Holding

No statutory right existed for the petitioner; the Pricing Committee was not a quasi‑judicial body; and the High Court lacked jurisdiction to issue mandamus, so the petition was dismissed.

Summary

The erstwhile ruler of Kutlehar, Raja Mahendra Pal, claimed that he was entitled to receive the price of forest produce sold to the Himachal Pradesh Forest Corporation at rates fixed by a Pricing Committee, along with interest, damages and penalties, invoking a right to livelihood under Article 21. The Himachal Pradesh High Court held that he possessed powers of the government and issued a mandamus directing payment. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the ruler had any statutory enforceable right, whether the Pricing Committee was a quasi‑judicial body whose decisions could be enforced by a writ, and whether Article 21 could be stretched to cover such contractual claims. The Court held that no statutory right existed for the petitioner, the Pricing Committee was not a statutory or quasi‑judicial authority, and the claims arose from the State’s sovereign rights, not from a private right enforceable under Article 21. Consequently, the High Court had erred in assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 and in granting mandamus. The appeal was allowed, the High Court judgment set aside, the writ petition dismissed, and the petitioner ordered to refund the amounts received with interest and costs.

Issues considered

The existence of any statutory enforceable right for the erstwhile ruler to claim payment for forest produce and related amounts.
Whether the Pricing Committee constituted by the State is a quasi‑judicial body whose decisions can be enforced by a writ of mandamus.
Whether the right to livelihood under Article 21 can be extended to encompass the petitioner’s contractual and royalty claims.
Whether the Himachal Pradesh High Court had jurisdiction under Article 226 to issue mandamus in this matter.

Subjects

Article 21Article 14Article 226right to livelihoodmandamusquasi‑judicial bodyPricing Committeeroyaltyforest lawsovereign rightsstatutory enforceability

Judgment

STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH A
v.
RAJA MAHENDRA PAL

MARCH 3l,"1999

[V.N. KHARE AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.] B

Constitution of India, Articles 14, 21 and 226-Erstwhile ruler claiming
price for forest produce supplied to state forest corporation at rates f1Xed by
pricing committee as payable to government-High Court holc{ing erstwhile
ruler to be possessed of powers of government and issuing mandamus for C
payment to him of amounts claimed-Held, no statutory enforceable right
existed in favour of erstwhile ruler; claims related to exercise of sovereign
rights vested in State and could not be made by private citizen; mandamus
could not have been issued. ·

Administrative Law-Pricing Committee constituted for determining
D
price payable to government for supplies made to forest corporation--
Whether quasi judicial body whose decision co.uld be enforc;ed through writ
of mandamus-Held, Pr~cing Committee not a quasi judicial or statutory
body; its decision could not be given effect to by the High Court-Constitution
of India, Article 226. E
Practice and pmcedure-Constitution, of India, Articles 21 and 226-
Writ petition by respondent er.stwhile ruler claiming price of forest produce
on basis of equality with State-High Court recognising and enforcing
respondent's right to livelihood under Article 21-Held, High Court wrongly
assumed jurisdiction; right to livelihood could not b..: expanded to include F
claims relating to contractual rights.

A notification was issued on August 31, 1915 by the Lt. Governor of
Punjab under Ss. 28, 29 (a) and 31 of the Indian Forests Act, 1878 whereby
the management of the Kutlehar forests was assigned to erstwhile rulers G
including MP, Respondent No.1. The rajas were to maintain proper account
of the trees standing on the land. Trees identified by the Forest Department
alone could be sold and only at the rates approved by the department.

By another notification in 1958, MP was appointed as Forest
Superintendent under S.2 (2) of the Forest Act. He was entitled to retain H
323
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 2 S.C.R.

A three-fourths of the income derivable from the forest. The remaining was
payable to the government.

In 1974, the Appellant State nationalised the forests and incorporated
the Himachal Pradesh Forest Corporation"(HPFC). Produce of the government
forests could thereafter be sold only to HPFC. MP filed a writ petition in the
B Himachal Pradesh High Court claiming that he should be paid for the forest
produce sold by him to the HPFC at the same rates as fixed by a Pricing
Committee ap~ointed by the governmen~ for the purpose of determining the
price for the supplies made by it to HPFC. He contended that the Pricing
Committee's decision that "No differential rates or system can be fixed for
C Kutlehar Forests" entitled him to a share in all the charges recovered by
the government from· HPFC.

The High Court held that MP was "for all purposes, possessed power ,,.
of the government" and entitled to the interest on the delayed payment of
royalty, damages and penalty for the illegally felled trees. He was further
D conferred with the grant of interest on interest and share in the levy of
extension fee chargeable by the State from HPFC. MP was found to have been
deprived of the right to life and entitled " to enforce his right to livelihood
through this writ petition".

The appellant then approached, this Court
E
Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD: 1.1. No statutory right enforceable under law existed in favour
of respondent No. 1 regarding the enforcement of which a command could
have been issued in the form of a writ of mandamus. [340-F]
F
1.2. The High Court was not justified in allowing the claims of
respondent No. 1. The claims against the forest corporation owed their
origin to the exercise of the sovereign righ~s veste.d in the appellant State.
No private citizen, unless specially authorjsed in that behalf under the
provisions of law could prefer such claims. [340-D-E)
G
Keshvananda Bharati v. State of Kera/a, [1973) Supp. SCR 1; R.C.
Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 3 SCR 530 and Madhav Rao v. Union,
(1971) 3 SCR 9, referred to.

