STATE OF M.P. & ORS.versusPARVEZ KHAN

                        [2014) 14 S.C.R. 520


A                     STATE OF M.P. & ORS.
                                  v.
                          PARVEZKHAN
                  (Civil Appeal No.10613 of 2014)
B                      DECEMBER 01, 2014
       [T. S. THAKUR AND ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, JJ.]
        Appointment/Recruitment -             Compassionate
  appointment in police service - Refusal of - By competent
C authority - On the ground of criminal antecedents of the
  candidate- Writ petition challenging the order on the ground
  that out of the two criminal cases, in one he was acquitted
  (for want of evidence) and in another was discharged on
  account of compounding of offence - Single Judge of High
  Court dismissed the petition, while Division Bench reversed
0
  the order of Single Judge - On appeal, held: Refusal to recruit
  the candidate by the competent authority was justified- The
                                     •
  person cannot be presumed fully exonerated     on his acquittal
  or discharge - The person who is likely to erode the credibility
E of police, ought not to enter the police force - Such
  appointment, on parity, is not permissible since doctrine of
  equality does not apply in such cases - Constitution of India
  -Arl.14.
         Allowing the appeal, the Court
F         HELD: The Division Bench of the High Court was
  not justified in interfering with the order rejecting the claim
  of the respondent for recruitment to the police service·
  by way of giving him compassionate appointment. A
  candidate, to be recruited to the police service, must be
G worthy of confidence and must be a person of utmost
  rectitude and must have impeccable character and
  integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not.
  fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged,
  it cannot be presumed that he was completely
H exonerated. Persons who are likely to erode the
                                520
        STATE OF M.P. & ORS. v. PARVEZ KHAN                    521


credibility of the police ought not to enter the police force. A
No doubt the Screening Committee has not been
constituted, the Superintendent of Police has gone into
the matter, who is the appointing authority. There is no
allegation of ma/a tides against the person taking the said
decision nor the decision is shown to·be perverse or B
irrational. There is no material to show that the appellant
was falsely implicated. Basis of impugned judgment was .
acquittal for want of evidence or discharge based on
compounding. The plea of parity with two other persons
who were recruited can also not help the respondent. c
To such cases the doctrine of equality enshrined in
Article 14 of the Constitution of India is not attracted.
[Paras 15, 14 and 13][532-E-H; 533-B-D; 534-B-C]
    . Commissioner of Police v. Mehar Singh 2013 (7)
     SCC 685 """' referred to.                                 D
              · CASE LAW REFERENCE
2013 (7) SCC 685            referred to           Para 9
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
10613 of2014.                                                  E
     From the Judgment and Order dated 20-03-2012 of the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in WritAppeal No.
262 of 2010.
     Mishra Saurabh, Vanshaja Shukla, Ankit Kr. Lal, Advs.
~~~~~~.                                                        F
    Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, Sr. Adv., Prashant Shukla, Nikilesh
Ramachandran,Advs. for the Respondent.
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
     ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J. 1. Leave granted.                   G
     2. This appeal has been preferred againstthe Judgment
and Order dated 201h March, 2012 of the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh at Jabalpur in Writ Appeal No.262 of 2010.

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522          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014) 14 S.C.R.


A  • > •3. The question raised for our consideration is whether
  ,the refusal by the competent authority to give compassionate
   appointment in.police:;service on the,ground of.criminal
   antecedents of a candldate who is.acquitted for,want of
   evidence or.who is discharged,from the criminal case on
B account of compounding can be justified. •              ,.
      1:   · 4. Sultan Khan was serving with the Madhya Pradesh
   Police. He'died in harness·on 21'' June, 2005. His son, the·
   respondent Parvez Khan; a'l'>"pliea for··compassionate
  'appointment: The competent authority sent his record for
C pOlice verification.· It was· found that tie was involved in two
   criminal cases.' In one case, he was' prosecuted fot offences
   tinder Sections 323;r324, 325;294 and 506-B/34 of the Indian
   Penal Code· and in;the other under Sections 452, 394 arid
   395 of the Indian Penal Code. The Superintendent of Police
D held that he was not eligible for appointment in Government
   service and closed his case. - . ,
          . 5. 4The respondent challenged the said order by way of
      Writ Petition No.15052 of ZOOS on the ground that in the first
             l f'         '            I
      case he was acquitted on 31" January, 2007 and in the second
E     he was discharged on account of compounding of offence.
