Supreme Court of India
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANR.versusPRAMOD BHARTIYA AND ORS.
- Citation
- 1992 INSC 268
- Decided
- 8 October 1992
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- KULDIP SINGH
Holding
The Court held that the respondents did not establish that their duties, functions and responsibilities were similar to those of non‑technical lecturers in Technical Schools, so the pay distinction was not violative of Article 14 and the appeal was allowed.
Summary
The State of Madhya Pradesh appealed against an order of the Madhya Pradesh Administrative Tribunal that had directed equalisation of pay scales between lecturers in Government Higher Secondary Schools and non‑technical lecturers in Technical Schools. The respondents, lecturers in Higher Secondary Schools, claimed that because their qualifications, service conditions and status were identical to those of non‑technical lecturers in Technical Schools, they were entitled to the same higher pay scale. The Court examined whether the constitutional principle of "equal pay for equal work" (derived from Article 14, Article 16(1) and Article 39(d)) was enforceable and whether the distinction in pay was irrational or lacked reasonable classification. It held that the respondents failed to prove that their duties, functions and responsibilities were similar to those of the non‑technical lecturers, and therefore the pay distinction was not unconstitutional. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the Tribunal’s order set aside.
Issues considered
- Whether the principle of equal pay for equal work is enforceable under Article 14, Article 16(1) and Article 39(d) of the Constitution
- Whether lecturers in Government Higher Secondary Schools are entitled to the same pay scale as non‑technical lecturers in Technical Schools
- Whether the distinction in pay scales is arbitrary, irrational or lacks a reasonable classification
- Whether the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 applies to the employees in question
- Who bears the burden of proof in a claim for equal pay for equal work
Legislation cited
- Equal Remuneration Act, 1976s. 1(3), s. 2(h)
Subjects
equal pay for equal workArticle 14Article 16(1)Article 39(d)Equal Remuneration Actdiscriminationclassificationlecturerspay scaleMadhya Pradesh
Judgment
A STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANR.
v.
PRAMOD BHARTIYA AND ORS.
OCTOBER 8, 1992
B (KULDIP SINGH, N.M. KASLIWAL AND
B.P. JEEVEN REDDY, JJ.)
Constitution of India, 1950 :
C Article 14-Equal pay for equal work :
Ingredients-Persons who plead to prove.
Civil Service :
D Lecturers of Higher Secondary Schools governed under Madhya
Pradesh Non-gazetted Class III Educational Service (Non-Collegiate Branch
Service)Recmitment and Promotion Rules, 1973 and Non-technical lecturers
of technical schools governed under M.P. Education Department (Technical)
Class III (Non-Ministerial) Recmitment Rules, 1980-Scale of pay-Dis-
E parity-Legality of
Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 :
Sections 1(3), 2 (h)-Application and object of-''Same work or work
of a similar nature''-Relevance of definition to the case of school teachers.
F The service conditions of the Respondents lecturers working in Higher
Secondary Schools were governed by Madhya Pradesh Non-gazetted Class
III Educational Service (Non-Collegiate Branch Service) Recrnitment and
Promotion Rules, 1973. In the State there was another set of schools called
'Technical Schools', which were also Higher Secondary Schools.
G
In Technical Schools, lecturers were categorised as technical lec-
turers and non-technical lecturers. Their service conditions were governed
by M.P. Education Department (Technical) Class III (Non-Ministerial)
Recruitment Rules, 1980.
H The case of the Respondents before the Administrative Tribunal was
904
STATEOFM.P. v. PRAMODBHARTIYA 905
that in the year 1981 the scale of pay admissible to non-technical lecturers In A
technical scitools and lecturers in Government Higher Secondary Schools
was identical viz., Rs.925-1500, that subseqoently a distinction came to be
made between them to the prejudice of the lecturers in Higher Secondary
Schools; that qualifications prescribed for both the posts and the service
conditions were identical though both of them were governed by different B
sets of Rules; that they taught more number ,,f hours every week than the
non-technical lecturers in technical schools; that since tbe qualifications,
service conditions and status of the non-technical lecturers in technical
schools and the lecturers in Government Higher Secondary Schools were the
same, they too were entitled to the scale of Rs.2000-3500 with effect from
1.1.1986. c
The appellant State opposed the respondent's claim. Tbe State con-
tended that the distinction between the lecturers in Government Higher
Secondary Schools and the non-technical lecturers I!' the Govermneot
Technical Schools was based upon the report of the Pay Commission; that
the Choudhary Commission bad maintained a distinction betwf\!n the pay D
scales of technical lecturers and non-technical lecturers working in tech-
nical schools and bad kept the non-technical lecturers in technical schools
on par with the lecturers in Government Higher Secondary Schools but as
a result of the decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in M.P. No.
