Holding

The State Government has no power to replace the sole member of a Commission of Inquiry; Section 3(3) only fills a vacancy and Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be invoked to reconstitute the Commission.

Summary

The Madhya Pradesh Government constituted a single‑member Commission of Inquiry to investigate the Churhat Children’s Welfare Society, appointing Justice S.T. Ramalingam. After his retirement, the State replaced him by notifications appointing retired judges G.G. Sohani and later Kamlakar Choubey. Writ petitions challenged these replacements, arguing that the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 permits filling only a vacancy under Section 3(3) and does not allow replacement of an existing sole member, and that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 cannot be used to amend the original appointment. The High Court quashed the notifications. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme expressly limits the Government’s power to filling vacancies and to rescind the Commission only under Section 7, and that Section 21 cannot be invoked to reconstitute the Commission. Consequently, the notifications appointing the retired judges were invalid. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the High Court’s order.

Issues considered

Whether the State Government can replace the sole member of a Commission of Inquiry after its constitution under Section 3(3) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952.
Whether Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 can be used to amend or vary the notification appointing the sole member, thereby effecting a replacement.
Whether Section 8‑A of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 confers any power to reconstitute the Commission by substitution of its member.
Whether the retirement of a sitting judge appointed as sole member creates an implied vacancy that can be filled by the Government.

Legislation cited

Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952s. 3, s. 7, s. 8-A
General Clauses Act, 1897s. 14, s. 16, s. 21

Subjects

Commission of Inquiryreplacement of memberSection 3(3)General Clauses ActSection 21statutory constructionindependence of inquiryvacancyreconstitutionMadhya Pradesh

Judgment

;\ STATE OF MADHYA•PRADESH
v.
AJAY SINGH AND ORS. ETC.

NO\'.EMBER 2, 1992

B [J.S. VERMA AND S.P. BHARUCHA, JJ.]

Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952 :

Sections 3, 7 and 8-A-{)ne-man Commission-Replacement of the
C initial appointee with another person-Whether pennissib/e under the scherne
of the Act-Whether Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 could be
in raked to read such power into the Act.

General Clauses Act, 1897:

D Section 2 I-Pott er to add to an1end or vary: or rescind any notifica-
1

tion--JV!ietht;r cuuld be invoked to reconstitute the C.:on11nission of Inquiry by
rcpiacemelll of substituiio.'z of tlze existin!i members, though not provided in
the scheme of lhe Act.

Pursuant to the direction given by the State High Court, the appel-
E lant-State by a Notification dated 24.2.1989, constituted a Commission of
Inquiry under the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952, to investigate into the
affairs of the Children's Welfare Society, of which Respondent No.l was
an office bearer and appointed a sitting Judge of the High Court of
another State as the sole member of the Commission. The inquiry w.ts to
F be completed within a period of six months, but the period was extended
from time to time. Meanwhilr, the sole member became due to retire as a
Judge of the High <.:ourt on attaining the age of superannuation and,
therefore, he wrote a letter dated 193.1991 to the Chief Secretary of the
appellant-State drawing attention to this fact and requesting that the
necessary modalities be worked out well in time for his continuance as
G Commission of Inquiry, in the light of the guidelines issued by the Govern-
ment of India for the benefits and emoluments payable to a Judge on his
retirement in such a situation. The Judge also mentioned some of the
facilities he expected, to which he would not be entitled fron1 the State
Government on his retirement. The Chief Secretary sent a reply dated
H 9.4.1991 to the Judge promising to give an early reply and requesting him
274
STATE OF M.P. v. AJAY SINGH 275

to continue with the inquiry so that the same could be completed early. A
However, without further rererence to the Judge, the State Government
issued a notification dated 10.7.1991, replacing him by a retired Chier
Justice of another High Court. This appointment was challenged before
the High Court, which, by an interim order dated 30.7.1991 stayed the
operation or the notification. During the pendency of the writ petition, the
new member tendered his resignation. Consequently, the High Court dis-
B
missed the writ petition as infructuous on S.9.1991. Thereafter, the Chief
Secretary to the Government sent a letter dated 12.9.1991 to the original
appointee expressing the State Government's inability to accept the terms
and conditions of the Judge, and informing him of the appointment of
retired Chief Justice or another High Court, who had since resigned. c
Thereafter the State Government issued another notification dated
9.l.1992 appointing a retired Judge or another High Court as a single
member of the Commission. This was challenged before the High Court
on the ground that during the continuance as the single member of the D
Commission of Inquiry of the original appointee, there was no power in
the State Government to replace him, and there being no vacancy in the
office, the power under Section 3(3) or the Commissions of Inquiry Act,
1952, which was available only to fill any vacency, could not be invoked
and there was no other source or power •vailable to the State for the
purpose and, therefore, the appointment first or the retired Chier Justice E
and then, on his refusal, of another retired Judge, being without any
authority, was invalid.

The High Court allowed the·writ petitions and quashed the notifica·
tion dated 9.l.1992. It held that there was no vacancy in the office of' the F
' single member of the Commission to empo\l·er the State fiovernment to
fill the vacancy under Section 3(3) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. It
also held there was neither any valid reason or ground nor any power
available in the State Government to replace the original member by
another person as was purported to be done by first appointing one
member and then another member, both of whom were also retired G
Judges.

In the appeals, by special leave, on behalf of the State Government,
it was contended that aid of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act was
available to the State Government for exercising its po\\-·ers under the H
27() Sl'l'RH!I· COURT Rl·.l'ORTS \ l'!'l2J SUPP. 2 S.C'.R.

A Commis!:tlflns of Inquiry Act •to add, to a1nend or vaf}·' the notification
issued initially appointing thl' sitting .Judge as the sole member of the
Cornmission \Vhich enabled the State (;overnn1ent to reconstitute the
Commission by replacing that .Judge with any other person in the cir-
cumstances of the case, though the power to rescind any notification \\'as
not available, since this ~as provided in Section 7 of the Commissions of
B Inquiry Act. Reference was also made to Section 8-A of the Lommissions
of' Inquiry Act to support the contention that Government's power to
reconstitute the Commission even during the availability of the person so
appointed, even though it wa,; submitted that Section 8-A was not the
source of power for reconstitution of the Commission. It was also con-
C tended that the Government's power to extend the time specified in the
initial notification for completing the work of the Commission was not to
be found in any express provision in the Commissions of Inquiry Act, but
was exercised by an1endment of the initial notification only under Section
21 of' the General Clauses Act. and that though there was no express
provision in the Commissions of lnquiry Act empowering the Government
D
to replace or substitute the sole member of a Commission with another
person during the continuance of the Commission, this was implicit in the
power to appoint a Commission and designate its personnel under Sub-
sections (I) and (2) of Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act read
\\'ith the power to amend or vary any notification available under Section
E 21 of the General Clauses Act.

It "'as submitted on hehall' of the petitioner in the Public Interest
Petition thitt Sections J4 and 16 of the lieneral Clauses Act were also
availahll' to support. the notifications under challense issued by the State
Government.
F
On behalf uf respondent No.1 it was submitted that the scheme of
the Con1missions of Inc1uiry A.ct did not permit invoking Section 21 of the
(~eneral Clauses ,Ac1. except for enlargement of the period for completion

of the in<1uiry by amendment of the notification only to that extent since
G the only situations in which reconstitution of the Commissions could be
made were provided in the Commissions of Inquiry Act itself, that Section
8-A of the Cornmissions of Inquiry Act was enacted for an entirely, dif-
ferent purpose, namely, to ensure continuity of the Commission's work
and had nothing to do "ith its reconstitution, that the scheme of the
H enactment showed that the appropriate Government could not interfere
STATE OF M.P. v. A.JAY SINGH 277

with the working of the Comniission after ils constitution except in the A
manner expressly provided in the Act and Section 7 \Vas a clear indication
that interference with the functioning of the Co1n1nission \Vas not per~nis·
sihle in any other rnanner, and, thereforei Section 21 of the (;eneral
Clauses Act was not available to support the Government's action in the
instant case.
B
Dis1nissing the appeal, this Court,

