Holding

The doctrine of equal pay for equal work is enforceable but requires proof of equal work of equal value; the High Court's directions were set aside and the matters remitted for fresh consideration.

Summary

The State of Haryana appealed against several High Court orders directing daily‑wage and contract workers (ledger clerks, pump operators, fitters, etc.) to receive the minimum pay of regular Class IV employees from the date of filing their writ petitions. While the appeals were pending, the respondents were regularised and began receiving the regular pay scale. The Supreme Court examined whether the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" applied to these workers and whether the High Court’s blanket direction was proper. It held that the doctrine is enforceable but only when the claimant proves that the work performed is of equal value, taking into account qualifications, recruitment mode, responsibilities, and other relevant factors. The Court found that the High Court had applied the doctrine without such analysis and therefore set aside its orders. The matters were remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration, with directions to allow amendment of petitions and to assess the factual equivalence before granting any equal‑pay relief.

Issues considered

Whether daily‑wage or contract workers are entitled to the minimum pay of regular Class IV employees from the date of their appointment.
Whether the High Court's direction to pay such minimum wages from the filing date should be interfered with.
Whether the doctrine of equal pay for equal work applies to workers appointed on daily wages or contract without examining qualifications, recruitment mode, and nature of work.
Whether classification based on recruitment process, educational qualifications, or other differentiating factors is permissible under Article 14.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 39(d)

Subjects

equal pay for equal workservice lawdaily wage workerscontract workerspay scaleregularisationArticle 14Article 39(d)classificationminimum wages

Judgment

STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. A
v.
CHARANJIT SINGH AND ORS. ETC. ETC.

OCTOBER 5, 2005

[S.N. VARIAVA, DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.] B

Service Law:

Equal pay for equal work- Doctrine-Applicability- Ledger clerks,
ledger keepers, pump operators, mali-cum-chowkidar, fitters, petrol men, c
surveyors etc. appointed on daily wages-These daily wagers made a claim
of minimum wages payable under pay scale of regular Class IV employees
from the date of their appointments-On reference made to Full Bench, State
Government directed to give minimum of wages in the scale payable to a
regular Class JV employee from the date of filing of respective petition--- D
Whilst appeals were pending before Supreme Court, these daily wagers had
been regularized-From the date of their regularization they were being paid
pay scales as payable to a regular Class IV employee-Correctness of-Held:
Undoubtedly, the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" is not an abstract
doctrine and is capable of being enforced in a Court of law---BUL equal pay
must be for equal work of equal value- The principle of' 'equal pay for equal E
. work'' has no mechanical application in eve1y case-The High Court blindly
proceeded on the basis that the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work"
applied without examining any relevant factors-Hence, High Court judgment
set aside-Matter remitted to High Court for fresh consideration.

Doctrine: F

''Equal pay for equal work' '---Explained.

The respondents were daily wagers who were appointed as ledger
clerks, ledger keepers, pump operators, mali-cum-chowkidar, fitters, petrol G
men, surveyors etc. All of them claimed the minimum wages payable under
the pay scale of regular Class IV employees from the date of their
appointments. The question whether or not these persons were entitled to
the minimum of the pay scale of a regular Class IV employee was referred
to a Full Bench of the High Court for consideration. Following the Full
57 fl
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Bench decision the respondents have been directed to be given the T

minimum of the wages in the scale payable to a regular Class IV employee
from the date of the filing of the respective petition. Hence the appeal.

Whilst these appeals were pending before this Court, all the
respondents had been regularized. From the date of their regularization
B they were being paid pay scales as payable to a regular Class IV employee.

The following question arose before the Court:-

Whether the directions of the High Court to pay the minimum wage
in the scale payable to a Class IV employee from the date of their filing
c the respective petition is required to be interfered with?

Disposing of the appeal, the Court

HELD: I. Undoubtedly, the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work"
is not an abstract doctrine and is capable of being enforced in a Court of
D law. But equal pay must be for equal work of equal value. The principle
of "equal pay for equal work" has no mechanical application in every
case. Article 14 permits reasonable classification based on qualities or
characteristics of persons recruited and grouped together, as against those
who were left out. Of course, the qualities or characteristics must have a
reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service matters
E
merit or experience can be a proper basis for classification for the purposes
of pay in order to promote efficiency in administration. A higher pay scale
to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional
avenues is also an acceptable reason for pay differentiation. The very fact
that the person has not gone through the process of recruitment may itself,
F in certain cases, make a difference. If the educational qualifications are
different, then also the doctrine may have no application. Even though
persons may do the same work, their quality of work may differ. Where
persons are selected by a Selection Committee on the basis of merit with
due regard to seniority a higher pay scale granted to such persons who
are evaluated by competent authority cannot be challenged. A
G
classification based on difference in educational qualifications justifies a
difference in pay scales. A mere nomenclature designating a person as say
a carpenter or a craftsman is not enough to come to the conclusion that
he is doing the same work as another carpenter or craftsman in regular

