Holding

The two orders were imposed on different grounds and causes of action; therefore, no double jeopardy arose and the termination under Rule 7(2)(b) was valid.

Summary

Balwant Singh, a driver for Haryana Roadways, caused a fatal bus accident. Following a claim award of Rs.1,12,950 against the department, he was punished under Rule 7 of the Haryana Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1987 with a four‑year pay reduction. He was later convicted in a criminal trial for offences under the IPC and, on that basis, his services were terminated. He challenged the termination, alleging double jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the Constitution, claiming he was punished twice for the same offence. The High Court set aside the lower courts’ decrees, holding that double jeopardy applied. The Supreme Court held that the two disciplinary actions were based on different grounds—one for departmental loss and the other for a criminal conviction—so Article 20(2) did not apply, and the termination was valid under Rule 7(2)(b). Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the State’s appeal, restoring the trial court’s judgment.

Issues considered

Whether the pay reduction order and the termination order constitute punishment for the same offence, thereby violating Article 20(2) of the Constitution (double jeopardy).
Whether Rule 7(2)(b) of the Haryana Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1987 exempts a major penalty imposed on the basis of a criminal conviction from the procedural requirements of Rule 7(1).

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 20(2)
Haryana Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1987s. Rule 7(1), s. Rule 7(2)(b)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 279, s. 304-A, s. 337, s. 338

Subjects

double jeopardyArticle 20(2)disciplinary actiontermination of servicepay reductionRule 7criminal convictionmotor accident

Judgment

STATE OF HARYANA A
v.
BALWANT SINGH

MARCH 4, 2003

[SHIVARAJ V. PATIL AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.] B

Service Law:

Haryana Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1987-Rule
7(1) und (2)(b)-Motor accident by bus Driver of Government Transport C
Department-Loss caused to the Department due to payment of claim amount
for the accident-After departmental enquiry delinquent punished with reduction
of pay-In criminal case for the accident, Driver convicted-Consequently
terminated from service-Suit alleging non conduct ofenquiry and not granting
opportunity of being heard-Suit decreed-Confirmation of decree by first D
appellate Court-In second appeal High Court setting aside the decree on the
ground that delinquent suffered double jeopardy-On appeal, held-In the
facts of the case delinquent not sufferedfrom double jeopardy-The two orders
against the delinquent were on different grounds and different causes ofaction--
When major penalty is imposed on the ground of his conviction, compliance
of the Rules not required-Constitution of India, 1950-Artic/e 20(2). E
Respondent, a Driver in the Transport Department of the appellant-
State caused an accident which resulted in death of one and injury to
another person. The award passed in the claim petition of the victims
resulted in monetary loss to the Department. Respondent was
chargesheeted under Rule 7 of Haryana Civil Services (Punishment and F
Appeal) Rules, 1987 and after enquiry he was punished with reduction of
pay. In the criminal proceedings for the accident, he was convicted and
as a result of the conviction his services were terminated. He filed appeal
against the termination order on the ground that he could not be tried
twice for the same offence. During pendency of the appeal, he filed a suit G
alleging that the termination order was passed without giving him
opportunity of being heard and without holding any enquiry. Suit was
dismissed. Appeal against the same was also dismissed. However, in second
appeal High Court set aside the decrees passed by both the Courts on. the
ground that he could not be punished twice for the same offence in view H
557
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India.
In appeal to this Court, appellant-State contended that the
respondent was not punished twice for the same offence, as the earlier
order was in wake of order of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal because
of his causing loss and defamation to the Department; while the later order
B of terminat'ion was passed on the basis of his conviction; that the
respondent did not suffer double jeopardy as the cause of action and
grounds for passing the two orders were different and distinct; and that
High Court was not right in reversing the concurrent findings of fact.

Allowing the appeal, the Court
c
HELD: I.I. In view of the facts of the case, there was no question of
prosecuting and punishing the respondent for the same offence twice. The
High Court was not right in equating departmental enquiries on different
ground to a prosecution in criminal case. High Court also has failed to
D see that the two orders passed against the respondent were on different
grounds and were on different causes of action. (561-A-B)

1.2. There was no question of the respondent suffering 11 double
jeopardy. The aid of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India was wrongly
taken. Article 20(2) does not get attracted to the facts of the present case.
E Before the trial Court, no issue was raised as to the respondent suffering
a double jeopardy although in the first appellate court, discussion was
~ade on this point. (562-H; 563-A)

Union of India and Anr. v. P.D. Yadav, (20021 l SCC 405, referred
to.
F
2. When a major penalty is proposed to be imp.osed upon a person
on the ground of conduct which led to his conviction on a criminal charge,
following the provisions contained in Rule 7(1) and (2) is not l'equired.
Rule 7 itself makes a distinction in regard to the punishment to be imposed
G depending on the grounds. (561-D-E)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURJSDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5124 of2001.

