Holding

The Superintendent of Police’s order authorising an Inspector to investigate under Section 17 was valid, making the investigation by an authorised officer; therefore the High Court’s quashing was erroneous.

Summary

The State of Madhya Pradesh filed criminal appeals against Ram Singh and two other public servants who were charged under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for possessing assets disproportionate to their known sources of income. The investigations were authorised by the Superintendent of Police (SP) under Section 17 of the Act, which permits an SP to order a junior officer to investigate offences falling under clause (e). The Madhya Pradesh High Court quashed the investigations, holding that the SP’s order did not satisfy the requirement of an “authorised officer” under the second proviso of Section 17. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the language of Section 17, the need for the SP to apply his mind, and the factual record showing that the SP’s written order identified the case, the accused and the investigative officer. The Court held that the SP’s order was a valid exercise of power, thereby authorising the Inspector’s investigation, and that the High Court’s quashing was unsustainable. Consequently, the appeals were allowed and the trial courts were directed to proceed with the cases.

Issues considered

Whether an investigation into an offence under clause (e) of Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 requires a specific order from a Superintendent of Police as mandated by the second proviso of Section 17.
Whether the Superintendent’s order in the present cases satisfied the statutory requirement of an ‘authorised officer’ and reflected a proper application of mind.
Whether the High Court erred in quashing the investigation and charge‑sheets on the ground of lack of authorisation.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(1)(e), s. 13(2), s. 17

Subjects

Prevention of Corruption ActSection 17 investigation authorityauthorised officerquashing of proceedingscriminal appellate jurisdictioncorruptiondisproportionate assetsCode of Criminal Procedure 482

Judgment

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH A
v.
SHRI RAM SINGH

FEBRUARY 1, 2000

[K.T. THOMAS AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.) ·B

Prevention of Conuption Act 1988 (PCA), Ss. 13 (1) (e), 13(2) r/w S.17
second proviso-Superintendent of Police (SP) making an order under S.17
authorising Inspector to investigate crime u/s 13 (1) (e) of PCA against respon-
dents-<:hargesheets filed on basis of such investigation-High Cowt quashing C
proceedings against respondents on the ground that investigation was not by
an authorised officer in terms of S.17-Held, High Cowt's interpretation of
S.17 and fznding that investigation was not by an authorised officer unsus-
tainable in law; SP had applied his mind while passing the order authorising
Inspector to investigate-Code of Criminal Procedure 1974, S.482.
D
C1111seq1.1ent upon investigations end raids conducted, a criminal
case under S.13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 19311 (PCA) was
resistered against respondent RS as he was found to have acquired prop:i:r-
ties disproporti1mate to his known sources of income during the p:riod
\'then h: was a sub-inspect11r, Excise and District Excise Officer. Cases on E
similar cha~s w:re registered against respondent JS, a sub-ins}H!ctor
and respondent KV, an assistant engineer. In relation to these cases the
Sup:rintendent of Police (SP) after being av;are of the FIRs reeistered
against the rer;pond:mts and thl! }H!nding Investigations, mude orders tl/s
17 of the PCA aut1111rising the Ins}H!ctor to investiGUte tlae cases.
F
Allowing the p2titions filed by the respondents under S.482 of th:
Code of Cric.uinal Procedure, 1974 (Cr.P.C.), the High Court quashed the
proceedings holding that the investigation had not bl!en conducted by an
authorised 11fficer in terms of S.17 of the PCA. The State appeal:d to this
Court.
G
Allowin~ the appeals, this Court

HELD : 1.1. The judgments of the High Court regarding the inter-
premtion of S.17 aod holding the investigation to have not been inves-
tib>zted by an authorised officer are not sustainable in law. (593-E] H
579
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) 1 S.C.R.
A State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, [1992] 1 Suppl. SCC 335, explained.

H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, AIR (1995) SC 196, referred to.

1.2. The Superintendent of IPolice appears to have applied his mind
and passed an order authorising the investigation by an inspector under
B the peculiar circumstances of the case. The time between the registration
of the FIR and authorisation in terms of second proviso to Section 17
shows further the application of mind and the circumstances which
weighed with the Superintendent of Police to 4irect authorisation to order
the investigation. [593-C-D]

c CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
114 of 2000 Etc.