        6. Learned Single Judge did not find any merit in his
  conte'iition in the writ petition and dismissed the petition. On
  appeal, the Division Bench took a different view. It was held
F that the object of verification was to verify suitability of a
  candidate for employment. Since the respondent was
  ,acquitted in both the criminal cases he c:ould n91.be considered
  unsultable. No reason had been given as to why after acquittal
  in the criminal case .. the respondent was considered to be
  unsuitable. Accordingly, the Division Bench ·directed
G consideration of case of the respcindent 'afresh ·in the light of
  observations in the order within three months. Aggrieved
  thereby, the appellant-State has preferred this appeal:
            7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.'
H
         STATE OF M.P. & ORS. v. PARVEZ KH.~N                         523
              [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

      8. Learned counsel for the State submitted that since on A
police verification, it was found that the respondent was
involved in.criminal cases involving moral turpitude, he could
not be given appointment. Mere acquittal for want of evidence
or discharge on account of compromise could not be taken to
be conclusive for suitability of a candidate. The result of criminaf B
proceedings was not conclusive of suitability of a candidate
for recruitment to police service.
      9. It is submitted that in a criminal case, a person cannot
be punished in absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt
but the standard of proof required for consideration of suitability   C
or otherwise of a candidate was not the same. Discharge on
account of compounding of the offence by the victim depended
upon the attitude of the parties. The victim may be prepared
to settle the matter for any consideration other than innocence
of the accused, but it did not wash off the criminal antecedents      D
of an accused. Entering into police service required a
candidate to be of character, integrity and clean antecedents.
If a person is acquitted or discharged, it cannot always be
inferred that he was falsely involved and he had no criminal
antecedents. All that may be inferred is that he has not been         E
proved to be guilty. Reliance has been placed on the decision
of this Court in Commissioner of Police vs. Mehar Singh1 •
      10. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the
impugned order and submitted that some other similarly placed
candidates had been given compassionate appointment. Two F
such. instances have been pointed out by the respondent in
the counter affidavit. He has also submitted that the State of
Madhya Pradesh has issued Guidelines dated 5th June, 2003
for character verification of candidates for recruitment to
Government service and such guidelines do no justify rejection G
of candidature of the respondent. One of the instances given
is of Dilip Kumar Samadhiya son of Shri Jagdish Prasad
Samadhiya against whom three criminal cases we~e
1
 2013 (7) sec 685
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524         SU~REMECOURTREPORTS                  [2014] 14 S.C.R.


A    registered prior, to the recruitment in Government service but
     he was •acquitted either·on account of compromise or on
     account of benefit of doubt. Still, he was given appointment.
     Similarly, Jitender Sharma was recruited to Police service .
     though he was tried for a criminal case, but acquitted on
·s. ·account of compounding or on the basis of benefit of doubt.
     As per Guidelines dated 5th June, 2003, an independent view
     can be taken only where candidate has concealed the
     information about pendency of trial and not where there is no
     such concealment, as in the present case.,,.
c         · 11. After due consideration, we are of the view that the
      impugned .order cannot be sustained. Refusal by the
      competent authority to recruit the respondent on the ground of
      criminal antecedents is not liable to be interfered with. The
      applicable Guidelines dated 5'h June, 2003 inter alia provide:
D
           "Ori the basis of merits and demerits by the Hon'ble
           Court the acquitted candidate will be eligible for the
           Government Service."       '
            The above guidelines show that acquittal is not
E     conclusive. Even after acquittal,' basis of order of the Court
      has to be gone into by the competent authority. Even after
      order based on corripromise or l~ck of evidence may render
      a candidate ineligible. In the present case, the relevant part
      of the order of the Superintendent of Police is as follows:
 F         "Action was taken in regard to the proceedings of
           compassionate appointment, character verification was
           got done, wherein vide Letter No. VS.!21NHR/2007/
           17(F)283107 dated 17.9.2007 of the Police
           Headquarters it was informed that acase under Section
'G         294, 323, 506, 324, 34 of /PC had been registered
           against the applicant in Police Station Kotwali as Crime
           No. 185106 and             .