H
service. The quality of work which is produced, may be different and even
the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a comparison
•
STATE OF HARYANA r. CHARAN.llT SINGH 59
of physical activity. The application of the principle of "equal pay for equal A
work" requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The
accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ
from job to job. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. There
maybe qualitative difference as regard reliability and responsibility.
Functions may be the same but the responsibilities made a difference. Thus B
normally the applicability of this principle must be left to be evaluated
and determined by an expert body. These are not matters where a writ
court can lightly interfere. Normally, a party claiming equal pay for equal
work should be required to raise a dispute in this regard. In any event
the party who claims equal pay for equal work has to make necessary
averments and prove that all things are equal. Thus, before any direction C
can be issue~ by a Court, the Court must first see that there are necessary
averments find there is a proof. If the High Court is, on basis of material
placed before it, convinced that there was equal work of equal quality and
all other retevant factors are fulfilled it may direct payment of equal pay
from the date of the filing of the respective Writ Petition. In all these cases, D
the High Court has blindly proceeded on the basis that the doctrine of
equal pay for equal work applies without examining any relevant factors.
(73-F, G, H; 74-A, B, C, D, E, F]

State of Hmyana v. Jasmer Singh, [ 1996[ I 1 SCC 77, State of Hmyana
v. Tilak Raj, (2003( 6 SCC 123, Orissa University of Agriculture and
Technology v. Mano} K. Mohanty, (2003] 5 SCC 188 and Government of West E
Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy, (2004[ I SCC 347, relied on.

Surinder Singh v. Engineer-in-Chief C.P. W.D., [1986] I SCC 639,
affirmed.

Dhirendra Chamo/i v. State ofU.P., (1986[ 1 SCC 637, State o/Orissa F
v. Ba/aram Sahu, (2003[ I SCC 250, State of U.P. v. Putti Lal, (2003) 8
SCALE 259, State of Puniab v. Devinder Singh, (1988[ 9 SCC 595, Sandep
Kumar v. State of U.P., (1993[ Supp. 1 SCC 525, Bhagwan Dass v. State of
Hmyana, (1987[ 4 SCC 634 and State of Punjab v. Ta/winder Singh, [2003[
II SCC 776, referred to.
G
2. All the impugned judgments are set aside and all these matters
are remitted back to the High Court. The High Court shall now examine
each case and see whether the necessary averments are there. It shall then
consider all relevant facts and decide whether everything is identical and
.. equal. If the High Court feels that there is a dispute which would
necessitate extensive evidence it may direct that party to raise an H
60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 12005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A appropriate dispute where such questions could be dealt with and which,
in fact, would be the appropriate proceedings. 175-A, Bl

3. 11 is clear that persons employed on contract cannot claim equal
pay on the basis of equal pay for equal work. Faced with this situation it
was submitted that all these persons were in fact claiming that their
B respective appointments were regular appointments by the regular process
of appointment but that instead of giving regular appointments they were
appointed on contract with the intention of not paying them regular salary.
It was admitted that the petitions may be badly drafted and such a
contention not put forth specifically. The High Court has disposed of these
C petitions also on the footing that the principle of equal pay fo..-equal work
applied. The impugned orders in these cases also are set aside and the
matters remitted back to the High Court for disposal. 175-G, H; 76-A, Bl

State of Ha1yana v. Surinder Kumar, 119971 3 SCC 633 and Union of
India v. Baby, !19981 9 SCC 252, relied on.
D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6562 of2002.

From the Judgment and Order dated 13.3.2002 of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in C.W.P. No. 9723 of 1992.

WITH
E
C.A. Nos. 6567, 6568, 6570, 6572, 6569, 6573, 6574, 6575, 6528,
6647, 6485, 7093, 8090/2002, C.A. No. 6166 of2005, C.A. Nos. 1272, 1475/
2003, C.A. No. 6167 of2005, C.A. Nos. 4154, 4636/2003, 5104, 6322/2003,
4447, 6654-6657, 8636/2003, C.A. Nos. 185, 189/2004, C.A. No. 6648/2002.
F
P.N. Mishra, Ajay Siwach, Pardeep Dahiya, Sandeep Sharma, T.V.
George, Jasbir Singh Malik, Arun Kumar Singh, S.K. Sabharwal, Ms.Kamakshi
S.Mehlwal, Suresh C.Gupta, R.K. Tripathi, J.K. Pali, Kamal Mohan Gupta,
Jinendra Jain, Ajay Jain, Ms. Anjali, Ravishankar Garg, Ms.Abha R.Sharma,
Mrs. K. Sharda Devi, Seeraj Bagga, Mrs.Sureshta Bagga, Ms. Hemantika
G Wahi, Ajay K.Agrawal, J.P. Dhanda, Ranbir Singh Yadav, B.S. Mor, Gian
Singh, Mahinder Singh Dahiya, Ajay Choudhary, R.S. Dwivedi, P.K. Singh,
Ajay Bansal, Prem Malhotra, Pankaj Kumar, Ms.Indu Malhotra, Ms.C.K.
Sucharita, Ugra Shankar Prasad, B.S. Chahar, Mrs.Jyoti Chahar, Vinay Garg,
Sudhir"Nandrajog, Ms. Sarda Devi and Prem Malhotra for the appearing
H parties. •
STATE OF HARY ANA v. CHARANJIT SINGH [VARIA VA, J.] 61
... The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
S.N. VARIA VA, J. Delay condoned.

