STATE OF KARNATAKAversusVEDANAYAGAM

                       STATE OF KARNATAKA                                   A
                                 v.
                          VEDANAYAGAM

                          NOVEMBER 23 994

       [M.M. PUNCHHI AND K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, JJ.]                        B
    Indian Penal Code 1860-Clause Thirdly a/Section 300 Scope-Single
injury-Stabbing with dagger on left side of chest Injury found sufficient in
ordinary course of nature to cause death-No pre meditation-Accused
intended to cause that particular injury-Whether Clause Thirdly ofSection
300 /PC attracted-Held-Yes Conviction u!s 302 sustainable.                   C
    This appeal has been filed against the judgement of the High Court
holding that the offence would come down to Section 304 P1trt II IPC
and not one u/s 302 IPC.

     The deceased, who was son of P.W. l's sister, was living with his D
mother PW 3. The accused developed illicit intimacy with the wife of
PW 1. On the fateful day PW 3, the mother of the deceased and the
mother of the accused were quarrelling with each other. The accused
hearing the quarrel came out of his house armed with a dagger. Seeing
this PW 1 went and brought the deceased. Then the accused shouted
that "you have defamed me. I would not leave you. I will Kill." Saying E
this he stabbed on the left side of the chest of the deceased and the
deceased fell down •nd died instantaneously. The Trial Court held him
guitly u/s 302 IPC and sentenced him to under go imprisonment for life.

    On appeal, the High Court confirmed the finding of the Trial
Court namely that it was the accused who caused the fatal injury but F
held that having regard to the genesis of the matter i.e. that there was
no pre-meditation and since the accused inflicted only one blow with
the dagger which unfortunately landed on the chest, it cannot be said
that the accused intended to cause the death of the deceased. (The High
Court also observed that on seeing the deceased the accused who had. G
only a knife in his hand gave only one blow and unfortunately it landed
on the chest of the deceased and that there are no circumstances placed
before us to indicate that the accused wanted to finish off Sugumaran
or intendt.d to finish off Sugumaran. Therefore, under these
circumstances, it is very difficult to infer that the accused inflicted the
blow on the chest of the deceased with an intention to bring about his H
                                   697
    698                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS          [1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R

A   death. The High Court further held that "Therefore, according to the
    principle laid down in Tholan's case, we think that the offence,
    however, unfortunate it may be, would come down to Section 304 Part
    II, IPC.")

         The question that arose for consideration was whether the offence
B   committed by the sole accused in this case amounted to murder
    punishable u/s 302 IPC or culpable homicide punishable u/s 304 Part II
    IPC and whether the High Court was right in holding that whenever
    there is only single injury the offence would be culpable homicide
    though the medical evidence is to the effect that the some is necessarily
    fatal and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
c
          Allowing the appeal, this Court

         HELD 1.1 Both the Courts below have clearly noted that the injury
    was a very serious one which brought about the instant death. The
    blow was aimed at the chest and the injury was inflicted with great
D   force with a deadly weapon on the vital part. It entered the thoracic
    cavity, passed through the substance of the sternum, injured the lower
    lobe of the left lung and entered the chamber of the right ventricle. It is
    not a case where there was a quarrel between the accused and the
    deceased or where they grappled with each other so that it cannot be
    definitely said that the accused aimed the blow at a particular part of
E   the body and therefore, intended to cause that particular injury which
    was objectively found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
    to cause death. No doubt there was no pre-meditation. Therefore, the
    important question is whether Clause Tqirdly of Section 300 IPC is
    attracted. (701 D to F)
F        1.2 Ingredient of Clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC is not the
    intention to cause death but on the other hand the ingredient to be
    proved is the intention to cause the particular injury that was present.
    It is fallacious to contend that whenever there is a single injury only a
    case of culpable homicide is made out irrespective of other
G   circumstances. (702 G)

         Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, (1958) SCR 1495; Jagrup Singh v.
    State of Harayana, [1981) 3 SCC 616, Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi
    Administration) JT (1991) 1 SC 288, relied on.

H         Tho/an v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR (1984) SC 759, distinguished.
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. VEDANAYAGAM (K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J.]              699

     1.3 There is no legal basis whatsoever for the High Court to hold A
that since the respondent accused gave only one blow, though found to
be sufficient in the ordinarily course of nature to cause death, Clause
Thirdly of Section 300 is not attracted. In the instant case, there was
hostility· between PW 1 and the accused. The words uttered by the
accused against the deceased followed by the stabbing with the dagger
on the left side of the chest of the deceased, would clearly indicate that B
he intended to cause that particular injury which was objectively found
to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. (704 G,
705H, 706 B)

    1.4. Going through the facts of the case, there is no doubt
whatsoever that the accused intended to cause that particular injury on C
the chest which necessarily proved fatal. Therefore, Clause Thirdly of
Section 300 IPC is clearly attracted. The High Court erred in holding
that the accused did not intend to cause his death by inflicting the
injury in his chest because there was no pre-meditation and, therefore,
the offence would be culpable homicide. This view of the High Court is
not correct. (706 C, D)                                                 D
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 454
of 1988.

