Holding

Non‑compliance with Section 50 is a matter for trial; the Sessions Judge was not justified in discharging the accused and the evidence obtained remains admissible.

Summary

The State of Himachal Pradesh charged Shri Pirthi Chand under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 after police seized 1.015 kg of charas following a raid based on secret information. The Sessions Judge discharged the accused, holding that the mandatory safeguards of Section 50 of the Act—informing the accused of his right to a search before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate—had not been complied with, and the High Court affirmed this order. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that compliance with Section 50 is a factual issue to be decided at trial, and that the Sessions Judge was not justified in discharging the accused before trial. The Court further ruled that evidence obtained from a search, even if the search violated Section 50, remains admissible and the weight of such evidence is for the trial court to assess. Consequently, the High Court could not quash the FIR or charge‑sheet under its inherent powers, and the appeal was dismissed, with the matter not remitted for trial due to the lapse of time and the modest quantity of contraband seized.

Issues considered

Whether a Sessions Judge may discharge an accused at the stage of taking cognizance on the ground of non‑compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act.
Whether the High Court can exercise its inherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the FIR/charge‑sheet in such circumstances.
Whether evidence obtained from a search that violates Section 50 is inadmissible under the Evidence Act.
Whether non‑compliance with Section 50 warrants dismissal of the charge‑sheet.
Whether the case should be remitted for trial despite the passage of time and the quantity of seized contraband.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161, s. 482
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114(e)
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985s. 20, s. 50

Subjects

NDPS ActSection 50mandatory safeguardsillegal searchadmissibility of evidenceinherent powersSection 482 CrPCArticle 226 Constitutiondischarge of accusedcontraband seizurecharas

Judgment

STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH A
v.
SHRI PIRTHI CHAND AND ANR.

NOVEMBER 30, 1995

[K. RAMASWAMY AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.] B

Narcotic Drngs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985-Sections 20
~ • and 5()-Mandatary provisions of Sec. SO-Violation of-To be proved at
~ trial-Discharge of accused for non compliance of Sec 50, before trial con-
ducted-Not legally sustainable-Evidence collected in a search in violation C
of law-Admissibility of

Criminal Procedure Code 197rSection 482-Inherent powers-Exer-
cise of power to quash FIR/chargesheet/complaint-Exceptional considera-
tions in econoniic offences.
D
The ·respondent was charge-sheeted for an offence u/s 20 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 but the Sessions
Judge discharge him from the offence on the ground that the provisions
of section 50 of the Act had not been complied with. On revision, the High
Court confirmed the order of discharge. Tims this appeal by special leave. E

The questions raised for consideration were (i) whether the Sessions
Judge was justified, at the stage of taking cognizance of the offence, in
discharging the accused, even before the trial was conducted on merits, on
the ground that the provisions of Section 50 of the Act had not been
complied with, and (ii) whether the High Court would be justified in F
exercising its inherent power u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
or under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash the FIR/chargesheet/com-
plaint.

Disposing of the appeal, this Court
G
HELD : I.I. Compliance of the safeguards in Section 50 of the Nar-
cotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act is mandatory obliging the office
concerned to inform the person to be searched of his right to demand that
search could be conducted in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a
Magistrate. The possession of illicit articles has to be satisfactorily estab- H
29
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A lished before the Court. The officer who conducts search must state in his
evidence that he had informed the accused of his right to demand, while he
is searched, in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate and that
the accused had not chosen to so demand. If no evidence to that effect is
given, the Court must presume that the person searched was not informed
of the protection the law given him and must find that possession of illicit
B articles was not established. The presumption under Section 114 illustra·
tion (e) of the Evidence Act, that the official duty was properly performed,
therefore, does not apply. It is the duty of the court to carefully scrutinise
the evidence and satisfy that the accused had been informed, by the con·
cerned officer, that he had a right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer
•
c or a Magistrate and that the person had not chosen to so demand.
[34·E·G]
1.2. Whether the accused has been afforded such a right and whether
the authorised officer has violated the mandatory requirement, as a ques·
tion of fact, has to be proved at the Trial. The organised traffic in
D contraband generates deleterions effect on the national economic affecting
the vitals of the economic life of the community. It is settled law that
illegality committed in investigation does not render the evidence obtained
during that investigation inadmissible. Inspite of illegal search property
seized, on the basis of said search, still would form basis for further
investigation and prosecution against the accused. The manner in which
E the contraband is discovered may affect the factum of discovery but if the
factum of discovery is otherwise proved then the manner becomes im·
material. Every deviation from the details of the procedure prescribed for
search, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that search by the police
renders the recovery of the articles pursuant to the illegal search, ir·
F relevant evidence nor the discovery of the fact inadmissible at the trial.
Weight to be attached to such evidence depends on facts and circumstan-
ces in each case. The court is required to scan the evidence with care and
to act upon it when it is proved and the court would hold that the evidence
would be relied upon. [34-H, 35-F-G, 36-D]

