Holding

Judgments must be confined to the facts and legal points of the case; extraneous observations and directions to executive officials are invalid.

Summary

The Karnataka High Court refused leave to appeal against the acquittal of seven accused in a Section 307 IPC case and, in doing so, issued sweeping remarks about the state of criminal justice, especially criticizing the police, and directed the Home Secretary and Home Minister to report the government's reaction. The State of Karnataka challenged these extraneous observations and the directions before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that a judgment must be confined to the facts and legal issues of the case and that the High Court had overstepped its jurisdiction by venturing into matters unrelated to the proceedings. It further ruled that directing executive officials to respond to such observations was an impermissible exercise of judicial power. Consequently, the directions to the State Public Prosecutor, Home Secretary and Home Minister were set aside and the appeal was disposed of.

Issues considered

Whether a High Court may make observations unrelated to the specific case and criticize the police department without evidentiary basis.
Whether a High Court can direct executive officials, such as the Home Secretary and Home Minister, to report their reaction to judicial observations.
Whether such extraneous observations and directions violate principles of judicial decorum and exceed the court's jurisdiction.

Subjects

judicial decorumextraneous observationshigh court jurisdictiondirections to executivecriminal law administrationacquittalleave to appealpolice criticism

Judgment

A STATE OF KARNATAKA
v.
THE REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

AUGUST 10, 2000

B [K.T. THOMAS AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.]

Judgment-Dealing with subjects outside !is-High Court while refus-
ing leave to appeal against acquittal of accused in a case u/s. 307 /PC making
sweeping remarks against present criminal law administration and particu-
C larly against police department of State and directing Home Secretary and
Home Minister of the State to report to it the reaction of Government to the
observations made in the judgment-Held, judgments and orders should
confine to facts and legal points involved in particular cases-Observations
made by High Court are absolutely uncalled for on the facts of the case-
Directions issued to the Home Secretary and the Home Minister are set
D aside-Strictures.

A Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court, while refusing leave
to appeal against acquittal of the accused in a criminal trial for offences
including the offence under s.307 I.P.C., made sweeping remarks on the
E present system of criminal law administration and particularly against the
police department of the State. The subjects referred to by the High Court
in its judgment were (1) murders committed with impunity, (2) the in·
crease in cases involving atrocities against women, (3) harassment inflicted
on young married women, including "bride burning", (4) molestation and
rape of girls and young women. The High Court pointed out towards the
F high percentage of acquittal (i.e. 96.4 % ) in criminal trials and held the
investigating agencies, namely, the police ~epartment "responsible" to a
very large extent for the deplorable state of affairs and gave directions to
the Secretary to Government (Home) and the Home Minister of the State
to report to it as to what was the reaction of the Government to the
G observations made in the judgment. Aggrieved, the State Government
filed the present appeal.

It was contended for the appellant-State that the observations, par-
ticularly the disparagmg remarks made against the police department of
the State as a whole were absolutely unnecessary in the instant case and
H
384
STATE v. REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA 385
there was no material available on record for the Court to record such A
findings.

Disposing of the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1.1. The High Court went outside the scope of the tis before
it and made observations which are not in tune with the perceptions of
B
judicial exercise. The High Court dealt with subjects which are totally
ungermane and far beyond the scope of the present case. The observations
made by it are absolutely uncalled for on the facts of the case. [389-B]

1.2. Judicial decorum requires that judgments and orders should con- C
tine to the facts and legal points involved in the particular cases which Judges
deal with. May be, sometimes Judges would, perhaps wittingly or even un-
wittingly, just outside the contours of the litigation, but even such
overlappings should be within bounds of propriety and sobriety. But there
is no justification for traversing so far beyond the canvass as was done by
D
the High Court in this case or to cover areas which are grossly extraneous to
the subject matter of the case. The problems posed by the High Court have
already engaged the attention of the Law Commission. On more than one
occasions the Commission has submitted its report for consideration by
Parliament. But putting the blame largely on the police force of the State
for all the ills pointed out by the High Court, without data or material or E
evidence in this case, is not a course which .can be approved. Demoralisation
of departments would badly erode the already impaired efficiency of our
forces . .Judgment should confine to the scope of the case.[389-D-E]

State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Naim, AIR (1964) SC 703 = F
[1964] 2 SCR 363; R.K. Lakshmanan v. A.K. Srinivasan & A111:, [1976] 1 SCR
204 =AIR (1975) SC 1741; Niranjan Pa/llaik v. Sashibhushwz Kar & Anr.,
[1986] 2 SCC 569 =AIR (1986) SC 819 and S.K. Viswambaran v. E.Koyakunju
& Ors., [1987] 2 SCC 109 =AIR (1987) SC 1436, relied on.

