Holding

The High Court erred in quashing the charge; inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised only in exceptional cases after the whole prosecution evidence is on record.

Summary

The State of Delhi charged Gyan Devi, her mother‑in‑law and husband with culpable homicide not amounting to murder (IPC 304/34) in the death of Sudesh. The High Court, on a revision petition, directed the trial court to record only medical evidence and then quashed the charge under Section 304/34 using its inherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC, without the entire prosecution case being placed on record. The Supreme Court held that such an exercise of inherent jurisdiction is permissible only in exceptional cases and after the prosecution evidence is fully recorded; the High Court had pre‑judged the evidence and erred. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, allowed the appeal, and directed the trial court to continue the trial in accordance with law.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court can quash a charge framed under Section 304/34 IPC on the basis of limited medical evidence alone, invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, without the entire prosecution evidence being placed on record.
Whether the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC may be exercised at the charge‑framing stage and what criteria govern its exercise.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 173(2), s. 227, s. 239, s. 240, s. 288, s. 397, s. 401, s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 304, s. 34

Subjects

quashing of chargeinherent jurisdictionSection 482 CrPCcharge framingprima facie casemedical evidencecriminal procedureculpable homicide

Judgment

A STATE OF DELHI
v.
GY AN DEVI AND ORS.

OCTOBER 18, 2000

B [D.P. MOHAPATRA AND RUMA PAL, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860/Criminal Procedure Code, 1973-Sections 304, 341
482-Charges framed-High Court directing Trial Court to record medical
evidence-High Court quashing the charges on basis of medical evidence-
C Inherent Power of High Court-Held, quashing of Charges on basis of medical
evidence without considering entire prosecution evidence, which was not
placed on record, is improper-Inherent Power should be exercised very
sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure
ends of justice.
D Respondents, mother-in-law and husband of the victim were accused of
qrnrder. Trial Court framed charges under Sections 304/34 I.P.C. The
respondents filed petition before High Court for revision. High Court disposed
of the petition directing the Trial Court to record medical evidence first and
exempting the respondents from personal appearance in the Trial Court till
E such time. Trial Court recorded the medical evidence. The respondents filed
an application before the Trial Court seeking discharge from the offence
under Section 304/34 l.P.C., which was dismissed. The High Court allowed
the application filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and set aside the order of the
Trial Court.

F In appeal to this Court, State contended that the High Court erred in
quashing the charges on the basis of medical evidence only; and that the
entire prosecution evidence was not placed on record before the Court.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

G HELD: I.I. At the stage of framing of charge, the Trial Court is not
to examine and assess in detail the materials placed on record by the
prosecution nor is it for the Court to consider the sufficiency of the materials
to esta.blish the offence alleged against the accused persons. At the stage of
charge, the Court is to examine the materials only with a view to be satisfied
H that a prima facie case of commission of offence alleged has been made out
270
STATE OF DELHI v. GYAN DEVI 271
against the accused persons. When the petition is filed by the accused under A
Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking the quashing of charge framed against them,

- t~e Court should not interfere with the order unless there are strong
reasons to hold that in the interest of justice and to avoid abuse of the
process of the Court, a charge framed against the accused needs to be
quashed. Such an order can be passed only in exceptional cases and on rare B
occasions. Once the Trial Court has framed a charge against an accused,
the trial must proceed without unnecessary interference by a superior Court
and the entire evidence from the prosecution side should be placed on record.
Any attempt by an accused for quashing of a charge before the entire
prosecution evidence has come on record should not be entertained sans
exceptional of cases. 1274-E-GI C
1.2 The High Court has erred in its approach to the case as if it was

