Supreme Court of India
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESHversusNIRMALA DEVI
- Citation
- 2017 INSC 325
- Decided
- 10 April 2017
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- A K SIKRI
Holding
Imprisonment is a mandatory component of the punishment for offences under Sections 307, 328 and 392 IPC, and an appellate court cannot replace it with a fine alone; the High Court’s alteration of the sentence was ultra vires.
Summary
The State of Himachal Pradesh appealed against the Himachal High Court’s order that replaced the trial court’s imprisonment sentences for Nirmala Devi with a fine of Rs.30,000. The trial court had convicted her under IPC sections 307 (attempt to murder), 328 (causing hurt by poison) and 392 (robbery) and sentenced her to two years’ simple imprisonment for each offence, to run concurrently, along with a modest fine. The High Court, invoking mitigating factors of the accused being a woman and mother of three minor children, set aside the imprisonment and imposed only a fine. The Supreme Court held that the statutes for those offences expressly require imprisonment ‘and’ fine, making imprisonment mandatory; the appellate court cannot, under Section 386 CrPC, replace imprisonment with fine alone. Consequently, the High Court’s modification was unlawful and the trial court’s sentence was restored.
Issues considered
- Whether Sections 307, 328 and 392 of the IPC mandate imprisonment in addition to fine, thereby prohibiting a sentence consisting solely of fine.
- Whether the High Court, exercising power under Section 386(b)(iii) of the CrPC, could lawfully alter the nature of the sentence by eliminating imprisonment altogether.
- Whether the mitigating circumstances of the accused’s gender and having minor children justify substituting imprisonment with a fine.
- Interpretation of the phrase ‘and shall also be liable to fine’ in the IPC.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 386
- Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940s. 27, s. 34
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 307, s. 309, s. 328, s. 392, s. 53
Subjects
sentencingappellate jurisdictionSection 386 CrPCimprisonmentfineIPC sections 307 328 392mitigating circumstancesgenderproportionalitycriminal law
Judgment
(2017] 2 S.C.R. 112
A STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
v.
NJRMALA DEVI
(Criminal Appeal No. 667of2017)
B APRIL 10, 2017
[A. K. SIKRI AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.J.]
Code ofCri111inal Procedure, 1973:
s. 386 - Powers of the appellate court - High Court in exercise
c of power uls. 386 altering the extent of sentence - Respondent-
lady along with co-accused intoxicated the co111plainant, looted
money from hi111, beat him and dumped him in a watercourse - Trial
court convicted the respondent for the offences punishahle ulss.
328, 307, 392134 and awarded imprisonment of two years in respect
of each of the offences which were to run conc11rre111ly - Howeve1;
D
the High Court set aside the sentence of imprisonment and substituted
by fine of Rs. 30,0001- - Held: In respect of offences u!vs. 307, 328
and 392 there has to be punishment ofi111prisonment, and in addition,
convict is also liable to pay fine - Thus, awarding the punishment
of imprisonment is a must and there cannot be a situation where no
E imprisonment is imposed at all -- Acts commilled by re.1pondent
constitute heinous o,ffences, haring common intention along with
co-accused - Tii•o 111itigating circumstances pressed into service by
the respondent that she is a 11·oman and is having three minor children
has to be balanced with the nature of crime irhich the respondent
co111111itted - Trial court took into consi(/eration these circzunstances
F
and on that basis, took a lenient vie11· - No reason for the High
Court to show any further mercy - Removing the element of
i111prisonment altogether erroneous in law - Thus, the sentencing
part of the judgme/1/ of the High Court is set aside and the judgment
o,f the trial court is restored - Penal Code, I 860 ss. 328, 307,
G 392134 ·- Sentence/Se11tencing.
s. 386 - Powers of the appellate court while hearing appeals
from the trial court -- Held: If con1•i('tio11 is maintained, appdlate
court has the power to alter the nature or the ntent, or the nature
and extent, of the sentence (though it ca1111ut enhance the sr1111e1
H Ho1vever, such 17n11·er is lo be cxerrisell in 1~~11ns <~(th. ···inns
I i7
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. NIRMALA DEVI 113
for which the accused has been convicted - Power cannot be A
exercised contrary to law.
Sentence/Sentencing: Award of sentence - Gender of the
offender, if a mitigating factor, while fixing the quantum of sentence -
Held: Depends upon the facts of each case, whether gender should
be treated as a relevant consideration - No hard and fast rule can B
be laid down.
Principles of sentencing - Stated.
Allowing the appeal, the Conrt
HELD: By the Court: The judgment of the High Court is C
set aside to the extent it modifies the sentence and the sentence
of imprisonment as awarded by the trial court is restored herewith.
Per Sikri, J.: 1.1 As can be seen from the language of
Sections 307, 328 and 392 IPC, all these sections provide for
imprisonment 'and' fine. In fact, after specifying particular term D
of imprisonment, all these sections use the words 'and shall also
be liable to fine'. There has to be punishment of imprisonment in
respect of these offences, and in addition, the convict is also liable
to pay line. Therefore, awarding the punishment of imprisonment
is a must and there cannot be a situation where no imprisonment
is imposed at all. The High Court was, therefore, clearly wrong E
in not inflicting a sentence of imprisonment, by modifying the
sentence awarded by the trial court and obliterating the sentence
of imprisonment altogether. Thus, the very approach of the High
Court in substituting the sentence by fine alone is impermissible
in law. (Para 14) [124-F-H; 125-A-B]
F
1.2 Section 386 Cr.P.C. enlists the powers of the appellate
court while hearing the appeals from the trial court. In an appeal
from conviction, ifthe conviction is maintained, the appellate court
has the power to alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and
extent, of the sentence (though it cannot enhance the same).
G
However, such power has to be exercised in terms of the
provisions of the Penal Code for which the accused has been
convicted. Power to alter the sentence would not extend to
exercising the powers contrary to law. The High Court committed
a legal error in doing away with the sentence of imprisonment
altogether. [Para 15) [125-B-C) H
114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017) 2 S.C.R.
A 1.3 The acts committed by the respondent constitute
heinous offences. Having common inteniion along with co- ·
accused, she administered poison like substance to the
complainant; robbed him of his money; and even attempted to
kill him. Award of sentence is imprisonment is a must. [Para 16]
(125-D-E]
B
1.4 The offences for which the respondent is convicted
prescribe maximum imprisonment and there is no provision for
minimum imprisonment. Thus, there is a wide discretion given
to the court to impose any imprisonment which may be from one
day (or even till the rising of the court) to ten years/life. However,
c at the same time, the judicial discretion which has been conferred
upon the court, has to be exercised in a fair manner keeping in
view the well established judicial principles. [Para 18] (127-H;
128-A-B]
1.5 The following principles of sentencing can be deduced:
D
(i) Imprisonment is one of the methods used to handle the
convicts in such a way to protect and prevent them to
commit further crimes for a specific period of time and
also to prevent others from committing crime on them
out of vengeance. The concept of punishing the
E criminals by imprisonment has recently been changed
to treatment and rehabilitation with a view to modify
the criminal tendency amoni: them.
(ii) There are many philosophies behind such sentencing
justifying these penal consequences. The philosophical/
jurisprudential justification can be retribution,
F
incapacitation, specific deterrence, general deterrence,
rehabilitation, or restoration. Any of the above or a
combination thereof can be the goal of sentencing.
(iii) Notwithstanding the above theories of punishment,
when it comes to sentencing a person for committing a
G heinous crime, the deterrence theory as a rationale for
punishing the offender becomes more relevant. In such
cases, the role of mercy, forgiveness and compassion
becomes secondary.
(iv) In such cases where the deteri:ence theory has to
H prevail, while determining the quantum "r ;entence,
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. NIRMALA DEVI 115
discretion lies with the Court. While exercising such a A
discretion, the Court has to govern itself by reason and
fair play, and discretion is not to be exercised according
to whim and caprice. It is the duty of the Court to impose
adequate sentence, for one of the purposes of imposition
of requisite sentence is protection of the society and a
B
legitimate response to the collective conscience.
(v) While considering as to what would be the appropriate
quantum of imprisonment, the Court is empowered to
take into consideration mitigating circumstances, as
well as aggravating circumstances. (Para 20) (134-E-
H; 135-A-D] c
1.6 When the Penal Code provides discretion to Indian
Judges while awarding the sentence, the Court will have
undoubtedly regard to extenuating and mitigating circumstances.
As regards the question as to whether the respondent being a
lady and having three minor children will be extenuating reasons, D
it is observed that in many countries of the world, gender is not a
mitigating factor. Some jurists also stress that in this world of
gender equality, women should be treated at par with men even
as regards equal offences committed by them. Women are
competing men in the criminal world; they are emulating them in
E
all the crimes; and even surpassing men at times. Therefore,
concept of criminal justice is not necessarily synonymous with
social justice. Eugene Mc Laughlin shows a middle path. She
finds that predominant thinking is that 'paper justice' would
demand giving similar penalty for similar offences. However, when
it comes to doing 'real justice', element of taking the F
consequences of a penalty cannot be ignored. Here, while iloing
'real justice' consequence.s of awarding punishment to a female
offender are to be seen. According to her, 'real justice' would
consider the likelihood that a child might suffer more from a
mother's imprisonment than that of his father's. Insofar as Indian
G
judicial mind is concerned, in certain decisions of this Court,
gender is taken as the relevant circumstance while fixing the
quantum of sentence. It would depend upon the facts of each
case, whether it should be treated as a relevant consideration
and no hard and fast rule can be laid down. [Para 21) (135-E-H;
136-A) H
116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.
