Supreme Court of India

STATE OF KARNATAKAversusLAXUMAN

Citation: 2005 INSC 521
Decided: 25 October 2005
Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
Bench: R C LAHOTI

Holding

The right to compel a reference under Section 18(3)(b) and the Deputy Commissioner’s power to make a reference both lapse three years and 90 days after the claimant’s timely application for reference, and Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply.

Summary

The State of Karnataka appealed against High Court orders that had allowed a claimant, Laxuman, to file a belated application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Karnataka‑amended Land Acquisition Act seeking a court‑directed reference for enhanced compensation. The claimant had filed the initial application for reference within the statutory 90‑day period, but the Deputy Commissioner failed to make the reference within the further 90‑day period, and the claimant waited more than ten years before approaching the court. The Supreme Court examined whether the right to compel a reference and the Deputy Commissioner’s power to make a reference extinguish after three years and 90 days from the claimant’s application, and whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act could revive the claim. It held that both the claimant’s right to move the court and the Deputy Commissioner’s power cease after the prescribed period, and that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is inapplicable. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court orders, dismissed the claimant’s applications for reference, and allowed the State’s appeal.

Issues considered

Whether the right of the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference and the claimant's right to move the court under Section 18(3)(b) are extinguished after three years and 90 days from the claimant's application for reference.
Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be invoked to condone delay in an application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Karnataka‑amended Land Acquisition Act.

Legislation cited

Limitation Act, 1963s. 137, s. 5

Subjects

Land acquisitionReference to courtCompensation enhancementLimitation periodStatutory interpretationExtinguishment of right

Judgment

STATE OF KARNATAKA A
v.
LAXUMAN

OCTOBER 25, 2005

[R.C. LAHOTI, CJ., G.P. MATHUR AND P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, JJ.] B

Land Acquisition:

Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
c
Section 18 (as amended and adopted in State of Karnataka)-Reference
to Court-Application under S. 18(3)(b)-Limitation period-Applicability
of S. 5 of the Limitation Act-Notice of award under S. 12(2) served on the
claimant-Claimant filed application under S. 18(1) seeking reference within
90 days as laid down in S. 18(2)-Deputy Commissioner failed to make a D
reference within 90 days as laid down in S. l 8(3)(a)-Claimant approached
civil court under S. 18(3)(b) after JO years-Application for condonation of
delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act also filed-Civil Judge condoned delay
and directed Deputy Commissioner to make a reference-High Court refused
to interfere-Correctness of-Held: On expiry of a period of three years and
90 days right of Deputy Commissioner to make a reference and that of E
claimant to move the court gets extinguished-Section 5 of the Limitation Act
cannot be invoked to an application under S. J8(3)(b)-High Court's
judgment set aside-Limitation Act, 1963, S. 5.

The notice of award under S. 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(as amended and adopted in the State of Karnataka) was served on the F
respondent-claimant The respondent filed an application under Section 18(1)
ofthe Act (as amended and adopted in the State of Karnataka) within 90 days
as prescribed under Section 18(2) of the Act. But the Deputy Commissioner
did not make a reference within 90 days as provided under Section 18(3)(a)
·of the Act. The respondent approached the civil court under Section 18(3)(b) G
of the Act after more than 10 years after receipt of the notice of the award.
The respondent also filed an application for condonation of delay under Section
5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The civil judge condoned the delay and directed
the Deputy commissioner to make a reference in terms of Section 18 of the

535 H
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Act In revision, the High Court refused to interfere on the ground that Section
5 of the Limitation Act had application and there was no reason to interfere
with the condoning of the delay by the civil judge. Hence the appeal. The
following questions arose before the Court:-

(1) Whether on expiry of the period of three years and 90 days the right
B of the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference and that of the claimant to
move the court get extinguished?

(2) Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be invoked to an
application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (as
C amended and adopted in the State of Karnataka)?
Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The State Legislature by an amendment brought to Section
18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 substituted the proviso to Section 18(2)
D by replacing the period of six weeks by a period of 90 days and making the
starting point, the date of service of notice from the Deputy Commissioner
under Section 12(2) of the Act. Section 18(3) was added directing that the
Deputy Commissioner should make the reference to the court within a period
of90 days from the date of receipt of the application under Section 18(1) of
the Act. If he failed to do so within the period of 90 days, the party was given
E a right under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act to apply to the court to direct the
Deputy Commissioner to make the reference and the court was conferred the
power to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within such
period as may be fixed by the court. 1543-D-F]

2. No time for applying to the court in terms of Section 18(3) of the Act
F is fixed by the statute. But since the application is to the court, though under
a special enactment, Article 137, the residuary article of the Limitation Act,
1963 would be attracted and the application has to be made within three years
of the application for making a reference or the expiry of 90 days after the
application. 1544-D-EI
G The Addi. Sp/. land Acquisition Officer v. Thakoredas, Major, AIR
(1994) SC 2227, Kera/a State Electricity Boardv. T.P. Kunhaliumma, 11976]
4 SCC 634 and Officer on Special Duty (land Acquisition) v. Shah Manila/
Chandulal, (1969] 9 SCC 414, relied on.

