Holding

The Supreme Court held that the grass‑covered hilly tracts are neither waste lands nor uncultivated lands within the meaning of s.6/ s.7, and therefore do not vest in the Government; the former taluqdar/inamdar remains an occupant.

Summary

The case concerned vast hilly tracts of land that produced natural grass and were formerly part of taluqdar and inamdar estates. After the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949 and the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1952 came into force, the State of Gujarat claimed that these lands were "waste" or "uncultivated" and therefore vested in the Government under s.6 and s.7 of the Acts. The former owners argued that the lands were neither waste nor uncultivated, that they were productive in the sense of yielding grass, and that they should remain occupants under s.5(1)(b) and s.5(2)(b). The Supreme Court examined the meaning of "waste lands" and "uncultivated lands" and the effect of the Explanation, which limits "uncultivated" to cultivable land left fallow for three consecutive years. It held that the hilly grass lands were not waste lands and, being uncultivable, did not fall within the definition of uncultivated lands, so they did not vest in the Government and the former owners retained occupant rights. Consequently, the appeals filed by the State were dismissed with costs.

Issues considered

The meaning of "waste lands" and "uncultivated lands" under s.6 of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949 and s.7 of the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1952.
Whether the hilly grass‑covered tracts qualify as waste or uncultivated lands for the purpose of vesting in the Government.
The effect of the Explanation to s.6/s.7, which defines uncultivated land as land not cultivated for three consecutive years.
Whether compensation is payable for extinguishment of rights in such lands under the respective Acts.
The correctness of the High Court and Revenue Tribunal's finding that the lands did not vest in the Government.

Legislation cited

Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879s. s.37(2)
Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1952s. s.5(2)(b), s. s.7
Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949s. s.5(1)(b), s. s.6
Gujarat Taluqdars Act, 1888s. s.4
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. s.17(4)

Subjects

agrarian reformland tenure abolitionwaste landuncultivated landoccupant rightsstatutory interpretationcompensationTaluqdariInamSupreme Court of India

Judgment

233

STATE OF GUJARAT A
v.
GUJARAT REVENUE TRIBUNAL & ORS.
August 8, 1979
[N. L. UNTWALIA AND A. P. SEN, JJ.] B

Bon1bay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949- S. 6-Bon1bay Personal
lnam.J Abolition Act, 1952-S. 7-Scope of.

Words & phrases-Waste lands-Meaning of.
c
The object and purpose of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act,
1949 and ·the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1952 was to abolish
taluqdari and inamdari rights as a measure of agrarian reform. Section 6 of
the former Act and s. 7 of the latter Act (both of which are identical in tenns}
provide that among others " .... all unbuilt village site lands, all waste lands-
and all uncultivate lands (excluding lands used for building or other non-agricul-
tural purposes), which are not situate within the limits of the wantas ....... " D
shaU vest in the Government. The Explanation to this section provides "for the
purposes of this section land shall be deemed to be uncultivated, if it has not been
cultivated for a continuous period of three· years immediately before the date on
which this Act comes into force."

The respondents were former Taluqdars and Inamdars. Vast stretches of hilly
tracks which were incapable of cultivation, but on which there was spontaneous E
growth of grass formed part of the taluqdari estates and iii.ams. When grass
was cut from these lands, care was taken not to cut stubs but they were allow-
ed to remain in tact so that in the following year grass grew with the onset of
rains. The respondents secured income from .the grass grown on the lands;
for earning income they kept watchmen so that unauthorised pasturing by
cattle did not destroy the growing grass.
r
With the abolition of the ta1uqdari rights and inams the lands were regard-
ed as having vested in the Government. The respondents thereupon sought a
declaration that the lands we~e neither vacant lands nor uncultivated lands and
being in their possession they became the occupants thereof. The Mahalkari
held that the lands were not waste lands or uncultivated lands and since the
respondents were in possession thereof they became occupants. The Collector G
reversed this order and held that by reason of Explanation to s. 6 of the Taluq-
dari Abolition Act and Explanation to s. 7 of the Inams A'bolition Act, the lands
should be treated as unoccupied lands and, therefore, they vested in the Govern-
ment. The Revenue Tribunal reversed the order of the Collector.

On further appeal the High Court held that the lands were productive lands
in the sense that grass grew naturally and that the Explanation contemplates H·
only those lands which could be cultivated but which were left fallow and un-
cultivated for a cont'i'nuous period of three years.
2J4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.C.R.