HELO: I. The power under Section 3(3) of the Commissions or
Inquiry Act, 1952, was not available to the State Government in the facts
of the instant case to appoint any other person replacing the uriginal C
nternber as the sole member of the Commission of Inquiry. The power
under sub-sections (I) or (2) of Section 3 read with Section 21 or the
General Clauses Act or even Section 14 or Section 16 thereof was also not
available for the purpose. Accordingly, the notiticatious dated 10.7.1991
and 9.1.1992 issued by the State Government appointing the retireil Chief
Justice and another retired Judge were both invalid. The High Court was, D
therefore, right in c1uashing the notifications dated 10.7.1991 and 9.1.1992.
The appellant-State should, in view of th.e retire1nent of the original
member as a Judge of the High Court in the meanwhile, take necessary
action to finalise his tern1s and conditions in accordance with the
guidelines issued by the Govern111ent of India in this behalf. Such action E
should be taken promptly to avoid any undue deJay in completion of the
Commission's task. [304-C-F]

2.1. The power of the Government to appoint a Commission of
Inquiry and name the person or persons constituting it is in sub-section
(1) of Section 3 and is not an exercise divided between sub-sections (l) and F
(2) of Section 3. It is not as if sub-section (1) deals with the mere
appointment of a Commission of fnqui~· "ithout. clothing it with its
personnel and the power to appoint the 1nemher/members thereof is to be
found only in sub- section (2). That apart, there is nothing in any of these
provisions to suggest that the Government has the power to reconstitute G
the t::om1nission after its appointment hy replacing the existing sole mem-
ber with another person. Sub-section (3) of Section 3, inserted by the
A_mendtnent Act of 1971, deals expressly with the Governn1cnt's power to
fill any vacancy which n1ay have arisen since the constitution of the
(~on1mission. The question of replacement of a member appointed initially
is beyond its scope. The insertion of suh-section (3) becan1e necessary to H
278 SUPRL'MF COURT Rl'l'ORTS 11992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A provide exprt'ssly in the statute for the (;overnrnent's power to fill any
vacancy after the initial constitution" After its insertion, the scheme of the
enactrnent excludes the power of reconstitution of the Co1nmission in a
n1anner not expressly provided therein. In view of sub-section (3), it is not
permissible to construe sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 3 in any other
manner. If the schen1e of the enactment gave such wide power to
B reconstitute a Commission after it~ initial constitution and permitted
replacement or substitution of tthe existing member of a Commission with
another person sans sub-section (3) of Section 3, the power to fill any
vacancy was not required to be provided separately and expressly. It is
also significant that in the amendment so made the power is limited only
c to filling any vacancy without conferring any power to reconstitute the
Commission by replacement or substitution of the existing member \\'hich
indicat.es that no such power of replacement or substitution of the existing
member was contemplated in the scheme of the Act or intended to be
conferred on the Govern1111:ut even after the amendment.
[298-H: 299-A-C; 300-A]
D
2.2. Section 8-A was simultaneously inserted by amendment to pro-
vide that the procedure docs uot require interruption of the inquiry by
reason of change in the constitution of the Commission due to filling any
vaca1u.·y or decrease in the nun1ber of members. The expression 'or by any
E other reason' in sub~section (2) of Section S·A cannot be widened to
include the reason of reconstitution of the Comn1ission by replacement or
substitution of the existing men1ber since that power is not available to the
Government in the scherne of the Act and, therefore. this expression in
Section 8·A(2) cannot be read as conferring any additional power or giving
F any such indication. The expression 'or by an)' other reason' following
'vacancy having been filled' in Section 8·A(2) n1ust, therefore, mean any
other reason, such as decrease in the number of members, when the initial
number is more than one, and the vacancy remains unfilled. It cannot
mean substitution of the existing member with another person, since no
such power exists. Section 8·A(2) is not the source of an additional power,
G but merely an indication of the power to reconstitute the Commission. The
indication is of the power of reconstitution being available only in the
111anner indicated. l'he only situation in which the Govern1nent can re·
scind the notification issued under Section 3 constituting the Commission
is laid down in Section 7 of the Aft. which provides that the Commission
H would re<1se to exist when the appropriate (;overnrncnt by notificatir
STATE OF M.P. 1·. AJAY SINGH 279

declares that 'the continued existence of the Co1nn1ission is unnecessar)"'. A

2.3. The scheme of the enactlnent is that the appropriate (;overn-
ment should have no control over the Commission atler its constitution
under Section 3 of the Act except for the purpose of filling any vacancy
which may have arisen in the office of a member of the Co1nmission apart
from winding up the Commission by issuance of a notification under B
Section 7 of the Act if the continued existence of the Commission is
considered unnecessary. The vacancy in the office of a member of the
Commission may arise for several reasons, including resignation hy the
member, when the Governn1e11t's power to till the vacancy under Section
3(3) of the Act can be exercised. [300-A-E & GI C

2.4. The context as well as the scheme of the Commissions or Inquiry
Act, 1952 clearly indicate that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897
cannot be invoked to enlarge the Governn1ent's power to reconstitute the
Commission constituted under Section 3 of the Act in a n1anner other that D
that expressly provided in the Commissions of lm1uiry Act. There being
no express power given by the Commissions of Inquiry Act to the ap·
propriate c;uvernment to reconstitute the Cornmission of Inquiry con-
stituted under Section 3 of the Act by replacement or substitution of its
sole 1ne1nber and the existence of any such po"''er being negatived by clear
implication, no such power can be exercised by the appropriate Go\'ern- E
men!. [302-C-F]

2.5. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act can be invoked only if, and
to the extent, if any. the context and the sche1ne of the Con1missions of
Inquiry Act so permits. The general power in Section 21 of the General F
Clauses Act is 'to add, to an1end, vary or rescind any notifications' etc. In
the context of reconstitution of the f:ommission, the power to fiU any
vacancy in the office of a manner of the Co1nmission is expressly provided
in sub-section (3) of Section 3 or the Commissions oflriquiry Act. Similar·
ly, the power to discontinue the existence of the Commission when it
becomes unnecessary can be exercised by issue of a notification in accord- G
ance with Section 7 of the Act which results in rescinding the notification
issued under Section 3 constituting the Con1mission. Thus, the power to
rescind any notification conferred generally in Section 21 of the f':-reneral
Clauses Act is clearly inapplicable in the scheme of the Commissions of
Inquiry Act which expressly provides for the exercise of this power in H
280 Slll'HEME COURT REPORTS p992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A relation to Commission constituted under Section 3 of the Act. The only
other material general powers in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act are
the power to •amend' or 'vary' any notification. The extent to which the
constitution of the <:ommission can be a1nended or varitid by filling any
vacancy in the oflice of a men1ber as provided in the Cornmissions of
Inquiry Act is also obviously excluded from the purview of Section 21 of
B the General Clauses Art which cannot be inv~ked for this purpose. In a
case like the instant one, where the scheme of the Commissions of Inquiry
Act does provide for amendment and variation of the notification issued
under Section 3 for the purpose of reconstitution of the Commission in
the manner indicated, even thal power to amend or vary any notification
C by virtue of Section 21 of' the General Clauses Act must be taken as
exdudrd by clear implication in the sphere of reconstitution of the Com-
mission. J\..1oreover, the power to amend or vary cannot include the power
to replace or substitute the existing <'.omposifion of the Commission with
an entirely new composition. The aid of Section 21 of the General Clauses
D Act for enlargement of time does not conflil't w·ith the context or scheme
of the Commissions oflnquiry Act. [301-A-E]

2.6. The rule of construction embodied iu Section 21 of the General
Clauses Act cannot apply to the pl'ovisions of the Commissions of Inquiry
Act; 1952 relating to reconstitution of a Conunis.sion ronstituted there-
E under since the subjcctM1nattrr, context and etl~cl of such provisions are
inconsistent With such appli<·a1ion. Moreover, this construction best har-
monises with the subjel'1 of the enactment and lhe object of the legislation.
Restoring public confidence by Constituting a Commission of Inquiry to
investigate into a 'definite n1atter of public importance' is the. purpose of
F such an exerrise. It is, therefore, the prime need that the Co1n1nission
funrtions as an indrpendent agency free frcun any govern-n1ental control
after its constitution. II follows that after appointment, the tenure of
members of the ccnnmission should not be dependent on the will of the
(J-overnment to secure tht'.ir independence. A body not so independent is
not likely to enjoy the requisite public confidence and may not attract men
G of quality and self-respect. In such a situation, the object of the enactment
would be frustrated. [302-H; 303-A-C]

Mi.wn,a Mills Ltd. v. Their Workers, [1954] S.C.R. 465, distinguished.