                       , the applicant was acquitted
                                               ..      on the basis
           of a compromise by the Court on 23.2.2007. In the
           same manner in Crime No. 494106 under Section 394,
H
         STATE OF M.P. &ORS. v. PARVEZ KHAN                      525
              [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

     364, 451 of /PC a case was registered and vide A
     judgment dated 31.1.2007 of the Court he was
     acquitted.
     Two separate crimes had been registered against the
     applicant, wherein in one case Section 394, 451, 365
     of /PC are there and which come in the categor.y of B
     moral turpitude. In the judgment of the Court benefit of
     doubt has been given, therefore, as per the new
     guidelines of 2003 issued by the Government of
     Madhya Pradesh in respect of character verification the
     applicant Parvez Khan alias Sonu alias Raja has been C
     found to be ineligible for Government service."
      12. In Mehar Singh (supra), the question considered
by this Court was as follows :
     "18. The question before this Court is whether the 0
     candidature of the respondents who had made a clean
     breast of their involvement in a criminal case by
     mentioning this fact in their application/attestation form
     while applying for a post of Constable in Delhi Police,
     who were provisionally selected subject to verification E
     of their antecedents and who were subsequently
     acquitted/discharged in the criminal case, could be
     cancelled by the Screening Committee of the Delhi
     Police on the ground that they are not found suitable
     for appointment to ttre post of Constable."
                                                                 F
After considering the rival contentions, the Court held :
     "23. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude
     that the Screening Committee would be entitled to keep
     persons involved in grave cases of moral turpitude out
     of the police force even if they are acquitted or G
     .discharged if it feels that the acquittal or discharge is
     on technical grounds or not honourable. The Screening
     Committee will be within its rights to cancel the
     candidature of a candidate if it finds that the acquittal is
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526        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 14 S.C.R.


A        based on some serious flaw in the conduct of the
       . prosecution case or is the result of material witnesses
         turning hostile. It is only experienced officers of the
        .Screening Committee who will be able to judge whether
         the acquitted or discharged candidate islikely to revert
B        to similiir activities in future with more strength and
         vigoui. if appointed, to the post in a police force. The
         Screening Committee will have to consider the nature
         and. extent of such person's involvement in the crime
         and his propensity of becoming a cause for worsening
C        the law and order ~ituation rather than maintaining it. In
         our opinion, this policy framed by the Delhi Police does
         not merit any interference from this Court as its object
         appears to be to ensure tHat only perions with
         impeccable character enter the police ~orce.
D          24.1 We find no substance in the contention that by
        cancelling the respondents' candidature, the Screening
        Committee.- '
                       has overreached  ,, the . judgments of the
        criminal court. We are aware that the question of co-
        relation between a criminal case and a departmental
E       enquiry does noi directly arise here, but, support can
        be drawn from the principles laid down by this Court in
        connection with it because the issue involved is
       f    ··''\       '   '   '         .
        somewhat identical, namely, whether to allow a person
      . with doubtful integrity to work in the department. While
 F      the standard of proof in a criminal case is the proof
        beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a
        departmental proceeding is preponderance of
        probabilities. Quite often criminal cases end in acquittal
        because witnesses tum hostile. Such acquittals are not
G       acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of
        doubt would not stand on a par with a clean acquittal on
        merit after a full-fledged trial, where there is no indication
        of the witnesses being won over In R.P Kapurv. Union
        of India [AIR 1964 SC 787] this Court has taken a view
 H
    STATE OF M.P. &ORS. v. PARVEZ KHAN                          527
         [ADARSH KUMARGOEL, J.]