G 1.3. The evidence collected in a search in violation of law does not
become inadmissible in evidence under the Evidence Act. The consequence
would be that evidence discovered would be to prove unlawful possession
of the contraband under the Act. It is founded in Panchnama to seize the
contraband from the possession of the suspect/accused. Though the search
H may be illegal but the evidence collected, i.e. Panchnama etc., nonetheless
STATE v. PIRTHICHAND 31

would be admissible at the trial. At the stage of filing charge-sheet it cannot A
be said that there is no evidence and the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge
would be committing illegality to discharge the accused on the ground that
section SO or other provisions have not been been complied with. At the
trial an opportunity would be available to the prosecution to prove that
the search was conducted in accordance with law. Even if search is found
B
to be in violation of law, what weight should be given to the evidence
collected is yet another question to be gone into. Under these circumstan-
ces, the Session Judge was not justified in discharging the accused, after
filing of the charge-sheet holding that mandatory requirements of section
SO had not been complied with. [39-E-G]
c
State of Punjab v. Ba/bir Singh, [1994] 3 SCC 299, Saiyad Mohd.
Saiyaad Umar Saiyed & Ors. v. The State of Gujarat, JT (199S) 3 SC 489;
Pman Mal v. Director of Inspection, [1974] 1 SCC 34S; Radha Kishan v.
State of U.P., AIR (1963) SC 822; State of Maharashtra v. Natwar Lal, AIR
(1%0) SC S93, Shyam Lal v. State of MP., AIR (1972) SC 886; State of D
Kera/a v.Alasseny Mohd., AIR (1978) SC 933; Sunder Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, AIR (19S6) SC 411; State of Maharashtra v. P.K Pathak, AIR
(1980) SC 1224; Matajog Dubey v. HC Balui, AIR (19S6) SC 44 andRakesh
Kumar @ Sachdeva @ Deva v. State (Delhi Administration), [1994] Supp.
3 sec 729, relied on.
E
1.4. More than ten years had passed and the contraband seized was
not of a considerable magnitude. rt was not a lit case to remit at this stage
for trial but non-remittance on facts of this case should not be used as
precedent in future cases. [39-H, 40-A]
F
2.1. The exercise of inherent power of the High Court is an excep-
tional one. Great care should be taken by the High Court before embarking
to scrutinise the FIR/charge-sheet/complaint. In deciding whether the case
is rarest of rare cases to scuttle the prosecution in its inception, it first
has to get into the grip of the matter whether the allegation constitute the
offence. FIR is only an initiation to move the machinery and to investigate G
into cognisable offence. After the investigation is conducted and the
charge-sheet is laid the prosecution produces the statements of the wit-
nesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code in support of the Charge-
sheet. At that stage it is not the function of the Court to weigh the pros

-- and cons of the prosecution case or to consider necessity of strict com- H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
.,,.
A pliance of the provisions which are considered mandatory and its effect of
non-compliance. It would be done after the trial is conclnded. The Conrt
has to prima facie consider from the averments in the charge-sheet and the
statements of witnesses on the record in support thereof whether court
could take cognizance of the offence, on that evidence and proceed further
B with the trial. If it reaches a conclusion that no cognisable offence in made
out no further act could be done except to qnash the charge sheet. Bot only
in exceptional cases, i.e. in rarest of rare cases of ma/a fide initiation of
the proceedings to wreak private vengeance, process of criminal action is
availed of in laying a complaint or FIR itself does not disclose at all any
cognisable offence-'the court may embark upon the consideration thereof
c and exercise the power. [38-C-F]

