Holding

The High Court’s order waiving custodial sentences without reasons is unsustainable; the trial court’s imprisonment sentences are restored.

Summary

Muralidhar, a bus driver, collided with a tempo on 3 December 1995, causing the death of a 16‑year‑old boy and grievous injuries to a passenger. He was convicted under IPC sections 279 (rash driving), 338 (grievous hurt) and 304‑A (death by negligence) and sentenced by the trial court to rigorous imprisonment (six months for 338 and one year for 304‑A) along with fines. The Karnataka High Court, invoking section 71 of the IPC, waived the custodial portions of the sentence and imposed only fines, without recording any reasons. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in dispensing with imprisonment without justification, emphasized the proper interpretation of "negligence" and "rashness" under section 304‑A, and reiterated the need for sentences to reflect the gravity of the offence and societal interest. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside and the trial court’s sentence restored.

Issues considered

The applicability of section 71 IPC to waive custodial sentences for offences under sections 279, 338 and 304‑A without recording reasons.
Whether the sentence of imprisonment imposed by the trial court is appropriate for the offences committed.
The correct interpretation of "negligence" and "rashness" under section 304‑A IPC.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 279, s. 304-A, s. 338, s. 71

Subjects

sentencingcustodial sentencesection 304-Anegligencerashnessroad safetyvehicular homicideIndian Penal Codeappellate jurisdiction

Judgment

[2009] 4 S.C.R. 400

A STATE OF KARNATAKA
V.
MURALIDHAR
Criminal Appeal No. 428 of 2002
MARCH 16, 2009
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY,
JJ.]
Sentence/Sentencing: •
c Sentence for imprisonment and fine for conviction u/ss.
279, 338 and 304 A /PC - Reduction of by confining it to fine
and waiving of custodial imprisonment - On appeal, held: High
court order not justified - Custodial sentence was waived
without indicating any reason - Order of trial court restored -
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 71
0
>
Award of Punishment - Criterion for determining -
Discussed.
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 304-A - Applicability of -
Discussed.
E
Words and Phrases - 'Negligence' - Meaning of in the
context of s. 304 A /PC.
Trial court awarded imprisonment and imposed fine
for conviction of the respondent-accused u/ss. 279, 338
F and 304-A IPC. High Court, in revision, taking note of s. 71
IPC, waived the custodial sentence and imposed fine.
Hence the present appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
G HELD: 1.1 High Court has without considering the
relevant aspects and even without indicating any reason,
waived the custodial sentence and imposed only fine. The
judgment therefore is clearly unsustainable. [Para 26]
[414-D]
H 400
STATE OF KARNATAKA V MURALIDHAR 401

1.2 Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence A
would do more harm to the justice system to undermine
the public confidence in the efficacy of law and society
could not long endure under such serious threats. It is,
therefore, the duly of every court to award proper
sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and B
the manner in which it was executed or committed etc. ·
[Para 21] [411-C]
Sevaka Perumal etc. v. State of Tamil Naidu Al R 1991
SC 1463 - relied on.
c
1.3 After giving due consideration to the facts and
circumstances of each case, for deciding just and
appropriate sentence to be awarded for an offence, the
aggravating and mitigating factors and circumstances in
_.. which a crime has been committed are to be delicately
0
balanced on the bas.is of really relevant circumstances in
a dispassionate manner by the Court. Such act of
balancing is indeed a difficult task. In the absence of any
foolproof formula which may 'provide any basis for
reasonable criteria to correctly assess various
circumstances germane to the consideration of gravity E
of crime, the discretionary judgment in the facts of each
~ case, is the only way in which such judgment may be
equitably distinguished. [Para 22] [413-A-D]
Dennis Councle MCGDautha v. State of Callifornia 402 F
US 183: 2~ L.D. 2d 711 - referred to.
1.4 The object should be to protect the society and
to deter the criminal in achieving the avowed object of
law by imposing appropriate sentence. It is expected that
the courts would operate the sentencing system so as to G
impose such sentence which reflects the conscience of
the society and the sentencing process has to be stern
where it should be. [Para 23] [413-E]
1.5 Imposition of sentence without considering its H
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C R

