Holding

The Supreme Court held that the harsh directions and language in the High Court judgment were ultra vires and must be expunged, while the remaining findings of the High Court stand.

Summary

The State of Gujarat appealed against two Gujarat High Court judgments that imposed strict time‑limits for granting sanction and filing charge‑sheets in corruption cases and declared a paragraph of the State Vigilance Manual ultra vires. The High Court also directed that any delay beyond two months would attract contempt proceedings and used strong language criticizing public prosecutors. The Supreme Court examined whether these directions were within the court's jurisdiction, conflicted with the Prevention of Corruption Act, and violated natural‑justice principles by not giving notice to the Advocate‑General. It held that the harsh directions and language were beyond the court’s authority, ordered the offending portion to be expunged, and left the remaining findings untouched. The appeal was allowed, the order set aside, and the matter referred to the Central Vigilance Commission for further action.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court's directions imposing a two‑month deadline for sanction and contempt for delay are within its jurisdiction.
Whether the declaration that paragraph 4 of the Vigilance Manual conflicts with Sections 7, 13, 17 and 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is valid without notice to the Advocate‑General.
Whether the High Court can direct the sanctioning authority and impose contempt for non‑compliance.
Whether the language used in the High Court judgment violates principles of natural justice and judicial propriety.

Legislation cited

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13, s. 17, s. 19, s. 7

Subjects

Prevention of Corruption Actsanctioncontempt of courtjudicial languageultra viresnatural justicevigilance manualhigh court jurisdictionappealCentral Vigilance Commission

Judgment

STATE OF GUJARAT A
v.
K. V. JOSEPH ETC.

NOVEMBER 9, 2000

[UMESH C BANERJEE AND K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, JJ.] B

Judgment-Judgment of High Court challenged by State Government-
contention that portion of directions contained in the judgment was not
warranted and was without jurisdiction andjudgment using strong language- C
Held, the relevant portion of the directions is rather harsh and the same
stands expunged from the judgment-:--However, findings of the High Court are
not disturbed and the judgment shall stand m94ified accordingly.

Vigilance Manual

Para 4-High Court declaring para 4 as ultra vires being in direct
D
conflict with Ss. 7, I 3, I 7 and I 9 of the. Prevention of Corruption Act-No
notice given to Advocate General of the State-Held, the language used in
the judgment is rather strong-Restraint and use of temperate language
ought to be the basic criteria in the judicial approach-By reason of the
factum of non-availability of any opportunity to any of the parties, the E
judgment cannot be sustained and is set aside-However, considering the
nature of a/legations and by reason of involvement of high Public Officials,
it would be expedient to refer. the matter to Central i;igilance Commission
for taking appropriate steps in accordance with la~Judicial Proprie~
Natural Justice.
F
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 60 l
of 1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated 17.3.97 of the Gujarat High Court
in Misc. Cr!. A. No. 471/97 in Cr!. A. No. 803of1995.
G
WITH

Criminal Appeal No. 602 of 1997.

K.N. Rawal, Additional Solicitor General, Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Ms.
485 H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Smita Inna, P. Parmeswaran, Ms. Anil Katiyar, Vimal Chandra Dave, Sanjay R.
Hegde and Satya Mitra for the appearing parties.

The following Order of the Court was delivered :

The State of Gujarat is in appeal against the judgments of the Gujarat
B High Court in these appeals. Whereas in Criminal Appeal No 601/97, judgment
in its entirety has been challenged as totally without jurisdiction, the Criminal
Appeal No. 80211997, however, is having a limited challenge and the main
grievance pertains to certain directions. For convenience sake the Criminal
Appeal No. 602/1997 is taken up first for hearing.

c contended
Mr. K.N. Rawal, the learned Additional Solicitor General of India
that the directions contained at paragraph 26. l at page 68-69 of
the paperbook in particular the last few lines are not only unwarranted but
wholly without jurisdiction. For convenience sake the same is set out
hereinbelow:-
" ........... .In fact, after registering the offence, sanction must be
D
obtained within one month or at the most within two months, and
thereafter, the chargesheet should be filed within fifteen days. If
round about three months if the chargesheet is not filed, Director
General, Anti-Corruption Bureau should call for necessary explanation
and take appropriate departmental action against the concerned
E Investigation Officer and also must request the concerned departmental
head to· grant sanction immediately. The concerned sanctioning
authority from the date of the receipt of papers shall grant sanction
within two months failing which he would be liable for the contempt
proceedings of this Court in absence of reasonable explanation. It will
also be a duty of the trial court to see that if it come across any
F belated granting of sanction and thereafter filing of the chargesheet,
appropriate observations are made against the concerned officials by
forwarding a copy of his judgment and order at the highest to Secretary
level. Incidentally, it may also be stated that some of the learned PPs
in charge of Corruption case do not cite Judgment of this Court and
G Apex Court in favour of the prosecution. This is too sad!!.."

The learned Additional Solicitor General highlighting the initiation of
contempt proceedings in the absence of reasonable explanation from the
sanctioning authoFity in the event of there being a delay of two months,
contended that judicial proceedings ought not to prompt the judicial officers \
H to apprehend things and pass orders on apprehensions. It has further been
STATE OF GUJARAT v. K.V. JOSEPH ETC. 487

contended that as a matter of fact adaptation of procedure as above would A
not only denegrate the Judiciary itself but the confidence reposed by the
people to the Judiciary would be shaken and resultantly a total anarchy in
the judicial system.

