STATE OF H.P. AND ORS.versusRAJ KUMAR BRIJENDER SINGH AND ORS.

A                            STATE OF H.P. AND ORS.
                                          v.
                   RAJ KUMAR BRUENDER SINGH AND ORS.

                                  APRIL 22, 2004

B                  [B.RIJESHKUMARANDARUNKUMAR,JJ.]


          Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972:

          S. 20(3)-Financial Commissioner-Exercise of suo motu power of
C revision after withdrawal of appeal by State Government against order of
  Collector-Held, Financial Commissioner would have power to proceed suo
  motu in a suitable case even though an appeal preferred before lower
  appellate authority is withdrawn may be by the State-Financial
  Commissioner while exercising the power under sub-s.(2) of s. 20 acts as a
D statutory authority and no restriction can be placed on exercise of such
  power on the.ground that he is a part ofthe machinery ofthe State Government
  or an officer of the State-It is in a different statutory capacity under which
  Financial Commissioner exercises his power and is free to pass any order in
  accordance with law which may or may not be against the State Government.

E          S.20(3)-Revision-By exercise of suo motu power by Financial
    Commissioner-Limitation-Order of Collector declaring certain land as
    surplus-Appeal by State Government before Commissioner-Later
    withdrawn-I 5 years thereafter Financial Commissioner exercising suo motu
    power of revision-Held, the order of the Financial Commissioner stands
F   vitiated having been passed after a long lapse of I 5 years of the order which
    has been interfered with-Exercise of the power after unreasonable lapse of
    time and such delayed action on his part nullifies the order passed by him
    in exercise of power in sub-s.(3) of s.20.

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 130of1999.

G        Fr.om the Judgment and Order dated 23.6.97 of the Himachal Pradesh ·
    High Court in C.W.P. No. 96of1992

                                        WITH

          C.A. No. 131 of 1999.
H                                        618
                  STATE v. RAJ KUMAR BRUENDER SINGH                        619

     J.S. Attri, Additional Advocate General, (H.P.), (AC) for the Appellants.     A
     B.S. Banthia for the Respondents.

     The following Order of the Court was delivered :

     . The dispute in this appeal relates relates to declaration of surplus area B
under the provisions of the Himachal Paradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Act,
1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). On coming into force of the
aforesaid Act, ceiling proceedings were initiated and an order was passed by
the Collector on 14.I.1976 as a result of which 9,000 bighas of land belonging
to the original owner Raja Lakshman Singh, whose heirs are respondents in
this appeal, was declared surplus and I,opo bighas was left as the land which C
they were found entitled to hold within the permissible limits on the basis of
the number of units in the family.

       The State, it seems, felt aggrieved by the order passed by the Collector.
Hence, it filed an appeal before the Commissioner. The appeal was, however,
withdrawn by the State on March 20, 1976. As a result of the withdrawal of         D.
the appeal preferred against the order of; the Collector, the order passed by
the Collector attained finality. The Financial Commissioner, however, seems to
have exercised his suo moto power under Section 20(3) of the Act and by
Order dated 7.11.91 set aside the order of the Collector dated 14.1.1971. It may
be noted here that the Financial Commissioner had initiated the suo moto           E
proceedings on 21.8.1990. As a consequence of the order passed by the
Financial Commissioner, the permissible area in the hands of the respondents
was still reduced, hence, they preferred a writ petition against the order
passed by the Financial Commissioner. A number of grounds had been taken
by the respondents impugning the validity of the order passed by the Financial
Commissioner. Out of the several points, one related to the power of the           F
Financial Commissioner to exercise the suo moto power after the State had
withdrawn the appeal and the other was regarding delayed exercise of the
power, that is to say, about 15 years after passing of the order by the
 Collector. It may also be noted that the appeal preferred by the State against
 the order of the Collector before the Commissioner was also withdrawn around      G
 the same period, namely March, 1976.

      The High Court observed that it was not necessary to go into the merits
of different grounds raised by die respondents challenging the order of
Finaucial Commissioner and preferred to deal with the question relating to
power of the Financial Commissioner to take up the matter suo moto after the       H
    620                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A appeal, preferred by the State Government, was withdrawn. So far as the
    question of delayed exercise of the power is concerned, that has only been
    mentioned but no further discussion has been held except to observe that
    normal period prescribed for filing appeal is 60 days and for revision, it is 90
    days.