Special land Acquisition Officer v. G.C. Paramraj, ILR 1991(2)
H
STATE OF KARNA TAKA v. LAXUMAN 537

Karnataka 1109, approved. A
3. On a plain understanding of the Scheme of Section 18 of the Act as
amended in Karnataka, it is apparent that a claimant has to make an
application for reference within a period of 90 days of the service of notice
under Section 12(2) of the Act. The Section casts a duty on the concerned
officer to make a reference within 90 days of the receipt of the application B
for reference. The mere inaction on the part of the officer does not affect or
straightaway extinguish the right of the claimant-applicant. The claimant is
conferred the right to approach the court but he has to do so, within three
years of his having made an application for reference in view of the general
law of limitation. It is in this context that it has been held that the time available C
to a claimant for approaching the court for getting a reference made, is in all
three years and 90 days from the date of the accrual of the cause·of action.
That accrual is when he makes an application for reference within the time
prescribed by Section 18(2) of the Act. The controversy that is generated in
these appeals is whether on the expiry of the said period of three years and
90 days, the right of the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference and that D
of the claimant to move the court get extinguished. It is to be remembered
that the claimant had made his application for reference within the 90 days
prescribed by the statute. Should a construction be adopted which will lead to
a position that a claimant who has done his part, loses his right on the failure
of the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within 90 days of the E
receipt of the application for reference? That will depend on the statutory
scheme. (545-G-H; 546-A-D]

4. Under the Karnataka scheme, the period for making an application
for reference has been enhanced from six weeks to 90 days and the terminus
a quo is the receipt of notic~ from the Collector under Section 12(2) of the F
Act. The Section proceeds further and imposes a duty on the Deputy
Commissioner to make the reference to the Court within 90 days from the
date of receipt of the application under Section 18( 1) of the Act. Though it
may not be conclusive what one has to notice is that expression used is "shall"
and not "may". The scheme does contemplate a situation where the Deputy
Commissioner, in spite of the peremptory nature of the duty cast on him, still G
fails to make the reference within the time stipulated by Section 18(3)(a).
The claimant is, therefore, given the right to approach the Court, namely, the
Court that is to deal with the claim on the reference being made, to direct the
Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within a time to be fixed by the
Court. This right to apply to the Court which is to deal with the reference, is H
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R

A not available under the Central Act.1547-D-F]
5. Extinguishment of a right can be expressly provided for or it can arise
by the implication from the statute. Section 18 of the Act as in Karnataka
sets out a scheme. Having made an application for reference within time before
the Deputy Commissioner, the claimant may lose his right by not enforcing
B the right available to him within the time prescribed by law. Section 18(3)(a)
and Section 18(3)(b) read in harmony, casts an obligation on the claimant to
enforce his claim within the period available for it. The scheme brings about
a repose. It is based on a public policy that a right should not be allowed to
remain a right indefinitely to be used against another at the will and pleasure
C of the holder of the right by approaching the court whenever he chooses to do
so. When the right of the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference on
the application of the claimant under Section 18( I) of the Act stands
extinguished on the expiry of 3 years and 90 days from the date of application
for reference, and the right of the claimant to move the Court for compelling
a reference also stands extinguished, the right itself loses its enforceability
D and thus comes to an end as a result. This is the scheme of Section 18 of the
Act as adopted in the State of Karnataka. The High Court is, therefore, not
correct in searching for a specific provision bringing about an extinguishment
of the right to have a reference and on not finding it, postulating that the
right would survive for ever. [551-E-H; 552-A-B]

E State of M.P. v. Bhai Lal AIR (1964) SC 1006, referred to.

6. Under the scheme .of Section 18 of the Act as in Karnataka the
claimant loses his right to move the Court for reference on the expiry of three
years and 90 days from the date of his making an application to the Deputy
F Commissioner under Section 18 (I) of the Act within the period fixed by
Section 18(2) of the Act. This loss of right to move the court precludes him
from seeking a remedy from the court in terms of Section 18 of the Act. This
loss of right in the claimant puts an end to the right of the claimant to seek
an enhancement of compensation. To say that the Deputy Commissioner can
make a reference even after the right in that behalf is lost to the claimant
G would be incongruous. Once the right of the claimant to enforce his claim
itself is lost on the scheme of Section 18 of the Act, there is no question of
the Deputy Commissioner who had violated the mandate of Section 18(3)(a) of
the Act, reviving the right of the claimant by making a reference at his sweet
will and pleasure, whatever be the inducement or occasion for doing so. On a
H harmonious understanding of the scheme of the Act in the light of the general
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. LAXUMAN 539
principle that even though a right may not be extinguished, the remedy may A
become barred, it would be appropriate to hold that on the expiry of three years
and 90 days from the date of application for reference made within time under
Section 18(1) of the Act the remedy of the claimant to have a reference gets
extinguished and the right to have an enhancement becomes unenforceable.
The Deputy Commissioner would not be entitled to revive a claim which has B
thus become unenforceable due to lapse of time or non-diligence on the part
of the claimant. [552-B-F]

The Addi. Sp!. Land Acquisition Officer v. Thakoredas, Major AIR (1994)
SC 2227, relied on.

Assistant Commissioner v. Laxmi Bai !LR 1987 Karnataka 2132, C
approved.

Hanamappa v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer !LR (1998)
Karnataka 4071 (FB), overruled.

7. On the failure of the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference within D
90 days from the date of an application under Section 18(1) of the Act, the
claimant is given the right to approach the Land Acquisition Court seeking
the compelling of a reference by the Deputy Commissioner. Once the right to
move for a compelled reference is lost to the claimant on the scheme of Section
18, the very right to have a claim for enhancement, would come to an end in E
view of the fact that the remedy in that behalf becomes barred. Thereafter, the
Deputy Commissioner cannot revive that right to a reference. [553-F-GJ

8. The right to have a reference enforced through Court or through the
Deputy Commissioner becomes extinguished on the expiry of three years and
90 days from the date of the application for reference made in time. Consistent F
with this position it has necessarily to be held that Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 would not be available since the consequence of not enforcing the
right to have a reference made on the scheme of Section 18 of the Act as
obtaining in Karnataka, is to put an end to the right to have a reference at all.
Since in that sense it is an extin~uishment of the right, the right cannot be G
revived by resorting to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. [554-G-H; 555-AJ

The Addi. Sp/. Land Acquisition Officer v. Thakoredas, Major AIR
(1994) SC 2227, relied on.