A Dismissing the appeals;
HELD : 1. The High Court as well as the Revenue Tribunal were right
in holding that the disputed lands did not vest in the Government under s. 6
of the Taluqdari Abolition Act and s. 7 of the lnams Abolition Act. [242AJ

2. It would be evident from s. 6 that the vesting is in respect of properties
which could be put to public use. It leaves private properties, of the taluqdars
B
untouched. Public properties situate in a taluqdar's estate vested in the
Government because they were meant for public use. In spite of vesting of
such property in the Gove1nment, the conferral af the rights of an occupant
on a taluqdar under s. 5(1)(b) in respect of the lands in his actual possession
is saved. [239D-F]

3. The contention that the grass lands on hilly tracks which were incapable
c of cultivation were waste lands and uncultivated lands within the meaning of
s. 6 cannot be accepted. The expression ..all waste lands" has been joined by
the. conjunction "and" with the expression "all uncultivated lands". They indi-
cate two distinct types of lands. H the legislature had intended that the afore-
said expression should indicate one class of lands the expression would have
been "all waste and uncultivated lands" as against the expression "all waste
and uncultivated lands". There are, therefor, two distinct categories of pro-
D perties viz., waste lands and uncultivated lands. [240A-B1
4. The expression "waste lands'' means lands which are desolate, abandoned
and not fit ordinarily for use for building purposes. In the sequence in which
the expression waste lands appears in the two sections it cannot but have its
ordinary etymological meaning viz., lands lying desolate or useless without
trees or grass or vegetation, not capable of any use. [240C]
E
Rajanand Brahma Shah v. State of U.P. & Ors. [1967] 1 SCR 373, lshwar-
lal Girdharilal Joshi etc. v. State of Gujarat & Anr.. [1968] 2 SCR 267;
referred to.

S(a). The grass lands on hilly tracts were not waste lands. They were
productive lands in the sense that grass grew naturally and so they were not
F desolate, abandoned or barren waste lands with no vegetation. The expr~
sion "waste lands'' in the context would be clearly in the original sense of the
term waste as meaning barren or desolate lands which are unfit for any use or
worthless. That test is not clearly' satisfied. [240H]

(b) The expression "uncultiYated lands" in s. 6 must in the context in
which it appears means "cultivable but not cultivated", "allowed to lie fallow".
G It is uncultivable or unfit for cultivation. [241B]

6. The Explanation below s. 6 has a two-fold function : ( 1) to explain the
meaning of the expression "uncultivated lands'' in the substantive provIB1on
and (2) it is a key for ascertaining the meaning of the expression "unculti-
vated lands". Without the Explanation any land lying uncultivated on the
date of the vesting even for a year i.e. allowed to lie fallow accordin~ to. the
e normal agricultural practice would vest in the Government. But the :f'.:xplana-
tion steps. in and seeks to mitigate the rigour. It says that the land allowed
to lie fallow continuously for a period of three years shall alone be :leemed.
to be uncultivated land. meaning the ceby that .a piece of land allowed to lie
GUJARAT v. REVENUE TRIBUNAL (Sen, !.) 235

fallo_w intermittently for a period of· 1ess than three years will not be deemed A
"uncultivated lands". [241 C·El

_7. In the instant case there were no basic operations as tilling of the land;
sowing or dissemiri<iting ot seeds and planting of grass. The subsequent opera-
tions viz., the act of securing the income of the grass by engaging watchmen
etc. by themselves would not tentamount to cultivation of the land. [241G]
B
8. The Acts make no provision for payment of compensation for the acqui-
sition of the rights of the former Taluqdar and lnamdars in su,,;;!J. lands. Section
7 of the former Act and s. 10 of the latter Act speak of tb.i! ~:r::nguishment of
any right or interest in land which is \Vaste or uncultivated but is culturable.
The lands in question not being fit for cultivation were not culturable and,
therefore, they do not fall within the ambit of these provisions. If the conten·
tion of the appellants were to prevail it would have the effect of taking these c
lands out of the purview of s. 14 of the former Act ands. 17 of the latter Act
though such lands are not governed bys. 17 ands. 10 respectively. This would
result in deprivation of property without payment of compensation. [242B·D]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2411-2427
and 2431-2440 of 1969. D
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
5-11-1968 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C.A. Nos. 570/63, 629,
and 634/63, 283-286 of 1966 and 287-296 and 300-309/66.
· G. A. Shah and M. N. Shroff for the Appellant.
D. V. Patel, l. N. Shroff, P. V. Hathi and H. S. Parihar for the E
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SEN J. These twentycseven appe•als, by special leave, directed
against a judgment of the Gujarat High Court dated November, 5
1968 raise a common question and are, therefore, disposed of by P
this common judgment.

