Supreme Court of India
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESHversusBAJJOORI KANTHAIAH AND ANR.
- Citation
- 2008 INSC 1187
- Decided
- 20 October 2008
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
The High Court was not justified in quashing the FIRs; the order is set aside.
Summary
The Prohibition and Excise officers filed FIRs alleging that the accused were transporting or storing black jaggery/molasses for the purpose of manufacturing illicit distilled liquor, offences punishable under the Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 and the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, 1995. The accused moved the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to quash the FIRs, and the High Court dismissed the FIRs on the ground that there was no material showing the seized articles were intended for illicit liquor. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the FIRs did disclose a prima facie case, as they contained witness statements and seizures of black jaggery and alum, which are relevant to the alleged offence. The Court reiterated that the inherent power under Section 482 is exceptional and may be exercised only in rare circumstances, not where the material is merely a matter for trial. Consequently, the High Court’s order quashing the FIRs was set aside and the appeals were allowed.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court was justified in exercising its inherent power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIRs alleging manufacturing of illicit liquor.
- What are the parameters and limitations governing the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Inherent jurisdictionSection 482 CrPCQuashing FIRIllicit liquorExcise lawProhibition ActCriminal procedureHigh Court powersPrima facie case
Judgment
[2008) 14 S.C.R. 841
-r-'I
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH A
v.
BAJJOORI KANTHAIAH AND ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1637 of 2008)
OCTOBER 20, 2008
B
~~ [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM
SHARMA, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 482 - Inherent
powers of High Court Exercise of - Parameters laid down - c
Discussed - On facts, FIR alleging offence of manufacturing
illicit liquor - Quashing of, by High Court finding that there
was no material to show that seized articles were intended to
be used for commission of offence - Held: Not justified - It
cannot be said that FIR did not disclose commission of offence
D
- There was either statements of witnesses or seizure of black
--r jaggery and alum materials being used for manufacturing illicit
distilled liquor which cannot be said to be without relevance -
Acceptability of the materials to fasten culpability on accused
is a matter of trial - Thus, order of High Court set aside.
E
The Prohibition and Excise officers registered an FIR
against the accused alleging that he was either transport-
ing or storing black jaggery/molasses for manufacturing
illicit distilled liquor or was abetting the offence of manu-
-( facturing illicit liquor, punishable under Andhra Pradesh F
Excise Act, 1968 and Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act,
1995. Accused filed application u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. for quash-
ing the FIR. High Court held that there was no material to
show that the seized articles were intended to be used
for manufacturing of illicit distilled liquor and quashed the
G
>
" FIR. Hence the present appeals.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 In all these cases there was either state-
841 H
842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.
j..,-
A ments of witnesses or seizure of black jaggery and olum
materials being used for manufacturing illicit distilled Ii-
quor which factors cannot be said to be without relevance.
Whether the material already in existence or to be col-
lected during investigation would be sufficient for hold-
B ing the concerned accused persons guilty has to be con-
sidered at the time of trial. At the time of framing the charge
-~ ,......
it can be decided whether prima facie case has been
made out showing commission of an offence and involve-
ment of the charged persons. At that stage also evidence ,_
c cannot be gone into meticulously. It is immaterial whether
the case is based on direct or circumstantial evidence.
Charge can be framed, if there are materials showing pos-
sibility about the commission of the crime as against cer- I
tainty. That being so, the interference at the threshold with ,,
~
the F.l.R. is to be in very exceptional circumstances. [Para
D
9] [850-A-D] f-
'-r-
1.2 The acceptability of the materials to fasten culpa-
bility on the accused persons is a matter of trial. These
are not the cases where it can be said that the FIR did not
E disclose commission of an offence. Therefore, the High
Court was not justified in quashing the FIR. Keeping in
view the principles of law as enunciated herein, the ac-
tion of the High Court in quashing the FIR in each case
cannot be maintained and are set aside. [Paras 10 and
F 11] [850-E-F]
~
R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866; State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; The Janata
Dal etc. v. H.S. Chowdhary and Ors. etc. AIR 1993 SC 892;
Dr. Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar and Anr. AIR 1964 SC 1;
G Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar and Ors. AIR 1990
SC 494; State of Bihar and Anr. v. P P. Sharma, I.A. S. & Anr. ~ .
1992 Suppl (1) SCC 222; Rupan Deal Bajaj (Mrs.) & Anr. v.
Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and Anr. 1995 (6) SCC 194; State of
Kera/a and Ors. v. 0. C. Kuttan and Ors. 1999 (2) SCC 651; \.
H State of U. P. v 0. P Sharma 1996 (7) SCC 705; Rashmi
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. BAJJOORI 843
KANTHAIAH & ANR.