H The Stale of Biharv.D.N. Ga11f<1tlv& Ors., 11959] S.C.R. ll91.relied on.
STATE OF M.P. v. AJAY SINGH [VERMA, .1.] 281

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 4734-35 A
of 1992.

From the Judgment and Order dated 8.5.1992 of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition Nos. 481 and 533 of 1992.

Shanti Bhushan, N.C. Jain, S.K. Agnihotri and Ashok K. Singh for B
the Appellant.

Kapil Sibal, N.S. Kale, A.P. Dhamija, S.K. Jain, Manmohan, S.
Atreya, Pradcep Agarwal, Basant Bhai Mehta, Ravindra Srivastava, R.N.
Srivastava, B.Y. Desai and S.V. Deshpande for the Respondents.
c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

VERMA, J. The petitioner Stale of Madhya Pradesh in both these
petitions seeks leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution against
the common judgment and order dated 8.5.1992 of the High Court of Mad- D
hya Pradesh in Miscellaneous Petition Nos. 481of1992 and 533of1992 under
Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court has allowed both these writ
petitions.

The material facts arc these. In Miscellaneous Petition No. 3909 of
1987 filed in public interest by Kailash Joshi, then Leader of the Opposition E
in Madhya Pradesh Yidhan Sabha and now a Cabinet Minister in Madhya
Pradesh, relating to the affairs of the Churhat Children's Welfare Society and
the lottery conducted by it, the M.P. High Court by its judgment dated
• 20.1.1989 issued a direction for setting up an independent high power agency
to hold an inquiry into the affairs of the said Society of which respondent No.
1 Ajay Singh was one of the office bearers. In compliance of that direction, F
the State Government passed a resolution on 24.2.1989 and also issued
notification of the same date having the effect of setting up a Commission of
Inquiry consisting of Justice S.T. Ramalingam, a Judge of the Madras High
Court to investigate into the affairs of the said Society and the lottery
conducted by it. The resolution and notification are as under :- G
"Bhopal, the 24th February, 1989

No. F. 1-3-89-J(i)-E.C. - Whereas the High Court of Mad-
hya Pradesh in its order dated the 20th January 1989 in
M.P. No. 3909/87 Kai/ash Joshi versus State of Madhya H
282 Sl!i'Rl'ME COURT RFPQRTS IJ9'!2J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Pradesh and others has directed that an inquiry be made
by an independent high power agency into the affairs of
the Churhat Children's Welfare Society and how the share
of its profits derived from Jll or any other draws have been
utilized and to take such action as may be required under ...
the law against the said Society and its organizing agent
B and that the Stale Government is of the view that the said
order of the High Court should be implemented and car-
ried out and whereas the Stale Government is also satisfied
that this is a definite matter of public importance which
calls for an inquiry to be made, the State Government
c hereby appoints an independent high power agency
presided over by Shri Justice S.T. Ramalingam, .Judge of
the Madras High Court.

2. The Headquarters of the Agency shall be at Jabal-
pur, Madhya Pradesh.
D
3. The terms of reference for inquiry by the aforesaid
Agency shall be as under:-

(1) How the affairs of the Churhat Children's Wel-
fare Society are conducted and how the share of
E the profit derived and the money collected
through lottery has been utilised ?

(2) What is the amount collected draw-\\ise, by the
agent and the Society and what is the tax liability
as per the Madhya Pradesh Lottery (Niyantran
F Tatha Kar) Adhiniyam, 1973?

(3) Whether any irregularities, illegalities and offen-
ces were committed in organizing the lottery, '
holding of draws oflottery, distribution of prizes,
and in thal event, the person responsible for the
G same;

(4) Any other matter incidental or connected with
the above subject-rnatter of enquiry.

(4) The Agency may complete its enquiry and submit
H its report tu lhe State Government within a period of six
STATE OF M.P. 1·. AJAY SINGH [VJ,RM1\ J.[ 283

months from the date of issue of this Notification. A
By order and in the name of the
Governor of Madhya Pradesh,

R.C. Shri,,astava, Secy,''
B
"Bhopal, the 24th February, 1989

No. F.1-3-89-I(i) -E.C. - Whereas by Government of
Madhya Pradesh Resolution dated the 24th February 1989
and Notification No. F.1-3-89-I(i) -E.C., dated the 24th
February 1989 an independent High Power Agency c
presided over by Shri S.T. Ramalingam, Judge of the
Madras High Court has been set up to hold an inquiry
into the affairs of the Churhat Children's Welfare Society;

And whereas the State Government having regard to
the nature of the inquiry to be made and other circumstan-
D
ces of the case is of the opinion that provisions contained
in sub-sections (2) to (5) of Section 5 of the Commissions
of Inquiry Act, 1952, should be made applicable to the
aforesaid Agency;
E
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by
sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Commissions of Inquiry
Act, 1952, the State Government hereby directs that the
provisions of sub-sections (2) to (5) of Section 5 of the
said Act shall apply to the above described Agency.
F
By order and in the name of the
Governor of Madhya Pradesh,

R.C. Shrivastava, Sec)'."

According to the terms of the above notification, the inquiry was to G
be completed within a period of six months from the date of issue of the
notification. As the inquiry could not be completed within that period, by
a notification dated 1.8.1990 the period for completing the inquiry was
extended upto 22.8.1991; then by another notification dated 16.8.1991 the
pe,riod was extended upto 31.3.1992: and then by another notification dated H
284 Slll'Rl·MI' COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 27.3.1992 the period for completing the inquiry s~an<ls extended upto
31.3.1993.

In the n1eantin1e, Justice S.T. Ramalingan1 heca1ne <luc to retire a<.; a
Judge of the Madras High Court on 30.6.1991 on attaining the age of •
superannuation and, therefore, he wrote a letter dated 19.3. 1991 to the
B Chief Sc(..:retary or the Stale <lrawing atll.!ntiun lLl thi~ fact and rcy_Ul.!~ting
that necessary modalities be \Vorked out well in tin1c for his continuance
as Commission of Inquiry in the light of the guidelines issued by the
Government of India for the benefits and emoluments payable lo a Judge
on his retirement in such a situation. Justice Ramalinga1n mentioned in that
c letter some of the facilities he expected, to which he would not be entitled
from the Government of Tamil Nadu on his retirement. The C~ief
Secretary R.P. Kapoor sent a reply to Justice Ramalingam by DO No.
504/CS/91 dated 9.4.1991 as under:·

"My dear Hon'blc Justice Ranrnlingam,
D
Thank you very much foe your letter No. 53 of 19th
March, 1991. The issues raised in your letter regarding the
tenure of the Comn1ission and the terms and conditions
after your superannuation arc under active consideration
of the Government and I \vill he in a position tn inform
E
you after a final vie\v is taken in this case. In the meanwhile
may I request that the proceedings may be continued so
that the inquiry can be completed at the earliest possible.