From the Judgment and Order dated 6.1.97 of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court in Crl. M.P. No. 2481 of 1996.
D K.N. Shukla, U.R. Lalit, Uma Nath Singh, Sakesh Kumar, S.S. Khan-
duja, Yash Pal Dhingra, B.K. Satija, S.K. Gambhir, Vivt:k Gambir, Sapan
B Mutu, Ashok Kumar Singh, Ms. Sushila Shukla, Ms. Shipra Jain and L.S.
Chauhan for the appearing parties.

E The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SETHI, J. Heard, Leave granted.

Relying upon the judgment of this Court in State of Haryana & Ors.
v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., [1992) 1 Suppl. SCC 335 and exercising powers under
F Section 482 of tht: Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh vide the judgment impugned in these appeals quashed the inves-
tigations and consequent proceedings against the respondents initiated,
conducted and concluded by the police under Section 13(1)(e) and Section
13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as
G "the Act"). The Court found that for the offence punishable under Section
13{1){e) of the Act the investigation had not been conducted by an
authorised officer in terms of Sec:tion 17 of the Act. It was observed :

''It is of utmost importance that investigation into criminal offence
must always be free frorn any objectionable features or infirmities
H which may legitimately lead to the grievance of the accused that
STATE v. RAM Sl~GH [SETHI,J.] 581

the work of investigation is carried on unfairly and with any ulterior A
motive. The prosecution of the accused on the basis of investigation
by a person who had no legal authority to investigate cannot be
allowed:''

In order to appreciate the legal controversy, it is proper to refer to some B
of the facts regarding which there does not appear to be any dispute at this
stage in these appeals.

Regarding Ram Singh respondent, a secret information is stated to
have been received on 4.7.1992 alleging that when he was a Sub Inspector,
Excise and District Excise Officer, he had acquired properties dispropor- c
tionate to his known sources of income. On verification it was found that
he had earned movable and immovable properties allegedly much more
disproportionate to his known sources of income during the check period
commencing from 1.1.1982, 4.9.1992. Resultantly Crime No. 103/92 under
Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Act was registered against him. On D
4.8.1992 a raid WdS conducted by Shri B.N. Bhatia, Dy. Superintendent of
Police, SPE Lokayukt Office, Gwalior after obtaining a search warrant
from the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior and a seizure memo was
prepared with respect to recovery of movable articles from the possession
of his son, namely, Pratap Singh, Advocate. On 7.8.1992 another raid was
conducted by Shri C.P.S. Chaturvedi, Dy Supdt. of Police, Lokayukt Office, E
Gwalior at the Government Quarter allotted to the said respondent at
Vikas Nagar, Betul, under a search warrant dated 3.8.1992. Some docu-
ments, one transistor, one pistol and diaries were recovered in the raid.
The respondent Shri Ram Singh moved Crimina! Misc. No. 143 of 1993
before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior praying for an- F
ticipatory bail which was allowed. Vide, letter dated 14.12.1993, the Addi-
tional Excise Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior directed the
respondent to submit the statement on the prescribed form Nos. 1, 2 and
3 to the Lokayukt Gwalior. The statement were submitted to Shri P.S.
Sisodia, Deputy Superintendent of Police Lokayukt Officer, Moti Mahal,
Gwalior on 16.5.1994. It was mentioned in the statement that the total G
income of the respondent from all sourses was Rs. 4,19,000 and t:xpendi-
ture was Rs. 2,58, 700 which show the savings of Rs. 1,60,300. Hc declared
that his assets were not disproportionate to the known sources of his
income. After further information was submitted by tht: respondent, a
further enquiry was made on 5.6. 1995 with respect to his bank account. In H
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) 1 S.C.R.
A May, 1996 the respondent filed the Petition No. 2481196 under Section 482
of the Criminal Procedure Code p:raying for quashing the proceedings
relating to Crime No. 143/93 and charge-sheet thereof filed against him.
He contended that the entire search and seizure made by Special Police
Establishment was illegal, ma/afide and without any basis. It was further
B contended that the search was conducted without jurisdiction and was in
contravention of the provisions of S•:ction 17 of the Act. He alleged that
the investigation was malicious inasmuch as the accounts of his family
members had illegally been freezed.

