Holding

A Subordinate Judge created under the Land Acquisition Act is not subordinate to the District Judge for the purposes of Sections 195 and 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code, rendering the District Judge’s inquiry invalid.

Summary

The State of Andhra Pradesh alleged a large‑scale fraud in the award of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act and sought a criminal inquiry under Section 340 of the CrPC. A District Judge conducted the inquiry, but the High Court held that the Subordinate Judge appointed under the Act was not subordinate to the District Judge for purposes of Section 195/340 CrPC, because appeals from the Land Acquisition Judge lie exclusively to the High Court. The State appealed, arguing that the Subordinate Judge was administratively subordinate to the District Judge under the CPC and that the term “ordinarily” in Section 195(4) should be read broadly. The Supreme Court affirmed that the hierarchy prescribed by a special statute prevails over the general CPC hierarchy, that “ordinarily” must be read in context, and that Section 195 recognises only judicial, not administrative, subordination. Consequently, the District Judge’s inquiry was impermissible and the High Court’s order stands.

Issues considered

The nature of subordination of a Subordinate Judge appointed under the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of Section 195/340 CrPC
Whether the District Judge can conduct an inquiry under Section 340 CrPC against a Subordinate Judge of the Land Acquisition Court
The interpretation of the word “ordinarily” in Section 195(4) CrPC
Whether Section 195 CrPC recognises administrative discipline or only judicial discipline
The effect of a special statute (Land Acquisition Act) on the hierarchy prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 2(4), s. 3, s. 96
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 172-188, s. 193-196, s. 199, s. 200, s. 205-211, s. 228, s. 463, s. 471, s. 475, s. 476
Land Acquisition Act, 1898s. 26, s. 53

Subjects

Land acquisitionCriminal Procedure CodeSection 195Section 340Judicial hierarchySpecial statuteSubordinationFraudCompensation award

Judgment

STATE OF A.P. A
v.
V. SARMA RAO AND ORS. ETC. ETC.

NOVEMBER IO, 2006

[S.B. SINHA AND DAL VEER BHANDARI, JJ.] B

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974-Sections 195 and 340 - Fraud in
awarding land acquisition compensation involving Sub-ordinate judge of
Civil Court, notified by State for handling reference from awards of Land
Acquisition Collector, his staff, advocates and other officials-Inquiry under C
Section 340 by District Judge and his complaint pursuant to it - High Court
holding that Sub-ordinate judge of Civil Court was its sub-ordinate, and no~
of District Judge; therefore, inquiry conducted by District Judge was
impermissible and High Court itself had to conduct that inquiry • Correctness.
of-Held-Though Court of Sub-ordinate judge was subordinate to District. D
Judge for administrative purpose and also under Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, it was not subordinate in relation to proceeding under special statutes
like Land Acquisition Act, 1898-Jt was more so as Civil Courts had no
jurisdiction in relation to matters falling within the purview of Act of 1989-
As appeals from award of Court of Sub-ordinate judge lay exclusively to High
Court, it was subordinate to High Court-Section 195 ofthe Cr.P.C. recognised E
judicial discipline with regard to right ofhigher authority to exercise appellate
powers; it did not recognise administrative discipline.

Words and phrases- 'Ordinarily '-Jn context of Section 195(4) of Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1974.
F
State Government acquired certain lands and awards in that respect
were made by the Land Acquisition Collector. Owners of the land preferred
references against the awards to the Sub-ordinate judge of Civil Court notified
by State for that purpose. Allegedly, a large scale fraud took place in awarding
compensation wherein the Sub-ordinate Judge, his staff, advocates of the G
claimants as well as those appearing for the State, and other officials were
said to be involved. Since allegations against the accused came within the
purview of the offences specified under Section 195 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1974, an inquiry under Section 340 tllereof was conducted by

859 H
860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] S'JPP. 8 S.C.R.

. ·A District Judge, who after examining a number of witnesses, filed a complaint
pursuant to his findings. An appeal came to be filed against that by respondents
before the High Court, and same was allowed. High Court held that Sub-
ordinate judge of Civil Court was its sub-ordinate, and not of the District
Judge, since all appeals from award of Sub-ordinate judge under Land
Acquisition Act of 1898 lay to the High Court. Therefore, the inquiry
B conducted by the District Judge was impermissible and High Court itself had
to conduct that inquiry. Hence the present appeal.

