Holding

No general proposition that inordinate delay alone warrants quashing of an FIR; each case must be assessed on factors such as prejudice, nature of offence, and reason for delay.

Summary

The State of Andhra Pradesh filed a criminal appeal against the quashing of an FIR registered against IPS officer P.V. Pavithran under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The FIR was lodged on 8 March 1984, but the investigation report was filed only on 17 September 1987, leading the respondent to seek quashing of the FIR on the ground of inordinate delay under Section 482 of the CrPC. The High Court ordered the FIR quashed, and the State contended that any delay in investigation should automatically be a ground for such quashing. The Supreme Court held that no blanket rule can be laid down; delay must be examined in light of factors such as prejudice to the accused, the nature of the offence and whether the delay was deliberate or unavoidable. Applying this principle, the Court found that the present case did not merit interference, especially as the respondent had retired, and dismissed the appeal. The judgment reaffirmed the right to a speedy investigation under Article 21 but emphasized a case‑by‑case assessment.

Issues considered

Whether an inordinate delay in investigation, by itself, constitutes a ground for quashing the FIR or proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC.
What factors must be considered to determine if delay prejudices the accused's right to a fair trial under Article 21.
Whether the High Court's broad proposition that any inordinate delay warrants quashing is legally sustainable.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 173, s. 482
Constitution of Indias. 21
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947s. 5(1)(e), s. 5(2)

Subjects

speedy trialinquiry delaySection 482 CrPCquashing FIRArticle 21prevention of corruptioncriminal procedureprejudice to accusedcase‑by‑case assessment

Judgment

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
A
v.
P.V. PAVITHRAN

MARCH I, 1990

B [S. RATNAVEL PANDIAN AND K. JAYACHANDRA
REDDY, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Sections 173 and 482-
lnvestigation-lnordinate delay-Whether ipso facto a ground for
quashing of F.1.R.-Factors to he considered for determining delay-
C Speedy investigation and trial-Necessity for.

Constitution of India, 1950: Article 21-Right to speedy investi-
gation and fair trial-Delayed or protracted investigation-Whether
causes grave prejudice or disadvantage to accused.

D A case was registered against the respondent, an officer of the
Indian Police Service, under Section 5(2) read with Section S(l)(e) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, on 8.3.1984 but the investigation
report was submitted to the Government on 17.9.1987. In November,
1987; the respondent filed a criminal petition for quashing further pro-
y
ceedings pursuant to the registration of the First Information Report
E contending that there had been inordinate delay in the investigation and
that the prosecution had not filed the report as contemplated under
Section 173 Cr. P.C. till he filed the petition. The appellant contended
that the delay was occasioned on account of dilatory tactics adopted by
the respondent and that the case was a complicated and time-consuming
one. The High Court quashed the First Information Report and
F observed that wherever there was an inordinate delay on the part of the
investigating agency in completing investigation, the case merited
quashing of the First Information Report even.

The State preferred an appeal in this Court contending that the
High Court's observation was too wide a proposition and it would be
G detrimental to the prosecution in future under all circumstances,
regardless of reasons therefor.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: I. I No general and wide proposition of law cari be for-
H mutated that wherever there is inordinate delay on the part of. the

746
STATE OF A.P. v. P.V. PAVITHRAN 747

investigating agency in completing the investigation, such delay, ipso
A
facto, would provide ground for quashing the First Information Report
or the proceedings arising therefrom. [750H, 7SIA]

1.2 A lethargic and lackadaisical manner of investigation over a
prolonged period makes an accused in a criminal proceeding to live
every moment under extreme emotional and mental stress and strain B
and to remain always under a fear psychosis. Therefore, it is imperative
that if investigation of a criminal proceeding staggers on with tardy
pace due to the indolence and inefficiency of the investigating agency
causing unreasonable and substantial delay resulting in grave prejudice
or disadvantage to the accused, the Court as the protector of the right
and personal liberty of the citizen will step in and resort to tbe drastic
remedy of quashing further proceedings in such investigation. How- c
ever, there are offences of grave magnitude which would necessarily
involve considerable time for unearthing the crimes aud bringing the
culprits to book. Therefore, it is not possible t-0 formulate inflexible
guidelines or rigid principles of uniform application for speedy investi-
gation or to stipulate any arbitrary period of limitation within which D
investigation in a criminal case should be completed. [7508-F]

1.3 The determination of the question whether the accused has
been deprived of a fair trial on account of delayed or protracted investi-
gation would also, therefore, depend on various factors including
whether such delay was unreasonably long or caused deliberately or E
intentionally to hamper the defence of the accused or whether it was due
to the dilatory tactics adopted by the accused. The Court, in addition,
has to consider whether such delay on the part -0f the investigating
agency has caused grave prejudice or disadvantage to the accused. The
assessment of these factors necessarily vary from case to case. (750G-H I
F
Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar, [1986] 4 SCC 481, relied on.