The State in its reply filed i.n the High Court alleged that after
C investigation it had transpired that during the check period, the respondent
had a total income of Rs. 3,13,470.68 from all known sources and his
expenditure being Rs. 16,25,723.49. Thus the disproportionate amount
came to Rs. 13,12,252.81 which was stated to be 350 times more than the
known sources of his income. After iinvestigation sanction was obtained and
D charge-sheet was filed. The initial investigation was conducted by Shri B.N.
Bhatia, Dy. Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment,
Gwalior and thereafter by Shri D.S. Rana, Inspector SPE, Gwalior who
was stated to have been duly authorised by the Superintendent of Police,
SPE Gwalior vide order No. SPE/2766/94 dated 12.12.1994. The order of
the Superintendent of Police was claimed to be strictly under Section 17
E of the Act.

Respondent Jagdish Prasad was appointed as a Sub-Inspector and
was also holding the post of A.D.E.O. On 16.11.1984 Preliminary Enquiry
No. 120/84 was registered against him. On 7.5.1985 one Shri Tara Chand,
F resident of Dahimandi, Gwalior filed a complaint against the said respon-
dent whereupon another Preliminary Enquiry No. 5/85 was registered
which was taken for investigation. On the basis of Preliminary Enquiry No.
5/85 Crime No. 132/92 under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Act was
registered against him on 7.10.1992. After investigation it transpired that
G during check period commencing from 1.2.1964 to 31.1.1984 the respon-
dent had earned a sum of Rs. 1,12,380.54 from his known sources of income
and incurred an expenses of Rs. 2,14,608.84. In this way he was found to
be possessing disproportionate property worth Rs. 1,02,228.30. After ob-
taining the sanction for prosecutioin by the competent authority a charge-
sheet was submitted in the Court on 5.8.1986. The respondent moved the
H High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code praying or
STATh v. RAM SINGH [SETHI, J.] 583

quashing the investigation and consequent proceedings against him in the A
light of the judgment in Bhajan Lat's case (supra) which was allowed vide
the order impugned.

Respondent Kedarilal Vaishya had joined the service in the Govern-
ment on 15.7.1978 as Sub-Engineer and was promoted to post of Assistant
B
Engineer on 8.3.1990. An information was recdved in the office of the
Superintendent of Police, SPE Regional Lokayukta Karyalaya, Gwalior
that the aforesaid respondent had immovable properties much more dis-
proportionate to known sources of his income. After verification Crime No.
17/94 was registered under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(1)(d) read with Sec-
tion 13(2) of the Act. A search warrant was received by inspector Ram C
Lakhan Singh Bhadhouria from the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Gwalior. The Superintendent of Police SPE Regional Lokayukta
Karyalaya, Gwalior issm:d order No. 454 dated 8.2.1994 authorising the
investigation of the case by Shri Ram Lakhan Singh Bhadhouria. On
investigation it was found that during the check period from 7.7.1978 to D
2.9.1994 the respondent had earned a total amount of Rs. 3,86,966.75 <md
incurred an expenditure of the 7,95,243.98. In this way he was found to be
possessing Rs. 4,08,277.23 more than his earnings was found to be dis-
proportionate to his known sources of income, punishable under Section
13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Act. The sanction for prosecution was obtained
on 26th October whercafter a charge-sheet was filed against the n:spondent E
in the Court of Sub-Judge Shivpuri which was registered as Special Session
Case No. 4/1996. Not satisfied with the investigation respondent filed a
petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code praying for
quashing of the investigation and consequent proceedings in Crime No.
17/94 which was allowed vide the order impugned in these appeals.
F
Corruption in a civilised society is a disease like cancer, which if not
detected in time is sure to maliganise the polity of country leading to
disastrous consequences. It is termed as plagne which is not only con-
tagious but if not controlled spreads like a fire in a jungle. Its virus is
compared with HIV leading to AIDS, being incurable. It has also been G
termed as Royal thievery. The socio-political system exposed to such a
dreaded communicable disease is likdy to crumble under its own weight.
Corruption is opposed to democracy and social order, being not only anti
people, but aimed and targeted against them. It affects the economy and
destroys the cultural ht:ritage. Unles& nipped in the bud at the earlier, it is H
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] 1 S.C.R.
A likely to cause turbulence shaking of the socio·economic·political system
in an otherwise healthy, wealthy, effective and vibrating society.