. The short question involved in these matters relates to interpreta-
tion of s. 6 of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949,
"the Taluqdari Abolition Act", and s. 7 of the Bombay Personal
Inams Abolition Act, 19 52, "the Personal In ams Abolition Act". G
In the present appeals, certain facts are no longer in dispute. The
respondents are the erstwhile taluqdars or inamdars what was
k~o~n as Ghogha Mahal, which now forms part of the Bhavnagar
d1stnct. There were vast stretches of hilly tracts described as
'Dunger', which were incapable of cultivation, but on which there was H
spo?taneous gro~th of grass. These lands formed part of their taluq-
dan estates or mams. They used to sell the grass growing on these
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] l S.C.R.

lands and it was a definite source of income to them. It appears that
the lands were recorded as Khnraba in the record of rights and,
therefore, consequent upon the abolition of taluqdari rights by the
Taluqdari Abolition Act and with the Abolition of inams under the
Personal Inams Abolition Act, the lands were recorded us having vested
in the Government. Thereupon, the respondents made separate claims
I!
before the Mahalkari, Ghogha Mahal, seeking a declaration under
s. 37(2) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 that the lands were
neither vacant lands nor uncultivated lands and being in their posses-
sion, they become the occupants thereof.
In an enquiry held under s. 3(2), the Mahalkari examined the
c claimants individualiy, the village talatis and the relevant entries in
the records of rights which showed that the taluqdars and inamdars
were deriving income from the grass growing on the lands. It was
also in evidence that considerable effort and expenses had to be in-
curred by them for securing the income of this grass i.e., by keeping
watchmen etc. to see that unauthorised pasturing by cattle brought
D
011 land or trespassing on it did not destroy the growing grass, but
that it grew to full stature so as to give a fair and full yield. When
operation for cutting of the grass used to commence, the stubs were
not cut off but were allowed to remain intact so that the next year
after the rains, the grass would grow naturally again. A portion of
E the grass-lands were also kept apart by the respondents for the graz-
ing of their cattle by fencing of the area. The Mahalkari, Ghogha
Mahal by his order dated October 28, 1958 held on this evidence
that the lands could not be treated as waste lands or uncultivated
lands, and siucc the respondents were in possession thereof, they
became the occupants.
F
The Collector, Bhavnagar, in exercise of his suo motu powers .of
revision under s.211 of the Code by his order dated· February 28,
1961 set aside the orders of the Mahalkari and held i11 all these
twenty-seven cases, that since the lands in question were not being
cultivated by taluqdars or inamdars, they must, by reason of Expla-
nation to s. 6 of the Taluqdari Abolition Act and Explanation to
G s. 7 of the lnams Abolition Act, be treated to be 'unoccupied lands',
and, therefore. the lands vest in the Government. The Revenue
Tribunal, however, by its two orders dated June 19, 1962 and March
26, 1965, reversed the order of the ColJector an<l restored that of
the Mahalkari holding the respondents to be the occupants of the
lands in question. The State Government of Gujarat filed twenty-
sevcn writ petitions in the High Court for quashing the orders of the
Revenue Tribunal.
GUJARAT v. REVENUE TRIBUNAL (Sen, ].) 237

