Holding

The Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam Tribunal is a court, so Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to revision applications under Section 19, rendering the Nagarpalika Parishad decision incorrect.

Summary

The State of Madhya Pradesh filed a revision application before the High Court under Section 19 of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983, but the application was 80 days late. The issue was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which allows condonation of delay, applies to such revision applications. Earlier decisions (Nagarpalika Parishad) held it did not, but the Supreme Court examined whether the arbitration tribunal created by the Act is a "court" within the meaning of the Evidence Act and the Limitation Act. The Court concluded that the tribunal possesses all the trappings of a court and therefore Section 5, via Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, is applicable. Consequently, the earlier Nagarpalika decision was deemed incorrect, and the matter was ordered to be placed before the Chief Justice for referral to a larger bench.

Issues considered

Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to revision applications filed under Section 19 of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983.
Whether the arbitration tribunal created under the Act qualifies as a "court" for the purposes of the Limitation Act and the Evidence Act.
Whether the decision in Nagarpalika Parishad, Morena v. Agrawal Construction Co. is a binding precedent.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 115
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 3
Limitation Act, 1963s. 29(2), s. 5
Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983s. 19

Subjects

Limitation ActSection 5Section 29Arbitration TribunalCourtRevisionHigh CourtSpecial ActCondonation of delayBinding precedent

Judgment

[2008] 8 $.C.R. 349

-.\
STATE OF M.P. AND ANR. A
v.
ANSHUMAN SHUKLA
., (Civil Appeal No.3498 of 2008)
. MAY 12, 2008
B
[S.B. SINHA AND V.S. SIRPURKAR, JJ.]
;..
Limitation Act, 1963 - s. 5 - Applicability of, to. Revision
application filed before High Court in terms of s.19 of Madhya
Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam (Act), 1983 - c
Division Bench of High Court in *Nagarpalika Parishad case
held that the provisions of s. 5 of 1963 was not available- SLP
thereagainst was dismissed by this Court- In **Mukri Gopalan
case, this Court held that provisions of s.5 would automati-
cally get attracted to rent proceedings - Held: Prima facie
D
*Nagarpalika Parishad case do not lay down correct law -
Matter referred to larger Bench - Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 - s.115 - Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran
Adhiniyam, 1983 - s.19.
The question as to whether s.5 of Limitation Act, 1963 E
is applicable in the matter of entertaining a revision appli-
cation before High Court filed in terms of s.19 of Madhya
Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 came
_,. up for consideration before the Division Bench of High
~ Court in *Nagarpa/ika Parishad case wherein it was held F
that the provisions ofs.5 of 1963 being not available, the
delay in filing revision application was not condonable.
Reference was thereafter made to Full Bench in the light
of decision of this Court in **Mukri Gopalan case.·
In the meantime the decision in *Nagarpalika Parishad G
. -+ case came up for consideration before this Court. The de-
cision of Division Bench was affirmed by this Court and
SLP was dismissed. In the meanwhile the matter was re-
ferred again for consideration by a larger Bench which
349 H
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 8 S.C.R.

A included the question as to whether the decision of this
Court in regard to the dismissal of SLP constituted a bind-
ing precedent. The Constitution Bench found that the
decision of this Court in *Nagarpalika Parishad case con-
stituted a binding precedent and it was bound by it and
B thus held that s.5 of Limitation Act has no application to
revision application filed before the High Court under s.19
of the Act.
In the instant case, the appellant contended that the
Arbitration Tribunal being a Court, in view of the provi-
c sions contained in sub-section (2) of s.29 of the Limita-
tion Act, the High Court committed a serious error in opin-
ing that it did not have any power to condone the delay.
Referring the matter to larger Bench, the Court
D HELD:1.Prima facie *Nagarpalika Parishad case was .,
not correct!y decided. [Para 32] [372-B]
2. The Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran
Adhiniyam, 1983 (Act) came into force with effect from 1st
March, 1985. It was enacted to provide for the establish-
E ment of a Tribunal to arbitrate on disputes to which the
State Government or a Public Undertaking (wholly or sub-
stantially owned or controlled by the State Government),
is a party, and for matters incidental thereto or connected
therewith. [Para 3] [354-E]
~
F
*Nagarpalika Parishad, Morena v. Agrawal Construction
Co. (2004) (II) MPJR 374; **Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat
Puthanpurayil Aboobacker (1995) 5 SCC 5 - referred to.
3. The Act is a special Act. It provided for compul-
G sory arbitration. It provides for a reference. The Tribunal
has the power of rejecting the reference at the threshold.
It provides for a special limitation. It fixes a time limit for
. .
passing an award. The High Court exercises a limited
power. The revisional power conferred upon the High
H Court is akin to s.115 CPC. It has the power to decide as
STATE OF M.P. AND ANR. v. ANSHUMAN 351
SHUKLA
k
to whether the Tribunal has misconducted itself or the A
proceedings or has made an award which is invalid in
law or has been improperly procured by any party to the
proceedings. [Paras 12, 13] [358-C-F]
4. The proviso appended to s.19 was added by M.P.
Act No.19 of 2005. Prior thereto the High Court, even at B
the instance of a party, despite expiry of the period of limi-
)>-
tation could have exercised its suo motu jurisdiction. [Para
14] [358-F,G]
5.1. It is a trite law that provisions of the Limitation c
Act, 1963 shall apply to a Court. It has no application in
regard to a Tribunal or persona designata. There exists a
distinction between a Court and the Tribunal. The very
fact that the authorities under the Act are empowered to
examine witnesses after administering oath to them
. D
clearly shows that they are 'Court' within the meaning of
the Evidence Act. The Tiibunal has been conferred vari-
ous powers. There, therefore, cannot be any doubt what-
soever that the authorities under the Act are also 'eourts'
within the meaning of the provisions of the Evidence Act.
[Paras 15, 16] [358-H, 359-A-D] E

