
A~~~h s~ La~hale,' Medical Superintendent and Dr.' Pathbda, Medical Officer
0

D
of Rural Hospital, Arvi, District' Wardha, after completing the jointly conducted
autopsy reported that death of the child was due to asphyxia by rape and
1
smothering. . :

of
There is ·not even a speck doubt that Gangu was kidnapped from her
house and she was raped and killed by someday on the evening of22.12.1995. E
Infact die Sessions Court arid the High Court concurrently found the aforesaid
point affirmatively. The whole endeavour was therefore confined to the question
whether the crime was' committed by the respondent.
..
The trial court and the High Court focused on the circumstances which
prosecution presented through the evidence for proving that the.culprit in the · F
ghastly infanticide was the ·respondent himself and none else. The Sessions
Judge found that all those circumstances were established and they formed
themselves into a completed chain unerringly pointing to the guilt of the
responoent. But the' Division iBench of the High Court differed from the
findings of the Sessions Court regarding some of the circumstances and that G
resulted in exoneration of the respondent.

. The circumstances which prosecution presented can be recast as follows
. : (I) Respondent visited the house of Gangu at about 3.30 P.M. and after he
left the house it was realised, that Gangu also disappeared; (2) PW-8 Mahadeo
saw the accused and a female child together in his sh~p at about 4.30. P.M. fl
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A on the same days; (3) PW-14 Motiram saw them together in his shop at about
4.00 P.M.; (4) A little later PW-3 Sayyed Niyamat saw them walking along the
road; (5) Respondent after his arrest disclosed to PW.26 (Police Inspector of
Arvi Police Station) that the dead body of the child was concealed in the farm
and he offered to hand it over. Pursuant thereto the spot was pointed out by
the respondent wherefrom the dead body was recovered; (6) PW-20 Dr.
B Avinash S. Law hale stated that the person who caused the injuries on the
vagina of the deceased child would have sustained injuries on his male organ.
When respondent was medically examined on 25.12.1995 by PW-22 Dr. Nand
Kumar it was noticed that his glands penis was swollen with multiple tiny
punctuated abrasions besides abrasions on the posterior aspect of both
C elbow joints. According to the doctor those injuries could have been caused
48 hours earlier than the time of his examination; (7) Stains of human blood
and semen were detected on the under-clothes of the accused when he has
arrested.

The Division Bench of the High Court was not disposed to rely on the
D evidence of the three witnesses who claimed to have seen the respondent and
the girl together though their evidence was found reliable by the trial court.
Nor did the High Court concur·with the Sessions Courts's finding regarding
recovery of 'the dead body as sequel to the information supplied by the
respondent. The High Court declined to take the injuries which the doctor
E noticed on the person of the respondent as an incriminating circumstance on
the premise that it is not a conclusive circumstance. The Division Bench
sidestepped the circumstance that semen and blood were detected on the
under-clothes of the accused on the premise that there was delay in seizing
those wearing apparels.

F The evidence of PW-3 Sayyed Niyamat (PW-8) Mahadeo and Motiram
(PW-14) needs scrutiny by us because acceptability of that evidence will
have a decisive impact on the final conclusion of this case.

PW-8 Mahadeo claimed to have seen the respondent with a little girl
G at his grocery shop around 4 P.M. on 22.12.1995. He said that the man with
the girl had purchased some peppermint from his shop presumably for
appeasing the girl as she was then crying. His reas.on for remembering this
purchase was that next he heard about the murder of a little girl and he visited
-
the house of the girl on 24.12.1995, and identified the dead body as that of
the same girl. In a test identification parade conducted by PW-26 Magistrate·
H he identified the respondent as the person who accompanied the child.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. SURESH [THOMAS, J.) 221
PW-3 Sayyed Nayamat gave evidence that when he was returning from A
bis Friday Namaz he saw a young man holding a crying girl around 4.00P.M.
He too gave almost the same reason for remembering it that when he heard
next day about the murder of a little girl he had some doubt whether it was
the same crying girl. He also identified the respondent in the test identification
parade.
B
PW-14 Motiram has a betel shop in the locality. His evidence is that a
young man wearing pant and shirt visited his shop at about 4.30 p.m. and
bought some "Kharra" from the shop. He remembered it as a little girl was
with him who was found crying then. When he heard next day about the
murder he felt suspicious because the young man whom he saw the previous C
day in his shop was a total stranger in the locality. So he informed the police
about it. He too was called in the Test Identification Parade wherein he
identified the respondent as the person whom he saw with the girl.