Appellant-State contended that in terms of Section 53 of the Act of 1898,
Sub-ordinate judge of Civil Court was governed by Code of Civil Procedure,
C 1908 wherein it was sub-ordinate to the District Judge, and hence
requirements of Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code were fulfilled.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. A Court of Subordinate Judge may be subordinate to District
D Judge for administrative purpose. He may be a court subordinate to it under
the Code of Civil Procedure. But in relation to a proceeding under the Land
Acquisition Act, it would not be. In terms of Section 53 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1898 the procedures laid down under the Civil Procedure
Code would apply but the same is subject to the exceptions specified therein,
viz., save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything contained therein.
E Land Acquisition Act is a special statute. It provides for the forums both
original and appellate. Section 2(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
defines 'district' to mean the local limits of the jurisdiction of a principal
Civil Court of original jurisdiction, also known as District Court. It also
includes local limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court.
F Section 3 thereof provides hierarchy of the courts. What is of significance is
that the subordination of courts as specified therein is only for the purpose
of the said Code and not for the purpose of a special Act, although the
provisions thereof may be applicable to a case arising thereunder. Section
96 of the Code provides that an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by
any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorized to hear
G appeals from the decisions of such Court. The Court entitled to hear the
·appeals from a decree passed by a trial Court, therefore, must be authorized
therefor. It is one thing to say that an appeal, depending upon the valuation,
would lie before different forums, but if under the provisions of a special
statute an appeal shall lie only before the High Court and to no other, the
District Court would not be a court where an appeal would ordinarily lie from
H
STATEOFA.P.v. V.SARMARAO 861
a judgment of the Land Acquisition Judge. Land Acquisition Act being self• A
. contained code; in relation to the matters falling within the purview of the
Land Acquisition Act, the Civil Courts would have no jurisdiction. 1868-A-H)

''Laxmi Chand & Ors. v. Gram Panchayat, Kararia & Ors., AIR (1996)
SC 523, referred to
B
2.1. Sull-Section (4) of Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure must
be read with Sub-Section (3) thereof. Sub-Section (3) broadly divides the ·
Courts into Civil, Revenue or Criminal as also a Tribunal constituted by or
under a Central, Provincial or State Act. If a statute constitutes such Tribunal
and declares it to be a Court for the purport of the said Section, Section 195
of the Criminal Procedure Code shall apply. It is, thus, the presiding officers ,C
of those forums only, which are specified under Sub-Section (3) of Section ,
195 of the Criminal Procedure Code, may file a complaint petition in relation
to the offences punishable under the Sections specified in Clause (b) of Sub-
section (1) of Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is only for that
purpose a legal fiction has been created, stating that the Court shall be deemed D
to be Subordinate to the Court to w~ich appeals ordinarily lie. If an appeal
exclusively lies to the High Court, the Court of Land Acquisition Judge shall
be subordinate to the High Court and not the Principal Civil Court, although
appeal may lie before the latter from the judgments and decrees passed by it
in the suits which may be filed before it. 1869-A-DI
E
2.2. Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not recognise
administrative discipline; it recognises judicial discipline with regard to the
right of the higher authority to exercise appellate powers. The expression
"ordinarily" may mean "normally", but, the said expression must be
understood in the context in which it has been used. "Ordinarily" may not F
mean "solely" or ''in the name'', and thus, if under no circumstance an appeal
would lie to the Principal District Judge, the Court would not be subordinate
to it. When in a common parlance the expression "ordinarily" is used, there
may be an option. There may be cases where an exception can be made out It
is never used..in reference to a case where there is no exception. It never
means "primarily". 1869-E-F) · G
KailashChandrav. Unionoflndia, 11962) 1 SCR374,Krishangopalv.
Shri Prakashchandra & Ors. 11974] SCC 128 referred to.

Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab Anr., (1956) SCR 125 held inapplicable.
H
862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A 2.3. The Civil Courts exercise their jurisdiction not only in respect of
a suit filed before it, they do so under various special statutes. The hierarchy
of the Courts for the purpose of Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
therefore, will have to be determined, having regard to the nature of the
proceedings and the statutes under which the same is required to be
B determined. (872-A-BI

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1136 of
2006.