5.2. The definition of 'Courts' under the Evidence Act
is not exhaustive. Although the said definition is for the
.; purpose of the said Act alone, all authorities must be held
)' to be courts within the meaning of the said provision who F
are legally authorised to take evidence. [Para 17] [359-D,E]
The Empress v. Ashootosh Chuckerbutty and Ors. /LR
(4) Cal. (15) 483 (FB) - affirmed.
5.3. The Commissioner who has been authorised to
take evidence of the witnesses has been held to be a
-; court. The Rent Controller the Election Tribunals and also
the coroners before whom evidence can be adduced have
been held to be courts. [Para 18] [359-F,G]
Jyoti Narayan v. Brijnandan Sinha AIR (1954) Patna 289:
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 8 S.C.R.

A G. Bulliswamy v. Smt. C. Annapurnamma AIR (1976) Andhra
Pradesh 270; Prem Chand v. Sri O.P Trivedi and Ors. AIR
(1967) All. L.J. 5; Tanajirao Martinrao Kadambande v. H.J.
Chinoy 71 Bombay Law Reporter 732 - affirmed.
Brijnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain AIR 1956 SC 66 ;Vindar
8 Kumar Satya v. State of Punjab AIR 1956 SC 153; Sitamathi
Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Jugal Kishore Sinha AIR
1965 Pat 227; Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha vs. Sitamarhi
Central Coop. Bank Ltd. AIR 1967 SC 1494; Chandra Kishore
Jha v. State of Bihar 1!:175 BBCJ 656; S.K. Sarkar, Member,
C Board of Revenue, U. P, Lucknow v. Vinoy Chandra Misra
(1981) 1 SCC 436; The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. The Em-
ployees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi AIR 1950 (SC) 188;
Sakuru v. Tanaji (1985) 3 SCC 590; K.P Verma vs. State of
Bihar 1988 PLJR 1036 - referred to.
D
5.4. A Court for the purpose of application of the Limita- " .
tion Act should ordinarily be subordinate to the High Court.
The High Court exercises its jurisdiction over the subordi-
nate courts in terms of s.115 CPC. While the High Court ex-
E ercises its revisional jurisdiction, it for all intent and purport
exercises an appellate jurisdiction. [Para 21) [365-F,G]
Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v.Krishnaji Dattatreya
Bapat AIR 1970 SC 1 - relied on.
6.1. The provisions of the Act clearly postulate that
F the State of Madhya Pradesh has created a separate fo-
rum for the purpose of determination of disputes arising
out of the works contract. The Tribunal is not one which
can be said to be a Domestic Tribunal. The Members of
the Tribunal are not nominated by the parties. The dispu-
G tants do not have any control over their appointment. The
tribunal may rejc~t a reference at the threshold. It has the
power to summon records. It has the power to record
evidence. Its functions are not limited to one Bench. The
Chairman of the Tribunal can refer the disputes to another
H Bench. Its decision is final. It can award costs and inter-
STATE OF M.P. AND ANR. v. ANSHUMAN 353
SHUKLA
,\
est. The finality of the decision is fortified by a legal fie- A
tion created by making an Award a decree of a Civil Court.
It is executable as a decree of a Civil Court. The Award of
the Arbitral Tribunal is not subject to the provisions of the
Arbitration Act, 1940 and the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1944. The provisions of the said Acts have no appli- B
cation. Therefore, the Tribunal for all intent and purport is
a Court. The Tribunal has to determine a /is. There are two
parties before it. It proceedings are judicial proceeding
subject to the revisional order which may be passed by
the High Court. Therefore, if the Arbitral Tribunal in ques- c
tion is a Court and not a persona designate, sub-section
(2) of s.29, s.5 of the Limitation Act would apply. It is only
when the limitation provided under the Special Law, is
different from that prescribed in the Schedule appended
to the Limitation Act, sub-section (2) of s.29 would be at-
D
'! tracted. [Paras 22, 23, 25] [366-A-F, 369-A,B]
Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. La/it Narain Mishra (1974) 2
sec 133 - referred to.
6.2. If the Tribunal is a Court, fortiori sub-section (2)
of s.29 would apply. As it is a Court it was not necessary E
for the legislature to confer power under s.5 of the 1963
Act specifically. In that view of matter an application un-
der s.5 of the Limitation Act would be maintainable. [Para
J
27] [369-C]
~ F
6.3. In **Mukri Gopalan case, this Court held that on a
conjoint reading of s.29(2) of Limitation Act, 1963 and s18
of Rent Act, provisions of s.5 would automatically get at-
tracted to those proceedings as there is nothing in the Rent
Act expressly excluding applicability of s.5 of Limitation
G
Act to appeals under the Rent Act. [Para 28] [370-A,B]
. -;.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal NO.
3498 of 2008
From the final Judgment and Order dated 30.6.2005 of
H
/"
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 8 S.C.R.