2277 of 1985 disposed of on 29.7.1988, the non-technical lecturers in the E
technical schools bad to be placed in the same scale of pay as the technical
lecturers; that though the qualifications for both the posts were the same,
the service conditions and their mode of recruitment were different.
The Tribunal allowed the application, against which the present
appeal was preferred by the State. F
Allowing the appeal, this Court,
HELD: 1.1. Equal pay for equal work, it is self evident, is implicit in
the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14, it flows from It. Because G
clause (d) of Article 39 spoke of 'equal pay for equal work for both men
and women' it did not cease to be a part of Article 14. To say that the said
rule having been stated as a directive principle of State policy Is not
enforceable in a Court of Law is to indulge in sophistry. Parts IV and Ill
of the Constitution are not supposed to be exclusionary of each other. They
are complementary to each other. The rule Is as much a part of Article 14 H
906 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A as It Is or clause (1) or Article 16. Equality or opportunity guaranteed by
Article 16(1) neeessarlly means and involves equal pay for equal work. It
means equally that it Is neither a mechanical rule nor does It mean
geometrical equality. The concept or reasonable classiDcatlon and all other
Rules evolved with respect to Articles 14 and 16(1) come Into play wherever
B complaint or infraction of this Rule rails for consideration. [907 11-H)
1.2. It must be remembered that since the plea oreqnal payforequal
work has to be examined with reference to Article 14, the burden Is upon
the petitioners to establish their right to equal pay, or the plea or dis·
crimlnatlon, as the case may be. [91S·E)
c 1.3. The quality of work may vary from post to posL It may vary
from institution to lostitutlou. It Is not a matter of assumption but one or ·
proof. [915-C)
1.4 It Is not enough to say that the quallftcatlous are same nor is
D It enough to say that the schools are or the same status. It Is also not
sufficient to say that the service conditions are similar. What Is more
Important and crucial Is whether Ibey discharge similar duties, functions
and responsibilities. [914-BJ
1.S. The respondents (Original petitioners) have failed to establish
E that their duties, responslbllltes and functions are similar to those of the
non-technical lecturers In Technical Colleges. They have also failed to eslab·
lisb that the distinction between their scale of pay and that of non-technical
lecturers working In Technical Schools is either irrational and that It bas no
basis, or that it Is vitiated by ma/a jides, either In law or In facL [915-D)
F
Randhir Singh v. Union of India & Ors., [1982) 1 S.C.C. 618; P.K
Ramachandra Iyer and others v. Union of India and others, [1984) 2 S.C£.
141; P. Savita and others v. U'!ion of India and oihers, [1985) Suppl. S.C.C.
94; Dhirendra Chamou and others v. State of U.P., (19116) 1 S.C.C. 637;/aipal
and others v. State of Haryana and others; [1988) 3 S.C.C. 354; Federation
G of all India (Customs and Excise Stenographers v. Union of India, [1986) 3
S.C.C. 91 and State of U.P. and Ors. v. J.P. Chaurasia and Ors., [1989) 1
S.C.C. 121, referred to.
Supreme Court Employees Welf.ue Association v. Union of India,
H A.l.R. 1990 S.C. 334, explained.
STATEOFM.P. v. PRAMODBHARTIYA[JEEVANREDDY,J.) 907
2.1. The Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 is applicable to such estab· A
lishment and employments as may be notified by the Central Government
under Section 1(3) of the Act. (914-F]
2.2 Though the Equal Remuneration Act is mainly directed against
discrimination against women arid Is also not applicable to the employ·
ments or establishments to which the Respondents belong, yet the B
relevance of the definition cannot be denied, occurs as it does In an
enactment made to give statutory shape to the rule of "equal pay for equal
work both for men and women". (914-G]
2.3. It would be evident form the deftnltion In S~lon 2(b) of the Equal C
Remuneration Act that the stress Is upon the slmlh!rlty or skill, effort and
responslblllty when performed under similar condl!lons. (914-H)
Mackinnon Mackenzie v. Andrey D'Costa, (1987) 2 S.C.C. 469 and
Federation of All India Customs and Excise Stenographers v. Union of India,
(1988] 3 S.C.C. 91, referred to. D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION; Civil Appeal No. 4049 of
1992.