A 1. 7 In the instant case, two mitigating circumstances which
are pressed into service by the respondent are that she is a woman
and is having three minor children. This has to be balanced with
the nature of crime which the respondent committed. As can be
seen, these circumstances were taken into consideration by the
trial court and on that basis, the trial court took a lenient view by
B
awarding imprisonment for two years in respect of each of the
offences under Sections 307, 328 and 392 IPC, which were to be
run concurrently. There was no reason to show any further mercy
by the High Court. Removing the element of imprisonment
altogether was, in any case, erroneous in law. The sentencing
c part of the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the
judgment of the trial court is restored. (Para 22) (136-B-D]
Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India & Ors.
(1999) 7 SCC 409 : [1999] 1 Suppl. SCR 87; Narinder
Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & A11r. (2014) 6 SCC
D 466 : [2014] 4 SCR 1012; Satish Kumar Jayanti Lal
Dabgar v. State of Gujarat (2015) 7 SCC 359 : (2015]
2 SCR 751; Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar & Ors. (2013)
9 SCC 516 : (2013] 5 SCR 979 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
E [1999] 1 Suppl. SCR 87 referred to Para 14
[2014] 4 SCR 1012 referred to Para 17
J2015J 2 SCR 751 referred to Para 18
__gQ13J 5 SCR 979 referred to Para 19
F Per Ashok Bhushan. J. (Concurring): 1.1 The Scheme of
Section 53 of the Penal Code enumerates the punishments. Both
imprisonment of either description i.e. rigorous or simple and
fine are included within the punishments. The Scheme of the Penal
Code indicates that for different offences different punishments
have been provided for. Chapter XVI of the Penal Code deals
G
with 'all offences affecting the human body'. The punishment for
an offence of attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC is
imprisonment and fine. There are several other offences in the
same chapter where sentence provided is imprisonment or fine
or both. Section 309 ofIPC provides for punishment for an offence
H to attempt suicide. [Para 15] (142-E-F]
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. NIRMALA DEVI 117
1.2 Prior to amendments made in Section 309 by Act 8 of A
1882, tbe punishment provided for Section 309 was 'simple
imprisonment for a term, which can be extended to one year or,
and shall also be liable to fine. By the above amendments of 1882
the words 'and shall also be liable to fine' have been deleted and
substituted by the words 'or with fine or with both', The legislature
B
is thus, well aware of the distinction between the punishment
which provides imprisonment and with fine and punishment by
imprisonment or fine or by both. The punishment provided in
said sections which contains the imprisonment and shall also be
liable to fine has to be read to mean that offence being proved
under Section 307, 329 and 392 IPC the punishment of c
imprisonment and fine are imperative.[Paras 16, 28] [142-H; 143-
A; 148-E-F]
1.3 The Penal Code contains a well thought and carefully
considered a regime of punishment. For graver offences, severe
punishments have been provided, where it was thought to provide D
lesser punishment, option of imprisonment or fine has been
provided for, in the Scheme of Section 309 IPC. The punishment
provided in Section 307, 328 and 392 IPC are those which have
been provided for serious offences and it cannot be countenance
that the offence having been proved the punishment can only be
a fine. In case, such interpretation is accepted those offenders in E
the society, who are financially well-off can well get away only
with punishment of a fine, which shall neither be in the interest of
society nor in accordance with the scheme of punishment, as
delineated in Penal Code.[Paras 29, 30] [148-F-H; 149-A]
1.4 The trial court awarded the sentence of two years F
imprisonment with fine of Rs. 2,000/- for each of the said offences,
which was in accordance with the Statutory Scheme. Thus, the
punishment under Section 307, 328 and 392 IPC cannot only be
a fine, imprisonment is an imperative part of punishment.[Para
31] [149-B] G
1.5 The power of the appellate court, as contained under
Section 386 is co-extensive with the power of trial court. In a
case, where trial court had acquitted an accused under Section
386(a), the appellate court can reverse an order of acquittal and
hold the accused guilty and pass such sentence on him according H
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.
A to law. Thus, even when the appellate court has been given power
0
to reverse an acquittal and hold the accused guilty, the power to
pass sentence is to be exercised "according to" law. The word
'according to law' clearly indicates the sentence as provided under
the Penal Code. Thus, power of appellate court to sentence an
accused after holding him guilty has to be in accordance with the
B
punishment as provided under Penal Code. Thus, while exercising
power under Section 386(b) when the appellate court has been
given power to alter the nature or the extent or ,nature and extent
both of the sentence, altering of the sentence has also te be In
accordance with the Scheme of punishment as contained in the
c Penal Code. [Paras 32, 33) (149-C-F]
1.6 Appellate Court cannot exercise its power under
386(b)(iii) to alter the sentence of the imprisonment and fine into
a sentence of only a fine, which shall be contrary to the Statutory
Scheme. In event, such power is conceded to Appellate Authority
D to alter a sentence of imprisonment and fine with sentence only
of a fine, the consequences would be unfair and nnjust.[Para 34)
[149-F-GJ
1. 7 In a case of murder, under Section 302 IPC also,
punishment is with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also
E be liable to fine. Imprisonment for life, on the above interpretation,
can also be converted only into fine, which is clearly impermissible
and not in accordance with the Scheme of Penal Code. Thus, no
interpretation can be put to Section 386(b)(iii) except that the
power of the appellate court to alter the sentence awarded by
trial court has to be in accordance with law i.e. sentencing
F provisions as contained in the Penal Code. [Para 35) [149-G-H;
150-A-B]
1.8 Section 386 Sub clause (b)(i) uses the phrase 'reverse
the finding and sentence, whereas Sub clause (iii) uses the phrase
'alter the nature or the extent or the nature and the extent of the
G sentence'. There is a difference between the word 'reverse' and
'alter', both have been made, contemplating different
consequences and circumstances. [Para 36) (150-B-C)
1.9 Setting aside the sentence of punishment, as done by
the High Court in the instant case amounts to reversal of the
H sentence and cannot mean alteration of sentence. There cannot
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. NIRMALA DEVI 119
be any dispute as to the power of the appellate court to alter the A
nature and extent of the sentence without altering the finding.
Thus, even in a case when High Court affirms the finding of guilt,
the nature and extent of sentence can very well be altered. The
appellate court taking into consideration the case can alter/reduce
the sentence. [Paras 38, 39] (150-E-G]
B
1.10 The High Court modified the sentence taking into
consideration that appellant lady has to take care of her three
minor sons, out of them two are mentally retarded. The trial court,
while sentencing the accused to two years imprisonment had
already taken the said fact into consideration. The order of the
High Court, modifying the sentence is unsustainable and is set- c
aside. The judgment and order of the trial court is restored (Paras
41, 45] [150-H; 151-A, E-F]
Badrj Prasad v. Emperor (1922) ILR 44 All 538;
Mis. Rajasthan Pharmaceutical Laboratory, Bangalore
and Two Others v. State of Karnataka (1981) 1 SCC D
645: (1981] 2 SCR 604; Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar
v. Union of India & Ors. (1999) 7 SCC 409 : [1999]
1 Suppl. SCR 87; State of Andhra Pradesh v. Thadi
Narayana AIR 1962 SC 240 : [1962] SCR 904 -
referred to. E
Case Law Reference
(1922) ILR 44 All 538 referred to Para 18
[1981] 2 SCR 604 referred to Para 21
(1999] 1 Suppl. SCR 87 referred to Para 26 F
[1962] SCR 904 referred to Para 37
CRIMIN AL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :Criminal Appeal No.
667 of2017.
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.07.2012 of the High Court
ofHimachal Pradesh at Shimla in Criminal Appeal No. 79 of2003. G
Ms. Promila, Adv., for the appellant.
K. K. Mani (A.C.), Adv. for the respondent.
The following Judgments and Order of the Court were delivered
A. K. SIKRI, J. 1. Leave granted. H
t
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.
A 2. K.espondent herein faced trial for offence covered by Sections
328, 392, 397 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (!PC)
alongwith co-accused Krishan Lal Sharma. When the trial was underway,
both the accused persons were released on bai I, pending trial. 12
prosecution witnesses (PWs) were examined and some more were yet
to be examined. At that stage, respondent absented from court and was
B
declared a proclaimed offender. Thereafter, trial proceeded against
Krishan Lal Sharma, who was convicted for committing offences under
the aforesaid provisions, for which he was charged, vide judgment dated
19"' April, 2002. Later on, the respondent was apprehended and brought
to trial and testimony ofremaining prosecution witnesses were recorded
c in her case. It culminated in the judgment dated 27'" February, 2003
whereby the Sessions Judge convicted the respondent also for the
offences punishable under Sections 328, 307, 392 read with Section 34,
!PC. As a consequence, order of sentence was passed on 5'" March,
2003. She was inflicted with the punishments of simple imprisonment
for a period of two years and fine in the sum of Rs. 2,000/-, in default of
D
payment of which to undergo imprisonment for a further period of three
months, for the offence each punishable under Sections 328, 307 and
392 !PC with direction that all the substantive sentences were to run
concurrently.
3. Fine of Rs. 6,000/- was directed to be paid to the complainant,
E Ramesh Kumar as compensation. A sum of Rs. 12,000/- was recovered
from the respondent which was also ordered to be released to the
complainant.
4. The respondent filed an appeal againstthejudgment dated 5"'
March, 2003 passed by the Sessions Judge in the High Court. The High
F Court has affirmed the conviction. However, insofar as award of sentence
is concerned, it is drastically modified by removing imprisonment part of
the sentence and substituting the same with fine simplicitorofRs. 30,000/-.