The menace of corruption was found to have enormously increased
by first and second world war conditions. The corruption, at the initial
stages, was considered confined to the bureaucracy who had the oppor·
B tunities to deal with a varfoty of State largesse in the form of contracts,
lice~ces and grants. Even after the war the opportunities for corruption
continued as large amounts of Government surplus stores were required
to be disposed of by the public servants. As consequence of the wars the
shortage of various goods necessitated the imposition of controls and
C extensive schemes of post·war reconstruction involving the disbursement of
huge sums of money which lay in the control of the public servants giving
them wide discretion with the result of luring them to the glittering shine
of the wealth and property. In other to consolidate and amend the laws
relating to prevention of corruption and matters connected thereto, the
D Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was enacted which was amended from
time to time. In the year 1988 a new Act on the subject being Act No. 49
of 1988 was enacted with the object of dealing with the circumstances,
contingencies and shortcomings which were noticed in the working and
implementation of 1947 Act. The law relating to prevention of corruption
was essentially made to deal with the public servants not as understood in
E the common parlance but specifically defined in the Act.

The Act was intended to make effective provision for the pn:vention
of bribe llld corruption rampant amongst the public servants. It is a social
legislation intended to curb illegal activities of the public servants and is
p designed to be liberally construed so as to advance its object. Dealing with
the object underlying the Act this Court in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay,
(1984) 2 sec 183, held :

'The 1947 Act was enacted, as its long title shows, to make more
effective provision for the prevention of bribery and corruption.
G Indisputably, therefore, the provisions of the Act must receive such
construction at the hands of the Court as would advanced the
object and purpose underlying the Act and at any rate not defeat
it. If the words of th1: Statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the
plainest duty of the court to give effect to the natural meaning of
H the words used in the provisions. The question of construction
STATE v. RAM SINGH [SE1Hl, J.] 585
arises only in the event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of A
the words used in the statute would be self-defeating. The court
is entitled to ascertain the intention of the Legislature to remove
the ambiguity by construing the provision of the Statute as a whole
> kecping in view what was .the mischief when the Statute was
enacted and to remove which the Legislature enacted the Statute.
The rule of construction is so universally accepted that it need not
B
be supported by precedents. Adopting this rule of construction,
whenever a question of construction arises upon ambiguity or
where two views are possible of a provision, if would be the duty
of the Court to adopt that construction which would advance the
object underlying the Act, namely, to make effective provision for c
the prevention of bribery and corruption and at any rate not defeat
iti'

Procedural delays and technicalities of law should not be permitted
to defeat the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The overall public
interest and the social object is required to be kept in mind while inter- D
preting various provisions of the Act and decided cases under it.

For the purposes of deciding these appeals reference to Sections 13
and 17 of the Act is necessary. Section 13 deals with the criminal miscon-
duct of the public servants and prescribes the punishment for the commis- E
sion of offence of criminal misconduct. A public servant is said to commit
the offence of criminal misconduct.

"(a) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or
attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any other
person any gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive F
or reward such as is mentioned in Section 7; or

(b) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or
attempts to obtain for himself or for any other person, any valuable
thing without consideration or for a consideration which he knows
to be inadequate from any person whom he knows to have been, G
or to be, or to be likely to be concerned in any proceeding or
business transacted or about to be transacted by him, or having ·
any connection with the official functions of himself or of any
public servant to whom he is subordinate, or from any person
whom he knows to be interested in or related to the person so H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 1 S.C.R.
/\. concerned; or

(c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise
converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under
his control as a public: servant or allows any other person so to do;
or
B
(d) if he, -

(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any
other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or

C (ii) by abusing his position as as public servant, obtains for himself
or for any othe:r person any valuable thing of pecuniary
advantage; or

(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person
any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public
D
interest; or

(e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at
any time during the period of his office, been in possession for
which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary
E resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of
mcome.

Explanation-For the purposes of this Section, "known sources of
income" means income received from any lawful source and such
receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of
F any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public
servant

(2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be
punishable with impriwnment for a term which shall be not less
G than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also
be liable to fine."

