Holding

The Supreme Court held that the injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, the accused shared common intention to kill, and therefore conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC is proper.

Summary

In December 1989, the deceased Rati Ram was attacked by two accused who struck him with musals on the head and body, causing multiple injuries. He died five days later from septicaemia that the autopsy report linked to the head injury, which was deemed sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The trial court convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC for common intention to kill and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The High Court applied Exception 4 to Section 300, reduced the charge to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II, and released them. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the injuries themselves were sufficient to cause death, the secondary septicaemia was not a relevant factor, and the accused shared a common intention to kill, thereby reinstating the conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 and ordering life imprisonment.

Issues considered

The death caused by septicaemia secondary to head injury can be treated as death in the ordinary course of nature for the purpose of murder under Section 302 IPC.
Whether the accused had a common intention to cause death under Section 34 IPC.
The applicability of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC in converting murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 300, s. 302, s. 304 Part II, s. 326, s. 34

Subjects

murderculpable homicidecommon intentionSection 302 IPCSection 34 IPCsepticaemiamedical jurisprudenceException 4 Section 300life imprisonment

Judgment

A STATE OF HARYANA
v.
PALA AND ORS.

JANUARY 29, 1996

B [K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860:

Ss.302 r/2, 34, 304 Pmt ll-Murder-Inte11tion to cause death-T1ial
C Cowt co11victing for murdei-High Court Convicting u11der S.304 Part II and
sentencing the accused to undergo in1prison111ent to the period already under-
gone--On appeal held, accused shared co111n1on intention to kill the
deceased-Hence convicted u11der S.302 r/2 S.34 and sentenced to impriso11-
ment for life.

D State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Pu1111ayya, (1976] 4 SCC 382 relief on.
•
Lyon's Medical Jurispmdence for India (Tenth Edution), referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
210 of 1996.
E
From the Judgment and Order dated 1.9.92 of the Punjab & Haryana
High Court in Cr!. A No. 145-DB of 1990.

D.B. Vohra for Ms. Indu Malhotra for the Appellant.

F Rajiv K Garg and N.D. Garg for the Complainant.

B.K. Mehta and Prem Malhotra for the Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted.
G
We have heard the counse.1 on both sides. The facts are thal in the
evening of December 6, 1989, the deceased Rati Ram, who was Lambardar
,,
of the village, had gone on stroll outside the village. While he was coming
~-
at about 8.30 p.m., the appellants emerged from their house and each of
H them having been armed with musals, A-1 had attacked the deceased when
1022
STATEv. PALA 1023

- he came in front of their house, on the head and hit him three times on A
different parts. When the deceased had fallen, A-2 again beaten him thrice
on chest, abdomen and other parts of the body. PW-6 and 7, the son and
brother of the deceased, who were coming in search of him had witnessed
the occurrence. When PW-7 raised the cry, the accused had gone in and
went away. The deceased was taken to the hospital. He died five days
B
thereafter. The doctor, PW-9, R.M. Singh, conducted autopsy. He noted
seven injuries and injury nos. 2 and 3 were head injuries. Injury No. 2 was
a lacerated wound which was inflicted on the right mastoid region of size
of 4cm x 1 cm. It was irregular in shape. According to the doctor, the cause
of the death was due to septicaemia which resulted as a result of head-in-
jury and was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. All the c
injuries were ante/mortem in nature and were sufficient to cause death in
the ordinary course of nature. He had stated that "Septicaemia is the direct
result of the head-injury. This not a disease. In other words, head injury is
the cause of death. The injuries found on the person of the deceased could
be caused by musals Ex. P-1 and P-2." In the cross-examination, he stated
D
that "Septicaemia has no relation with bleeding. It is incorrect to suggest
that injuries in this case are not sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature. The Sessions Court convicted the respondents, applying
clause thirdly of Section 300 !PC, under Section 302 !PC and sentenced
that to undergo imprisonment for life. On appeal, the High Court had
applied exception 4 to Section 300 !PC and converted the offence of E
murder into culpable homicide not amounting to murder and convicted
under Section 304 Part JI and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment to
the period already undergone and accordingly got them released. Thus this
appeal by special leave.
F
It is not a case of a sudden fight upon heat of passion. The accused
bet the deceased taking undue advantage. Therefore, Shri Mehta, learned ,
senior counsel appearing for the respondents, fairly and rightly has not
placed his case under Exception 4 to Section 300. On the other hand he
contended that when death was due to septicaemia, it cannot be referable
to the cause of the death in the ordinary course of nature due to anti G

'
, mortom injuries and that, therefore, the offence of murder has not been
made out. In support thereof, he sought to place reliance on Lyon's
Medical Jurisprudence for India (Tenth Edition) at page 222. It is stated
therein that "Danger to life depends, primarily, on the amount of hemor-
rhage, on the organ wounded, and on the extent of shock; secondarily, on H
1024 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 1 S.C.R.

A secondary hemorrhage, on the occurrence of septicaemia, erysipelas,
tetanus, or other complications. In answering the question whether a
wound is dangerous to life, the danger must be assessed on the probable
primary effects of the injury: Such possibilities as the occurrence of tetanus
or septicaemia, later on , are not to be taken into consideration." Though
B the learned counsel had not read the later part of the opinion, the medical
evidence on record do clearly establish that Septicaemia is not the primary
cause and the death was due to injuries caused to the deceased and they
are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Septicaemia
would, therefore, not be taken into account.

C Clause thirdly of Section 300 !PC envisages that if the act is done
with intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury
intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, it would be murder coming under Section 300 !PC and that,
therefore, it would not be a culpable homicide under Section 299 !PC.
D When the accused emerged from their house and beat with deadly weapon
on the head and other parts of the body and death occurred as a result of
the injuries, it must be inferred that the attack on vital parts of the body
was intended to be caused with an intention to cause death. Intention is
locked up in the heart of the assailant and the inference is to be drawn
from acts and attending circumstances.
E
It is then contended that the respondents had no intention to cause
the death and that in support thereof he relies upon the judgment of this
Court in State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya, [1976] 4 SCC 382. The
facts therein do not help the respondents. All the injuries therein though
F were not on vital parts, namely, legs and hands of the deceased, and death
ensued due to their cumulative effect, this Court had applied clause thirdly
of Section 300 !PC and had reversed the contra-finding of the High Court
had set aside the conviction under Section 304 part II and convicted the
accused under Section 302 read with 34 !PC. It is true that this Court
therein in paragraph 39 had observed that no secondary factor such as
G gangrene, tetanus etc., supervended. In this case, the supervening event of
septimcemia is not of any consequence as pointed out by the doctor as the
death was only on account of head injuries and other injuries caused to
the deceased. It is then contended that as there is no proof that a particular
. '

accused had caused fatal head injury, they are liable only to be convicted
H under Section 326 !PC. We find no force. The facts as narrated above
STATEv. PALA 1025

would establish that both the accused shared common intention to kill the A
......
- deceased and are liable to conviction under Section 302 read Section 34
lPC.

The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The judgment of the High Court
is set aside and the accused stand convicted under Section 302 read with
Section 34 !PC. They are accordingly directed, as held by the trial court, B
to undergo the imprisonment for life. They are directed to surrender
themselves forthwith. In case they do not surrender, the Sessions Judge
would forthwith issue warrant of arrest and have the warrants executed
through the concerned police and report to the registry of this Court of
compliance. C
G.N. Appeal allowed.

)