Holding

A prosecutrix in a sexual offence is a victim and a competent witness whose testimony need not be corroborated in material particulars unless special circumstances warrant it.

Summary

The respondent, a Sub‑Inspector of police, was convicted of raping a 19‑year‑old woman, Shamimbanu, by the trial court. The High Court acquitted him, holding that the victim’s testimony required corroboration in material particulars and that medical evidence was inconsistent. The State appealed. The Supreme Court held that a prosecutrix in a sexual offence is a victim, not an accomplice, and is a competent witness under Section 118 of the Evidence Act; her testimony need not be corroborated unless special circumstances demand it. The Court found the victim’s evidence credible, the semen‑stain evidence corroborative, and rejected the High Court’s insistence on corroboration. Consequently, the conviction and sentence were restored. The appeal was allowed, the High Court order set aside, and the respondent ordered to surrender and serve his sentence.

Issues considered

The prosecution evidence of the prosecutrix in a rape case requires corroboration in material particulars?
Whether the High Court erred in excluding the victim’s testimony and medical evidence in assessing guilt?
Whether statements recorded under Section 162 CrPC are admissible?
Whether the standard of proof for a police officer accused of rape differs from that for a private citizen?

Legislation cited

Bombay Police Acts. 110, s. 117
Code of Criminal Procedures. 162
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 160, s. 47(2), s. 53(2)
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114, s. 118, s. 133, s. 39
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 342, s. 376

Subjects

rapesexual offenceevidenceprosecutrixcorroborationpolice officer abuse of powerIndian Evidence Actstandard of proofvictim testimonycriminal law

Judgment

STAIB OF MAHARASHTRA
A
v.
CHANDRAPRAKASH KEWAL CHAND JAIN

JANUARY 18, 1990

[A.M. AHMADI AND M. FATHIMA BEEVI, JJ.] B

Indian Evidence Act-Sections 39, 114, 118 and 133--Victim of sex
offence-Victim of crime-Court to evaluate evidence so as to protect
rights of women extent of corroboration needed-Notion that except in
rarest of rare cases, the evidence of the prosecutrix cannot be accepted
unless corroborated in material particulars erroneous.
c
Indian Penal Code-Sections 376 and 342-Crime committed by
persons in authority-Police officer-Court to give deterrent puniSh-
ment.

The respondent, a Sub-Inspector of police, was convicted under D
section 376 .of I.P.C. for having committed rape on a young newly
married girl of 19 or 20 years of age, by the Additional Sessions Judge,
Nagpur. The respondent challenged his conviction in appeal to the High
Court. The High Court set aside the order of conviction and sentence
imposed by the trial court and acquitted him. The State feeling
aggrieved came up in appeal by special leave. While allowing the appeal E
setting aside the order of the High Court and restoring that of the Trial
Court, the Court,

HELD: A prosecutrbi ,of a sex-offence caonot be pot on par with
an accomplice. She is in fact a vic.tim of the crime. The Evidence Act
nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is cor- F
rohorated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent wit-
ness under section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as
is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree
of care and caution must attache in the evaluation of her evidence as in
the case of any injured complainant or witness and no more. [123B-C]
G
What is more necessary is that the Court must be alive to and
conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence oh person who
is interested in the outcome of charge levelled by her. Having regad to
the increase in the number of sex-violation cases in the recent past,
particularly cases of molestation and rape in custody, it is proper to
remove the notion, if it persists, that the testimony of a woman who is a H
115
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 1 S.C.R.

A victim of sexual violence must ordinarily be corroborated in material
particulars except in the rarest of rare cases. [123C-D; 1248-C]

Ours is a conservative society where it concerns sexual behaviour.
Ours is not a permissive society as in some of the Western and European
countries. Our standard of decency and morality in public life is not the
B same as in those countries. It is, however, unfortunate that respect for
womanhood in our country is on the decline and cases of molestation
and rape are steadily growing. An Indian Woman is now required to
suffer indignities in different forms, from lewd remark to eve-teasing,
from molestation to rape. Decency and morality in plublic life can be
promoted and protected only if w1e deal strictly with those who violate
l
C the social norms. The standard of proof to be expected by the Court in
such cases must take into account the fact that such crimes are generally
committed on the sly and very ra1·ely direct evidence of a person other
than the prosecutrix is available. [1240-F]

Courts must also realise that ordinarily a woman, more so a
D young girl, will not stake her reputation by leveling a false charge
concerning her chastity. By our criminal laws vide powers are confer-
red on police officers investigaiin1: cognizable offences. The infrastruc-
ture of our criminal 'investigation system recognises and indeed protects
the right of a woman to decent and dignified treatment at the hands of
the investigating agency. [l24F-H]
E
The purpose and setting, the person and his position, the misuse
or abuse of office and the des11air of the victim which led to her
surrender are all relevant factors which must be present in the miud of
the Court while evaluating the conduct-evidence of the prosecutrix. A

F
person in authority, such as a police officer carries with him the awe of
office which is bound to condition the behaviour of his victim [l25C-D]

The Court must not be oblivious of the emotional turmoil and thl
'
J
psychological injury that a prosecutrix suffers on being molested or
raped. She suffers a tremendous sense of shame and the fear of being
shunned by society and her near relatives including her husband.
G Instead of treating her with compassion and understanding as one who
is an injured victim of a crime, she is, more omen than not, treated as a
sinner and shunned. It must, therefore be realised that a woman who is
subjected to sex-violence would always be slow and hesitant about disc-
losing her plight. The Court mrnst, therefore, evaluate her evidence in
the above background.
H
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. CHANDRAPRAKASH [AHMADI, l.] 117

Bharwada Bhognibhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, [1983] 3 SCR A
280-relied upon.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 221of1986 etc.