1.3. Royalty connoted the State's share in the goods upon which the
H rights of its exploitation were conferred upon any person or a group of
STATE v. R.M. PAL 325
persons. Royalty could not be claimed by any individual, much less the A
controversial items being its attribute, by a citizen. [340-C]

1.4. The contention that the words "no differential rates or system" in
the decision of the pricing committee entitled the Respondent No.I to a share
in all charges recovered by government was without foundation. Those
words were relatable only to the royalty and not to the other recoveries which B
the appellant. State was entitled to recover as a sovereign being admittedly
the owner of the forest and its producV.The High Court committed a mistake
in reading something between the lines which in fact did not exist.
[337-F-Hl

2. The decision of the Pricing Committee, not being statutory, could C
not have been given effect to by the High court. The Committee was neither
statutory nor was it intended to be a quasi- judicial tribunal. The decisions
of the Committee were applicable to the parties to the said Committee and
not to any third person. The Committee had no source of its constitution in
any statutes nor was it intended to determine or adjudicate the claims of D
parties. [336-E•GI
Province of Bombay v. Khusaldas S. Advani, [1950) SCR 621; Rex v.
Electricity Commissioners, (1924) 1 KB171; Rex v. London Canty Council,
(1931) - 2 KM 215 and Radeshyam v. State of MP., AIR (1959) SC 107,
referred to. E
3.1. The High Court wrongly assumed jurisdiction. It adopted a casual
approach in applying the right to livelihood to the facts and circumstances
of the case. The right to livelihood could not be extended to embrace all sorts
of claims relating to legal or contractual rights of parties completely ignoring
the person approaching the court. [331-H; 332-A-B) F
3.2. Dismissal of the writ petition of respondent No.I on this ground
at this stage was likely to result in miscarriage of justice on account of the
lapse of time. The alternative remedies not being efficacious at this stage,
the Supreme Court would decide the claim on merits. [332-C-DJ

CIVIL AP PELLA TE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 9495 of G
1995.
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.1.93 of the Himachal Pradesh
High Court in C.W.P. No.528of1991.

Naresh Kumar Sharma for the Appellant. H
326 SUPREME .COURT REPORTS [1999] 2 S.C.R.

A K.B. Rohtagi and Ms. Aparna Rohtagi for the. Responde.nts.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SETHI, J. Despite independence of the country about half a century
back and the establishment of a democratic set up with the declaration in the
B Constitution to have a Secular, Socialist Republic in the country, there are
people and organisations who have not mentally re-conciled with the realities
of life and the writings in the chapters of history for various reasons including
their vested interests. Ignoring the establishment of the rule of law and the
development of the constitutioryal set up, they have made and are making
C fanatic efforts to sabotage the path of the goal intended to achieve the
welfare of the society. Ignoring the verdicts of this Court in Keshvananda
Bharati v. State of Kera/a, (1973] Suppl., SCR l, R.C. Cooper v. Union of
India, (1970] 3 SCR 530 and Madhav Rao v. Union, (1971] 3 SCR 9 and various
other pronouncements, efforts have been made to reverse back the wheel of
history merely for personal gains to quench the lust for money and power.
D The case of respondent No.I in this litigation is one of such persons who
has done everything possible to utilise the forum of the Court~ for the
attainment of his personal benefits by attempting to utilise the alleged
constitutional guarantees in his favour. A ruler of the yester years, the
respondent No. 1, approached th~ High Court for issu!lnce of the command
E to the State Forest Corporation by treating him equivalent to the Government
of Himachal Pradesh with conferment of monetary gains which were permissible
to the State Government on the basis of the decision of the Pricing Committee.
The High Court granted prayer stmght for by the judgm_ent impugned in this
appeal. The Maharaja was held, to have been equated with the Goyemment
and entitled to the relief claimed by hini as according to· the High Court he
F was found to have been deprived of the right to life as envisaged by Article
21 of the Constitution of India. The High Court observed "We have held that
the petitioner is entitled to enforce his claim particularly the right to his
livelihood through this writ petition." It was further held, "he was, for all
purposes, possessed power of the government. The Court further observed,
G "infact the Pricing Committee on behalf of the Government in its wisdom,
appear to have equated the petitioner with the governll\.ent and directed that
the decision regarding the aforesaid payments taken in respect of the
government product shall also apply to Kutlehar Forest as well." By way of
issuance of the writ of mandamus, the re.spondent No. I was held entitled to
the interest on the delayed payment of royalty, damages with respect to illicit
H felling plus I 00 per cent penalty for the illegally felled. trees. He was further
STATE v. R.M. PAL [SETHI, J.) 327
conferred with the grant of interest on interest and share in the levy of A
extension fee chargeable by the State from the respondent-corporation under
- - the terms of the agreement or the provisions of law applicable in the case.