With very kind regards,
F
Yours sincerely,

Sd/-
(R.P. Kapoor)"'

G This letter of the Chief Secretary apart fron1 pron1ising to give an
early reply also requested Justice Ramalingam lo continue with the inquiry
so that the same could be completed early. While the promised reply from
the State Govcrnmc;it to Justice Ramalingam \Vas awaited) the State
Government, withoJt further reference to Justice Ramalingam, issued a
H notification dated 10.7.1991 as under :-
STATE OF M.P. L AJAY SINGH [VERMA, .l.J 285

"Bhopal, the 10th July, 1991 A
No. F.1-6-91-1-(8-Ka). - Whereas, an independent high
power agency comprising of a single member namely
Justice S.T. Ramalingam, Judge of the Madras High Court
was appointed under this Department Notification No.
F.1-3-89-l(i) -E.C., dated the 24th Februa1y 1989; B

And whereas Justice S.T. Ramalingarn has retired as
Judge of the Madras High Court, on 30th of June 1991;

And whereas for continuing in the said agency after
retirement Justice Shri S.T. Rarnalingam has placed cer- c
tain tcnns and conditions which have not been found
possible for the Government to accept.

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by
sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry
D
Act, 1952 (No. LX of 1952), the State Government hereby
appoint Justice Shri G.G. Sohani, retired Chief Justice,
High Court of Patna (Bihar) as single member of the said
agency in place of Justice Shri S.T. Ramalingam.

Accordingly this Department Notification Nos. (l)F.1- E
3- 89-l(i) - E.C., dated the 24th February 1989, (2) F.1-3·
89-l(i) - E.C., dated the 7Ath February 1989 and (3)
F.1-3-89-l(i) - E.C., dated the 24th February 1989, shall
stand amended lo this extent.

By order and in the name of the F
Governor of Madhya Pradesh

S.K. Misra, Secy."

Accordingly, by this notification, the Staie Government replaced Jus-
tice S.T. Ramalingam with Justice G.G. Sohani, retired Chief Justice of Patna G
High Court as the sole member of the Commission of Inquiry. The appoint-
ment of Justice G.G. Sohani in place of Justice S.T. Ramalingam was chal-
lenged in the M.P. 1-iigh Court by a writ petition - M.P. No. 2359 of 1991- by
respondent No. l Ajay Singh. By an interim order dated 30.7.1991 pa<sed by
the High Court, the operation of the above notification dated 10.7.1991 was H
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992[ SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A stayed. During the pendency of that writ petition, Justice G.G. Sohani con-
veyed to the State Governrnent his disinclination to continue with the assign-
ment and tendered his resignation. Consequ~ntly, the High Court dismissed
that writ petition as infructuous on 5.9.1991. It was only thereafter that the
Chief Secretary of the State Government sent a letter dated 12.9.1991 in
continuation of his earlier letter dated 9.4.1991 to Justice Ramalingam which
B is as under ;.
11
This 1s in· continuation to my earlier letter No.
504/CS/91 dated 9th April, 1991 regarding the arrange-
ment for the Commission of Enquiry (Churhat Children
c Welfare Society and Lottery), consequent to your super-
annuation as a Judge of the Madras High Court.

2. The State Government have considered your com-
munications about the inconveniences you were facing in
coming to Jabalpur for want of Air-link between Madras
D and Jabalpur. The State Government have also considered
the terms and conditions mentioned in your letter of 19th
March, 1991. On careful consideration of all aspects men-
tioned in your communications it has not been possible for
the State Government to accept the terms and conditions
E set out in your letter of 19th March for taking up the work
of the above mentioned Enquiry Commission after your
superannuation. The State Government had accordingly
appointed Justice Mr. G.G. Sohani, retired Chief Justice
of the Patna High Court to be the single Member of the
Commission. I am, however, happy to convey the deep
F appreciation of the State Government for the services
rendered by you in the Commission in spite of all the
personal inconvenience it has caused. The Hon'ble Chief
Minister had made a general mention of it in the Vidhan
Sabha on the 4th July, 1991.
G
3. Delay in reply to your letter is regretted. It was caused
because of the litigation arising out of the appointment of
Justice Sohani which was since been decided.

Wishing you and your family a very happy life after
H your superannuation.
STATE OF M.P. v. AJAY SINGH !VEgMA, .I.) 287

Yours sincerely, A

R.P. Kapoor"

'J'hc State Governn1ent thereafter issued another notification dated
9.1 .1992 as under:-
B
"Bhopal, the 9th January 1992

No. F.J-6-91-l (8 Ka). - Whereas in exercise of the
powers conferred by sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the
Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952 (No. LX of 1952)
Justice Shri G.G. Sohani, retired Chief Justice, High Court c
of Patna (Bihar) was appointed as single member of an
independent high. power agency constituted under this
department notification No. F.1-3-89-J(i)-E.C., dated 24th
February 1998 in place of Justice Shri S.T. Ramalingam
vide this department Notification No. F.1-6-91-l(S Ka),
D
dated the 10th July 1991 ;

And whereas Justice Shri G.G. Sohani, retired Chief
Justice, High Court of Patna (Bihar) has since withdrawn
his consent to \vork as single member of the said agency;
E
No\v, therefore, in exercise of the po\vers conferred by
sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Commissions of Enquiry
Act, 1952 (No. LX of 1952), read with Section 21 of the
General Clauses Act, 1897 (No. 10 of 1897), the State
Govcrn1nent hereby appoint Justice Shri Kamlakar
Choubcy, retired Judge of the Allahabad High Court as a F
single member of the said agency in place of Shri G.G.
Sohani.

Accordingly this department Notification Nos. (1) F.1-
3-89-I(i)-E.C., dated 24th February, 1989, (2) F.1-3-89-
G
I(i)- E.C., dated 24th February, 1989, and (3) F.1-3-89-1
, (i) E.C., dated the 24th February, 1989, shall stand
"' amended to this extent.

By order and in the name of the
Governor of :rvtadhya Pradesh, H
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Sushma Nath, Secy."

In this manner, the State Government after replacing Justice s:r.
Ramalingam first by Justice G.G. Sohani, thereafter replaced him by
Justice Kamlakar Choubey, a retired Judge of the Allahabad High Court,
as the sole member of the Commission. It is unnecessary to refer to the
B
terms and conditions of appointment of Justice Kamlakar Ciloubey which
were delai1ed in the General -Administration Department Memo. dated
23.3.1991 and are referred in the High Court judgment, which include the
,.
i-

facility of a Camp Office for him at Varanasi and other facilities of vehicle,
telephone and staff etc.
c
The appointment of Justice Kamlakar Choubey as the sole member
constituting the Commission of Inquiry in this manner resulting in the
replacement of Justice S.T. Ramalingam initially appointed for the purpose
led to writ petitions - M.P. Nos. 481 of 1992 and 533 of 1992 - for quashing
D the notification dated 9.1.1992 appointing Justice Kamlakar Choubey.
Challenge to the notification dated 10.7.1991 issued earlier appointing
Justice G.G. Sohani is academic in view of Justice Sohani having resigned
as indicated earlier. The remaining significance of the validity of the
notification dated 10.7.1991 appointing Justice G.G. Soham relates only to
the State Government's power to appoint another person in place of Justice
E S.T. Ramalingam in the above circumstances.

The challenge of the writ petitioners before the High Court was that
during the continuance as the single member of the Commission of Inquiry
of Justice S.T. Ramalingam, there was no power in the State Government
F to replace him as the member of the Commission and, therefore, the
appointment first of Justice G.G. Sohani and on his refusal, of Justice
Kamlakar Choubey, being without any authority, was invalid. On this basis,
the relief of quashing the notification dated 9.1.1992 appointing Justice
Kamlakar Choubey was sought. In substance, the argument was that there
being no vacancy in the office, the power under Section 3(3) of the
G Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, which is available only to fill any vacancy
could not be invoked and there was no other source of power available to
the State Govermnent for this purpose. The argument of the learned
Advocate General 0n behalf of the State Government was that a vacancy
had arisen in the membership of the Commission on account of Justice
H Ramalingam's retirement from Madras High Court on 30.6.91, and there
STATE OF M.P. v. AJAY SINGH [VERMA . .I.[ 289

being his implied resignation indicated by his inclination to continue on the A
terms and conditions suggested by him, which the State Government did
not consider feasible, the power of the State Government under Section
3(3) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act to fill the implied vacancy was
available. It was also urged by the learned Advocate General that vacancy
in the office of the single member of the Commission was also implied from
B
the fact that the appointment of Justice S.T. Ramalingam as the Commis-
sion of Inquiry. was qua his status as a sitting Judge of the Madras High
Court and, therefore, his retirement as a Judge resulted in creation of the
vacancy. The learned Advocate General also placed reliance on Section 16
of the General Clauses Act, 1897, in aid of the State Government's power
under Section 3(3) of the Commissions of inquiry Act. Another submission c
of the learned Advocate General was that the State Government was the
sole judge in this matter and was, therefore, competent to choose the
person for making or continuing the inquiry in view of the power available
under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act read with Section 16
of the General Clauses Act. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of D
Kailash Joshi placed reliance on Section 3(2) of the Commission of Inquiry
Act read with Section 14 of the General Clauses Act to support the State
Ciovernment's action appointing Justicc Kamlakar Choubey contending
that the State Government had power to reconstitute the Commission
replacing Justice S.T. Ramalingam by another person. An a~gument chal-
lenging the locus standi of the writ petitioner was also faintly urged by E
counsel for Kailash Joshi.