From the Judgment and Order dated 7.3.92 of the Madhya Pradesh
Administrative Tribunal, Bench Indore in 0.A. No.2198 of 1990. E
S.K. Agnohotri for the Appellants.
K.Madhava Reddy, D. Rama Krishna Reddy and G. Prabhakar for
the Respondents.
F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. Equal pay for equal work, it is self eviden~
is implicit in the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14, it flows from
it. Because clause (d) of Article 39 spoke of "equal pay for equal work for G
both men and women" it did not cease 10 be a part of Article 14. To say
that the said rule having been stated as a directive principle of State policy
is not enforceable in a Court of Law is lo indulge in sophistry. Parts IV
and III of the Constitution are not supposed to be exclusionary of each
other. They are complementary to each other. The rule is as much a part
of Article 14 as it is of clause (1) of Article 16. Equality of opportunity H
908 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) SUPP. l S.C.R.
A guaranteed by Article 16(1) necessarily means and involves equal pay for
equal work. It means equally that it is neither a mechanical rule n0r does
it mean geometrical equality. The concept of reasonable classification and
all other Rules evolved with respect to Articles 14 and 16(1) come into play
wherever. complaint of iofraction of this· Rule falls for consideration. This
is the principle affirmed in Randhir Singh v. Union of India & Ors., [1982]
B 1 S.C.C. 618 as well as in the subsequent decisions of this Court. II would
be instructive to notice a few of them.
In Rantihir Singh, Chinnappa Reddy, J. Speaking for the Bench of
three learned Judges said:
c
"We concede that equation of posts and equation of pay
are matters primarily for the Executive Government and
expert bodies like the Pay Commission and not for courts
but we must hasten to say that_ where all things are equal
that is, where all relevant considerations are the same,
D
persons holding identical posts may not be treated dif-
ferentially in the matter of their pay merely because they
belong to different departments. Of course, if officers of
the same rank perform dissimilar functions and the power,
duties and responsibilities of the posts held by them vary,
E such officers may not be heard to complain of dissimilar
pay merely because the posts are of the same rank and
the nomenclature is the same ......... Construing Articles 14
and 16 in the light of the Preamble and Article 39 (d), we
are of the view that the principle 'equal pay for equal
F work' is deducible from those Articles and may be proper-
ly applied to case of unequal scales of pay based on no
classification or irrational classification though those
drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under
the same employer."
G The above principle was followed and applied in P.K Ramacloandra
Iyer, [1984] 2 S.C.C. 141, Savita [1985] Suppl. S.C.C. 94, Dhirendra Chamo/i
(1986] 1 S.C.C. 637, Surinder Singh [1986] 1 S.C.C. 639, Jaipal [1988] 3
S.C.C. 354 and in Federation of All India Customs and Excise Stenographers
v. Union of India, [1988] 3 S.C.C. 91. While it is not necessary to refer to
H all the decisions, a brief reference to the decisions last-mentioned may be
STATEOFM.P. v. PRAMODBHARTIYA(JEEVANREDDY,J.] 909
in order. S. Mukherj~ J. speaking for himself and R.S. Pathak, C.J. had this A
to say about the content of the rule:
"In this case the differentiation has been sought to be
justified in view of the nature and the types of the work
done, that is, on intelligible basis. The same amount of
physical work may ential different quality of work, some B
more sensitive, some requiring more fact, some less - it
varies from nature and culture o{.employment. The prob-
lem about equal pay cannot always be translated into a
mathematical formula. If it has a rational nexus with the
object sought for, as reiterated before a certain amount c
of value judgment of the administrative authorities who
are charged with fixing the pay scale has to be le~ with
them and it cannot be interfered with by the court unless
it is demonstrated that either it is irrational or based on
no basis or arrived ma/a fide either in law or in fact. In
the light of the averments made in the facts mentioned
D
before, it is not possible to say that the differentiation is
based on no rational nexus with the object sought for to
be achieved."