From the Final Common Judgment and Order dated 27.9.2002 of the High
Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Appeals Nos.
c: 587,907,971/1999, 1658, 1659, 1660, 1661, 1662, 1663, 1664, 1665, 1666, 1769/
2000, 7, 8, 9, IO, II, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 170, 269, 361, 363/2001, 1607/2000 and
Criminal Petition Nos. 5375, 5376 and 5377/2001.

Anoop G. Choudhary, D. Bharathi Reddy for the Appellant.

D Annam D.N. Rao, Shiv Kumar Suri, Sibo Sankar Mishra, G. Ramakrishna
Prasad, Venkat Subramaniam T.R. and B. Suyodhan for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. Leave granted.
E
Interpretation of the provisions of Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure
Code is in question in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order
dated 27.9.2002 passed by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court, whereby and whereunder a complaint petition filed by the District &
F Sessions Judge, Vishakhapatnam in terms thereof was quashed.

The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. Lands situated in Pisinikada
village in the district of Vishakhapatnam were acquired by the State of Andhra
Pradesh for providing house-sites to the weaker sections of society. Awards
in respect of the said acquisition were made by the Land Acquisition Collector.
G Reference thereagainst was made to the Civil Court at the instance of the
owners of the land. A large scale fraud, allegedly, took place in awarding
compensation wherein the Sub-ordinate Judge, Anakapalle, his staff, the
advocates of the claimants, the advocates appearing on behalf of the State
and other officials were said to be involved. Upon obtaining requisite
permission from the High Court, the CBCID registered a case and investigation ·
H thereinto was carried on. In its report dated 4.5.1998, the Additional Director
STATEOFA.P. v. V. SARMARAO [S.B. SINHA,J.] 863
General of Police, CID, Hyderabad indicated about a large scale conspiracy A
and fraud committed by the accused persons. Allegations made as against the
accused came within the purview of the offences specified under Section 195
of the Criminal Procedure Code as a result thereof an inquiry under Section
340 thereof was imperative. The High Court got the matter examined by a
Special Committee. It was opined that an inquiry may be conducted by
District Judge, Vishakhapatnam. The report of the said Committee having. B
been approved by the Full Court of the High Court, an inquiry was made by
the District Judge, Vishakhapatnam. The learned District Judge examined a
large number of witnesses and ultimately filed a complaint on 1.5.1999, pursuant·
to the findings recorded therein. An appeal came to be filed thereagainst by ,
respondents herein before the High Court, which was marked as Criminal • C
Appeal No.587 of2000. A learned Single Judge of the High Court, in view of!.
the importance of the question involved, referred the matter to a Division
Bench by an order dated 31. l 0.2000.

A Division Bench of the High Court, by reason of the impugned
judgment, allowed the appeal holding that the inquiry conducted by the D
District Judge was impermissible in law. It was directed :

"In the light of what has been stated herein above, we set aside '
the order passed by the District Judge, but in the facts and
circumstances of the case direct the Registrar to place the matter
before the Hon'ble Chief Justice who may place the matter before an E
appropriate Bench for orders under Section 340 Cr.P.C. Dicidedly the
Court under Land Acquisition Act is a Court subordinate to the High
Court as all appeals lie to the High Court. We would have ordered an
enquiry under Section 340 Cr.P.C. by the Sub-Judge himself but as the
matter had earlier been considered by two Judges of this Court though F
administratively and the report of such committee had been approved
by the Full court, therefore, we direct that the matter be heard and
decided by the High Court reminding ourselves with the old maxim
that justice 1:iust not only be done but also seen to have been done. "

The State is, thus, in appeal before us.
G
Mr. Anup G. Choudhary, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant submitted that the High Court committed a manifest error in
passing the impugned judgment in so far as it failed to take into consideration
that Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code read with Section 195 thereof
H
864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A specifies the Courts being Civil, Criminal or Revenue, which are genus and,
as the Land Acquisition Judge is governed by the provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure in terms of Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1898, (for
short, 'the Act'), thus, being subordinate to the District Judge, the statutory
requirements in relation to filing of Complaint Petition in tenns of Section 340
of the Criminal Procedure Code stood fulfilled. The Constitution Bench decision
B of this Court in Ku/dip Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr., [1956] SCR 125, Mr.
Choudhary would submit, has wrongly been applied by the High Court in so
far as it failed to notice the effect and purport of the term "ordinarily" in its
proper perspective.

