STATE OF HARYANAversusSHAKUNTLA AND ORS.

                        [2012] 5 S.C.R. 276


A                       STATE OF HARYANA
                                  v.
                      SHAKUNTLA AND ORS.
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 658 of 2008)
                          APRIL 19, 2012
B
        [A.K. PATNAIK AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]

           Penal Code, 1860 - ss.302, 325, 148 and 149 - Murder
    - Common object - Armed assault on PW4's parents causing
c   30133 injuries on different parts of their body and
    consequently their death - Earlier, on one occasion accused
     'M' and 'R' had beaten PW4's parents, for which they were
    facing criminal trial, and on another occasion they had
    abused and beaten PW4 - All nine accused convicted by trial
0   court   - High Court accepted the plea of alibi taken by three
    accused i.e. 'S', 'P' and 'Sa' and acquitted them but upheld
    conviction in relation to the other six accused (including 'M'
    and 'R') -Cross-appeals by State and the six convicted
   'accused - Held: M' and the other accused had been looking
E for an opportunity to fight with PW4's father and his family
    members, on one pretext or the other - All the accused, except
    those acquitted by the High Court, had participated with a
    common mind to cause fatal injuries upon the parents of PW4
    - PW-4, in his statement, clearly and definitely explained the
F occurrence, by attributing specific role to each one of the
    accused - His version fully supported by that of PW-5, other
    documentary evidence on record and also medical evidence
  . - The members of the assembly had acted in furtherance to
    the common object and the same object was made absolutely
    clear by the words of accused 'M' when he exhorted all the
G others to 'finish' the deceased persons - PW4's father,
    admittedly, had fallen on the ground - However, the accused
    still continued inflicting heavy blows on him and kept on doing
    so till he breathed his last - They did not even spare PW4's

H                               276
   STATE OF HARYANA v. SHAKUNTLA AND ORS.                    277


mother and inflicted as many as 33 injuries on her body - A
Where a person has the intention to cause injuries simplicitor
to another, he/she would certainly not inflict 30133 injuries on
the different parts of the body of the victim, including the spine
- The spine is a very delicate and vital part of the human body
- It, along with the ribs protects all the vital organs of the body, B
the heart and lungs, etc. - Powerful blows on these parts of
the body can, in normal course, result in the death of a person,
as has happened in the instant case - The way in which the
crime has been committed reflects nothing but sheer brutality
- Conviction of six accused (as ordered by trial court and High     c
Court) affirmed - As regards the other three accused 'S', 'P'
and 'Sa', the High Court accepted their plea of alibi keeping
in view the evidence led by the defence witnesses and
acquitted them - It was for the State to show that the High Court
completely fell in error of law or that judgment in relation to 0
these accused was palpably erroneous, perverse or untenable
- However, none of these parameters were satisfied in appeal
preferred by the State against acquittal of the three accused
- Judgment of High Court accordingly not interfered with.

      Witness - Interested witness - Appreciation of - Held: E
 Once, the statement of a witness is found trustworthy and is
duly corroborated by other evidence, there is no reason for
the Court to reject the statement of such witness, merely on
the ground that it was a statement of a related or interested
witness - In the present case, the presence of PW-4 and PW- F
5 (i.e. the children of the deceased couple) at the place of
occurrence was natural and their statements were trustworthy,
corroborated by other evidence and did not suffer from the
vice of suspicion or uncertainty - 30 and 33 injuries
respectively were caused on the bodies of the two deceased, G
but still, PW-4 and PW-5 attributed specific role to each
individual accused, particularly with regard to the grievous
injuries caused by them - The Court has to give credence to
their statements as they lost their close relations and had no
reason to falsely implicate the accused persons, who were H
    278      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A a/so their relations.

       Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 136 - Acquittal by
  High Court - Interference with - Scope of - Held: Against the
  judgment of acquittal, onus is on the prosecution to show that
8 the finding recorded by the High Court is perverse and
  requires correction by Supreme Court, in exercise of its
  powers under Article 136 of the Constitution - An appellate
   Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is a
  double presumption in favour of the accused - Firstly, the
C presumption of innocence is available to such accused under
  the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence, i.e., that
  every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless proved
  guilty before the court and secondly, that a lower court, upon
  due appreciation of all evidence has found in favour of his
  innocence - Merely because another view is possible, it would
0
  be no reason for the Supreme Court to interfere with the order
  of acquittal.

       The prosecution case was that the nine accused
  persons namely, 'M', 'R', 'K', 'B', 'S', 'P', 'Ka', 'Sa' and 'L'
E came armed with lathis and other deadly weapons and
  launched armed assault on the parents of PW4 and thus
  caused their death. Earlier, on one occasion accused 'M'
  and 'R' had beaten PW4's parents, for which they were
  facing criminal trial, and on another occasion they had
F abused and beaten PW4. The trial Court convicted all the
  nine accused under Sections 148 as well as under
  Section 325/302 both read with Section 149 IPC. On
  appeal, the High Court accepted the plea of alibi taken by
  three accused i.e. 'S', 'P' and 'Sa' and acquitted them but
G upheld the conviction in refation to the other six accused
  (including 'M' and 'R').

        The present three appeals have been filed against the
    said judgment of the High Court. Criminal Appeal No. 658
    of 2008 has been preferred by the State against the order
H
   STATE OF HARYANA v. SHAKUNTLA AND ORS.                279


of acquittal of 'S', 'P' and 'Sa', Criminal Appeal No. 1005     A
of 2008 has been preferred by the five convicted accused
namely, 'M', 'R', 'K', 'B' and 'L' and Criminal Appeal No.
1707 of 2008 has been preferred by the accused, 'Ka'
against dismissal of their respective appeals by the High
Court.                                                          B

     Dismissing the appeals filed by the accused, as well
as the appeal filed by the State, the Court

     HELD:1. The facts and circumstances of the case
 clearly show that 'M' and the other accused had been           C
 looking for an opportunity to fight with PW4's father and
 his family members, on one pretext or the other. 'M'
exhorted the others to 'finish them', upon which the
accused persons started assaulting the victims and
continued till both the parents of PW4 died. The                D
circumstance deserving the attention of this Court is that,
even when PW4's father fell on the ground as a result of
a blow on his spine, still none of the accused person
showed any mercy, they instead continued with the
assault. The statements of Dr. PW-1 and Dr. PW2, and the        E
post mortem reports of the deceased, Ext. PA and Ext.
PC clearly demonstrate the intentional brutality and intent
of the accused to kill the victims. They caused as many
as 30 injuries on the person of PW4's father and 33
injuries on the person of PW4's mother, resulting in the        F
death of both of them. [Para 12] [290-D-G]