Incidentally, it may be noticed that use of temperate language and
tolerance are the two basic factors in any judicial approach and it is in this B
perspective Mr. Rawat contended that direction as noticed above to the trial
court and use of strongest possible language as regards public prosecutors
cannot but be said to be rather unfortunate. A generalized statement ought
not to be made since restraint is the greatest virtue that one may expect from
a judge. c
We do find some justification in Mr. Rawat' s criticism of the judgment.

In this view of the matter, and since the portion indicated above is
rather harsh, the same stands expunged from the judgment. Save as above,
we do not wish to disturb the finding of the court in the judgment under D
appeal. We however record our appreciation at the gesture of the learned
Add. Solicitor General since he himself submitted that the rest of the order
by reason of the subsequent event should not be disturbed in any way. The
appeal is, therefore, dismissed though however the High Court's judgment
shall stand modified to the extent indicated above.
E
Turning attention on to the Criminal Appeal No. 60 l/1997 unfortunately
however, the judgment under appeal is more pathetically couched and we
cannot possibly lend concurrence to use of such strong language by the
High Cou~. Significantly, the Indian Administrative Service Officers Association
as also the Union of India have made fervent appeals to this Court for being
impleaded as parties so as to be able to advance submissions before this F
Court at the final disposal of the appeal. We however are not inclined to pass
any order on such submission.

In order however to appreciate the contentions raised in this matter the
directions as contained in the judgment are set out hereinbelow:-
G
"(I) Portion of para 4 of the Vigilance Manual is in direct conflict
with the statutory provisions viz. Sections 7, 13, 17, and 19 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act the same stands ultra vires and null and
void.

(2) Once the proposal to grant sanction under Section 19 of the H
L __

488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Prevention of corruption Act is forwarded by the investigating agency
to competent authorities then to Bureau the same in passing
appropriate order beyond the period of 2 months amounts to lack of
devotion to duty and in absence of just and proper explanation, the
concerned officer would be liable not only for departmental proceedings
but also for the contempt of Court.
B
(3) It is declared that once the sanction is duly accorded by the
competent authority under Section 19 of the Act neither Vigilance
Commission not for the purpose any other Department of the State
Government has any right, power whatsoever to direct the sanctioning
authority either to reconsider or withdraw or in any other way directing
c it to withdraw the prosecution from the Court.

(4) The circular dated 13/6/ 1986 issued by the State Government
evoking the earlier circular dated 3 J'st May 1986 is ultra vires and are
quashed and set aside.
D (5) The charge levelled against Respondent that since he is a part_
and parcel of the Government he had no business to confront the
Government. The said charge levelled by the Government is absolutely
unfounded.

(6) So far as the withdrawal of prosecution is concerned, concerned
E officers were involved in the process of illegal withdrawals the Chief
Secretary shall take immediate necessary departmental and criminal
proceedings against those officers."

Be it noted that the judgment under appeal was delivered by the
Appellate Bench of the High Court on the basis of the letter written by the
F then Incharge Anti-Corruption Bureau and the resultant effect of which is the
declaration of para 4 of the vigilance manual as ultra vires by reason of the
same being said to be in direct conflict with the statutory provisions of
Sections 7, 13, 17 and 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. No notice
however was sent to the Advocate-General of the State before such a
G declaration was effected and the same thus can not but be termed to be not
sustainable.

While it is true that corruption cases against some influential public
·servants ought not to be withdrawn at the instance of the Home Department
without any basis whatsoever, but in our view in terms of the doctrine of
H forum convenience the High Court by itself cannot usurp the function in the
STATE OF GUJARATv. K.V. JOSEPH ETC. 489
manner as it has in the matter, rather forwarded the same to such of the A
Institutions as are available in the country for such inquiries. This is a matter
of propriety rather than convenience. In any event, time factor also has a
definite role to play in the event the matter is to be considered by the High
Court itself. Needless to record that the arrear issue is already very high in
the agenda and if matters like the present one are taken up by the Court then
and in that event the Court itself shoulders the responsibility and resultantly B
further delay "in disposals would be inevitable. Expeditious disposal is the
requirement and inordinate delay should always be avoided.

In any event, we do feel however to record that the language used is
rather strong and as noticed above restraint and use of temperate language C
ought to be the basic criteria in the judicial approach. The violation of the
principle of natural justice also have been contended by reason of the fact
that no notice was sent in the matter for the purposes of any explanation
neither any explanation obtained. The court passes an order on the basis· of
the available materials and upon affording the reasonable opportunity of
hearing and in the event there is any deprivation in regard thereto affectation D .
of the cause of justice would be the effect.

In any event by reason of the factum of the non-availability of any
opportunity to any of the parties, we do not feel it inclined to proceed with
the matter in any further detail. The words and phrases used also to say the
least are not very apposite. The judgment thus in any event cannot be E
sustained.

In that view of the matter, this appeal is allowed. The order under
challenge is set aside.

Considering however, the nature of the allegation levelled and by reason F
of the involvement of high public officials, we do feel it expedient to refer the
matter to the Central Vigilance Commission for dealing with the eight instances
of sanction of prosecution as adumberated in the judgment and take appropriate
steps in accordance with law, preferably within a period of one year from the
date of commll'nication of the order. Costs directed to be paid in terms of the G
judgment however shall not be recovered.

RP. Appeal allowed.