Bell v. Director of Public Prosecutions of Jamaica and another,·
[1985] 2 All England Law Reports 585, referred to.

The .Power of the Courts to stay a Criminal Prosecution; J9X5 G
Criminal Law Review 175, referred to.

In the instant case, the respondent was placed under suspension
pending enquiry but was reinstated on the basis of enquiry report and
further action was stopped. However, by a subsequent order dated 5th
July, 1985 the earlier order was cancelled and a show cause notice·for H
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1990] 1 S.C.R.
A his compulsory reitrement was issued. The Central Administrative Tri- '~
bunal held that the order dated 5th July, 1985 was illegal and beyond
the powers of State Government. This Court dismissed State's Special
Leave Petition. In the meantime, the respondent was allowed by the
appellant to retire peacefully from service on attaining the age of
superannuation and the First Information Report and consequent pro-
B ceedings were quashed by the High Court. In these circu~stances, this .~
is riot a fit case for interference. [751D, E, G, 752A, C-E]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 359 of 1989.

From the Judgment and Order dated 29. 7.1988 of the Andhra
c Pradesh High Court in Crl. Petition No. 1023 of 1987.
K. Madhava Reddy and G. Prabhakar for the Appellant.

H.S. Gururaj Rao, Subodh Markandeya, Mrs. C. Markandeya,
D W.A. Nomani and G. Seshagiri Rao for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S. RATNA VEL PANDIAN, J. The State of Andhra Pradesh re-
presented by the Director, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Hyderabad has
E filed this criminal appeal challenging the correctness of the Order
dated 29.7.1988 of tiie High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Crime No.
7I ACB/Cr.II/84 dated 8.3.1984 on the file of the Special Judge for
ACB & SPE quashing the First Information Report in exercise of its
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

F: A few facts relevant to decide this case may be stated:

The respondent was selected to the Indian Police Service in the
·year 1953 and he worked in various capacities at different places.
While he was working as Commissioner of Weights & Measures,
Government of Andhra Pradesh, on a report dated 7.3.1984 submitted
G by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, a ).
case was registered against him on 8.3.1984 in Crime No. 7/ACB/Cr.
Il/84 under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947 on the allegations that while functioning as
Commissioner of Police and later as Vice-Chairman of Andhra
Pradesh Housing Board during the years 1978-82, he ingulged in
H corrupt practices and acquired immovable assets either in his name or
STATE OF A.P. v. P.V. PAVITHRAN [PANDIAN, J.] 749

~-· inits theinvestigation
name of his wife. The Anti-Corruption Bureau after completing
submitted its report on 22.4.1987 to its Director-
A
General who in turn sent the same to the Government on 17.9.1987.
The Government accorded the necessary sanction for prosecution in
G.O.Ms. Nos. 525 and 526 dated 16.9. 1988. In the meantime, the
respondent filed the criminal petition for quashing further proceedings

~ pursuant to the registration of the First Information Report, inter alia,
contending that there had been lull in the investigation for fairly long
B

spell causing inordinate delay and that the prosecution had not filed
its report contemplated under Section 173 Cr.P.C. till he filed the
petition for quashing the proceedings in November 1987 though the
case was registered even in March 1984.

The plea of the respondent was stoutly resisted by the appellant c
__,..< stating that the delay was occasioned on account of the dilatory tactics
" adopted by the respondent and the case was a complicated and.time-
consuming one.

The High Court has quashed the First Information Report on the D
ground that there was inordinate delay in the investigation. Aggrieved

r
by that judgment, the State has preferred this Criminal appeal.

Mr. Madhava Reddy, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellant took an exception to the observation of the learned
Single Judge of the High Court reading: E

" .......... I hold that wherever there is an inordinate
delay on the part of the investigating agency in complet-
ing investigation, the case merits quashing of the First
Information Report even. . .............. G'encraITy.
this Court will not quash the F.l.R. because it amounts F
to stopping of investigation, but where there is an inor-
dinate delay, the same is a ground to quash even the
F.l.R."

and contended that the above observation is too wide a proposition G
_., and it will be detrimental to the prosecution in future under· all
circumstances, regardless of the reasons therefor.

Though we have decided to dispose of this appeal on some other
ground, the submission of Mr. Madhava Reddy on the above extracted
observation of the High Court makes it necessary to examine the ques~ H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] I S.C.R.

A lion whether a mere delay in the investigation of a criminal proceeding
will by itself serve as a sufficient ground for quashing the proceedings
in pursuance of the registration of the case notwithstanding whatever
may be the reasons for the delay. This question has come up for
determination in a number of cases wherein this Court has cxarnincd
the right of an accused for a speedy investigation and trial in a criminal
B case in the light of Article 21 of the Constitution oflndia.