The Addi. Sp/. Land Acquisition Officer v. Thakoredas, Major AIR H
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A (1994) SC 2227 and Assistant Commissioner v. Laxmi Bai, ILR (1987)
Karnataka 2132, approved.

CIVIL APPELL<\ TE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2024 of 1999.

From the Judgment and Order dated 11.9.98 of the Karnataka High Court
B in C.R.P. No. 3682of1995.
WITH

C.A. Nos. 4459/99, 607-609, 5547/2000, 1566 and 1567 of2001.

C Sanjay R. Hegde, Anil K. Mishra, A. Rohen Singh and N. Ganpathy,
(NP) for the Appellant.

K. Radhakrishnan and Mrs. K. Sarada Devi for the Respondent No.
1566/2001.

D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

P.K. BALASUBRAMANY AN, J. All these appeals involve questions
connected with the scope and effect of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition
Act as amended and adopted in the State of Karnataka. The brief facts leading
to the appeals are as under.
E
CIVIL APPEAL N02024 OF 1999

The State challenges the order of the learned Single Judge of the
Karnataka High Court in Civil Revision Petition No.3682 of 1995 by which the
learned Judge dismissed the revision fil.ed by the State challenging the order
F of the Civil Judge, being the land acquisition court, purporting to condone
the delay in filing an application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Land Acquisition
Act, as amended in Karnataka. The notice of the award under Section 12(2)
of the Act was served on the claimant on 6.1.1984. Under Section 18(2) of the
Act, the claimant had 90 days from the date of service of that notice, to seek
a reference under that Section for enhancement of compensation. The
G respondent claimed that an application under Section 18(1) of the Act seeking
a reference was filed on 15.3.1984, within 90 days of 6.1.1984, but the reference
was not made by the Deputy Commissioner within 90 days thereafter as
enjoined by Section I 8(3)(a) of the Act. The claimant approached the civil
court under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act only in April 1994, more than IO years
H after the receipt of the notice of the award. The claimant also purported to
STATE OF KARNA TAKA v. LAXUMAN [BALASUBRAMANY AN, J.] 541

file an application for condoning the delay in making the application. This was A
in view of the fact that it had been held that an application to the court under
Section 18(3)(b) of the Act had to be made within three years of the expiry
of 90 days of the date of making an application seeking a reference for
enhancement of compensation. The State opposed the application for
condoning the delay on the ground that Section 5 of the Limitation Act had B
no application and that, in any event, no ground was made out for condoning
the long delay of ten years in filing the application. The civil judge proceeded
to condone the delay and proceeded to direct the Deputy Commissioner to
make a reference in terms of Section 18 of the Act. In revision, the High Court
refused to interfere on the ground that Section 5 of the Limitation Act had
application and there was no reason to interfere with the condoning of the C
delay by the civil judge. The High Court apparently without even a verification,
merely accepted the evidence of PW I that he had made an application within
90 days of the receipt of the notice of the award under Section 12(2) of the
Act. Feeling aggrieved by that order, this appeal by special leave has been
filed by the State.
D
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4459 OF 1999

In this case, the civil judge dismissed the application made under
Section 18(3 )(b) of the Act by the respondent on the ground that the application
was barred by limitation. This order of the civil judge was challenged in an
appeal before the District Judge. It is not clear under what provision such an E
appeal was filed, since under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act as
amended in Karnataka no appeal is provided to the District Court from such
an order of the civil judge and an appeal is provided only against the award.
The appellate court is seen to have held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act
was ·applicable and the learned civil judge ·was in error in dismissi°ng the p
application for compelling the reference under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act
without deciding the prayer for condonation of the delay in filing that
application. This order of the District Judge was challenged in revision before
the High Court. The High Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act had
application and declined to interfere with the order of remand made by the
Additional District Judge. The High Court, thus, dismissed the revision filed G
by the State. Aggrieved by this order, the State has come up with this appeal
by special leave.

CIVIL APPEAL NOs.607-609 of 2000

In the first case it appears that the application for reference under H
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Section 18(1) of the Act itself was made only two years after the award.
Another seven years thereafter an application for compelling a reference was
made under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act. The civil judge dismissed the
application on the ground that it was out of time. Ten years thereafter, the
claimant filed a revision as C.R.P. No.1505of1997 before the High Court. The
High Court ignored the delay of ten years in filing the revision in a somewhat
B cavalier manner and allowing the revision remitted the reference application
to the Land Acquisition Court for entertaining the application under Section
18(3)(b) of the Act. The others were cases ofa similar nature. In all of them
there was considerable delay in making the application for reference and also
delay in approaching the court. In these revisions also, same lack of application
C of mind was exhibited by the High Court and the revisions were allowed and
the applications remitted. The common order thus passed, is subjected to
challenge in these appeals.

CIVIL APPEAL N0.5547 OF 2000

D The State challenges the order of the High Court passed under the same
circumstances leading to the challenge in C.A. No.4459 of 1999. Here the
application for compelling a reference was dismissed on the ground that it ·
was out of time. The District court permitted the claimant to file an application
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and directed its consideration. The High
Court refused to interfere.
E
CIVIL APPEAL N0.1567 OF 2001

In this appeal, the State of Karnataka challenges the order in Civil
Revision Petition No. 956 of 1998. In this case also the civil judge dismissed
the application unJe:;r Section l 8(3)(b) of the Act in view of the fact that it
F was not within time. An appeal was purported to be filed by the claimant
under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The same was allowed
and the matter was remanded. Against the order of the District Court, the
revision was filed by the State challenging the competence of the order. The
High Court refused to interfere based on the same reasons it had adopted in
G the order giving rise to Civil Appeal No.4459 of 1999. Feeling aggrieved, the
State has filed this appeal by special leave.