The High Court allowed the writ petitions and quashed the notifica-
tion dated 9.1.1992 appointing Justice Kamlakar Choubey. lt held that
there was no vacancy in the office of the single member of the Commission F
to empower the State Government to fill the vacancy under Section 3(3)
of lhe Commissions of Inquiry Act. On a construction of the provisions of
the Commissions of Inquiry Act and those of the General Clauses Act
relied on in support of the rival contentions, the High Court came to the
conclusion that there was neither any valid reason or ground nor any power
available in the State Government to replace Justice S.T. Ramalingam by G
another person as was purported to be done by first appointing Justice
G.G. Sohani and then Justice Kamlakar Choubey, both of whom were also
retired Judges. The objection to locus standi of the writ petitioners was also
rejected. The relevant part of the directions made by the High .Court is as
under:- H
2'l0 SUPREME COURT Rl'PORTS \ 1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A "42. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the petition
succeeds and is hereby allowed. The notification dated
10.7.1991 (Anncxure-H) and the consequent notification
based thereon dated 9.1.1992 (Annexure-M) arc hereby
quashed. It is open to the State Government to propose to
Hon'hle Shri Justice S.T. Ramalingam the terms and con-
B ditions for his continuance as a member of the Commission
equivalent to, less or more favourable than those offered
and fixed for Hon'ble Shri Justice Kamlakar Choubey.
Thereafter depending on his reply the State Government
may continue or discontinue his appointment or substitute
c another member in his place. It is also made dear that it
would be open to Justice Ramalingam to accept the terms
and conditions offered by the State Government of Madhya
Pradesh or to resign from the office, by taking a decision
in that behalf early, so that the work of the Commission is
not unduly hampered and it is completed well within the
D
extended period i.e. before 31st March, 1993........ "

Hence, these petitions for grant of special leave.

Leave granted.
E
Shri Shanti· Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the State of Madhya
Pradesh, expressly gave up the argument advanced before the High Court
of the implied resignation of .Justice S.T. Ramalingam giving rise to a
vacancy or any implied vacancy on retirement of Justice Rarnalingam as a
F Judge of the Madras High Court to enable exercise of power under Section
3(3) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act for first appointing Justice G.G.
Sohani and then Justice Kamlakar Choubey in place of Justice S.T.
Ramalingam. The case of the State of Madhya Pradesh in this Court was
confined by Shri Shanti Bhushan to only one point. The only contention of
Shri Shanti Bhushan is that the aid of Section 21 of the General Clauses
G Act is available to the State Government for exercising its powers under
the Commissions of Inquiry Act 'to add to, amend or vary' the notification
issued initially appointing Justice S.T. Ramalingam as the sole member of
the Commission which enables the State Government to reconstitute the
Commission by replacing .Justice S.T. Rarnalingam with any other person
H in the circumstances of the case. He argued that it is in exelcise of this

'
STATE OF M.P. v. !\Ji\ Y SINGH [VERMA J.r 291

power that the period fixed initially for completion of the inquiry could be A
amended since, to the extent the provisions in the Commissions of Inquiry
Act are silent, recourse can be had to Section 21 of the General Clauses
Act for making a suitable addition, amendment or variation of the initial
notification. Acccrding to learned counsel, the power to rescind any
notification being provided in Section 7 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act,
such a power in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act was not available,
B
but not so the power given by Section 21 of the General Clauses Act to
add to, amend or vary any notification. Shri Shanti Bhushan also referred
to Section 8-A of the Commissions of Inquiry Act as an indication to
support his submission of the Government's power to reconstitute the
Commission even during the availability of the person so appointed even C
though, he stated, Section 8-A is not the source of power for reconstitution
of the Commission.

In reply, Shri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel for respondent No.
1, submitted that the scheme of the Commissions of Inquiry Act does not D
permit invoking Section 21 of the General Clauses Act except for enlarge-
ment of the period for completion of the inquiry by amendment of the
notification only to that extent since the only situations in which reconstitu-
tion of the Commission can be made are provided in the Commissions of
Inquiry Act itself and, therefore, the context rules out the applicability of
Section 21 of the General Clauses Act for any such purpose. Shri Sibal also E
submitted that the construction suggested by Shri Shanti Bhushan is alien
to the scheme of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. Shri Sibal added that
Section 8-A of the Commissions of Inquiry Act was enacted for an entirely
different purpose, to ensure continuity of the Commission's work and has
nothing to do with its reconstitution. Shri N.S. Kale, learned counsel for F
Kailash Joshi, while supporting the submission of Shri Shanti Bhushan
added that Sections 14 and 16 of the General Clauses Act are also available
to support the impugned notifications issued by the State Government.

In the ultimate analysis, the controversy surviving before us on the
rival contentions is considerably narrowed. In substance, the only surviving G
controversy now is whether in the scheme of the Commissions of Inquiry
Act, the power 'to add to, amend or vary' any notification given by Section
21 of the General Clauses Act is available to reconstitute a Commission of
Inquiry constituted under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act by
replacing the sole member appointed initially with another person during H

z.
292 SUPREMF COURT REPORTS [!992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A the availability of the sole member initially appointed. The validity of the
aforesaid impugned notificdions dated 10.7.1991 appointing Justice G.G.
Sohani and dated 9. l.1992 appointing Justice Kamlakar Choubey to replace
Justice S.T. Ramalingam depends on the answer to this question which
alone now survives for decision.

B A reference to the object and purpose of an enactment in the nature
of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 would be worthwhile before
proceeding to examine its scheme and the provisions therein. The object
of the enactment, to the extent it is relevant, while construing the meaning
of its provisions may be of assistance.
c
The Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 is similar to and is modelled
on the corresponding English statute and provides this historical back-
ground for the Indian statute. The purpose of such an enactment is aptly
summarised in the speech of Lord Salmon on 'Tribunals of Inquiry' as
D under:-

"In all countries, certainly in those which enjoy freedom of
speech and a free Press, moments occur when allegations
and rumours circulate causing a nation-wide crisis of con-
fidence in the integrity of public life or about other matters
E of vital public importance. No doubt this rarely happens,
but when it does it is essential that public confidence should
be restored, for without it no democracy can long survive.
This confidence can be effectively restored only by
thoroughly investigating and probing the rumours and al-
F legations so as to search out and establish the truth. The
truth may show that the evil exists, thus enabling it to be
rooted out, or that there is no foundation in the rumours
and allegations by which the public has been disturbed. In
either case, confidence is restored. How, in such cir-
cumstances, can the truth best be established ?"
G
It is for the purpose of ascertaining the truth in such circumstances that
the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 has been enacted. While construing
the provisions of the enactment, it would be useful to bear in mind its
object if occasion arises for illumination of any grey areas with reference
H to the object of the enactment as a permissible aid to construction.