Kumar (Smt.) v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada 1997 (2) SCC 397; A
---k'
Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Anr. 1999
(8) SCC 728; Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi and Ors.
AIR 1999 SC 1216; State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa
and Anr. 2002 (3) sec 89 - relied on.
CASE LAW REFERENCE B
AIR 1960 SC 866 Relied on. Para 6
.+-. rJ 1992 Supp (1) sec 335 Relied on. Para 6
AIR 1993 SC 892 Relied on. Para 8
c
AIR 1964 SC 1 Relied on. Para 8
AIR 1990 SC 494 Relied on. Para 8
1992 Suppl (1) sec 222 Relied on. Para 8
1995 (6) sec 194 Relied on. Para 8
D
1999 (2) sec 651 Relied on. Para 8
1996 (7) sec 10s Relied on. Para 8
1997 (2) sec 397 Relied on. Para 8
1999 (8) sec 728 Relied on. Para 8 E
AIR 1999 SC 1216 Relied on. Para 8
2002 (3) sec 89 Relied on. Para 8
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1637 of 2008 F
From the final Judgment and Order dated 14.2.2006 of
7
the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in
Crl. Petition No. 690 of 2006
WITH G
>
, CriminalAppeal Nos. 1638, 1639, 1640, 1641, 1642, 1643
and 1644 of 2008
D. Bharathi Reddy for the Appellant.
H
844 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R
A Gouri Karuna Das, Anu Gupta, Bhakti Pasrija and Rani
Jethmalani for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted in all these
B cases.
· 2. By the impugned judgments the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh has quashed the FIR filed by Prohibition and Excise
officers alleging commission of offences punishable under ~.~ ....
Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 (in short the 'Act') and the
C Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, 1995 (in short the 'Prohibition
Act'). In all the cases the allegation was that the concerned ac-
cused was either transporting or storing black jaggery/molas-
ses for the purpose of manufacturing illicit distilled liquor or was
an abettor so far as the offence of manufacturing illicit liquor is
D concerned. On being moved by application under Section 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code')
by the concerned accused for quashing the FIR, the High Court
accepted the plea holding that there was no material to show
that the seized articles were intended to be used for manufac- '---T---
E turing of illicit distilled liquor. Accordingly, the FIR in each case
was quashed.
3. In support of the appeals, learned counsel appearing
for the State of Andhra Pradesh submitted that the High Court's
approach is clearly erroneous. These are not cases where there
F was total absence of material to show the commission of a
crime. Whether there was adequate material already in exist-
ence or which could have been collected during investigation
and their relevance is essentially a matter of trial. The High Court ~
was not, therefore, justified in quashing the FIR. The exercise of
G power under Section 482 of the Code is clearly indefensible.
4. There is no appearance on behalf of the respondents in
spite of service of notice. A
.5. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a
H case of this nature is the excepti~n and not the rule. The Sec-
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. BAJJOORI 845
KANTHAIAH & ANR
tion does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only A
~· saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before
the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances
under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely,
(i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse
of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of B
justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any in-
flexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent juris-
diction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can
} >- provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore,
have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which c
are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties im-
posed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds ex-
pression in the Section which merely recognizes and preserves
inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or
criminal possess, in the'absence of any express provision, as
D
inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary
to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration
of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alique concedit,
--r'
conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the
law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it
cannot exist). While exercising powers under the Section, the E
Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. lnher-
ent jurisdiction under the Section though wide has to be exer-
cised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such
exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the
Section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real F
and substantial justice for the administration of which alone
courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of jus-
tice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to
produce injustice, the court has power to prevent s~ch abuse. It
would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action G
which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice.
In exercises of the powers court would be justified to quash any
~- proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts
to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceed-
ings would otherw_ise serve the ends of justice. When no of- H
~
846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.
A fence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the
question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it ·J..-.,
is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the com-
plain ant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even
if the allegations are accepted in toto.
B 6. In R.P Kapur v. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 SC 866),
this Court summarized some categories of cases where inher-
ent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceed-
ings: ~ ~
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar t-
c
against the institution or continuance e.g. want of
sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint taken at its face value and accepted in
D their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there
is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. '!--
E 7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in
mind the distinction between a case where there is no: legal
evidence. or where there· is evidence which is clearly inconsis-
tent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal
evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the
F accusations, When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon
an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or
~·
whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would
not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial
G process no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression,
or, needless t1arassment. Court should be circumspect and ju-
dicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts
and circumstances 'into consideration before issuing process, ~
lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private com-
plainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly.