The very same principle was reiterated by K J aganatha Shetty. J. in E
State of U.P. and Ors. v. J.P. Chaurasia and Ors., (1989] 1 S.C.C. 121:
"In the matter of employment the government of socialist
State must protect the weaker sections. It must be ensured
that there is no exploitation of poor and ignorant. It is the F
duty of the State to see that the underprivileged or weaker
sections get their due. Even if they have voluntarily ac-
cepted the employment of unequal terms, the State should
not deny their basic rights of equal treatment. It is against
this background that the principle of "equal pay for equal
work' has to be construed in the first place. Second, this G
principle has no mechanical application in every case of
similar work. It has to be read into Article 14 of the
Constitution. Article 14 permits reasonable classification
fonnded on different bases. It is now well established that
the classification can be based on some qualities or char- H
910 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A acteristics of person grouped together and not in others
who are left out. Those qualities or characteristics must,
of course, have a reasonable relation to the object sought
to be achieved. In service matters, merit or experience
could be the proper basis for classification to promote
efficiency in administration. He or she learns also by
B
exj>erience as much as by other means. It cannot be denied
that the quality of work performed by persons of longer
experience is superior than the work of newcomers.'
We must, however, refer to the decision of a Division Bench of this
C Court comprising M.M. Dutt and T.K. Thommen, JJ. In Supreme Court
Employees Welfare Association v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 334
which, on first impression appears to strike a different note, though on
deeper scrutiny it does not. In paragraph 38 of the judgment, M.M. Dutt.
J. says this after a review of the earlier decisions of this Court dealing with
p 'equal pay for equal work'.
'It follows from the above decisions that although the
doctrine of 'equal pay for equal work' does not come
within Art.14 of the Constitution as an abstract doctrine,
but if any classification is made relating to the pay scales
E and such classification is unreasonable and/or if unequal
pay is based on no classification, then Art. 14 will at once
be attracted and such classification should be set at naught
and equal pay may be directed to be given for equal work.
In other words, where unequal pay has brought about a
F discrimination within the meaning of Art.14 of the Con-
stitution, it will be a case of 'equal pay for equal wprk', as
envisaged by Art. 14 of the Constitution. If the classifica-
tion is proper and reasonable and has a nexus to the object
sought to be achieved, the doctrine·of'equal pay for equal
work' will not have any application even though the per-
G sons doing the same work are not getting the same pay.
In short, so long as it is not a case of discriminat\on under
Art. 14 of the Constitution, the abstract doctrine of 'equal
pay for equal work', as envisaged by Art. 39(d) of the
Constitution, has no manner of application, nor is it en-
H forceable in view of Art.37 of the Constitution. Dhirendra
STATEOFM.P. v.PRAMODBHARTIYA[JEEVANREDDY,J.] 911
Chamoli v. State of U.P., (1986) 1 S.C.C 637 is a case of A
'equal pay for equal work' as envisaged by Art. 14, and
not oft.he abstract doctrine of 'equal pay for equal W<>rk'."
Though the paragrllJ>h ope!\ with the words "the doctrine of equal
pay for equal work does not come within Article 14 of the Constitution as
an abstract doctrine' the entire paragraph, if read as a whole, clearly brings B
out the fact that the rule is nothing but a facet of Article 14. Indeed, it may
not be possible to say, logically or otherwise, that Article 14 does not imply
equal pay for equal work. In this view of the matter, we must say that the
distinction sought to be drawn in this decision between "equal pay for equal
work as envisaged by Article 14" and 'the abstract doctrine of equal pay C
for equal work' is somewhat nebulous and in our respectful opinion
appears to be mere semantics.
Let us now examine the facts of this case in the light of the principles
flowing from the aforesaid decisions.
D
The Respondents are lecturers working in Higher Secondary Schools
in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Conditions of their service are governed
by Madhya Pradesh Non-gazetted Class-III Educational Service (Non-Col-
legiate Branch Service) Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 1973 (herein-
after referred to as "1973 Rules"). In the State of Madhya Pradesh there is E
another set of schools called 'Technical Schools'. The conditions of service
of the lecturers working in these schools are governed by M.P. Education
Department (Technical) Oass-III (Non-Ministerial) Recruitment Rules, 1980.