C Mr. Annam D.N. Rao, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents, on the other hand, urged that the Land Acquisition Judge being
not a Court subordinate to the District Judge, the Complaint Petition at the
instance of the latter was not maintainable.

Before we embark upon the issues raised before us, we may notice the
D relevant statutory provisions.

Land Acquisition Act was enacted to amend the law for the acquisition
of land needed for public purposes and for Companies and for determining
the amount of compensation to be made on account of such acquisition. It
is a complete Code by itSelf. It defines "Court" to mean a Principal Civil Court
E of original jurisdiction, unless the Approptiate Government has appointed (as
it is hereby empowered to do) a speeial judicial Officer within any specified
local limits to perform the functions of the Court under the Act.

An Award is made under the Act by the Collector. Only when an
awardee is dissatisfied with the Award, he may file an application before the
F Collector, in terms of Section 18 of the Act, whereupon a reference may be
made to a court. Section 26 of the act reads as under:

"26. Form of awards.-{1) Every award under this Part shall be
in writing signed by the Judge, and shall specify the amount awarded
under clause first of sub-section (l) of section 23, and also the
G amounts (if any) respectively awarded under each of the other clauses
of the same sub-section, together with the grou:ids of awarding each
of the said amounts.

(2) Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the
statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the
H
STATE OF A.P. v. V. SARMA RAO [S.B. SINHA, J.] 865
meaning of section 2, clause (2) and section 2, clause (9), respectively, A
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."

The Court, to which reference is made, is ordinarily a Principal Civil
Court of original jurisdiction which would mean the District Judge. However,
a forum may be created for reference of such disputes before a Special Judicial
Officer within a specified local limit to perform the functions of the Court B
under the Act.

The Officer of the Court is, indisputably, a Judicial Officer. Despite
applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) in
relation to the proceedings pending before it, its substantive part is not C
applicable. A right of appeal is provided for under Section 96 of the Criminal
Procedure Code. Such appeals are to be filed before the Forums laid down
under the Civil Procedure Code or the courts governed by the statute. However,
no appeal from a judgment of the Land Acquisition Judge can be filed before
the principal court of civil jurisdiction or in other words, the District Judge
of the district, as such appeals lie only before the High Court. No appeal ex D
facie or filed against the order passed by the reference court is maintainable
before the District Judge.

Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides for prosecution for
contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public
justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence. The relevant E
provisions of Section 195 read as under :

"195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public
servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating
to documents given in evidence. - (l) No Court shall take cognizance
F'
(a) (i) of any offence punishable under sections 172 to 188 (both
inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or

(ii) of any abetment of, attempt to commit, such
offence, or

(iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, such offence, G
except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned
or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively
subordinate;

(b )(i) of any offence punishable under any of the following section of H
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860); namely, sections 193 to l 96 (both
inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such
offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any
proceeding in any Court, or

(ii) of any offence described in section 463, or punishable under
B section 471, section 475 or section 476, of the said Code, when such
offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document
produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or

(iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit,
or the abetment of, any offence specified in sub-clause (i) or sub-
C clause (ii),

except on the complaint in writing of that Court or by such officer of
the Court as that Court may authorise in writing in this behalf, or of
some other Court to which that Court is subordinate.

D (2) ......................... .

(3) In clause (b) of sub-section (I), the term "Court" means a Civil,
Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes a tribunal constituted by or
under a Central, Provincial or State Act if declared by that Act to be
a Court for the purposes of this section.
E (4) For the purposes of clause (b) of sub-section (I), a Court shall
be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals ordinarily
lie from appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court,-or in
the case of a Civil Court from whose decrees no appeal ordinarily lies,
to the principal Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction within
F whose local jurisdiction· such Civil Court is situate:

Provided that

(a) where appeals lie to more than one Co•1rt, the Appellate Court
of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court to which such Court shall be
deemed to be subordinate;
G
(b) where appeals lie to a civil and also to a Revenue Court, such
Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court
according to the nature of the case or proceeding in connection with
which the offence is alleged to have been committed."