A the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Civil Revision
No. 1330 of 2003
S.K. Dubey, B.S. Banthia, Vikas Upadhyay and Yogesh
Tiwari for the Appellants.

B The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for
short the 1963 Act) in the matter of entertaining a revision appli-

-
c cation before the High Court in terms of Section 19 of the Madhya
Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (for short
the Act) is involved in this appeal which arises out of a judgment
and order dated 30th June, 2005 passed by a Full Bench of
Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur in Civil Revision
No.1330 of 2003.
D 1
3. Before embarking on the said question we may notice
the statutory provisions of the Act for resolution of the legal is-
sue.
The Act came into force with effect from 1•1 March, 1985. It
E
was enacted to provide for the establishment of a Tribunal to
arbitrate on disputes to which the State Government or a Public
Undertaking (wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the
State Government), is a party, and for matters incidental thereto
or connected therewith.
F .
The Arbitral Tribunal is constituted in terms of Section 3 of
the Act for resolving all disputes and differences pertaining to
works contract or arising out of or connected with execution,
discharge or satisfaction of any such works contract. 'M

G Section 7 provides for reference to Tribunal. Such refer-
ence may be made irrespective of the fact as to whether the
agreement contains an arbitration clause or not. Section 7-A
provides for the particulars on the basis whereof the reference
petition is to be filed.
H
-
STATE OF M.P. AND ANR. v. ANSHUMAN 355
SHUKLA [S.8. SINHA, J.]
..
Section 7-8 provides for limitation for filing an applica- A
tion, which is in the following terms:-

"7-8. Limitation.- (1) The Tribunal shall not admit a
reference petition unless -

(a) the dispute is first referred for the decision of 8
the final authority under the terms of the works
contract; and

(b) the petition to the Tribunal is made within one
year from the date of communication of the
decision of the final authority : c
Provided that if the final authority fails to decide the dispute
within a period of six months from the date of reference to
it, the petition to the Tribunal shall be made within one
year of the expiry of the said period six months.
D
'f
(2) Notwithstanding <lnything contained in sub-section (1 ),
where no proceeding has been commenced at all before
any Court proceeding the date of commencement of this
Act or after such commencement but before the
commencement of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham E
Adhikaran (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1990, a reference
petition shall be entertained within one year of the date of
commencement of Madhya pradesh Madhyastham
.... Adhikarn (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1990 irrespective of
~ the fact whether a decision has or has not been made by F
the final authority under the agreement.

(2-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section
(1 ), the Tribunal shall not admit a reference petition unless
it is made within three years from the date on which the
works contract is terminated, foreclosed , abandoned or G
~ , comes to an end in any other manner or when a dispute
arises during the pendency of the works contract :
Provided that if a reference petition is filed by the State
Government, such period shall be thirty years."
H
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A 4. Chapter IV of the Act contains Sections 16 to 18. Sec-
tion 16 deals with passing of an award by the Tribunal and/or its
Benches. Sectbn 17 gives finality to the award made thereun-
der. Such awards made, in terms of Section 18 would be
deemed to be a decree within the meaning of Section 2 of the
B Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 19 confers a power of
revision on the High Court, sub-section (1) whereof reads as
under:-
•
"19. High Court's power of revision. - (1) The High Court
may suo motu at any time or on an application for revision
c made to it within three months of the award by an aggrieved
party, call for the record of any case in which an award has
been made under this Act by issuing a requisition to the
·Tribunal and upon receipt of such requisition, the Tribunal
shall send or cause to be sent to that Court the concerned
0 award and record thereof :
Provided that any applicc~tion for revision may be admitted "
after the prescribed period of three months, if the applicant
satisfies the High Court that he had sufficient cause for
not preferring the revision with such period.
E
Explanation. - the fact that the applicant was misled by
any order, practice or judgment or the High Court in
ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be
sufficient cause within the meaning of this sub-section."
'·
F 5. We may notice that the proviso thereto had been ap- ..
pended by the M.P. Act No. 19 of 2005.
6. The State of M.P. filed a revision application before the
High Court. It was barred by 80 days.
G 7. A question as to whether the High Court could have con-
doned the delay or not came up for consideration before a Divi- ,. I