\.r
A effect on the social order in many cases may ·be in reality A

a futile exercise. The social impact of the crime, e.g. where
it relates to offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping,
misappropriation of public money, treason and other
offences involving moral turpitude or moral delinquency
B which have great impact on social order, and public
interest, cannot be lost sight of and per se require
exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude by imposing
meager sentences or taking too sympat~etic view merely
..
on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences ..
c will be result-wise counter productive in the long run and
against societal interest which needs to be cared for and
strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the
sentencing system. [Para 24] [413-F-H; 414-A]
1.6 The Court will be failing in its duty if appropriate
D punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been ;.
committed not only against the individual victim but also
against the society to which the criminal and victim
belong. The punishment to be awarded for a crime must
not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be
E consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the
crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime
warranting public abhorrence and it should "respond to
the society's cry for justice against the criminal". [Para ~

25] [414-D]
F 2.1 Section 304-A IPC applies to cases where there
is no intention to cause death and no knowledge that the
act done in all probability will cause death. The provision
is directed at offences outside the range of Sections 299
and 300 IPC. The provision applies only to such acts
G which are rash and negligent and are directly cause of ~ :i. .._,..

death of another person. Negligence and rashness are
essential elements u/s. 304-A. Culpable negligence lies in
the failure to exercise reasonable and proper care and
the extent of its reasonableness will always depend upon
H the circumstances of each case. Rashness means doing
STATE OF KARNATAKA V MURALIDHAR

an act with the consciousness of a risk that evil A
consequences will follow but with the hope that it will not.
[Para 7] [406-F-H]
2.2 A negligent act is an act done without doing
something which a reasonable man guided upon those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of B
human affairs would do or act which a prudent or
t- reasonable man would not do in the circumstances
attending it. A rash act is a negligent act done precipitately.
Negligence is the genus, of which rashness is the species.
[Para 6] [405-G-H; 406-A-B] C
Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1937) AC 576
- referred to.
2.3 Negligence is a breach of duty imposed by law.
In criminal cases, the amount and degree of negligence
are determining factors. A question whether the accused's D
conduct amounted to culpable rashness or negligence
depends directly on the question as to what is the amount
of care and circumspection which a prudent and
reasonable man would consider to be sufficient consi-
dering all the circumstances of the case. [Para 7] [406-H; E
407-A-B]
2.4 Criminal rashness means hazarding a dangerous
or wanton act with the knowledge that it is dangerous or
wanton and the further knowledge that it may cause injury
but done without any intention to cause injury or know- F
ledge that it would probably be caused. [Para 7] [407-B]
Prabhakaran v_ State of Kera/a 2007 (8) SCALE 605 -
referred to.
Case Law Reference
G
2007 (8) SCALE 605 Referred to. Para 20
AIR 1991 SC 1463 Relied on. Para 21
402 us 183: 28
L.D. 2d 711 Referred to. Para 22 H
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 4 S.C.R.
-
A CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 428 of 2002
.
From the Judgement and Order dated 21.08.2000 of the
High Court of Karnataka, Criminal R. P. No. 64 of 1999.

B Anil Kr. Mishra, A. Rohen Singh, Amit Kr. Chawla Sanjay
R. Hegde, for the Appellant.
S.N. Bhat, for the Respondent.
•
The Judgement of the Court was delivered by ,...
c DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned
Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court allowing the Revision
Petition filed by the respondent. The respondent faced trial for
alleged commission of offence punishable under Sections 279,
D
338, 304-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC')
by learned Ill rd Additional Sessions Judge, Mangalore. For the
"
offence punishable under Section 338 IPC the respondent was
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and
to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- with default stipulation. For the offence
E :
punishable under Section 304-A IPC he was sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/
-with default stipulation. The appeal was dismissed by learned
)-
Ill rd Additional Sessions Judge, D.K. Mangalore.