There is no denying the fact that a lethargic and lackadaisical
manner of investigation over a prolonged period makes ail accused in a
criminal proceeding to live every moment under extreme emotional
and mental stress and strain and to remain always under a fear
psychosis. Therefore, it is imperative that if investigation of a
c criminal proceeding staggers on with tardy pace due to the indolence
or inefficiency of the investigating agency causing unreasonable and J.
/
substantial delay resulting in grave prejudice or disadvantage to the
accused, the Court as the protector of the right and personal liberty of
the citizen will step in and resort to the drastic remedy of quashing
D further proceedings in such investigation.

While so, there are offences of grave magnitude such as
diabolical crimes of conspiracy or clandestine crimes committed by
members of the underworld with their tentacles spread over various
parts of the country or even abroad. The very nature of such offences
E would necessarily involve considerable time for unearthing the crimes
and bringing the culprits to book. Therefore, it is not possible to
formulate inflexible guidelines or rigid principles of uniform applica-
tion for speedy investigation or to stipulate any arbitrary period
of limitation within which investigation in· a criminal case should be
completed.
f
The determination of the question whether the accused has been
deprived of a fair trial on account of delayed or protracted investiga-
tion would also, therefore, depend on various factors including
whether such delay was unreasonably long or caused deliberately or
intentionally to hamper the defence of the accused or whether such
G delay was inevitable in the nature of things or whether it was due to the
dilatory tactics adopted by the accused. The Court, in addition, has to
consider whether such delay on the part of the investigating agency has
caused grave prejudice or disadvantage to the accused.

The assessment of the above factors necessarily vary from case to
H case. It would, therefore, follow that no gene!al and wide proposition
\

STATE OF A.P. v. P.V. PAVITHRAN [PANDJAN, J.] 751

of law can be formulated that wherever there is inordinate delay on A
the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation,
such delay, ipso facto, would provide ground for quashing the First
Information Report or the proceedings arising therefrom.

Our above view is supported by a decision of this Court in
Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar, [1986] 4 SCC 481. Reference may 8
also be had to Bell v. Director of Public Prosecutions of Jamaica and
another, [1985] 2 All England Law Reports 585 and the article in 1985
Criminal Law Review 175 captioned 'The Power of the Courts to stay a
·Criminal Prosecution.'
;
It follows from the above observations that no general and wide
proposition of law can be formulated that wherever there is any
c
inordinate delay on the part of the investigating agency in, completing
the investigation, such delay is a ground to quash the F.l.R.

Reverting to the present case, the respondent was placed under
suspension pending enquiry into certain irregularities in the purchase D
of land as pointed out in the earlier part of this judgment. The State
Government on the basis of the enquiry report passed orders for
stopping further action and directed re-instatement of the respondent
into service with immediate effect by Order dated 5th September 1984.
Accordingly, he was re-instated and aliowed to function as Controller,
Weights & Measures, Andhra Pradesh. However, by subsequent order E
dated 5th July 1985, the appellant (State Government) cancelled the
aforesaid order dated 5th September 1984 and directed the respondent
to show cause as to why the penalty of compulsory retirement should
not be imposed on him. Thereupon, the respondent filed Writ Petition
No. 10670 of 1985 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, seeking a
writ of mandamus declaring the orders of the appellant contained in F
G.O. Rt. No. 2930, GA (SC. C) Department dated 5th July 1985 as
arbitrary and unconstitutional, and consequently to set aside the
same by holding that the appellant was bound to give effect to the
Orders contained in G.O. Rt. No. 4572, GA (SC. C) Department
da_ted 5th September 1984. This writ petition was transferred to the
Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench. The Tribunal G
allowed the petition holding that the impugned order in G.0.Rt. No.
2930 dated 5th July 1985 is illegal and beyond the powers of the
State Government.

Aggrieved by the judgment of the Tribunal, the State of Andhra
Pradesh preferred a Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 405 of 1987 H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] I S.C.R.

A before this Court, and this Court by its Order dated 16.11.1988 ,
dismissed the same. The said order reads as follows: ·../._

"Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case
and specially in view of the facts that the respondent has
retired from service on attaining the age of superannua·
B tion, we do not consider it a fit case for interference. It is
accordingly dismissed."

-
Admittedly, the appellant notified the date of retirement of the
respondent w.e.f. 30th April 1988 by G.O.Rt. No. 866 dated 10th
March 1988. Accordingly, the respondent was allowed to retire peace-
C fully from service on attaining the age of superannua'.1on. The First
Information Report and the consequent proceedings 0.~ the registra-
tion of the case were quashed by the High Court on 29 .7 .1988.
Surprisingly, the appellant accorded sanction for prosecution in
G.O.Ms. Nos. 525 & 526 dated 16.9.1988 i.e. afternearly 50 days of the
quashing of the First Information Report.
D
In view of the above facts and circumstances and the various
events following the suspension of the respondent culminating in his
being allowed to retire on attaining the age of superannuation, we are
of the view that it is not a fit case for interference.

E The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.
""' .
l

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