sion Bench of the said Court in Nagarpalika Parishad, Morena
vs. Agrawal Construction Co. : 2004 (II) MPJR 374. It was held
therein that the provisions of Section 5 of the 1963 Act being
H not available, the delay cannot be condoned.
STATE OF M.P. AND ANR. v. ANSHUMAN 357
SHUKLA [S.8. SINHA, J.]
-+
8. Reference was thereafter made to a Full Bench in the A
light of the decision rendered by this Court in Mukri Gopalan
vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayi/ Aboobacker (1995) 5 SCC 5. In the
meantime the decision in Nagar Palika Parishad, Morena (su-
pra) came up for consideration before this Court. The decision
of the Division Bench was affirmed by this Court stating :- B
"Heard Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain, learned counsel for the
petitioner at length.
In our view there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment.
The authority in the case of Nasiruddin and others vs. Sita c
Ram Agarwal reported in (2003) 2 SCC 577 has been
correctly followed. Same view has also been taken by this
Court in the case of Union of India vs. Popular Construction
Co. reported in (2001) 8 SCC 4 70.
The Special Leave Petition stands dismissed with no order D
as to costs."
9. In the meanwhile the matter was referred again for con-
sideration by a larger Bench which included the question as to
whether the decision of this Court in regard to the dismissal of
the special leave petition constitutes a binding precedent. The E
questions referred for decisions of the larger Bench were :-
"(a) Whether the power of High Court for exercise of
~
revisional jurisdiction under Section 19 of M.P. Madhyasthm
~ Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 is totally constricted and F
restricted to a period of three months of the passing of the
award which is the limitation prescribed for an aggrieved
party or it can exercise such power of revision suo motu
within a reasonable period of time that can travel beyond
three months?
G
(b) Whether the decision tendered in the case of
"' Nagarpalika Parishad vs. Agrawal Construction Co. 2004
(2) MPJR 374 would be a binding precedent?"
10. The Constitution Bench found that the decision of this
H
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A Court in Nagarpalika Parishad (supra) constitutes a binding
..
precedent and it was bound thereby.
It was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no ap-
plication to a revision application filed before the High Court
under Section 19 of the Act.
8
11. Mr. S.K. Dubey, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants, would submit that the Arbitration Tribu- t
nal being a Court, in view of the provisions contained in sub-
section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, the High Court
c committed a serious error in opining that it did not have any
power to condone the delay.
12. The Act is a special Act. It provided for compulsory
arbitration. It provides for a reference. The Tribunal has the power
of rejecting the reference at the threshold.
D
It provides for a special limitation. It fixes a time limit for
"
passing an Award. Section ~ 4 of the Act provides that proceed-
ing and the award can be challenged under special circum-
stances. Section 17, as noticed hereinbefore, provides for fi-
nality of the award, notwithstanding anything to the contrary con-
E tained in any other law relating to arbitration.

13. The High Court exercises a limited power. The
revisional power conferred upon the High Court is akin to Sec-
tion 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It has the power to ~

F decide as to whether the Tribunal has misconducted itself or ~

the proceedings or has made an award which is invalid in law
or has been improperly procured by any party to the proceed-
ings.
14. As noticed heretobefore the proviso appended to Sec-
G tion 19 was added by M.P. Act No.19 of 2005. Prior thereto the
High Court, even at the instance of a party, despite expiry of the
f
period of limitation could have exercised its suo motu jurisdic-
tion.
15. ·It is a trite law that provisions of the Limitation Act,
H
STATE OF M.P. AND ANR. v. ANSHUMAN 359
SHUKLA [S.B. SINHA, J.)

1963 shall apply to a Court. It has no application in regard to a A
Tribunal or personal designata. There exists a distinction be-
tween a Court and the Tribunal.
16. The very fact that the authorities under the Act are em-
powered to examine witnesses after administering oath to them
clearly shows that they are 'Court' within the meaning of the Evi- 8
dence Act. It is relevant to refer to the definition of 'Court' as
contained in Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act which reads
as follows:-

'Court' includes all Judges and Magistrates, and all c
persons, except arbitrators, legally authorised to take
evidence.

The Tribunal has been conferred various powers.
There, therefore, in our opinion, cannot be any doubt what-
D
soever that the authorities under the Act are also 'courts' within
the meaning of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act.
17. The definition of 'Courts' under the Indian Evidence
Act is not exhaustive (See The Empress vs. Ashootosh
Chuckerbutty and others :_ILR (4) Cal. (15) 483 (FB). Although E
the said definition is for the purpose of the said Act alone, all
authorities must be held to be courts within the meaning of the
said provision who are legally authorised to take evidence. The
word 'Court' under the said Act has come up for consideration
~
at different times under the different statutes. F
18. The Commissioner who has been authorised to take
evidence of the witnesses has been held to be a court (See
Jyoti Narayan vs. Brijnandan Sinha: AIR 1954 Patna 289). The
Rent Controller has been held to be a court (See G. Bulliswamy
vs. Smt. C. Annapurnamma: AIR 1976 Andhra Pradesh 270. G
The Election Tribunals have been held to be courts (See Prem
..,
Chand vs. Sri O.P Trivedi and others : AIR 1967 All. L.J. 5 at
page 7). Coroners before whom evidence can be adduced have
been held to be courts (See Tanajirao Martinrao Kadambande
vs. H.J. Chinoy: 71 Bombay Law Reporter 732. H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 s c R.