Concluding paragraph of the impugned judgment giving reasons fortaking
this course of action is reproduced below:
G "! have given careful consideration to the submission made by
the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, who sl1bmits
that the appellant is a lady and looking after her three minor sons
out of them two are mentally unsound and in these circumstances,
the Court should take a lenient view. This fact was also urged
H before the learned trial court which has taken a lenient view of
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. NIRMALA DEVI 121
fA. K. SlKRl, J.l
the case. What I find further is that the appellant has also A
absconded during the trial and cannot be considered to be. such
an innocent person. However, on the conspectus of the material
on record, it would be in the fitness of things in the case. the
sentence of imprisonment under each head is set aside and instead
a fine of Rs. 30,0/- is imposed upon the appellant with a direction
B
that the amount be deposited in the Court of leamed Sessions
Judge, Chamba, Division Chamba within a period of six months
from today failing which the sentence of imprisonment shall
revive. On deposit of such fine, it shall be paid to the complainant.
A direction is issued to the learned Sessions Judge, Chamba to
comply with this judgment." c
5. Respondent has not challenged the order against that part of
the judgment whereby her conviction has been upheld by the High Court.
To that extent, the judgment of the High Court has attained finality. On
the contrary, it is the State which has filed the Special Leave Petition
under Article 136 of the Constitution (out of which present appeal arises), D
questioning the validity, propriety and justification of the impugned order
whereby the sentence of imprisonment is set aside and substituted by
fine of Rs. 30,000/-. Therefore, the learned counsel for the parties
confined their submissions on this aspect alone.
6. Before examining the issue raised, it would be apposite to E
take note of the prosecution case against the respondent for which she
stands convicted. The case originated on the basis of complaint filed by
the complainant, Ramesh Kumar (PW-13), resulting into registration of
the FIR (Exh. PL). He stated therein that on 22"' August, 2000, he left
his house situated at Preet Nagar, Jammu at around 8.40 A.M. in the
morning to withdraw a sum of Rs. 27,000/- from his Bank account from F
the Bank Satbari for the purposes of purchasing an auto-tempo which
he wanted to use for transporting children studying in his school. On
way to the bank, he met Krishan Lal accused, who was driving Maruti
Van No. JK-02M-4392, an old acquaintance of the complainant. He
asked the complainant as to where he was going whereupon he disclosed G
that he was going to withdraw a sum of Rs. 27,000/- for purchasing an
auto-tempo from Pathankot. At that point oftime, the complainant had
a sum of Rs. 4,000/- in his pocket. Accused Krishan Lal told him that he
would get him a discount from an authorized auto-tempo dealer at
Pathankot and that he was willing to drive him to that place. Both went
H
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 2 S.C.R.
A to the bank where the complainant withdrew a sum of Rs. 27,000/-.
Thereafter, accused Krishan Lal took him to his house where he was
offered a cup of tea. Then, Krishan Lal took him to the house of one
lady (respondent herein). He informed the complainant that this lady
would also go to Pathankot and they would go there together. The
accused offered a glass of water and thereafter a cup of tea after which
B
the complainant, Ramesh Kumar, suspected that he had been made to
ingest some intoxicant. They boarded the Van where after the
complainant lost consciousness. He regained his senses/consciousness
in the Civil Hospital at Dalhousie in the early hours of24'" August, 2000.
He had lost all the currency. The case is that the money had been looted
c from the complainant; he had been beaten up badly and dumped in a
Nullah somewhere near Dalhousie.
5. It is on the aforesaid allegations that the respondent along
with Krishan Lal were fasten with the charges under Sections 328, 392,
307 read with Section 34 of the !PC. As pointed above, prosecution
D was able to substantiate the aforesaid allegations resulting into the
conviction of the respondent.
8. To put it in nutshell, the prosecution succeeded in proving,
beyond reasonable doubt, that respondent in furtherance of common
intention with her co-accused had administ~red stupefying intoxicating
E substance to the complainant with intent to commission of offence, that
is, theft of currency notes of the complainant and in the process attempted
to kill the complainant as well.
9. At this juncture, I would like to reproduce the provisions under
which the respondent has been convicted. ·' ·
F "S. 328: Causing hurt by means of poison, etc. with intent
to commit an offence:
Whoever administers to or causes to be taken by any person
any poison or any stupefying, intoxicating or unwholesome drug,
or other thing with intent to cause hurt to such person, or with
G intent to commit or to facilitate the commission of an offence or
knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause hurt, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a tenn which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
S. 392: Punishment for robbery:
Whoever commits robbery shall be punished with rigorous
H
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. NIRMALA DEVI 123
[A. K. SJKRI, J.]
imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years; and A
shall also be liable to fine; and, ifthe robbery be committed on
the highway between sunset and sunrise, the imprisonment may
be extended to fourteen years.
S. 307 : A'ttempt to murder.-Whoever does any act with
such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, B
if-he by that act caused death, he would be guilty or murder, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine;
and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender
shall be liable either to [imprisonment for life], or to such
punishment as is here in before mentioned. c
Attempts by life convicts- [When any person offending under
this section is under sentence of [imprisonment for life], he may,
if hurt is caused, be punished with death.]
I 0. As is clear from the bare reading of the aforesaid sections,
offence mentioned therein are of serious nature. Maximum D
'imprisonment' for committing offence under Section 328 IPC.is I 0 years
as well as fine. Likewise, the punishment stipulated in Section 392 !PC
is 'rigorous imprisonment' for a term which may extend to I 0 years, as
well as fine. In case of highway robbery between sunset and sunrise,
imprisonment can be extended even to 14 years, though that is not the E
case here. Insofar as Section 307 IPC is concerned, which relates to
commission of offence by attempting to murder, again maximum sentence
of imprisonment of either description (i.e. simple or rigorous) upto 10
years can be awarded, in addition to making the convict liable to pay
fine. This punishment can go upto life imprisonment if hurt is caused to
any person by an act which is done with the intention or knowledge that F
it may cause death.
11. In the instant case, hurt is caused. Following aspects are
clearly discernible from the reading of these provisions:
(a) The offences mentioned under ail these Sections are of
G
serious nature.
(b) Maximum penalty, under normal circumstances, is I 0 years
which under certain circumstances can even be life
imprisonment (Section 307 IPC) or 14 years (under Section
392 !PC)
H
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 7] 2 S.C.R.
A (c) Whereas imprisonment under Sections 307 !PC and 328
!PC can be of either description, namely, 'simple
imprisonment' or 'rigorous imprisonment' and, therefore, it
is left to the discretion of the trial court to award any of
these depending upon the circumstances of a case, insofar
as punishment under Section 392 !PC is concerned there is
B
no such discretion and the imprisonment has to be rigorous
in nature.
12. In the instant case, as noticed above, trial court a\varded
imprisonment of two years, that too, simple imprisonment for all the
three offences which was to run concurrently. The record shows that it
c was pleaded before the trial court that respondent is a lady and further
that she had three minor sons. These considerations persuaded the trial
court to take a lenient view. In the appeal filed by the respondent before
the I ligh Court, on the question of sentence same very circumstances
were pleaded, which resulted in mellowing the High Court further by
D setting aside the imprisonment part of sentencing and modifying the
sentence to that of fine of Rs. 30,000/- alone.
13. In this context and factual background, two points arise for
consideration, viz.:
(i) Whether the High Court was permitted, in law, to do away
E with the punishment of imprisonment altogether and
substitutes the same with fine alone?
(ii) Whether the circumstances pleaded by the respondent were
so mitigating that punishment of fine alone could be justified?
14. Coming to the first question, as can be seen from the language
F
of Sections 307, 328 and 392 of !PC, all these sections provide for
imprisonment 'and' fine. In fact, after specifying particular term of
imprisonment, all these sections use the words 'and shall also be liable to
fine". This expression came up for consideration in Z1111iarrao Bltikaji
Nagarkar v. Union of l11tlia & Ors.' and the Court explained that in
G such circumstances, it is imperative to impose both the sentences i.e.
imprisonment as well as fine. Tims, there has to be punishment of
imprisonment in respect of these offences, and in addition, the convict is
also liable to pay fine. Therefore, awarding the punishment of
imprisonment is a must and there cannot be a situation where no
II 1
\t999J1sec409
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. NIRMALA DEVI 125
[A. K. SIKRI, J .]
imprisonment is imposed at all. The High Court was, therefore, clearly A
wrong in not inflicting a sentence of imprisonment, by modifying the
sentence awarded by the trial court and obliterating the sentence of
imprisonment altogether. Thus; the very approach of the High Court in
substituting the sentence by fine alone is impermissible in law.
15. Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enlists the B
powers of the appellate _court while hearing the appeals from the trial
court. In an appeal from conviction, ifthe conviction is maintained, the
appellate court has _the power to alter the nature or the extent, or the
nature and extent, of the sentence (though it cannot enhance the same).
However, such a power has to be exercised in terms of the provisions of
Indian Penal Code etc: for which the accused has been convicted. Power c
to alter the sentence would not extend to exercising the powers contrary
to law. It clearly follows that the High Court committed a legal error in
doing away with the sentence of imprisonment altogether.
16. The second question is as to whether the circumstances
pleaded by the respondent justify taking a lenient view in the matter. D
The acts committed by the respondent constitute heinous offences.
Having common intention along with co-accused, she administered poison
like substance to the complainant; robbed him of his money; and even
attempted to kill him. As already held, award of sentence is imprisonment
is a must. The question is, in the wake of the commission of crime of this E
nature, to what extent the mitigating factor viz. the respondent being a
woman and having three minor children, be taken for the purposes of
• <
sentencmg? .• ·
17. In Zunjarrao B/1ikaji Nagarkar 's case, it was impressed
upon by this Court that the penalty to be imposed has to commensurate F
with the gravity of the offence. In Narinder Sing fl & Ors. v. State of
Punjab & Am:'. there is a brief narration of the jurisprudential theories
of punishment in criminal cases, described as under:
"14. The law prohibits certain acts and/or conduct and treats
them as offences. Any person committing those acts is subject G
to penal consequences which may be of various kinds. Mostly,
punishment provided for committing offences is either
imprisonment or monetary fine or both. Imprisonment can be
rigorous or simple in nature. Why are those persons who commit
'" 1 (2014)6 sec 466 H
\
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.