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.6.1985 of the Bombay B
High Court in Cr!. Appeal No. 215 of 1982.

S.B. Bhasme, Mrs. H. Wahi, A.S. Bhasme and A.M. Khan-
wilkar fo~ the Appellants.

V.D. Misra, J. Wad and Mrs. Arona Mathur for the Respon-
dents. C

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

AHMADI, J. This appeal by special leave is brought by the
State of Mahar_ashtra againstthe judgment of acquittal recorded by the D
Nagpur Bench of the High Court of Bombay (Maharashtra) reversing
the conviction of the respondent Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, a
Sub-Inspector of Police, under Section 376, I.P.C. for having commit-
ted rape on Shamimbanu, a girl aged about 19 or 20 years on 22nd
August, 1981. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur, came
to the conclusion that the prosecution had brought home the charge E
under Section 376, LP .C. and sentenced the respondent to suffer
rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000, in
default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 6 months. He was, how-
ever, acquitted of the charge under Section 342, I.P.C. The respon-
dent challenged his conviction in appeal to the High Court. The High
Court set aside the order of conviction and sentence imposed by the F
trial court and acquitted the respondent. The State feeling aggrieved
sought special leave to appeal. On the same being granted this appeal
is before us.

Briefly the facts are that the parents of Shamimbanu were resid-
ing as t.!nants in a part of the building belonging to the father of G
Mohmad Shafi while the remaining portion was occupied by the
owner's family. PW 1 Mohmad Shafi aged about 25 years fell in love
'r· · with PW 2 Shamimbanu aged about 19 years. The prosecution case is
that although the parents of both knew about their love affair, for
some reason or the other, they were not married. Both of them left
Nagpur and went to Bombay where they contracted a marriage H
118 S U:PREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 1 S.C.R.
•
A through a Kazi and returned to Nagpur by train on 20th August, 1981.
They got down at Anjani Railway Station ('a suburb of Nagpur) and
went to a nearby Gurudeo Lodge and occupied Room No. 204. That
night i.e. on the night of 20th/12st August, 1981, PW 8 Police Sub-
Inspector Qureishi checked the hotel and learnt that the couple was
living in the said room in the assumed names of Mohmad Shabbir and
8 · Sultana. On being questioned PW I Mohmad Shafi gave out the true
facts and showed the Nilkahnama. Ex. 10. On being satisfied about the .-
correctness of the version, Police Sub-Inspector qureishi got tbeir cor-
rect names substituted in the register of the Lodge as is evident from
the entry Ex. 31, proved by PW 5 M.anoh~r Dhote, the Man~er of the
Lodge. Pohce Sub-Inspector Qure1sh1 did not deem 1t n~..:essary to
take any steps against the couple.
c
On the next night between 21st and 22nd August, 1981 the
respondent-accused went to the hotel room No. 204 occupied by the
couple at the odd time of about 2.30 a.m. and knocked on the door.
He was accompanied by PW 7 Constable Chandrabhan. When
D Mohmad Shafi opened the door the respondent questioned him on
seeing Shamimbanu with him. Mohmad Shafi told him that she was his
wife and gave their correct names. Notwithstanding their replies the
respondent insisted that they accompany him to the police station. PW
5 reqi1ested the respondent to sign his visit book since he had inspected
a few rooms of his Lodge including Room No. 204 but the respondent
E told him that he would do it later. So saying he left the Lodge with the
couple.

On reaching the police station the respondent separated the
couple. He took Shamimbanu to the first floor of the police station
while her husband Mohmad Shafi was taken to anoher room by PW 7.
F Shamimbanu alleges that after she was taken to the first floor, the
respondent flirted with her, slapped her when she refused to respond
to his flirtation and demanded that she spend the night with him. The
respondent also demanded that she should give her age as 15 years so
that Mohmad Shafi could be booked. On her refusing and protesting
against his behaviour he threatened her with dire consequences.
G
In the other room Mohmad Shafi was subjected to beating by
PW 7. After sometime both the boy and the girl were brought down to
the main hall of the police station. By then it was around 5.00 or 5.30 ._,
a.m. Thereafter .he sent Mohmad Shafi with a constable to fetch the
girl's father. The girl's parents arrived at the police station shortly.
H The respondent asked the girl's parents if they were prepared to take
- - --------------------

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. CHANDRAPRAKASH [AHMADI, J.I 119
\
back the girl who claimed to have married Mohmad Shafi. The girl's
parents showed annoyance and left the police station refusing to take A
her with them. Mohniad Shafi's parents also adopted the same
attitude.