1.3. By the direction of the High Court, the Home Secretary and the G
Home Minister are compelled to react openly to the observations made in
the judgment and report to the High Court on such reactions. Such a
direction is nothing but an exercise in redundancy. The directions issued to
the State Public Prosecutors as well as to the Home Secretary and the
Home Minister are, therefore, set aside. [387-B; 388-G; 390-F] H
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 652
of 2000.

From the Judgment and Order dated 18.6.99 of the Karnataka High Court
in Crl. A. No. 319 of 1999.

B N. Ganpathy for the Appellant.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

THOMAS, J. Delay condoned.

C Leave granted.

A Division Bench of Karnataka High Court went outside the scope of
the lis before it and made certain observations which are not in tune with the
perceptions of judicial exercise. Why they did so in this case is beyond com-
prehension. State of Karnataka, unable to abide by the directions issued as per
D the order, has filed this appeal by special leave. For disposal of this appeal we
did not find any necessity to issue notice to the sole respondent (Registrar
General of the High Court of Karnataka) as he would have nothing to say about
the impugned directions. So we propose to dispose of the matter without
bringing the respondent to this Court.

E How the above situation reached can be summarized thus:

Seven persons were prosecuted in a Sessions Court for various offences,
the serious-most among which was the offence under Section 307 of the IPC.
After the trial the Sessions Judge acquitted all the accused. The testimony of
the eye witnesses examined by the prosecution was not believed by the Ses-
F sions Judge. At the same time he frowned at the investigation, as is being done
in many of the judgments ending in acquittal. The delay in dispatching the FIR
to the Magistrate was also highlighted in the judgment of the Sessions Court.

The State of Karnataka filed a petition for leave to appeal against the said
order of acquittal. The Division Bench of the High Court, while refusing leave,
G
made a departure from the precedents and issued an unusual direction to the
State Public Prosecutor like this:

"We direct the learned SPP to forward a copy of this order to the
Secretary to Government (Home) as also to the Honourable Home
H Minister both of whom shall acknowledge the receipt of the same and
STATE v. REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA [THOMAS, J.] 387

shall report back to this Court within a period of two months as to what A
precisely is the reaction of the Government to the observations of this
High Court."

The Home Secretary and the Home Minister of the State are now com-
pelled to react openly to the observations made in the judgment and to report
B
to the High Court on such reactions. It is necessary to extract the observations
made by M.F. Saldhana, J, who spoke for the Division Bench. The first facet
of the observations is the following:

"This Court has had occasion to deal with a large number of appeals
filed against orders of acquittals. In case after case, it is noticed that c
it is principally because of poor investigation followed up by a total
lack of interest in the conduct of the prosecution that has resulted in
the accused being acquitted. Murders are committed with impunity and
the other set of cases of which we need to take very serious note
relating to atrocities against women where even the reported number
D
of cases has sharply increased. We have come across a series of
horrifying incidents where young married women were harassed, tor-
... tured and set on fire, another line of cases where girls and women have
been molested, sexually attacked and raped. String of acquittals in all
these cases which are as high as 96.4 per cent only because the
requisite evidence and the evidence of the quality that the Court E
expects has not been forthcoming. The investigating agencies, namely,
the Police Department are responsible to a very large extent for this
deplorable state of affairs."

Learned counsel for the State made a scathing onslaught on those obser- F
vations, particularly the disparaging remarks made against the police depart-
ment of the State as a whole and contended that they are absolutely unnecessary
in the present case, apart from being unsupported by any material whatsoever.
He submitted that there was no material available on record for the Court to
reach such omnibus findings. Learned Judge went on to observe further as
follows: G

'Time is of the essence as far as investigation of criminal cases are
concerned and consequently, it is equally important that apart from the
speed with which the Police act, that the investigation has got to be
done with a high degree of efficiency and professionalism. All these H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A factors are lacking in the majority of investigations. There is something
seriously wrong and we put it down to the fact that obviously on all
sorts of political considerations, the' recruitment process has been
diluted to point of induction into the force of persons who should not
have been there at all. It goes without saying that when this happens,
one can never expect efficiency. The manner in which the recruitments
B
are done and more importantly the considerations leave much to be
desired and if the law and order machinery on which crores of rupees
of tax payers money is being spent is at all to justify its existence, the
Government will have to take serious note of the observations and
rectify the state of affairs."
c
After making some more sweeping remarks on the present system of
criminal law administration the Bench said the following also:

"Similarly, the principal disease that has infected the criminal justice
system in the State is the cheerful manner in which the Court is
D informed that the vital witnesses are hostile who is responsible for this
is not difficult for the Court to infer, the moment the question is asked
as to who is the beneficiary. The investigating Agency also owes a duty
"'-
to ensure that the vital witnesses are present and that they produce the
type of evidence which ·is expected of them. This aspect of the matter
E will require very serious attention if at all the State is concerned about
rectifying the present state of affairs which is assuming disastrous
proportion."