The judgment impugned in this appeal has been assailed on various
grounds including the ground of non-maintainability of the writ petition, error
on the part of the High Court to equate the State Government with a private B
person, disentitlement of the respondent to claim a share .ih the penal interest
, ~

and levies which the S~ate was entitled to impose and recover as a consequence
of its sovereign .functions.

The relevant facts for deciding the present appeal are, that the dispute C
relates to J(utlehar Forest located in the' district of Kangra, now a part of
Himachal Pradesh State which was earlier a Princely State. The aforesaid
Princely State was founded by one Shri Narendra Pal about 300-400 years
back whose descendant is respondent No. 1, the said State was conferre'd 16
'Tappas' (chunks of land), four were Jagir 'Tappas' and twelve Khalsa
'Tappas'. In Four Jagii 'Tapas', the land revenue to the extent of Rs.10,000 D
was assigned to the forefathers of respondent No. I by way of 'Jagir'. In
addition to four 'Tappas', about twenty thousand acres of land belonging to
the 'Baratandars' (right holders) which was not used for agricultural purposes,
was also- assigned. The forefathers of respondent No. l are stated to have
grown ~arge number of trees over the said land from the period before 1868 E
A.D. Respondent No. I claimed that his ancestors protected and maintained
those trees "while 'Baratandars' ·were granted various rights including the right
to get timber on concessional rate for their domestic requirements and the
right to graze their cattle. During the settlement operation of civil district of
Kangra in I869, Mr. James Lyall, Settlement Officer, had made a proposal vide
the letter I2.2. I868 that the management of forests in four 'Tappas' be granted F
to the Raja of Kutlehar. The aforesaid proposal is claimed to have been
accepted by the Government of Punjab not only with respect to four 'Jagir
Tappas' but also for all I6 'Tappas' including I2 Khalsa 'Tappas'. The
predecessor-in:interest ofrespondent No. I are stated to have started managing
the Kutlehar Forest subject to the conditions·contained in the approval dated G
I I. I . I 869. The then Government is stated to have started laying claims to the
trees grown on the aforesaid land in the year 19 I 5 which was resisted and
resulted in the commencement of the .fresh correspondence between the
parties. The controversies are said to have been set at rest by the Lt.
Governor of Punjab in the year 19I6 vide letter dated 25.5.I916 by which it
was made.clear that "All trees growing in the protected forests, subject to the H
·I
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 2 S.C.R.

A right of 'Bartandars' and to the other conditions and exceptions hereinafter
specified, belong to Government, but have been assigned by Government to
the Raja so long as he abides by the conditions of management hereunto
appended".

In exercise of his power~ vested under Sections 28, 29(a) an 31 of the
B Indian Forests Act, 1878, the Lt. Governor of Punjab issued Notification dated
31.8.1915 by which various lands within the limits of various Jagirs including
the Jagir of Kutlehar in the district of Kangra, the management of the'forests
was assigned to the Rajas' including the predecessor-in-interest of the
respondent No. I, subject to the terms and conditions specified in the aforesaid
orders. The Rajas' were directed. to maintain proper account of the trees
C standing on the land which could be sold to traders only after the trees were
marke~ by the Forest Department. The trees could be sold only at the rates
approved by the Forest Department. The Raja was held entitled to continue
to realize grazing fees from the 'Gaddies' at the rates fixed by government or
by mutual agreement between the Raja and the 'Gaddi' subject to the approval
D by the Deputy Commissioner. However, vide Notification No. 4531-FT. (CH-
58/523 dated I.I 0.1958 issued under Section 2(2) of the Forest Act, the
respondent was appointed as a Forest Superintendent and the employees
working under him in the aforesaid forest declared as Forest Officers with
respect to Kutlehar Forest. As per terms of his appointment, the respondent
was held entitled to retain 3/4 of the income derivable from the forest whereas
E 1/4 of the gross income was payable to the government. The conditions
explicitly provided :-
"The Raja shall keep a register showing all the receipts from the sale
of timber, bamboos and other forest produce whether to zamidars or
to traders. Of this income the Raja shall in case of Kutlehar, receive
F 3/4 and Government l/4."
The various forest produces such as resin, timber, bamboo and bhabar
grass etc. were required to be auctioned by the respondent like the manner
such auctions were held by the Forest Department in respect of government
forests in accordance with the working plan and the highest bidder was to
G be granted the lease. This practice was discontinued after the forests were
nationalised by the Appellant-State in the year 1974, when Himachal Pradesh
Forest Corporation was incorporated under the provisions of the Companies
Act, I 956. Produce of the government forests, thereafter, could be sold only
to the Forest Corporation. Ever since its incorporation the respondent-
corporation continued purchasing timber and other forest produces from
H respondent No. I in accordance with the working plan. The said respondent
STATE v. R.M. PAL [SETHI,].] 329
alleged that in addili-on to his entitlement of the sale price of the various A
forest produces sold by him out of the Kutlehar forest to the respondent-
corporation, he was also entitled to share the interest on delayed payment,
interest on interest and compensation for damages caused to the trees in the
course of extraction of timber etc. The basis for his claim as pleaded in writ
petition and noticed by the High Court was :-
B
"Firstly, the Government of Himachal Pradesh constituted a Committee
of officers for determination of the price and terms and conditions of
the supply of forest produce sold in favour of the second respondent
(HP Forest Corporation) vide notification dated 18.5.1974 (Annexure-
C) whereby the fourth respondent (Pricing Committee) on behalf of C
the Government in its wisdom had equated the petitioner with the
Government and directed that the decision regarding the aforesaid
payments taken in respect of the Government produce should apply
to Kutlehar Forest as well;

. Secondly, that according to the practice prevailing and trade custom, D
the petitioner is entitled to his share in the above said additional
income, and

Thirdly, that the Government and the pet1t10ner were similarly
circumstanced in so far as the sale of the forest produce is concerned
and, therefore, any discrimination of the share of additional amount E
by way of income is offensive to Article 14 of the Constitution."