The respondent then recorded an offence under Section 110 read
with 117 of the Bombay Police Act against Mohmad Shafi on the B
allegation that he was found misbehaving on a public street uttering
filthy abuses in front of Gujarat Lodge near Gurudeo Lodge. After
putting Mohmad Shafi in the Jock-uo he sent the girl Shamimbanu to
Anand Mahal Hotel with PW 7. Initially PW 4, the Hotel Manager
refused to give a room to an unescorted girl but PW 7 told him that he
had brought her on the directive of the respondent. Thereupon PW 4
allotted Room No. 36 to her. He made an entry in the hotel register to c
the effect 'Shamimbanu wife of Mohmad Shafi ...... as per instruc-
tions of Police Sub-Inspector Shri Jain ..... .' vide Ex. 25. Afte1
leaving the girl in Room No. 36, PW 7 left the hotel. It is the prosecu-
tion case that after the girl was allotted the room, as per the usual
practice, the hotel boy changed the bed-sheets, pillow covers and quilt D
cover. The rent was charged from the girl.

Having thus separated the couple and finding the girl thoroughly
helpless, the respondent visited the girl's room and knocked on the
door. The unsuspecting Shamimbanu opened the door. The respon-
dent entered the room and shut the door behind him. Thereafter he E
asked the girl to undress but on the girl refusing he forcibly removed
her 'kurta' and threw it away. He gagged the girl's mouth and
threatened her with dire consequences if she did not submit. He then
threw the girl on the cot, forcibly removed her 'salwar' _and denuded
her. He then had sexual intercourse with her, notwithstanding her
protestations. After satisfying his lust, the respondent left threatening F
that he would bury both of them alive if she complained to anyone. He
told her that he would now arrange to send back her husband.

- Not fully satisfied the respondent returned to the hotel room
after about half an hour and knocked on the door. Shamimbanu
opened the door thinking that her husband h·1-t returned. When she G
saw the respondent she tried to shut the door but the respondent forced
his way into the room and shut the door from within. He once again
had sexual intercourse with her against her will. He repeated his threat
befoe leaving.

On the otherhand Mohmad Shafi was sent to Court on his arrest · H ·
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 1 S.C.R.

under Sections 110/117 of the Bombay Police Act. He was released on
A
bail. He returned to the police station by about 5.00 p.m. and enquired
about the whereabouts of his wife. PW 7 told him she was in Room No.
36 of Anand Mahal Hotel. He immediately went to his wife. On seeing
him she was in tears. She narrated to him what she had gone through at
the hands of the respondent. Enraged Mohmad Shafi went back to the
B police station and informed PW 14 Inspector Pathak about the com-
mission of assault and rape on his wife by the respondent. PW 14
recoded the same in the station diary at 6.35 p.m. and informed his
superiors about the same presumably because a police officer was
involved. Thereupon Deputy Commissioner of Police Parassis and
Assistant Commissioner of Police Gupta arrived at the police station.
The Assistant Commissioner of Police asked Inspector Pathak to
c accompany Mohmad Shafi and fetch Shamimbanu. On their return
with Shamimbanu Mohmad Shafi was asked to give a written account
of the incident which he did. On the basis thereof an offence under
section 376, J.P. C. was registered and the investigation was entrusted
to Inspector Karpe of Crime Branch.
D
In the course of investigation a spot panchnama of Room No. 36
was drawn up and certain articles such as bed-sheet, quilt cover,
mattress, etc. which had semen-like stains were attached. The hotel
register containing the relevant entry (Ex. 25) was also seized and J
statements of witnesses were recorded. Both the respondent and
E Shamimbanu were sent for medical examination and their blood sam-
ples were taken along with that of Mohmad Shafi to determine their
blood groups. Similarly the garments of the respondent and Shamim-
banu were attached and sent for chemical examination along with the
articles seized from the hotel room. On the conclusion of the investiga-
tion the respondent was charge sheeted and put up for trial before the
F Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur.

The respondent pleaded not guilty to the charge and denied the
accusation made against him. His defence was that he arrested
Mohmad Shafi on the charge under Sections 110/117, Bombay Police
Act, and took him to Gurudeo Lodge and from there he took him and
G Shamimbanu to the police station. Since the parents of both the boy
and the girl disowned them he had no alternative but to place Mohmad
Shafi in the lock-up and allow Shamimbanu to leave the police station
as a free citizen since she was not accused of any crime. It was his say
that after Shamimbanu left the police station she went to Anand Mahal
Hotel and stayed in Room No. 36 awaiting Mohmad Shafi. According
H to him as Mohmad Shafi was annoyed because of his detention in the
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. CHANDRAPRAKASH !AHMADl, J .J 121

Jock-up, he had, with the assistance of Shamimbanu, falsely involved
A
~. him on the charge of rape.

The trial court found that the respondent had visited Room No.
204 at an odd hour and had taken the couple to the police station
where he had misbehaved with the girl. It also found that he had
booked the boy on a false charge and had lodged the girl in Room No .. B
36 after their parents disowned them. It lastly held that the evidence of
the prosecutrix clearly established that the respondent had raped her
twise in that room. The trial court convicted the respondent under
Section 376, I.P.C.