CIVIL APPEAL N0.1566 OF 2001

This appeal challenges the decision of the Full Bench of the Karnataka
H High Court which by a majority held that even though the right to the
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. LAXUMAN [BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.] 543

claimant to apply for compelling a reference under Section 18(3)(b) of the A·
Land Acquisition Act, as amended in the State of Karnataka may be lost, the
Deputy Commissioner could still make a reference even if it be after ten years,
if he so chose and that in such a situation, the court could also compel a
reference notwithstanding that the period for applying for reference has
expired. The State challenges the above view adopted by the Full Bench by
a majority and contends that the minority view holding that once the right B
to the claimant to apply has come to end, the question of reference does not
arise, is the correct one and deserves to be accepted.

2. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition of the Act, 1894 (for short "the
Act") as amended by Act 68 of 1984 provided that a person interested in a C
land acquired and who has not accepted the award of compensation by the
Collector, could apply to the Collector for a reference of his claim within six
weeks of the date of the award if he was present at the time of making of the
award and within six weeks of the notice from the Collector under Section
12(2) of the Act if he was not so present. In a case that may not be covered
by either of the above situations, the claimant has to make his application D
within six months of the date of the award of the Collector. The State Legislature
by an amendment brought to Section 18 of the Act substituted the proviso
to Section 18(2) by replacing the period of six weeks by a period of 90 days
and making the starting point, the date of service of notice from the Deputy
Commissioner under Section 12(2) of the Act. Sub-section (3) was added E
directing that the Deputy Commissioner should make the reference to the
court within a period of 90 days from the date of receipt of the application
under sub-section (I) of Section 18 of the Act. If he failed to do so within
the period of 90 days, the party was given a right under Section 18(3)(b) of
the Act to apply to the court to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the
reference and the court was conferred the power to direct the Deputy F
Commissioner to make the reference within such period as may be fixed by
the court. For the purpose of convenience it will be better to quote the section
as amended in the State of Karnataka:

"18. REFERENCE TO COURT(!) Any person interested who has
not accepted the award or amendment thereof, may by written G
application to the Deputy Commissioner require that the matter be
referred by the Deputy Commissioner for determination of the court,
whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount
of the compensation, the person to whom it is payable, or the
apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. H
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A (2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the
award is taken:

Provided that every such application shall be made within ninety
days from the date of service of the notice from the Deputy
Commissioner under sub-section (2) of Section 12.
B
3. (a) The Deputy Commissioner shall, within ninety days from the
date of receipt of an application under sub-section ( 1) make a reference
to the Court.

(b) If the Deputy Commissioner does not make a reference to the
c Court within a period of ninety days from the date of receipt of the
application, the applicant may apply to the court to direct the Deputy
Commissioner to make the reference, and the Court may direct the
Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within such time as the
Court may fix."

D The court to which the application was to be made was the principal
civil court of original jurisdiction.

3. As can be seen, no time for applying to the court in terms of sub-
section (3) is fixed by the statute. But since the application is to the court,
though under a special enactment, Article 137, the residuary article\of the
E Limitation Act, 1963, would be attracted and the application has to be made
within three years of the application· for making a reference or the expiry of
90 days after the application. The position is settled by the decision of this
Court in The Addi. Sp/. Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. Thakoredas,
Major and Ors., AIR (1994) SC 2227. It was held:
F "Admittedly, the cause of action for seeking a reference had arisen on
the date of service of the award under Section 12(2) of the Act. Within
90 days from the date of the service of notice, the respondents made
the application requesting the Deputy Commissioner to refer the cases
to the Civil Court under Section 18. Under the amended sub-section
G 3(a) of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner shall, within 90 days from
September 1, 1970 make reference under Section 18 to the Civil Court
which he failed to do . Consequently, by operation of sub-section 3(b)
with the expiry of the aforestated 90 days, the cause of action had
accrued to the respondents to make an application to the Civil Court
with a prayer to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference.
H There is no period of limitation prescribed in sub-section 3(b) to make
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. LAXUMAN [BALASUBRAMANYAN,J.] 545

tpat application but it should be done within limitation prescribed by A
the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Since no Article expressly prescribed
the limitation to make such application, the residuary article under
Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act gets :ittracted. Thus,
it could be seen that in the absence of any special period of limitation
prescribed by clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act, B
the application should have been made within three years from the
date of expiry of 90 days prescribed in Section 18(3){b) i.e. the date
on which cause of action had accrued to the respondent-claimant.
Since the applications had been admittedly made beyond three years,
it was clearly barred by limitation. Since, the High Court relied upon
the case in Municipal Corporation of Athani AIR (1969) SC 1335, C
which has stood overruled, the order of the High Court is
unsustainable."