In Technical schools, lecturers are categorised as technical lecturers and
non-technical lecturers. Technical schools too are Higher Secondary Schools.
F
The kespondents say that in the year 1981, the scale of pay admis-
sible to non-technical lectureres in technical schools and lecturers in
Government Higher Secondary Schools was identical viz., Rs.925-1500.
Subsequently, it is complained, a distinction came to be made between
them to the prejudice of the lectureres in Higher Secondary Schools. They
say that qualifications prescribed for· both the posts are identical and so G
are conditions of service though both them are governed by different sets
of Rules. Indeed, their case is that they teach more number of hours every
week than the non-technical lecturers in technical schools. They say that,
as a result of the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the
non-technical lecturers in technical schools have been given the same pay H
912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A scale as is admissible to the technical lectureres in those schools, with the
result that they (non-technical lecturers in technical schools) are .now
placed in t,he pay scale of Rs.2,000-3500 with effect from 1.1.1986, whereas
the Lecturers in Higher Secondary Schools continue in the Scale of
Rs.1640-2900. Since the qualifications, service conditions and status of the
non-technical lecturers in technical schools and the lecturers in Govern-
B
ment High Secondary Schools are the same, say the petitioners, they too
are entitled to the scale of Rs.2,000-3500 with effect from 1.1.1986. The
reliefs sought by the respondents ate:
"(l). The Hon'ble Tribunal may kindly be pleased to direct
C the Respondents to produce all service details, Service
conditions and other data in respect of non-technical
lecturers of Technical Schools and the applicants for
comparing the service conditions.
(2). Issue a Writ of mandamus directing the Respondents
D to remove the disparity in the pay scales of non- technical
lecturers of Technical Schools and the lecturers of Higher
Secondary Schools i.e., the applicants and being them on
par w.e.f. 1.4.1981. The date of implementation of Choud-
hary Pay Commission Report and consequent revision of
E pay from time to time.
(3) That this Hon'ble Tribunal, after removing disparity
in the pay scales as praye~ above, direct re-fixation of the
pay of the applicants in the matter aforesaid & pay them,
consequently,. all the. arrears of salary and other benefits,
F attached to the pay scales.
The State opposed the Respondents' claim before the Administrative
Tribunal. According to the counter-affidavit (filed in 0.A.853 of 1989 and
adopted in this matter) following is their case: The Government of Madhya
Pradesh had appointed a Pay Commission under the Chairmanship of Sri
G M.S. Choudhary for examining the various aspects of the pay, structure of pay
scales, service facilities etc., The Commission submitted its report in the year
1981. Government accepted its recommendations. The distinction between
the lecturers in Government Higher Secondary Schools and the non-technical
lecturers in the Government Technical Schools is based upon the report of the
H Pay Commissioh which merely continues a pre-existing distinction. While
STATEOFM.P. v.PRAMODBHARTIYA[JEEVANREDDY,J.] 913
consi.:eririg the scales of pay of lecturers in Higher Secondary Schools, one A
has to keep in mind the pay scales of teachers working in Higher Secondary
Schools. The gap between the pay scales of lecturers and teachers should not
be widened. The Choudhary Commission had maintained a distinction be-
tween the pay scales of technical lecturers and non-technical lecturers work-
ing in technical schools and had kept the non-technical lecturers in technical B
schools on par with the lecturers in Government Higher Secondary Schools
but as a result of the decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in M.P.
No.2277of1985 disposed of on 29.7.1988 the non-technical lecturers in the
technical schools had to be placed in the same scale of pay as the technical
lecturers. From the said fact it does not follow that the lecturers in Higher
Secondary Schools should. also be placed in the same pay scale. Merely be- C
cause the educational qualifications for both the posts are same it does not
follow that they should carry equal pay. "There are number of posts in dif-
ferent departments carrying different pay scales where educational qualifica-
tion of post-graduates is prescribed. Not only their duties and factions are
deferent but there is a difference also in degree". Though the qualifications for D
both the posts are the same, the service conditions and their mode of recruit-
ment is different.