The respondent preferred an appeal to the High Court. A
learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the appeal and acquit- c
ted the respondent. The High Court took the view that the oral infor-
mation Ex. 50 furnished by Mohmad Shafi to Inspector Pathak at 6.35
p.m. constituted the First Information Report and the subsequent
written information Ex. 7 given at 8.30 p.m., was inadmissible in evi-
dence as hit by Section 162 of the Code. The"High ·Court then took the D
view that except in the 'rarest of the rare cases' where the testimony of
the prosecutrix is found to be so trustworthy, truthful and reliable that
,._ no corroboration is necessary, the Court should ordinarily look for
corroboration. According to it as Ex. 50 did not unfold two successive
acts of rape, this was not a case where it would be safe to base a
conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, more so because E
both the girl and the boy had reason to entertain a grudge against the
respondent who had booked the latter. Lastly the High Court pointed
out that the version of the prosecutrix is full of contradictions and is
not corroborated by medical evidence, in that, the medical evidence
regarding the examination of the prosecutrix is negative and does not
show marks of violence. These contradictions and inconsistencies have f
been dealt with in paragraphs 24 to 31 of the judgment. The High
Court also noticed certain infirmities in the evidence of PW 1 Mohmacj
Shafi in paragraphs 32 to 34 of its judgment. The High Court, there-
fore, concluded that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the
guilt of the accused and accordingly acquitted him. It is against this
order of the High Court that the State has preferred this appeal by G
special leave.

The learned counsel for the appellant-State submitted that the
entire approach of the High Court in the matter of appreciation of
evidence of the prosecution witnesses, particularly PW 2, betrays tota! /'
ignorance of the psychology of an Indian woman belonging to the Ji
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 1 S.C.R.

traditional orthodox society. He submitted that the prosecutix of this
A
case came from an orthodox muslim family, was semi-literate having
studied upto the VII Standard and whose parents considered it a
shame to take her back to their fold because she had eloped and
married a boy of her own choice. He submitted that the statement of
law in the High Court judgment that implicit reliance cannot be placed
B on a prosecutrix except in the rarest of rare cases runs counter to the
law laid down by this Court in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State
of Gujarat, [1983] 3 SCR 280. He also submitted that the evidence of
the prosecutrix has been rejected on unsustainable grounds which do
not touch the substratum of the prosecution case and which can be
attributed to nervousness and passage of time. According to him this
approach of the High Court has resulted in gross miscarriage of justice
c which this Court must correct in exercise of its jurisdiction under Arti-
cle 136 of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the respondent,
however, supported the High Court judgment.

It is necessary at the outset to state what the approach of the
D Court should be while evaluating the prosecution evidence, particu-
larly the evidence of the prosecutrix, in sex-offences. Is it essential that
the evidence of the prosecutrix should be corroborated in material
particulars before the Court basis a conviction on her testimony? Does
the rule of prudence demand that in all cases save the rarest of rare the
Court should look for corroboration before acting on the evidence of
E the posecutrix? Let us see if the Evidence Act provides the clue.
Under the said statute 'Evidence' means and includes all statements
which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses,
in relation to the maUers of fact under inquiry. Under Section 59 all
facts, except the contents of documents, may be proved by oral evi-
dence. Section 118 then tells us who may give oral evidence. Accord-
F ing to that section all persons are competent to testify unless the Court
considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions
put to them, or from giving rational answers to those questions, by
tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body or mind, or
any other cause of the same kind. Even in the case of an accomplice
Section 133 provides that he shall be a competent witness against an
G accused person; and a conviction is not illegal merely because it pro-
ceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. However,
illustration (b) to Section.114, which lays down a rule of practice, says .,
.
that the Court 'may' presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit,
unless he is corroborated in material particulars. Thus under Section
133, which lays down a rule of law, an accomplice is a competent
H witness and a conviction based solely on his uncorroborated evidence
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. CHANDRAPRAKASH [AHMADI, J.I 123

is not illegal although in view of Section 114, illustration (b ), courts do ' A
not as a matter of practice do so and look for corroboration in material
particulars. This is the conjoint effect of Sections 133 and 114, illustra-
..A. tion.(b). >

A prosecutrix of a sex-offence cannot be put on par with an B
accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act
nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is car-
roborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent
~ witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same
weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The
same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her
evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no c
t more. What is necessary is that the Court must be alive to and con-
scious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is
interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the Court
keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of
_......
the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the D
Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it
to look for corroboration. If for some reason the Court is hesitant to
place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look
for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of
corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of
A.
evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix E
must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.
But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the Court is
entitled to base a conviction on he.r evidence unless the same is shown
to be infirm and not trustwothy. If the totality of the circumstances
~.....
·-, appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does
not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the
F

-~
Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence.
We have, therefore, no doubt in our minds that ordinarily the evidence
of a prosecutrix who does not lack understanding must be accepted.
The degree of proof <eq uired must not be higher than is expected of an
injured witness. For the above reasons we think that exception has
rightly been taken to the approach of the High Court as is reflected in
G
the following passage:

"It is only in the rarest of rare cases if the Court finds that
\.
the testimony of the prosecutrix is so trustworthy, truthful
I and reliable that other corroboration may not be neces-
sary." H
r
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 1 S.C.R.

With respect, the law is not correctly stated. If we may say so, it is just
A
the reverse. Ordinarily the evidence of a prosecutrix must carry the
same weight as is attached to an injured person who is a victim of
violence, unless there are special circumstances which call for greater
caution, in which case it would be safe to act on her testimony if there
is independent evidence lending assurance to her accusation.