     2. Both the deceased had tried to run away, but were
chased by the accused. While 'M' exhorted the others, all
accused persons, particularly accused No. 7, 'Ka',
effectively participated in inflicting injuries on the bodies   G
of the deceased. Thus, a common intention came into
existence at the spur of the moment, even if the same was
not pre-existing. The existence of common object and
intent is not only reflected from the circumstantial
evidence, but is also clearly demonstrated in the               H
   280     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A statement of PW-4 and PW-5, respectively. The offenders,
  if have no common intention or object to kill the victim,
  they would normally stop assaulting the victim and leave
  him in the injured condition when he falls down on the
  ground. On the contrary, in the case in hand, all the
B accused, except those acquitted by the High Court, had
  participated with a common mind to cause fatal injuries
  upon both the parents of PW4. PW-4, in his statement, has
  clearly and definitely explained the occurrence, by
  attributing specific role to each one of the accused.
c According to him, 'R' inflicted Jaily blow on the legs of
  PW4's father. 'M' gave Jaily blow on the head of PW4's
  father, which the deceased deflected with his hands. 'K'
  gave Jaily blow on the back of PW4's father, whereafter
  the victim fell on the ground. Thereafter, 'B' inflicted
  Kasola blow on the head of PW4's father and finally, all
0
  the other accused started mercilessly inflicting blows on
  the person of the PW4's father. [Para 13] [290-H; 291-A-
   E]
      3.1. The statement of PW-4 also shows that the
E accused persons had also inflicted injuries on the body
  of PW4's mother, with an intention to kill her. The version
  put forward by this witness is fully supported by that of
  PW-5 and from other documentary evidence placed on
  record. The medical evidence completely corroborates
F the story advanced by this witness for the prosecution.
  Once, the statement of a witness is found trustworthy
  and is duly corroborated by other evidence, there is no
  reason for the Court to reject the statement of such
  witness, merely on the ground that it was a statement of
G a related or interested witness. [Para 14] [291-E-G]
      3.2. In the present case, it is more than clear that PW-
  4 and PW-5 were both present at the time of the incident.
  The prior animosity and clashes between the two families
  has come on record. In the cross-examination.· no material
H was brought out to the contrary. It is clear that the
   STATE OF HARYANA v. SHAKUNTLA AND ORS.                  281


presence of PW-4 and PW-5 at the place of occurrence              A
was natural and their statements, are trustworthy,
corroborated by other evidence and do not suffer from
the vice of suspicion or uncertainty. The Court has to give
credence to their statement as they have lost their close
relations and have no reason to falsely implicate the             B
accused persons, who are also their relations. [Paras 17,
19] (292-F-G; 295-F-G]

     Mano Dutt & Anr. v. State of U. P. (2012) 4 SCC 79 -
relied on.
                                                                  c
    Waman & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (2011) 7 SCC
295: 2011 (6) SCR 1072; Ja/pat Rai & Ors. v. State of
Haryana JT 2011 8 SC 55; State of Haryana v. Ram Singh
(2002) 2 SCC 426: 2002 (1) SCR 208 - held inapplicable.
                                                                  D
    4.1. In the present case, 30 and 33 injuries
respectively had been caused on the bodies of the
deceased, but still, PW-4 and PW-5 have attributed
specific role to each individual accused, particularly with
regard to the grievous injuries caused by them. [Para 23]         E
(297-F-G]

     4.2. It is clear that, as per the case of the prosecution,
there were more than five persons assembled at the
incident. The members of this assembly had acted in
furtherance to the common object and the same object              F
was made absolutely clear by the words of accused 'M'
when he exhorted all the others to 'finish' the deceased
persons. (Para 26] (298-G-H; 299-A]

      4.3. The intention and object on the part of this group     G
was clear. They had come with the express object of
killing PW4's father and his family members. In view of
the manner in which 'M' exhorted all the others and the
manner in which they acted thereafter, clearly establishes
that their intention was not to inflict injuries simplicitor.     H
    282       SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A PW4's father, admittedly, had fallen on the ground.
  However, the accused still continued inflicting heavy
  blows on him and kept on doing so till he breathed his
  last. They did not even spare PW4's mother and inflicted
  as many as 33 injuries on her body. Where a person has
B the intention to cause injuries simplicitor to another, he/
  she would certainly not inflict 30/33 injuries on the
  different parts of the body of the victim, including the
  spine. The spine is a very delicate and vital part of the
  human body. It, along with the ribs protects all the vital
c organs of the body, the heart and lungs, etc. Powerful
  blows on these parts of the body can, in normal course,
  result in the death of a person, as has happened in the
  instant case. The way in which the crime has been
  committed reflects nothing but sheer brutality. The
0
  members of the assembly, therefore, were aware that
  their acts were going to result in the death of the
  deceased. [Para 27) [299-A, B-E]

          Sarman & Ors. v. State of MP. 1993 Supp. (2) SCC 356
    - distinguished.
E
          Ramchandran & Ors. v. State of Kera/a (2011) 9 SCC
    257 - referred to.

     Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition and Advanced
F Law Lexicon, 3rdEdition - referred to.