The respondent asserted that the additional amounts claimed by him
were payable even by the private lessees to whom he and the government
had sold various forest produces before coming into the existence of the
respondent-corporation. The appellant-State was claimed to have constituted F
a Pricing Committee which decided to apply the decisions taken by it in regard
to the sales made by Forest Department to the sales made by the respondent
out of the Kutlehar forest as well. To strengthen his claim, the respondent
relied upon Article 51 of the Article of Association of the respondent-
corporation which provided that the Government could issue directions from G
time to time which the directors of the company were bound to comply with.
The respondent claimed that the corporation had an inescapable obligation
to pay to him all the amounts claimed which it had failed _to pay despite
repeated written requests. The decision qua interest on interest is stated to
have been taken by the Pricing Committee with the object to curb the pendency
of belated payments attributed to the respondent-corporation. The decision H
.~

- --
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 2 S.C.R.

A regarding penalty of the illicit/outshaped blazes was stated to have been
~' taken on 17 .8.1982. Levy of extension fee was imposed vide decision oi the
Pricing Committee dated 4.12.1986. The aforesaid decisions are stated to have
been made applicable in the case of the respondent vide Item No. VIII
recorded in the minutes of the proceedings of the meeting held on 16.5.1988.

B The Pricing Committee in its meeting held on 6.10.1990 was stated to
have reviewed the guidelines issued earlier in respect of the dealings of the
Himachal Pradesh State Forest Corporation with the Government and the
royalty to be charged from, and levies and penalties to be imposed upon the
. corporation in respect of the working of the forest by the corporation. The
C Ktitlehar Forest is stated to have been resumed by the State of Himachal
Pradesh vide Notification dated 19.1.1990 issued under Section 3 of the
Punjab Resumption of Jagir Act, 1957. The Principal Chief Conservator of
Forests was directed to take over management and possession of Kutlehar
forest from respondent No. I with the assistance of the Collector. Respondent
No. I filed a writ petition (WP No. 42/90) with respect to his pre-existing rights
D as also his entitlement to retain the forest by challenging the validity of the
notification. Thereafter, he also challenged the Himachal Pradesh (Acquisition
of Management) Act, 1992 by filing a writ petition (W.P. No. 707 /92). During
the pehdency of the aforesaid writ petition No. 42/90, respondent No. I flied
. C.W.P. No: 528/91 in the High Court ofHimachal Pradesh claiming the relief
E on the basis of the decisions of the Pricing Committee being applicable to him.
The claim of the respondent No. I was resisted on various grounds including:-

"(i) that the petitioner is not the owner of the forest;
(ii) that it is a case of enforcing contractual rights which can be
done by way of a Civil Suit and not through this writ petition.
F Therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable;
(iii) that the decision of the fourth respondent (Pricing Committee)
regarding the payment of additional amounts in question, such
as, interest on belated payments, interest on interest, penalty on
illicit out shaped blazes, levy of extension fees etc. to the
G petitioner is not binding on the first or the second respondent
(HP Forest Corporation)
(iv) that the trees are not revenue but capital and that since the
property in the trees is that of the first respondent, the first
respondent is not liable to pay the share out of the damage
H caused to the trees, etc. etc.
I
STATE v. R.M. PAL [SETHI, J.] 331
Rejecting the pleas of the appellant, the High Court allowed the writ A
pet~tion vide the judgment impugned in this appeal.

The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has vehemently argued
that the writ·petition filed was not maintainable as the High Court was not
justified in entertaining the same and consequently granting the relief to the
respondent No. I. The rights of respondent No. l, if any, are stated to be based B
upon a contract for which he was obliged to avail of the alternative efficacious
remedy of filing a suit either for the recovery of the money or for rendition
of accounts. It is contended that the discretionary powers vested in the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution could not have been exercised in
the facts and circumstances of the case. Though, we find substance in the C
submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, yet we are not inclined
to allow the appeal and dismiss the writ petition of respondent No. l only on
this ground. It is true that the powers conferred upon the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution are discretionary in nature which can be
invoked for the enforcement of any fundamental right or legal right but not
for mere contractual rights arising out of an agreement particularly in view of D
the existence of efficacious alternative remedy. The Constitutional Court should
insist upon the party to avail of the same instead of invoking the extraordinary
writ jurisdiction of the Court. This does not however debar the Court from
granting the appropriate relief to a citizen under peculiar and special facts
notwithstanding the existence of alternative efficacious remedy. The existence E
of the special circumstances are required to be noticed before issuance of the
direction by the High Court while invoking the jurisdiction under the said
Article. In the instant case, the High Court did not notice any special
circumstance which could be held to have persuaded it to deviate from the
settled proposition of law regarding the exercise of the writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution. For exercise of the writ jurisdiction, the High F
Court pressed into service the alleged fundamental right to livelihood of the
respondent which was found to have been violated by not making him the
payment of the amounts claimed in the writ petition. It is true that Article 21
of the Constitution is of utmost impo~ance, violation of which, as and when
found, directly or indirectly, or even remotely, has to be looked with disfavour. G
The violation of the right to livelihood is required to be remedied. But the
right to livelihood as contemplated under Article 21 of the Constitution
cannot be so widely construed which may result in defeating the purpose
sought to be achieved by the aforesaid Article. It is also true that the right
to livelihood would include all attributes of life but the same cannot be
extended to the extent that it may embrace or take within its ambit all sorts H
.J
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 2 S.C.R.