H
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. BAJJOORI 847
KANTHAIAH & ANR.
At the same time the Section is not an instrument handed over A
..___-{ to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its
sudden cieath. The scope of exercise of power under Section
482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High
Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable
offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise B
to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this
Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC
335). A note of caution was, however, added that the power
should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare
cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as c
follows:
"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case D
against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
-~
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) E
of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
F.1.R. or complaint and the evidence collected in F
support of the same do not disclose the commission
·--f of any offence and make out a case against the
accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the F.1.R. do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- G
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by
l--- a Police Officer without an order of a Magistrate as
-1-
contemplated under S. 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
H
848 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.
A are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis
of which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
8 of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the proceedings
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code
or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress
c for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
. with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wn~aking vengeance on the accused and with a view
D
to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
8. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High
Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the
very plen.itude of the power requires great caution in its exer-
E cise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise
of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power
should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High
Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain
from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire
F facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has
not been collected and produced before the Court and the is-
sues involved, w~ether factual or legal, are of magnitude and
can~ot be seen in their true perspective withe.ut sufficient mate-
rial. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard
G to cases in which the High Court will exercise its e.xtraordinary
jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See: The
Janata Dal etc. v. H.S. Chowdhary and others, etc. (AIR 1993
SC 892), Dr. Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar and another
(AIR 1964 SC 1). It would not be proper for the High Court to
H analyse the case of the complainant in the lig~t of all probabili-
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH v. BAJJOORI 849
KANTHAIAH & ANR.
ties in order to determine whether a conviction would be sus- A
·~
tainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the
proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to as-
sess the material before it and conclude that the complaint can-
not be proceeded with. In proceeding instituted on complaint,
exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is B
called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose
any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the alle-
gations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of
> which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open
to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, nee-
C:
essary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case
before the trial to find out whether the case would end in convic-
tion or acquittal. The complaint/F.l.R. has to be read as a whole.
If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light
D
of the statement made on oath of the complainant or disclosed
in the F.l.R. that the ingredients of the offence or offences are
disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint/
·~
F.l.R. is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would
be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an
information is lodged at the police station and an offence is E
registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of sec-
ondary importance. It is the material collected during the inves-
tigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the
accused person. The allegations of mala tides against the in-
formant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the ba-
p
sis for quashing the proceeding. (See : Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v.
R. Prasanna Kumar and others (AIR 1990 SC 494), State of
Bihar and another v. P P Sharma, I.A. S. and another (1992
Suppl (1) SCC 222), Rupan Deol Bajaj (Mrs.) and another v.
Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and another (1995 (6) SCC 194), §fate G
of Kera/a and others v. 0. C. Kuttan and others (1999 (2) SCC
651 ), State of U.P. v. 0. P. Sharma (1996 (7) SCC 705), Rash mi
~
).. Kumar (Smt.) v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada (1997 (2) SCC 397),
Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and another
(1999 (8) SCC 728), Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi and H
850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.
A others Al R 1999 SC 1216), State of Karnataka v. M.
Oevendrappa and another (2002 (3) SCC 89). ~
9. In all these cases there was either statements of wit-
nesses or seizure of black jaggery and olum materials being
used for manufacturing illicit distilled liquor which factors cannot
B be said to be without relevance. Whether the material already in
existence or to be collected during investigation would be suffi-
cient for holding the concerned accused persons guilty has to be
considered at the time of trial. At the time of framing the charge it
can be decided whether prim a facie case has been made. out
c showing commission of an offence and involvement of the charged
persons. At that stage also evidence cannot be gone into me-
ticulously. It is immaterial whether the case is based on direct or
circumstantial evidence. Charge can be framed, if there are ma-
terials showing possibility about the commission of the crime as
D against certainty. That being so, the interference at the threshold
with the F.l.R. is to be in very exceptional circumstances as held
in R.P. Kapoor and Bhajan Lal cases (supra).
~-
10. Ultimately, the acceptability of the materials to fasten
culpability on the accused persons is a matter of trial. These
E are not the cases where it can be said that the FIR did not dis-
close commission of an offence. Therefore, the High Court was
not justified in quashing the FIR in the concerned cases.
11. Keeping in view the principles of law as enunciated
F above, the action of the High Court in quashing the FIR in each
case cannot be maintained and are set aside.
12. Learned counsel for the State submitted that there shall
be early investigation in the matter and submission of Report
under Section 173 of the Code shall be done without delay and
G in any event, not later than the end of February, 2009. We make
it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of
the case.
~ ~
13. All the appeals are allowed, as indicated above.
H N.J. Appeal allowed.
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