From .the Judgment and Order dated 19.4.2000 of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in R.S.A. No. 2154 of 1998.

H Praveen Kumar Rai, for Ms. H. Wahi, for the Appellant.
STATE v. BAL WANT SINGH [SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, J.] 559

Sanjay Sarin and Ms. Manjula Gupta, for Ashok Mathur, for the A
Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SHIV ARAJ V. PA Tl L J. The State of Haryana is in appeal challenging
the judgment and decree passed by the High Court in second appeal reversing B
the judgment and decree passed by the trial court as affirmed by the first
appellate court.

The respondent was driving bus of the Haryana Roadways. An accident
was caused because of the rash and negligent driving of the respondent. In
the said acciC:~nt, one person died and other person suffered injuries. In the C
claim petition filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, an award
was passed which resulted in the loss of Rs. 1, 12,950/- to the Transport
Department of the State. A charge-sheet was issued under Rule 7 of Haryana
Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1987 (for brevity che Rules').
After holding enquiry, a punishment was imposed on him reducing the pay D
to the minimum of time scale of Driver for a period of four years by the order
dated 12.3.1990. This order was passed against him in the wake of the orders
of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kurukshetra. On account of causing
of the same accident, a criminal case was also registered vide F.l.R. No. 127
dated 25.7.1988 for the offences under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A E
IPC. He was convicted by the court after trial in the said criminal case. Based
on this conviction, the General Manager of Haryana Roadways passed another
order dated 17.9.1992 terminating the services of the respondent. This order
was communicated to the respondent when he was undergoing punishment.
After he was released from jail in January, 1993, he submitted a joining
report in the office of the General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Karnal. F
Instead of accept.ing joining report, the termination order dated 17.9.1992
was handed over to him. He filed an appeal before the Commissioner and
Secretary, Haryana Roadways against the order of termination of his services
on the ground that he could not be tried twice for the same offence. When
the appeal was still pending, he filed a suit alleging that no proper opportunity G
was given to him and no enquiry was held but the termination order was
passed only on the basis of the judgment passed by the learned Sessions
Judge upholding his conviction. The appellant contested the suit on several
grounds inter a!ia conter.ding that due to negligence of the respondent, the
appellant suffered loss of Rs. I, 12,950 as he was careless on his duty; the
order of termination of his services was rightly passed and there was no need H
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) 2 S.C.R.

A to conduct an enquiry under Rule 7(2) of the Rules when the said order was
passed on the basis of the conviction and sentence passed against him. After
trial, the suit was dismissed. Aggrieved by judgment and decree passed by
the trial court, the respondent filed an appeal before the appellate court. The
appeal was also dismissed. Not being satisfied with the order passed in the
B appeal, the respondent filed second appeal before the High Court. The same
was allowed setting aside the decrees passed by both the courts below only
on the ground that an employee could not be punished twice for the same
offence in view of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India as no person
shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. Hence,
this appeal questioning the validity and correctness of the impugned judgment
C and decree passed in the second appeal by the High Court.

The learned counsel for the appellant urged that the High Court
committed a manifest error in taking a view that the respondent was prosecuted
and punished for the same offence twice; earlier order dated 12.3.1990 was
passed after holding enquiry under Rule 7 of the Rules, because of rash and
D negligent driving of the bus, he caused loss to the Haryana Roadways to the
tune of Rs. I, 12, 950, defamed the Transport Department and proved
indiscipline; the said action was taken in the wake of the orders of the Motor
Accidents Claims Tribunal reducing his pay to the minimum time scale of
Driver for a period of fo•J~ years; thereafter, the order dated 17.9.1992
E terminating his services was passed on the basis of conviction and sentence
passed against him by the criminal court for offence under Section 304-A
!PC. According to the learned counsel, the cause of action and grounds for
passing two orders aforementioned against the respondent being different and
distinct, there was no question of the respondent suffering double jeopardy;
r
he was not prosecuted and punished twice for the same offe!}ce; action was
F taken according to the Rules governing the case of the respondent on two
different occasions. He also contended that the High Court was not right and
justified in reversing the concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the
courts l>elow. As against these submissions, the learned counsel for the
respondent supported the impugned judgment for the very reasons stated in
G the impugned order.
From tb facts that are not in dispute, it is abundantly c:lear that the
order dated 12.3.1990 wa~ passed against the respondent reducing the pay to
the minimum of time scale of Driver for a period of four years on account
of his causing loss and bringing bad .name to the Department in the light of·
H the order passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, that too after
STATE v. BAL WANT SINGH [SHIVARA.I V. PATIL, J.] 561
holding enquiry under the Rules after giving him opportunity. The second A
order dated 17.9.1992 was passed on the basis of the conviction and sentence
passed against him by the competent criminal court for the offence under
Section 304-A IPC which was permissible under the Rules. These being the
facts, there was no question of prosecuting and punishing the respondent for
the same offence twice. The High Court was not right in equating departmental
enquiries on different grounds to a prosecution in criminal case. The High B
Court also has failed to see that the two orders passed against the respondent
were on different grounds and were on different cause of actions.