A of claim relating to the legal or contractual rights of the parties completely
ignoring the person approaching the court and the alleged violation of the
said right. The High Court appears to have adopted a very generous, general
and casual approach in applying the right to livelihood to the facts and
circumstances of the case apparently for the purpose of clothing itself with
the power and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. We are sure
-B that if the High Court had considered ·the argument in the right perspective
and in the light of various pronouncements of this Court, it would not have
ventured to assume jurisdiction for the purposes of conferring the State
largess of public money, upon an unscrupulous litigant who preferred his
claim on his proclaimed assumption of being as important as the Government
C of the State and equal thereto. Despite holding that the High Court had
wrongly assumed the jurisdiction in the facts of the case, as earlier noticed,
we are not inclined to dismiss the writ petition of the respondent No.1 on this
ground at this stage because that is likely to result in miscarriage of justice
on account of the lapse of time which may now result in the foreclosure of
all other remedies which could be availed of by the respondent in the ordinary
D course. The alternative remedies available to the respondent admittedly not
being efficacious at this stage has persuaded us to decide the claim of the
respondent on merits.

To justify the claim of the respondent based upon the decision of the
E Pricing Committee, the learned senior counsel Dr. L.M. Singhvi, has submitted
that as the Pricing Committee was the quasi-judicial tribunal constituted by
the State Government in exercise of its statutory as well as plenary power, the
respondents in the writ petition were bound to abide by_its decision and in
case of their failure to perform the obligations, the writ petitioner was justified
in approaching the Court by way of writ petition to seek the enforcement of
F rights arising on account of the decision of the alleged statutory Pricing
Committee. It is not disputed that the Pricing Committee was constituted by
a Notification No. 10-26172-SF dated 18.5.1974 which was initially presided
over by the Chief Secretary and later on by the Minister of Forests. It is also
not disputed that the said Committee was established to determine the terms
G and conditions for the supply of resin, resin blazes, standing trees and other
forest produce to be handed over by the Himachal Pradesh Forest Department
to the Himachal Pradesh State Forest Corporation Ltd. from time to time.
However, there i!> nothing on the record to suggest that the said committee
was constituted in exercise of any statutory power. Despite mentioning the
provisions of State Forest Corporation Act of 1974, the learned counsel for
H the respondent No. I could not refer to any statutory obligation under the said
STATE v. R.M. PAL [SETHI, J.] 333
~-

Act requiring the appointment of the Pricing Committee. The argument appears A
to be afterthought and contradictory to the pleadings. In his writ petition, the
respondent No.I referred to Clause 51 of the Memorandum of Association of
Articles of Association and submitted :-

,.. "That in exercise of the powers conferred by clause 51 of the
Memorandum, the Government ofHimachal Pradesh vide Notification B
No.10-26172-SF, Shimla dated 18.5.74 constituted a committee of officers
to determine the price and terms and conditions for the supply of
resin, resin blazes, standing trees and other forest produce to be sold
to the Himachal Pradesh Forest Corporation Ltd. from time to time. A
copy of the said notification is annexed to this petition as
...... Annexure C .
c
That this notification was subsequently amended in the year 1986
vide notification No. Fts (B) (A) 4-14/84-11 dated 28.11.88. By this
notification the earlier-notification of 1974 was partially modified so
--\. as to include the State Minister for Forests, Himachal Pradesh as the
~
Chairman of the said Committee. D
That the aforesaid Committee has been holding meetings from
time to time and taking decisions regarding the prices at which the
Corporation would purchase the forest produce from the Forest
Department."
E
The petitioner further submitted that the State and all its functionaries
were duty bound to act fairly and reasonably in the discharge of their official
functions. The conduct of the respondent-corporation in allegedly denying
to the writ petitioner the benefit of the Pricing Committee which was stated
to be otherwise binding on the corporation in accordance with the Clause 51
of the Memorandum of Association, was alleged to be amounting to actionable F

.. _
wrong which entitled the petitioner to seek appropriate directions from the
Court to direct the respondent-corporation to give effect to the said decision
and the appellant to issue direction to the Corporation to carry out all the
directives of the Pricing Committee in relation to the forest produce sold in
favour of the corporation by the writ petitioner out of Kutlehar forest. A
G
Committee constituted for the purposes of settling the matters between the
~ Government and the Forest Corporation in pursuance of Clause 51 of the
Memorandum of Association could not be termed to be a quasi judicial
tribunal, the decision of which coutd be binding upon the State for the
purposes of the writ petitioner as well. Clause 51 authorises the State
Government to issue appropriate directions, from time to time, as might be H
<:>
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 2 S.C.R.