I
I

I
STATE OF M.P. v. AJAY SINGH [VF.RMA. J.] 293

The Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 was enacted to provide for A
the appointment of Commissions of Inquiry and for vesting such Commis-
sions with certain powers. Section 2 of the Act contains definitions. Section
3 provides for appointment of a Commission of Inquiry. Sub-section (1) of
Section 3 lays down that a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of
making an inquiry into any 'definite matter of public importance' may be
appointed by the appropriate Government if it is of opinion that it is
B
necessary so to do and shall make such an appointment if a resolution in
this behalf is passed by each House of Parliament or, as the case may be,
the Legislature of the State, by notification in the Official Gazette. Sub-
section (2) of Section 3 says that the Commission may consist of one or
more members appointed by the appropriate Government, and where the c
number is more than one, one of them may be appointed as the Chairman.
Sub-section (3) of Section 3 enables the appropriate Government to fill any
vacancy y,:hich may arise in the office of a member of the Commission
whether consisting of one or more than one member, at any stage of an
inquiry. Sub-section ( 4) of Section 3 requires the appropriate Government D
to cause to be laid before ~ach House of Parliament or, as the case may
be, the Legislature of the Stale, the report, if any, of the Commission of
Inquiry together with a memorandum of the action taken thereon, within
a period of six months from the submission of the report by the Commis-
sion to the appropriate Government. Section 4 prescribes that the Com-
mission shall have the powers of a civil court while trying a suit under the E
Code of Civil Procedure in respect of the matters mentioned therein.
Section 5 deals with the additional powers of the Commission. Section 5-A
relates to the power of the Commission for conducting investigation per-
taining to inquiry. Section 5-B deals with the power of the Commission to
appoint assessors. Section 6 provides for the manner of use of the state- F
ments made by persons to the Commission. Section 6-A provides that some
persons are not obliged to disclose certain facts. Section 7 deals with the
manner in which a Commission of Inquiry appointed Section 3 ceases to
exist in case its continuance is unnecessary. It provides for a notification in
the Official· Gazette by the appropriate Government specifying the date
from which the Commission shall cease to exist if it is of the opinion that G
the continued existence of the Commission is unnecessary. Where a Com-
mission is appointed in pursuance of a resolution passed by the Parlian1ent
or, as the case may be, the Legislature of the State, then a resolution for
the discontinuance of the Comn1ission is also to be passed by it. Section
H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 8-A provides that the inquiry is not to be interrupted by reason of vacancy
or change in the constitution of the Commission and it shall not be
necessary for the Commission to commence the inquiry afresh and the
inquiry may be continued from the stage at which the change look place.
Section 8-B prescribes that persons likely lo be prejudicially affected by
the inquiry must be heard. Section 8-C deals with the right of cross-ex-
B amination and representation by legal practitioner of the appropriate
Government, every person referred to in Section 8-B and, with the permis-
sion of the Commission, any other person whose evidence is recorded by
the Commission. Sections 9, 10 and 10-A relate to ancillary matters while
Section 12 contains the rule making power of the appropriate G.overnment.
C Section 11 provides that the Act is to apply to other inquirying authorities
in.certain cases and where the Government directs that the said provisions
of this Act shall apply to that authority and issues such a notification, that
authority shall be deemed to be a Commission appointed under Section 3
for the purposes of this Act. Admittedly, it is by virtue of Section 11 that
D the Commission of Inquiry appointed in the present case is deemed to be
a Commission appointed under Section 3 for the purposes of this Act
because the Commission was constituted by a resolution of the Govern-
ment pursuant to the direction of the M.P. High Court in the writ petition
filed in public interest by Kailash Joshi as indicated earlier. For the
purposes of this case, the material provisions of the enactment arc Sections
E 3, 7 and 8-A apart from Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 with
reference to which the rival contentions were made.

These provisions are as under :-

F The Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952

"3. Appointment of Commission.; (!) The appropriate
Government may, if it is of opinion that it is necessary so \
to do, and shall, if a resolution in this behalf is passed by
each House of Parliament or, as the case may be, the
G Legislature of the State, by notification in the Official
Gazette, appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose
of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public
importance and performing such functions and within
such time as may be specified in the notification, and the
H Commission .1.0 appointed shall make the inquiry and

i
J
I
STATE OF M.P. v. AJAY SINGH [VERMA. J.] 295

perform the functions accordingly : A
Provided that where any such Commission has been
appointed to inquire into any matter -

(a) by the Central Governmen~ no State Government
shall, except with the approval of the Central Govern- B
ment, appoint another Commission to inquire into the
same matter for so long as the Commission appointed
by the Central Government is functioning;

(b) by a State Government, the Central Government shall
not appoint another Commission to inquire into the
c
same matter fur so long as the Commission appointed
by the State Government is functioning, unless the
Central Government is of opinion that the scope of the
inquiry should be extended to two or more States.
D
(2) The Commission may consist of one or more mem-
bers appointed by the appropriate Government, and
where the Commission consists of more than one member,
one of them may be appointed as the Chairman thereof.

(3) The appropriate Government may, at any stage of
E
an inquiry by the Cqmmission fill any vacancy which may
have arisen in the office of a member of the Commission
(whether consisting of one or more than one member).

(4) The appropriate Government shall cause to be laid F
be!ore- each House of Parliament or, as the case may be,
the Legislature of the State, the report, if any, of the
Commission on the inquiry made by the Commbsion
under sub-section (1) together with a memorandum of the
action taken thereon, within a period of six months of the
submission of the report by the Commission to the ap-
G
propriate Government."

1
'7. Commission to cease to exist when so notified.- (1)
The appropriate Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, declare that - H
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A (a) a Commission (other than a Commission appointed in
pursuance of a resolution passed by each House of
Parliament or, as the case may be, the Legislature of
the State) shall cease to exist, if it is of opinion that
the continued existence of the Commission is unneces-
sary;
B
(b) a Commission appointed in pursuance of a resolution
passed by each House of Parliament or as the case
may be, the Legislature of the State, shall cease to exist
if a resolution for the discontinuance of the Commis-
c sion is passed by each House of Parliament or, as the
case may be, the Legislature of the State. ,

(2) Every notification issued under sub-section (1)
shall specify the date from which the Commission shall
cease to exist and on the issue of such notification, the
D Commission shall cease to exist with effect from the date
specified therein.11

"8-A. Inquiry not to be interrupted by reason of vacan-
cy or change in the constitution of the Commission. - (1)
E Where the Commission consists of two or more members,
it may act notwithstanding the absence of the Chairman
or any other member or any vacancy among its members.

(2) Where during the course of an inquiry before a
Commission, a change has taken place in the constitution
F of the Commission by reason of any vacancy having been
filed or by any other reason, it shall not be necessary for
•
the Commission to commence the inquiry afresh and the
inquiry may be continued from the stage at which the

G
change took place."

The General Clauses Act, 1897'
11
-
21. Power to issue, to include power to add to, amend,
vary or rescind, notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws. -
Where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to issue
H notifications, orders, rules or bye~laws is conferred, then
STATE OF M.P. v. AJAY SINGH [VERMA, J.J 297

that power includes a power, exercisably in the like man- A
ner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any)
to and to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders,
rule or bye-laws so issued. 11