F 2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

The respondent had been driving the bus on Ullal-Hejamadi
route on 3.12.1995 at about 10.30 a.m. A tempo was coming
from the opposite direction. Both the vehicles rubbed through
resulting in the right hand side portion of the bus hitting the right
G hand side portion of the tempo, as a result of which a boy sitting
at that hind portion of the tempo died and one passenger
sustained grievous injuries. It was in respect of this accident
..,.. . --
that the respondent came to be prosecuted and convicted.
The primary stand before the High Court was that the
H
STATE OF KARNATAKA V MURALIDHAR 405
[DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

.-· i. offences were such that the accused should not be required to A
undergo imprisonment. Accordingly, taking note bf Section 71
IPC, High Court held that for the offence under Section 338 IPC
the accused was to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- with default
stipulation and for the offence under Section 304-A the accused
was to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- with default stipulation and out of B
the total amount of Rs.6,000/- a sum of Rs.5,000/- was to be
paid to the father of the deceased boy.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant-State submitted that
the High Court has not indicated any reason as to why this was
not a fit case where custodial sentence was not to be imposed. C
The High Court found that the accused was rightly convicted for
the offence punishable under Sections 279, 338 and 304-A IPC.
After having so observed without any basis or reason the
custodial sentence was waived and fines were imposed. It was
also noted that no separate sentence was necessary in respect D
of offence under Section 279 IPC. It is submitted that the
sentences should be commensurate with the gravity of the
offence.
4. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand
submitted that the occurrence took place long back .::11d, E
therefore, taking the overall view waived the custodial sentence
and imposed fines.

5. In the instant case, 16 years old boy lost his life because
of the rash and negligent acts of the respondent. F
6. Section 304A speaks of causing death by negligence.
This section applies to rash and negligence acts and does not
apply to cases where death has been voluntarily caused. This
section obviously does not apply to cases where there is an
intention to cause death or knowledge that the act will in all G
__J probability cause death. It only applies to cases in which without
any such intention or knowledge death is caused by what is
described as a rash and negligent act. A negligent act is an act
done without doing something which a reasonable man guided
upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct H
406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 4 S.C.R.

A of human affairs would do or act which a prudent or reasonable
man would not do in the circumstances attending it. A rash act
is a negligent act done precipitately. Negligence is the genus,
of which rashness is the species. It has sometimes been
observed that in rashness the action is done precipitately that
s the mischievous or illegal consequences may fall, but with a
hope that they will not. Lord Atkin in Andrews v. Director of Public
Prosecutions (1937) AC 576 at p.583 = 2 All E.R. 552)
observed as under:

"Simple lack of care such as will constitute civil liability is
C not enough. For purposes of the criminal law there are
degrees of negligence; and a very high degree of
negligence is required to be proved before the felony is
established. Probably of all the epithets that can be applied
'recklessness' most nearly covers the case. It is difficult to
D visualize a case of death caused by reckless driving in the
connotation of that term in ordinary speech which would
not justify a conviction for manslaughter; but it is probably
not all embracing, for 'recklessness' suggests an
indifference to risk whereas the accused may have
E appreciated the risk and intended to avoid it, and yet shown
in the means adopted to avoid the risk such a high degree
of negligence as would justify a conviction."