This position is also supported by the reasoning in Kera/a State Electricity
Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, [1976) 4 SCC 634. It may be seen that under the
Central Act sans the Karnataka amendment there was no right to approach D
the principal civil court of original jurisdiction to compel a reference and no
time limit was also fixed for making such an approach. Allihat was required
of a claimant was to make an application for reference within six weeks of the
award or the notice of the award, as the case may be. But obviously the State
Legislature thought it necessary to provide a time frame for the claimant to E
make his claim for enhanced compensation and for ensuring an expeditious
disposal of the application for reference by the authority under the Act fixing
a time within which he is to act and conferring an additional right on the
claimant to approach the civil court on satisfying the condition precedent of
having made an application for reference withi.n the time prescribed.
F
4. A statute can, even while conferring a right, provide also for a repose.
The Limitation Act is not an equitable piece of legislation but is a statute of
repose. The right undoubtedly available to a litigant becomes unenforceable
if the litigant does not approach the court within the time prescribed. It is in
this context that it has been said that the law is for the diligent. The law
expects a litigant to seek the enforcement of a right available to him within G
a reasonable. time of the arising of the cause of action and that reasonable
time is reflected by the various articles of the Limitation Act.

5. On a plain understanding of the scheme of Section 18 of the Act as
amended in Karnataka, it is apparent that a claimant has to make an application H
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005)SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A for reference within a period of 90 days of the service of notice under Section
12(2) of the Act. The section casts a duty on the concerned officer to make
a reference within 90 days of the receipt of the application for reference. The
mere inaction on the part of the officer does not affect or straightaway
extinguish, the right of the claimant-applicant. The claimant is conferred the
right to approach the court but he has to do so, within three years of his
B having made an application for reference in view of the general law oflimitation.
It is in this context that it has been held that the time available to a claimant
for approaching the court for getting a reference made, is in all, three years
and 90 days from the date of the accrual of the cause of action. That accrual
is when he makes an application for reference within the time prescribed by
C Section 18(2) of the Act. The controversy that is generated in these appeals
is whether on the expiry of the said period of three years and 90 days, the
right of the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference and that of the claimant
to move the court, get extinguished. It is to be remembered that the claimant
had made his application for reference within the 90 days prescribed by the
statute. Should a construction be adopted which will lead to a position that
D a claimant who has done his part, loses his right on the failure of the Deputy
Commissioner to make the reference within 90 days of the receipt of the
application for reference? That will depend on the statutory scheme. If we
construe the provision as conferring on the litigant a further right to approach
the court for getting the matter referred, in case a Deputy Commissioner fails
E to make a reference within 90 days of the receipt of the application, we have
prima facie to say that on his failure to approach the court and get the
reference made, he would lose his right to have a reference for enhancement
of compensation. Obviously, the mischief that was sought to be averted by
the Legislature was the causing of undue delay by Deputy Commissioners in
making references and the making of highly belated references, sometimes
F based on applications clandestinely received long after the award itself had
been made. If we keep this object in view, the conclusion possible is that, if ·
a claimant does not get his claim referred to the court within three years of
his making the application before the Deputy Commissioner within the period
fixed and the accrual of a cause of action, his right to claim enhancement of
G compensation would get extinguished. In the context of Section 28A of the
Act, there will be no irreparable prejudice caused to the claimant since he can
always make a claim for more based on any enhancement of award by a court
in any other reference arising out of the acquisition under the same notification.
The difference may be only in the matter of interest and the like.

H 6. Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended in Karnataka is
STA TE OF KARNA TAKA v. LAXUMAN [BALASUBRAMANY AN, J.] 547

self contained. The amendments substantially alter the position as obtaining A
under Section 18 of the Central Act. Under the Central Act, there is only an
obligation on the claimant who is not satisfied with the award of compensation
and receives it under protest, to make an application to the Collector for
making a reference of his claim for enhancement to the Court and to ensure
that his application is made within the time provided under sub-Section (2) B
of that Section. In other words, once an application has been made for making
a reference for enhancement, no further right is conferred on him, except, may
be that he can approach the High Court in its writ jurisdiction, seeking the
issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Collector to perform the duty
imposed on him by Section 19 of the Act, by making an appropriate reference.
Even in such a case, it is open to the High Court to decline to issue a writ C
as sought for by a claimant, when the approach to the High Court is unduly
delayed or the petitioner is guilty of latches.

7. Under the Kamataka scheme, the period for making an application for
reference has been enhanced from six weeks to 90 days and the terminus a
quo is the receipt of notice from the Collector under Section 12(2) of the Act. D
The Section proceeds further and imposes a duty on the Deputy Commissioner
to make the reference to the Court within 90 days from the date of receipt of
the application under Section 18( I) of the Act. Though it may not be conclusive
what one has to notice is that expression used is "shall" and not "may". The
scheme does contemplate a situation where the Deputy Commissioner, in E
spite of the peremptory nature of the duty cast on him, still fails to make the
reference within the time stipulated by sub-Section 3(a) of Section 18. The
claimant is, therefore, given the right to approach the Court, namely, the Court
that is to deal with the claim on the reference being made, to direct the Deputy
Commissioner to make the referenci: within a time to be fixed by the Court.
This right to apply to the Court which is to deal with the reference, is not F
available under the Central Act.

8. Whatever might have been the controversy in the High Court in that
regard, after the decision of this Court in The Addi. Sp/. Land Acquisition
Officer, Bangalore v. Thakoredas, Major and Ors., (supra), the time for
approaching the court under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act stands crystalised. G
The application has to be made within three years of the expiry of 90 days
_ from the date of application under Section 18( 1) of the Act made by the
claimant. If the application is not made within that time the right to move is
lost. In that case, the court dismissed the application under Section 18(3)(b)
of the Act. We have, therefore, to proceed on the basis that the remedy of H
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

· A approaching the court under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act gets extinguished on
the expiry of the period limited therefor.

9. This Court has also held that in proceedings under the Land
Acquisition Act before the authorities under that Act, Section 5 of the
Limitation Act has no application (See Officer on Special Duty (Land
B Acquisition) and Anr. v. Shah Manila/ Chandulal and Ors., [1996] 9 SCC 414.
Therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be resorted to while making
an application under Section 18( I) of the Act and the application has to be
made within the period fi~d by Section 18(2) of the Act.