       5. PW-4, in his statement, had clearly stated that
  accused 'M', 'R', 'K' and one of their other relations, who
  was later on identified to be 'Ka', had reached there,
  armed with jailies. Even in the FIR, PW4 had made a
G similar statement that one other relative of his, whose
  name he did not know, had also come there. Thus, it was
  a case where PW-4 had duly identified that person, but
  did not know the exact name of that person. Further, it is
  true that the witnesses have not attributed any specific
H role to 'Ka', but their statement is clear that all the
   STATE OF HARYANA v. SHAKUNTLA AND ORS.                  283


accused persons had started inflicting injuries upon the          A
body of the deceased. In other words, being members of
the unlawful assembly, 'Ka', along with others, had also
inflicted injuries upon the deceased, in furtherance to the
common object and thus, would also be liable to be held
guilty accordingly. Another important feature is that             B
recovery of Ext. 11 Jaili was made at the behest of
accused, 'Ka'and was taken into possession vide Ext.
PUA/1. [Para 28] [299-G-H; 300-A-C]

     6. The High Court acquitted three accused while
accepting the plea of alibi taken by them. Against the            C
judgment of acquittal, onus is on the prosecution to
show that the finding recorded by the High Court is
perverse and requir~s correction by this Court, in
exercise of its powers under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India. An appellate Court must bear in            D
mind that in case of acquittal, there is a double
presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the
presumption of innocence is available to such accused
under the fundamental principles of criminal
jurisprudence, i.e., that every person shall be presumed          E
to be innocent unless proved guilty before the court and
secondly, that a lower court, upon due appreciation of all
evidence has found in favour of his innocence. Merely
because another view is possible, it would be no reason
for this Court to interfere with the order of acquittal. It was   F
for the State to show that the High Court has completely
fallen in error of law or that judgment in relation to these
accused was palpably erroneous, perverse or untenable.
None of these parameters are satisfied in the appeal
preferred by the State against the acquittal of three             G
accused. [Paras 36 and 40] [301-G-H; 302-A-C; 304-D-E]

      Girja Prasad (Dead) By Lrs. v. State of M.P. (2007) 7
SCC 625: 2007 (9) SCR 483 ; Chandrappa v. State of
Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415: 2007 (2) SCR 630; C. Antony           H
v. K. G. Raghavan Nair (2003) 1 SCC 1 • relied on.
    284       SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A       Munshi Prasad & Ors. v. State of Bihar (2002) 1 SCC
    351: 2001 (4) Suppl. SCR 25 - referred to.

                         Case Law Reference:

      2011 (6) SCR 1072           held inapplicable Para 14, 15
B
      JT 2011 8 SC 55             held inapplicable Para 14

      2002 (1) SCR 208            held inapplicable Para 14,16

      (2012) 4 sec 79             relied on            Para 18
c     1993 Supp. (2) sec 356 distinguished             Para 22

      (2011) 9 sec 257            referred to          Para 24

      2001 (4) Suppl. SCR 25      referred to          Para 32

D     2007 (9) SCR 483            relied on            Para 37
      2007 (2) SCR 630            relied on            Para 38

      (2003) 1 sec 1              relied on            Para.39

E       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    No. 658 of 2008 etc.

        From the Judgment & Order dated 26.07.2007 of the High
    Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal
    No. 700-D/1997.
F                                 WITH
    Crl. Appeal Nos. 1005 and 1707 of 2008.

        S.B. Sanyal, R.K. Das, V. Giri, Manjit Singh, AAG, C.V.
  Subba Rao, Dinesh Chander Yadav, Vibhuti Sushant Gupta for
G Dr. Kailash Chand, Tarjit Singh, Kamal Mohan Gupta for Naresh
  Bakshi, A.V. Palli, Atul Sharma, Anupam Raina, Rekha Palli
  for the appearing parties.
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H         SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. We may notice the case of
   STATE OF HARYANA v. SHAKUNTLA AND ORS.                   285
            [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