We think it proper, having regard to the increase in the number
of sex-violation cases in the recent past, particularly cases of molesta-
tion and rape in custody, to remove the notion, if it persists, that the _
testimony of a woman who is a victim of sxual violence must ordinarily -"'
be corroborated in material particulars except in the rarest of rare
cases. To insist on corroboration except in the rarest of rare cases is to
c equate a woman who is a victim of the lust of another with an accomp-
lice to a crime and thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding
insult to injury to tell a woman that her story of woe will not be
believed unless it is corroborated in material particulars as in the case
of an accomplice to a crime. Ours is a conservative society where it
D concerns sexual behaviour. Ours is not a permissive society as in some
of the Western and European countries. Our standard of decency and
morality in public life is not the same as in those countries. It is,
however, unfortunate that respect for womanhood in our country is on
the decline and cases of molestation and rape are steadily growing. An
Indian woman is now required to suffer indignities in different forms,
E from lewd remarks to eve-teasing, from molestation to rape. Decency
and morality in public life can be promoted and protected only if we
deal strictly with those who violate the societal norms. The standard of
proof to be expected by the Court in such cases must take into account
the fact that such crimes are generally committed on the sly and very
rarely direct evidence of a person other than the prosecutrix is avail-

l
F able. Courts must also realise that ordinarily a woman, more so a
young girl, will not stake her reputation by levelling a false charge
concerning her chastity.

But when such a crime is committed by a person in authority,
e.g. a police officer, should the Court's approach be the same as in any
other case involving a private citizen? By our criminal laws wide powers
are conferred on police officers investigating cognizable offences. The
infrastructure of our criminal investigation system recognises and
indeed protects the right of a woman to decent and dignified treatment
at the hands of the investigating agency. This is evident from the
proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 47 of the Code which obliges the
police officer desiring to effect entry to give an opportunity to the
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. CHANDRAPRAKASH !AHMADI, J.] 125

woman in occupation to withdraw from the building. So also sub- A
section (2) of Section 53 requires that whenever a female accused is to
be medically examined such examination must be under the supervi-
sion of a female medical practitioner. The proviso to Section 160 stipu-
lates that whenever the presence of a woman is required as a witness
the investigating officer will record her statement at her own resi-
dence. These are just a few provisions which reflect the concern of the B
legislature to prevent harassment and exploitation of women and pre-
serve their dignity. Notwithstanding this concern, if a police officer
misuses his authority and power while dealing with a young helpless
girl aged about 19 or 20 years, her conduct and behaviour must be
judged in the backdrop of the situation in which she was placed. The
purpose and setting, the person and his position, the misuse or abuse
of office and the despair of the victim which led to her surrender are all C
relevant factors which must be present in the mind of the Court while
evaluating the conduct-evidence of the prosecutrix. A person in
authority, such as a police officer, carries with him the awe of office
which is bound to condition the behaviour of his victim. The Court
must not be oblivious of the emotional turmoil and the psychological D
injury that a prosecutrix suffers on being molested or raped. She suf-
fers a tremendous sense of shame and the fear of being shunned by
society and her near relatives, including her husband. Instead of treat-
ing her with compassion and understanding as one who is an injured
,.._I victim of a crime, she is, more often than not, treated as a sinner and
' shunned. It must, therefore, be realised that a woman who is subjected E
to sex-violence would always be slow and hesitant about disclosing her
plight. The Court must, therefore, evaluate her evidence in the above
background.

It is time to recall the observations of this Court made not so far

l
back in Bharwada Bhognibhai Hirjibhai, (supra): F

"In the Indian setting, refusal to act on the testimony of a
victim of sexual assaults in the absence of corroboration as a
rule, is adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of
the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual
molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with G
lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? To do so is
to justify the charge of male chauvinism in a male domina-
ted society. We must analyse the argument in support of
the need for corroboration and subject it to relentless and
remoreseless cross-examination. And we must do so with a
logical, and not an opinionated, eye in the light of H
126 SUPREME COURT REPOR.TS [1990] 1 S.C.R.

probabilities with our feet firmly planted on the soil of India
A
and with our eyes focussed on the Indian horizon. We must
not be swept off the feet by the approach made in the
Western World which has its own social mileu, is own social
mores, its own permissive values, and its own code of life.
Corroboration may be considered essential to establish a
B sexual offence in the backdrop of the social ecology of the
Western World. It is wholly unnecessary to import the said
concept on a turn-key basis and to transplate it on the
Indian soil regardless of the altogether different atmosp-
here, attitudes, mores, responses of the Indian Society, and
its profile. The identities of the two worlds. are different.
The solution of problems cannot therefore be identical."
c
Proceeding further this Court said:

"Without the fear of making too wide a statement, or of
overstating the case, it can be said that rarely will a girl or a
D woman in India make false allegations of sexual assault
.......... The statement is generally true in the context
of the urban as also rural society. It is also by and large true
in the context of the sophisticated, not so sophisticated,
and unsophisticated society. Only very rarely can one
conceivably come across an exception or two and that too
E possibly from amongst the urban elites. Because: ( 1) A girl
or a woman in the tradition bound non-permissive Society
of India would be extremely reluctant even to admit that
any incident which is likely to reflect on her chastity had
ever occurred. (2) She would be conscious of the danger of
being ostracised oy the Society or being looked down by the
F Society including by her own family members, relatives,
friends and neighbours. (3) She would have to brave the
whole world. (4) She would face the risk of losing the love
and respect of her own husband and near relatives, and of
her matrimonial home and happiness being shattered. (5)
If she is unmarried, she would apprehend that it would be
G difficult to secure an alliance with a suitable match from a
respectable uf an acceptable family. (6) It would almost
inevitably and almost invariably result in mental torture
and suffering to herself. (7) The fear of being taunted by
others will always haunt her. (8) She would feel extremely
embrassed in relating the incident to others being over
H powered by a feeling of shame on account of the upbringing
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. CHANDRAPRAKASHIAHMADI,J.] 127

in a tradition bound society where by and large sex is taboo.
A
(9) The natural inclination would be to avoid giving publi-
city to the incident lest the family name and family honour
is brought into controversy. ( 10) The parents of an unmar-
ried girl as also the husband and members of the husband's
family of a married woman would also more often than not,
want to avoid publicity on account of the fear of social B
stigma on the family name and family honour. (11) The
fear of the victim herself being considered to be promis-
cuous or in some way responsible for the incident regard-
less of her innocence. (12) The reluctance to face interroga-
tion by the investigating agency, to face the court, to face
the cross examination by Counsel for the culprit, and the
risk of being disbelieved, acts as a'deterrent." c

We are in complete agreement with these observations.

We now proceed to examine if the High Court was justified in
upturning the order of conviction passed by the Trial Court. The High D
Court refused to confirm the conviction of the respondent as it found
the evidence of the prosecutrix full of contradictions and not consistent
with medical evidence as well as the findings recorded by the Chemical
Analyst. We may first indicate the contradictions which prompted the
High Court to look for corroboration. Jhey are:
E
(i) the version that the respondent had misbehaved with her
in the police station and had molested her could not be
believed because she did not complain about the same to
the other police officers who were present in the police
station main hall on the ground floor or to her relatives
who were called to the police station;. F

(ii) th.e conduct of the respondent in calling her parents and in
giving them an opportunity to take her with them does not
smack of an evil n1ind;

(iii) the evidence of the prosecutrix that the respondent was G
instrumental in lodging her in Anand Mahal Hotel room is
not supported by any evidence;

(iv) the conduct of the prosecutrix. in not informing and seeking
assistance from the hotel management after the first inci-
dent and even after the second incident of ra£e in the hotel H
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 1 S.C.R.

room fs unnatural and surprising;
A
(v) the find of semen-stains on the 'salwar' and 'kurta' of the \.
prosecutrix runs counter to her evidence that on both the
occasions she was completely denuded before she was
ravished;
B
(vi) the absence of marks of physical violence also runs counter
to her version that when she tried to raise an alarm she was
slapped by the respondent;

(vii) the evidence of PW 3 Dr. Vijaya and the medical report
Ex. 17 do not lend corroboration to the evidence of the
c prosecutrix that the respondent had sexual intercourse
with her notwithstanding the resistence offered by her;

(viii) the report of the Assistant Chemical Analyst Ex. 71 shows
that neither semen nor spermatozoa were detected from
D the vaginal smear and slides that were forwarded for
analysis; and

(ix) the evidence of PW 12 Dr. More and his report Ex. 41
shows that no physical injuries were found on the person of
the respondent to indicate that he had forcible sexual
E intercourse shortly before his examination.

Before we proceed to deal with these discrepancies we think it is
necessary to clear the ground on the question whether the prosecutrix
had a sufficiently strong motive to falsely involve the respondent and
that too a police officer. II is possible that she may have felt annoyed at
F being dragged out of the hotel room at dead of night after they had
satisfied Police Sub-Inspector Qureishi that they were legally wedded
only a few hours back. PW 1 may also have felt offended at being
wrongly booked under Sections 110/117, Bombay Police Act. The
question is whether on acr.ount of this annoyance both PW 1 Mohmad
Shafi and PW 2 Shamimbanu would be prepared to stake the reputa-
G tion of the latter? As pointed out earlier ordinarily an Indian woman
would be most reluctant to level false accusation of rape involving her
own reputation unless she has a very strong bias or reason to do so. In
the present case although the couple had reason to be annoyed with
the conduct of the respondent, the reason was not strong enough for
Mohmad Shafi to involve his wife and soil her reputation nor for
H Shamimbanu to do so. An Indian woman attaches maximum impor-
STA TE OF MAHARASHTRA v. CHANDRAPRAKASH [AHMADI, J .} 129

tance to her chastity and would not easily be a party to any move which
A
would jeopardise her reputation and lower her in the esteem of others.
There are, therefor, no such strong circumstances which would make
the court view her evidence with suspicion.