A considered necessary in regard to the exercise and performance of the function

-
of the Corporation in the matters involving substantial public interest and in
like manner might vary and annul any earlier direction. Directions thus issued
are required to be duly complied with and given immediate effect to.
Memorandum and Articles of Association regulated the conduct of the
appellant and respondent No. 2 herein, which was not in any way, intended
B to be made applicable to other persons such as ,the respondent No. l herein.

The submission that the Pricing Committee was a quasi-judicial tribunal
constituted by the State Government in exercise of its statutory as well as
plenary executive powers can also not be accepted in the light of the functions
C assigned to the Committee. Quasi-judicial acts are such acts which mandate
an officer the duty of looking into certain facts not in a way which it specially
directs but after a discretion, in its nature judicial. The exercise of power by
such tribunal or authority contemplates the adjudication of rival claims of the
persons by an act of the mind or judgment upon the proposed course of
official action as to an object of the corporate power, for the consequences
D of which the official will not be liable, although his act was not well-judged.
A quasi-judicial function has been termed to be one which stands midway a
judicial and an administrative function. The primary test is as to wheth.er the
authority alleged to be a quasi-judicial, has any express statutory duty t9 act
judicially in arriving at the decision in question. If the reply is in affirmative,
E the authority would be deemed to be quasi-judicial, and if the reply is in the
negative, it would notbe. The dictionary meaning of the word 'quasi' is, "not
exactly".

It follows, therefore, that an authority is described as quasi-judicial
when it has some of the attributes or trappings of judicial functions, but not
F all. This Court In Province of Bombay v. Khusaldas S. Advani, [1950) SCR
621, dealt with the actions of the statutory body and laid down tests for
ascertaining whether the action taken by such body was a quasi-judicial act
or an administrative act. The Court approved the celebrated definition of the
quasi-judicial body given by Atkin L.J., as he then was in Rex v. Electricity
G Commissioners, (1924) l KB 171 in which it was held:

"Whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine
questions affecting rights of subjects, and having the duty to act
judicially act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the
controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in
H these writs."
STATEv. R.M. PAL [SETHI, J.) 335
The aforesaid definition was accepted as correct in Rex v. London A
County Council, ( l 93 l-2KB 215) and many subsequent cases both in England
and in India. Again this Court in Radeshyam v. State of M.P., AIR (1959) SC
107 relying upon its earlier decision held :-

"It will be noticed that this definition insists on three requisites each
of which must be fulfilled in order that the act of the body may be B
quasi-judicial act, namely, that the body of persons (1) must have
legal authority, (2) to determine questions affecting the rights of
parties, and (3) must have the duty to act judicially. Since a writ of
certiorari can be issued only to correct the errors of a court or a quasi
judicial body, it would follow that the real and determining test for
ascertaining whether an act authorised by a statute is a quasi judicial C
act or an administrative act is whether the statute has expressly or
impliedly imposed upon the statutory body the duty to act judicially
as required by the third condition in the definition given by Atkin L.J.

Relying on paragraphs 114 and 115 of Halsbury's Laws of England D
3rd Edition Volume 11 at pages 55-58 and citing the case of R. v.
Manchester Legal Aid Committee, 1952-2 QB 413 learned counsel for
the appellants contends that where a statute requires decision to be
arrived at purely from the point of view of policy or expediency the
authority is under no duty to act judicially. He urges that where, on E
the other hand, the order has to be passed on evidence either under
an express provision of the statute or by implication and determination
of particular facts on which its jurisdiction to exercise its power
depends or if there is a proposal and an opposition the authority is
under a duty to act judicially. As stated in paragraph 115 ofHalsbury's
Laws of England Volume 11 page 57, the duty to act judicially may F
arise in widely differing circumstances which it would be imposible to
attempt to define exhaustively. The question whether or not there is
a duty to act judicially must be decided in each case in the ~ight of
the circumstances of the particular case and the construction of the
particular statute with the assistance of the general principles laid
down in the judicial decisions. The principles deducible from the G
various judicial decisions considered by this Court in 1950 SCR 621:
(AIR 1950 SC 222) at page 725 (ofSCR): (at p. 260 of AIR) were thus
formulated namely:-
"(i) that if a statute empowers an authority not being a Court in the
ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made H
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999) 2 S.C.R.

A by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by
another party and to determine the respective rights of the
contesting parties who are opposed to each other there is a !is
and prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to
the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and
the decision· of the authority is a quasi judicial act; and
B
(ii) that if a statutory authority has power to do any act, which will
prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are not two
--
parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the
authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it,
the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi judicial
c act provided the authority is required by the statute to act
judicially."

