STATE OF KERALAversusKURISSUM MOOTTIL ANTONY
- Citation
- 2006 INSC 812
- Decided
- 9 November 2006
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
Corroboration is not a sine qua non for conviction in sexual offence cases; the High Court’s acquittal was unsustainable and the conviction stands.
Summary
The State of Kerala appealed the Kerala High Court’s acquittal of Kurissum Moottil Antony, who had been convicted under Sections 377 and 451 IPC for committing an unnatural offence on a ten‑year‑old girl. The High Court set aside the conviction on the ground that the victim’s testimony was not corroborated and that a report allegedly given before the FIR had been suppressed. The Supreme Court held that corroboration is not a mandatory requirement in sexual offence cases, especially when the victim’s testimony is detailed and credible, and that the High Court erred in demanding it. The Court observed no material inconsistency in the victim’s evidence and rejected the alleged suppression claim. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the acquittal, restored the trial and appellate courts’ convictions, and ordered the accused to serve the remaining sentence.
Issues considered
- Whether corroboration of the victim’s testimony is required for conviction under Sections 377 and 451 IPC.
- Whether the High Court correctly acquitted the accused on the ground of lack of corroboration and alleged suppression of a pre‑FIR report.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 357(1)(b)
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 377, s. 451
Subjects
Judgment
STATE OF KERALA A
v.
KURISSUM MOOTTIL ANTONY
NOVEMBER 9, 2006
[ARIJIT PASAYAT AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.] B
Penal Code 1860-Section 377-Unnatural offences-Conviction
under-Evidence of victim-Need of corroboration-Held: Jn such cases,
rule as to non-requirement of corroboration is applicable-Accused cannot C
cling to a fossil formula and insist on corroborative evidence, even if the case
spoken to by the victim, taken as whole, strikes judicial mind as probable-
Thus, in the instant case plea of lack of corroboration unsustainable-There
being no material inconsistency in cross examination and also no suppression
of report purported to have been given before FIR was lodged, acquittal of
accused by High Court set aside-Evidence Act, 1872. D
Accused committed unnatural offence on a 10 years old girl. FIR was
lodged. Investigating officer carried out investigation. On basis of the evidence
on record, trial court convicted and sentenced the accused under sections 377
and 451 IPC. Sessions Judge upheld the order. However, High Court set aside
the conviction on the ground of absence of corroboration and alleged E
suppression of a report purported to have been given before FIR was lodged.
Hence the present appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court.
HELD: 1.1. An accused cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist on F
corroborative evidence, even if taken as a whole, the case spoken to by the
victim strikes a judicial mind as probable. Judicial response to human rights
cannot be blunted by legal jugglery. (776-A-BJ
1.2. To insist on corrobation except in the rarest of rare cases is to
equate one who is a victim of the lust of another with an accompliace to crime G
and thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding insult to injury to tell a
. " ... woman that her claim of rape will not be believed unless it is corroborattd in
material particular as in "the case of accommplice to a crime". Why should
be the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual
773 H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R. ..
A molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with
doubt, disbelief or suspicion? In cases relating to section 371 IPC the rule
regarding non-requirement of corrobation is equally applicable. Thus, in the
instant case, the plea about lack of corroboration has no substance.
[776-E-G]
1.3. Reading of victim-PW-1 's evidence shows that the High Court
B proceeded on erroneous impression as if written complaint was earlier lodged
before the police which was suppressed by the prosecution. High Court had
proceeded on the basis as if PW-2, friend of victim to whom she narrated the
incident, has resiled from her statement made during investigation. It is really
not so. The evidence of PW-1 who was 10 years of age at the time of
C occurrence and was about 14 years of age at the time of deposition in Court
has categorically and elaborately described the incident. Also in cross-
examination no material inconsistency has surfaced except some minor ones
which are but natural. High Court clearly lost sight of these factors and
passed acquittal order on untenable grounds. Thus, the order of High Court
is unsustainable and is set aside. [777-B-G]
D
Rafiq v. State of UP., (1980] 4 SCC 262; Bharwada Bhogiabhai and
Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1988) SC 753; Rameshwar v. The State of
Rajasthan, AIR (1952) SC 54; State of Maharashtra v. Chandra Prakash
Kewalchand Jain [1990) 1 SCC 550; Bhupinder Sharma _v. State of H.P.,
(2003] 8 sec 551, relied on.
E
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1134 of
2006.
From the Judgment and Order dated 2.2.2005 of the High Court ofKerala
at Emakulam in Crl. R.P. No. 243/1996.
F
R. Sathish for the Appellant.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:
ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. Leave granted.
G
The State of Kerala challenges the order passed by the learned Single
Judge of the Kerala High Court directing acquittal of the respondent by
accepting revision petition filed by the respondent. Respondent was found
guilty ofoffences punishable under Sections 451 and 377 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (in short 'IPC'). The Trial Court had convicted the respondent as
H aforesaid and had imposed sentence of six months and one year rigorous
STATEOFKERALAv. KURISSUMMOOTTILANTONY[PASAYAT,J.) 775
imprisonment respectively with fine ofRs.2000/- in each case. The fine amount A
ofRs.2000/- was to be paid to the victim in terms of Section 357 (l)(b) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short 'Cr.P.C.').