A In Brijnandan Sinha vs. Jyoti Narain: AIR 1956 SC 66 it
has been held that any Tribunal or authority whose decision is
final and binding between the parties is a court. In the said de-
cision, the Supreme Court, while deciding a case under Court
of Enquiry Act held that a court of enquiry is not a court as its
B decision is neither final nor binding upon the parties. In Vindar 1-

Kumar Satya vs. State of Punjab: AIR 1956 SC 153 the Su-
preme Court has made a broad distinction of a court and quasi
judicial Tribunal. In the Sitamathi Central Co-operative Bank
Ltd. vs. Jugal Kishore Sinha : AIR 1965 Pat 227 a Division
C Bench of the Patna High Court has held that Assistant Regis-
trars appointed under the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Soci-
eties Act to be courts. In the said decision, this Court has held
that, when a question arises as to whether the authority consti-
tuted under a particular Act exercising judicial or quasi judicial
D power is a court or not, then the following tests must be fulfilled
before the said authority can be termed as a court : •
"(a) the dispute which is to be decided by him must be in
the nature of a civil suit :
(b) the procedure for determination of such dispute must
E be judicial procedure ; and
(c) the decision must be a binding nature."

The aforementioned judgment has been affirmed by the
Supreme Court in the case of Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha vs.
F Sitamarhi Central Coop Bank Ltd. : AIR 1967 SC 1494 "
In Chandra Kishore Jha vs. State of Bihar: 1975 BBCJ
656, a Division Bench of the Patna High Court has held the the
Compensation Officer acting under the Bihar Land Reforms Act,
G 1950, to be a court as the said officer exercises judicial power
deciding civil dispute and pass an order which is final and bind-
ing between the parties. In S.K. Sarkar, Member, Board of Rev- <
enue, UP, Lucknow vs. Vinoy Chandra Misra: (1981) 1 SCC
436 the Board of Revenue has been held to be a court subordi-
H nate to the High CoUI; for the purpose of the provisions of the
STATE OF M.P. AND ANR. v. ANSHUMAN 361
SHUKLA [S.B. SINHA, J.]
. Contempt of Court Act. A
19. However, in The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi vs. The Em-
p/oyees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi AIR 1950 (SC) 188 it
has been held that a 'Labour Court' although has all the trap-
pings of the Court but still is not a court in technical sense. In
Sakuru VS. Tanaji . (1985) 3 sec 590, the Supreme Court has B
held that the statutory authorities did not come within the pur-
view of the definition of courts for the purpose of Section 5 of
the Limitation Act.

20. In K.P Verma vs. State of Bihar : 1988 PLJR 1036, c
which arose out of a case under the Bihar Administrative Tribu-
nalAct, a Division Bench of the Patna High Court held as under
-
"32. The modern sociological condition as also the needs
of the time have necessitated growth of administrative D
~-
law and administ~ative law tribunal. Executive functions of
the State calls for exercise of discretion and judgment
also and not a mere dumb obedience of the orders so that
the executive also forms quasi-judicial and quasi legislative
functions and, in this view of the matter, the administrative E
adjudication has become as indispensable part of the
modern state activity. However, judicial process differs
from administrative adjudicative process. Sometime
administrative adjudication is understood as the same
), thing as administration of justice, though both the terms F
relate to deciding upon disputes yet over the years a great
many difference have been noticed in them which may be
placed in the table as under :-
Judicial Adjudication
G
1. In this the disputes are decided by the persons
) specially trained in law.
2. The Courts normally cannot move a matter by
themselves, eg. suo moto.
H
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 8 S.C.R.

A 3. The Courts are bound by earlier precedents
and settled principles of Law.

4. The Courts decisions are objective.

5. Normally only the parties directly interested ino
B the lis take part in it.

6. The Law provides many safeguards against the
arbitrary decisions of the Courts in the shape
of procedures, appeals, revisions, reviews, etc.
etc.,
c
7. The judgments must be given with detailed
reasons by_ the Courts.

8. Judges enjoy a legal immunity from
responsibility of acts done in discharge of their
D duties and their conduct cannot be a subject of
discussion in any form. even in Parliament.

9. The Laws of evidence and other principles of
Common Law are fully applicable to the Courts.

E 10. The justice in courts is without 'biss' or 'affection
or ill will."

Administrative Adjudication

In this the disputes are decided by the persons having ad-
F ministrative experience.

The administrators may initiate action by themselves.
The administrators may decide each case on its merits.
The decisions of administrators are usually subjective.
G
In this even other citizens may appear in the interest of
public. (

In administrative adjudication, normally the decisions are
final and there is a much greater scope for arbitrary decisions
H of the adjudicators.
STATE OF M.P. AND ANR. v. ANSHUMAN 663
SHUKLA [S.B. SINHA, J.]
)
The administrative adjudicators may pass even cryptic non A
speaking orders.