 that departmental proceedings can proceed even A
 though a person is acquitted when the acquittal is other
 than honourable.
  25. The expression "honourable acquittal" was
  considered by this Court in S. Samuthiram {2013 (1)
 sec    598]. In that case this Court was concerned with a B
  situation where disciplinary proceedings were initiated
  against a police officer. Criminal case was pending
  against him under Section 509 /PC and under Section
  4 of theEve-Teasing Act. He was acquitted in that case
  because of the non-examination of key witnesses. C
  There was a serious flaw in the' conduct of the criminal
  case. Two material witnesses turned hostile. Referring
  to the judgment of this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh
  Panchal {1994 (1) SCC 541] Where in somewhat similar
  fact situation, this Court upheld a bank's aCtion of D
  refusing to reinstate an employee in service on the
  ground that in the criminal case he was acquitted by
  giving him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it was not an
  honourable acquittal, this Court held that the High Court
  was not justified in setting aside the punishment E
  imposed in the departmental proceedings. This Court
  obser\ied that the expressions "honourable acquittal';
. "acquitted of blame" and "fully exonerated" are unknown
  to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal Code.
  They are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is F
  difficult to define what is meant by the expression
  "honourably acquitted". This Court expressed that when
  the accused is acquitted after full consideration of the
  prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails
  to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it G
  can possibly be said that the accused was honourably ·
  acquitted.
 26. In light of the above, we are of the opinion ttiat since
 the purpose of the departmental proceedings is to k_eep
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528     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 14 S.C.R.


A       persons, who are guilty of serious misconduct or
        dereliction of duty or who are guilty of grave cases of
        moral turpitude, out of the department, if found
        necessary, because they pollute the department, surely
        the above principles will apply ~ith more vigour at the
B'      point of entry of a person in the police department i.e.
        at the time of recruitment. If it is found by the Screening
        Committee that the person against whom a serious case
        involving moral turpitude is registered is discharged on
        technical grounds or is acquitted of the same charge
c       but the acquittal is not honourable, the Screening
        Committee would be entitled to cancel his candidature.
        Stricter nqrms need to be applied while appointing
        persons in a disciplinary force because public interest
        is involved in it.
            ..                           '
D         27. Against the above .background, we shall now
         examine what is the nature of acquittal of the
         respondents. As per the complaint lodged by Ramji Lal,
         respondent Mehar Singh and others armed with iron
          chains,· lathis, danda, stones, etc. stopped a bus,
E        rebuked the conductor of the bus as to how he dared to
          take the fare from one of their associates. Those who
      . ·intervened were beaten up. They received injuries. The
         miscreants broke the side windowpanes of the bus by
          throwing stones. The complainant was also injured. This
F        incident is undoubtedly an incident affecting public
         order. The assault on the conductor was preplanned
         and premeditated. The FIR was registered under
          Sections 143, 341, 323 and 427 IPC. The order dated
          30-1-2009 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial
G        Magistrate, Khetri shows that so far as offences under
          Sections 323, 341 and 427 !PC are concerned, the
         accused entered into a compromise with the
         complainant. Hence, t/]i:t learned Magistrate acquitted
         respondent Mehar Singh and others of the- said
                             ' .                      .
H
    STATE OF M.P. & ORS. v. PARVEZ KHAN                     529
         [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

offences. The order further indicates that so far as A
offence of rioting i.e. offence under Section 147 IPC is
concerned, three main witnesses turned hostile. The
learned Magistrate, therefore, acquitted all the accused
of the said offence. This acquittal can never be
described as an acquittal on merits after a full-fledged B
trial. Respondent Mehar Singh cannot secure entry in
the police force by portraying this acquittal as an
honourable acquittal. Pertinently, there is no discussion
on merits of the case in this order. Respondent Mehar
Singh has not been exonerated after evaluation of the C
evidence.