Factual background as unfolded during trial of the respondent was that
on I 0.11.1986 accused trespassed into the house of the victim-girl who was
nearly about I 0 years of age on the date of occurrence and committed B
unnatural offence on her. After finding the victim alone in the house the
accused committed unnatural offence by putting his penis having carnal
intercourse against order ofnature. The victim (PW-I) told about the incident
to her friend (PW-2) who narrated the same to the parents of the victim and
accordingly on 13.11.1986 First Information Report was lodged. The C
investigation was undertaken by PW-11 who sent both the victim and the
accused for medical examination. He also seized the dress worn by the victim
at the time of occurrence. The Chemical Analyst report Ex.P7 indicated presence
of human semen and spermatozoa on the dress of the victim. Potency of the
accused was also proved by the doctor (PW-10) as per Ex.P6.
D
To further the prosecution version, 11 witnesses were examined. The
accused pleaded innocence. On consideration of the evidence on record,
learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, found the accused guilty and convicted
and sentenced as aforesaid noted. An appeal before the learned Sessions
Judge, Kelpetta did not bring any relief to the accused. Revision was filed
before the High Court which by the impugned order set aside the order of E
conviction and sentence. The primary ground on which the High Court
directed acquittal was the absence of corroboration and alleged suppression
of a report purported to have been given before the FIR in question was
lodged.
F
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the State submitted that
the High Court's approach is clearly erroneous. This Court in a catena of
cases has held that corroboration is not necessary for a case of this nature.
Finding certain alleged inconsistencies in the victim's testimony, the High
Court had observed that corroboration was necessary. It relied on a purported
statement stated to have been made at anterior point of time. It was observed G
that in the said complaint details of the incident constituting the offence were
not disclosed. This was suppressed by the Investigating Officer and mother
of the victim i.e. PW-5.
There is no appearance on behalf of the respondent-accused in spite
of the service of the notice. H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.
A An accused cannot cling to a fossil fonnula and insist on corroborative
evidence, even if taken as a whole, the case spoken to by the victim strikes
a judicial mind as probable. Judicial response to human rights cannot be
blunted by legal jugglery. A similar view was expressed by this Court in Rafiq
v. State of UP., [1980] 4 SCC 262 with some anguish. The same was echoed
B again in Bharwada Bhogiabhai and Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1988)
SC 753. It was observed in the said case that in the Indian setting refusal to
act on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault in the ·absence of
corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to injury. A girl or a woman in the
tradition bound non-pennissive society of India would be extremely reluctant
even to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect on her chastity or
C dignity had ever occurred. She would be conscious of the danger of being
ostracized by the society and when in the face of these factors the crime is
brought to light, there is inbuilt assurance that the charge is genuine rather
than fabricated. Just as a witness who has sustained an injury, which is not
shown or believed to be self-inflicted, is the best witness in the sense that
he is least likely to exculpate the real offender, the evidence of a victim of sex
D offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding.
Corroboration is not the sine qua non for conviction in a rape case. The
observations of Vivian Bose, J. in Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan, AIR
(1952) SC 54 were, "The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into
one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a
E conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence,
except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be
present to the mind of the judge... ".
To insist on corroboration except in the rarest of rare cases is to equate
one who is a victim of the lust of another with an accomplice to a crime and
F thereby insult womanhood. It would be adding insult to injury to tell a woman
that her claim of rape will not be believed unless it is corroborated in material
particulars as in "the case of an accomplice to a crime1'. (See State of
Maharashtra v. Chandra Prakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990] I SCC 550). Why
should be the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or
sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses
G tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The plea about lack of corroboration
has no substance.
It is unfortunate that respect for womanhood in our country is on the
decline and cases of molestation and rape are steadily growing. Decency and
H morality in public and social life can be protected only if Courts deal strictly
STATE OF KERALA v. KURISSUM MOOTTIL ANTONY [PASAYAT, J.] 777
with those who violate the social nonns. A
The above position was highlighted by this Court in Bhupinder Sharma
v. State ofHP., [2003] 8 SCC 551.
The rule regarding non-requirement of corroboration is equally applicable
to a case of this nature, relating to Section 377 IPC. B
In addition, it is to be noted that reading of PW- I's evidence shows that
the High Court proceeded on erroneous impression as if written complaint
was earlier lodged before the police which was suppressed by the prosecution.
A close reading of PW-5's evidence shows that she has not stated anything
of that nature. On the contrary, evidence of the mother PW-5 and the father C
PW-4 is that they went to the police station with the victim and FIR was
lodged. The High Court had proceeded on the basis as if PW-2 has resiled
from her statement made during investigation. It is really not so. She has
stated about accused going into the house of the victim asking for water and
when PW-I went inside to take the glass, accused forcibly catching her. The D
evidence of PW- I who was I 0 years of age at the time of occurrence and was
about I 4 years of age at the time of deposition in Court has categorically and
elaborately described the incident. She has graphically described as to how
the offence was committed. She has stated that while she was alone in the
house, the accused who was her neighbour came to her and asked for a glass
of water. But he did not go and wanted more glass of water. When she turned E
to take the glass she was caught forcibly by him and was to made lie on the
floor. The accused lifted her skirt and removed her underwear and thrust his
male organ, and committed carnal intercourse against the order of nature. She
cried but nobody heard the same except her brother who was unable to help,
as he was lying in bed because of paralysis. The accused went away thereafter. F
In cross-examination no material inconsistency has surfaced except
some minor ones which are but natural. The High Court clearly lost sight of
these factors and has directed acquittal on untenable grounds. It is
unsustainable and is set aside. Orders of the Trial Court and First Appellate
Court stand restored. Steps shall be taken by the concerned Court to take the G
respondent-accused to custody to serve remainder of sentence.
Appeal is allowed.
N.J. Appeal allowed.
H
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