This is not so normally in case of Tribunals unless the law ·
incorporating them may provide.

The Tribunals are not bound by any such law and need to B
follow only the principles of Natural Justice.

These have to apply the special policy and thus cannot
"" view things with that 'Cold neutrality of the impartial judge'

(Schwarts in American Administrative Law. P. 61)" c
Dr. Durga Das Basu in his Administrative Law, Second
Edition, at page 280 has also given broad features which
characterise a 'Court'.
,,, However, this broad distinction may not be held to be
D
J. applicable as how in India apart from the Administrative
Tribunals pure and simple as in the United Kingdom or the
United States of America, various special Tribunals are
being constituted, and that although they are not regular
'courts' and have judicial authorities but have all the
E
trappings of the Court. The number of such Tribunals is on
the increase owing to the welfare role taken up by the
State under our Constitution, as such so that "the number
of Indian statutes which constitute administrative
authorities, purely administrative and quasi judicial, is
A· legion." (See Durga Das Basu, Administrative Law, 2nd F
Edition at page 285).
"Although in its constitution, it is a Tribunal as
the source of authority is by reason of a statutory
provision and it is empowered by the statutory
G
provisions to exercise any adjudicating power
of the State. (See A.P.H.L. Conf. vs. Sangma,
• A. 1977 S.C. 2155 (2163), e.g. the Election
Commission, deciding disputes as to Party
' Symbols (ibid); the settlement Commision
H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A under s. 2451 of the Income-tax Act (C.l.T. v. '
Bhattacharya, A. 1979 S.C. 1724); Arbitrator
appointed under s. 10A of the Industrial
Disputes Act (Gujarat Steel Tubes vs. Mazdoor
Union, A. 1980 S.C. 1896) ; The Central
B Government, exercising powers under s. 111
(3) of the Companies Act (Harinagar Sugar Mills
vs. Shyam Sundar, A. 1961 S.C. 1669 (1679)." t

In this connection, it may further be necessary to bear in
mind that the root of the word "Tribunal" is Tribunal which
c is a Latin word meaning a raised platform on which the
seats of the tribunes or the magistrates are placed. Thus,
all courts are tribunals but all tribunals are not courts.
However, there cannot be any doubt that these
administrative tribunals or the administrative tribunals or
D
the administrative courts are authorities outside the
ordinary Court system which interp;et and apply the laws
when acts of public administration are attacked in formal
suits or by other established methods. In essence the
Administrative Tribunals may be called a specialized court
E of law, although it does not fulfil the criteria of a law court
as is understood inasmuch as it cannot like an ordinary
law court entertain suits on various matters, including the
matter relating to the vires of legislation. However, such a
Tribunal like ordinary law courts, as found hereinbefore,
F ....
are bound by the rules of evidence and procedure as laid
down under the law and are required to decide strictly, as
per the law.
0. Hood Phillips and Paul Jackson in 0. Hood Phillips'
Constitutional and Administrative Law, Sixth Edition, at
G
page 575 observed as follows. -
;
·'Administrative Jurisdiction" or "fa.dminist;:itive
Justice" is a name given to various ways of
deciding disputes outside the ordinary courts.
H It is not possible to define precisely what bodies
STATE OF M.P. AND ANR. v. ANSHUMAN 365
SHUKLA [S.B. SINHA, J.]

constitute the "ordinary courts" although this A
expression was used in the Tribunals and
Inquiries Acts 1958 and 1971. There are some
bodies that might be placed under the heading
either of ordinary courts or of special tribunals.
Guidance cannot be found in the name of a B
body; the Employment Appeal Tribunal, for
example, is a superior court of record."

At page 576 under the Chapter "Special Tribunals" the
author has stated as follows:-
c
'These are independent statutory tribunals
whose function is judicial. They are often called
"administrative tribunals" especially those more
closely related by appointment or policy to the
Minister concerned, because the reasons for
0
creating them are administrative. The tribunals
are so varied in composition, method of
appointment, functions and procedure, and in
their relation to Ministers on the one hand and
the ordinary courts on the other, that a
satisfactory formal classification is impossible.' E
It, therefore, in my opinion, logically follows that the tribunal,
although not a law court in its true sense but is a court in
a limited sense and is bound to act independently and
impartially and exercise judicial authority without any fear F
or favour from any person and, thus, would be a court
within the meaning of the provisions of the Evidence Act
and the Contempt of Courts Act."
21. A Court for the purpose of application of the Limitation
Act should ordinarily be subordinate to the High Court. The High G
Court exercises its jurisdiction over the subordinate courts inter
• alia in terms of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
While the High Court exercises its revisional jurisdiction, it for
all intent and purport e:vercises an appellate jurisdiction. [See -
Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar vs. Krishnaji Dattatreya H
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 8 S.C.R.