A offences subjected to such penal consequences? There are many
philosophies behind such sentencing justifying these penal
consequences. The philosophical/jurisprudential justification can
be retribution, incapacitation, specific deterrence, general
deterrence, rehabilitation, or restoration. Any of the above or a
combination thereof can be the goal of sentencing.
B
15. Whereas in various countries, sentencing guidelines are
provided, statutorily or otherwise, which may guide Judges for
awarding specific sentence, in India we do not have any such
sentencing policy till date. The prevalence of such guidelines
may not only aim at achieving consistencies in awarding sentences
c in different cases, such guidelines normally prescribe the
sentenci1lg policy as well, namely, whether the purpose of
awarding punishment in a particular case is more of a deterrence
or retribution or rehabilitation, etc. In the absence of such
guidelines in India, the courts go by their own perception about
D the philosophy behind the prescription of certain specified penal
consequences for particular nature of crime. For some deterrence
and/or vengeance becomes more important whereas another
Judge may be more influenced by rehabilitation or restoration as
the goal of sentencing. Sometimes, it would be a combination of
both which would weigh in the mind of the court in awarding a
E particular sentence. However, that may be a question of quantum.
16. What follows from the discussion behind the purpose of
sentencing is that if a particular crime is to be treated as crime
against the society and/or heinous crime, then the deterrence
theory as a rationale for punishing the offender becomes more
F relevant, to be applied in such cases. Therefore, in respect of
such offences which are treated against the society, it becomes
the duty of the State to punish the offender. Thus, even when
there is a settlement between the offender and the victim, their
will would not prevail as in such cases the matter is in public
G domain. Society demands that the individual offender should be
punished in order to deter other effectively as it amounts to
greatest good of the greatest number of persons in a society. It
is in this context that we have to understand the scheme/
philosophy behind Section 307 of the Code.
17. We would like to expand this principle in some more detail.
H
STATE OF HlMACHAL PRADESH v. NlRMALA DEVI 127
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
We find, in practice and in reality, after recording the conviction A
and while awarding the sentence/punishment the court is
generally governed by any or all or combination of the aforesaid
factors. Sometimes, it is the deterrence theory which prevails in
the minds of the court, particularly in those cases where the
crimes committed are heinous in nature or depict depravity, or
B
lack morality. At times it is to satisfy the element of"emotion" in
law and retribution/vengeance becomes the guiding factor. In
any case, it cannot be denied that the purpose of punishment by
law is deterrence, constrained by considerations ofjustice. What,
then, is the role of mercy, forgiveness and compassion in law?
These are by no means comfortable questions and even the c
answers may not be comforting. There may be certain cases
which are too obvious, namely, cases involving heinous crime
with element of criminality against the society and not parties
inter se. In such cases, the deterrence as purpose of punishment
becomes paramount and even if the victim or his relatives have
D
shown the virtue and gentility, agreeing to forgive the culprit,
compassion of that private party would not move the court in
accepting the same as larger and more important public policy
of showing the iron hand oflaw to the wrongdoers, to reduce the
commission of such offences, is more important. Cases of murder,
rape, or other sexual offences, etc. would clearly fall in this E
category. After all, justice requires long-term vision. On the other
hand, there may be offences falling in the category where the
"correctional" objective of criminal law would have to be given
more weightage in contrast with "deterrence" philosophy.
Punishment, whatever else may be, must be fair and conducive
F
to good rather than further evil. Ifin a particular case the court
is of the opinion that the settlement between the parties would
lead to more' "'nd; better relations between them; would prevent
further occurrence of such encounters between the parties, it
may hold settlement to be on a better pedestal. It is a delicate
balance between the two conflicting interests which is to be G
achieved by the court after examining all these parameters and
then deciding as to which course of action it should take in a
pai1icular case."
18. The offences for which the respondent is convicted prescribe
maximum imprisonment and there is no provision for minimum H
128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.
A imprisonment. Thus, there is a wide discretion given to the Court to
impose any imprisonment which may be from one day (or even till the
rising of the court) to ten years/life. However, at the same time, the
judicial discretion which has been conferred upon the Court, has to be
exercised in a fair manner keeping in view the well established judicial
principles which have been laid down from time to time, the prime
B
consideration being reason and fair play. Some of the judgments
highlighting the manner in which discretion has to be exercised were
taken note of in Sa tish Kumar Jaya11ti Lal Dabgar v. State of Gujarat'
and I may reproduce the same:
"18. Likewise, this Court made the following observations
c regarding sentencing in the cases involved in sexual offences
in Sumer Singh v. Surajbhan Singh ((2014) 7 SCC 323 : (2014)
3 SCC (Cri) 184]: (SCC pp. 337-39, paras 33-36)
"33. It is seemly to state here that though the question of
sentence is a matter of discretion, yet the said discretion cannot
D be used by a court of law in a fanciful and whimsical manner.
Very strong reasons on consideration of the relevant factors
have to form the fulcrum for lenient use of the said discretion.
It is because the ringing of poignant and inimitable expression,
in a way, the warning of Benjamin N. Cardozo in The Nature
E of the Judicial Process-Yale University Press, 1921 Edn.,
p.114:
'The Judge even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is
not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight errant roaming
at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He
F is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is
not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated
benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by
tradition, methodised by analogy, disciplined by system, and
subordinated to "the primordial necessity of order in social life".'
G
34. In this regard, we may usefully quote a passage from Ramji
Daymm/a and Sons (P) ltd. v. Invest Import [( 1981) I SCC
80] : (SCC p. 96, para 20)
"20 .... when it is said that a matter is within the discretion of
the court it is to be exercised according to well-established
H • (2015) 7 sec 359
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. NIRMALA DEVI 129
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
judicial principles. according to reason and fair play. and not A
according to whim and caprice. "Discretion", said Lord
Mansfield in R. v. Wilkes [( 1770) 4 Burr 2527 : ( 1558-1 774)
All ER Rep 570 : 98 ER 327] , "when applied to a court of
justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must be
governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague,
B
and fanciful, but legal and regular" (see Craies 011 Statute
Law, 6th Edn., p. 273).'
35. In Aero Traders (P) Ltd. v. Ravinder Kumar Suri [(2004)
8 SCC 307] the Court observed: (SCC p. 3 11, para 6)
"6 .... According to Black's Lall' Dictionary ''judicial c
discretion" means the exercise ofjudgment by a Judge or court
based on what is fair under the circumstances and guided by
the rules and principles of law; a court's power to act or not
act when a litigant is not entitled to demand the act as a matter
ofright. The word "discretion" connotes necessarily an act of
a judicial character, and, as used with reference to discretion D
exercised judicially, it implies the absence of a hard-and-fast
rule, and it requires an actual exercise of judgment and a
consideration of the facts and circumstances which are
necessary to make a sound, fair and just determination, and a
knowledge of the facts upon which the discretion may properly E
operate. (See 27 Corpus Jiiris Secundum, p. 289.) When it
is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the
authorities, that something is to be done according to the rules
of reason and justice and not according to private opinion;
according to law and not humour. It only gives certain latitude
or liberty accorded by statute or rules, to a Judge as distinguished F
from a ministerial or administrative official, in adjudicating on
matters brought before him.'
Thus, the Judges are to constantly remind themselves that the
use of discretion has to be guided by law, and what is fair under
the obtaining circumstances. G
36. Having discussed about.the discretion, presently we shall
advert to the duty of the court in the exercise of power while
imposing sentence for an offence. It is the duty of the cornt to
impose adequate sentence. for one of the purposes of imRosition
H
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.
A ofrequisite sentence is protection of the society and a legitimate
response to the collective conscience. The paramount principle
that should be the guiding laser beam is that the punishment should
be proportionate. It is the answer of law to the social conscience.
Jn a way, it is an obligation to the society which has reposed faith
in the court of law to curtail the evil. While imposing the sentence
B
it is the court's accountability to remind itself about its role and
the reverence for rule of law. It must evince the rationalised
judicial discretion and not an individual perception or a moral
propensity. But, if in the ultimate eventuate the proper sentence
is not awarded, the fundamental grammar of sentencing is
c guillotined. Law cannot tolerate it; society does not withstand it;
and sanctity of conscience abhors it. The old saying 'the law
can hunt one's past' cannot be allowed to be buried in an indecent
manner and the rainbow of mercy, for no fathomable reason,
should be allowed to rule. True it is, it has its own room, but, in all
circumstances, it cannot be allowed to occupy the whole
D
accommodation. The victim, in this case, still cries for justice.
We do not think that increase in fine amount or grant of
compensation under the Code would be a justified. answer in
law. Money cannot be the oasis. It cannot assume the centre
stage for all redemption. Interference in manifestly inadequate
E and unduly lenient sentence is the justifiable warrant, for the
Court cannot close its eyes to the agony and anguish of the victim
and, eventually, to the cry of the society. Therefore, striking the
balance we are disposed to think that the cause of justice would
be best subserved if the re~pondent is sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for two years apart from the fine that has
F
been imposed by the learned trial Judge."
19. Likewise, stressing upon the principle of proportionality in
sentencing in the case of Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar & Ors,', this
Court stressed that special reasons must be assigned for taking lenient
view and undue sympathy for accused is not justified. It was equally
G important to keep in mind rights of victim as well as society at large and
the corrective theory on the one hand and deterrence principle on the
other hand should be adopted on the basis of factual matrix. Following
paragraphs from the said judgment under the caption 'sentencing policy'
need to be referred to:
H '!201319 sec 516
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. NIRMALA DEVI 13 1
fA. K. SIKRI, J.l
"11. The cardinal principle of sentencing policy is that the sentence A
imposed on an offender should reflect the crime he has committed
and it should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence. This
Court has repeatedly stressed the central role of proportionality
in sentencing of offenders in numerous cases.
