Holding

A judge appointed under Section 429 CrPC has full authority to resolve the difference and may decide the whole case, including acquitting the accused, and his decision in this case was within jurisdiction.

Summary

The State of Andhra Pradesh appealed the acquittal of P.T. Appaiah and another, who had been convicted by a Sessions Judge for murder under IPC s.302 read with s.34. A Division Bench of the High Court upheld the conviction but was split on whether the offence was murder or culpable homicide. Under s.429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the matter was referred to a third judge, who, finding the sole eyewitness's testimony doubtful, acquitted the accused. The State contended that the third judge exceeded his jurisdiction by overturning the concurrent finding of the two judges. The Supreme Court held that s.429 empowers the third judge to decide the whole case, including overturning the earlier finding, and that his decision was not unreasonable or perverse. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a third judge appointed under Section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 can set aside the concurrent finding of a Division Bench and acquit the accused.
Scope and limits of the jurisdiction conferred by Section 429 CrPC on the third judge.
Whether the third judge's acquittal was unreasonable, perverse, or beyond his authority.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898s. 429
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 304 Part I, s. 34

Subjects

Section 429 CrPCthird judge jurisdictionappellate proceduremurder vs culpable homicideevidentiary doubtacquittallife imprisonment

Judgment

580

A

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
y,

P. T. APPAIAH AND ANOTHER
B
August 28, 1980
[R. S. SARKARIA AND A. C. GUPTA, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, s. 498-Difjerence between two Judges
of High Court on nature of offence committed by accused-Reference to thud
c Judge-Third Judge considering evidence and finding accused not guilty-
Acquitta/ whether valid.

The Sessions Judge convicting the respondents under section 302 read with
section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, senttonced each of them to imprisonment
for life. On appeal, a Division Bench of the High Court found that the accus-
ed caused the injuries but the Judges composing the Division Bench differed
D on .the nature of the offence committed by the accused. The third Judge to
whom the case was referred under section 429 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure 1898, found no motive for the accused to commit the offence and held
that the evidence of the chief prosecution witness was of a doubtful nature
and that it was not safe to find the accused guilty relying on that evidence.
He acquitted both the accused.

E In apj,eal to this Court by the State, it was contended that as the difference
between the two Judges of the Division Bench was confined to the nature of
the offence only, the third Judge to whom the case was referred in a reference
under section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, had no power to acquit
the accused by upsetting the concurrent finding of two Judges.

F
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD: 1. The third Judge to whom the case was refen:ed under section
f
429 did not over-step the limits of his jurisdiction and it cannot be said that
the view taken by him was unreasonable or perverse. [586 D·E]

2. In Bhagat Ram's Case, [1972] 3 SCR 303 the scop1~ of section 429
was not considered, nor any question wa:; raised whether tbe Judges of the
Division Bench could restrict the powers of the third Judge under section 429,
G nor was the notice of the Court drawn 1!0 the three earlier decisions of this
Court. [584 DJ
'
3. What Section 429 contemplates is that it is for the third Judge to
decide on what points he shall hear arguments, if any, and that postulates
that he is completely free in resolving the difference as he thinkg fit. [584 E]
H Babu and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1965] 2 SCR 771 applied.

4. The language of section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is
explicit that the case with the opinion of the Judges comprising the Court ot
ANDHRA PRADESH v. p, T. APPAIAH (Gupta, J.) 581

Appeal shall be laid before another Judge of the same Court and that the judg· A
ment or order shall follow the opinion of the third Judge who can or will deal
with the whole case. [585 D-E]
Union ~I India and another v. B. N. Ananti Padmanabiah etc. [1971] Suppl.
'SCR 460: Hethubha v. The State of Gujarat [1971] l·SCR 31: referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 112 of 1975. B
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
3-10-1974 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court ilil Criminal Appeal
Nos. 57 and 325 / 72.
~ P. Rama Reddy, G. S. Rao and G. N. Rao for the Appellant.
c
A. N. Mulla and G. Narisimhal,u for the Respondenlt.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