-'I
A Bapat: AIR 1970 SC 1].
22. The provisions of the Act referred to hereinbefore clearly
postulate that the State of Madhya Pradesh has created a sepa-
rate forum for the purpose of determination of disputes arising
inter alia out of the works contract. The Tribunal is not one which
B can be said to be a Domestic Tribunal. The Members of the
Tribunal are not nominated by the parties. The disputants do
jo
not have any control over their appointment. The Tribunal may
reject a reference at the threshold. It has the power to summon
records. It has the power to record evidence. Its functions are
c not limited to one Bench. The Chairman of the Tribunal can re-
fer the disputes to anott.er Bench. Its decision is final. It can
award costs. It can award interests. The finality of the decision
is fortified by a legal fiction created by making an Award a de-
cree of a Civil Court. It is executable as a decree of a Civil Court.
D The Award of the Arbitral Tribunal is not subject to the provi-
sions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and the Arbitration and Con-
ciliation Act, 1944. The provisions of the said Acts have no ap-
plication.

23. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Tribunal for
E all intent and purport is a Court. The Tribunal has to determine a
lis. There are two parties before it. It proceedings are judicial
proceeding subject to the revisional order which may be passed
by the High Court.

24. In Hukumdev Narain Yadav vs. La/it Narain Mishra :
F
(1974) 2 sec 133 this Court was considering a question
•
whether an Election Tribunal while sitting on a Saturday, which
is not a usual working day, would function as Court. It was opined
-
G "10. Now that we have held that the Court is not closed
and the petition could have been presented to the
Registrar on Saturday, March 18, 1972, the question would •
be, does Section 5 of the Limitation Act apply to enable
the petitioner to show sufficient cause for not filing it on the
H last day of limitation, but on a subsequent day? Whether
STATE OF M.P. AND ANR. v. ANSHUMAN 367
SHUKLA [S.B. SINHA, J.]
,_
Section 5 is applicable to election petitions filed under A
Section 81 of the Act will depend upon the terms of Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act. Whether Section 5 could be
invoked would also depend on the applicability of sub-
section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act to election
petitions. Under this sub-section where a special or local B
law provides for any suit, appeal or application a period
different from the period prescribed therefor by the
Schedule, the provisions specified therein will apply only
insofar as and to the extent to which they are expressly
excluded by such special or local law. Under Section 29(2) c
of the Limitation Act of 1908 as amended in 1922, only
Section 4, Sections 9 to 18 and Section 22_of that Act
applied
. . ordinarily unless excluded by a special or local
law. Thus unless Section 5 was made applicable by or
under any enactment the discretion of the Court to extend
D
~ time thereunder would not be available. Similarly Sections
6 to 8 would not apply and neither acknowledgment nor
payment (under the former Sections 19 and 20) could
give a fresh starting point of limitation. Even Section 5
under the old Act was in terms inapplicable to applications
unless the Section was made applicable by or under any E
of the enactment. The new Section 5 is now of wider
applicability and as the objects and reasons state:
"Instead of leaving it to the different States or
the High Courts to extend the application of F
• Section 5 to applications other than those
enumerated in that Section as now in force,
this clause provides for the automatic
application of this Section to all applications,
other than those arising under Order 21 of the
G
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, relating to the
• execution of decrees. In the case of special or
local laws, it will be open to such laws to provide
that Section 5 will not apply."
The present section incorporates two changes: ( 1) a H
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A uniform rule making it applicable to all applications except
those mentioned therein [by defining "application" as
including a "petition" in Section 2(b)); and (2) to all special
and local enactments, unless excluded by any of them.
The difference in the scheme of the provisions of sub-
B section (2) of Section 29 under the two Acts will be
discernible if they are juxtaposed as under:

Section 29(2) of old Act Section 29(2) of new Act

Where 2ny special or local law prescribes for
c any suit, appeal or application a period of
limitation different frorr. the period prescribed
therefcr by the First Schedule, the provisions of
Section 3 shall apply, as if such period were
prescribed therefore in that Schedule, and for
the purpose of determining any period of
D
limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or
application by any spacial or local law-(a) the
provisions contained in Section 4, Sections 9
to 18, and Section 22 shall apply only insofar
as, and to the extent to which, they are not
E expressly excluded by such special or local law;
and(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall
not apply. Where any special or local law
prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a
period of limitation different from the period
F prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of •
Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the
period prescribed by the Schedule and for the
purpose of determining any period of limitation
prescribed for any suit, appeal or application
G by any special or local law. the provisions
contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall
apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, •
they are not expressly excluded by such special
or local law.
H
STATE OF M.P. AND ANR. v. ANSHUMAN 369
SHUKLA [S.B. SINHA, J.]

25. There cannot, therefore, any doubt whatsoever that if A
the Arbitral Tribunal in question is a Court and not a personal
designate, sub-section (2) of Section 29, Section 5 of the Limi-
tation Act would apply. It is only when the limitation provided
under the Special Law, is different from that prescribed in the
Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, sub-section (2) of B
Section 29 would be attracted.