the prosecution in brief at the very outset of this judgment. On   A
3rd July, 1994, Manohar Lal (deceased) who had retired from
service as Subedar in the Indian Army, had taken his wife, Smt.
Sushila (deceased) to Delhi for her treatment as she was
complaining of pain in the chest. Naresh Kumar, PW-4 is the
eldest son of Manohar Lal. All were residents of Village           B
Nandrampurbas, Haryana.
      2. In the evening, wh~n PW-4 was putting earth on a ditch
 in front of his house, accused Matadin and Rajender came
 there and abused and beat him. However, PW-4 did not lodge
 any police report in this regard. On 5th July, 1994, Manohar Lal C
 and his wife Sushila returned from Delhi at about 9 AM. At that
 time PW-4, his sister Rajesh, PW-5 and their brother Suresh
 were sitting at the gate of their house. When Manohar Lal and
 Sushila were enquiring about the incident that had taken place
 on 3rd July, 1994, all the nine accused, namely, Matadin, D
 Rajender, Krishan, Bhim Singh, Shakuntla, Premwati, Kailash,
 Sarjeeta and Laxmi came tllere armed with lathis and other
deadly weapons. Laxmi opened the assault by giving an iron
rod blow which hit Sushila at her leg. Thereafter, Matadin gave
a Jaily blow on the head of Manohar Lal but Manohar Lal took E
it at his hand. To save themselves, Manohar Lal and Sushila
started running towards the house of Guwarias but the accused
chased them. Then Krishan gave a Jaily blow which hit
Manohar Lal at his back as a result of which Manohar Lal fell
down. Bhim Singh gave a Kasola blow at his head and then F
they all started beating Manohar Lal. Thereafter, all the accused
opened attack on Sushila and beat her mercilessly. Ultimately,
considering both of them dead, all the accused persons ran
away towards village Silarpur. When the children of Manohar
Lal went near their parents, they found that Manohar Lal had
died on the spot, but Sushila was still alive and unconscious. G
Krishan, son of Richpal, took Sushila to the Civil Hospital,
Rewari in a Maruti Van, but she was declared brought dead
by the doctors there.
    3. PW-4 who had left for the Police Station, Dharuhera,        H
    286      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A leaving behind PW-5 and his younger brother near the body of
  Manohar Lal. On the way near village Alawarpur, he met Subey
  Singh, Sub-Inspector who recorded the statement of PW-4 vide
  Ext. PH. After making endorsement to the Police Station, an
  FIR vide Exh. PH/1, was registered in the Police Station,
B Dharuhera. The process of criminal law was set into motion
  against the accused persons on the basis of the statement, Ext.
  PH.
       4. It has come on record that the deceased Manohar Lal
  had, after retirement, been working in the Indian Army in the
C Defence Supply Corps (DSC) at Defence Colony, Delhi. As
  afore-noted, he had taken his wife for medical treatment to
  Delhi. In the evening, the accused Matadin and Rajender had
  beaten up PW-4. Moreover, in the year 1986 also, Rajender
  and Matadin had beaten up Manohar Lal and his wife Sushila,
D for which they were also facing criminal trial.
         5. In furtherance to registration of the above-mentioned
    FIR, on 10th July, 1994, all the accused were produced before
    the Investigating Officer and were arrested. Upon interrogation,
    they made disclosure statements on the basis of which
E   weapons of offence were recovered. Then, the investigation
    was handed over to Udai Singh, SHO (PW-17), who after
    completion of investigation submitted the report to the court of
    competent jurisdiction under Section 173 of the Code of
    Criminal Procedure, 1973 {for short 'the CrPC'). Having been
F   committed to the Court of Sessions, the accused were charged
    with the offences punishable under Sections 148, 302 read with
    Section 149, of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short "the
    IPC") and Section 325 read with Section 149 IPC, to which they
    pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. They were tried in
G   accordance with law and, finally, vide judgment of the Trial Court
    dated 22nd August, 1997, all the nine accused were held guilty
    for commission of the offence punishable under Sections 148
    as well as the offence punishable under Section 325/302 both
    read with Section 149 IPC. The accused were awarded the
H   following sentences, which were to run concurrently:
   STATE OF HARYANA v. SHAKUNTLA AND ORS.                   287
            [SWATANTER KUMAR , J.]
    "2. After going through the statements of the accused A
    persons and also the submissions made by their counsel
    and also the submissions made by the learned PP for the
    State, I sentence all the accused persons to undergo
    rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year also to pay
    a fine of Rs. 500/- each and in default of payment of fine B
    the accused shall undergo RI for a period of three months,
    for the commission of offence punishable under section
    148 Indian Penal Code. I again sentence all the accused
    persons to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of
    two years and also to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- each and in C
    default of payment of fine, the accused shall undergo further
    rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months, for the
    commission of offence punishable under section 325 read
    with section 149 Indian Penal Code. I also sentence all the
    accused persons to "imprisonment for life" and also to pay
                                                                  0
    a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each in default of payment of fine,
    the accused shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a
    period of 2 years, for the commission of offence punishable
    under section 302 read with section 149 Indian Penal
    Code. All the sentences to run concurrently. Case property
    stands confiscated to the State and be disposed of after E
    the period of limitation. File be consigned to records."
     6. Aggrieved from the judgment of the Trial Court, the
accused preferred an appeal before the High Court. The High
Court, vide its judgment dated 26th July, 2007, upheld the          F
conviction and sentence of accused Nos. 1 to 4 and 9 while
acquitting the accused Nos. 5, 6 and 8 i.e. Shakuntla, Premwati
and Sarjeeta. It also upheld the conviction and order of sentence
in relation to the accused no. 7 Kailash.
     7. The present three appeals have been filed against the       G
said judgment of the High Court.
     8. Criminal Appeal No. 658 of 2008 has been preferred
by the State of Haryana against the order of acquittal of three
accused namely Shakuntla, Premwati and Sarjeeta, Criminal
Appeal No. 1005 of 2008 has been preferred by five convicted        H
    288        SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A accused namely, Matadin, Rajender, Krishan, Bhim Singh and
  Laxmi and Criminal Appeal No. 1707 of 2008 has been
  preferred by the accused, Kailash against dismissal of their
  respective appeals by the High Court. As all the three appeals
  are from one and the same judgment, therefore, these appeals
B shall be disposed of by a common judgment.
        9. The contentions raised on behalf of the accused/
    appellant before this Court are :
          a)    Taking the facts and circumstances of the case and
                the evidence cumulatively, an offence under Part I
c
                or Part II of Section 304, IPC is made out and not
                an offence punishable under Section 302 of the
                IPC.
          b)    There was neither common intention amongst the
D               members of the assembly to cause death of the
                deceased persons nor any common object.
          c)    The witnesses examined by the prosecution are
                witnesses related to the deceased and, as such,
                the Court could not have relied upon the testimony
E               of such interested witnesses in convicting the
                accused.
          d)    In fact, there was no assembly, much less an
                unlawful assembly, so as to attract the provisions
                of Section 149 IPC and the accused persons have
F               been incorrectly charged and convicted for the said
                offences.
          e)    The Courts have erred in law in not giving the same
                weightage and significance to the defence
G               witnesses as has been given to the prosecution
                witnesses. Relying upon the defence witnesses, the
                Court ought to have accepted the plea of alibi put
                forward by the accused. Upon the correct
                application of principles of appreciation of
                evidence, the accused should have been given the
H
   STATE OF HARYANA v. SHAKUNTLA AND ORS.                    289
            [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
            benefit of doubt keeping in view the fact that the      A
            other three accused had been acquitted by the High
            Court.
      f)    In Criminal Appeal No. 1707 of 2008, accused No.
            7, Kailash was neither named in the FIR nor was
            alleged to have caused any injury. There existed no     B
            common object and the material witnesses had not
            been examined. Being young boy of 23 years, he
            had been falsely involved in the crime and, thus, was
            entitled to acquittal.
     10. While refuting these contentions, the State has made
                                                                    c
the following contentions in the appeal preferred by it against
the acquittal of three accused :
      a)    There was no provocation, but still, the accused
            persons together assaulted the deceased persons         o
            and continued to assault them till they were certain
            that the victims were dead.
      b)    In fact, Manohar Lal had died on the spot while
            Sushila died on the way to the hospital. The number
            of injuries found upon the bodies of the deceased       E
            i.e. 30 and 33, respectively, clearly show that the
            intention was to kill and not to merely hurt or cause
            injury to the deceased persons.
      c)    From the evidence of PW-4 and PW-5, it is clear
            that the accused persons constituted an unlawful        F
            assembly and they had the common intention and
            object of killing the deceased.
     11. On a proper appreciation of the evidence placed on
record, it is clear that in the circumstances, one could hardly     G
expect any other evidence to be available. It would only be the
family members who would be present at the place of
occurrence of the crime and only such interested persons could
depose with regard to commission of the crime. The
statements of these witnesses are trustworthy and offer the         H
    290       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A   graphic eye account of the exact events, during the course of
    occurrence. Clearly, there was common object among the
    members of the unlawful assembly to somehow do away with
    Manohar Lal and his wife Sushila.
       12. It is a settled principle of the law of evidence that it is
B not the quantity, but the quality of evidence that has to be taken
  into consideration by the Court while deciding such matters. As
  already noticed, even in the year 1986, Rajender and Matadin
  had beaten Manohar Lal and his wife, for which they were also
  facing criminal trial. Again, they had abused and beaten
C Naresh, PW-4 on 3rd July, 1994, when he was putting earth in
  the street in front of his house. Thereafter, on 5th July, 1994,
  this unfortunate incident had taken place. When on 5th July,
  1994, Manohar Lal and his wife returned from Delhi, even
  before they entered their house and when they were discussing
D the incident that took place on 3rd July, 1994 with their teenage
  children, the accused persons, armed with weapons, came
  there and started assaulting Manohar Lal and his wife. This
  clearly shows that Matadin and the other accused had been
  looking for an opportunity to fight with Manohar Lal and his
E family members, on one pretext or the other. Matadin exhorted
  the others to 'finish them', upon which the accused persons
  started assaulting the victims and continued till both Manohar
  Lal and his wife Sushila died. The circumstance deserving the
  attention of this Court is that, even when Manohar Lal fell on
F the ground as a result of a blow on his spine, still none of the
  accused person showed any mercy, they instead continued
  with the assault. The statements of Dr. G.S. Yadav, PW-1 and
  Dr. Kamal Mehra, PW2, and the post mortem reports of the
  deceased, Ext. PA and E?'t. PC clearly demonstrate the
G intentional brutality and intent of the accused to kill the victims.
  They caused as many as 30 injuries on the person of Manohar
  Lal and 33 injuries on the person of Sushila, resulting in the
  death of both of them.
        13. Both the deceased had tried to run away, but were
H   chased by the accused. While Manohar Lal exhorted the others,
   STATE OF HARYANA v. SHAKUNTLA AND ORS.                       291
            [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
 all accused persons, particularly accused No. 7, Kailash,              A
 effectively participated in inflicting injuries on the bodies of the
 deceased. Thus, a common intention came into existence at
 the spur of the moment, even if the same was not pre-existing.
The existence of common object and intent is not only reflected
from the circumstantial evidence, but is also clearly                   B
demonstrated in the statement of PW-4 and PW-5,
 respectively. The offenders, if have no common intention or
object to kill the victim, they would normally stop assaulting the
victim and leave him in the injured condition when he falls down
on the ground. On the contrary, in the case in hand, all the            C
accused, except those acquitted by the High Court, had
participated with a common mind to cause fatal injuries upon
both Manohar Lal and Sushila. PW-4, in his statement, has
clearly and definitely explained the occurrence, by attributing
specific role to each one of the accused. According to him,
                                                                        D
Rajender inflicted Jaily blow on the legs of Manohar Lal.
Matadin gave Jaily blow on the head of Manohar Lal, which the
deceased deflected with his hands. Krishan gave Jaily blow on
the back of Manohar Lal, whereafter the victim fell on the ground.
Thereafter, Bhim inflicted Kasola blow on the head of the
deceased Manohar Lal and finally, all the other accused started         E
mercilessly inflicting blows on the person of the deceased
Manohar Lal.
       14. The statement of PW-4 also shows that the accused
persons had also inflicted injuries on the body of Sushila, with
                                                                        F
an intention to kill her. The version put forward by this witness
is fully supported by that of PW-5 and from other documentary
evidence placed on record. The medical evidence completely
corroborates the story advanced by this witness for the
prosecution. Once, the statement of a witness is found
trustworthy and is duly corroborated by other evidence, there           G
is no reason for the Court to reject the statement of such
witness, merely on the ground that it was a statement of a
related or interested witness. The learned counsel appearing
for the accused relied upon the judgments of this Court in the
case of Waman & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra [(2011) 7 SCC              H
    292       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A   295], Ja/pat Rai & Ors. v. State of Haryana [JT 2011 8 SC
    55] and State of Haryana v. Ram Singh [(2002) 2 SCC 426],
    to contend that the statement of a related or interested
    witnesses should not be relied upon and made the sole basis
    of conviction by the Court.
B      15. Firstly, none of these judgments state this principle as
  an s;ibsolute proposition of law. Each judgment deals with its
  own facts. In the case of Waman (supra), the Court clearly held
  that if the evidence of the related witnesses is found to be
  consistent and true, the same cannot be discarded. Similarly,
C in the case of Jalpat Rai (supra), the Court noticed that the
  presence of the witnesses at the time of incident would not
  guarantee their truthfulness. The question to be examined by
  the Court is whether their testimony is trustworthy an(! reliable
  insofar as complicity of the appellants in the crime is
D concerned, or whether they have tried to implicate the innocent
  along with the guilty.
       16. In the case of Ram Sin.gh's (supra), the circumstances
  were totally different. In that case, the interested and related
  witnesses were not only examined as witnesses to the incident
E but they were also witnesses to the arrests and in view of these
  facts, the Court felt that there existed a doubt about the
  trustworthiness of these witnesses, which must go to the benefit
  of the accused.
F      17. All these cases, in fact, would have no application to
  the present case. In the present case, it is more than clear that
  PW-4 and PW-5 were both present at the time of the incident.
  The prior animosity and clashes between the two families has
  come on record. In the cross-examination, no material was
  brought out to the contrary. On the other hand, there seems to
G be no challenge to vital facts. The facts of the cited cases being
  different and there being hardly any challenge to the vital
  aspects of the present case, ratio decidendi of those judgments
  would hardly further the case of the accused.