7. Section 304-A applies to cases where there is no
intention to cause death and no knowledge that the act done in
F all probability will cause death. The provision is directed at
offences outside the range of Sections 299 and 300 IPC. The
provision applies only to such acts which are rash and negligent
and are directly cause of death of another person. Negligence
and rashness are essential elements under Section 304-A.
G Culpable negligence lies in the failure to exercise reasonable ]
and proper care and the extent of its reasonableness will always
depend upon the circumstances of each case. Rashness means
doing an act with the consciousness of a risk that evil
consequences will follow but with the hope that it will not.
H Negligence is a breach of duty imposed by law. In criminal cases,
STATE OF KARNATAKA V MURALIDHAR 407
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
.. ._
the amount and degree of negligence are determining factors.
A question whether the accused's conduct amounted to culpable
A

rashness or negligence depends directly on the question as to
what is the amount of care and circumspection which a prudent
and reasonable man would consider to be sufficient considering
all the circumstances of the case. Criminal rashness means B
hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it
is dangerous or wanton and the further knowledge that it may
~
cause injury but done without any intention to cause injury or
.~
knowledge that it would probably be caused .

8. As noted above, "Rashness" consists in hazarding a c
dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and
that it may cause injury. The criminality lies in such a case in
running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or
indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence on
the other hand, is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to D
exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to
guard against injury either to the public generally or to an
individual in particular, which, having regard to all the
circumstances out of which the charge has arisen it was the
imperative duty of the accused person ,to have adopted.
E
9. The distinction has been very aptly pointed out by
Holloway J. in these words:
1
"Culpable rashness is acting with the consciousness that
the mischievous and illegal consequences may follow, but
with the hope that they will not, and often with the belief F
that the actor has taken sufficient precautions to prevent
their happening. The imputability arises from acting despite
the consciousness. Culpable negligence is acting without
the consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect
-~'"' will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor G
has not exercised the caution incumbent upon him and
that if he had, he would have had the consciousness. The
imputability arises from the negligence of the civic duty of
circumspection." (See In re: Nidamorti Nagabhusanam
7 Mad. H.C.R. 119) H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.

A '°'......
A 10. Vehicular accidents resulting in deaths and injuries are
spiraling.

11. The Editorial under the heading "Road Traffic Injuries
& fatalities in India - a modern epidemic" in Indian J. Med. Res.
123, January 2006 contains some interesting observations. The
B relevant portions read as follows:

"The United Nations General Assembly adopted a 4

resolution on road safety on October 26, 2005 which invites .
Member States to implement the recommendations of the
c World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention; to
participate in the first United Nations Global Road Safety
Week; and to r~cognize the third Sunday in November of
every year as the World Day of Remembrance for Road
Traffic Victims'. This resolution follows the publication of
The World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention by the
D
World Health Organization in 2004. This report highlights
the fact that all over the world working age people are
more likely to suffer hospitalization, permanent disability
and death due to road traffic injuries than most other
diseases. The situation in India is not very different.
E
About 82,000 persons were killed on Indian roads in 2002.
Official statistics regarding serious injuries are not reliable
as they underestimate the actual number, but it is
estimated that the number of people hospitalized may be
F 15-20 times the number killed. In a do-nothing scenario,
it is possible that India will have 1,20,000 - 1,30,000 road
traffic fat~lities in the year 2008 and possibly 1,50,000 -
1,75,000 in 2015. Our vision should aim at reducing the
fatalities to less than 1,00,000 in the short term (2008)
G
and less than 70,000 in the long term (2015). ... . "
)()()( )()()( )()()(

Safety measures for the near future
)()()( )()()( )()()(

H
STATE OF KARNATAKA V MURALIDHAR 409
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

......../ ~ Motor vehicle occupants: (i) Enforcement of seatbelt use A
laws countrywide; (ii) restricting travel in front seat of cars
by children has the potential of reducing injuries
dramatically; and (iii) bus and truck occupant injuries,
fatalities, and injuries caused to other road users can be
reduced significantly by enforcing strict observance of B
speed limit regulations on highways. Ensuring that bus
timetables and truck movement schedules make it
< possible for drivers to observe speed limits with ease.
... Random speed checking on highways would help ensure
such measures. c
)()()( )()()( )()()(

Road safety strategies - Long term
Traffic calming and speed control: (i) Aim at implementing