Section 17 deals with investigation into cases under the act and provides :

"17. Persons authorised to investigate-Notwithstanding anything
H contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no
STATEv. RAMSINGH[SETill,J.] 587

police officer below the rank, - A
(a) in the case of the Delhi Special Police Establishment, of an
Inspector of Police;

(b) in the metropolitan area of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and
Ahmedabad and in any other metropolitan area notified as B·
such under sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), of an Assistant Com-
missioner of Police,

(c) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police
officer of equivalent rank. c
shall investigate any offence punishable under this Act without the
order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first
class, as the case may be, or make any arrest therefore without a
warrant;
D
Provided that if a police officer not below the rank of an Inspector
of Police is authorised by the State Government in this behalf by
general or special order, he may also investigate any such offence
without the order of a Mc::tropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of
the first class, as the case may be, or make arrest therefore without E
a warrant.
> Provided further that an offence referred to in clause (e) of
sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall not be investigated without the
order of a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent
of Police." F
This Section provides that no police officer below the rank of an lnspe¢tor
in the case of Delhi Special Police Establishment, an Assistant Commis-
sioner of Police in the metropolitan areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras
and Ahmedabad and any other metropolitan area notified as such and Dy.
Superintendent of Police or a police officer of the equivalent rank shall G
investigate an offence punishable. under the Act without prior order of the
metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class, as the case may
be, or make any arrest thereof without warrant. According to the first
proviso if a police officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police is
authorised by the Government in this behalf by general or special order, H
588 SUPREMc COURT REPORTS (2000) 1 S.C.R.
A he can also investigate in such offences without the order of Mt:tropolitan
Magistrate e1r tht: Magistrate of First Class, as the case may be, or make
arrest thereof without a warrant. Regarding compliance of this part of the
section then is no controversy in the present appeals. However, the second
proviso provides that where an offence reforred to in clause (e) of sub-
B section (1) of Section 13 is sought to bi.: investigated, such an investigation
shall not bc conducted without the order of a Polict: Officer not below the
rank of a Superintt:ndent of Police. Thi.: interprt:tation of this proviso is
involved in the present controversy.

The investigation conducted and the consequrnt procet:dings are
C stated to have been quashed on similar grounds in Bhajan Lat's case
(supra). The facts of that case were, one Dharam Pal presented a com-
plaint against Ch. Bhajan Lal, the former Chief Minister of Haryana
making certain serious allegations against him which prim a f acie showed
commission of offence punishable under the Act. The complaint was
D presented in the Chief Minister's Secrt:tariat on 12.1.1987 when said Shri
Bhajan Lal liad ceased to be the Chief Minister. An endorsement was made
by the Officer on Special Duty in the Chief Minister's Secretariat to the
effect. "C.M. has seen. For appropriak action" and was marked it to the
Director G.;:neral of Police who in turn made endorsement on the same
day which read, "Please look into this; take necessary action and report"
E and marked it to the Superintendent of Police. Hissar. The complaint
alongwith the above endorsement of OSD and DGP was put up bdore the
SP on 21.l l.1987 on which date the SP made his t:ndorsement reading
"Please register a case and investigate". The Station House Officer of the
Police Stabon n:gistered a case on tht: basis of tht: alkgations in the
F complaint -mder Sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code and
Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. After forwarding
the copy of thi: First Information Report to the Magistrate and other
officers concerned, the SHO took up the investigation and proceeded to
the spot accompanied by his staff. At this stage Shri Bhajan Lal filed Writ
Petition No. 9172/87 under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India
G seeking quashing of the First Information Report and issuance of directions
restraining the police from further proceeding with the investigation. The
High Court held that allegation made in the complaint do not constitute a
cognizable offence for commencing a lawful investigation and granted relief
as prayed for by the petition therein. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment
H the State of Haryana preferred an appeal in this Court which was disposed
STATE v. RAM SINGH [SETHI,J.] 589

of as under: A
"We set aside the judgment of the High Court quashing the First
Information Report as not being legally and factually sustainable
in law for the n:asons aforementiom:d; but, however, we quash the
commenccmcnt as well as the entire investigation, if any, so far
done for the reasons given by us in the instant judgment on the B
ground that the third appellant (SHO) is not clothed with valid
legal authority to take up the inwstigation and proceed with the
same within the meaning of Section 5A(l) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, as indicated in this judgment. Further we set aside
the order of the High Court awarding costs with a direction that c
the said costs is payable to the first respondent (Ch. Bhajan Lal)
by the second respondent (Dharam Pal).

In the result, the appeal is disposed of accordingly but at the same
time giving libtrty to the State Government to direct an investiga-
tion afresh if it so desires, through a compettnt Police Officer D
tmpowered with valid legal authority in strict compliance with S.
SA(l) of the Act as indicated supra. No order as to costs."