ll may be mentioned that sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 3 and
Section 8-A were inserted while Section 7 was substituted in the Commis-
B
sions of Inquiry Act, 1952 by the Commissions of Inquiry (Amendment)
Act, 1971 (No.79 of 1971) as a result of the recommendations of the Law
Commission of India made in paras 26 and 34 of its 24th Report. In para
26, the recommendation made was to amend Section 3 of the Act 'to
provide expressly for the filling up of vacancy or for an increase in the c
number of members whenever the Government thinks it necessary or
expedient to do so'. In para 34 of the Report, the recommendation was to
insert a new section 8-A in the light of the proposed amendment in Section
3 to clarify that 'it is not necessary for the Commission to recommence its
inquiry if a change takes place in the constitution of the Commission during D
the pendency of an inquiry'. The legislative history of sub-section (3) of
Section 3 and Section 8-A inserted simultaneously by amendment of the
Act shows their interrelation and the object of enacting Section 8-A is to
clarify that the inquiry is not required to recommence or be interrupted by
reason of the filling of any vacancy or decrease in the number of members
of the Commission. Section 8-A along with Sections 8-B and 8-C inserted E
simultaneously by amendment in the principal Act relate to the procedure
of the Commission and were inserted to provide for specific situations
while Section 8 contains the general power of the Commission to regulate
its own procedure.
F
The real question for decision in the present case is : Whether the
appropriate Government after constitt1ting the Commission under Section
3 of the Act is empowered to reconstitute the Commission substituting
another person as the sole member in place of the initial appointee? In
substancei it is this power that the State Government claims to have .
exercised in the present case and is attempted to be justified by the G
argument advanced by Shri Shanti Bhushan to support the appointment
first of Justice G.G. Sohani and then of Justice Kamlakar Choubey in place
of Justice S.T. Ramalingam. To recapitulate, the argument of Shri Shanti
Bhushan is that the power of reconstituting the Commission in this manner
is available to the State Government under Section 21 of the General H
298 SUPREMF COURT RFPORTS [ 1992[ SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Clauses Act which can be invoked in aid of the power of the Government
under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. Section 8-A of the
Commissions of Inquiry Act is referred to by Shri Shanti Bhlishan as ar.
indication of the existence of this power in the State Government even
though he does not rely on it as a source of this power. Shri Kapil Sibal,
on the other hand, contends that the scheme of the enactment shows that
B the appropriate Government cannot interfere with the working of the
Commission after its constitution except in the manner expressly provided
in the Act and Section 7 is a clear indication that interference with the
functioning of the Commission is not permissible in any other manner. Shri
Sibal contends that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is not available
c to support the Government's action in the present case.
Shri Shanti Bhushan concedes that there is no express provision in
the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 empowering the Government to
replace or substitute the sole member of a Commission with another
person during the continuance of the Commission, but he submits that this
D is implicit in the power to appoint a Commission and designate its person-
nel under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 3 of the Commissions of
Inquiry Act read with the power to amend or ~ary any notification available
under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. Shri Shanti Bhushan also
conceded that the aid of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is available
E only if the context and the scheme of the Commissions of Inquiry Act so
permits. He submitted that the Government's power to extend the time
specified in the initial notification for completing the work of the Commis-
sion is not to be found in any express provision in the Commissions of
Inquiry Act, but is exercised by amendment of the initial notification only
F under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. According lo Shri Shanti
Bhushan, the appointment of a Commission is under sub-section (1) and
it is under sub-section (2) of Section 3 that the person constituting the
Commission is appointed even though it may be a simultaneous process.
The replacement of the member initially appointed to constitute the Com-
mission, according to learned counsel, is by re-exercise of the power under
G sub-section (2) of Section 3. The submission is that the Commission ap-
pointed under sub-section (1) of Section 3 continues while it may be
reconstituted by replacement of the member which is done under sub-sec-
tion (2).

H In our opinion, the power of the Government to appoint a Commis-
STATE OF M.P. v. AJAY SINGH \VERMA J.J 299

s1on of Inquiry and name the person or persons constituting it 1s in A
sub-section (1) of Section 3 and is not an exercise divided between sub-
sections (1) and (2) of Section 3 as suggested by Shri Shanti Bhushan.
Sub-section (2) merely confers the power in the Government to appoint a
Commission consisting of one or more members and provides that if there
be more than one member of the Commission, then one of them may be
appointed Chairman of the Commission. It is not as if sub-section (1) deals
B
with mere appointment of a Commission of Inquiry without clothing it with
its personnel and the power to appoint the member/members thereof is to
be found only in sub-section (2). That apart, there is nothing in any of these
provisions to suggest that the Government has the power to reconstitute
the Commission after its appointment by replacing the existing sole mem- c
ber with another person, Sub-section (3) deals expressly with the
Government's power to fill any vacancy which may have arisen since the
constitution of the Commission. The question of replacement of a member
appointed initially is obviously beyond its scope.

D
Sub-section (3) inserted by amendment in Section 3 of the Commis-
sions of Inquiry Act, 1952 is a clear contra·indication to the construction
suggested by Shri Shanti Bhushan of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 3
in the scheme of the Act. If the construction suggested by Shri Shanti
B_hushan be correct, there \Vas no need to make this amendment and insert
sub-section (3) which is a clear indication of the limit and extent to which E
the power of reconstitution of the Commission can be exercised by the
Government after the Commission has been constituted. As the Law
Commission's Report itself indicates, this amendment b.:::came necessary to
provide expressly in the statute for the Government's power to fill any
vacancy after the initial constitution. Whatever may have been the position F
prior to insertion of sub-section (3) in Section 3, there can be no doubt
that after its insertion, the scheme of the enactment excludes the power of
reconstitution of the Comrriission in a manner not expressly provided
therein. In view of sub-section (3), it is not permissible to construe sub-sec-
tions (1) and (2) of Section 3 in any other manner. If the scheme of the
enactment gave such wide power to reconstitute a Commission after its G
initial constitution and permitted replacement or substitution of the exist-
ing member of a Commission with another person sans sub-section (3) of
Section 3, the power to fill any vacancy was not required to be provided
separately and expressly. The mere fact that such a provision was con-
sidered necessary and has been enacted by inserting sub-section (3) is H
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A sufficient to negative such a contention. It is also significant that in the
amendment so made the power is limited only to filling any vacancy without
conferring any power to reconstitute the Commission by replacement or
substitution of the existing member wh;ch indicates that no such power of
replacement or substitution of the existing member was contemplated in
the scheme of the Act or intended to be conferred on the Government
B even after the amendment. Section 8-A was simultaneously inserted by
amendment to provide that the procedure does not require interruption of
the inquiry by reason of change in the constitution of the Commission due
to filling any vacancy or decrease in the number of members. The expres-
sion 'or by any other reason' in sub-section (2) of Section 8-A cannot be
c widened to include the reason of reconstitution of the Commission by
replacement or substitution of the existing member since that power is not
available to the Government in the scheme of the Act and, therefore, this
expression in Section 8-A(2) cannot be read as conferring any additional
po\.\'er or giving any such indication. The expression 'or by any other
D reason' following 'vacancy having been filled' in Section 8-A(2) must,
therefore, mean any other reason, such as decrease in the number of
members, when the initial nu1nber is more than one, and the vacancy
remains unfil1ed. It cannot mean substitution of the existing member with
another person, since no such power exists. Shri Shanti Bhushan has rightly
submitted that Section 8-A(2) is not the source of an additional power but
E merely an indication of the power to reconstitute the Commission. The
indication is of the power of reconstitution being available only in the
manner indicated.

In this context, reference to Section 7 of the Commissions of Inquiry
F Act, 1952 is also apt. This provision lays down that the Commission would
cease to exist when the appropriate Government by notification declares
that 'the continued existence of the Commission is unnecessary'. Such a
notification is~ued under Section 7 in the event of the continued existence
of the Commission becoming unnecessary has the effect of rescinding the
notification issued under Section 3 of the Act constituting the Commission.
G The enactment, therefore, also provides in Section 7 the only situation in
which the Government can rescind the notification issued under Section 3
constituting the Commission. To the extent to which express provision is
made in the enactment, it is common ground, Section 21 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 cannot be invoked. These aspects have to be borne in
H mind while considering the tenability of the submission made by Shri Shanti
STATE OF M.P. 1·. AJAY SINGH [VERMA, J.J 301

Bhushan with the aid of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. A

It is common ground before us that Section 21 of the General Clauses
Act can be invokod only if, and to the extent, if any, the context ·and the
scheme of the Commissions of Inquiry Act so permits. The general power
in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is 'to add to, amend, vary or
rescind any notification' etc. In the context of reconstitution of the Com-
B
mission, the power to fill any vacancy in the office of a member of the
Commission is expressly provided in sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the
Commission of Inquiry Act. Similarly, the power to discontinue the exist-
ence of the Commission when it becomes unnecessary can be exercised by
issue of a notification in accordance with Section 7 of the Act which results c
in rescinding the notification issued under Section 3 constituting the Com-·
missio11. Thus, the power to rescind any notification conferred generally in
Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is clearly inapplicable in the scheme
of the Commissions of Inquiry Act which expressly provides for the exer-
cise of this power in relation to a Commission constituted under Section 3 D
of the Act. The only material remaining general powers in Section 21 of
the General Clauses Act are the power to 'amend ' or 'vary' any notifica-
tion. The extent to which the constitution of the Commission can be
amended or varied by filling any vacancy in the office of a member as
provided in the Commissions of Inquiry Act is also obviously excluded from
the purview of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act which cannot be E
invoked for this purpose.