2.2. When the remedy under Section 482 is available, the High Court
would be loath and circumspect to exercise its extraordinary power under
Article 226 since efficacious remedy nnder Section 482 of the Code is
D available. When the Court exercises its inherent power nnder Section 482
the prima consideration should not be whether the exercise of the power
would advance the cause of justice or it would be an abuse of the process
of the court. When investigating officer spends considerable time to collect
the evidence and places the charge-sheet before the Court, further action
should not be short-circuited by resorting to exercise inherent power to
E
quash the charge-sheet. The social stability and order requires to be
regulated by proceeding against the offender as it is an offence against the
society as a whole. This cardinal principle should always be kept in mind
before embarking upon exercising inherent power. The accused involved
in an economic offence destablises the economy 8nd causes grave incursion
F on the economic planning of the state. When the Legislature entrusts the
power to the police officer to prevent organised commission of the offence
or offences involving moral turpitude or crimes of grave nature and are
entrusted with power to investigate into the. crime in intractable terrains
and secrative manner in concert, greater circumspection and care and
G caution should be borne in mind by the High Court when it exercises its
inherent power. Otherwise, the social order and security would be put in
Jeopardy and to grave risk. The accused will have field day in destablising
the economy of the State regulated under the relevant provisions.
[38-G-H, 39-A-D)

H State of Hmyana v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., [1992) Supp. l SCC 335 and
STATE v. PIRTifI CHAND 33

Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj & Anr. v• .Kanwar Pal Singh Gill & Anr., JT (1995) A
7 SC 299, relied on.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1752 of 1995.

From the Judgment and Order dated 4.6.92 of the Himachal Pradesh B
in Cr!. Rev. No. 118 of 1987.

Naresh K. Sharma for the Appellant.
•
Arvind Kumar for Ms. Laxmi Arvind for the Respondents.
c
The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted.

We have heard the counsel on both sides. On March 24, 1986, on
receipt of a secret information that a contraband, viz., Charas was being
D
dealt with at the bus stand, head Constable Rattan Singh alongwith other
police officials was present at bus stand, Amb. They secured the presence
of one Pradhan Subhas Chand and on Gurdas Ram and raided the house
of the first respondent. On search, they found 1 kilo 15 grams of Charas.
The took sample and divided the same into three parts. One was given to E
the accused, another was sent to the court and third one was sent to the
chemical examiner for analysis. On analysis, it was found that it was Charas.
Accordingly, charge-sheet was filed to prosecute him under Section 20 of
the Narcotic Durgs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, "the
Act"). After considering the charge-sheet, the learned Sessions Judge by F
his order dated July 6, 1987 discharged the respondent from the offence
under Section 20. On revision, the High Court by the impugned order
dated June 4, 1992 made in Criminal Revision No. 118/87 confirmed the
same. Thus this appeal by special leave.

The question is whether the learned Sessions Judge was justified, at G
the stage of taking cognizance of the offence, in discharging the accused,
even before the trial was conducted on merits, on the ground that the
provisions of Section 50 of the act had not been complied with. This Court