• Agreeing with the Revenue Tribunal, the High Court held that·
there was evidence that the lands in dispute were not lying desolate,
abandoned or barren with _l}_O vegetation, but. were, in fact, produc-
tive lands, in the sense that grass grew naturally and so, they could
not be regarded as 'waste lands', although they were wrongly re-
corded as such. It also held that the hilly tracts on which grass
B
grew naturally, by their very nature were unfit for cultivation and,
t
' therefore, could not be treated as 'uncultivated land<;'. 1t relied on
the Explanation to the two sections and observed that it contemplates
only those lands which could be cultivated but which were left fallow
and uncultivated for a continuous period of three years, Jn its opin~
ion, the expressions 'waste lands'. and 'uncultiva~ed lands', therefore, c
did not cover grass-lands on hilly tracts which by their very nature
are incapable of cultivation, but which are not useless so as to be
not capable of any use .
• The question for consideratio·n in these appeals is whether the
High Court was right in holding that the respondents, who were
taluqdars or inamdars, were entitled to settlement of these grass-lands D
on hilly tracts as 'occupants' thereof under s. 5 ( 1) (b) of the Taluq-
dari Abolition Act and s. 5(2) (b) of the Inams Abolition Act.·
Before dealing with the judgment of the Court below, it will be
convenient to refer to the scheme of the two Acts and to set out the
relevant sections. The provisions of the two Acts are identical in E
terms. It would suffice, for our present purposes, to generally refer
to the provisions of the Taluqdari Abolition Act.
The object and purpose of the Act, as is clear from the preamble,
was to abolish the taluqdari rights as a measure of agrarian reform.
Section 3 abolished the taluqdari tenure and extinguished all incidents
of the tenure attached to any land comprised in a taluqdari estate F
save as provided in the Act. Under s. 4, all revenue· surveys and·
settlements mllde under s. 4 of the Gujarat Taluqdars Act, 1888 are
deemed to have been made under Chapter VIII and VIII-A of the Land
Revenue Code. By s. 5 (1) (a) all taluqdari lands are henceforth
liable to the payment of land revenue in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Land Revenue Code. G

The abolition of the taluqdari tenure, however, did not deplive
the taluqdars of the lands in their possession, and s.5 (1 )(b) provides
that a taluqdar holding any taluqdari land shall be deemed to be ·
an occupant within the meaning of the Land .Revenue Code or any
other law for the time being in force. Than comes s. 6 which pro- H
vides that all public roads, lanes etc., n0t situate '"ithin the wa1itas
belonging to a taluqdar, shall vest in the govern.en! and all rights
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS l1980J 1 S.C.R.

held by ~ taluqdar. in such property shall be deemed to have been
extinguished. Section 7 provides for payment of compensation to •
taluqdars for extinguishment of rights under s.6 Clause (b) (i)
thereof provides that if the property acquired is 'waste or uncultivat-
ed but is culturable land', the amount of compensation shall not ex-
ceed three the assessment of the land. Section 14 provides for pay-
B
ment of compensation to taluqdars for extinguishment or modifica-
tion of any other right where such extinguishment or modification
t
amounts to transference to public ownership of such lands or any
right in and over snch land, i.e. in any land other than those in res-
pect of which provision for the payment of compensation has been
c made under s.7.
The scheme under the Personal lnams Abolition Act is more or
less similar. Section 4 provides that notwithstanding anything con-
tained in a.ny usage, settlement, grant, sanad, or order or a decree or
order of a Court or any law for the time being in force (1) all
personal inams shall be deemed to have been extinguished, with effect
D from and on the appointed date; (2) all rights legally subsisting on
the said date in respect of such personal inams shall be deemed to
have been extinguished. save as expressly provided by or under the
provisions of the Act. Similarly s. 5(2) (a) provides that an inamd:ir in
respect o! the inam land in his actual possession or in possession of a
person holding from him other than an inferior holder referred to in
E
cl.(b), shall be entitled to all the rights and shall be liable to all
obligations in respect of such land as an occupant. Under cl. (b) an
inferior holder holding an inam land is entitled to the same rights.
Turning now to s.6 of the Taluqdari Abolition Act and s.7 of
the Personal Inams Abolition Act, which are identical in terms, the
r first thing to be noticed is that they deal with specific properties alone,
which are enumerated therein and in which all the rights of the
talnqdars or inamdars are completely extinguished.
Section 6 of the Taluqdari Abolition Act reads:

G "6. All public roads, lanes and paths, the bridges.
ditches, dikes and fences, on or beside, the same, the bed
of the sea and of harbours, creeks below high water mark,
and of rivers, streams, nallas, lakes, wells and tanks, and
all canals, and water courses, and all standing and flowing
water, all unbuilt village site lands, all waste lands and all
B uncultivated land (excluding lands used for building or
other non-agricultural purposes), which are not situate
within the limits of the wantas belonging to a taluqdar in a
GUJARAT v. REVENUE TRIBUNAL (Sen, J.) 239

taluqdari estate shall except in so far a_s any rights of any
• person other than the taluqdar may be established in and
over the same and except as may otherwise be provided by
any law for the time being in force, vest in and shall be
deemed to be, with all rights in or over the same or apper-
taining thereto, the property of the Government and all B
rights held by a taluqdar in such property shall be deemed
to have been extinguished and it shall be lawful for ~he
Collector, subject to the general or special orders of the
Commissioner, to dispose them of as he deems fit, subject al-
ways to the rights o[ way and of other rights of the public
or of individuals legally subsisting. c
Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, land
shall be deemed to be u11cultiva1ted, if it has 1101 been culti-
vated for a co11ti11uo11s period of three years immediately
before the date on which this Act comes into force".
(Emphasis supplied) D

On a fair reading of the section, it would be evident that the
vesting is in respect of properties which could be put to public use.
It leaves the private properties of the taluqdar untouched. The
' legislative intent is manifested by clear enumeration of certain specific
properties not situate within the wantas of a ta:luqdar. It begins by E
specifying 'All public roads, lanes, paths, bridges, etc.' and ends up
with 'all village site lands, all waste lands and all uncultivated lands',
and these being public properties situate in a taluqdar's estate must
necessarily vest in the Government because they a·re meant for public
use. In spite of vesting of such property in the Government, how-
ever, the conferral of the rights of an occupant on a taluqdar under F
s. 5 ( l) (b) in respect of the lands in his actual possession, is saved .
• Pausing there, it is fair to observe that the words in parenthesis
'excluding lands used for building or other non-agricultural pur-
poses', exemplify the intention of the legislature not to deprive a
taluqdar of such land, even though such property is uncultivated land, G
due to its inherent character as well as by reason of the Explanation.

It is, therefore, evident that the determination of the question whe-
ther a particular category of property belonging to a taluqdar in a
taluqdari estate is vested in the Government or not, and the deter-
mination of the question whether the rights held by a taluqdar in such H
property shall be deemed to have been extinguished or not, will
depend upon the category of that property. The expression 'all
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] I S.C.R.

waste lands' has been joined by conjunctive 'and' with the expression
'all uncultivated lands'. They, therefore, indicate two distinct types
of lands. If the legislature had intended that tbe aforesaid expres-
sion should indicate one class of lands, the expression rather would
have been 'all waste and uncultivated lands' as against the expression
B 'all waste lands and all uncultivated lands'. Here we have, therefore,
two distinct categories of properties viz. (!) waste lands, and (2)
uncultivated lands. The contention that the grass-lands on hilly
tracts which are incapable of cultivation were 'waste lands' or 'un-
cultivated lands' within the meaning of s. 6 cannot be accepted.
Now, the expression 'waste lands' has a well-:defined legal conno-
c tation. It means lands which are desolate, abandoned, and not fit
ordin"rily for use building purposes. In Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary 3rd Ed., vol. 2, p. 2510, the meaning of word waste'
is given as :
"l. Waste or desert land, uninhabited or sparsely in-
D habited and uncultivated country; a wild and desolate re-
gion; 2. A piece of land not cultivated or used for any pur-
pose, and producing little or no herbage or wood. In legal
use, a piece of such land not in any man's occupation but
lying common. 3. A devastated region."
E In the sequence in which the expression 'waste lands' appears
in the two relevant sections, it cannot but have its ordinary etymo-
logical meaning as given in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary i.e., land
lying desolate or useless, without trees or grass or vegetation, not
capable of any use. In Rajunand Bramha Shah v. State of Uttar
Pradesh & Ors.,(') this Court, while discerning the meaning of 'waste
F and arable land' in s. 17 ( 4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
observed that the expression 'waste land' as contrasted to 'arable
land', would mean 'land' which is unfit for cultivation and habitation,
desolate and barren land with little or no vegetation thereon. To the
same effect is the decision in lshwarlal Girdhari1al Joshi etc. v. State
G of Gujarat & Anr. (')
It is clear that these grass-lands on hilly tracts were not waste
lands. They were productive lands in the sense that grass grew
naturally and so they were not desolate, abandoned or barren waste
lands with no vegetation. The expression 'waste lands' in the con-
text would be clearly, in the original sense of the term 'waste' as
H
(1) [1967] l SCR 373.
(2) [1968] 2 SCR 267.
GUJARAT v. REVENUE TRIBUNAL (Sen, J.) 241

A
meaning barren or desolate lands which are unfit for any use or
which are worthless. That test is not clearly fulfilled.