10. The Division Bench of the High Court in Special Land Acquisition
C Officer v. Q.C. Paramraj, !LR (1991) 2 Karnataka 1109 held that the reference
court has not only the power, but also the duty, to consider whether the
reference was time barred and therefore invalid. It also held that Article. 137
of the Limitation Act applies to an application under Section 18(3)(b) of the
Act, a position approved by this Court. Then the Division Bench held that
D the power to make a reference under Section 18(3) subsists till the right of
the party to make an application before the court seeking a direction to the
Deputy Commissioner to make a reference exists and from this it followed that
there is no power in the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference thereafter
and if such a reference is made by the Deputy Commissioner, it is invalid. An
application to the court not made within 3 years after the expiry of 90 days
E from the date of the application under Section 18(1) of the Act, had to be
rejected in limini. The Division Bench laid down the law thus:-

"It is a well recognized rule of construction that in order to ascertain
the true meaning of a provision the intention of the Legislature, as
ascertainable from the language of the provision is the safe guide.
F From the amendment of Section 18, it is clear that in addition to the
time limit of 90 days fixed in Section 18, the Legislature intended to
create a duty in the Deputy Commissioner to make a Reference within
90 days and further if within the said period the Deputy Commissioner/
Land Acquisition Officer failed to make a Reference, to confer a right
G on the party to make an application before the Court seeking a direction
to the Deputy Commissioner to make the Reference. If that right is not
exercised by the party within time, then the right ceases. Once the
right of the party to get a Reference is time barred, it would be
incongruous to hold that the Deputy Commissioner can still make a
Reference,
,, at any time even after decades. In our view, it is reasonable
H
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. LAXUMAN [BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.) 549

to construe the provision to mean that the date on which the right of j
the party to get a Reference comes to an end would also be the date
on which the power of the Deputy Commissioner to make Reference
comes to an end. We are not persuaded to agree with the construction
suggested for the respondent that the power of the Officer continues
even after the right of the party comes to an end and continues for
ever. It means even after an application made before the Court after I
three years is rejected as the Court is powerless ·to entertain a time
barred application, the Deputy Commissioner would have the power
to make a Reference, nullifying the order of the Court rejecting the
application as time barred. Such a construction would lead to a situation
in which in one case the Deputy Commissioner could make a Reference

- if he so desires and in another he could refuse to do so, if he so
desires, in which even the party would be helpless. In other words,
the Deputy Commissioner could act according to his whims and
fancies. It is difficult to agree that the Legislature intended to bring
about such a result. Further, such a construction which brings about
anomalous and incongruous results and gives ample scope for
nepotism, favouritism and corruption, should not be given. We have
come across several Re~erences made after two decades, particularly
after several additional benefits were conferred by Amending Act 68
of 1984 amending the Land Acquisition Act. In our opinion, the
correct view to take is, just as the party loses the right to the Reference
if no application is made within 90 days in terms of Section 18(2), the
party, who had made an application within 90 days loses the right to
secure a Reference ifhe fails to make an application within three years
after the expiry of 90 days from the date of the Reference application
and consequently the power of the Deputy Commissioner/Land
Acquisition Officer to make Reference comes to an end. We are,
therefore, of the view that the date of cessation of the Deputy
Commissioner to make the Reference also constitutes the date of
cessation of power of the Deputy Commissioner. To put it in a nutshell
the latter comes to an end on the date on which the former ends and
the award of the Land Acquisition Officer becomes final. Therefore,
neither the party can seek a Reference nor the Deputy Commissioner
can make the Reference after the expiry of 3 years and 90 days from
the date of the Reference application."

11. In view of some differences of opinion that subsequently arose
mainly because of the failure to appreciate the reasoning of the Division
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Bench as above, the question was referred to a Full Bench. The Full Bench,
by a majority has overturned the above view. That decision of the Full Bench
is reported as Hanamappa v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, !LR
(1998) Karnataka 4071. That decision is challenged in Civil Appeal No.1566
of2001. ··

B 12. While one of the Judges agreed with the position expanded by the
Division Bench in G.C. Paramraj, (supra), two of the learned Judges proceeded
to hold that the Division Bench in G. C. Paramraj (supra) did not lay down
the correct law. It is seen that while holding so, the court stated that there
was no mandatory obligation on the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference
C within 90 days as provided under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act and there is no
provision for loss of right in the claimant once he had made an application
for reference under Section 18( 1) of the Act within the time prescribed by
Section 18(2) of the Act. The consequences flowing from the claimant not
seeking to enforce his right under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act in a case where
the reference was not made within the time mandated by the statute was got
D over by invoking the theory that there was no provision for extinguishment
of the right and that a party cannot be penalised for the failure of the Deputy
Commissioner to make the reference. The majority stated that the decision in
The Addi. Sp!. Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. Thakoredas, Major
and Ors. (supra) rendered by this Court would not in any manner suggest that
E the view they are adopting was erroneous. The question whether the expression
"shall" used in Section 18(3)(a) of the Act made it mandatory for the Deputy
Commissioner to make a reference within 90 days or whether the provision
was only directory was discussed at length. The presiding Judge, on the
other hand, adopted ~he approach made in Paramraj 's case and held that
there was no reason to reconsider the view expressed therein. The learned
F Judge noticed that even in the matter of issue of a writ of mandamus under ·' •
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in State of MP. v. Bhai Lal, AIR·· i··
(1964) SC 1006 this Court had held that after the expiry of the period of
limitation and on the ground of uncondonable !aches, the same cannot be
sought for or issued.
,.
13. The majority, in our view, was not justified in mixing up the position
obtaining under Section 18 of the Central Act and the position obtaining
under Section 18 of the Act as amended in Karnataka. The Court had to
consider the scheme of Section 18 as obtaining in Karnataka, the scope of
the relevant provisions and the consequences arising from it, unaffected by
lI what might be the position under Section 18 of the Central Act. Section 18
STATE OF KARNATAKA v. LAXUMAN [BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.] 551