Special leave granted in S.L. Ps.

(I) In all these Appeals, the Respondents were daily wagers who were B
appointed as ledger clerks, ledger keepers, pump operators, mali-cum-
chowkidar, fitters, petrol men, surveyors etc. All of them claimed the minimum
wages payable under the pay-scale of regular Class IV employees from the
date of their appointments. The question whether or not these persons were
entitled to the minimum of the pay-scale of a regular Class IV employee was
referred to a Full Bench for consideration. The Full Bench gave its decision. C
Following the Full Bench decision all these Writ Petitions have been disposed
off with short Orders. In all these cases the Respondents have been directed
to be given the minimum of the wages in the scale payable to a regular Class
IV employee from the date of the filing of the respective Petition.

(2) One other fact which must be mentioned is that, whilst these Appeals D
were pending before this Court, all the Respondents have been regularized.
From the date of their regularization they being paid pay-scales as payable
to a regular Class IV employee. The question therefore is only whether the
directions of the High Court to pay the minimum wage in the scale payable
to a Class IV employee, from the date of their filing the respective Petition, E
is required to be interfered with.

(3) When these Appeals came up for hearing on 23rd August, 2004 this
Court referred the matters to a larger Bench for consideration by passing the
following Order:
F
"The respondents in all these appeals were initially appointed as
Ledger-clerks, ledger keepers, pump operators, mali-cum-chowkidars,
fitters, petrol man, surveyor, drivers etc. on daily wages or on
contractual basis. They were all regularized with effect from October,
)
2003 and they have been getting the minimum payable under the
regular pay scale of Class-IV employees from the date of their G
regularization. In the writ petitions filed by these respondents before
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, the Division
Bench directed that these respondents shall be paid the minimum
... salary and dearness allowances payable to their counter parts working
on regular basis. The question for consideration before this Court, in H
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.CR.

A the present set of cases, is that whether these respondents are entitled
to get the minimum scale of pay from the date of their appointment
as daily wagers/casual employees or they are entitled to get the
minimum salary in the scale of pay from the date of their regularization.

Learned counsel for the State contended that they are entitled to
B get minimum of the scale of pay only from the date of regularization
whereas the respondents. contended that applying the principle of
"equal pay for equal work" they are entitled to get the minimum of
the pay scale from the date of their employment as casual employees
or daily wagers. The respondents, in this connection, relied on the
decision of this Court reported in AIR (1986) SC P. 584, Surinder
c Singh and Anr. v. Engineer-in-Chief, C.P. W.D. and Ors. wherein the
petitioners were appointed on daily wages in the Central Public Works
Department were given salary and allowances which were payable to
the regular employees from the date on which they were employed
but in series of other decisions rendered by this Court reported in
D [ 1996] I I SCC p. 77, State of Haryana and Ors. v. Jasmer Singh and
Ors., in paras 9 and I 0 it was held that the daily rated workmen who
were to be paid minimum wages admissible to such workmen as
prescribed and not in the pay scale a.pplicable to similar employees
working on regular service. Reliance was also placed on earlier
decisions in Harbans Lal v. State of HP, [1989] 4 SCC p.459. A
E similar view was taken by th:s Court in Orissa University of
Agriculture & Technology and Anr. v. Mano) K. Mohanty, [2003] 5
SCC P. 188 AND Ghaziabarl Development Authority and Ors. v.
Vikram Chaudhary and Ors., [1995] 5 SCC p.2!0 and also in State
o/Hmyana and Anr.. v. Ti/ak Raj and Ors., [2003] 6 SCC p.123.
F It appears that there is a conflict of decision and earlier decision
in Surinder Singh and Anr. v. Engineer-in-Chief, C. P. W.D. and Ors.,
AIR (1986) SC 584 "'as not referred to in later decisions. Therefore,
in our view, these cases have to be considered by a larger bench so
that the conflict may be resolved. The registry is requested to place
G these matters before the Hon 'ble Chief Justice of India for posting
the same before a larger bench."

The matters are thus before this three Judge Bench.

(4) In the case of Surinder Singh v. Engineer-in-Chief, C.P. W.D.,
H reported in [I 986] I SCC 639 = AIR ( 1986) SC 4, a two Judge Bench of this
STATEOFHARYANAv. CHARANJ!TSINGH [VARIAVA, J.] 63

Court held that the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" is not an abstract A
doctrine which is not capable of being enforced in a court of law. This Court
cited with approval the following observations made in the case of Dhirendra
Chamo/i v. State of U.P., reported in (1986] I SCC 637:

"We therefore allow the writ petitions and make the rule
absolute and direct the Central Government to accord to these B
persons who are employed by the. Nehru Yuvak Kendras and
who are concededly performing the same duties as Class IV
employees, the same salary and conditions of service as are being
received by Class IV employees, except regularization which
cannot be done since there are no sanctioned posts. But we hope C
and trust that posts will be sanctioned by the Central Government
in the different Nehru Yuvak Kendras, so that these persons can
be regularized. It is not at all desirable that any management and
particularly the Central Government should continue to employ
persons on casual basis in organizations which have been in D
existence for over 12 years. The salary and allowances of Class
IV employees shall be given to these persons employed in Nehru
Yuvak Kendras with effect from the date when they were
respectively employed.
Earlier the court also observed that it was a peculiar attitude to take E
on the part of the Central Government to say that they would pay
only daily wages and not the same wages as other similarly employed
employees, though all of them did identical work. The court said:
This argument lies ill in the mouth of the Central
Government for it is an all too familiar argument with the p
exploiting class and a welfare State committed to a socialist
pattern of society cannot be permitted to advance such an
argument. It must be remembered that in this country where
there is so much unemployment, the choice for the majority of
people is to starve or to take employment on whatever exploitative
terms are offered by the employer. The fact that these employees G
accepted employment with full knowledge that they will be paid
only daily wages and they will not get the same salary and
conditions of service as other Class IV employees, cannot provide
an escape to the Central Government to avoid the mandate of
... equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. This article H
declares that there should be equality before law and equal
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A protection of the law and implicit in it is the further principle .
that there must be equal pay for equal work of equal value .......
It makes no difference whether they are appointed in sanctioned
posts or not. So long as they are performing the same duties,
they must receive the same salary and conditions of service as
Class IV employees."
B
(5) In Dhirendra Chamoli's case this Court then held that the Central
Government like all organs of a State is committed to the Directive Principles
of State Policy and Article 39 enshrines the principle of equal pay for equal
work. On this basis, this Court directed the Government to pay to the Petitioners
C therein and all other daily wagers the same salary and allowances as were
paid to regular and permanent employees. To be immediately noted that in
this case, there is no discussion as to whether or not the concerned employees
were similarly situated with the regular employees and what was the nature
of their work and the nature of work of a regular employee. The case appears
to have proceeded on the footing that everything was identical and that the
D doctrine of equal pay for equal work applied. Counsel for the Respondents
have also relied upon other Judgments of this Court. They are being dealt
with later.

(6) The question as to when such a doctrine can apply was considered
by this Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh, reported in
E [1996] 11 sec 77. In this case, it was he/d that the principle of equal pay
for equal work is not easy to apply. It \vas held that there are inherent
difficulties in comparing and evaluating the work of different persons in
different organizations or even in the sr,me organization. Earlier judgments
directing payment on the basis of the doctrine of equal pay for equal work
F were taken note of. The Court recorded that a note of caution had been
expressed in the case of State of UP. v. JP. Chaurasia, (1989] I SCC 121.
It was pointed out that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" has no
mechanical application in every case of similar work. It was held that Article
14 permits reasonable classification based on qualities or characteristics of
persons recruited and grouped together, as against those who were left out.
G It was held that these qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable
relation to the object sought to be achieved. It was held that in service
matters merit or experience can be a proper basis for classification for the
purposes of pay in order to promote efficiency in administration. It was held
that a higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of
H promotional avenues is also an acceptable reason for pay differentiation. It •
STATEOFHARYANAv. CHARANJITSINGH [VARIAVA,J.] 65
was held that even though persons may do the same work, their quality of A
work may differ. It was held that where persons are selected by a Selection
Committee on the basis of merit with due regard to seniority a higher pay
scale granted to such persons who are evaluated by competent authority
cannot be challenged. Note was also taken of the case of Mewa Ram Kanojia
v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, [1989] 2 SCC 235 wherein it was
held that a classification based on difference in educational qualifications B
justified a difference in pay scales. This Court further observed that the
judgment of the Pay Commission in this regard relating to the nature of the
job, in the absence of material to the contrary, should be accepted. The case
of Harbans Lal v. State of H.P. [1989] 4 SCC 459 was referred to with
approval. In that case it was held that a mere nomenclature designating a C
person as a carpenter or a craftsman was not enough to come to the conclusion
that he was doing the same work as another carpenter in regular service. In
that case, carpenters employed by the Himachal Pradesh Handicraft
Corporation on daily wages sought parity of wages with carpenters in regular
service. This Court negatived this contention, holding that a comparison cannot
be made with counterparts in other establishments with different management D
or even in the establishments in different locations though owned by the
}
same management. The quality of work which is produced may be different
and even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a
comparison of physical activity. The application of the principle of "equal
pay for equal work" requires consideration of various dimensions of a given E
job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail may
differ from job to job. It was held that it must be left to be evaluated and
determined by an expert body. In Jasmer Singhs' case this Court summed up
as follows:

" ....... the quality of work performed by different sets of persons holding F
different jobs will have to be evaluated. There may be differences in
educational or technical qualifications which may have a bearing on
the skills which the holders bring to their job although the designation
of the job may be the same. There may also be other considerations
which have relevance to efficiency in service which may justify
differences in pay scales on the basis of criteria such as experience G
and seniority, or a need to prevent stagnation in the cadre, so that
good performance can be elicited from persons who have reached the
top of the pay scale. There may be various other similar considerations
. which may have a bearing on efficient performance in a job. This
Court has repeatedly observed that evaluation of such jobs for the H
66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A purposes of pay scale must be left to expert bodies and, unless there .
are any ma/a fides, its evaluation should be accepted.