   From the Judgment and Order dated 16.9.87 of the Kamataka High
Court in Crl .A. No.302 of 1986.                                                 E
    Mohan R. Katak and M. Veerappa for the Appellant.

    R.P. Wadhwani for the Respondent.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                                 F
     K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J. The question that arises for
consideration in this appeal filed by the State of Kamataka is whether the
offence committed by the respondent, the sole accused in the case, amounts
to murder punishable under Section 302 l.P.C. or culpable homicide
punishable under Section 304 Part II l.P.C. and whether the High Court is
right in holding that whenever there is only single injury the offence would     G
be only culpable homicide though the medical evidence is to the effect that
the same is necessarily fatal and sufficient in the ordinary course of riature
to cause death ?

    The deceased Sugumaran, P.W.1, Pooswamy and other material
witnesses were all workers in Kolar Gold Field and were residing in a place      H
    700                     SUPREME COUR,,T REPORTS         [1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R

A   called Gorgaum. The House of the accused w&s about 26 feet from P. W. l's
    house. The deceased, who was son of P.W. l. 's sister, was living with his
    mother P.W. 3, Muniyamma in another house. The accused developed
    illicit intimacy with Chudamani, wife of P.W:l. on 9.7.1984 at about 11
    P.M., P.W.l saw the accused making signs to his wife Chudamani and
    seeing P.W.l he ran away. On 13.7.1984 at about 3.P.M.,P. W. 3 and the
B   mother of the accused were quarrelling near the house of P. W. l. P. W. l
    rushed to the house of P.W. 3 and fetched her son, the deceased. The
    accused in the meanwhile, on hearing the quarrel, entered the scene with a
    knife M.0.1 in his hand and on seeing the deceased the accused gave a
    knife blow on the left side of his chest as a result of which the deceased fell
    down and died instantaneously. P.W. l chased the accused but could not
c   catch him. Thereafter he went to the police station and gave a report,
    Ex.P.l. P.W. 10, S.I., took up investigation, held the inquest and sent the
    dead body for post-mortem. The Doctor, who conducted the post-mortem,
    found one stab injury on the left side of the chest and opined that the death
    was a result of the said injury to the vital organs. After completion of the
    investigation, the charge sheet was laid. The accused pleaded not guilty.
D   The trial court accepted the prosecution case and held that a clear case .
    under Section 302 I.P.C. is made out and accordingly convicted the accused
    and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. On appeal the High
    Court confirmed the finding of the trial court namely that it was the accused
    who caused the fatal injury but relying on the judgment of this Court in
    Tho/an v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR (1984) SC 759, however, held that
E   having regard to the genesis of the matter i.e. that there was no pre -
    meditation and since the accused inflicted only one blow with the dagger,
    M.0.1 which unfortunately landed on the chest, it can not be said that "the
    accused intended to cause the death of the deceased." The High Court also
    observed that on seeing the deceased the accused who held already a knife
    in his hand "gave only one blow to Sugumaran and unfortunately it landed
F   on the chest of the deceased" and "that there are no circumstances placed
    before us to indicate· that the accused wanted to finished off Sugumaran or
    intended to finish off Sugumaran. Therefore, under these circumstanc~s. it
    is rather very difficult to infer that the accused inflicted the blow on the
    chest of the deceased with an intention to bring about his death. "The High
    Court further held that" Therefore, according to the principle laid down in
G
    Tholan's case, we think that the offence, however, unfortunate it may be,
    would come down to Section 304 Part II I.P.C.

        It is the above finding of the High Court that is challenged in this
    appeal by the State. Both the Court below have held that on seeing the
H   deceased, Sugumaran, the accused who was armed with a dagger, M. 0. l,
     STATE OF KARNATAKA v. VEDANAYAGAM [K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J.]             701

     plunged it into the left side of the chest of the deceased as a result of which A
     he died instantaneously. The Doctor, who conducted the post-mortem,
     noted the following injury :

              "a)   a punctured wound 2" by 112 "over the chest on the left side
                    over the 2nd costal cartilage 1" from the mid sternum
                    situated obliquely. It has clean out edges and sharp angles at B
                    both the extremities edges are over cut. The edges of the
                    wound clean not bruised. On probing the wound with ablunt
                    probe it had freely entered the theresic cavity.

                    On dissection it is noticed that the wound had passed
                    through the substance (T) of the sternum , 2nd costal C
                    cartilage· anterior border of the lower lobe of the left lung
                    and entered the chamber of the right ventricle 2 "above the
                    .... (not clear) of the heart."