H         18. A Bench of this Court in the case of Mano Dutt & Anr.
  STATE OF HARYANA v. SHAKUNTLA AND ORS.                    293
           [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
v. State of UP. [(2012) 4 SCC 79], (to which one of us, Hon.       A
Swatanter Kumar, J. was a member), while dealing with the
issue of credibility of testimony by interested witnesses, held
as under:
     "19. Another contention raised on behalf of the accused/
     appellants is that only family members of the deceased        B
     were examined as witnesses and they being interested
     witnesses cannot be relied upon. Furthermore, the
     prosecution did not examine any independent witnesses
     and, therefore, the prosecution has failed to establish its
     case beyond reasonable doubt. This argument is again          C
     without much substance. Firstly, there is no bar in law in
    examining family members, or any other person, as
    witnesses. More often than not, in such cases involving
    family members of both sides, it is a member of the family
    or a friend who comes to rescue the injured. Those alone       D
    are the people who take the risk of sustaining injuries by
    jumping into such a quarrel and trying to defuse the crisis.
    Besides, when the statement of witnesses, who are
    relatives, or are parties known to the affected party, is
    credible, reliable, trustworthy, admissible in accordance      E
    with the law and corroborated by other witnesses or
    documentary evidence of the prosecution, there would
    hardly be any reason for the Court to reject such evidence
    merely on the ground that the witness was family member
    or interested witness or person known to the affected party.   F
    There can be cases where it would be but inevitable to
   examine such witnesses, because, as the events
   occurred, they were the natural or the only eye witness
   available to give the complete version of the incident. In
   this regard, we may refer to the judgments of this Court,       G
   in the case of Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, [(2007)
   14 SCC 150]. This Court drew a clear distinction between
   a chance witness and a natural witness. Both these
   witnesses have to be relied upon subject to their evidence
   being trustworthy and admissible in accordance with the
   law. This Court, in the said judgment, held as under:           H
    294       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A                "28. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that
                 Indian legal system does not insist on plurality of
                 witnesses. Neither the legislature (Section 134 of
                 the Evidence Act, 1872) nor the judiciary mandates
                 that there must be particular number of witnesses
B                to record an order of conviction against the
                 accused. Our legal system has always laid
                 emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence
                 ~ather than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of
                 witnesses. It is, therefore, open to a competent court
c                to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and
                 record conviction. Conversely, it may acquit the
                 accused in spite of testimony of several witnesses
                 if it is not satisfied about the quality of evidence.
                 The bald contention that no conviction can be
                 recorded in case of a solitary eyewitness, therefore,
D
                 has no force and must be negatived.
                 29. It was then contended that the only eyewitness,
                 PW 6 Sopan was none other than the son of the
                 deceased. He was, therefore, "highly interested"
E                witness and his deposition should, therefore, be
                 discarded as it has not been corroborated in
                 material particulars by other witnesses. We are
                 unable to uphold the contention. In our judgment, a
                 witness who is a relative of the deceased or victim
F                of a crime cannot be characterised as "interested".
                 The term "interested" postulates that the witness
                 has some direct or indirect "interest" in having th~
                 accused somehow or the other convicted due to
                 animus or for some other oblique motive."
G         20. It will be useful to make a reference of another judgment
          of this Court, in the case of Satbir Singh & Ors. v. State
          of Uttar Pradesh, [(2009) 13 SCC 790], where this Court
          held as under:
                 "26. It is now a well-settled principle of law that only
H                because the witnesses are not independent ones
   STATE OF HARYANA v. SHAKUNTLA AND ORS.                  295
            [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
            may not by itself be a ground to discard the           A
            prosecution case. If the prosecution case has been
            supported by the witnesses and no cogent reason
            has been shown to discredit their statements, a
            judgment of conviction can certainly be based
            thereupon. Furthermore, as noticed hereinbefore, at    B
            least Dhum Singh (PW 7) is an independent
            witness. He had no animus against the accused.
            False implication of the accused at his hand had
            not been suggested, far less established."
    21. Again in a very recent judgment in the case of Ba/raje     C
    @ Trimbak v. State of Maharashtra [(2010) 6 SCC 673],
    this Court stated that when the eye-witnesses are stated
    to be interested and inimically disposed towards the
    accused, it has to be noted that it would not be proper to
    conclude that they would shield the real culprit and rope in   D
    innocent persons. The truth or otherwise of the evidence
    has to be weighed pragmatically. The Court would be
    required to analyse the evidence of related witnesses and
    those witnesses who are inimically disposed towards the
    accused. But if after careful analysis and scrutiny of their   E
    evidence, the version given by the witnesses appears to
    be clear, cogent and credible, there is no reason to
    discard the same."
     19. When we examine the facts of the present case in light
of the above principles, it is clear that the presence of PW-4 F
and PW-5 at the place of occurrence was natural and their
statements, are trustworthy, corroborated by other evidence and
do not suffer from the vice of suspicion or uncertainty. The Court
has to give credence to their statement as they have lost their
close relations and have no reason to falsely implicate the G
accused persons, who are also their relations. Thus, we find
no merit in this contention of the learned counsel for the
accused.
     20. Again, while relying on the judgment of Waman (supra)
the learned counsel has contended that the accused persons         H
    296       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A   were not members of unlawful assembly and they had neither
    knowledge nor intention to commit any crime in prosecution of
    a common object.
          "40. Even otherwise, A-12 was also charged under Section
          149 IPC as a member of unlawful assembly with the
B         requisite common object and knowledge. Inasmuch as the
          prosecution evidence insofar as women accused is not
          cogent, their acquittal cannot be applied to A-12 who was
          in the compar.y of A-1 to A-6. As mentioned above, apart
          from conviction under Section 302 Dilip, A-12 was
c         convicted under Section 149. Section 149 creates a
          specific offence and deals with punishment of the offence.
          The only thing is that whenever the court convicts any
          person or persons of any offence with the aid of Section
          149, a clear finding regarding the common object of the
D         assembly must be given and the evidence disclosed must
          show not only the nature of the common object but also that
          the object was unlawful. In order to attract Section 149 it
          must be shown that the incriminating act was done to
          accomplish the common object of unlawful assembly. It
E         must be within the knowledge of the other members as one
          likely to be committed in prosecution of common object. If
          members of the assembly knew or were aware of the
          likelihood of a particular offence being committed in
          prosecution of a common object, they would be liable for
F         the same under Section 149."
         21. To bring out this distinction somewhat more clearly, the
    learned counsel has relied upon the meaning given to the
    expression "assembly" and "assemble" in Black's Law
    Dictionary and Law Lexicon which reads as under:-
G         Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition:
          "Assembly" - The concourse or meeting together of a
          considerable number of persons at the same place. Also
          the persons so gathered.
H         "Assembly, unlawful" - The congregating of people which
   STATE OF HARYANA v. SHAKUNTLA AND ORS.                      297
            [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
     results in antisocial bahavior of the group, i.e. blocking a      A
     sidewalk, obstructing traffic, littering streets; but, a law
     which makes such congregating a crime because people
     may be annoyed is violative of the right of free assembly.
     Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rdEdition :
                                                                       B
     "Assemble" - To bring together; to collect in one place or
     as one body; to convene; to congregate.
     "Assembly" - A company of persons assembled together
     in one place usually for a common purpose - generally,
     for deliberation, legislation, worship of social                  C
     entertainment."
     22. Besides relying on para 40 of the judgment of this
Court in Waman (supra), reliance has also been placed on
Sarman & Ors. v. State of MP. [1993 Supp. (2) SCC 356] to
argue that as all the appellants were armed with lathis, it was        D
not clear from the statements of witnesses as to which injury
had been inflicted by which accused. All the members of the
unlawful assembly cannot be charged wfth offences under
Sections 302 read with 149, IPC.
                                                                       E
      23. At the outset, we may notice that in the case of Sarman
 (supra), the Court had clearly noticed that on facts, the statement
of PW-12 could not be accepted as it was not reliable.
Secondly, it was not stated as to which of the accused had
caused injuries to the deceased. In that case, only 17 injuries
had been inflicted upon the body of the deceased. In contra-           F
distinction thereto, in the present case, 30 and 33 injuries have
respectively had been caused on the bodies of the deceased,
but still, PW-4 and PW-5 have attributed specific role to each
individual accused, particularly with regard to the grievous
injuries caused by them.                                               G
     24. In the case of Ramchandran & Ors. v. State of Kera/a
[(2011) 9 sec 257], a Bench of this Court dealt, at some
length, with the scope and object of Section 149 IPC. It was
held that Section 149 IPC essentially has two ingredients, one,
                                                                       H
    298      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A   that the offence must be committed by any member of unlawful
    assembly consisting of five or more members and second,
    such offence must be committed in prosecution of the common
    object under Section 141 IPC of that assembly or such as the
    members of that assembly knew was likely to be committed in
B   prosecution of the common object. Clarifying the expression
    "common object", the Bench further said that it is not necessary
    that th.ere should be a prior concert in the sense of a meeting
    of minds of the members of the unlawful assembly. The common
    object may form on the spur of the moment. It is enough if it is
c   then adopted by all the members and is shared by all of them.
         25. In the case of Waman (supra), the Court also stated
    that in order to attract Section 149 IPC, it must be shown that
    the incriminating act was done to accomplish the common
    object of the unlawful assembly. It must be within the knowledge
D   of other members that the offence is likely to be committed in
    prosecution of the common object, and if such requirement is
    satisfied, then they would be held liable under Section 149 IPC.
        26. It is not possible to define the constituents or
  dimensions of an offence under Section 149 simplicitor with
E regard to dictionary meaning of the words 'unlawful assembly'
  or 'assembly'. An "assembly" is a company of persons
  assembled together in a place, usually for a common purpose.
  This Court is concerned with an "unlawful assembly". Wherever
  five or more persons commit a crime with a common object
F and intent, then each of them would be liable for commission
  of such offence, in terms of Sections 141 and 149 IPC. The
  ingredients which need to be satisfied have already been spelt
  out unambiguously by us. Reverting back to the present case,
  it is clear that, as per the case of the prosecution, there were
G more than five persons assembled at the incident. All these nine
  persons were also convicted by the Trial Court and the
  conviction and sentence of six of them has been affirmed by
  the High Court. The members of this assembly had acted in
  furtherance to the common object and the same object was
H made absolutely clear by the words of accused Matadin, when
   STATE OF HARYANA v. SHAKUNTLA AND ORS.                     299
            [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