9. This court in the case of Harbans Lal v. State of H.P., [1989] 4
sec 459: [1990) sec (L&S) 71 : (1989) 11 ATC 869 further held
that daily-rated workmen who were before the Court in that case
B were entitled to be paid minimum wages admissible to such workmen
as prescribed and not the minimum in the pay scale applicable to
similar employees in regular service - unless the employer had decided
to' make such minimum in the pay scale applicable to the daily-rated
workmen. The same position is reiterated in the case of Ghaziabad
Development Authority v. Vikram Chaudhary, [1995) 5 SCC 210 :
c [1995] sec (L&S) 1226: (1995) 31 ATC 129.

10. The respondents, therefore, in the present appeals who are
employed on daily wages cannot be treated as on a par with persons
in regular service of the State of Haryana holding similar posts. Daily-
rated workers are not required to possess the qualifications prescribed
D
for regular workers, nor do they have to fulfil the requirement relating
to age at the time of recruitment. They are not selected in the manner
in which regular employees are selected. In other words the
requirements for selection are not as rigorous. There are also other
provisions relating to regular service such as the liability of a member
E of the service to be transferred, and his being subject to the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the authorities as prescribed, which the daily-rated ·
workmen are not subjected to. They cannot, therefore, be equated
with regular workmen for the purposes for their wages. Nor can they
claim the minimum of the regular pay scale of the regularly employed."

F (7) In the case of State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj, reported in [2003] 6
sec 123, it has been held that the principle of equal pay for equal work is
not always easy to apply. It has been held that there are inherent difficulties
in comparing and evaluating the work of different persons in different
organizations or even in the same organization. It has been held that this is
G a concept which requires, for its applicability, complete and wholesale identity
between a group of employees claiming identical pay scales and the other
group of employees who have already earned such pay scales. It has been
held that the problem about equal pay cannot be translated into a mathematical
formula. It was further held as follows:

H "11. A scale of pay is attached to a definite post and in case of a daily
STATE OF HARYANA v. CHARANJITSINGH [VARIAVA, J.] 67

wager, he holds no posts. The respondent workers cannot be held to A
hold any posts to claim even any comparison with the regular and
permanent staff for any or all purposes including a claim for equal
pay and allowances. To claim a relief on the basis of equality, it is
for the claimants to substantiate a clear cut basis of equivalence and
a resultant hostile discrimination before becoming eligible to claim
rights on a par with the other group vis-a-vis an alleged discrimination. B
No material was placed before the High Court as to the nature of the
duties of either categories and it is not possible to hold that the
principle of "equal pay for equal work" is an abstract one.

"(8) In the case of Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology v. C
Mano} K Mohanty, reported in [2003] 5 SCC l 88, this Court set aside the
Order of the High Court granting equal pay for equal justice on the basis that
the High Court, before issuing such directions, had not examined facts of the
case in order to appreciate whether the Respondent therein satisfied the relevant
requirements such as the nature of work done by him as compared to the
nature of work done by a regularly employed person, the qualifications, the D
responsibilities, etc. It was noted that as the Respondent therein was only on
a temporary basis and he had not undergone the process for regular recruitment
and in such cases direction to give regular pay scale could not be given
without examining the relevant factors. It was held that before giving such
directions the Court must also keep in mind what to what would be its E
implications and impact on the other employees. It was held that in the
absence of necessary averments and materials placed on record, there is no
scope to give such a direction. It was held that the burden to prove that
everything was equal is on the person claiming equal pay for equal work and
in the absence of necessary averments and proofs a party would not be
entitled to get such directions. F
(9) In the case of Government of West Bengal v. Tarun K Roy reported
in [2004] 1 SCC 347, a three Judge Bench of this Court has also considered
the doctrine of equal pay for equal work in the following terms:

"Equal Pay for Equal Work G
Article 14 read with Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India envisages
the doctrine of equal pay for equal work. The said doctrine, however,
does not contemplate that only because the nature of the work is
same, irrespective of an educational qualification or irrespective of
their source of recruitment or other relevant considerations the said H
68' SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A doctrine would be automatically applied. The holders of a higher
educational qualification can be treated as a separate class. Such
classification, it is trite, is reasonable. Employees performing the
similar job but having different educational qualification can, thus, be
treated differently.

B In State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Tri/ok Nath Khosa, AIR (1974) SC
1 : (1974] 1 SCC 19 : 1974-1-LLJ-121, this Court held:

"Educational qualifications have been recognized by this Court as a
safe criterion for determining the validity of classification."
\.,_

c The Post of Operator-cum-Mechanic and Sub-Assistant Engineers are
technical posts. As noticed hereinbefore, whereas for the posts of
Operator-cum-Mechanic the qualification of school final examination
and a certificate obtained from the Industrial Training institute would
be sufficient; for the posts of Sub-Assistant Engineer the person must
have a diploma from a polytechnic apart from being a matriculate. ,
D
It is also not in dispute that such qualification was prescribed as far
back as in the year 1971 and the respondents herein were appointed
thereafter.

The Court, in exercise of its power of judicial review cannot hold that
E matriculates with a certificate from ITis or simply graduates in science
would be entitled to hold the posts of Sub-Assistant Engineers. It is
for the executive to lay down the qualification required for holding
a post and not for the Courts.