If a criminal court is to view the testimony of the aforesaid three
witnesses as unnatural it would be easy to brush it aside with the stereotyped D
reasoning that those persons had no cause to remember having seen the man
with the girl accompanying him. Such a reasoning overlooks the broad aspect
that a human mind, on hearing about any shocking incident, would have the
tendency to recollect any previous event which could have had a connection
with that incident. If as a matter of fact those witnesses had occasion to see
a crying girl of that age on the very day of the gruesome episode as happened E
in this case, there is nothing improbable in those witnesses remembering the
person who was seen in the company of that girl. If they had immediately
informed the police that they noticed a similarly aged girl crying in the
company of an utter stranger of that locality that cannot be brushed aside
as a doubtful conduct. Either the three witnesses concocted the story falsely F
or what they said must be true. Why should they concoct it falsely. We are
not told of any reason whatsoever for those three witnesses to bother
themselves to concoct such a canard.

It seems that a minor discrepancy in their evidence had affected their
credibility before the High Court. They said that they went to the police G
station on 24.12.1995, whereas PW-26 Police Inspector said that they visited
the police station only on 25.12.1995. We do not attach any significance to
the aforesaid discrepancy as PW-26 should have been more correct because
he was speaking with the help of investigation records while the witnesses
would have spoken from their memory only. Another reason advanced by the
Division Bench is that when PW-3 Sayyed Niyamat went to the bereaved H
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

-A house he did not info.:.U anyone in that f,,;,;ily as to what he saw. earlier. But
PW-3 himself gave an explanation for it that as members of that family were
then in a shock he did not venture to tell them about it at that occasion. Here
also· the qu~stion is not whether PW-3 should have told them despite his
hesitation but whether the witness had chosen to adopt such a reticence in
a situation like that. It is not for the Court to suggest that he should have
B divulged it to the ~embers of the bereaved family despite his own thinking
about it .Ai any rate we are not impressed by o.he aforesaid reasoning for
rejecting the testim~ny ~fan important witness like PW-3.

The Division Bench then advanced a theory that there is "an inherent
C incredibility in the evidence" on the premise that a culprit kidnapping a minor
girl with sinister design would normally take the precaution not to be seen
by any other person on the way, but in this case the culprit along with the
girl had moved from place to place in the town. We are unable to appreciate
such a reasoning as proposition of human conduct. For considering that
reasoning it' must be remembered that Gangu would certainly have been
D "abducted by some body (even assuming that it was not this respondent} and
·that person had taken ·_the abducted girl from her house up to the farm. Unless
it is suggested that· there was another alternative and safer route for the
culprit to take the girl unnoticed by any shopkeeper or even a pedestrian .
there in no rationale in the reasoning that there is "inherent incredibility" in
E the version tha~ respon~ent would have taken th': girl through this route.
The last reasoning of the Division Bench is based on a criticism of the
modes adopted by the Executive Magistrate who held the test identification
parade. The aforesaid criticism was based on the evidence of two witnesses
who said that the accused were taken on foot from police station to the place
F ·where the parade was conducted and that their faces were not covered during
sucll transit. ·.
-~

_. E,xt. 17.is the minutes of the test identification parade eonducted by the
as
Magistrate who himself was examined PW-2. It contairis the details of the
steps adopted by him. Seven other persons ~ere kept ready in the room and
G the witnesses were kept in another room from where they could not see the
suspect. Thereupon the suspect was brought from the lock up with the help
· · of two respectable persons and all precautions were taken that the witnesses
could not see the suspect during such transit. Then the suspect was permitted
to stand anywhere among the 7 persons. It was thereafter that the witnesses •
were brought with the help of the same respectable persons and the witnesses
H were then asked to identify the person whom they saw on the crucial day.
•
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. SURESH [THOMAS, J.] 223
1
. I
If potholes were to be ferreted out from the proceedings of' the' A.
· magistrates holding such parades possibly no test identification parade can
escape from one or two lapses. If a scrutiny is made from that angle alone
and the result of the parade is treated as vitiated every test identification ·
parade would become unusable. We remind ourselves that identification
parades are not primarily meant for the court. They are meant for investigation
·purposes. The object of conducting test identification parade is two fold. First· B
is to enable the witnesses to ~atisfy themselves that the prisoner whom they
suspect is really the one who was seen by them in connection with the
commission of the crime. Second is to satisfy the _investigating authorities
that the suspect is the real person whom the witnesses had seen in connection
with the said occurrence. So the officer conducting the test identification C
parade should ensure that 'the said object of the parade is achieved. If he
pennits dilution of the modality to be followed in a p!1J'ade, he should see to
it that such relaxation would not impair the purpose for which the parade is
held, vide Budhsen v. State ofUttar Prdesh, [ 1970] 2 SCC 128 and Ramanathan
v. State a/Tamil Nadu, [1978] 3 SCC 86."
D
When we scanned through .Ex. 17 minutes of the test identification
parade, we feel that the safeguards adopted by PW~2 Executive Magistrate
were quite sufficient for ensuring that the parade was conducted in a reasonably
foolproof manner. We feel that the Division Bench niggled on unimportant
details and came to the wrong conclusion that the test identification parade E
was irretrievably vitiated. The reasons by which the testimony of those three
witnesses had been jettisoned by the Division Bench were fatuous and we
cannot support them. · · .