In the instant case the order appointing the Pricing Committee which
was amended on 26.11.86 specifically provided :

D "The aforesaid Pricing Committee was established to determine (not
merely to advise on) the price and terms and conditions for the
supply of resin, resin blazes, standing trees and other foreign produce
to be handed over by the HP Forest Department to the HP State
Forest Corporation Ltd from time to time." ' ..
E Applying the tests noticed herein above, it cannot be said by any
stretch of imagination that the said committee was intended to be a quasi-
judicial tribunal as argued on behalf of the respondent No. I. This Committee
can also not be stated to have been constituted in exercise of the plenary
administrative power of the appellant-state. It has been conceded before us
that the said Committee was not constituted in terms of Section 6 of the
F Himachal Pradesh Forest Produce (Regulation of Trade) Act, 1982. No other
statutory provision has been relied either. The Committee appears to have
----
been constitµted for settlement of the claims and disputes between the
appellant-state and the respondent-corporation. The decisions of the Committee
were applicable to the parties to the said Committee and not to any third
G person. The said Committee had no source of its constitution in any statutes
nor was it intended to determine or adjudicate the claims of parties with
respect to the matters referred to it for opinion and suggestion or even for
settlement between the parties concerned. The decision of the Committee, not
being statutory, thus could not be given effect to by the High Court.

H Assuming that the Committee was of a quasi-judicial character, it has
STATE v. R.M. PAL [SETHI, J.] 337
to be seen as to whether its decisions/recommendations were applicable to A
the respondent No.1 in so far as Kutlehar Forest was concerned. It is admitted
that the Committee dealt with various items of disputes between the State of
Himachal Pradesh and the Forest Corporation such as handing over of charging
of extension fee, fixation of rates for resin blazes for the year 1988-89, 1989-
90, adjustment ofrebate, royalty, rates for timber lots (deodar, kail fir and chi!, B
sal lots, Eucalyptus lots, shisham, sain and tuni, khair lots) interest on belated
payments, damages in geltu lots, interest on interest, royalty for private trees
and levy of extension fee. It is not disputed before us that on the basis of
the arrangement prevalent before the constitution of the corporation,
respondent No. I was entitled to a share of 75 per cent of the sale profits of
the forests. In other words, it is conceded ~at respondent No.1 was entitled C
to 75 per cent of the royalty received from the Kutlehar Forest. It is also not
disputed that respondent No. l has already been paid his due share of royalty
on the basis of the price fixed by the Pricing Committee from time to time. The
dispute is with respect to item No. XI, pertaining to interest on belated
payments, item No. XII damage in geltu lots, item No. XIII interest on interest D
and item No. XVII levy of extension fee, mentioned in the Proceedings of the
Pricing Committee dated 6.10.1990 (Annexure C). To claim the share in the
aforesaid items, the respondent No. l relied upon the decision of the Pricing
Committee meeting held on 16.5.1988 which inter alia provided :

"It was decided and clarified that the royalty will be charged for E
Kutlehar Forests on the same lines as fixed for Govt. lots linked with
the nature of trees and intensity of marking. No differential rates or
system can be fixed for Kutlehar Forests."

It is contended that the words "no differential rates or system" mentioned p
in the aforesaid item of the decision of the Pricing Committee entitled the
respondent No.1 to a share in all types of charges received/recovered by the
Government from the State Forest Corporation. The submission is superficial
having no foundation to stand inasmuch as it ignores the heading of the item
No.VIII dealing with "charging ofroyalty for Kutlehar Forest". The reference G
to the words, "no differential rates or system" is relatable only to the royalty
and not to the other recoveries which the appellant-State was entitled to
recover as a sovereign being admittedly the owner of the forest and its
produce. The High Court appears to have committed a mistake in reading
something between the lines which in fact did not exist. Finding difficult with
the conclusions arrived at by the High Court, the learned senior counsel H
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . (1999) 2 S.C.R.

A appearing for respondent No. I vehemently urged that the items regarding
which the respondent No.I had preferred his claim, in fact, were the attributes
of the royalty, the payment of which the appellant-State could not have
denied to his client. In support of his submission he has referred to various
judgments.
B Whatever be the meaning of the word "royalty", its connotation and
use in the context of the case has to be understood in the light of the peculiar
facts and attending circumstances. The practice prevalent for exploitation of
the forest produce, cannot be ignored, which generally authorised the owner
of the forest to recover the royalty for the felling of trees and extraction and
C utilisation of the other forest produce. The extension fee, interest, interest on
interest, payment for out shaped illicit blazes, and damages cannot be held
to be covered by the term "royalty" as used in item No.VIII of the proceedings
of the Pricing Committee. The respondent No. I as already noticed could not
be equated with the State Government ofHirnachal Pradesh,.and had no basis
D to claim the ownership in the trees grown in the Kutlehar forest after he
acc;pted his appointment as a Forest Superintendenqn the year 1958 under
Section 2(2) of the Forest Act. The acceptance of his position as a Forest
Superintendent in Jaw, 'a forest officer' appointed under Section 2(2) of the
Forest Act clearly established that the respondent No. I had accepted the
State Government to be dominant owner of the property and that he was
E merely an officer appointed by the Government in exercise of its sovereign
power. But for his position as a Forest Officer, he had no jurisdiction to deal
with the forest or even enter into it. The arrangements made earlier in the form
of conferment of rights upon his forefather stood extinguished and merged
with his position as a Forest Officer of the State Government. He was entitled
F only to such benefits to which the forest officer is entitled. His entitlement
in the present case was restricted only to the extent of sharing of the royalty
and not for anything more. Even in the settlement report of 1916 which was
amended on 30.7.1945 regarding Kutlehar Forest it was provided that all trees
growing in the protected forest subject to the rights of Burtandars and to the
G other conditions and exceptions specified therein belonged to the Government
which· were assigned to the Raja so Icing as he abides the conditions of
management or such other conditions as were specified at the time or which
might be substituted by other terms at any time.·