GUPTA, J.-This appeal preferred by the State of Andhra Pradesh
is directed against a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court D
·by which a learned Judge of that Court exercising jurisdictibn under
-section 429 of the Code of Crimiool Procedure, 1898 set aside the
-0rder of conviction and the sentences passed on the respoodents
before us by the Sessions Judge, Chittoor Division. The charge
against the respondents was that at about ten on the night of
September 5, 1971 Venkataramaiah Chetty anid Cbakala Giddappa E
{P.W. 1) were returning to their village Sanganapalle from Kadepalle
where they had gone and when they were about a mile from
.· Sanganapalle, respondent No. 1 armed with a bill-hook and
respondent No. 2 with a stout stick attacked them and beat
Venkatarama.iah Cbetty severely causing multiple iinjuries as a result
·Of which he died. The Sessions Judge accepted the evidence of P.W. 1 F
and the dying declaration said to have been made by Venkataramaiah
Chetty in the presence ·of several witnesses including P.W. 1 and
·convicted the respondents under section 302 read with section 34 of
the Indian Penal Code and sentenced each of them to undergo
imprisonment for life. On appeal preferred by the accused a
G
Division Bench of the High Court rejected the dying declaration but
·accepted the evidence of P.W. 1 to find that the accused caused the
injuries to which Venkataramaiah Chetty succumbed; the learned
Judges composilng the Division Bench however differed on the nature
·Of the offence that was committed by the accused i'n calliSing these
:injuries. Madhava Reddy J. held that having regard to the nature
Df the injuries it was not posisible to finid that the accused intended H
to cause death and that the offence committed by the accused was
.culpable homicide not amounting to_ murder punishable under section
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A 304 Part I of the Indian Penal Code. Sriramulu J. was of the
opinion that in causing the injuries the accused had the common
intention to kill Venkafaramaiah Oietty. He also observed that
even assumimg the offence did not fall under clau:se "Firstly" of
section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, it undoubtedly fell under
clause "Thirdly" of that section and on this view reached the·

.4
B conclusion that the Sessions Judge was justified in convicting the
accused persons under section 302 read with rsection 34 of the Indian
Penal Code. The case was then referred to a third Judge, .
Rachandra Raju J .. under section 429 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898. Raju J. found on a consideration of the evidence .-
c that "there does not appear to be any motive, much less sufficient
motive, for the accused to commit the offence". The immediate·
motirve for' the offence according to the prosecution was an incident ~
said to have taken place on September 1, 1971, four days prior to·
the date of occurrence, when P.W. 5, a son of the deceased, was
beaten by the accused when cattle of the deceased :;trayed into the
D field of the first respondent. According to Raju J. what happened on
September 1, was a trivial incident, P.W. 5 did not sustain any
injury, he did not report the matter to anyone and even when the
deceased came and intervened there was no quarrel, the accused did
not try to assault the deceased nor the· deceased tried to beat the
accused. Pointing out certain infirmities in the evidence of the sole
E eye-witness P.W. 1, Raju J. found tha~ his evidence was "doubtful
and suspicious". P.W. 7 who sought to corroborate a part of the ·...i.._

evidence of P.W. 1, according to Raju J. did not "inspire much r
confidence". Raju J. did not think it "safe to find the accused
guilty by placing absolute reliance on the evidence of P.W. 1 and £
accordingly he acquitted both the accused. /
F
Before us Mr. P. Rama Reddy for the State of Andhra Pradesh
contends that it was not open to the third Judge to upset the
concurrent finding of both the learned Judges composing the Division
Bench that the aceuised were guilty of some offence; it is argued that
as the difference between the two Judges of the Division Bench was
G confined to the nature of the offen~ only, the third Judge to whom the
case was referred urider section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
had no power to acquit the accused. Sedtion 429 of the Code of "JC'
Criminal Procedure, 1898 reads:
"When the Judges composing the Court of appeal are equally
divided in opinion, the case, with their opinions thereon, shall
H be laid before another Judge of the same Court, and such Judge,.
after such hearing (if any) as he thinks fit, shall deliver his
opinion, and the judgment or order shall follow such opiniDn."·
ANDHRA PRADESH v. P. T. APPAIAH (Gupta, J.) 583