Under Rule 7(1) of the Rules, no order imposing a major penalty shall
be passed against a person to whom the said Rules are applicable unless he C
has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action
proposed to be taken. Under Rule 7(2) procedure to be followed and the
requirements to be satisfied before imposing penalty in that regard are
indicated. Sub.-rule 2(b) of Rule 7 states that the provisions of the foregoing
sub-rule shall not apply where any major penalty is proposed to be imposed
upon a person on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on D
a criminal case. In the present case, the first order was passed on 12.3.1990
reducing the pay to the minimum of time scale of Driver under Rule 7(1) of
the Rules. The second order terminating his services was passed on 17.9.1992
under Rule 7(2)(b). When a major penalty is proposed to be imposed upon
a person on the ground of conduct which led to his conviction on a criminal E
. ., charge following the provisions contained in Rule 7( I) and (2) is not required .
Rule 7 itself makes a distinction in regard to the punishment to be imposed
depending on the grounds.

A three Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India and Anr. v. P.D.
Yadav, (2002] I SCC 405, while dealing with more or less a similar contention p
with regard to double jeopardy, has held thus:-

. "A contention, though feebly, was advanced on behalf of some of the
respondents that forfeiture of pension in addition to the punishment
imposed under Section 71 of the Army Act amounted to double
jeopardy. In our view, this contention has no force. There is no question G
of prosecuting and punishing a person twice for the same offence.
Punishment is imposed under Section 71 of the Army Act after trial
by Court Martial. Passing an order under Regulation 16(a) in the
matter of grant or forfeiture of pension comes thereafter and it is
related to satisfactory service. There is no merit in the contention that
H

T
I
~··

562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A the said Regulation is bad on the ground that it authorized imposition
of a double penalty; may be in a given case. penalty of cashiering or
dismissal from service and the consequential forfeiture of pension
may be harsh and may cause great hardship but that is an aspect
which is for the President to consider while exercising his discretion
under the said Regulation. May be in his discretion, the President
B may hold that the punishment of cashiering or dismissal or removal
from service was sufficient having regard to circumstances of the
case ~nd that a person need not be deprived of his right to pension.
A crime is a legal wrong for which an offender is liable to be
prosecuted and punished but only once for such a crime. In other
c words, an offender cannot be punished twice for the same offence.
This is ~emand of justice and public policy supports it. This principle
is embodied in the well-known maxim nemo debet bis vexari, (si
constat curiae quod sit) pro una et eadem causa·:. meaning
., no one
ought to be vexed twice if it appears to the court that it is for one and
the same cause. Doctrine of double jeopardy is a protection against
D prosecution twice for the same offence. Under Articles 20-22 of the
Indian Constitution, provisions are made relating to personal liberty
of citizens and others. Article 20(2) expressly. provides that: "No-one
shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than
once." Offences such as criminal breach of trust, misappropriation,
E cheating, defamation etc., may give rise to prosecution on criminal
side and also for action in civil court/other forum for recovery of
money by way of damages etc., unless there is a bar created by law.
I.n the proceedings before General Court Martial, a person is tried for
an offence of misconduct and whereas in passing order under
Regulation 16(a) for forfeiting pension, a person is not tried for the
F same offence of misconduct after the punishment is imposed for a
proven misconduct by the General Court Martial resulting in
cashiering, dismissing or removing from service. Only further action
is taken under Regulation 16(a) in relation to forfeiture of pension.
Thus, punishing a person under Section 71 of the Army Act and
G making order under Regulation 16(a) are entirely different. Hence,
.there is no question· of applying principle of double jeopardy to the
present case."

·under these circumstances, there was no question of the respondent
suffering a double jeopardy. The aid of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of
H India was wrongly taken. Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India does not

\
)
STATE v. BAL WANT SINGH [SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, J.) 563
get attracted to the facts of the present case. Before the trial court, no issue A
was raised as to the respondent suffering a double jeopardy although in the
first appellate court, the discussion was made on this point. In the view we
have expressed above that the High Court committed a serious error in holding
that the respondent was prosecuted and punished for the same offence twice,
the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. Hence, the same· is set aside.
The judgment and decree passed by the trial court as affirmed by the first B
appellate court is restored. The appeal is allowed accordingly but with no
order as to costs.

K.K.T. Appeal allowed.

. .

.