Holding

When a statute prescribes a minimum term of imprisonment, courts cannot impose a sentence below that minimum, and Article 142 cannot be used to override the statutory provision.

Summary

The respondent, Vikram Das, was convicted under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 for assaulting a SC/ST woman and was sentenced by the trial court to six months of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.500. The High Court, on the respondent's request, credited the time already served and effectively set aside the imprisonment while increasing the fine to Rs.3,000. The State appealed, contending that the statutory provision mandates a minimum imprisonment of six months and that a lower sentence cannot be imposed. The Supreme Court examined whether a court may reduce a sentence below a legislatively prescribed minimum and whether Article 142 of the Constitution can be invoked to do so. Relying on earlier decisions, the Court held that where a statute prescribes a minimum term, courts cannot award a lesser sentence and Article 142 cannot override such a clear legislative mandate. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the High Court order was set aside, and the respondent was directed to serve the remaining six‑month imprisonment with the enhanced fine.

Issues considered

Can a court award a sentence less than the minimum term prescribed in Section 3(1)(xi) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989?
Can the power under Article 142 of the Constitution be exercised to reduce a statutory minimum sentence?

Legislation cited

Defence of India Act, 1962
Defence of India Ruless. 126-P(2)(ii)
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958s. 13, s. 28, s. 7
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989s. 3(1)(xi)

Subjects

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Actminimum sentenceArticle 142sentencingrigorous imprisonmentfineconstitutional lawcriminal procedureappealcourt discretion

Judgment

[2019] 3 S.C.R. 691 691

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH A
v.
VIKRAM DAS
(Criminal Appeal No. 208 of 2019)
FEBRUARY 08, 2019
B
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD AND
HEMANT GUPTA, JJ.]
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 – s.3(1)(xi) – Trial court convicted the
respondent for an offence under s.3(1)(xi) and sentenced him to
C
undergo 6 months RI with fine of Rs.500/- – Conviction was not
disputed by the respondent before the High Court and only quantum
of punishment was disputed – High Court modified sentence of 6
months RI to the extent of sentence already undergone, however, it
enhanced the fine amount of Rs.500/- to Rs.3000/- – Appeal by
State on the ground that sentence, less than minimum sentence, D
cannot be granted – Held: Where minimum sentence is provided
for, the Court cannot impose less than the minimum sentence – The
provisions of Art.142 of the Constitution cannot be resorted to impose
sentence less than the minimum sentence – s.3(1) of the Act provides
for a punishment for a term which shall not be less than six months
E
but which may extend to five years and with fine – Therefore, High
Court could not have awarded sentence less than the minimum
sentence contemplated by the Statute – The order passed by High
Court is set aside – The respondent is directed to undergo the
remaining sentence imposed by the trial court for offence under
s.3(1)(xi) of the Act – Sentence/Sentencing – Constitution of India F
– Art.142.
Narendra Champaklal Trivedi v. State of Gujarat (2012)
7 SCC 80 : [2012] 6 SCR 165; State v. Ratan Lal Arora
(2004) 4 SCC 590 : [2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 631; Mohd.
Hashim v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2017) 2 G
SCC 198 : [2016] 9 SCR 953 – relied on
Case Law Reference
[2012] 6 SCR 165 relied on Para 5
[2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 631 relied on Para 6
[2016] 9 SCR 953 relied on Para 7 H
691
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 3 S.C.R.

A CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
208 of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.05.2012 of the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal No. 654 of
2007.
B
Vaibhav Srivastava, Dy. AG, Varun Chopra, AAG, Mrs.
Swarupama Chaturvedi, B. N. Dubey, Mukesh Kumar, Ms. Indira
Bhakar, Santanu Singh, Advs. for the Appellant.
Harmeet Singh Ruprah, Navjyot Singh, Anup Jain, Pranav Pathak,
Advs. for the Respondent.
C
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
HEMANT GUPTA, J. 1. The State is in appeal challenging the
Order dated 08.05.2012 passed by the High Court of Judicature of
Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, sentencing the respondent for an offence
D under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 19891 to the sentence already undergone,
but enhancing the fine from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 3000/-.
2. The aforesaid Order of the High Court was passed in appeal
filed by the respondent herein against the Order dated 12.03.2007 passed
E by the trial court whereby the respondent was convicted for the offence
under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Act and was sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for six months with fine of Rs. 500/-.
3. In appeal, the High Court has recorded the statement of the
counsel for the respondent that he does not wish to press the appeal on
F merit and confines his argument to the sentence part only. It was on
such statement; the appeal was disposed of. The relevant extract from
the order of the High Court reads as under:-
“(2) Learned counsel for the appellant, at the outset, submitted
that he does not wish to press the appeal on merit and confine his
G arguments to the sentence Part only. He has challenged only
quantum of punishment. He has submitted that, appellant has
deposited the fine amount of Rs. 500/- and has been undergone
sentence for 11 days during the course of trial…...

1
The Act
H
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. VIKRAM DAS 693
[HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

(5) Accordingly, the appeal filed by the appellant is partly allowed. A
The order of conviction passed against the appellant is maintained.
However, the sentence of six months R.I. awarded to the appellant
is modified to the extent of sentence already undergone by him.
His jail sentence is hereby set aside. The fine of Rs. 500/- imposed
by the trial court is hereby enhanced to Rs. 3,000/- (Rs. Three
B
Thousand only)…….”
4. Section 3(1) of the Act provides for a punishment for a term
which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to five
years and with fine. Therefore, the only question is whether the High
Court could award sentence less than the minimum sentence
C
contemplated by the Statute. The relevant Section 3(1)(xi), as it existed
prior to amendment by Central Act No. 1 of 2016, reads as under:-
“3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.- (1) Whoever, not being
a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, —
……………… D
(xi) assaults or uses force to any woman belonging to a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe with intent to dishonour or outrage
her modesty;
………………
E
Shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not
be less than six months but which may extend to five years and
with fine.”
5. Learned counsel for the appellant relies upon judgment of this
Court in Narendra Champaklal Trivedi v. State of Gujarat2 wherein
F
an argument raised by the appellant was rejected that sentence less
than minimum sentence can be awarded in exercise of the powers
conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution. The Court held as under:-
“27. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellants, if
we correctly understand, in essence, is that the power under Article
G
142 of the Constitution should be invoked. In this context, we may
refer with profit to the decision of this Court in Vishweshwaraiah
Iron & Steel Ltd. v. Abdul Gani3 wherein it has been held that
the constitutional powers under Article 142 of the Constitution
2
(2012) 7 SCC 80
3
(1997) 8 SCC 713 H
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 3 S.C.R.

A cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provision but at
the same time, these powers are not meant to be exercised when
their exercise may come directly in conflict with what has been
expressly provided for in any statute dealing expressly with the
subject. It was also made clear in the said decision that this Court
cannot altogether ignore the substantive provisions of a statute.
B
xxx xxx xxx
30. In view of the aforesaid pronouncement of law, where the
minimum sentence is provided, we think it would not be at all
appropriate to exercise jurisdiction under Article 142 of the
C Constitution of India to reduce the sentence on the ground of the
so-called mitigating factors as that would tantamount to supplanting
statutory mandate and further it would amount to ignoring the
substantive statutory provision that prescribes minimum sentence
for a criminal act relating to demand and acceptance of bribe.
The amount may be small but to curb and repress this kind of
D proclivity the legislature has prescribed the minimum sentence. It
should be paramountly borne in mind that corruption at any level
does not deserve either sympathy or leniency. In fact, reduction
of the sentence would be adding a premium. The law does not so
countenance and, rightly so, because corruption corrodes the spine
E of a nation and in the ultimate eventuality makes the economy
sterile.”
6. In State v. Ratan Lal Arora4, this Court was considering the
grant of benefit of Probation of the Offenders Act, 19585 to a convict of
the offences under Prevention of Corruption Act, 19886. It was held
F that in cases where an enactment enacted after the Probation Act
prescribes minimum sentence of imprisonment, the provisions of the
Probation Act cannot be invoked. The Court held as under:-
“12. That apart, Section 7 as well as Section 13 of the Act provide
for a minimum sentence of six months and one year respectively
G in addition to the maximum sentences as well as imposition of
fine. Section 28 further stipulates that the provisions of the Act
shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for
4
(2004) 4 SCC 590
5
Probation Act
6
Corruption Act
H
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v. VIKRAM DAS 695
[HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