12. The factual matrix of this case is similar to the facts and B
circumstances in Shai/esh Jasvantbhai v. State of
Gujarat [(2006) 2 SCC 359: (2006) I SCC (Cri) 499] wherein
the accused was convicted under Sections 307/114 IPC and for
the same the trial court sentenced the accused for l 0 years.
However, the High Court, in its appellate jurisdiction, reduced
the sentence to the period already undergone. In that case, this c
Court held that the sentence imposed is not proportionate to the
offence committed, hence not sustainable in the eye of the law.
This Court observed thus: (SCC pp. 361-62, paras 7-8)
"7. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting
claims and demands. Security of persons and property of the D
people is an essential function of the State. It could be achieved
through instrumentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is
a cross-cultural conflict where living law must find answer to
the new challenges and the courts are required to mould the
sentencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion of E
lawlessness would undermine social order and lay it in ruins.
Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must
be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing
\ appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a cornerstone of the
edifice of 'order' should meet the challenges confronting the
society. Friedman in his Law in Changing Society stated that: F
'State of criminal law continues to be-as it should be-a
decisive reflection of social consciousness of society.'
Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt
the corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual matrix.
By deft modulation, sentencing process be stern where it should G
be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The
facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the
crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the
motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused,
the nature of weapons used and all other attending
H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.
A circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the
area of consideration.
8. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence
would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the
public confidence in the efficacy oflaw and society could not
B long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the
duty of every cou11 to award proper sentence having regard to
the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was
executed or committed, etc."
13. This position was reiterated by a three-Judge Bench of this
c Court in Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed v. State of
Gujarat [(2009) 7 SCC 254: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 368], wherein
it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 281, paras 99-100)
"99 .... The object of awarding appropriate sentence should
be to protect the society and to deterthe criminal from achieving
D the avowed object to (sic break the) law by imposing appropriate
sentence. It is expected that the courts would operate the
sentencing system so as to impose such sentence which reflects
the conscience of the society and the sentencing process has
to be stern where it should be. Any liberal attitude by imposing
meagre sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on
E account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be
resultwise ·counterproductive in the long run and against the
interest of society which needs to be cared for and strengthened
by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system.
I 00. Justice demands that courts should impose punishment
F befitting the crime so that the courts reflect public abhorrence
of the crime. The court must not only keep in view the rights
of the victim of the crime but the society at large while
considering the imposition ofappropriate punishment. The court
will be failing in its duty ifappropriate punishment is not awarded
G
for a crime which has been committed not only against the
individual victim but also against the society to which both the
criminal and the victim belong."
In that case, the Court further goes to state that meagre sentence
imposed solely Olrnccount of lapse of time without considering
H
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. NIRMALA DEVI 133
fA. K. SIKRI, J.l
the degree of the offence will be counterproductive in the long A
run and against the interest of the society.
I 4. In Jameel v. State of U.P. ~(20 l 0) 12 SCC 532 : (2011) l
SCC (Cri) 582], this Court reiterated the principle by stating that
the punishment must be appropriate and proportional to the gravity
of the offence committed. Speaking about the concept of B
sentencing, this Court observed thus: (SCC p. 535, paras 15-16)
"15. In operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the
corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual matrix.
By deft modulation, sentencing process be stern where it should
be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The c
facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the
crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the
motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused,
the nature of weapons used and all other attending
circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the
area of consideration. D
16. It is the duty of every court to award proper sentence
having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in
which it was executed or committed. The sentencing courts
are expected to consider all relevant facts and circumstances
bearing on the question of sentence and proceed to impose a E
sentence commensurate with the gravity of the offence."
15. In Guru Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka [(2012) 8 SCC
734: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 594: (2013) I SCC (Cri) 972], while
discussing the concept of appropriate sentence, this Court
expressed th@t: (SCC pp. 744-45, para 33) F
"33 .... It is the duty of the court to see that appropriate
sentence is imposed regard being had to the commission of the
crime and its impact on the social order. The cry of the collective
for justice which includes adequate punishment cannot be lightly
ignored." G
16. Recently, this Court in Gopal Singh v. State of
Uttarakhand [(2013) 7 SCC 545: (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 608: JT
(2013) 3 SC 444] held as under: (SCC p. 551, para 18)
H
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.
A "18. Just punishment is the collective cry of the society. While
the collective cry has to be kept uppermost in the mind,
simultaneously the principle of proportionality between the crime
and punishment cannot be totally brushed aside. The principle
ofjust punishment is the bedrock of sentencing in respect of a
criminal offence."
B
17. We reiterate that in operating the sentencing system, law
should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence based on
factual matrix. The facts and given circumstances in each case,
the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and
committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct
c of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending
circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area
of consideration. We also reiterate that undue sympathy to impose
inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system
to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law. It is
0 the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard
to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was
executed or committed. The court must not only keep in view
the rights of the victim of the crime but also the society at large
while considering the imposition of appropriate punishment."
E 20. Following principles can be deduced from the reading of the
aforesaid judgment:
(i) Imprisonment is one of the methods used to handle the
convicts in such a way to protect and prevent them to commit
further crimes for a specific period of time and also to
F prevent others from committing crime on them· out of
vengeance. The concept of punishing the criminals by
imprisonment has recently been changed to treatment and
rehabilitation with a view to modify the criminal tendency
among them.
(ii) There are many philosophies behind such sentencing
G
justifying these penal consequences. The philosophical/
jurisprudential justification can be retribution, incapacitation,
specific deterrence, general deterrence, rehabilitation, or
restoration. Any of the above or a combination thereof can
be the goal of sentencing.
H
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. NIRMALA DEVI 135
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
(iii) Notwithstanding the above theories of punishment, when it A
comes to sentencing a person for committing a heinous crime,
the deterrence theory as a rationale for punishing the
offender becomes more relevant. In such cases, the role
of mercy, forgiveness and compassion becomes seconda1y.
(iv) In such cases where the deterrence theory has to prevail, B
while detennining the quantum of sentence, discretion lies
with the Court. While exercising such a discretion, the Court
has to govern itself by reason and fair play, and discretion
is not to be exercised according to whim and caprice. It is
the duty of the Court to impose adequate sentence, for one
of the purposes of imposition of requisite sentence is c
protection of the society and a legitimate response to the
collective conscience.
(v) While considering as to what would be the appropriate
quantum of imprisonment, the Court is empowered to take
into consideration mitigating circumstances, as well as D
aggravating circumstances.
21. When the Indian Penal Code provides discretion to Indian
Judges while awarding the sentence, the Court will have undoubtedly
regard to extenuating and mitigating circumstances. In this backdrop,
the question is as to whether the respondent being a lady and having E
three minor children will be extenuating reasons? I may observe that in
many countries of the world, gender is not a mitigating factor. Some
jurists also stress that in this world of gender equality, women should be
treated at par with men even as regards equal offences committed by
them. Women are competing men in the criminal world; they are F
emulating them in all the crimes; and even surpassing men at times.
Therefore, concept of criminal justice is not necessarily synonymous
with social justice. Eugene Mc Laughlin shows a middle path. She
finds that predominant thinking is that 'paper justice' would demand giving
similar penalty for similar offences. However, when it comes to doing
'real justice', element of taking the consequences of a penalty cannot be G
ignored. Here, while doing 'real justice' consequences of awarding
punishment to a female offender are to be seen. According to her, 'real
justice' would consider the likelihood that a child might suffer more from
a mother's imprisonment than that of his father's. Insofar as Indian
judicial mind is concerned, I find that in cert1!in decisions of this Court,
H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 2 S.C.R.
A gender is taken as the relevant circumstance while fixing the quantum
of sentence. I may add that it would depend upon the facts of each case,
whether it should be treated as a relevant consideration and no hard and
fast rule can be laid down. For example, where a woman has committed
a crime being a part of a terrorist group, mercy or compassion may not
be shown.
B
22. In the present case, two mitigating circumstances which are
pressed into serv.ice by the respondent are that she is a woman and she
is having three minor children. This has to be balanced with the nature
of crime which the respondent has committed. As can be seen, these
circumstances were taken into consideration by the trial court and on
C ·that basis, the trial court took a lenient view by awarding imprisonment
for two years in respect of each of the offences under Sections 307, 328
and 392 of the !PC, which were to be run concurrently. There was no
reason to show any further mercy by the High Court. Further, as found
above, removing the element of imprisonment altogether was, in any
D case, errgneous in law. I, thus, allow this appeal and set aside the
sentencing part of the judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment
of the trial court.
ASH OK BHUSHAN, J. I. Leave granted. I had advantage of
going through the erudite judgment of brother Justice A. K. Sikri and I
E am in full agreement with the opinion expressed by brother Justice A. K.
Sikri. Looking to the importance of issues involved in this appeal, I have
also penned my reasons.
2. State of Himachal Pradesh has filed this appeal, challenging
the judgment of the High Court dated 03.07.2012 by which, criminal
F appeal filed by the respondent-accused had been decided, setting-aside
the sentence of the imprisonment under Section 328, 392 and 307 !PC
and modifying the fine of Rs. 2000/-to a fine of Rs. 30,000/-.
3. The brief facts necessary to be noted for deciding the issues
raised in the appeal are:
G a. On 22.08.2000, Rakesh Kumar (complainant), Resident of Preet
Nagar, Jammu, left his house for withdrawing a sum of Rs. 27,000/-
lying in his account in a bank at Satbari for purchasing an auto-tempo
from Pathankot as the complainant was running a private school upto
middle class in Jammu.
H b. When the complainant was on his way to Bank and reached near
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. NIRMALA DEVI I37
[ASHOK BI-IUSHAN, J.)