          Both the courts below have clearly noted that the injury was very
     serious one which brought about the instant death. From the above D
     description, it can be seen that the blow was aimed at the chest and the
     injury was inflicted with great force with deadly weapon on the vital part. It
     entered the thoracic cavity, passed through the substance of the sternum ,
     injured tlie lower lob of the left lung and entered the chamber of the right
     ventricle. It is not a case where there was a quarrel between the accused and
     the deceased or where they grappled with each other so that it can not be E
     definitely said that the accused aimed the blow at a particular part of the
     body and therefore intended to cause that particular injury which was
     objectively found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
     death. No doubt there may be scope to contend that there was no pre -
     meditation and therefore Clause Firstly of Section 300 l.P.C. namely that F
     the accused intended to cause death, is not attracted. But the important
     question is whether Clause Thirdly of Section 300 l.P.C. is attracted.

          The scope of Clause .Thirdly of Section 300 l.P.C has been the subject
     matter of various decisions of this Court. The decision in Virsa Singh v.
     State of Punjab, [1958] SCR 1495 has throughout been followed in a G
'·   number of cases by all the High Courts as well as the Supreme Court. In all
     these cases the approach has been to find out whether the ingredient namely
     the intention to cause the particular injury was present or not ? If such an
     intention to cause that particular injury is made out and if the injury is
     found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then
     Clause Thirdly of Section 300 1.P.C. is attracted. Analysing Clause Thirdly H
    702                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R

A   and as to what the prosecution must prove, it was held in Virsa Singh 's case
    as under:

                    "First, it must establish, quite objectively that a bodily
                    injury is present;

B                   Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; these are
                    purely objective investigations.

                    Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to
                    inflict that particular bodly injury, that is to say, that it was
                    not accidental or unitentional, or that some other kind of
c                   injury was intended.

                    Once these three elements are proved to be present, the
                    enquiry proceeds further and,

                    Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just
D                   described made up of the three element set out above is
                    sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
                    This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential
                    and has nothing to do with the intention ofthe offender . "

                    It was further observed as under :
E
                    "If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the
                    consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown,
                    or reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or
                    otherwise unintentional. "

F                                                              (emphasis supplied)

         Thus it is clear that ingredient of clause Thirdly is not the ·intention to
    cause death but on the other hand the ingredient to be proved is the
    intention to cause the particular injury that was present. It is fallacious to
    contend that wherever there is a single injury only a case a culpable
G   homicide is made out irrespective of other circumstances. In Emperor v.
    Sardarkhan Jaridkhan, (1917) l.L.R. 41 Bombay 23, 29 it was observed as
    under:

                    "where death is caused by a single blow, it is always much
                    more difficult to be absolutely certain what degree of bodily
H                   injury the offender intended."
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. VEDANAYAGAM [K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J.]                703

    Commenting upon this observation Justice Bose in Virsa Singh 's case A
held thus:

                "With due respect to the learned Judge he has linked up the
                intent required with the seriousness of the injury, and that,
                as we have shown, is not what the section requires. The two
                matters are quite separate and distinct, though the evidence B
                about them may sometimes overlap."

     As to how the intention is to be inferred even in a case of single injury,
Justice Bose further held as under :

                "The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict C
                a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to
                inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show
                that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify
                such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the section
                requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the
                injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only D
                possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether
                he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious
                consequences, is neither here nor there. The question, so far
                as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to
                kill, or to infict an injury of a particular degree of
                seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the injury in E
                question; and once the existence of the injury is proved the
                intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or
                the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion. But
                whether the intention is there or not is one of fact and not
                one of law. Whether the wound is serious or otherwise, and
                if serious, how serious, is a totally separate and distinct F
                question and has nothing to do with the question whether
                the prisoner intended to inflict the injury in question.

                It is true that in a given case the enquiry may be linked up
                with the seriousness of the injury. For example, ifit can be      G
                proved, or if the totality of the circumstances justify an
                inference, that the prisoner only intended a superficial
                scratch and that by accident his victim stumbled and fell on
                the sword or spear that was used, then of course the offence
                is not murder. But that is not because the prisoner did not
                intend the injury that he intended to inflict to be as serious    H
    704                    SUPREME coµRT REPORTS             (1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R

A                  as it turned out to be but because he did not intend to inflict
                   the injury in question at all. His intentiqn in such a case
                   would be to inflict a totally different injury. The difference
                   is not one of Jaw but one of fact"