In support of his contention Mr. Rama Reddy relies on the judgment A
of this Court in Bhagat Ram v. State of Rajasthan.(1) This was a
decision by a Bench of two Judges. In that case Bhagat Ram, an
,Inspector of Police, was charged with having · committed offences
under sections 120B, 161, 218, 347 and 389 of the Indian Penal
Code and also under section 5(1)(a) read' with section 502) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act. Another accused, Ram Swaroop, who B
was tried along with Bhagat Ram was charged with having committed
offence's under sections 120B and 165A of the Indian Penal Code.
The trial court acquitted both Bhagat Ram and Ram Swaroop of all
the charges framed against them. The appeal preferred by the State
of Rajasthan against the acquittal wa.s heard by a Division Bench c
composed of Tyagi and Lodha JJ. The Division Bench confirmed
the acquittal of Ram Swaroop. The acquittal of Bhagat Ram in
respect of the charges under sections 347, 218, 389 and 120B was
also affirmed. The Judges however differed on the point whether the
acquittal of Bhagat Ram regarding the chargeis under section 161 of
the Indian Penal Code and section S(l)(a) o~ the Prevention of
Corruption Act should be maintained; according to Tyagi J. these
charges had not been proved, in the opinion of Lodha J. they had been.
In view of tMs difference, the learned Judges passed the following
order :
"The result is that the appeal of the State against t.he order
of acquittal of respondent Ram Swaroop is dismisised. The
appeal of the State so far as it relates to the .acquittal of
respondent Bhagat Ram under sections 347, 218, 389 and 120B
Indian Penal Code is also dismissed. Tn view of the difference
of opinion about the acquittal of Bhaga.~ Ram under section 161
Indian Penal Code and Section S(l)(a) of the Prevention of
Corruption Ad, the matter may be laid before Hon'ble the Chief
Justice for referring it to the third Judge."
Jagat Narayan J., the third Judge to whom the case was referred,
held that Bhagat Ram was guilty of offences under SectiOn 161 and
also sections 120B, 218 and 347 of the Indian Penal Code. This
Cou!11: held in Bhagat Ram v. State of Rajasthan (supra) that it was G
not permissible for the third Judge to reopen the matter and convict
Bhagat Ram of offences under sections 120B, 218 and 347 of the
Indian Penal Code because :
"The present was not a case wherein the entire matter
relating to the acquittal or conviction of Bhagat Ram had been K
left open because acquittal or conviction of Bhagat Ram had
(1) [1972] 3. SCR 303.
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f1981] 1 S.C.R.
A been left open because of a difference of opinion '5etween the
twp Judges. Had that been the position, the whole case relating
to Bhagat Ram could legitimately be considered by Jagat Narayan,
J. and he could have formed his own view of the matter regardiing
the correctness of the order of acquittal made by the trial .J:udge
in respect of Bhagat Ram. On the contrary, as mentioned
B
earlier, an express order had been made by tihe Division Bench
upholding the acquittal of Bhagat . Ram for offences under
sectioll$ 120B, 218, 347 and 389 IPC and the State appeal in that
respect had been dismissed."
Clearly the decision in Bhagat Ram's case turns on the construction
c put on the order of the Division Bench referring "the matt1::r" ~o the
third Judge that he was to decide only the question on which the two
Judges had differed Bhagat Ram's acquittal iln respect of the offence
under section 161 Indian Penal Code and section 5(1Xa) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act was justified. The scope of section 429
was not considered in Bhagat Ram's ca.se, no question was raised
D
whether the Judges of the Division Bench could restriet the powers
of the third Judge under sectidn 429, norl the notice of the Court
appears to have been drawn to three earlier decisions of this Court
on the point. In Babu and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh( 1) a
Bench of five Judges held:
E "The section [is. 429] contemplates that it is for third Judge
to decide on what points he shall hear arguments, if any, and
that postulates that he is completely free in resolving the difference
as he thinks fit "
The next case is He~hubha v. The State of Gujarat(2 ) which
was decided by a Bench ofi two Judges. In that case the Seissions
{
F
Judge acquitted three .accused of the charge under section 302 mad
with section 34 Indian Penal Code but corwicted them under sectibn
304 Part II read with section 34. Two of them were also convicted
under section 323 and the third was convicted under section 323 read
with section 34. On appeal to High Court one of the two Judges
G composing the Division Bench held that it was the firsiti appellant alone
who inflicted the fatal injury on the victim and found him guilty
under section 302, while the second and ~h~d appellants were found )I(
guilty under section 324 read with section 34. The other learned
Judge was of the view tha.t all the accused must be acquitted as,
according to him, the evidence was not satisfactory. The case was
H then placed before a third Judge under \section 429 of the Code of
(!) [1965] 2 SCR 771.
(2) [1971] 1 SCR 31.
ANDHRA PRADESH v. P. T. APPAIAH (Gupta, J.) 585