... in State of Punjab v. Ba/bir Singh, [1994] 3 SCC 299 has considered the
provisions of the Act. Section 50 has been held to be mandatory. In H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
•
A paragraph 16, this Court has held that it is obligatory on the part of the
empowered or the authorised officer to inform the suspect that, if so
required, he would be produced before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate
and search would be conducted in his presence. It was imperative on the
part of the officer to inform the person of the above right and if he failed
to do the same, it amounted to violation of the requirement of Section 50
B of the Act. It was held that when the person was searched he must have
been aware of his right and that if could be done only if the authorised or
empowered officer informed him of the same. Accordingly, this Court by
implication read the obligation on the part of authorised officer to inform
the person to be searched, of his right to information that he could be
c searched in the presence of the Gazetted officer or the Magistrate. In
Sa(vad Mohd. Saiyaad Umar Saiyad & Ors. v. nie State of Gujarat, JT
[1995] 3 SC 489 a three-Judge Bench of this Conrt had reiterated the above
view and held that having regard to the grave consequences that might
entail the possession of illicit articles under the Act, viz., the shifting of the
D onus to the accused and the serve punishment to which he became liable,
the legislature bad enacted safeguards contained in Section 50. Com-
pliance of the safeguards in Section 50 is mandatory obliging the officer
concerned in inform the person to be searched of his right to demand that
search could be condin:ted in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a
Magistrate. The possession of illicit articles has to be satisfactorily estab-
E lished before the Court. The officer who conducts search must state in his
evidence that he had informed the accused of his right to demand, while
he is searched, in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate and
that the accused had not chosen to so demand. If no evidence to that effect
is given, the Court must presume that the person searched was not
p informed of the protection the law gives him and must find that possession
of illicit articles was not established. The presumption under Section 114
illustration (e) of the Evidence Act, that the official duty was properly
performed, therefore, does not apply. It is the duty of the court to carefully
scrutinise the evidence and satisfy that the accused had been informed, by
the concerned officer, that he had a right to be searched before a Gazetted
G Officer or a Magistrale and that the person had not chosen to so demand.

It is to be seen whether the accused has been afforded such a right
and whether the authorised officer has violated the mandatory require-
ment, as a question of fact, has to be proved at the trial. In Pooran Mal v.
H Director of Inspection, [1974] 1 SCC 345, Constitution Bench of this Court
STATE v. PIRTIU CHAND 35

had held that power of search and seizure, is, in any system of A
jurisprudence, an overriding power of the State for the protection of social
security and that power is necessarily regulated by law. A search by itself
is not a restriction on the right to hold and enjoy property, though seizure
is a temporary restriction to the right of possession and enjoyment of the
property seized. However, the seizure will be only temporary and limited B
for the purpose of the investigation. The power of search and seizure is an
accepted norm in our criminal law envisaged in Sections 96 to 103 and 165
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, "the Code"). The
Evidence Act permits relevancy as the only test 'of admissibility of evidence.
The evidence obtained under an illegal search and seizure does not exclude C
relevant evidence on that ground. It is wrong to invoke the sprit of
Constitution to exclude such evidence. The decisions of the American
. Supreme Court spelling out certain Constitutional protections in regard to
search and seizure are not applicable to exclude the evidence obtained on
an illegal search. Courts in India refuse to exclude relevant evidence merely
on the ground that it is obtained by illegal search and seizure. When the D
test of admissibility of evidence lies in relevancy, unless there is an express
or necessarily implied prohibition in the Constitution or other law,
evidence obtained as result of illegal search and seizure, is not liable to be
shut out. Search and Seizure are not a new weapon in the armoury of those
whose duty it is to maintain social security in its broadest sense. If the E
safeguards are generally on the lines adopted by the Code, they would be
regarded as adequate and render the restrictions imposed as reasonable
measures.

It would be seen that the organised traffic in contraband generates
F
deleterious effect on the national economy affecting the vitals of the
economic life of the community. It is settled law that illegality committed
in investigation do_es not render the evidence obtained during that inves-
tigation inadmissible. lnspite of illegal search property seized, on the basis
of said search, still would form basis for further investigation and prosecu-
tion against the accused. The manner in which the contraband is discovered G
may affect the factum of discovery but if the factum of discovery is
otherwise proved then the manner becomes immaterial.