In the facts and circumstances of that case this Court posed a qutstion to
itself in the following terms :
E
''Now what remains for consideration is whether there is any valid
order of the S.P. permitting the third appellant to investigate the
offence falling undtr clause (t) of sub-section (1) of Section 5. As
we have already mtntioned in the earlitr part of this judgment,
the S.P. (tht second appellant) has given the one word direction F
on 21.11.1987 'investigate'. The question is whether the one word
direction 'investigatt' would to an 'order' within the meaning of
second proviso of Section 5A(l)."

The Court found on facts that as there was absolutely no reason given by
the SP in directing the SHO to investigate, the order of the SP was directly G
in violation of the dictum of law. The SHO was, therefort, found not
clothed with the requisite legal authority within the meaning of second
proviso to Section 5A(l) of 1947 Act to investigate the offences under
clause (e) of Section 5(1) of the Act. This Court held that (1) as the
salutary legal requirement of disclosing the reason for according the per- H
590 SUPREME COURT REPOR rs (2000) 1 S.C.R.
A mission is not complied with; (2) as the prosecution is not satisfactorily
explaining the circumstances which impelled the SP to pass the order
directing the SRO to investigate the case, (3) as the said direction manifest-
ly seems to have been granted mechanically and in a very casual manner, =
regardless of the principles of law enunciated by this Court and (4) as the
B SHO had got neither any order from the Magistrate to investigate the
offences under Sections 161 and 165 IPC nor any order from the SP for
investigation of the offences under Section 5(1)(t:) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act tn the manner known to law, the order of direction reading
only "investigate'' suffered from legal infirmity. The Court found that
despite quashing the direction of the SP and the investigation thereupon
C would not, in any manner, deter the State of Haryana to pursue the matter
and direct the investigation afri~sh in pursuance of the FIR, if the State so
desire.

It may be noticed at this stage that a three Judge Bench of this Court
in H.N. Rishbud & Anr. v. State of Delhi, AIR ( 1955) SC 196, had held that
D a defect or illegality in investigation, however, serious, has no direct bearing
on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. Refer-
ring to the provisions of Sections 190, 193, 195 to 199 and 537 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure (1898) in the context of an offence under the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, the Court held : ~

E
"A defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no
direct bearing on the compeknce or the. procedur..: relating to
cognizance or trial. No doubt a police n:port which result from an
investigation is providc:d in Section 190, Cr.P.C. as the material on
which cognizance is talcen. But it cannot be maintained that a valid
F and legal police report is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the
Court to take cognizance. Section 190 Cr.P.C. is one out of a group
of sections under the heading ''Conditions requisite for initiation
of proceedings". The language of this section is in marked contrast
with that of the other sections of the group under the same heading,
i.e., Sections 193 and 195 to 199.
G
These latter sections regulate the competence of the Court and
bar its jurisdiction in certain cases excepting in compliance there-
with. But Section 190 does not. While no doubt, in one sense,
clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 190(1) are conditions requisite
H for taking of cognizance, it is not possible to say that cognizance
STATE v. RAM SINGH '.SETHI, J.] 591

on an invalid police report is prohibited and is therefore a nullity. A
Such an invalid report may still fall either under Clause (a) or (b)
of Section 190(1). (whether it is the one or the other we need not
pause to consider) and in any case cognizance so taken is only in
the nature of error in a proct:cding antecedent to the trial. To such
a situation Section 537, CLP.C. which is in the following terms is
attracted : B

'Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding,.
sentence or order passed by the Court of competent jurisdic-
tion shall be rev _rsed or altered on appeal or revision on
account of any error, omission or irregularity in the com-
plaint, summons, warrant, charge, proclamation, order, judg-
c
ment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any
enquiry or other proceedings under this Code, unless such
error, omission or irregularity, has in fact occasioned a failure
of justice."
D
If, therefore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a police report vitiated
by the breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation,
there can be no doubt that the result of the trial which follows it
cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be
shown to have brought about a miscarriage of justice. That an
illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect E
the competence and the jurisdiction of the court for trial is well
settled as appears from the cases in -Prabhu v. Emperor, AIR
(1944) PC 73 (C) and Lumbhardar Zutshi v. The King, AIR (1950)
PC 26(D)."
F
It further held :

''In our opinion, therefore, when such a breach is brought to the
notice of the Court at an early stage of the trial, the court will have
to consider the nature and extent of the violation and pass ap-
propriate orders for such investigation as may be called, for wholly G
or partly, and by such officer as it considers appropriate with
reference to the requirements of Section 5-A of the Act, It is in
the light of the above considerations that the validity or otherwise
of the objection as to the violation of Section 5(4) of the Act has
to be decided and the course to be adopted in these proceedings, H
592 SlJPREMb COURT REPORTS [2000) 1 S.C.R.
A determined."