The next question is whether the High Court was justified in
refusing to place reliance on her evidence in view of the discrepancies B
and inconsistencies indicated above. It is not in dispute that the
respondent had taken both PW 1 and PW 2 to the police station at
;1-
dead of night. At the police station both of them were separated. She
was all alone with the respondent till about 5.00 a.m. This was her first
encounter with the police. She must have been nervous and consider-
ably shaken. She must have felt helpless as she was all alone. She must C
be terribly worried.not only about her own fate but also that of her
husband. It is during the time she was alone with the respondent that
the latter is alleged to have misbehaved with her. How could she
complain to the other police officers in the police station about the
behaviour of their colleague unless she be sure of their response?
Having seen the behaviour of one of them, how could she place confi- D
dence in others belonging to the same clan? She may rather prefer to
ignore such behaviour than speak of it to unknown persons. Ordinarily
an Indian woman is ashamed to speak about such violations of her
I person, more so to total strangers about whose response she is not
Jo.-. sure. There was no point in speaking to her parents who had disowned.
her. She, however, claims to have informed her husband about the E
same on his return. The omission on the part of her husband to make a
mention about the same cannot discredit her. Even if we assume that
she omitted to mention it, the said omission cannot weaken her evi-
dence as obviously she would attach· more importance to what hap-
pened thereafter in the hotel room. The respondent's behaviour in the
police station had paled into insignificance in view of his subsequent F
misdeeds. No wonder she would attach greater importance to the sub-
sequent events rather than dwell on advances made earlier. We, there-
fore, cannot agree with the High Court's observation that "the pro-
secutrix is not only prone to make improvements and exaggerations,
but is also a liar disclosing a new story altogether to serve her
. interest". This is a harsh comment which, we think, is totally G
unwarranted.

The High Court has argued that the conduct of the respondent in
-sending for her parents and in permitting her to go with them shows
that the respondent's intentions were not evil. In the first place it must
be mentioned that the suggestion to call the parents came from PW 1. H
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1990] 1 S.C.R.

Secondly the evil thought may have taken concrete shape after the
A
parents refused to take her with them. It was then that the respondents
realised the helplessness of the girl and chalked out a plan to satisfy his
lust. As a part of that design he falsely booked Mohmad Shafi and
made arrangements to lodge the girl in a hotel of his choice. The
evidence of PW 4 Suresh Trivedi read with the entry in the hotel
B register and the contradiction brought on record from his police state-
ment leave no room for doubt that the girl was lodged in his hotel at
the instance of the respondent. PW 6 and PW 7 have also resiled from
their earlier versions to help the respondent. But notwithstanding their
denial we see no reason to disbelieve Shamimbanu on the point of PW
7 having lodged her in Room No. 36 of Anand Mahal Hotel as the
same is corroborated not only by the remark in the entry Exh. 25 of the
c hotel register but also by the fact that it was PW 7 who informed
Mohmad Shafi that she was in Room No. 36. We are, therefore, of the
view that her evidence in this behalf is supported by not only oral but
also documentary evidence. How then could she seek help or assis-
tance from the hotel staff which was under the thumb of the respon-
D dent? The hotel was situate within the jurisdiction of the respondent's
police station. It was at the behest of the respondent that she was kept
in that room. She must have realised the futility of complaining to
them. Failure to complain to the hotel staff in the above circumstances
cannot be described as unnatural conduct.

E It is true that the prosecutrix had deposed that on both the occa-
sions she was completely denuded before the respondent raped her.
On the first occasion he had removed her 'kurta' before she was laid on
the cot. Her 'salwar' was removed while she was lying on the cot.
Therefore, the 'salwar' may be lying on the cot itself when the act was
committed. It is, therefore, not at all surprising to find semen stains on
F the 'salwar'. She was wearing the same clothes when she was ravished
the second time. On the second occasion he first threw her on the cot
and then undressed her. Therefore, both the 'kurta' and the 'salwar'
may be lying on the cot at the time of sexual intercourse·. Besides she
had worn the same clothes without washing herself immediately after
the act on each occasion. It is, therefore, quite possible that her
G clothes were stained with semen. It must also be remembered that this
is not a case where the prosecuting agency can be charged of having
concocted evidence since th~ respondent is a member of their own
force. If at all the investigating agency would try to help the respon-
dent. There is, therefore, nothing surprising that both these garments
bore semen stains. Besides, there was no time or occasion to manipu-
H late semen stains on her clothes and that too of the respondent's
STATEOFMAHARASHTRAv. CHANDRAPRAKASH [AHMADl,J.] 131

group. Her clothes were sent along with the other articles attached A
from Room No. 36 for chemical analysis under the requisition Ex. 67.
The report of the Assistant Chemical Analyser, Ex. 69 shows that her
clothes were stained with human blood and semen. The semen found
on one of her garments and on the bed sheet attached from the room
was of group A which is the group of the respondent, vide Ex. 70. Of
course the other articles, viz., the mattress and the underwear of the B
respondent bore no stains. On the contrary the find of semen lends
corroboration, if corroboration is at all needed to the version of the
prosecutrix. The possibility of the semen stains being ?f Mohmad Shafi
is ruled out as his group was found to be 'B' and not 'A'. In the
circumstances the absence ·of semen or spermatozoa in the vaginal
smear and slides, vide report Ex. 71, cannot cast doubts on the cre-
ditworthiness of the prosecutrix. The evidence of PW 3 Dr. Vijaya C
Lele shows that she had taken the vaginal smear and the slides on 23rd
August, 1981 at about 1.30 p.m. i.e., almost after 24 hours. The wit-
ness says that spermatozoa can be found if the woman is examined
within 12 hours after intercourse, thereafter they may be found bet-
ween 48 and 72 hours but in dead form. Shamimbanu may have D
washed herself by then. Therefore absence of spermatozoa cannot
discredit her evidence.