Digyana Bus Stand, he met Krishan Lal Shanna (Accused No. I) in his A
Maruti Van No. JK -02M-4392.
c. Then the Accused No. I took the complainant to the house of his
neighbour Smt. Nirmala Devi (respondent-accused). The Accused No.
1 informed the complainant that since the Respondent-Accused also
had to go to Pathankot, therefore, they all would go together. In the B
house of the Respondent-Accused, the complainant was offered a glass
of water and thereafter a cup of tea after which the complainant
suspected that he had been made to ingest some intoxicant. Thereafter,
all boarded the van where the complainant became unconscious and did
not remember as to where he was taken.
c
d. On 24.8.2000, the complainant made a statement to the Inspector/
SHO Kishan Chand, P. S. Dalhousie, District Chamba at Civil Hospital,
Dalhousie which was recorded under Section 154 Criminal Procedure
Code narrating the whole incident mentioned above.
e. On the compliant, FIR No. 80 of2000 was registered at P. S. Dalhousie. D
Upon investigation, it was found that the Accused No. 1 and Respondent-
Accused had conspired to rob the complainant of his money. The
Respondent-Accused mixed some tablet in the tea offered to the
complainant because of which the complainant became unconscious. In
the van, the complainant was strangulated with a green dupatta of
Respondent-Accused. In the investigation, it was found out that both E
Accused No. I and Respondent-Accused after ensuring that the
complainant had died, threw him down the road in a nullah near village
Dhundiara. Thereafter, both went to Dalhousie and stayed at Kumar
Hotel for night. The complainant was found lying in nullah by one Shri
Tej Ram who had gone to his field to check the crops. The complainant F
was brought out from nullah by Tej Ram with the help of another person
and then taken to private clinic. On getting the first aid, the complainant
was taken to Civil Hospital in Dalhousie where the statement was made.
f. On 19.04.2002, Accused No. I was convicted and sentenced for
offences punishable under Section 328, 392, 397 lPC vide judgment
G
dated 19.4.2002. During the trial of the Respondent-accused, she was
declared proclaimed offender. Upon being apprehended, the remaining
prosecution witnesses were recorded.
4. The learned Sessions Judge convicted the respondent-accused
for offences under Section 328, 392 and 397 read with Section 34 IPC.
H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.
A After recording the conviction, the learned Sessions Judge imposed
following sentence:
" ...... she is ordered lo undergo simple imprisonment for a
period of two years and to pay fine in tile sum of Rs. 2,0001
- in default of payment of which to undergo imprisonment
B for a further period oft/tree months for the offence punishable
under Section 328 /PC, simple imprisonment for a period of
two years and also to pay fine in the sum of Rs. 2,0001- in
default ofpayment of which to undergo simple imprisonment
for a further period oft/tree months for the offence punishable
under Section 307 /PC and to undergo simple imprisonment
c for a period of two years anti to pay fine in the sum Rs.
2,0001- in default of payment to which lo undergo simple
imprisonment for a further period of three months for the
offence punishable under Section 392 /PC. All the
substantive sentences are ordered to run concurrently.,.
D 5. The respondent filed Criminal Appeal No. 79 of2003, which
had been heard and decided by High Court vide its judgment dated
03.07.2012. High Court taking a lenient view on sentence decided the
appeal by passing the following order:
"However, on the conspectus of the material on record, it .
E would be in the fitness of things in case the sentence of
imprisonment under each head is set aside and instead a
fine of Rs. 30, 0001- is imposed upon the appellant with a
direction that the amount be deposited in the Court of learned
Sessions Judge, Cltamba, Division Chamba within a period
F of six months from today failing which tile sentence of
imprisonment slwll revive. On deposit of such fine, it shall
be paid to the complainant. A direction is issued to the
learned Sessions Judge, Cllllmba to comply with this
iudgment."
G
6. We have heard learned counsel for the State of Himachal
Pradesh, Ms. Promila and Shri K. K. Mani for the accused. Learned
counsel for appellant in support of appeal contends that High Court erred
.in setting-aside the sentence of imprisonment by substituting it, by
enhancement of the amount of fine. The reduction of sentence by the
High Court was not in accordance with the provisions of Indian Penal
H Code. The order passed by Appellate Court is not in accordance with
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. NIRMALA DEVI 139
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
the power given under Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure A
1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"). High Cpurt while
exercising the power under Section 386(b) of the Code could have reduced
the sentence, but while maintaining the finding of the guilt could not have
set-aside the sentence of imprisonment.
7. Learned counsel for the, respondent-accused submitted that B
High Court has rightly enhanced the fine by setting-aside the sentence
of imprisonment in view of the facts & circumstances of the case. The
respondent-accused being a lady, who had to look after three minor
sons, out of them two being mentally unsound, sentence of imprisonment
has rightly been set-aside. The judgment and order of the High Court
beingjust and equitable, this Court need not interfere with the alteration c
of sentence ordered by the High Court.
8. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for
the parties and have perused the record carefully. The only issue, which
arises in this appeal for determination is, as to whether, the High Court in
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 386 of the Code could D
have set-aside the sentence of imprisonment, as imposed by trial court
under Section 328, 392 and 307 IPC by enhancing the amount of fine to
Rs. 30,000/- from the fine Rs. 2,000/- as ordered by trial court.
9. Section 386 of the Code provides for 'power of the Appellate
Court'. Section 386 of the Code which is relevant forthe present case is E
quoted below:
"386.Powers of tfte Appellate Court. - After perusing sucft
record and /tearing tfte appellant or /tis pleader, if fie
appears, and tfte Public Prosecutor if fte appears, and in
case of an appeal under section 377 or section 378, the F
accused, if fte appears, tfte Appellate Court may, if it
considers tftat tftere is no sufficient ground for interfering,
dismiss the appeal, or may-
(a) in an appeal from an order or acquittal, reverse such
order and direct that further inquiry be made, or that tire G
accused be re- tried or committed for trial, 11s the case nu1y
be, or find him guilty and pass sentence on him according to
law;
(b) in an 11ppeal from a conviction-
H
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017) 2 S.C.R.
A (i) reverse tlte finding and sentence and 11cquit or discharge
tfte accused, or order llim to be re-tried by a Court of
compete11/ jurisdiction subordinate to sucft Appellate Court
or committed/or trial, or
(ii) alter tfte fimlinf?, m11illlaininK tfte sentence, or
B (iii) witft or wit/tout altering the finding, alter tfte nature or
the extent, or tfte nature and extent, of the sentence, but not
so 11s to enllance the Same;
(c) in an 11ppeal for enhancement of sentence-
c (i) reverse the fi1uling and sentence and acquit or discharge
the accused or order llim to be re- tried by a Court competent
to try the offence, or
,(ii) 11lter tfte fimlinK m11int11ini11f? the sentence, or
(iii) with or wit/tout altering the finding, alter tfte nature or
D tile extent, or lite nature and extent, oftlte sentence, so as to
enhance or reduce the same;
(d) in 1111 appeal from any other order, alter or reverse such
order;
(e) make 1111y 11mendment or any consequential or incidental
E order tftat m11y be just or proper;
Provided th11t tile sentence sft11ll not be enlumced unless
tile 11ccused has fwd 11n opportunity ofshowing cause ag11inst
such enhancement:
F Provided further that the Appellate Court shall not i11jlict
greater punishment for the offence which ill its opinion tfte
accused ftas committed, titan mif?ltt /111ve been inflicted for
tit at offence by tfte Court p11ssing the order or se1ilence under
appe11l."
G 10. A perusal of the judgment of the High Cou11 indicates that the
High Court had not interfered with the finding of guilt as recorded by the
trial court. In para 10 of the judgment, High Court stated as follows:
"Further from the f11ct that the money has been recovered
from the 11cc11sed, there is 110 doubt in mind tllat tfte appellant
is guilty for tfte offences as charged. I c11nnot accept tllis
H
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. NIRMALA DEVI 14 I
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
submission tit at tlte evidence of tlte witnesses does not prove A
tlte guilt oftlte accusetl Tltere is tit us no merit in tit is appeal
w/liclt is accordingly dismissed."
11. High Court thus has not reversed the finding of the guilt and
without altering the finding of the guilt recorded by trial court, has altered
the sentence. In altering the sentence High Court has exercised its power B
under Section 386(b)(iii) of the Code. What is the meaning and content
of 'Statutory Scheme' as delineated by the words ''alter the nature or
the extent of the sentence, but not so as to enhance the same' has to be
considered and answered in th is appeal. Whether in altering the sentence,
the High Court is empowered to alter the sentence to an extent which
could not have been awarded by the trial court after recording the finding c
of the guilt?
12. In the present case, accused has been convicted under
Sections 307, 328 and 392 IPC. lt is useful to look into the above provisions
to find out nature of sentence which could be awarded for an offence
under the aforesaid sections. Sections 307, 328 & 392 IPC are extracted D
as below:
"307. Attempt to murder.- Wltoever does any act witlt sucft
intentio.n or knowledge, am/ under suclt circumstances tltat,
if lte by tltat act caused deatft, lte would be guilty of murder,
sllall be punislletl witlt imprisonment of eitlter description E
for a term wlticlt may extend to ten years, and slta/I also be
liable to fine; anti if lturt is caused lo any person by suclt
act, tlte offender situ/I be liable eitlter lo l[impriso11111ent for
life], or lo such punisltment as is ltereinbefore mentioned.
Attempts by life convicts.-2/Wlten any person offending F
under tltis section is under sentence of l[imprisonment for
life], lte may, if lturt is caused, be punislted witlt deatlt.]
328. Causing fturt by means of poison, etc., witlt intent to
commit an offence.- Wftoever administers to or causes to
be taken by any person any poison or any stupefying, G
intoxicating or unwlwlesome drug, or otlter tiling witlt intent
to cause lturt to suclt person, or witft intent to commit or to
facilitate tlte commission of an offence or knowing it to be
likely tftat lte will thereby cause /turf, sit all be punislted witlt
imprisonment of either description for a term wlticlt may
H
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.