he exhorted all the others to 'finish' the deceased persons.          A
       27. In other words, the intention and object on the part of
 this group was clear. They had come with the express object
 of killing Manohar Lal and his family members. It might have
 been possible for one to say that they had come there not with
 the intention to commit murder, but only with the object of          8
 beating and abusing Manohar Lal and others, but in view of the
 manner in which Matadin exhorted all the others and the manner
 in which they acted thereafter, clearly establishes that their
 intention was not to inflict injuries simplicitor. Manohar Lal,
 admittedly, had fallen on the ground. However, the accused still     C
 continued inflicting heavy blows on him and kept on doing so
till he breathed his last. They did not even spare his wife Sushila
 and inflicted as many as 33 injuries on her body. Where a
person has the intention to cause injuries simplicitor to another,
 he/she would certainly not inflict 30/33 injuries on the different   D
parts of the body of the victim, including the spine. The spine
is a very delicate and vital part of the human body. It, along with
the ribs protects all the vital organs of the body, the heart and
lungs, etc. Powerful blows on these parts of the body can, fn
normal course, result in the death of a person, as has happened       E
in the case before us. The way in which the crime has been
committed reflects nothing but sheer brutality. The members of
the assembly, therefore, were aware that their acts were going
to result in the death of the deceased. Therefore, we find no
merit in this contention of the accused also.                         F
    . 28. Then the next argument advanced on behalf of the
accused is that accused Kailash has neither been named in
the FIR nor has been attributed responsibility for any injury and
also, no material witness has been examined to attribute any
role to Kailash in the commission of the crime. Thus, he is           G
entitled to acquittal. Kailash is also related to the deceased as
well as to PW-4 and PW-5. PW-4, in his statement, had clearly
stated th~t accused Matadin, Rajender, Krishan and one of their
other relations, who was later on identified to be Kailash, had
reached there, armed with jailies. Even in the FIR, PW4 had           H
    300       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 5 S.C.R.