The aprellant's alternative contention raises, primarily, the ques-
tion whether upon a proper construction of s. 6 these grass-lands on
hilly tracts were uncultivated lands. That depends upon the terms
B
of the sf:ction. The expression 'uncultivated lands' in s. 6, must, in
the context in which it appears, mean 'cultivable but not cultivated'
i.e. fil for cultivation, but allowed to lie fallow. It is uncultivable
or unfit for cultivation.

The Explanation below s. 6 has a two-fold function. The purpose
of the Explanation first is to explain the meaning of the expression c
'uncultivated lands' in the substantive provision. It then seeks to
curtail the effect of the section. It is a key for ascertamu1g the
meaning of the expression 'uncultivated lands'. Without the Expla-
nation, a·ny land lying uncultivated, on the date of the vesting, even
for a year, i.e., allowed to lie fallow according to the normal agri- D
cultural practice, would vest in the Government. But then the Ex-
planation steps in and seeks to mitigate the rigour. It says that the
land allowed to lie fallow continuously for a period of three years,
shall alone be deemed to be uncultivated land, meaning thereby that
a piece of land allowed to lie fallow, intermittently, for a period of
less than three years will not be deemed 'uncultivated lands'. E

In that view of the matter, the grass-lands on hilly tracts which
were incapable of any cultivation could not, in law, be treated to be
uncultivated lands' within the meaning of s. 6, read with the Expla-
nation thereto.
F
There seems to be no doubt on the facts of the case that there
were no such basic operations as tilling of the land, sowing or dis-
seminating of seeds, and planting of grass. The subsequent opera-
tions i.e., operations performed after the grass grew on the land, e.g.,
the act of securing the income of this grass by engaging watchmen
etc. to see that unauthorised pasturing by cattle brought on land or G
trespassing on it did not destroy the growing grass hut that it grew to
full stature so as to give a fair and full yield, or when operations
for cutting off the grass used to commence, the act of tending the
stubs so that they were not cut off but were allowed to remain intact
so that the next year after the rains, the grass would grow naturally H
again, by themselves would not be tantamount to cultivation of the
land.
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l980]lsc.R.

A In our op1mon, the High Court as well as the Revenue Tribunal
were, therefore, right in holding that the disputed lands did not vest
in the government under s. 6 of the' Taluqdari Abolition Act and s. 7
, of the Personal Inams Abolition Act.
In reaching that conclusion, we cannot bnt take into consideration
B the fact that the Acts make no pr()vision whatever for payment of any
compensation for the acquisition of the rights of the former taluqdars
and inamdars in such lands. They are not entitled to any compen-
sation either under s. 7(1 )(b)(i) of the Taluqdari Abolition Act
and s.10.(1) (b) (i) of the Personal ~nams Abolition Act. These
provisions speak of the extinguishment of any right or interest in
c land which is 'waste or uncultivated but is culturable'. The lands
in question not being fit for cultivation, were not 'culturable' and,
therefore, they do not fall within the ambit of these provisions. If
the contention of the appellant were to prevail, it would lead to an
anomalous position. It would have the effect of taking these lands
D out of the purview of s. 14 of the Taluqdari Abolition Act and s. 17
of the Personal Inams Abolition Act, though such lands are not
governed by s. 7(1)(b)(i) of the former Act and s. lO(l)(i) of
the latter Act. This would result in deprivation of property without
payment of compensation.
Our attention was drawn to the decision in Ambabai Janhavibai
v. State of Maharashtra.(') That judgment proceeds on the foot-
ing that there was a conflict between s. 5 and s. 7 of the Personal
Inams Abolition Act. · There is no basis for this assumption. Fur-
ther, the observation that 'since it is admitted that no agricultural
operations were carried out on the lands for the purpose of raising
or growing grass on the lands', the contention that 'the lands on
F which grass grew naturally could not be said to be uncultivated,
cannot be accepted', even thongh the inamdars were making use of
these lands and were realising income by selling the grass which grew
thereon, appears to proceed on a wrongful assumption that the sine
qua non for the applicability of s. 5 was actual cultivation. This
G observation; in our view, cannot be supported.
In the result, these appeals must fail and are dismissed with costs.

P.B.R. Appeals dismissed.

(I) [1965] 67 Rom. LR. 291.