The learned counsel for the respondent Sri K.Madhava Reddy
placed strong reliance upon certain statements made by the Government
of Madhya Pradesh in their counter-affidavit file<! in the aforementioned E
M.P. ll77/85. The statements relied upon are to the following effect:
"The. status of the schoois (technical schools) is equal to
that of the Higher Secondary Schools ....... There is no
difference in the prescribed qualifications of non-techni- F
cal lecturers of Higher Secondary Schools under the con-
trol of Directorate of Technical Educational and that of
lecturers of Higher Secondary Schools which are under
the control of Directorate of Public instruction......... .lt is
a fact that the service conditions of the lecturers (non-
technical) in the Government Higher Secondary Schools G
and those of lecturers of the other Government Higher
Secondary Schools are practically the same."
The material above mentioned goes to show that (a) the qualifica-
tions prescribed for the lecturers in the Higher Secondary Schools and the H
914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A non-technical lecturers in Technical Schools are the same; (b) service
conditions of both the categories of lecturers are same and (c) that the
status of the schools is also the same. There is, however, a conspicuous
•
absence of any clear allegation and/or material suggesting that functions
and responsibilities of both the categories of lecturers is similar. Much less
is there any allegation or proof that qualitatively speaking, they perform
B similiar factions. It is not enough to say that the qualifications are same nor
is it enough to say that the schools are of the same status. It is also not
sufficient to say that the service conditions are similar. What is more
important and crucial is whether they discharge similar duties, functions
and responsibilities. On this score there is a noticeable absence of material.
C Whether we look at the averments in, and the material produced along
with, the Original Petition or to the averments in the counter-affidavit or
even to the averments in the counter-affidavit filed by the Government in
M.P. 2277/85 (upon which the counsel for the respondents has placed
strong reliance), we do not find any clear material to show that the duties,
D functions and responsibilities of both the categories of lecturers are iden-
tical or similar. In this context, it would be appropriate to refer to the
definition of the expressions "same work or work of similiar nature' con-
tained in clause (h) of Section 2 of the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976. The
said Act was enacted by Parliament (as pointed out by this Court in
Mackinnon Mackenzie v. Andrey D'Costa, (1987] 2 S.C.C. 469 to implement
E Article 39(d) of the Constitution and the obligation created by "The
Convention Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women
Workers' for work of equal value (generally referred to as 'Equal
Remuneration Convention, 1951') adopted on June 29, 1951, to which India
is a signatory. Article 2 of the Convention obliged the signatory States to
effectuate the said rule by all means including the machinery of law. The
F
said Act is applicable to such establishments and employments as may be
notified by the Central Government under Section 1(3) of the Act. Though
the said Act is mainly directed against discrimination against women and
is also not applicable to the employments or establishments to which the
Respondents herein belong, yet the relevance of the said definition cannot
G be denied, occurs as it does in an enactment made to give statutory shape
to the rule of "equal pay for equal work both for men and women". The
definition in Section 2(h) reads:
"2(h). 'same work or work of a similar nature' means work
H in respect of which the skill, effort and responsibility
STATE OF M.P .. v. PRAM OD BHARTIYA [!EEVAN REDDY, J.] 915
required are the same, when performed under similar A
working conditions, by a man or a woman and the dif-
ference, if any, between the skill, effort and responsibility
required of a man and those required of a woman are not
of practical importance in relation to the" terms and con-
ditions of employment.'
B
It would be evident from this definiti9n that the stress is upon the
similarity of skill, effort and responsibility when performed under similar
conditions. Further, as pointed out by Mukherji, J. (as he then was) in
Federatio11 of All l11dia Customs and Excise Stenographers the quality of
work may very from post to post. It may vary from institution to institution. C
We cannot ignore or overlook this reality. It is not a matter of assumption
but one of proof. The respondents (Original petitioners) have failed to
establish that their duties, responsibilities and functions are similar to. those
of the non-technical lecturers in Technical Colleges. They have also failed
to establish that the distinction between their scale of pay and that of
non-technical lecturers working in Technical Schools is either irrational D
and that it has no basis, or that it is vitiated by ma/a fides, either in law or
in fact (see the approach adopted in Federation case). It must be remem-
bered that since the plea of equal pay for equal work has to be examined
with reference to Article 14, the burden is upon the petitioners to establish
their right to equal pay, or the plea of discrimination, as the case may be. E
This burden the Original Petitioners (Respondents herein) have failed to
discharge.
For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed and the order of the
Administrative Tribunal is set aside. No order as to costs.
F
V.P.R. Appeal allowed.
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