- evaluating the medical evidence for the purpose of determining the question
whether the charge under section 304/34 l.P.C. framed against the accused
respondents was likely to succeed or not. This question was to be considered
by the Trial Judge after recording the entire evidence in the case. It was not ,D
the High Court to pre-judge the case at the stage when only a few witnesses
(doctors) had been examined by the prosecution and that too under the
direction of the High Court in the revision petition filed by the accused. The
High Court has not observed that the prosecution had closed the evidence
from its side. There is also no discussion or observation in the impugned E
order that the facts and circumstances of the case make it an exceptional
case in which immediate interference of the High Court by invoking its
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is warranted in the interest
of justice. On consideration of the matter, it is seen that the order under
challenge is vitiated on account of erroneous approach of the High Court and
it is clearly unsustainable. [276-H; 277-A-CI F
Mohd. Akber Dar & Ors. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., 119811
Supp. SCC 80; Radhey Shyam v. Kunj Behari & Ors., 119891Supp.2 SCC
572; Minakshi Bals v. Sudhir Kumar & 'Ors.,. 119941 4 SCC 142 and State
of MP. v. S.B. Johari & Ors., 120001 2 SCC 57, relied on.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeai No. G
888 of 2000.

From the Judgment and Order dated 7.12.1999 of the Delhi High Court
in Crl. M.M. No. 1926of1999.

'·
Altaf Ahmed, Additional Solicitor General, Ms. Sunita Shanna, V.P. Gogne H
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A and D.S. Mahra for the Appellant.
S.L. Aneja for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
-
B D.P. MOHAPATRA, J. Leave granted.

The limited question that arises for consideration in this case is whether
the High Court committed any illegality I error in quashing the charge framed
-
under Section 304 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short
'1.P.C.') against respondents 1 to 3 by the Sessions Judge in exercise of its
C powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'Cr.P.C.')? 1

On receipt of a report regarding the murder of one Smt. Sudesh, who

D
was the daughter-in -law ofrespondent 1 and wife of respondent 2, the police
made an investigation and laid a challan against the three respondents under
Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C. The Additional Sessions Judge, Karkardooma, on
consideration of the challan and the papers filed along with it, framed charges
-
under Section 498-A/34 IPC against all the three respondents and under
Section 304/34 1.P.C. against the respondents I and 2 vide the order dated 19
February, 1996. The charge under Section 304/34 l.P.C. which is relevant for
the purpose of this proceeding is to the following effect :
E
"And secondly, that you Veer Bhan Gulati and Smt. Gain Devi, on or
about 26.11.91 at a H.N.N-l IB/11, Dilshad Garden, both in furtherance
of common intention caused the death of Sudesh with intention of
causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death or with the
knowledge that your act was likely to cause her death and thereby
F committed an offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder
punishable under section 304 IPC read with 34 IPC and within my
cognizance."

Shortly after the said order was passed, the accused persons filed a revision
G being Criminal Revision No.113 of 1996 in the High Court seeking quashing
of the charge under Section 304/34 1.P.C. which was disposed of by the order
passed on l i.12.1997. On a perusal of the said order it appears that the High
Court disposed of the revision petition accepting the suggestions made by
the counsel for the petitioners (accused) and the counsel representing the
State that the Addi. Sessions Judge may be directed to first record the medical
H evidence in the case and till the recording of such evidence presence of Gyan
STATE OF DELHI v. GYAN DEVI [MOHAPATRA, J.] 273
Devi and Raj Sehgal i.e. respondents land 2 herein in Court be exempted as A
they would not be required for the purposes of identification and they can
be effectively defended even in their absence. The learned single Judge
accepted the suggestion and accordingly issued direction to the Addi.
Sessions Judge to record the medical evidence first and till that part of the
prosecution evidence is concluded to exempt the aforementioned accused B
persons from personal appearance in Court. The operative portion of the
order reads as follows:

"In view of what has been ordered above the learned counsel for the
petitioners prays that without prejudice to the pleas which the
petitioners may like to take after the recording of the medical evidence, C
the present petition be dismissed as withdrawn. Consequently, it is
dismissed as withdrawn."