H
STATEOFA.P. v. V. SARMARAO[S.B. SINHA,J.) 867
Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code reads as under : A
"340. Procedure in cases mentioned in section 195. - (l) When
upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwise any Court
is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an
inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in clause (b) of
sub-section (l) of section 195, which appears to have been committed B
in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as the case may be,
in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding
in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any,
as it thinks necessary, -

(a) record a finding to that effect; c'
(b) make a complaint thereof in writing;
(c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction;
(d) take sufficient security for the appearance for the accused
before such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailable D 1·
and the Court thinks it necessary so to do send the accused in
custody to such Magistrate; and
(e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before
such Magistrate.
(2) The power conferred on a Court by sub-section (l) in respect E
of an offence may, in any case where that Court has neither
made a complaint under sub-section (1) in respect of that offence
nor rejected an application for the making of such complaint, be
exercised by the Court to which such former Court is subordinate
within the meaning of sub-section (4) of section 195. F
(3) A complaint made under this section shall be signed, -

(a) where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, by
such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint;

(b) in any other case, by the presiding officer of the Court or by G
such officer of the Court as the Court may authorise in writing
in this behalf.

(4) In this section, "Court" has the same meaning as in section
195."
H
A
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

In terms of a notification issued by the State, a reference was to be
...
made to a subordinate Judge. "Would the said Court be the subordinate to
the Court of District Judge?" is the core question.

In our opinion, it would not be. A Court of Subordinate Judge may be
subordinate to District Judge for administrative purpose. He may be a court
B subordinate to it under the Code of Civil Procedure. But in relation to a
proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act, it would not be. We have noticed
that in terms of Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act, the procedures laid
down under the Civil Procedure Code would apply but the same is subject
to the exceptions specified therein, viz., save. in so far as they may be
C inconsistent with anything contained therein. Land Acquisition Act is a
special statute. It provides for the forums both original and appellate. Section
2(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 defines "district" to mean the local
limits of the jurisdiction of a prineipal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, also
known as District Court. It also includes local limits of the ordinary original
civil jurisdiction of a High Court. Section 3 thereof provides hierarchy of the
D courts in the following terms :

"3. Subordination of Courts. - For the purposes of this Code, the
District Court is subordinate to the High Court, and every Civil Court
of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small
Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court."
E
What is of significance is that the subordination of courts as specified
therein is only for the purpose of the said Code and not for the purpose of
a special Act, although the provisions thereof may be applicable to a case
arising thereunder. Section 96 of the Code provides that an appeal sh~ll lie
from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the
F Court authorized to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court. The Court
entitled to hear the appeals from a decree passed by a trial Court, therefore,
must be authorized therefor. It is one thing to say that an appeal, depending
upon the valuation, would lie before different forums, but if under the
provisions of a special statute an appeal shall lie only before the High Court
G and to no other, the District Court would not be a court where an appeal
would ordinarily lie from a judgment of the Land Acquisition Judge. Land
Acquisition Act being self-contained code; in relation to the matters falling
within the purview of the Land Acquisition Act, the Civil Courts would have
no jurisdiction. {See Laxmi Chand & Ors. v. Gram Panchayat, Karciria and
Ors., AIR (1996) SC 523).}
H
STATE OF A.P. v. V. SARMARAO[S.B. SINHA,J.] 869
Emphasis laid by Mr. Choudhary on the word "ordinarily" occurring in A
Sub-Section (4) of Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not of much
importance. Sub-Section (4) of Section 195 must be read with Sub-Section (3)
thereof. Sub-Section (3) broadly divides the Courts into Civil, Revenue or
Criminal as also a Tribunal constituted by or under a Central, Provincial or
State Act. If a statute constitutes such Tribunal and declares it to be a Court
for the purport of the said Section, Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code B
shall apply. It is, thus, the presiding officers of those forums only, which are
specified under Sub-Section (3) of Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure
Code, may file a complaint petition in relation to the offences punishable
..,. under the Sections specified in Clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 195
of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is only for that purpose a legal fiction has C
been created, stating that the Court shall be deemed to be Subordinate to the
Court to which appeals ordinarily lie. If an appeal exclusively lies to the High
Court, the Court of Land Acquisition Judge shall be subordinate to the High
Court and not the Principal Civil Court, although appeal may lie before the
latter from the judgments and decrees passed by it in the suits which may
be filed before it. D
Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not recognise
administrative discipline; it recognises judicial discipline with regard to the
right of the higher authority to exercise appellate powers. The expression
"ordinarily" may mean "normally", as has been held by this Court in Kai/ash E
Chandra v. Union of India, [1962] l SCR 374 : AIR (1961) SC 1346 and
Krishangopal v. Shri Prakashchandra & Ors. [ 1974] l SCC 128, but, the said
expression must be understood in the context in which it has been used.
"Ordinarily" may not mean "solely" or "in the name", and thus, if under no
circumstance an appeal would lie to the Principal District Judge, the Court
would not be subordinate to it. When in a common parlance the expression F
"ordinarily" is used, there may be an option. There may be cases where an
exception can be made out. It is never used in reference to a case where there
is no exception. It never means "primarily". In Kai/ash Chandra v. Union of
India, AIR (196 l) SC 1346, it is stated :