B         We may consider the first ground regarding power of the Financial
    Commissioner to proceed suo moto after an appeal preferred by the State had
    been withdrawn. The view which has been taken by the High Court, is that
    it was not open to the Financial Commissioner to exercise those powers. The
    High Court further goes on to observe that a bare reading of the provision;
C   namely Section 20, shows that the exercise of the •suo moto power is not
    available once an appeal preferred by the Sate is withdrawn. We, however,
    find that no such preposition flows from Section 20. of the Act. Section 20
    of Act reads as under :

                "20. (l) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the
D           Collector may, wi~hin sixty days from the date of the decision or order,
            prefer an appeal to the Commissioner :

               Provided that the Commissioner may entertain the appeal after the
           expiry of the said period of sixty days if he is satisfied that the
           appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in
E          time.
            (2) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Commissioner made
            under sub-section (l) may, within ninety.days from the date of the
            order, file a revision petition before the Fin_ancial Commissioner so as
            to challenge the legality or propriety of su~h order and the Financial
F           Commissioner may pass such order as he may deem fit. The order of
            the Financial Commissioner shall be final.

            (3) Nothwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-
            sections, the Financial Commissioner may, at any time, call for the
            record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to
G           him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety
            of such proceedings or order, and may pass such order in relation
            thereto as he may deem fit.

         Sub-section 3 of Section 20, quoted above, clearly provides . that
    notwithstanding anything contained in other sub-sections of Section 20,
H   Financial Commissioner shall have power to call for the record of any
                . STATE v. RAJ KUMAR BRUENDER SINGH                      621

proceedings of any authority subordinate to him and satisfy himself about the A
legality and propriety of the order passed. Once the State Government had
taken a decision to withdraw the appeal, it is submitted that the Financial
Commissioner could not take any different view in the matter suo moto to
pass any other order contrary to the decision of the State Government to
withdraw the appeal. In our view, the argument is fallacious. The Financial
Commissioner while exercising the power under sub-section (3) of Section 20 B
acts as a statutory authority. We also find that under sub-section 2 the
Financial Commissioner is an appellate authority against the order of the
Commissioner. While exercising such powers vested in him under sub-sections
(2) and (3) of Section 20, no such restrictions can be placed on exercise of
power of Financial Commissioner on the ground that he is a part of the ~
machinery of the State Government or an officer of the State. It is in a different
statutory capacity under which Financial Commissioner exercises his power
and is free to pass any order in accordance with law which may or may not
be against the State Government. Therefore, merely for the reason t~at one
of the parties to the appeal, may be State Government, chose to withdraw an
appeal filed before lower appellate authority, would be treated as a bar for the D
Financial Commissioner to exercise his power under sub-section 3 of the Act.
We, therefore, find this part of the order of the High Court is not sustainable.

       We are now left with the second question which was raised by the
respondents before the High Court, namely, the delayed exercise of the power     E
under sub-section (3) of Section 20. As indicated above, the Financial
Commissioner exercised the power after 15 years of the order of the Collector.
It is true that sub-section 3 provides that such a power may be exercised at
any time but this expression does not mean there would be no time limit or
it is in infinity. All that is meant is, that such powers should be exercised
within a reasonable time. No fixed period of limitation may be laid but          F
unreasonable delay in exercise of the power would tend to undo the things
which have attained finality. It depends on the facts and circumstances of
each case as to what is the reasonable time within which the power suo moto
action could be exercised. For example, in this case, as the appeal had been
withdrawn but the Financial Commissioner had taken up the matter in exercise     G
of his suo moto power, well it could be open for the State to submit that the
facts and the circumstances were such that it would be within reasonable time
but as we have already noted the order of the Collector which has been
interfered with, was passed in January 1976 and the appeal preferred by the
State was also withdrawn some time in March 1976. The learned counsel for
the appellant was not able to point out such other special facts and             H
    622                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A   circumstances by the reason of which it could be said that exercise of suo
    moto power after 15 years of the order interfered with, was within a reasonable
    time. Tliat being the position in our view, the order of the Financial
    Commissioner stands vitiated having been passed after a long lapse of 15
    years of the order which has been interfered with. Therefore, while holding
B   that the Financial Commissioner would have power to proceed suo moto in
    a suitable case even though an appeal preferred before lower appellate authority
    is withdrawn may be by the State. Thus, the view taken by the High Court,
    is not sustainable. But the order of the Financial Commissioner suffers from
    vice of the exercise of the power after unreasonable lapse of time and such
    delayed action on his part nullifies the order passed by him in exercise of
C   power in sub-section (3) of Section 20.

          In view of the discussion held above, we partly allow the appeal. As
    consequence thereof the order of the Financial Commissioner is set aside and
    order passed by the Collector shall stand restored and maintained. There
    would, however, b~ no order as to costs.
D
    CIVIL APPEAL NO. 131/1999

          In view of our decision rendered in C.A. No. 130/1999 the impugned
    order of the High Court dated June 23, 1997 is maintained. The appeal filed
    by the State stands dismissed.
E
    RP.                                           C.A. No. 130/99 partly allowed.
                                                      C.A. No. 131/99 dismissed.