26. In Mukri Gopa/an (supra) the distinction between the
" 'Personal Designata' and 'Court' was noticed. It was held that
the appellate authority constituted under Section 18 of the Rent
Act was a Court having all the trappings of the Courts. c
27. If the Tribunal is a Court, fortiori sub-section (2) of Sec-
tion 29 would apply. As it is a Court it was not necessary for the
legislature to confer power under Section 5 of the 1963 Act spe-
cifically. mthat view of mater an application under Section 5 of
D
the Limitation Act would be maintainable.
28. In Mukri Gopalan (supra), this Court held :

"15. After repealing of Indian Limitation Act, 1908 and its
replacement by the present Limitation Act of 1963 a
E
fundamental change was made in Section 29(2). The
present Section 29(2) as already extracted earlier clearly
indicates that once the requisite conditions for its
applicability to given proceedings under special or local
law are attracted, the provisions contained in Sections 4
~ to 24 both inclusive would get attracted which obviously F
would bring in Section 5 which also shall apply to such
proceedings unless applicability of any of the aforesaid
sections of the Limitation Act is expressly excluded by
such special or local law. By this change it is not necessary
to expressly state in a special law that the provisions G
contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall apply to
• the determination of the periods under it. By the general
provision contained in Section 29(2) this provision is made
applicable to the periods prescribed under the special
laws. An express mention in the special law is necessary H
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A only for any exclusion. It is on this basis that when the new
Rent Act was passed in 1965 the provision contained in
old Section 31 was omitted. It becomes therefore apparent
that on a conjoint reading of Section 29(2) of Limitation
Act of 1963 and Section 18 of the Rent Act of 1965,
B provisions of Section 5 would automatically get attracted
to those proceedings, as there is nothing in the Rent Act
of 1965 expressly excluding the applicability of Section 5 1"

of the Limitation Act to appeals under Section 18 of the
Rent Act."
c 29. The Full Bench, however, affirmed the decision of the
Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court on the au-
thority of Nasirrudin and others vs. Sitaram and others : (2003)
2 SCC 577 and Union of India vs. Popular Construction Co. :
(2001) a sec 410.
D
30. In Popular Construction (supra) application of Arbi-
tra'lion and Conciliation Act, 1996 was in question. The Arbitra-
tion Act clearly provided for a limitation in the matter of exercise
of discretionary jurisdiction for condoning the delay only for a
period of 30 days and not thereafter. It was in the aforemen-
E tioned situation this Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation
Act as such will have no application, as a special limitation has
been provided for.

F
31. In Nasirrudin (supra) this Court was considering the
applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matter of •
-
deposit of rent. The said question came up for consideration in
the light of the power of the Rent Controller in terms of the Rent
Control Statute in the matter of depositing the rent. In other words
the question was that the provision was directory or mandatory.
It was in that view of the matter this Court opined :-
G
"45. On perusal of the said section it is evident that the
question of application of Section 5 would arise where
~
-
any appeal or any application may be admitted after the
prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies
H the court that he had sufficient cause for not making the
STATE OF M.P. AND ANR. v. ANSHUMAN 371
SHUKLA [S.B. SINHA, J.]

appeal or application within such period. Section 13(4) A
provides that in a suit for eviction on the ground set forth
in clause (a) of sub-section (1 ). the tenant shall on the first
date of hearing or on or before such date, the court may
on the application fixed in this behalf or within such time
the tenant shall deposit in court or pay to the landlord in B
court as determined under sub-section (3) from the date
of such determination or within such further time not
exceeding three months as may be extended by the court.
Thus, sub-section (4) itself provides for limitation of a
specific period within which the deposit has to be made,
c
which cannot be exceeding three months as extended by
the court.

It was furthermore observed :-

"47. The provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act must
D
be construed having regard to Section 3 thereof. For filing
an application after the expiry of the period prescribed
under the Limitation Act or any other special statute, a
cause of action must arise. Compliance with an order
passed by a court of law in terms of a statutory provision
does not give rise to a cause of action. On failure to comply E
with an order passed by a court of law, instant
consequences are provided for under the statute. The court
can condone the default only when the statute confers
such a power on the court and not otherwise. In that view
of the matter we have no other option but to hold that F
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has no application
in the instant case."

It was observed that for entertaining an application within
the meaning of the said provision, there should be some re-
G
quest. Mukri Gopalan (supra) was distinguished stating :-
,,' ..
"53. Mr Gupta, appearing on behalf of the respondent,
however, placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in
Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppi/at Puthanpurayil Aboobacker.
Therein this Court was concerned with extension of the H
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 8 S.C.R.

A period of limitation in a case wherein an appeal was to be
preferred before an Appellate Authority under the Kerala
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. As for
preferring an appeal a period of limitation is prescribed,
it was held that Section 5 of the Act was applicable and,
B therefore, the said decision is of no help to the respondent."
It was not dissented from.
32. We, therefore, are prima facie of the opinion that the
Nagar Palika Parishad, Morena (supra) was not correctly de-
e cided and, thus, the matter requires consideration by a Larger
Bench. It is ordered accordingly.
33. Let the records of the case be placed before the
Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for constituting an appropri-
ate Bench.
D.G. Referred to larger Bench.

'
•