A extend to ten years, and shall also be liable lo fine.
392. Punishment for robbery.- Whoever commits robbery
shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to
fine; and, if lite robbery be committed on lite liigitway between
B sunset and sunrise, the imprisonment may be extended lo
fourteen years."
13. The trial court after holding the accused guilty has sentenced
her for rigorous imprisonment of two years with fine of Rs.2,000/- in
default of payment, further simple imprisonment for a period of three
c months for each of the above offences.
14. What is.the content and meaning of the word 'shall be punished
with rigorous imprisonment, which may extend to ten years, and shall
also be liable to fine', whether after finding the accused guilty of the
aforesaid offences, the trial court could have imposed sentence only of
D a fine or it was incumbent on the trial court to impose the sentence of
imprisonment as well as fine?
15. The Scheme of Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code enumerates
the punishments. Both imprisonment of either description i.e. rigorous or
simple and fine are included within the punishments. The Scheme of the
E Indian Penal Code indicates that for different offences different
punishments have been provided for. Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal
Code deals with 'all offences affecting the human body'. The punishment
for an offence of attempt to murder under Section 307 !PC as noted
above, is imprisonment and fine. There are several other offences in the
" same chapter where sentence provided is imprisonment or fine or both.
F Section 309 of !PC provides for punishment for an offence to attempt
suicide. Section 309 ofIPC is quoted as below:
"309. Attempt to commit suicide.-Wlwever attempts lo
commit suicide and does any act towards lite commission of
sucit offence, sitall ite punisited witit simple imprisonment
G for a term witicit may extend lo one year l[or witit fine, or
with both]."
16. Prior to amendments made in Section 309 by Act 8 of 1882,
the punishment provided for Section 309 was 'simple imprisonment for
a term, which can be extended to one year or, and shall also be Iiable to
H fine. By the above amendments of 1882 the words 'and shall also be
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. NIRMALA DEVI 143
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
liable to fine' have been deleted and substituted by the words 'or with A
fine or with both'. The legislature is thus well aware of the distinction
between the punishment which provides imprisonment and with fine and
punishment by i1nprisonment or fine or by both. Where punishment
provided is both by imprisonment and fine, can Court punish only with
fine?
B
17. In the present case, High Court by its judgment has punished
the accused only witli'fine after affirming the finding of the guilt recorded
by the trial court.
18. In an early decision of Allahabad High Court in Btufri Prasad
Vs. Emperor, (1922) /LR 44All 538, the Division Bench of the Court c
had occasion to consider the punishment in context of Section 392 IPC.
In the above case for an offence under Section 392 IPC, the Magistrate
inflicted a fine of Rs. I 00/- with an alternative period of imprisonment,
and if the fine was not paid with the further sentence of 30 stripes.
Appeal was filed by Badri Prasad which was admitted upon the question
of sentence. A notice was also issued by the High Court why sentence D
should not be enhanced or otherwise altered.
19. Chief Justice Edward Grimwood Mears in his separate
judgment held as follows: ·
"....... In tflese circumstances, tile Magistrate inflicted a fine E
of Rs. I 00 witfl an alternative period of imprisonment, if
that fine was not paid, and sentenced Badri Prasad also to
thirty stripes. Badri Prasad preferred an appeal to this Court
and it flas been admitted upoll tfle questioll of sentellce only-
alld, at tfle same time, llotice flas beell served oil flim to show
cause wfly Ifie se11tellce sflould llOI be e11fla11ced or otherwise F
altered. This was a cflarge Ullder Sectioll 390 alld the pellafty
is prescribed ullder Sectioll 392. A11 examillatioll of that
sectioll shows that a jille alone is llOt a permitted pullis/1melll
for a robbery. Robbery, ullfler tflese circumstallces, may be
pullisfled by rigorous imprisollme11t and by a fine, alld ill G
certaill cases by w/1ippillg ill additioll. But tfle Magistrate
erred ill law ill selllellcillg tfle accused to a fille a/Ill a fille
Ullaccompallied by imprisollmellt....... "
"....... Tflerefore, I defer very gladly to wflitt I have llO doubts
is ill this case Mr. Justice Ballllerji's better judgme11t Oil tfle
H
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.
A matter, I am quite in accord witlt ltim tltat tltere must he a
substantial period of imprisonment and, therefore, we alter
tlte nature of the punisltment wlticl1 Badri Prasad must
undergo, and we sentence flim to twelve montlts' rigorous
imprisonment witlt effect from tlte date of ft is arrest. We
maintain tlte fine ofimprisonment witft tlte alternative period
B
of imprisonment if tliat fine he not paid, and we wipe out
tltat part of tlte sentence wfticlt orders flim to receive a
whipping."
20. Justice Pramoda Charan Bannerji, in his separate judgment
stated the following:
c
"I am of opinion tltat tlte Court below was wrong in not
inflicting on tlte appellant a sentence of imprisonment. A
sentence of imprisonment is an essential sentence under
SeCtion 392 of tlte Indian Penal Code. To tftis sentence a
fine may he addetf and, under Section 4 of tlte Wltipping
D Act, a sentence of wftipping may he imposed wlzere, in tlte
commission of robbery, lturt is caused. Tlterefore, tlze
sentence offine only was an illegal sentence, .and a sentence
of imprisonment ouglzt to ltave been imposed."
21. Judgment in Mis. Rajastlwn Pharmaceutical Laboratory,
E Bangalore and Two Otfters versus State of Karnataka, (198I) 1
SCC 6f5, is also relevant to be referred to. Iq the above case, the Court
had occasion to examine Section 27a(ii) and Section 34(2) of Drugs &
Cosmetics Act, 1940. Section 27a(ii) also contains punishment "shall
be punishable with imprisonment for a term, which shall not be less than
F one year but which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to
fine". -
22. In para 5 of the judgment, the above provision has been ·
extracted as below:
"5. Cltapter IV of tfte Act, fteaded "Manufacture, Sale and
G· Distribution of Drugs and Cosmetics" includes Section 16 to
Section 33A. Section 18 prov!des inter alia :
.. ...no person. sltall ltimsel/ or by any otlter person on ft is
{Jeltalf-
(a) manufactur~ for sale, or sell, or stock or exhibit for
H sale, or distribute-
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. NIRMALA DEVI 145
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
(i) any drug or cosmetic wlticlt is not of standard quality; A
(b) .......
(c) manufacture for sale, or sell, or stock or exltibit for
sale or distribute any drug or cosmetic, except under, and
in accordance witlt Ille conditions of, a licence issued....
B
• * * * *
Section 18-A is in tltese terms:
Disclosure of tire name of the manufacturer, etc.- Every
person, 1101 being the manufacturer of a drug or cosmetic
or his agent for the distributio11 tflereof, shall, ifso required, C
disclose to the 111spector the name, address and other
particulars of the person from wltom fie acquired the drug
or cosmetic.
Section 27 which enumerates tire penalties for illegal
manufacture, sale, etc., of drugs reads- D
Whoever himself or by any other person 011 his behalf
manufactures for sale, sells, stocks or exhibits for safe or
distributes-
(a) any drug-
E
(i) .........
(ii) wit/tout a valid licence as required under clause (c) of
.Section 18,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which sit all
not be less than one year but wlticfl may extend to ten years F
and shall also be liable to fine:
Provided that the Court may, for any special reasons to
be recorded in writing, impose a sentence of imprisonment
of less than one year;
G
(b) any drug other than a drug referred to in clause (a) in
co11trave11tio11 of any of tlte provisions of this Chapter or
any rule made thereunder slrnll be pu11isflab/e with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years,
or witlr fine, or witlr botlr.
H
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.
A Section 28 provides for ''pe11alty for non-disclosure of tlte
name of tlte manufacturer, etc." a11d states:
Wlloever contrave11es tile provisions of Section 18-A sllall
be punisltable witlt impriso11ment for a term wlticlt may
extend to one year, or wit/1 fine wlticlt may extend to five
B hundred rupees, or witlr botlr."
23. In the above case, High Court has found the accused guilty
for an offence under Section 1S(c) of the Act for which, they were
punished under Section 27(a)(ii). High Court sentenced each of the three
appellants to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- on each of the count.
.c 24. This Court in para 7 had stated as follows:
"7. Tile Higlt Court imposed a fine of two tltousand rupees
on eaclr of tlte tltree appellants for tile offence under Section
18(c). Section 27(a)(ii)_makes a sente11ce of imprisonment
of not less titan one year compulsory for melt offence in
D addition to fine u11/ess for special reasons a sente11ce of
imprisonme11t for a lesser period was warranted."
25. This Court remitted the case to consider again on the findings
already recorded for the question of sentence. In para 8 following was
stated: -
E "8. 111 tile result, wlrile maintaining t!.!e co11viction of tlte
appellants, we remit tlte case to tlte Higlt Court; tire Higlr
Court will consider again on tire fi11dillgs already recorded
tire question of sentence-(a) for tlte offence under Section
18(c)punislrable under Section 27(a)(ii)_so far as appellants
2 and 3 are concerned, and (b) for tlte offence punisltable
F u11der Section 28_ofwlticl1 all tlte I/tree appellants /rave been
found guilty,- and pass appropriate sentences. Tlte appeal
is allowed to tire extent and in tire manner indicated above."
26. Another judgment which needs to be noted is Zunjarrao
Bl1ikaji Nagarkar versus Union of India and Others, (1999) 7 SCC
G 409.