In Radha Kris/tan v. State of UP., AIR {1963) SC 822, this Court held
that the evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure not be rejected but H
36 SVPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A requires to be examined carefully. Jn State of Maharashtra v. Natwarlal,
AIR (1980) SC 593, even if the search was illegal, it will not affect the
validity of the seizure and further investigation of the authorities or the
validity of the trial which followed on the complaint by the customs
officials. In Shyam Lal v. State of M.P., AIR (1972) SC 886: it was held that
even if the search and seizure is illegal being in contravention of Section
B
165, that provision does not have any effect in its application to the
subsequent steps taken in the investigation. In State of Kera/a v. A/asseny
Mohd., AIR 1978 SC 933, this Court had held that failure to comply strictly
with the statutory provisions, by the Food Inspector, would not vitiate the
trial and conviction of the accused.
c
It would thus be settled law that every deviation from the details of
the procedure prescribed for search, does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that search by the police renders the recovery of the articles
pursuant to the illegal search, irrelevant evidence nor the discovery of the
D fact inadmissible at the trial. Weight to be attached to such evidence
depends nn facts and circumstances in each case. The court is required to
scan the evidence with care and to act upon it when it is proved and the
court would hold that the evidence would be relied upon.

In Sunder Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR (1956) SC 411 a
E
three-Judge Bench of this Court held that under Section 103 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1898 though respectable inhabitants of the locality
were not associated with the search, that circumstance would not invalidate
the search. It would only affect the weight of the evidence in support of
the search and ihe recovery. At the highest, the irregularity in the search
F and the recovery would not affect legality of the proceedings. Jn State of
Maharashtra v. P.K. Pathak, AIR (1980) SC 1224 it was held that absence
of any independent witness from the locality to witness the search does not
affect the trial and the conviction uf the accused under the Customs Act.
In Matajog Dubey"· H.C. Bahri, AIR (1956) SC 44 it was held that when
G the salutary provisions have not been complied with, it may, however, affect
the weight of the evidence in support of the search or may furnish a reason
for disbelieving the evidence produced by the prosecution unless the
prosecution properly explains such circumstances which made it impossible
for it to comply with these provisions. In Balbir Singh's case (supra) this
H Court held that if the provisions of the Act have not been complied with,

-
STATE v. PIRTHI CHAND 37

the Court has to consider whether any prejudice has been caused to the A
accused and also examine the evidence in respect of the search in the light
of the fact that the provisions have not been complied with further consider
whether weight of evidence is in any manner affected because of the
non-compliance. The testimony of witness is not to be doubted or dis-
carded merely because he happens to be official. As a rule of caution and B
depending upon the circumstances of the case the court may look for
corroboration from independent evidence. This again depends upon the
questi'.m whether the official has deliberately filed to comply with tire
provisions or failure was due to lack of time and opportunity to associate
some independent witness with the search and strictly comply with the
provtstons.
c
In Rakesh Kumar@ Sachdeva @Deva v. State Delhi Administration-
al, (1994] Supp. 3 SCC 729 a two-judge Bench of this Court held that in
spite of non-examination of the investigation officer no-inference could be
drawn against the prosecution. Non-examination did not in any way affect D
the prosecution case nor prejudiced the accused in his defence. The Court
has to consider the evidence of the witnesses examined. Failure to join
independent witness1 of locality .is also not fatal. Conviction based on
e°vidence of policy officers alone is not improper. In that case since wit-
nesses were not willing to come and associate with the search under the E
TADA Act, this Court upheld the evidence given by the police officers and
accepted the finding of the High' Court which relied on the evidence of
police officers and the conviction was upheld.

The question then is whether the High Court would be justified in
F
exercising its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code or under
Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the FIR/charge sheet/complaint.

In State of Ha1yana & Ors.. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., (1992] Supp. 1 SCC
335 a two-Judge Bench of this Court laid down certain broad tests to
exercise the inherent power or extraordinary power of the High Court. It G
is not necessary to reiterate the guidelines. Suffice it to state that they are
only illustrative. The High Court should sparingly and only in exceptional
cases, in other words, in rarest of rare cases, and not merely it would be
appealable to the learned Judge, be inclined to exercise the power to quash
the FIR/charge-sheet/complaint. In that case the Court held that the FIR H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A should not be quashed since it disclosed prima facie cognisable offences to
proceed further in the investigation. In Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj & Anr. v.
Kanwar Pal Singh Gill & Anr. JT (1995) 7 SC 299 this Court reiterated the
above view that held that when the complaint or charge-sheet filed dis-
closed prima facie evidence of Court would not weigh at that stage and find
B out whether offence could be made out. The order of the High Court
exercising the power under Article 226, was accordingly set aside.