In Debdas Kumar's case (supra) the issue which fell for determination
F by this Court was as to whether those Operators-cum-Mechanic who
.were diploma holders, having regard to the aforementioned notification
dated November I 9, I 974 were entitled to be designated as Sub-
Assistant Engineers. This Court noticed that the Post of Sub-Assistant
Engineer is direct recruitment post and not a promotional post and,
thus, they are entitled to be designated as Sub-Assistant Engineers,
G particularly, when such a status had been conferred upon 17 persons
similarly situated. This court granted relief to Debdas Kumar's case
(supra), only on the ground that they had been discriminated against.

Question of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India on the
part of the State would arise only if the persons are similarly placed. ~ '
H
STATE OF HARY ANA v. CHARANJIT SINGH [VARIAVA, J.] 69
·-' Equality Clause contained in Article 14, in other words, will have no A
application where the persons are not similarly situated or when there
is a valid classification based on a reasonable differentia. Doctrine of
'equal pay for equal work', therefore is not attracted in the instant
case.

There is nothing on record to show that the duties and functions of B
two categories of employment are at par, and, thus, parity in pay-
scales is not permissible.

The very fact that from the very beginning two different pay scales
were being maintained is itself suggestive of the fact that the duties
and functions are also different. In fact it is not disputed that the two c
post of Sub-Assistant Engineer is a higher post.

In Chairman-cum-Managing Director, National Textiles Corporation
Ltd v. N.T.C. (WBAB & 0) Ltd Employees Union (2003)-III-LLJ-
1102, this Court, held at p. 1106 :
D
"9. In view of the fact that the nature of duties of the staff in the two
categories has been found to be not at par, parity in pay scales may
not be possible ...... "

In Orissa University ofAgriculture & Technology v. Manoj K. Mohanty
2003-11-LLJ-968 this Court noticed at p. 970 : E
"I 0. It is clear from the averments made in the writ petition extracted
above, nothing is stated as regards the nature of work, responsibilities
attached to the respondent without comparing to the regularly recruited
Junior Assistants. It cannot be disputed that there was neither necessary
averments in the writ petition nor any material was placed before the F
High Court so as to consider the application of principle of 'equal
pay for equal work'.

'This Court further noticed at p. 971 of LLJ :

"11. In the absence of material relating to other comparable employees
G
as to the qualifications, method of recruitment, degree of skill,
experience involved in performance of job, training required,
responsibilities undertaken and other facilities in addition to pay scales,
the learned single Judge was right when he stated in the order that in
... the absence of such material it was not possible to grant relief to the
respondent. ........ H
70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A 12. Before giving such direction, the High Court also did not keep in
mind as to what would be its implications and impact on the other
employees working in the appellant-University. From the averments
made in the writ petition extracted above, it is clear that no details
were given and no material was placed before the High Court for
comparison in order to apply the principle of 'equal pay for equal
B work'. The Court in State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh, AIR (1997)
SC 1788: [1996] 11 SCC 77: 1997-11-LLJ-667 observed that the
principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is not always easy to apply.
There are inherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating work done
by different persons in different organizations or even in the same
C organization.

13. Yet, in another decision in State Bank of India v. M. R. Ganesh
Babu, [2002] 4 SCC 556: 2002-11-LLJ-829, a Bench of three learned
Judges of this Court, while dealing with the same principle, has
expressed that :
D
' ......... It is well settled that equal pay must depend upon the nature
of work done. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work; there
may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility.
Functions may be the same but the responsibilities made a difference.

E
"In Tarun Roy's case an argument that relief should be given as in an
earlier matter objection was not taken was rejected in the following terms:

"In a case of this nature, the Courts are required to determine the
issue having regard to larger public interest. It is one thing to say that
p in a given case the High Court or this Court may not exercise an
equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 136 of the
Constitution of India, but it is another thing to say that the Courts
shall grant a relief to a party only on the ground that a contention
which is otherwise valid would not be raised on the ground that the
same was not done in an earlier proceedings.
G
In the instant case, the appellant has explained under what
circumstances the order of the learned single Judge of the Calcutta
High Court had to be obeyed. If rule of law is to be followed, judicial
discipline demands that the Court follows its earlier binding precedent.
The Calcutta High Court itself has rejected such a plea. The matter
H
STATE OF HARYANA v. CHARANJIT SINGH [VARIAVA, J.) 71
is pending in appeal. An order passed to the contrary by another A .
learned single Judge in ignorance of the earlier binding precedent by
itself would not constitute a binding precedent and may be held to
have been rendered per incuriam.

Furthermore, in the order dated October I, 1991, the learned Judge
categorically directed that the same would be subject to any order B
that may be passed in the appeal which is pending before the Division
Bench from the judgment and order dated January 20, 1989 passed
in Nemai Chand Ghosh 's case (supra). The said order, therefore, did
not attain finality.

In the aforementioned situation, the Division Bench of the Calcutta C
High Court manifestly erred in refusing to consider the contentions
of the appellant on their own merit, particularly, when the question
as regard difference in the grant of scale of pay on the ground of
different educational qualification stands concluded by a judgment of
this Court in Debdas Kumar's case (supra). If the judgment of Debdas D
Kumar's case (supra) is to be followed a finding of fact was required
to be arrived at that they are similarly situated to the case of Debdas
Kumar (supra) which in tum would mean that they are also holders
of diploma in engineering. They admittedly, being not, the contention
of the appellants could not be rejected, non-filing of an appeal, in any E
event, would not be a ground for refusing to consider a matter on its
own merits State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, [1995] 4 SCC 683.