In Bhajan la/'s case Oris Court had found on facts that the SP had passed
the order mechanically and in a wry casual manner regardless of the
settlt.:d principle~ of law. The provisions of Si:!ction 17 of the Act had not
been complied with. As earlier noticed the SP whilt: authorising the SHO
B to investigate had mad..: only endorsement to the effect ;'pkase register the
case and investigate". The SP was sh.'Jwn to be not aware either of allega-
tions or the nature of the offences and the prt.:ssure of worlc-load requiring
investigation by an Inspector. There is no denial of the fact that in cases
against the respondents in these appeals, even in the absence of the
C authority of the SP the investigating Oftic<:.r was in law authorised to
investigate the offonce falling under Section 13 of the Act with the
exception of one as is described under sub- section (l)(e) of the Act. After
registration of the FIR the Superintendent of Police in the instant appeals
is shown to be awan: and conscious of the allegations made against the
D respondents, the FIR registered against them and pending investigations.
The order passed by tht: SP in case of Ram Singh on 12.12.1994 with
respect to a Crime registered in 1992 was to the effect :

;'In exercise of powers conferred by the provisions on me, under
Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, I P .K.
E RC~AL, 'iup~rintcndent of Polict:, Special Pnlice Estab-
li~hment, Divi·,ion-1 Lobyl'k K.iryalaya, Gwalior Divi,ion Gwalior
(.M.P.) authorised Shri D.S. RANA CNSP-(SP:b) LAK-GWL
(M.P.) to invi.:stigate Crime No. 103;92 U/s. 13(1)(E), 23(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against Shri RAM SINGH -
D.O. EXCISE BATUL (M.P.)."
F
Similar orders have becn passed in the other two cases as well. The reasons
for entrustment of invi;stigation to the Inspector can be discerned from the
order itself. Thc appellant- State is, therefon:, justified in submitting that
the facts of Bha1an Lat's case were distinguishable as in the instant case
G the Supcrintendent of Police appears to have applied his mind and passed
the order authorising the investigation by an inspector under the peculiar
circumstances of the case. The reason for entrustment of in~estigation were
obvious. The High Court should not have libc:rally construed the provisions
of the Act in favour of the accused resulting in closure of the trial of the
H serious charges madc against the respondents in relation to commission of
STATEv. RAMSlNGH[SETifl,J.j 593

offences punishable under an Act legislated to curb the illegal and corrupt A
practices of the public officers. It is brought to our notice that under similar
circumstances the High Court had quashed the ,investigation and conse-
quent proceedings in a case registered against Shri Ram Babu Gupta
against which Criminal Appeal No. 1754 of 1986 was filed in this Court
which was allowed on 27th Septembt:r, 1986 by setting asidt: the order of
B
the High Court with a direction to the trial court to proceed with the case
in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made therein.

We are not satisfied with the finding of the High Court that merely
because tht: order of the Superintendent of Police was in typed proforma,
that showed the non-application of the mind or could be held to have been C
passed in a mechanical and casual manner. As noticed earlier the order
clearly indicates the name of the accused, the number of FIR, nature of
the offence and power of Superintendent of Police permitting him to
authorise a junior officer to investigate. The time between the registration
of the FIR and authorisation in terms of second proviso to Section 17 shows
further the application of mind and tne circumstances which weighed with D
the Superintendent of Police to direct authorisation to order the investiga-
tion.

Cnder these circumstances the appeals arc allowed and the judgment
of the High Court impugned in these appeals regarding the interpn:tation
of Section 17 and holding the inwstigation to have not been investigated E
by an authorised officer being not sustainable in law are hereby set aside
with the direction to the Trial Court to proceed with the trial in accordance
with the provisions of law. The respondents would be at liberty to defend
tht:ir cases on all such contentions on facts and law as art: available to them
which have not been adjudicated upon against them by the High Court and F
this Court.

S.M. Appeals allowed.