In compliance with the direction in the High Court order, the Addi. Sessions
Judge recorded the evidence of the doctors i.e. Dr. S.K. Verma (PW-I), Dr.
Nagendra Prasad (PW-2), Dr. V.V. Gupta (PW-3) and V.P. Gupta (PW-5). D
Thereafter, the Public Prosecutor representing the State informed the Court
that the prosecution has no other medical evidence to be led in the case.
Thereafter an application was filed on behalf of the accused persons before
the learned trial Judge seeking their discharge from the offence under Section
304/34 l.P.C. which was dismissed by the order dated 14 May, 1999. Thereafter,
the accused persons filed an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. assailing E
the legality of the order of the Addi. Sessions Judge and also seeking
quashing of the charge under Section 304/34 I.P.C. framed against them. The
said petition was allowed by the learned single Judge of the High Court and
the charge framed under Section 304/34 l.P.C. against respondents I and 2
was quashed by the order passed on 7 December, 1999. The said order is F
under challenge in this appeal filed by the state.
From the discussions in the order under challenge it is patent that the
learned single Judge has sifted the evidence of P.Ws 1 to 4 in the light of
the autopsY, report -Ex. PWI/A, discussed the testimony of the doctors, taken
note of the order sheet dated 3rd July, 1999 of the Trial Court in which the G
statement made by Ms. Lata Sharma, A.P.P. appearing for the State that no
other medical evidence is to be produced by the prosecution and has recorded
the finding which reads "obviously there is absolutely no evidence on record
to suggest that aforesaid injury no. 4 in Ex.PW I/A was in any way responsible
for causing meningitis which disease has been opined by PW- I to be the
cause of death of said Smt. Sudesh. That being so, charge under Section 304/ H
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A 34 1.P.C. could not have been legally framed against the said two petitioners
and the same to secure the ends of justice, needs to be quashed under
section 482 Cr.P.C."

Shri Altaf Ahmed, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for
the appellant, contended that High Court has clearly erred in passing the
B order quashing the charge as it has approached the case as if to determine
whether the said charge framed against respondents 1 and 2 will succeed or
not. This question, according to the learned Addi. Solicitor general, should
not have been considered at a stage when before the entire prosecution
evidence has not come on record.

c Shri S.L. Aneja, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, on the
other hand contended that the High Court, in the facts and circumstances of
the case, has rightly quashed the charge under Section 304/34 I.P.C. against
respondents 1and 2.

D In the backdrop of the factual position discussed above, the question
formulated earlier arises for our consideration. The legal position is well
settled that at the stage of framing of charge the Trial Court is not to exa11)ine
and assess in detail the materials placed on record by the prosecution nor is
it for the Court to consider the sufficiency of the materials to establish the
offence alleged against the accused persons. At the stage of charge the Court
E is to examine the materials only with a view to be satisfied that a prima facie
case of commission of offence alleged has been made out against the accused
person. It is also well settled that ·when the petition is filed by the ,accused
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking for the quashing of charge framed against
them the Court should not interfere with the order unless there are strong
reasons to hold that in the interest of justice and to avoid abuse of the
F process of the Court a charge framed against the accused needs to be
I! quashed. Such an order can be passed only in exceptional cases and on rare
occasions. It is to be kept in mind that once the Trial Court has framed a
charge against an accused the trial must proceed without unnecessary
interference by a superior court and the entire evidence from the prosecution
G side should be placed on record. Any attempt by an accused for quashing
of a charge before the entire prosecution evidence has come on record should
not be entertained sans exceptional cases.

In this connection we may refer to the case of Radhey Shyam v. Kunj
Behari. & Ors. etc. etc., [ 1989] Suppl. 2 SCC 572, in which a bench of three
II learned Judges of this Court referring to the decision in Mohd. Akbar Dar
STATE OF DELHI v. GYAN DEVI [MOHAPATRA, J.] 275

& Ors. v. State ofJammu and Kashmir & Ors., [1981] Supp. SCC 80, pointed A
out that at the stage of framing of charges meticulous consideration evidence
and materials by the Court is not required. This Court further observed:

"The High Court has also deemed it necessary to quash the charge
against respondents 1 to 3 because in its opinion the evidence
proposed to be adduced by the prosecution, even if fully accepted, B
cannot show that respondents 1 to 3 committed any offence and
referred in that behalf to the decision in State of Bihar v. Ramesh
Singh, [1977] 4 SCC 39. We find that the High Court's conclusion
about the inadequacy of the evidence against r~spondents 1 to 3,
besides being a premature assessment of evidence, is also attributable C
to the wrong premises on which the High Court's reasoning is based.