Criiminal Procedure, 1898 who convicted the first appellant under A
section 302 of the lnldian Penal Code, and the second and third
appellants under section 302 read with section 34. The convictiOili of
the first and the second appellants under section 323 and of the third .
appellant under iection 323 read with section 34 was upheid. In
appeal to this Court it was contended that the third Judge under
section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 could only deal B
with the di:tferences between the two Judges and not with the whole
case. Repelling this contention it was held : ·
"This Court in Babu and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh(l)-
held that it was for the third learned Judge to decide on what
points the arguments would be heard and therefore he was free c
to resolve t:he differences as he th/ought fit. Mehta. J. here dealt
with the whole case. Section 429 of the Criminal Procedure Code
states "that when the Judges comprisilng the Court of Appeal are
equally divided in opinion, the case with their opinion thereon,
shall be laid before another Judge of the same Court and such
Judge, after such hearing, if any, as he thinks fit, shall deliver D
his opi"lflion, and the judgment or order shall follow such
opinion". Two things are noticeable; first, that the case shall be
'
laid before another Judge, and, 1secondly, the judgment and order
will follow the opinion of the third learned Judge. It is, 1herefore,
manifest that the third learned Judge can or will deal with the E
whole case.''.
In Union of India and another. v. B. N. Aoonti Padmanabiah etc.,(2)
which was unreported when Bhagat Ram's case was decided, a three
Judge Bench of this Court oonfirmed the decision in Hethubha!s case.
In this case the accused who were found guilty of offences under
sections 5(2) and 5(1Xc) and S(l)(d) of ;the Prevention of Corruption F
Act, 1947 as well as sections 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code
by the Special Judge, Gauhati, challenged the order of conviction in
the High Court or Assam and Nagaland. On difference of opinion
between the two Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court,
the case was referred to a third Judge. Before the I third Judge new
plea was advanced that the Magistrate at Delhi had no jurisdiction to G
accord sanction to an Inspector of the Delhi Special Police Bstablish-
)c: ment to investigate the case in Assam. The third Judge held that
an order of a magistrate of the local jurisdiction was necessary, that
only a magistrate of the district where the crime was committed and
no magistrate outside the jurisdiction was competent to make an
H
(!) [1965] 2 SCR 771.
(2) [1971] Suppl. SCR 460.
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A order for investigati'on and accordingly the learned Judge quashed the
proceedings before the Special Judge. In appeal to this Court it was
contended that the third Judge could only deal with the difference ·
between the two Judges and not with the whole case. This contentiop. i-
was rejected with the observation :
"This question came up for consideration in the recent
unreported decision in Hethubha & Ors. v. The State of Gujarat
(supra). This Court held that the third learned Judge could deal
with the whole case. The language of c>eotion 429 of the Code ~
of Criminal Procedure is explicit that the case with the opinion
of the Judges comprising the Court o~ Appeal shall be laid --
·C before another Judge of the same Court. The other noticeable
feature in section 429 of" the Code of Criminal Procedure is that
the judgment or order shall follow the opinion of the third ~
learned Judge."
In view of these authorities which were not noticed in Bhagat Ram'a
n case we are unable to agree that the learned third· Judge in the
illiStant case to whom it was referred under sectioo 429 overstepped
the limits of his jurisdiction in deciding the case as be did.
On the merits of the case, we have already indicated how the
learned third Judge viewed the evidence; it cannot be said that the
E view taken was unreasonable or perverse.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.

j