,_
• The absence of marks of physical violence on the prosecutrix is
not surprising. According to her the respondent had slapped her and
threatened her with dire consequences when she tried to resist him on E
both occasions. Since she was examined almost 24 hours after the
event it would be too much to expect slap marks on her person. It is,
however, true that according to PW. 12 Dr. More there were no marks
of injury on the body of the respondent when he was examined on the
22nd itself at about-8.45 p.m. While it is true that the version of the
prosecutrix is that she had tried to resist him, it must be realised that F
the respondent being a strong man was able to overpower her and take

' her by force. Besides, he was a man in authority in police uniform. The
prosecutrix was alone and helpless. In the circumstances as pointed
out earlier the resistance would be considerably dampened. But the
evidence of PW 12 Dr. More who examined the respondent on the
22nd at 8.45 p.m. reveals that he had noticed (i) absence of smegma
around the glans penis and (ii) the frenum tortuous and edematous,
G

indicative of the respondent having had sexual intercourse within the
preceding 24 hours. However, absence of marks of violence and
absence of matting of pubic hair led the witness to state that no defi··
nite opinion could be given whether or not the respondent had sexual
intercourse in the last 24 hours. In cross-examination an attempt was H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 1 S.C.R.

made to show that smegma may be absent in a man with clean habits;

•
A
that the frenum may be edematous if there is friction with rough cloth
and tortuousness of the frenum could be due to anything that causes
swelling of the skin. The witness, however, said that he had not seen
marks of itching thereby negativing the suggestion. Be that as it may,
the evidence of this witness does show that there was evidence suggest-
B ing the possibility of the respondent having had sexual intercourse
within the preceding 24 hours although the witness could not hazard a
definite opinion. Therefore, the non-committal opinion of this witness
cannot be said to run counter to the evidence of the prosecutrix. It may
~
.•
•
be that the evidence as to resistence may have been overstated, a
tendency which is generally noticed in such cases arising out a fear of
being misunderstood by the society. That is not to say that she was in
c any way a consenting party. She was the victim of brute force and the
lust of the respondent.

PW 1 Mohmad Shafi's evidence is also brushed aside on account :.,
' in paragraphs 32 to 34 of the High
of so-called contradictions set out
D Court Judgment. The first reason is the non-disclosure of details in the
first oral statement which was reduced to writing at Ex. 50. That was
skeleto.n information. That is why the need to record a detailed version
Ex. 7 was felt. Therefore, merely because the details are not set out in
Ex. 50 it cannot be said that the prosecutrix had not narrated the
details. We have treated Ex. 50 as FIR for deciding this case. The ~
E previous involvement of PW 1 in a couple of cases is not at all relevant
because the decision of the case mainly r¢sts on his wife's evidence.
But even Ex. 50 shows that his wife had told him that the respondent
had raped her. We, therefore, do not see how the evidence of PW 1 can
be said to be unacceptable.

F The fact that the respondent had gone to Gurudeo Lodge at an
odd hour and had taken lhe prosecutrix and her husband to the police
station at dead of night is not disputed. The fact that the respondent
refused to sign the police visit book of the Lodge, though requested by
the Manager PW 5 Manohar Dhote, on the pretext that he was in a
J
hurry and would sign it later, which he never did, speaks for itself.
G Then the respondent booked Md. Shafi under a false charge and put
him behind the bars thereby isolating the prosecutrix. We say that the
charge was false not merely because it is so found on evidence but also
because of the report Ex. 46 dated 21st September, 1981 seeking with-
drawal of prosecution for want of material to sustain the charge. Hav-
"
ing successfully isolated the prosecutrix he sent her to Anand Mahal
H .Hotel with PW 7 who lodged her in Room No. 36. The respondent,
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. CHANDRAPRAKASH {AHMADI, J .] 133

therefore, had planned the whole thing to satisfy his lust. The subse- A
quent attempt on the part of the respondent to commit suicide on
being prosecuted as evidenced by the FIR Ex. 56 betrays a guilty
conscience. We are, therefore, of the opinion that if the prosecution
evidence is appreciated in the correct perspective, which we are afraid
the High Court failed to do, there can be no hesitation in concluding
that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the respondent's guilt. B
Unfortunately the High Court stigmatised the prosecutrix on a_
thoroughly erroneous appreciation of her evidence hereby adding to
her woes. If the two views were reasonably possible we--would have
refrained from interfering with the High Court's order of acquittal, I11
our opinion the trial court had adopted a correct :approach and had
properly evaluated the evidence and the High Court was not justified c
in interfering with the trial court's order of conviction.

On the question of sentence we can only say that when a person
in uniform commits such a serious crime of rape on a young girl in her
late teens, there is no room for sympathy or pity. The .punishment
must in such cases be exemplary. We, therefore, do not think we D
would be justified in reducing the sentence awarded by the trial court
. which is not harsh.

In the result we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High
.Court acquitting the respondent and restore the order of conviction
and sentence passed on the respondent by the trial court. The respon- E
dent will surrender forthwith and serve out his sentences in accordance·
with law. His bail bond wilt thereupon stand Ca)lcelied.

Criminal Appeal No. 220 of 1986.

In view of the order passed in the State's appeal, we need not F
pass separate orders in this appeal. The l'Ppeal will, therefore, stand
disposed of in view of the order passed in the above appeal.

R.N.J. Appeal allowed.