In State of Bihar v. Ramdeo Yadav, AIR (1996) SC 3135 : [1996] 3
SCC 493 wherein this Court noticed Debdas Kumar's case (supra)
~W~: F
"Shri B. B. Singh the learned counsel for the appellants contended
that though an appeal against the earlier Order of the High Court has
not been filed, since larger public interest is involved in the
interpretation given by the High Court following its earlier judgment,
the matter requires consideration by this Court. We find force in this G
contention. In similar circumstances, this Court in State of Maharashtra
v. Digambar, [1995] 4 SCC 683 and in State of West Bengal v.
Debdas Kumar, [1991] Suppl 1SCC138: 1995-111-LLJ (Suppl)-294,
had held that though an appeal was not filed against an earlier order,
when public interest is involved in interpretation of law, the Court is H
entitled to go into the question."
72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A The three Judge Bench decision of this Court is binding on this Court. Even
otherwise we are in full agreement with what has been stated therein.

(I 0) In the case of State of Orissa v. Balaram Sahu and Ors., reported
in [2003] 1 SCC 250, this Court has held that the applicability of the principle
depends not only on the nature or volume of the work but also on the
B qualitative difference in reliability and responsibilities also. It is held that it
is for the claimant of parity to substantiate a clear cut basis of equivalence
and a resultant hostile discrimination. It is held that in the absence of requisite
substantiating material the Court would be wrong to grant parity in pay
merely on the presumption of equality of nature of work. It was held that
C such workers would be entitled to prescribed minimum wages.

(11) Now we examine the authorities relied upon by counsel for various
Respondents to see whether this Court has laid down anything contrary.

(12) In the case of State of U.P. and Ors. v. Putti Lal, reported in
D (2003) 8 Scale 259, a three Judge Bench of this Court, of which one of us
(Variava, J.) was a party directed the Government to pay the concerned daily
rated workers the minimum of the pay scale payable to a regularly employed
worker. However, this was pending a scheme for regularization. Thus, there
was no direction to pay retrospectively. Further the order proceeds on the
E basis that everything was equal and that the principle applied. It was not
argued before this court that the principle had no application.

(13) In the case of State of Punjab v. Devinder Singh and Ors., reported
in [1988] 9 SCC 595, it was noted that the concerned Ledger Clerks were
found to have been given similar work as regular Ledger Clerks. This Court
F without any further discussion or consideration held that concerned Ledger
Clerks would be entitled to the minimum of the pay scale of Ledger Clerks.
It was directed that this be paid for a period of three years prior to the filing
of the Writ Petition. It seems that attention of this Court was not brought to
the earlier authorities, which lay down when the principle of equal pay for
G equal work can apply. Also we are unable to accept the finding that for
similar work the principle of equal pay applies. Equal pay can only be given
for equal work of equal value.

(14) In the case of Sandeep Kumar and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh
and Ors., reported in [1993] Supp I SCC 525, regularisation was refused but
H equal pay was granted on the admitted position that the concerned workmen
ST ATE OF HARY ANA v. CHARANJIT SINGH [V ARIA VA, J.] 73
were doing the same work. A
(15) In the case of Bhagwan Dass and Ors. v. State of Haryana and
Ors., reported in [ 1987] 4 SCC 634, this Court held that if the duties and
functions of the temporary appointees and regular employees are similar
there cannot be discrimination in pay merely on the ground of difference in
modes of selection. It was held that the burden of proving similarility in the B
nature of work was on the aggrieved worker. We are unable to agree with the
view that there cannot be discrimination in pay on the ground of differences
in modes of selection. As has been correctly laid down in Jasmer Singh 's
case (supra) persons selected by a Selection Committee on the basis of merit
with due regard to seniority can be granted a higher pay scale as they have C
been evaluated by competent authority and in such cases payment of a higher
pay scale cannot be challenged. Jasmer Singh 's case has been noted with
approval in Tarun K. Roy's case.