One of the fonnidably incriminating circunis~ces against the accused
was that_ the dead body was recover~d as pointed out by the respondent The F
statement of the respondent which led to the recovery of the dead body has
·been incorporated in Ext. 79 and the admissible portion of it reads th.is : ·
' . ' ' ' .

·. "He~ dead body is kept concealed in the field; I will take it out and
produce the same; come with me."
G
,. But unfortunately the Division Bench of the High Court did not rely on
a
the above circumstance on very fragile reasoning. The first limb of that
reasoning was based on a mistake committed by PW-3 Sayyed Niyamat in his
· __ .. evidence when he said that he saw the dead body of the a,ild on 23.12.1995.
Much strain is not required in holding that what PW-3 said should have_ been
understood as 24.12.1995. The second limb of the reasoning is that two other H
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A possibilities could not have been ruled out. Of which one is that respondent
would have seen someone else placing the dead body at that spot, and the
second is that respondent would have been told by somebody else that the
dead body was placed there.

B
We too countenance three possibilities when an accused points out the
place where a dead body or an incriminating material was concealed without
stating that it was conceded by himself. One is that he himself would have
concealed it. Second is that he would have seen somebody else concealing
-
it. And the third is that he would have been told by another person that it
was concealed there. But if the accused declines to tell the criminal court that
C his knowledge about the concealment was on account of one of the last two
possibilities the criminal court can presume that it was concealed by the
accused himself. This is because accused is the only person who can offer
the explanation as to how else he came to know of such concealment and if
he chooses to refrain from telling the court as to how else he came to know
of it, the presumption is a well justified course to be adopted by the criminal ..._,
D court that the concealment was made by himself. Such an interpretation is not
inconsistent with the principle embodied in Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

It is regrettable that the Division Bench had practically nullified the
most formidable incriminating circumstance against the accused spoken to by
E PW-22 Dr. Nand Kumar. We have pointed out earlier the injuries which the
doctor had noted on the person of the accused when he was examined on
25.12.1995. The significant impact of the said incriminating circumstance is
that the accused could not give any explanation whatsoever for those injuries
and therefore he had chosen to say that he did not sustain any such injury
at all. We have no reason to disbelieve the testimony of PW-22 Dr. Nand
F Kumar. False answer offered by the accused when his attention was drawn
to the aforesaid circumstance renders that circumstance capable of inculpating
him. In a situation like this such a false answer can also be counted as
providing "a missing link" for completing the chain.

G It is disconcerting that a case like this in which the prosecution has
presented such reliable and formidable circumstances forming into a completed
chain and pointing unerringly to the irresistible conclusion that the little girl
Gangu was raped and killed by none other than the respondent himself, ended
in unmerited acquittal from the Division Bench of the High Court. Criminal
justice unfortunately became a casualty in this case when the High Curt side-
H stepped all such circumstances and exonerated the culprit of such a grotesque
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. SURESH [THOMAS, J.) 225
crime. A
We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment and restore the
conviction passed by the trial court. Regarding sentence we would have
concurred with the Sessions Court's view that the extreme penalty of death
can be chosen for such a crime, but as the accused was once acquitted by
the High Court we refrain from imposing that extreme penalty in spite of the B
fact that this case is perilously near the region of "rarest of the rare cases"
envisaged by the Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab,
[1980] 2 SCC 684. However, the lesser option is not unquestionably foreclosed
and so we alter the sentence, in regard to the offence under Section 302 IPC,
to imprisonment for life. The sentences imposed by the trial court on all other C
counts would remain unaltered. The bail bond shall stand cancelled. We direct
the respondent to surrender to bail. We also direct the Sessions Judge,
Wardha to take immediate and necessary steps to put the accused in jail if
he is not already in jail, for undergoing the sentence imposed on him.

A.K.T. Appeals allowed. D