A   made a similar statement that one other relative of his, whose
    name he did not know, had also come there. Thus, it was a
    case where PW-4 had duly identified that person, but did not
    know the exact name of that person. Further, it is true that the
    witnesses have not attributed any specific role to Kailash, but
B   their statement is clear that all the accused persons had started
    inflicting injuries upon the body of the deceased. In other words,
    being members of the unlawful assembly, Kailash, along with
    others, had also inflicted injuries upon the deceased, in
    furtherance to the common object and thus, would also be liable
c   to be held guilty accordingly. Another important feature is that
    recovery of Ext. 11 Jaili was made at the behest of accused,
    Kailash and was taken into possession vide Ext. PUA/1.
          29. Thus, it is not a case based on mere statements by
    the interested witnesses, but is also supported by other
D   evidence. Further, if we examine this case from another point
    of view, i.e, if three persons whose plea of alibi has been
    accepted by the High Court were indeed absent and as per
    plea of alibi of other accused, namely, Krishan and Rajender
    along with Kailash, they were also not present there, then it could
E   hardly have been possible for the remaining three persons to
    inflict 63 injuries on the bodies of the deceased in a short
    spam. Not that this is a determinative factor, but this is a rational
    manner of looking at the events, as they appear to have
    happened in the present case.
F       30. The prosecution also has examined other witnesses
    who have deposed unambiguously involving Kailash also in the
    crime
         31. Lastly, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant
G   has contended that the plea of alibi of Rajender, Krishan and
    Kailash should have been accepted by the High Court. The
    accused have led their defence and produced defence
    witnesses to prove their plea of alibi. It is also their contention
    that the evidence of the defence witnesses should be
    appreciated at par with the prosecution witnesses.
H
    STATE OF HARYANA v. SHAKUNTLA AND ORS.                     301
             [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
       32. In this regard, reliance is also placed upon the judgment   A
 of this Court in Munshi Prasad & Ors. v State of Bihar [(2002)
 1 sec 351].
     33. The Trial Court as well as the High Court have
disbelieved the plea of alibi of accused Rajender, Krishan and
Kailash.                                                               B
      34. In paragraphs 62 to 67 of the judgment, the Trial Court
 has discussed, at some length, the reasons for disbelieving the
 pleas of alibi raised by the accused. In fact, the Trial Court
 noticed the contradictions appearing in the statement of OW- C
 2 and DW-3. It also noticed that either Ext. DB, the certificate,
 was not correct or DW-3 Khem Chand was deposing falsely
 before the Court. The Trial Court also examined the possibility
 that keeping in view the distance between the factory and the
 place of occurrence, which was nearly 5 kilometers or so, the
 possibility of the accused going to the factory after the D
occurrence could not be ruled out. These findings recorded by
the Trial Court have been accepted by the High Court. The High
Court, keeping in view the evidence led by the defence
witnesses accepted the plea of alibi as far as Shakuntla,
Premwati and Sarjeeta are concerned. In respect of the other E
three accused, we see no reason to interfere with these
concurrent findings, as they neither suffer from any perversity
in law nor any error in appreciation of evidence. Thus, we also
reject the plea of alibi of all these three accused.
                                                                       F
     35. The learned counsel appearing for the State has not
been able to bring to our notice any rationale as to why this
appreciation of evidence was improper. In order to disturb the
findings of fact arrived at by the High Court, this Court has to
have certain compelling reasons.
                                                                       G
       36. The High Court has acquitted some accused while
accepting the plea of alibi taken by them. Against the judgment
cf acquittal, onus is on the prosecution to show that the finding
recorded by the High Court is perverse and requires correction
'riy this Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 136 of the    H
    302        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2012] 5 S.C.R.