28. So far as respondent Shani Kumar is concerned,
the FIR lodged against him stated that he along with
other accused abused and threatened the
complainant's brother. They opened fire at him due to D
which he sustained bullet injuries. The offences under
Sections 307, 504 and 506 IPC were registered against
respondent Shani Kumar and others. The order dated
14-5-201 O passed by the Sessfons Judge,
Muzaffarnagar shows that the complainant and the E
injured person did not support the prosecution case.
They were declared hostile. Hence, the learned
Sessions Judge gave the accused the benefit of doubt
and acquitted them. This again is not a clean acquittal.
The use of firearms in this manner is a serious matter. F
For entry in the police force, acquittal order based on
benefit of doubt in a serious case of this nature is bound
to act as an impediment.
  29. In this connection, we may usefully refer to Sushi/
  Kumar [1996(11) CC 605]. In that case, the respondent G
· therein had appeared for recruitment as a Constable
  in Delhi Police Services. He was selected provisionally,
  but, his selection was subject to verification of character
  and antecedents by the local police. On verification, it
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530    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 14 S.C.R.


A      was found that his antecedents were such that his
       appointment to the post of Constable was not found
       desirable. Accordingly, his name was rejected. He
       approached the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the
       application on the ground that since the respondent had
B      been discharged and/or acquitted of the offence
       punishable under Section 304, Section 324 read with
       Section 34 and Section 324 /PC, he cannot be denied
       the right of appoinfment to the post under the State. This
       Court disapproved of the Tribunal's view It was observed
C"     that verification of the character and antecedents is one
       of the important criteria to test whether the selected
       candidate is suitable for the post under the State. This
       Court observed that though the can.didate was
       provisionally selected, the. appointing authority found
o      it not desirable to appoint him on account of his
       antecedent record and this view taken by the appointing
       authority in the background of the case cannot be said
       to be unwarranted. Whether the respondent was
      ·discharged or acquitted of the criminal offences, the
E      same has ·nothing to do with the question as to whether
       he should be appointed to. the post. What would be
       relevant is the conduct or character of the candidate to
       be appointed to a service and not the actual result
       thereof.
 F    30. It was argued that Sushi/ Kumar must be
      distinguished from the facts of the instant case because
      the respondent therein had concealed the fact that a
      criminal case was registered against him, whereas, in
      the instant case there is no concealment. It is not
G     possible for us to accept this submission. The aspect
      of concealment was not considered in Sushi/ Kumar
      at all. This Court only concentrated on the desirability
      to appoint a person, against whom a criminal case is
      pending, to a disciplined force. Sushi/ Kumar cannot
H
      STATE OF M.P. & ORS. v. PARVEZ KHAN                      531
           [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

  be restricted to cases where there is concealment of A
  the fact by a candidate that a criminal case was
  registered against him. When the point of concealment
  or otherwise and its effect was not argued before this
  Court, ft cannot be said that in Sushi/ Kumar this Court
  wanted to restrict its observations to the cases where B
  there is concealment of facts.
   xxxxxxxxx
    33. So far as respondent Mehar Singh is concerned,
    his case appears to have been compromised. It was
    urged that acquittal recordedpursuant to a compromise C
    should not be treated as a disqualification because that
    will frustrate the purpose of the Legal Ser\!ices
    Authorities Act, 1987. We se_e no merit in this
  · submission. Compromises or settlements have to be
    encouraged to bring about peaceful and amiable
                                                             0
    atmosphere in the society by according a quietus to
    disputes. They have to be encouraged also to reduce
• affears of cases and save the litigants from the agony
    of pending litigation. But these considerations cannot E
    be brought in here. In order to maintain integrity and
    high standard of police force, the Screening Committee
    may decline to take cognizance of a compromise, if it
    appears to it to be dubious. The Screening Committee
    cannot be faulted for that.
                                                               F
   xxxxxxxxxx
   35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders
   the great responsibility of maintaining law and order and
   public order in the society. People repose great faith
   and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. G
   A candidate wishing to join the police force must be a
   person of utmost rectitude. He must have impeccable
   character and integrity. A person having criminal
   antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is
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532        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 14 S.C.R.