27. In the above case, this Court had considered Section 325 !PC
and the phrase 'and shall also be liable to fine'. The Court held that
when the punishment provided is for sentence of imprisonment and also
~ith fine, the imprisonment and fine both are imperative. In para 37, 38
H & 39 following was stated:
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. NIRMALA DEVI 147
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
"37. Penalty to be imposed llas to be in commensurate witll A
tile gravity of tile offence anti tile exte11t of tile evasio11. 111
tile present case, pe11a/ty coultl llave been justified Appel/a11t
was, llowever, of tile view tllat imposition of pe11alty was not
mantlatory. He could II ave formed sucll a 1'iew. Under Section
325 of tile Indian Penal Code, a person found guilty "sllal/
B
be punislled witll imprisonment of eitllu tlescriplio11 for a
term wilicll may extend to seven years, and silall also be
liable to fine". Section 63 /PC provides rhat wllere no sum
is expressed to wlliclt a fine may extent/, the t1mount offine
to wllicll tile offender is liable is unlimited, but sllall not be
excessive. A Single Judge of tlte Pot11t1 Higll Court in Tett1r c
Gope v. Gm1t1uri Gope took lite view that expression "sllall
also liable to fine" in Section 325 IPC tloes not mean that a
sentence offine must be imposed in every case of conviction
in tllat section. He said:
"Suell <m expression llas been 11sed 'in tlte Penni Code D
only in connectio11 witll those offences where the legislature
has provitled that a sentence of imprisonment is compulsory.
In regard to such offences, tile legislature has left a
discretion ill the Court to impose also a 'sentence offine in
appropriate cases in atldition to tile imposition of a sentence
of imprisonment which alone is obligatory." E
38. We do not think that tile view expressed by tile Patna
High Court is correct as it would appear from tlte language
of tire section tlrat sentences of botlr imprisonment and fine
are imperative. It is tile extent offine wiliclr lras been left to
tire discretion of tire court. In Rajastlran Pltarmaceutica/s F
Laboratory v. State of Karnataka tlris Court lras taken Ille
view tlrat imprisonment anti fine botlr are imperative wlren
t/1e expression "shall also be liable to fine" was used under
Section 34 of t/1e Drugs anti Cosmetics Act, 1940. In I/rat
case, tllis Court was considering Section 27 oft/re Drugs and G
Cosmetics Act, 1940, w/1iclr enumerates tlle penalties for
illegal manufacture, sale, etc., of drugs and is as under -
"27. Wlroever lrimselfor by any other person on llis belralf
manufacture for sale, sells, stocks or exilibits for sale or
distributes - H
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.
A (a) any drug -
(i) * * *
(ii) without a valid licence as required under clause(c) of
Section 18,
shall be punishable willt imprisonment for a term which shall
B
not be less titan one year but wlticlt may extend to /en years
and shall also be liable to fine:
Provided I/rat the court may, for.any special reasons to be
recorded in writing, impose a sentence of imprisonment of
less than one year;
c
* * *"
39. This Court said t/ra/ the High Court imposed a fine of
two thousand rupees on eaclr of tire three appellants for tile
offence under Section l 8(c) of the Act wlten
Section 27(a)(ii) m"kes " sentence of imprisonment of not
D
less lll"n one ye(lr compulsory for such offence in "ddition
lo fine unless for special reasons "sentence of imprisonment
for" lesser period was warr"nted. 11 would tit us "ppear tll"t
tltis Court was of tile opinion th"t in suclt " case
imprisonment ""d fine, botlt are imperative."
E
* * * *
28. Thus, the punishment provided in aforesaid sections which
contains the imprisonment and shall also be liable to fine has to be read
to mean that offence being proved under Section 307, 329 and 392 IPC
the punishment of imprisonment and fine are imperative.
F
29. As noted above, the Indian Penal Code contains a well thought
and carefully considered a regime of punishment. For graver offences,
·severe punishments have been provided, where it was thought to provide
lesser punishment, option of imprisonment or fine h~s-been provided for
as noted, in the Scheme of Section 309 of!PC. The punishment provided
G in Section 307, 328 and 392 !PC are those which have been provided for
serious offences and it cannot be countenance that the offence having
.been proved the punishment can only be a fine.
30. In case, such interpretation is accepted those offenders in the
society, who are financially well-off can well get away only with
H punishment ofa fine, which shall neither be in the interest of society nor
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. NIRMALA DEVI 149
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
in accordance with the scheme of punishment, as delineated in Indian A
Penal Code.
31. The trial court has awarded the sentence of two years
imprisonment with fine of Rs. 2,000/- for each of the aforesaid offences,
which was in accordance with the Statutory Scheme. We are thus of
the clear opinion that punishment under Section 307, 328 and 392 !PC B
cannot only be a fine, imprisonment is an imperative part of punishment.
32. Now, let us examine, as to whether under Section 386 of the
Code which empowers the Appellate Court to alter the nature or the
extent or nature and extent of sentence empowers the Appellate Court
to alter the sentence of imprisonment and fine into a sentence of fine c
only. The power of the Appellate Court, as contained und,er Section 386
is coextensive with the power of trial court. In a case, where trial court
had acquitted an accused under Section 386(a), the Appellate Court can
reverse an order of acquittal and hold the ace.used guilty and pass such
sentence on him according to law.
D
33. Thus, even when the Appellate Court has been given power
to reverse an acquittal and hold the accused guilty, the power to pass
sentence is to be exercised "according to" law. The word 'according to
law' clearly indicates the sentence as provided under the Indian Penal
Code. Thus power of Appellate Court to sentence an accused after
holding him guilty has to be in accordance with the punishment as provided E
under Indian Penal Code. Thus, while exercising power under Section
386(b) when the Appellate Court has been given power to alter the
nature or the extent or nature and extent both of the sentence, altering
of the sentence has also to be in accordance with the Scheme of
punishment as contained in the Indian Penal Code. F
34. Appellate Court ~annot exercise its power under 386(b)(iii) to
alter the sentence of the imprison01ent and fine into a sentence of only a
fine, which shall be contrary to the Statutory Scheme. In event, such
power is conceded to Appellate Authority to alter a sentence of
imprisonment and fine with sentence only of a fine, the consequences G
will be unfair and unjust. '
35. In a case of murder, it is relevant to note that under Section
302 !PC also, punishment is with death, or imprisonment for life, and
shall also be liable to fine. Imprisonment for life, on the above
interpretation, can also be converted only into fine, which is clearly
H
150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.
A impermissible and not in accordance with the Scheme of Indian Penal
Code. Thus, no interpretation can be put to Section 386(b)(iii) except
that the power of the Appellate Court to alter the sentence awarded by
trial court has to be in accordance with Jaw Le. sentencing provisions as
contained in the Indian Penal Code.
B 36. There is one more aspect of the matter which needs to be
noted. Section 386 Sub clause (b)(i) uses the phrase 'reverse the finding
and sentence, whereas Sub clause (iii) uses the phrase 'alter the nature
or the extent or the nature and the extent of the sentence'. There is a
difference between the word 'reverse' and 'alter', both have been made,
contemplating different consequences and circumstances.
c
37. This Court, in State of An<l/1ra Prt1desli versus Tliadi
Narayana AIR 1962 SC 240 in para 12, while considering the word
reverse and alter used in Section 423 akin to Section 386 of the Code,,
stated as following: ~
D "12. Tlie word "alter" must in, Ifie context be distinguislied
from the word "reversed". Wliereas, under S.
423(1)(b)(l)power is conferred on the Higli Court to reverse
the order of conviction the power conferred on the Appellate
Court by the expression "alter the finding" is merely the
power to alter. Reversal of the order implies its obliteration,
E whereas alteration would imply no more t/ian modification
and not its obliteratiOn."
38. Setting aside the sentence of punishment, as done by the High
Court in the present case amounts to reversal of the sentence and cannot
mean alteration of sentence.
F 39. There cannot be any dispute as to the power of the Appellate
Court to alter the nature and extent of the sentence without altering the
finding. Thus, even in a case when High Court affirms the finding of
guilt, the nature and extent of sentence can very well be altered. The
Appellate Court taking into consideration the case can alter/reduce the
G sentence.
40. In the present case, the High Court has affirmed the finding
of the guilt but has erroneously set-aside the sentence of imprisonment
by providing for fine of Rs. 30,0001- only.
41. The State in this appeal has challenged the order passed by
H the High Court modifying the sentence. The Hi~ Court has modified
STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. NIRMALA DEVI 151
[ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]
the sentence taking into consideration that appellant lady has to take A
care of her three minor sons, out of them two are mentally retarded.
The trial court, while sentencing the accused had already taken the
aforesaid fact into consideration. In para 27 of the judgment trial court
has noticed following:
"27. Tiie convict was heard on tlle quantum of punis/1ment. B
Siie pleased for a lenient view being the first offender anti a
young lady of about 40 years in age. Siie also stated that slle
llas three minor sons and out of them two are mentally
unsound."
42. Trial court, while sentencing the appellant has thus taken above c
circumstances into consideration and for offences under Section 328,
307 and 392 IPC has awarded imprisonment of two years only with a
fine of Rs. 2,000/- each.
43. The maximum sentence under Section 328 is ten years, under
.Section 307 is ten years and in case of hurt, it is life imprisonment or
D
such punishment, as mentioned above. In Section 392 IPC, the maximum
punishment is for the period of fourteen years.
44. We are thus of the. view that the fact that accused has three
minor sons, out of them two are mentally retarded, was taken into
consideration by trial court and after considering the aforesaid fact,
E
sentence of imprisonment of only two years was ordered.
45. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that
order of the High Court, modifying the sentence is unsustainable and is
hereby set-aside. Judgment and order of the trial court dated 05.03.2003
is restored.
F
46. The appeal is allowed. The accused shall be taken into custody
for serving the sentence.
ORDER OF THE COURT
The appeal is allowed. Judgment of the High Court is set aside to
the extent it modifies the sentence and the sentence of imprisonment as G
awarded by the trial court is restored herewith. The respondent shall be
taken into custody to serve the sentence.
No costs.
Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed.
H
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