of the Act as in Karnataka, in fact, confers additional rights on a claimant by A
providing an extended time for making a claim for reference, possibly
considering the situation available in the State and a further right on the
claimant to approach the Land Acquisition Court for directing a reference to
it, based on the application already made by him before the Deputy
Commissioner. The High Court, in our view, erred in proceeding on an enquiry B
as to whether the obligation under Section 18(3)(a) of the Act on the Deputy
Commissioner was mandatory or directory. In fact, if one were to go by the
use of the expression "shall", and the introduction of Section 18(3 )(b) and the
right conferred thereunder, there is no difficulty even in taking the view that
it is mandatory for the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within 90
days of receipt of the application for reference. When he fails to perform the C
mandate of the statute, the provision gives the claimant. a right to approach
the Court which could compel the reference to be made by the Deputy
Commissioner who had failed to perform his duty under Section 18(3)(a) o~
the Act and in that process, even award costs of the proceedings against the
Deputy Commissioner, and in appropriate cases, to be recovered from him
personally. But what is relevant is not the question whether the duty cast on D
the Deputy Commissioner under Section 18(3)(a) of the Act as in Karnataka
is mandatory or it is directory. On its scheme, the Deputy Commissioner is
expected to make the reference within 90 days of the receipt of the application.
On his failure to do so, the claimant has to approach the Land Acquisition
Court for getting the matter referred. E
14. Extinguishment of a right can be expressly provided for or it can
arise by the implication from the statute. Section 18 of the Act as in Karnataka
sets out a scheme. Having made an application for reference within time
. before the .Deputy Commissioner, the claimant may lose his right by not.
enforcing the right available to him within the time prescribed by law. Section F
18(3)(a) and Section 18(3)(b) read in harmony, casts an obligation on the
claimant to enforce his claim within the period available for it. The scheme
brings about a repose. It is based on a public policy that a right should not
be allowed to remain a right indefinitely to be used against another at the will
and pleasure of the holder of the right by approaching the court whenever G
he chooses to do so. When the right of the Deputy Commissioner to make
the reference on the application of the claimant under Section 18( 1) of the Act
stands extinguished on the expiry of 3 years and 90 days from the date of
application for reference, and the right of the claimant to move the Court for
compelling a reference also stands extinguished, the right itself looses its
~ enforceability and thus comes to an end as a result This is the scheme of H
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Section 18 of the Act as adopted in the State of Kamataka. The High Court
is, therefore, not correct in searching for a specific provision bringing about
an extinguishment of the right to have a reference and on not finding it,
postulating that the right would survive for ever.

15. Under the scheme of Section 18 of the Act as in Kamataka, thus the
B claimant loses his right to move the Court for reference on the expiry of three
years and 90 days from the date of his making an application to the Deputy
Commissioner under Section 18 (I) of the Act within the period fixed by
Section 18(2) of the Act. This position is now settled by the decision of this
Court in The Addi. Sp/. Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. Thakoredas,
C Major and Ors., (supra). This loss of right to move the court precludes him
from seeking a remedy from the court in terms of Section 18 of the Act. This
loss of right in the claimant puts an end to the right of the claimant to seek
an enhancement of compensation. To say that the Deputy Commissioner can
make a reference even after the right in that behalf is lost to the claimant,
would be incongruous. Once the right of the claimant to enforce his claim
D itself is lost on the scheme of Section 18 of the Act, there is no question of
the Deputy Commissioner who had violated the mandate of sub-Section 3(a)
of Section 18 of the Act, reviving the right of the claimant by making a
reference at his sweet-will and pleasure, whatever be the inducement or
occasion for doing so. On a harmonious understanding of the scheme of the
E Act in the light of the general principle that even though a right may not be
extinguished, the remedy may become barred, it would be appropriate to hold
that on the expiry of three years and 90 days from the date of an application
for reference made within time under Section 18( I) of the Act, the remedy of
the claimant to have a reference gets extinguished and the right to have an
enhancement becomes unenforceabJe. The Deputy Commissioner would not
F be entitled to revive a claim which has thus become unenforceable due to
lapse of time or non-diligence on the part of the claimant.

16. The object of bringing in Section 18 in the amended form in Kamataka
has been highlighted in the decisions of that Court. The object was to ensure
that under-hand deals did not take place in the office of the Deputy
G Commissioner and to prevent belated applications and predated applications
being received by his office and references made, years after the acquisition
is completed. The object was also t<i ensure that all matters in connection with
an acquisition were completed within a reasonable time and claims for
enhancement did not hang like Damocles sword over the Government or over
H a company for the benefit of which the acquisition is undertaken. Therefore,
STATEOFKARNATAKA v. LAXUMAN [BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.] 553

any interpretation based on which the Deputy Commissioner is given the A
power to revive a claim which has become unenforceable, would defeat the
very purpose for which Section 18 in the form in which it is, was enacted in
the State of Karnataka. The majority in the full bench was, therefore, in error
in thinking that the Deputy Commissioner could make a reference at any time
at his sweet-will and pleasure, notwithstanding the fact that the right to move B
the court in that behalf has been lost to the claimant himself.