the time being in force. In the case of Supdt., Central A
Excise v. Bahubali7 while dealing with Rule 126-P(2)(ii) of the
Defence of India Rules which prescribed a minimum sentence
and Section 43 of the Defence of India Act, 1962 almost similar
to the purport enshrined in Section 28 of the Act in the context of
a claim for granting relief under the Probation Act, this Court
B
observed that in cases where a specific enactment enacted after
the Probation Act prescribes a minimum sentence of imprisonment,
the provisions of the Probation Act cannot be invoked if the special
Act contains any provision to enforce the same without reference
to any other Act containing a provision, in derogation of the special
enactment, there is no scope for extending the benefit of the C
Probation Act to the accused………….”
7. In the case of Mohd. Hashim v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Others8, the question examined was in relation to minimum sentence
provided for an offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,
19619, providing for minimum sentence of six months. It was held that D
benefit of the Probation Act cannot be extended where minimum sentence
is provided. The Court held as under:-
“19. The learned counsel would submit that the legislature has
stipulated for imposition of sentence of imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than six months and the proviso only states E
that sentence can be reduced for a term of less than six months
and, therefore, it has to be construed as minimum sentence. The
said submission does not impress us in view of the authorities
in Arvind Mohan Sinha 10 and Ratan Lal Arora 11 . We may
further elaborate that when the legislature has prescribed minimum
sentence without discretion, the same cannot be reduced by the F
courts. In such cases, imposition of minimum sentence, be it
imprisonment or fine, is mandatory and leaves no discretion to the
court. However, sometimes the legislation prescribes a minimum
sentence but grants discretion and the courts, for reasons to be
recorded in writing, may award a lower sentence or not award a G
sentence of imprisonment. Such discretion includes the discretion
7
(1979) 2 SCC 279
8
(2017) 2 SCC 198
9
Act of 1961
10
(1974) 4 SCC 222
11
(2004) 4 SCC 590 H
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 3 S.C.R.

A not to send the accused to prison. Minimum sentence means a
sentence which must be imposed without leaving any discretion
to the court. It means a quantum of punishment which cannot be
reduced below the period fixed. If the sentence can be reduced
to nil, then the statute does not prescribe a minimum sentence. A
provision that gives discretion to the court not to award minimum
B
sentence cannot be equated with a provision which prescribes
minimum sentence. The two provisions, therefore, are not identical
and have different implications, which should be recognised and
accepted for the PO Act.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
C 24. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the respondents would
submit that no arguments on merits were advanced before the
appellate court except seeking release under the PO Act. We
have made it clear that there is no minimum sentence, and hence,
the provisions of the PO Act would apply. We have also opined
D that the court has to be guided by the provisions of the PO Act
and the precedents of this Court. Regard being had to the facts
and circumstances in entirety, we are also inclined to accept the
submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that it will
be open for them to raise all points before the appellate court on
merits including seeking release under the PO Act.”
E
8. In view of aforesaid judgments that where minimum sentence
is provided for, the Court cannot impose less than the minimum sentence.
It is also held that provisions of Article 142 of the Constitution cannot be
resorted to impose sentence less than the minimum sentence.
9. The conviction has not been disputed by the respondent before
F the High Court as the quantum of punishment alone was disputed. Thus,
the High Court could not award sentence less than the minimum sentence
contemplated by the Statute in view of the judgments referred to above.
10. Therefore, the present appeal is allowed. The order passed
by the High Court is set aside. The respondent shall undergo the
G remaining sentence imposed by the trial court for an offence under Section
3(1)(xi) of the Act. The respondent shall surrender before the Court
within four weeks.

Devika Gujral Appeal allowed.
H