We, therefore, find that there was no warrant for the High Court
to quash the charge against respondents I to 3 in exercise of its
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C ... "

In the case of Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar & Ors., [1994] 4 SCC D
142, this Court considered the question of quashing of charge by the High
Court invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In that
context, this Court made the following pertinent observations:

" ..... To put it differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 E
Cr.P.C the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would not be justified
in relying upon documents other than those referred to in Sections
239 and 240 Cr.P.C; nor would it be justified in invoking its inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash the same except in
those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions
justify such a course. We hasten to add even in such exceptional F
cases the High Court can look into only those documents which are
unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant evidence.

Apart from the infirmity in the approach. of the High Court in
dealing with the matter which we have already noticed, we further find G
that instead of adverting to and confining its attention to the
documents referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC the High Court
has dealt with the rival contentions of the parties raised through their
respective affidavits at length and on a threadbare discussion thereof
passed the impugned order. The course so adopted cannot be
supported; firstly, because finding regarding commission of an offence H
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A cannot be recorded on the basis of affidavit evidence and secondly,
because at the stage of framing of charge the Court cannot usurp the
functions of a trial court to delve into and decide upon the respective
merits of the case."

In a recent decision in State of M.P. v. S.B. Johari & Ors., [2000] 2 SCC
_, '7, this Court, adverting to the question of quashing of charges in the light
of the provisions contained in Ss.227 & 288, 401 & 397 and 482 Cr.P.C. did
not favour the approach of the High Court in meticulously examining the
materials on record for coming to the conclusion that the charge could not
have been framed for a particular offence. This Court, while quashing and
C setting aside the order passed by the High Court, made the following
observations.

"After considering the material on record, learned Sessions Judge
framed the charge as stated above. That charge is quashed by the
High Court against the respondents by accepting the contention
D raised and considering the details of the material produced on record.
The same is challenged by filing these appeals.

In our view, it is apparent that the entire approach of the High
court is illegal and erroneous. From the reasons recorded by the high
Court, it appears that instead of considering the primafacie case, the
E High Court has appreciated and weighed the materials on record for
coming to the conclusion that charge against the respondents could
not have been framed. It is settled law that at the stage of framing the
charge, the court has to primafacie consider whether there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required
to appreciate the evidence and arrive at the conclusion that the
F materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. If
the court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out for proceeding
further then a charge has to be framed. The charge can be quashed
if the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the
guilt of the acc~sed, ev~ if fully accepted before it is challenged by
G cross-examination or rebutted by defence evidence if any, cannot
show that the accused committed the particular offence. In such case,
there would be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial..."

Judged in the light of the settled position of law as reiterated in the decisions
noted above, the order under challenge in the present case does not stand
H the scrutiny. The High Court has erred in its approach to the case as if it was
STATE OF DELHI v. GY AN DEVI [MOHAPATRA, J.] 277
evaluating the medical evidence for the purpose of determining the question A
whether the charge under Section 304/34 1.P.C. framed against the accused
respondents I and 2 was likely to succeed or not. This question was to be
considered by the Trial Judge after recording the entire evidence in the case.
It was not for the High Court to pre-judge the case at the stage when only
a few witnesses (doctors) had been examined by the prosecution and that too
under the direction of the High Court in the revision petition filed by the B
accused. The High Court has not observed that the prosecution had closed
the evidence from its side. There is also no discussion or observation in the
impugned order that the facts and circumsfances of the case make it an
exceptional case in which immediate interference of the High Court by invoking
its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P. C. is warranted in the interest C
of justice. On consideration of the matter we have no hesitation to hold that
the order under challenge is vitiated on account of erroneous approach of the
High Court and it is clearly unsustainable.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The order under challenge is set
aside. The trial Court is directed to proceed with hearing of the case in D
accordance with law.

B.S. Appeal allowed