( 16) In the case of State ofPunjab v. Ta/winder Singh and Ors., reported
in [2003] 11 SCC 776, this Court granted equal pay following Devinder D
Singh 's case (supra). Jasmer Singh 's case was brought to the notice of the
Court but it differentiated the case on the ground that in Jasmer Singh 's case
the Court had concluded that the daily wagers did not discharge the same
duties. Thus, this case also proceeds on the basis that the work was identical.
E
(17) Having considered the authorities and the submissions we are of
the view that the authorities in the cases of Jasmer Singh, Tilak Raj, Orissa
• . University of Agriculture & Technology and Tarun K. Roy lay down the
correct law. Undoubtedly, the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" is not
an abstract doctrine and is capable of being enforced in a Court of law. But
equal pay must be for equal work-of equal value. The principle of"equal pay F
for equal work" has no mechanical application in every case. Article 14
permits reasonable classification based on qualities or characteristics of persons
recruited and grouped together, as against those who were left out. Of course,
the qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object
sought to be achieved. In service matters, merit or experience can be a proper G
basis for classification for the purposes of pay in order to promote efficiency
in administration. A higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration
for lack of promotional avenues is also an acceptable reason for pay
differentiation. The very fact that the person has not gone through the process
of recruitment may itself, in certain cases, make a difference. If the educational H
74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A qualifications are different, then also the doctrine may have no application.
Even though persons may do the same work, their quality of work may
differ. Where persons are selected by a Selection Committee on the basis of
merit with due regard to seniority a higher pay scale granted to such persons
who are evaluated by competent authority cannot be challenged. A
B classification based on difference in educational qualifications justifies a
difference in pay scales. A mere nomenclature designating a person as say a
carpe~ter or a craftsman is not enough to come to the conclusion that he is
doing the same work as another carpenter or craftsman in regular service.
The quality of work which is produced may be different and even the nature
of work assigned may be different. It is not just a comparison of physical
C activity. The application of the principle of "equal pay for equal work"
requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy
required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job to job.
It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. There may be qualitative
difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the
D same but the responsibilities made a difference. Thus normally the applicability
of this principle must be left to be evaluated and determined by an expert
body. These are not matters where a writ court can lightly interfere. Normally
a party claiming equal pay for equal work "Should be required to raise a
dispute in this regards. In any event the party who claims equal pay for equal
work has to make necessary averments and prove that all things are equal.
E Thus, before any direction can be issued by a Court, the Court must first see
that there are necessary averments and there is a proof. If the High Court, is
on basis of material placed before it, convinced that there was equal work of
equal quality and all other relevant factors are fulfilled it may direct payment
of equal pay from the date of the filing of the respective Writ Petition. In all
F these cases, we find that the High Court has blindly proceeded on the basis
that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work applies without examining any
relevant factors.

(18) As stated above in all these cases the High Court has followed a
Full Bench decision of that Court. The Full Bench has also observed that the
G essential ingredient is similarity. This would be correct. However, at one
stage the Full Bench observes that even if some dispute is raised. That would
be wrong law. In each case the Court must satisfy itself that the burden of
proving that the work and conditions are equal is discharged by the aggrieved
employee.
H (
STATEOFHARYANA v. CHARANJITS!NGH [VARIAVA. J.] 75
(l9) We, therefore, set aside all the impugned Judgments and remit all A
these matters back to the High Court. The High Court shall now examine
each case and see whether the necessary averments are there. It shall then
consider all relevant facts, as enumerated above, and decide whether everything
is identical and equal. If the High Cou1i feels that there is a dispute which
would necessitate extensive evidence it may direct that party to raise an B
appropriate dispute where such questions could be dealt with and which, in
fact, would be the appropriate proceedings.

(20) One other fact which must be noted is that Civil Appeals Nos.
6648 of 2002, 6647 of 2002, 6572 of 2002 and 6570 of 2002 do not deal
with casual or daily rated workers. These are cases of persons employed on C
contract. To such persons the principles of equal pay for equal work has no
application. The Full Bench Judgment dealt only with daily rated and casual
workers. Where a person is employed under a contract, it is the contract
which will govern the terms and conditions of service. In the case of State
of Haryana v. Surinder Kumar and Ors., reported in (1991] 3 SCC 633,
persons employed on contract basis claimed equal pay as regular workers on D
the footing that their posts were interchangeable. It was held that these persons
had no right to the regular posts until they are duly selected and appointed.
It was held that they were not entitled to the same pay as regular employees
by claiming that they are discharging same duties. It was held that the very
object of selection is to test eligibility and then to make appointment in E
accordance with rules. It was held that the Respondents had not been recruited
in accordance with the rules prescribed for recruitment.

(21) In the case of Union of India and Ors. v. K. V Baby and Anr.,
reported in ( 1998) 9 SCC 252, the question was whether Commission Bearers/
Vendors are entitled to the same salary as regular employees. It was held that F
their appointment and mode of selection, their qualifications cannot be
compared with regular employees. It was held that by their very nature of
employment they cannot be equated with regular employees. It was held that
recruitment rules and service conditions do not apply to such persons. It was
held that their responsibilities cannot be equated with those of regular G
employees.

(22) Thus it is clear that persons employed on contract cannot claim
equal pay on basis on equal pay for equal work. Faced with this situation it
was submitted that all these persons were in fact claiming that their respective
appointments were regular appointments by the regular process of appointment H
76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

· A but that instead of giving regular appoinnnents they were appointed on contract
with the intention of not paying them regular salary. It was admitted that the

-
Petitions may be badly drafted and such a contention not put forth specifically.
The High Court has disposed of these Petitions also on the footing that the
principle of equal pay for equal work applied. We therefore set aside the
B impugned orders in these cases also and remit the matters back to the High
Court for disposal. The High Court shall permit these Petitioners to amend
their Petitions to make necessary averments and will also permit the
Respondents in these cases to file replies to the amended Petitions.

(23) With the above directions all these Appeals stand disposed off. All
C the matters are remitted back to the High Court. There will be no order as
to costs.

v.s.s. Appeal disposed of.

,.