It is thus settled law that the exercise of inherent power of the High
Court is an exceptional one. Great care should be taken by the High Court
before embarking to scrutinise the FIR/charge-sheet/complaint. In decid-
e ing whether the case is rarest of rare cases to scuttle the prosecution in its
inception, it first has to get into the grip of the matter whether the
allegations constitute the offence. It must be remembered that FIR is only
an initiation to move the machinery and to investiage into cognisable
offence. After the investigation is conducted and the charge-sheet is laid
D the prosecution produces the statements of the witnesses recorded under
Section 161 of the Code in support of the charge-sheet. At that stage it is
not the function of the Court to weigh the pros and cons of the prosecution
case or to consider necessity of strict compliance of the provisions which
are considered mandatory and its effect of non-compliance. It would be
E done after the trial is concluded. The Court has to prima facie consider
from the averments in the charge-sheet and the statement of witnesses on
the record in support thereof whether court could take cognizance of the
offence, on that evidence and proceed further with the trial. If it reaches
a conclusion that no cognigible offence is made out no further act could
be done except to quash the charge sheet. But only in exceptional case, i.e.
F
in rarest of rare cases of ma/a fide initiation of the proceedings to wreak
private vengence process of criminal action is availed of in lying a com-
plaint or FIR itself does not disclose at all any cognisable offence - the
court may embark upon the consideration thereof and exercise the power.

G When the remedy under Section 482 is available, the High Court .
would he loath and circumspect to exercise its extraordinary power under
Article 226 since efficacious remedy under Section 482 of the Code is
available. When the Court exercises its inherent power under Section 482
the prime consideration should only be whether the exercise of the power
H would advance the cause of justice or it would be an abuse of the process
STATE v. PIRTHI CHAND 39

of the court. When investigating officer spends considerable time to collect A
the evidence and places the charge-sheet before the Court, further action
should not be short-circuited by resorting to exercise inherent power to
quasb the charge-sheet. The social stability and order requires to be
regulated by proceeding against the offender as it is an offence against the
society as a whole. This cardinal principle should always be kept in mind B
before embarking upon exercising inherent power. The accused involved
in an economic offence destablises the economy and causes grave incursion
on the economic planning of the State. When the legislature entrusts the
power to the police officer to prevent organised commission of the offence
or offences involving moral turpitude or crimes of grave nature and are
entrusted with power to investigate into the crime in intractable terrains
c
and secrative manner in concert, greater circumspection and care ·and
caution should be born in mind by the High Court when it exercises its
inherent power. Otherwise, the social order and security would be put in
jeopardy and to grave risk. the accused will have field day in destablising
the economy of the State regulated under the relevant provisions. D

The evidence collected in a search in violation of law does not
become inadmissible in evidence under the Evidence Act. The conse-
quence would be that evidence discovered would be to prove unlawful
possession of the contraband under the Act. It is founded in Panchnama E
to seize the contraband from the possession of the suspect/accused.
Though the search may be illegal but the evidence collected, i.e.,
Panchnama etc., nonetheless would be admissible at the trial. At the stage
of filing· charge-sheet it cannot be said that there is no evidence and the
Magistrate or the Sessions Judge would be co'llmitting illegality to dis-
F
charge the accused on the ground that Section 50 or other provisions have
not been complied with. At the trial an opportunity would be available to
the prosecution to prove that the search was conducted in accordance with
law. Even if search is found to be in violation of law, what weight should ·
be given to the evidence collected is yet another question to be gone into.
Under these circumstances, the learned Sessions Judge was not justified in G
discharging the accused, after ftling of the charge-sheet holding that man-
datory requirements of Section 50 had not been complied with.

The next question is whether at this belated stage, would it be
necessary to remit the matter for trial. In view of the fact that more than H
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A ten years have passed and the contraband seized is not of a considerable
magnitude, we think that it is not a fit case to remit at this stage for trial
but non-remittance on facts of this case should not be used as precedent
in future cases.

The appeal is accordingly disposed of.
B
R.A. Appeal disposed of.