The surviving question, therefore, is : Whether there is power to
reconstitute the Commission by replacement or substitution of the existing
member, though not provided in the Commissions of Inquiry Act by F
invoking the residuary power to amend or vary any notification under
Section 21 of the General Clauses Act? In the first place, in a case like the
present where the scheme of the Commissions of Inquiry Act does provide
for amendment and variation of the notification issued under Section 3 for
the purpose of rec0nstitution of the Commission in the manner indicated,
even that power to amend or ·;ary any notification by virtue of Section 21 G
of the General Clauses Act must be taken as excluded by clear implication
in the sphere of reconstitution of the Commission. Moreover, the power to
amend or vary cannot include the power to replace or substitute the
existing composition of the Commission with an entirely new composition.
Shri Shanti Bhushan submitted that the time specified in the initial notifica- H
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992J SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A lion for completing the task of the Commission is enlarged by subsequent
notification and this is done in exercise of the general power available
under the General Clauses Act to extend time. This submission does not
support the argument of learned counsel that the general power under
Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is also available to reconstitute the
Commission by replacement or substitution of its sole member. The aid of
B
Section 21 of the General Clauses Act for enlargement of time does not
conflict with the context or scheme of the Commissions of Inquiry Act.

The context as well as the scheme of the Commissions of Inquiry Act,
1952 clearly indicate that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897
c cannot be invoked to enlarge the Government's power to reconstitute the
.Commission constituted under Section 3 of the Act in a manner other than
that expressly provided in the Commissions of Inquiry Act. There being no
express power given by the Commissions of Inquiry Act to the appropriate
Government to reconstitute the Commission of Inquiry constituted under
D Section 3 of the Act by replacement or substitution of its sole member and
the existence of any such po\ver being negatived by clear implication, no
such power can be exercised by the appropriate Government. The scheme
of the enactment is that the appropriate Government should have no
control over the Commission after its constitution under Section 3 of the
Act except for the purpose of filling any vacancy which may have arisen in
E the office of a member of the Commission apart from winding up the
Commission by issuance of a notification under Section 7 of the Act if the
continued existence of the Con1mission is considered unnecessary. The
vacancy in the office of a member of the Commission may arise for several
reasons, including resignation by the member, when the Government's
F power to fill the vacancy under Section 3(3) of the Act can be exercised.
Even though a case of implied resignation creating an implied vacancy was
set up by the State of Madhya Pradesh before the High Court, that stand
was rightly abandoned before us by Shri Shanti Bhushan.

We have no doubt that the rule of construction embodied in Section
G 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot apply to the provision> of the
Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 relating to reconstitution of a Commis-
sion constituted thereunder since the subject-matter, context and effect of
such provisions arc inconsistent with such application. Moreover, the con-
struction made by us best harmonises with the subject of the enactment
H and the object of the legislation. Restoring public confidence by constitut-
STATE OF M.P. v. AJAY SINGH [VERMA, J.] 303

ing a Commission of Inquiry to investigate into a 'definite matter of public A
in1pcirtance' is the purpose of such an exercise. It is, therefore, the prime
need that the Commission functions as an independent agency free from
any governmental control after its constitution. It follows that after appoint-
ment, the tenure of members of the commission should not be dependent
on the will of the Government, to secure their independence. A body not
so independent is not likely to enjoy the requisite public confidence any
B
may not attract men of quality and self-respect. In such a situation, the
object of the enactment would be frustrated. This aspect suggests that the
construction made by us, apart from harmonising the provisions of the
statute, also promotes the object of the enactment while the construction
suggested by the appellant frustrates both. c
Shri Shanti Bhushan placed reliance on the decision in Minerva Mills
Ltd. v. Their Workers, [1954] S.C.R. 465. In that decision, the power of the
appropriate Government under Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 to constitute an industrial tribunal for a fixed period of time and to D
constitute a new tribunal on the expiry of that period to hear and dispose
of references made lo the previous tribunal which had not been disposed
of by that tribunal was upheld. Shri Shanti Bhushan contended that the
observations made in that decision are not confined to the exercise of that
power on the expiry of the tenure of the tribunal first constituted. It was
clearly indicated in that decision that 'when the life of the first tribunal E
automatically came to end by efflux of time, no question of vacancy in the
office really arose and, therefore, it was not a case falling under sub-clause
(2) of Section 8 but the situation that arose fell within the ambit of Section
7'. The observations made in that decision have to be read in the context
of the facts of that case. That decision is clearly distinguishable.
F
On the other hand, Shri Kapil Sibal placed reliance on The State of
Bihar v. D.N. Ganguly & Others, [1959] S.C.R. 1191. This decision also
related to the reference of a dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act,
194?. It was pointed out that 'it was well settled that the rule of construction
embodied in Section 21 of the General Clauses Act can apply to the G
provisions of a statute only where the subject-matter, context, and effect of
such provisions are in no way inconsistent with such application'. On this
basis it was held that it did not apply to Section 10(1) of the Industrial
Disputes Act. On a construction of Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes
. Act, 1947, it was held that it does not confer on the appropriate Govern- H
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A ment the power to cancel or supersede a reference made thereunder in
respect of an industrial dispute pending adjudication by the tribunal con-
stituted for that purpose. Reliance placed on Section 21 of the General
Clauses Act on behalf of the Government to invoke such a power by
necessary implication \¥as clearly negatived. The decision of this Court in
Minerva Mills Ltd. (supra) was distinguished as we have already indicated.
B In our opinion, the ratio in D.N. (ianguly (supra) supports the view iaken
by us in the present case that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot
be invoked to support the impugned action of the State of Madhya Pradesh
as contended by Shri Shanti Bhushan. The construction suggested by Sri
Shanti Bhushan is inconsistent with the provisions and the scheme of the
c Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 and must, therefore, be rejected.

Admittedly, the power under Section 3(3) of the Commissions of
Inquiry Act, 1952 was not available to the State of Madhya Pradesh in the
facts of the present case to appoint any other person replacing Justice S.T.
Ramalingam as the sole member of the Commission of Inquiry. The power
D under sub-sections' (1) and (2) of Section 3 read with Section 21 of the
General Clauses Act or even Sections 14 or 16 thereof was also not
available for this purpose, for the reasons given earlier. Accordingly, the
notification dated 10.7.1991 appointing Justice G.G. Sohani and the
notification dated 9.1.1992 appointing Justice Kamlakar Choubey were
E both invalid. It is not unlikely that Justice G.G. Sohani may have resigned
forming the same opinion when his appointment was challenged. Ho\vever,
the Stale of Madhya Pradesh did not choose to reflect and reconsider the
legality of its action in spite of the resignation of Justice G.G. Sohani and
it continu\? to move in the 'Vrong direction by making another invalid
appointmerr: of Justice Kamlakar Chqubey.
F
Consequently, these appeals are dismissed and the impugned judg-
ment of the High Court quashing the notifications dated 10.7.1991 and
9.1.1992 is sustained for the aforesaid reasons given by us. The State of
Madhya Pradesh shall, in view of the retirement of Justice S.T. Ramalingam
G as a Judge of the Madras High Court in the meanwhile, take necessary action
to finalise his terms and conditions in accordance with the guidelines issued
by the Government of India in this behalf. Such action be taken promptly to
avoid any undue delay in completion of the Commission's task. No costs.

N.P.Y. Appeal dismissed.