-I
.. speed control and traffic calming measures in all urban
areas and at appropriate locations on rural highways by
D

altering road design, vehicle monitoring through intelligent
transport systems, and vehicle design by the year 2015.
This measure is likely to give us the maximum savings in
terms of lives and serious injuries; and (ii) segregated E
lanes for vulnerable road users and buses in urban areas.
Non-motorized transport and buses must be provided
segregated lanes on all major arterial roads in urban areas.
"' India specific designs need to be developed and phase
wise implementation plans drawn up for all cities. F
xxx xxx )()()(

Vehicle safely: (i) All vehicles sold in India should meet
international crashworthiness standards by 201 O; (ii) all
. A;-{
buses and trucks should meet pedestrian impact standards G
by 201 O; (iii) all urban buses to have low floors and
automatic closing doors; (iv) crashworthiness standards
must be developed for all indigenous vehicles by 2010
and implemented by 2012; (v) installation of Intelligent
Transport Systems (ITS) and other modern safety devices
H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.

A for assisting and controlling drivers; and (vi) driving under
the influence of alcohol and other drugs. A long term strategy
to reduce drinking and driving incidence to less than 10
per cent of all crashes needs to be drawn up for the next
10 yr. Sensitization of the public to the extent of the problem.
B Institution of random roadblocks and checking on urban
roads and rural highways. Ignition interlock on cars."
12. In "Global Road Safety" certain revealing data have
also been provided. They read as follows: •
c "THE COMING PLAGUE OF ROAD TRAFFIC INJURIES:
A PREVENTABLE BURDEN FE:>R RICH AND POOR
COUNTRIES".
13. Almost 1.2 million people are killed each year and 20-
50 million are injured or disabled, most people are unaware
D that road traffic injuries are a leading cause of death and •
disability.
14. In developing countries, death rates from vehicle
crashes are rising, and disproportionately high in relation to the
E number of crashes. According to a report published in 2000
Developing and transitional countries cumulatively
represent over 85 percent of all road traffic deaths
Kenya has nearly 2,000 fatalities per 10,000 crashes.
Vietnam has over 3,000 fatalities per 10,000
F crashes.
44% of all road traffic deaths occur in the Asia/Pacific
area, which only has 16 % of the total number of
motor vehicles.
G • At 71,495 and 59,927 total deaths, China and India,
respectively, had the highest number of road fatalities
in the world in 1995.-
Pedestrian deaths represent 62 % of all traffic
fatalities i11 Lebanon. In most developing countries
H
STATE OF KARNATAKA V MURALIDHAR 411
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
'-.
#.
vulnerable road users, including pedestrians, bicycle A
and motor cycle riders, account for the majority of all
fatalities.
• Eastern European countries represent 6% of motor
vehicles, but 11 % of crash fatalities worldwide.
B
The Latin America/Caribbean region has the second
~
highest crash costs behind Asia.
15. As vehicle use in developing countries are increasing,
~
road traffic injuries are expected to become the third leading
cause of death and disability worldwide by 2020. In developing c
countries, each vehicle is much more lethal than the vehicles in
developed countries, because it most frequently takes the lives
not of vehicle occupants, but of vulnerable road users:
pedestrians, cyclists. Many developing countries are increasing
the rate of motorized vehicle use at up to 18% per year. In India, D
for example, there has been a 23% in~rease in the number of
vehicles from 1990-1999 and a 60-fold increase is predicted
by 2050.
16. The human toll in such accidents is tragic. Survivors
E
. and family members are affected not only by an immediate death
or disability, but also lifetime psychological and physical
~ suffering. Crashes often result in orphans, and some victims,
as young as infants, spend the rest of their lives with medical
facilities.
F
ECONOMIC IMPACT
17. In addition to the devastating human toll, the economic
impact of road crashes is also enormous. Many of those injured
or killed are wage earners, leaving families destitute and without
•,.+-f means of support. Loss of wages, property damage, and other G
factors affected by road traffic crashes represented 4.6% of
the gross national product of the United States in 1994. In
' developing countries, road traffic crashes represent 3-5% of
the GNP. 'The estimated annual cost of road traffic crashes in
developing countries exceeds $100 billion (US). This amounts H
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.