                                                              (emphasis supplied)
B
        .This question was again considered Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana,
    [1981] 3 SCC 616 by a Bench of this Court consisting of Justice D.A.Desai
    and Justice A.P.Sen and following the ratio laid down in Virsa Singh 's case
    it was held as under :

c                   "There is no justification for the assertion that the giving of
                   a so/itqry blow on a vital part of the body resulting the
                   death must always necessarily reduce the offence to
                   culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable
                    under Section 304, Part II ofthe Code. If a man deliberately
                   strikes another on the head with a heavy Jog of wood or an
D
                    iron rod or even a lathi so as to cause a fracture of the skill,
                   he must in the absence of any circumstances negativing the
                   presumption, be deemed to have intended to cause the death
                   of the victim or such bodily injury as is sufficient to cause
                   death. The whole thing depends upon the intention to cause
E                  death, and the case may be covered by either clause Firstly
                   or clause Thirdly. The nature of intention must be gathered
                   from the kind of weapon used, the part of the body hit, the
                   amount offorce employed and the circumstances attendant
                    upon the death. "

F                                                             (emphasis supplied)

         Therefore there is no legal basis whatsoever for the High Court to hold
    that since the respondent accused gave only one blow, though found to be
    sufficient in the .ordinary course of nature cause death, Clause Thirdly of
    Section 300 is not attracted.
G
        In Tho/an 's case as well as other cases relied upon by the learned
    counsel for the defence, it was found that the genesis of the occ~rrence ~as
    such that there was a sudden quarrel, intervention or grappling or 4:ight
    which threw a doubt abo,ut the necessary ingredient namely intention to     1



H   cause that particular injury being there.
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. VEDANAYAGAM [K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J.]               705

    Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi Administration) JT 1991 (1) S.C. 288, all         A
the cases including Tho/ans Case have been considered in the light of the
principles laid down in Virsa Singh's case and ultimately itwas concluded
as under:

               "In all these cases, injury by a single blow was found to be
               sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. B
               The Supreme Court took into consideration the
               circumstances such as sudden quarrel, grappling etc. as
               mentioned above only to assess the state of mind namely
               whether the accused had the necessary intention to cause
               that particular injury i.e. to say that he desired expressly that C
               such injury only should be the result. It is held in all these
               cases that there was no such intention to cause that
               particular injury as in those circumstances, the accused
               could have been barely aware i.e. only had knowledge of
               the consequence. These circumstances under which the
               appellant happened to inflict the injury it is felt or atleast a D
               doubt arose that all his mental faculties could not have been'
               roused as to form an intention to achieve the particular
               result. We may point out that we are not concerned with the
               intention to cause death in which case it will be a murder
               simplicitor unless exception is attracted. We are concerned
               under clause Thirdly with the intention to cause that E
               particular injury which is a subjective inquiry and when
               once such intention is established and if the intended injury
               is found objectively to be sufficient in the ordinary course
               of nature to cause death, clause Thirdly is attracted and it
               would be murder, unless one of the exceptions to Section F
               300 is attracted. If on the other hand this ingredient of
                'intention' is not established or if a reasonable doubt arises
                in this regard then only it would be reasonable to infer that
                clause Thirdly is not attracted and that the accused must be
                attributed knowledge that in inflicting the injury he was
                likely to cause death in which case it will be culpable G
                homicide punishable under Section 304 Part II l.P.C."

    In the instant case, the accused had illicit intimacy with the wife of P.
W. I. From this it can be said that there was hostility between P. W. l and the
accused. On the fateful day P.W.3, the mother of the deceased and the
mother of the accused were quarrelling with each other, and even by then          H
    706                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R

A   the accused hearing the quarrel came out of his house anned with a dagger.:
    Seeing this P.W.l went and brought the deceased. Then the accused ·
    shouted that "You have defamed me. I would not leave you. I will kill"
    Saying this he stabbed on the left side of the chest of the deceased and the
    deceased fell down and died instantaneously. It is important to note that
    there was neither a quarrel nor a fight between the deceased and the
B   accused. The words uttered by the accused against the deceased followed
    by the stabbing with the dagger on the left side of the chest of the deceased;
    would clearly indicate that he intended to cause that particularly injury
    which was objectively found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of
    nature to cause death.

C         From all the above facts, there is no doubt whatsoever that the accused
     intended to cause that particular injury on the chest which necessarily
    proved fatal. Therefore Clause Thirdly of Section 300 l.P.C. is clearly
     attracted. The High Court erred in holding that "accused did not intend to
     cause his death by inflicting the injury on the chest because there was no
    .pre-ineditation and therefore the offence would be culpable homicide." This
D    view of the High Court is·no~ correct and as discussed above Clause Thirdly
     of Section 300 l.P.C. is clearly attracted. For all these reasons we set aside
    the judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment of the trial court
    covicting the accused under Section 302 l.P.C. and sentencing him to
    undergo for life. Accordingly the appeal is allowed.

E A.G.                                                           Appeal allowed.