A          acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, ·that
           acquittal or discharge order will have to be examined
           to see whether he has been completely exonerated in
           the case because even a possibility of his taking to the
           life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the
 B       · police force. The Standing Order, therefore, has
           entrusted the task of taking decisions in these matters·
           to the Screening Committee. The decision of the
           Screening Committee. must be taken as final unless it
           is ma/a fide. Jn recent times, the image of the police
c          force is tarnished. Instances of police personnel
      ., behaving in a wayward manner by misusing power are
           in public domain and are a matter of concern. The
           reputation of the police force has taken a beating. In
           such a situation, we would not like to dilute the
 o         importance and efficacy of a mechanism like the ·
           Screening Committee created by the Delhi Police to
           ensure that persons who are likely to erode its credibility
           do not enter the police force. At the same time, the
           Screening Committee must be alive to the importance
 E         of the trust reposed in it and must treat all candidates
           with pn even hand."
         13. From the above observations of this Court, it is clear
   that a candidate to be recruited to the police service must be
   worthy of confidence and must be a person of utmost rectitude
 F and must have impeccable character and integrity. A person
   having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if
   he is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that he
   was completely exonerated. Persons who are likely to erode
   the credibility.of the police ought not to enterthe police force.
 G No doubt the Screening Committee has not been constituted
   in the case considered by this Court, as rightly pointed out by
   learned counsel for the Respondent, in the present case, the
   Superintendent of Police has gone into the matter. The
   Superintendent of Police is the appointing authority. There is
 H
         STATE OF M.P. & ORS. v. PARVEZ KHAN                       533
              [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

no allegation of ma/a fides against the person taking the said     A
decision nor the decision is shown to be perverse or irrational.
There is no material to show that the appellant was falsely
implicated. Basis of impugned judgment is acquittal for want
of evidence or discharge based on compounding.·
      14. The plea of parity with two other persons who were       B
recruited can also not help the respondent. This aspect of the
matter was also gone into by this Court in Mehar Singh
(supra) and it was held :
              '
     "36. The Screening Committee's proceedings have               C
     been assailed as being arbitrary, unguided and
     unfettered. But, in the present cases, we see no evidence
     of this. However, certain instances have been pointed
     out where allegedly persons involved in serious
     offences have been recommended for appointment by
     the Screening Committee. It is well settled that to such      D
     cases the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of
     the Constitution of India is not attracted. This doctrine
     does not envisage negative equality (Fu/jit Kaur (2010
     (11) sec 455). It is not meant to perpetuate illegality or    E
     fraud because it embodies a positive concept. If the
     Screening Committee which is constituted to carry out
     the object of the comprehensive policy to ensure that
     people with doubtful background do not enter the police
     force, deviates from the policy, makes exception and
     allows entry of undesirable persons, it is undoubtedly        F
     guilty of committing an act of grave disservice to the
     police force but we cannot allow that i//ega/ity to be
     perpetuated by allowing the respondents to rely on such
     cases. It is for the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to
     examine whether the Screening Committee has                   G
     compromised the interest of the police force in any case
     and to take remedial action if he finds that it has done
     so. Public interest demands an ·in-depth examination
     of this a/legation at the highest level. Perhaps, such
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534          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2014] 14 S.C.R.


A           deviations from the policy are responsible for the spurt
            in police excesses. We expect the Commissioner of
            Police, Delhi to look into the matter and if there is
            substance in the allegations to take necessary steps
            forthwith so that policy incorporated in the Standing
B           Order is strictly implemented."
         15. Having given our thoughtful consideration, we are of
  the view that the Division Bench of the High. Court was not
  justified in interfering with the order rejecting the claim of the
  respondent for recruitment to the police service by way of giving
C him compassionate appointmen~.
           16. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the
      impugned order. There will be no order as to costs.

      Kalpana K. Tnpathy                              Appeal allowed.


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