A to nearly double the total combined development assistance
A -
these countries receive every year from bilateral and multi-lateral
government organizations. Globally, the estimated annual costs
of road crashes are 500 billion (US).
THIS PROBLEM IS PREVENTABLE
B
18. We have the tools needed to combat this epidemic. In
the developed nations, proven methods such as enforcement l
of laws regarding driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs,
reducing speed limits, and requiring seat belts and restraints
•.,--
c have shown significant reduction in traffic fatalities. Road design
and road environment, vehicle design, and road safety standards
are also strategies that successfully address traffic safety. For
maximum impact of RTl's, a systems approach with multiple,
scientifically proven prevention techniques must be employed.
Education alone has been shown to be less effective, and often
D
ineffective.
•
19. Proven interventions for developed countries require
research, modification, and testing for developing countries. For
example, developing countries face poorly designed and
E maintained roadways, unsafe vehicles, drivers under the
influence of drugs or alcohol, lack of national policies, and
inadequate enforcement. Success will require significant new
resources supported by sustained political commitment.
'•
20. These aspects were highlighted in Prabhakaran v.
F State of Kera/a (2007 (8) SCALE 605).
21. Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would
do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public
confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long
endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of ~;..-
G
every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature
of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or
'r1·.i
committed etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by this :~
Court in Sevaka Perum::il ete. v. State of Tamil Naidu (AIR 1991
SC 1463).
H
STATE OF KARNATAKA V MURALIDHAR 413
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

" 22. After giving due consideration to the facts and A
circumstances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate
sentence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and
mitigating factors and circumstances in which a crime has been
committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of really
relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner by the Court. B
Such act of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It has been very
aptly indicated in Dennis Councle MCGDautha v. State of
+-
Callifornia: 402 US 183: 28 L.D. 2d 711 that no formula of a

"" foolproof nature is possible that would provide a reasonable
criterion in determining a just and appropriate punishment in c
the infinite variety of circumstances that may affect the gravity
of the crime. In the absence of any foolproof formula which may
provide any basis for reasonable criteria to correctly assess
various circumstances germane to the consideration of gravity
•: of crime, the discretionary judgment in the facts of each case, D
is the only way in which such judgment may be equitably
distinguished.
23. The object should be to protect the society and to deter
the criminal in achieving the avowed object of law by imposing
appropriate sentence. It is expected that the Courts would E
operate the sentencing system so as to impose such sentence
which reflects the conscience of the society and the sentencing
f
process has to be stern where it should be.
24. Imposition of sentence without considering its effect F
on the social order in many cases may be in reality a futile
exercise. The social impact of the crime, e.g. where it relates to
offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping, misappropriation
of public money, treason and other offences involving moral
, ~ ~
turpitude or moral delinquency which have great impact on social G
order, and public interest, cannot be lost sight of and per se
require exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude by imposing
meager..._sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on
account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be result-
wise counter productive in the long run and against societal H
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.

A interest which needs to be cared for and strengthened by string
of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system.
25. The Court will be failing in its duty if appropriate
punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been
committed not only against the individual victim but also against
8 the society to which the criminal and victim belong. The
punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant
but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and
brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity
of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it should "respond
C to the society's cry for justice against the criminal".

26. This is a case where the High Court has without
considering the relevant aspects and even without indicating
any reason, waived the custodial sentence and imposed only
fine. The judgment therefore is clearly unsustainable. The
0
impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of •
the trial Court is restored.
27. The appeal is allowed.

K.K.T. Appeal allowed.