A   Constitution of India. This Court has repeatedly held that an
    appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there
    is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the
    presumption of innocence is available to such accused under
    the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence, i.e., that
B   every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless proved
    guilty before the court and secondly, that a lower court, upon
    due appreciation of all evidence has found in favour of his
    innocence. Merely because another view is possible, it would
    be no reason for this Court to interfere with the order of
C   acquittal.
        37. In Girja Prasad (Dead) By Lrs. v. State of M.P. [(2007)
    7 SCC 625], this Court held as under:-
          "28. Regarding setting aside acquittal by the High Court,
          the learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon Kunju
D         Muhammed v. State of Kera/a (2004) 9 SCC 193, Kashi
          Ram v. State of M.P. AIR 2001 SC 2902 and Meena v.
          State of Maharashtra 2000 Cri LJ 2273. In our opinion,
          the law is well settled. An appeal against acquittal is also
          an appeal under the Code and an Appellate Court has
E         every power to reappreciate, review and reconsider the
          evidence as a whole before it. It is, no doubt, true that there
          is presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and
          that presumption is reinforced by an order of acquittal
          recorded by the Trial Court. But that is not the end of the
F         matter. It is for the Appellate Court to keep in view the
          relevant principles of law, to reappreciate and reweigh the
          evidence as a whole and to come to its own conclusion
          on such evidence in consonance with the principles of
          criminal jurisprudence."
G        38. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka ((2007) 4 SCC
    415], this Court held as under:-
          "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the
          following general principles regarding powers of the
          appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an
H
   STATE OF HARYANA v. SHAKUNTLA AND ORS.                     303
            [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
    order of acquittal emerge:                                       A
    (1) An appellate court has full power to review,
    reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the
    order of acquittal is founded.
    (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no                 8
    limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power
    and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach
    its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
    (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and
    compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very        C
    strong circumstances~', "distorted conclusions", "glaring
    mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers
    of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
    phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of
    language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate            o
    court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of
    the court to review the evidence and to come to its own
    conclusion.
    (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in
    case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of      E
    the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is
    available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal
    jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be
    innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court
    of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal,      F
    the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
    reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.         ·
    (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis
    of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not
    disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."   G
      39. In C. Antony v. K.G. Raghavan Nair [(2003) 1 SCC
1], this Court held:-
    "6. This Court in a number of cases has held that though
    the appellate court has full power to review the evidence · H
    304        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012) 5 S.C.R.


A         upon which the order of acquittal is founded, still while
          exercising such an appellate power in a case of acquittal,
          the appellate court, should not only consider every matter
          on record having a bearing on the question of fact and the
          reasons given by the courts below in support of its order
B         of acquittal, it must express its reasons in the judgment
          which led it to hold that the acquittal is not justified. In those
          line of cases this Court has also held that the appellate
          court must also bear in mind the fact that the trial court had
          the benefit of seeing the witnesses in the witness box and
          the presumption of innocence is not weakened by the order
c         of acquittal, and in such cases if two reasonable
          conclusions can be reached on the basis of the evidence
          on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding-
          of the trial court. (See Bhim Singh Rup Singh v. State of
          Maharashtra 1 and Dharamdeo Singh v. State of Bihar.)"
D
         40. The State has not been able to make out a case of
    exception to the above settled principle~. It was for the State
    to show that the High Court has completely fallen in error of law
    or that judgment in relation to these accused was palpably
E   erroneous, perverse or untenable. None of these parameters
    are satisfied in the appeal preferred by the State against the
    acquittal of three accused.
         41. Thus, in these circumstances, we are of the considered
    view that this is not a case where tHe offence with which the
F   accused have been charged and punished can be converted
    to.an offence under Section 304 Part I or Part II of the IPC.
       42. For the reasons afore-recorded, we are unable to find
  any error of law or error in appreciation of evidence and
  therefore, we decline to interfere with the judgment of the High
G Court.
          43. The appeals filed by the accused, as well as the appeal
    filed by the State, against the judgment of conviction/acquittal
    are hereby dismissed.

H B.B.B.                                            Appeals dismissed.