Reliance upon the judgment of this Court in State of Orissa and Ors.
H v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. and Anr., AIR (1985) SC 1293, is also of no
STATE v. R.M. PAL [SETHI, J.] 339
help to respondent No. 1. In that case it was observed that 'royalty' is not A
a tenn used in legal parlance for the price of goods sold. It was observed that
the royalty was defined to mean, a payment reserved by the grantor of a
patent, lease of a mine or similar right, and payable proportionately to the use
made of the right by the grantee, which shall on payment of money, but may
be a payment in kind being the part of the produce of the exercise of the B
right. The judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Raja Bahadur Kamakshya
Narain Singh v. Commissioner of Income Tax Bihar and Orissa, AIR (1943)
PC 153, had held that royalty was an Income flowing from the covenant in
the lease. While dealing with the question of royalty, it was held:

"These are periodical payments, to be made by the lessee under his C
covenants· in consideration of the benefits which he is granted by the
lessor. What these benefits may be is shown by the extract from the
lease quoted above, which illustrates how inadequate and fallacious
it is to envisage the royalties as merely the price of the actual tons
of coal. The tonnage royalty is indeed only payable when the coal or D
coke is gotton and despatched : but that is merely the last stage. As
preliminary and ancillary to that culminating act, liberties are granted
to enter on the land and search, to dig and sink pits, to erect engines
and machinery, coke ovens furnaces and fonn railways and roads. All
these and the like liberties show how fallacious it is to treat the lease
as merely one for the acquisition of a certain number of tons of coal, E
or the agreed item of royalty as merely the price of each ton of
coal."

Neither the Judicial Committee of the Privy council nor this Court had
held or referred to that the item like extension fee, interest, interest on interest F
and payment for damage caused could be included within the ambit of the
tenn 'royalty'. The aforesaid payments were thus recoverable only on the
basis of the contract or the statutory provisions.

In Inderjeet Singh Sia/ and Anr. v. Karamchand Thapar and Ors. [1995]
6 sec 166 it was held: G
"In its primary and natural sense 'royalty', in the legal world, is known
as the equivalent or translation of jura regalia or jura regia. Royal
rights and prerogatives of a sovereign are. covered thereunder. In its
secondary sense the word 'royalty' would signify, as in mining leases,
that part of the reddendum, variable though, payable in cash or kind, H
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) 2 S.C.R.

A for rights and privileges obtained. It is found in the clause of the deed
by which the grantor reserves something to himself out of that which
he grants. But "What is in a name? A rose by any other name would
smell as· sweet." So said Shakespeare.

The Court further held that the commodity goes by its value and not
B by the wrapper in which it is packed. If the thought is clear, its translation
in words, spoken or written, may more often than not, tend to be faulty. The
same substance under the facts of the particular case has to be understood
before applying it in legal manner. This Court has very clearly held that
royalty in general connotes the State's share in the goods upon which the
C rights of its exploitation are conferred upon any persoQ or the group of
persons. If the royalty cannot be claimed by any individual, much less the
controvercial items being its attribute, even if assumed, can be claimed by a
citizen.

The subjects covered by item Nos, XI, XII, XIII and XVII have thus to
D be understood in this context which leave no doubt in our mind that the said
claims against the forest corporation covered by the aforesaid items owed
their origin to the exercise of the sovereign rights vested in the appellant
State. No private citizen, unless specially authorised in that behalf under the
provisions of law could prefer such claims. The High Court was, therefore,
E not justified in allowing the aforesaid claims in favour of the respondent No. I.
The observations in Para No.21 of the impugned judgment are, therefore,
bereft of any legal substance and thus cannot bo upheld.

We are, therefore, satisfied that the impugned judgment of the High
F Court cannot be sustained even on merits and is liable to be quashed inasmuch
as no statutory right enforceable under law existed in favour of the respondent
No. I regarding the enforcement of which a command could have been issued
in the form of a writ of mandamus. The appeal of the State is accordingly
allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside dismissing the writ
G petition filed by respondent No. l. Interim order issued in the case shall stand
vacated and the respondent No. I held liable to refund all the sums of money
which he has received in pursuance of the judgment of the High Court and
interim order of this Court dated 16.10.95. The excess amount shall be refunded
within a period of three months. In case, the excess amount is not refunded
within the time specified, the respondent No. I shall be liable for its refund
H along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of this
STATE v. R.M. PAL [SETHI, J.] 341
order till the actual payment is made. Respondent No. I is also held to pay A
costs which we quantify at Rs.5,000. The amount of costs be deposited in the
Registry for the Funds of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.

S.M. Appeal allowed.

B