17. The majority, in our view, has not properly appreciated the position
highlighted in the decision of that Court in Assistant Commissioner v. Laxmi
Bai, I.L.R. (1987) Kamataka 2132 that the power to make a reference under
Section 18 (3) subsists till the right of the party to make an application before C
the Court seeking a direction to the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference
exists and that the pessation of the right of the party to apply to the court
for seeking a direction to the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference, is
also the point at which the power of the Deputy Commissioner to refer,
ceases. We think that this position logically emerges from the scheme of
Section 18 of the Act as adopted in Kamataka. D
18. The language of Section 18 is plain as indicated by the High Court.
But the question is what is the scheme that has been formulated by Section
18 of the Act vis-a-vis a claim for enhancement. The scheme under Section
18 in Karnataka is a departure from the Central Act and the scheme in
Kamataka has to be understood, based on the provisions in Section 18 as E
in Kamataka and the consequences emerging from it. The question whether
the time fixed under Section I 8(3)(a) is mandatory or directory and whether
time fixed for performance of a duty is generally considered directory or
~andatory are all questions that may not have much relevance in t~e context
of the scheme of Section 18 of the Act. Whether mandatory or directory, on F
the failure of the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference within 90 days
from the date of an application under Section 18(1) of the Act, the claimant
is given the right to approach the Land Acquisition Court seeking the
compelling of a reference by the Deputy Commissioner. Once the right to
move for a compelled reference is lost to the claimant, on the scheme of
Section 18, the very right to have a claim for enhancement, would come to G
an end in view of the fact that the remedy in that behalf becomes barred.
Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner cannot revive that right to a reference.

19. The High Court has made much of the fact that there is no obligation
on the Deputy Commissioner under Section 18 of the Act to convey the H
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A information to the claimant about the making of the reference or the declining
of the application for reference. Once a claimant has made his application for
reference within the period prescribed by Section 18 of the Act, and he does
not get any notice from ihe reference court regarding the reference made to
that court for enforcement of his claim for enhanced compensation, it is for
the claimant to move the concerned court for getting a reference made in
B terms of Section 18 of the Act. If he gets intimation from the reference court
about the lodging of the reference, obviously, it becomes unnecessary for him
to approach the court for compelling a reference. But in a case where he gets
no intimation from the reference court about the reference having been made,
it is for him to invoke the jurisdiction of the reference court under Section
C 18(3 )(b) of the Act within the time prescribed therefor by law. The
extinguishment of the remedy by way of moving the civil court is not dependent
on receipt or otherwise of an intimation from the Deputy Commissioner about
the fate of his application for reference.

20. The view we have taken, after all, does not deprive a claimant who
D had protested, of his right to enhanced compensation in view of the
introduction of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act. He could seek an
enhancement based ori any award that might have been made within the· time
prescribed therefor in respect of land covered by the same notification.

21. Then the question is, whether in the context of Section 18 of the
E Karnataka amendment, the decision of this Court in Thakoredas (supra) and
our discussion as above, Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be invoked
or would apply to an application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act. This Court
has held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application to proceedings
before the Collector or l_)eputy Commissioner here, while entertaining an
F application for reference. We see no reason not to accept that position. Then
arises the question whether Section 5 could be invoked before the Land
Acquisition Court while making an application under Section I 8(3)(b) of the
Act. We have held in agreement with the earlier Division Bench of the
Kamataka High Court, that the right to have a reference enforced through
court or through the Deputy Commissioner becomes extinguished on the
G expiry of three years and 90 days from the date of the application for reference
made in time. Consistent with this position it has necessarily to be held that
Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be available since the consequence
of not enforcing the right to have a reference made on the scheme of Section
18 of the Act as obtaining in Karnataka, is to put an end to the right to have
H a reference at all. Since in that sense it is an extinguishment of the right, the
STATE OF KARNA TAKA v. LAXUMAN [BALASUBRAMANY AN, J.] SSS

right cannot be revived by resorting to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. We A
may incidentally notice that in Thakoredas (supra) this Court rejected the
application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act which was beyond time, though,
of course, there was no specific discussion on this aspect. 1

22. An application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act is to compel a
reference by the Deputy Commissioner. We have held that on the expiry of B
three years and 90 days from the date of the application for reference seeking
enhancement the right of the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference
comes to an end. In that context, and in the context of the fact that the
claimant himself loses his right to move the court for compelling a reference,
it is not possible to ~old that by in_voking Section 5 of the Limitation Act C
before the Land Acquisition Court the claimant can get over the bar to the
remedy created by Section 18 of the Act. We are, therefore, of the view that
Section 5 of the Limitation Act would have no application while approaching
the court under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act and if the application is not within
the time as indicated above, the same has only to be dismissed as was done
in Thakoredas 's case (supra). D
23. In the light of our discussion as above, we hold that the High Court
was in error in holding that the Deputy Commissioner could make a reference
even after the expiry of three years and 90 days from the date of the application
for reference made by the claimant within the time prescribed by Section 18(2)
of the Act. We uphold the view of the High Court in Paramraj's case (supra) E
that the remedy having become barred the right could not thereafter be
enforced. In that context, we hold that the claimant while approaching the
court under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act would not be entitled to invoke
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In the light of these, w~ allow these appeals
and set aside the orders of the High Court. We dismiss the applications for p
reference made by the claimants. We also uphold the view of the Land
Acquisition Court that a reference made beyond the expiry of three years and
90 days from the date of application for reference by the Deputy Commissioner
is incompetent. We hold that the respondents are not entitled to claim any
enhancement by recourse to Section 18 of the Act. In the circumstances we
make no order as to costs. G

v.s.s. Appeal allowed.

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