Learned counsel for the State was quite right in contending that it was
not the occasion for learned Judges of the High Court for giving vent to their
F general apathy towards the present system of administration of criminal justice.
The direction that the Home Minister and the Home Secretary of the State shall
report to the High Court regarding their reaction towards the observations made
in the judgment is nothing but an exercise in redundancy, for, their reaction
cannot be different from the views expressed by the Judges themselves. How
could they be different, as it is unexceptional that the system should improve.
G
The problems posed by the Judges have already engaged the attention of the
Law Commission. On more than one occasions the Commission has submiued
its report for consideration by Parliament. But putting the blame largely on the
police force of the State for all the ills pointed out by the learned Judges,
without data or material or evidence in this case, is not a course which can meet
H with our approval.
STATE v. REGISTRAR GENERAL HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA [THOMAS, J.] 389

Learned Judges pointed to subjects which are unfortunately not con- A
nected with this case. Those are- (I) murders committed with impunity, (2) the
increase in cases involving atrocities against women, (3) harassment inflicted
on young married women including "bride burning", (4) molestation and rape
of girls and young women. We have already extracted a gist of the facts of this
case. None of the fields to which learned Judges pointed their fingers would
B
cover the facts of this case. Hence learned Judges dealt with subjects which are
totally ungermane and far beyond the scope of this case as though it was
presentation of a paper in a seminar. Why should the Home Minister and the
Home Secretary react to the observations which are absolutely uncalled for on
the facts of this case.
c
Judicial disposition is definitely different from a paper presented for
seminar discussion. Nor can it be equated with a dissertation. Judicial decorum
requires that judgments and orders should confine to the facts and legal points
involved in the particular cases which Judges deal with. May be, sometimes
Judges would, perhaps wittingly or even unwittingly, just outside the contours
of the litigation, but even such overlappings should be within bounds of D
propriety and sobriety. But there is no justification for traversing so far beyond
the convass as was done by the High Court in this case or to cover areas which
are grossly extraneous to the subject matter of the case. If the subordinate
Courts are also to be tempted and encouraged to follow suit by travelling far
outside the scope of the !is the consequences would be far too many. Demor- E
alisation of departments would badly erode the already impaired efficiency of
our forces. It is time to remind ourselves once again that judgment should
confine to the scope of the case.

In the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Naim, AIR (1964) SC 703
=[1964] 2 SCR 363, a four Judge Bench of this Court heard the grievance of F
a State regarding certain sweeping remarks made by a learned Judge of the
High Court who dealt with the case of a police officer. The Judge of the High
Court had stated in his Judgment that "(a) If I had felt that with my lone efforts
I could have cleaned this augean stable, which is the police force, I would not
have hesitated to wage this war single handed. (b) That there is not a single
G
lawless group in the whole of the country whose record of crime comes
anywhere near the record of that organised unit which is known as the Indian
Police Force. (c) Where every fish barring perhaps a few stinks, it is idle to
pick out one or two and say that it stinks."

S.K. Das, J. (as he then was) speaking for the four Judge Bench ex- H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A pressed complete disapproval of those impugned observations and reminded
thus:

"It is not infrequent that sweeping generalisations defeat the very
purpose for which they are made. It has been judicially recognised that
in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or au-
·B thorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law
in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether
the party whose conduct is, in question, is before the court or has an
-
opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is
evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and
c (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral
part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognised
that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not
normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve."

During the 36 years which elapsed thereafter this Court has reiterated
D those words on different occasions.

R.K. Lakshmanan v. A.K. Srinivasan & Am:, [1976) 1 SCR 204 =AIR
(1975) SC 1741, Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhushan Kar & Anr., [1986) 2 SCC
569 =AIR (1986) SC 819, S.K. Viswambaran v. E. Koyakunju & Ors., [1987)
2 sec 109 =AIR (1987) SC 1436.
E
It would have been very appropriate if learned Judges of the Division
Bench who rendered the impugned order would have reminded themselves of
the above caution administered by the apex court more than three decades ago.

... For the aforesaid reasons we have to interfere with the impugned order.
F We hereby set aside the directions issued to the State Public Prosecutor as well
as to the Home Minister and Home Secretary of the State.

Appeal is disposed of accordingly.

R.P. Appeal disposed of.