"This intention is made even more clear and beyond doubt by the G
use of the word "ordinarily". "Ordinarily" means in the large majority
of cases but not invariably".

In Krishangopal (supra), whereupon Mr. Choudhary has placed relian~
this Court was considering the provisions of Section 86 A of the Representation
H
870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A of People Act, 1951. In terms of the said provision, an election petition would
be clearly entertainable by a Single Judge, but it was held that such jurisdiction
could also be exercised by two or more judges.

The Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Ku/dip Singh (supra)
does not render much assistance in this case~ The ratio laid down therein
B must be understood in the fact situation obtaining therein. In that case, an
appeal was maintainable from the decree passed by the concerned Principal
District Judge. We may briefly notice the fact of that matter: One Amar Singh
filed a civil suit against one Kuldip Singh for recovery of a large sum of
money on the basis of a mortgage in the Court of Subordinate Judge of First
C Class. The defendant filed a receipt which purportedly showed that Rs.35,000/
- had been paid towards satisfaction of the mortgage and in the witness box
he had sworn that he had paid the money and had received the receipt. The·
Court held that the receipt did not appear to be a genuine document and that
defendant's evidence was not true. Accordingly it passed a preliminary decree
against the defendant for the full amount of the claim on 15-3-1950. Final
D decree followed on 15-7-1950. An appeal was taken to the High Court which
was dismissed on 9-5-51. The High Court also held that receipt was a suspicious
document and the defendant's evidence was not reliable. The plaintiff thereafter
moved an application before the trial Court asking that a complaint be filed
against the defendant under section 193 and 471 IPC. When the decree was
E passed the Court was presided by one Mr. Barlow. When the application was
made for filing the complaint Mr. Barlow was transferred and Mr. Augustine
was the Subordinate Judge. Before that application could be heard Mr.
Augustine was also transferred and no Subordinate Judge of the First Class
was appointed in his place. One Mr. K.K. Gujral, a Subordinate Judge of the
Fourth class was sent to the area and was asked to decide the· matter, but as
F he ·was only a Subordinate Judge of fourth Class he made a report to the
District Judge that he had no jurisdiction because the offence had been
committed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of First Class. The District
Judge then transferred the matter to the Senior Subordinate Judge Mr. Preetam
Singh and he made a complaint which was subject matter of challenge before
G the Supreme Court. After Mr. Preetam Singh passed an order which was
challenged in an appeal before the Additional District Judge Mr. J.N. Kapoor.
The learned Judge held that the Senior Subordinate Judge Mr. Preetam Singh
had no jurisdiction to make the complaint because he was not successor of
Mr. B1rlow. On merits it was held that there was no case. Thereupon, the
matter went to the High Court in revision. The learned Judge at the High
H Court held that the Senior Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction and the material
STATE OF A.P. v. V. SARMARAO[S.B. SINHA,J.] 871

disclosed a prima facie case. Accordingly he set aside the Additional District A
Judge's order and restored the order of Senior Subordinate Judge making the
complaint.

It was held :

"Section 476 authorises the appropriate Court, after recording a 1B
finding that it is expedient in the interests of justice, etc., to, among
other things, make a complaint in writing and forward it to a Magistrate
of the first class having jurisdiction. That was done by Mr. Pitam
Singh. So the only question we have to decide on this part of the case
is whether the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge over which Mr.
Pitam Singh presided was the Court to which the Court of Mr. Barlow C
was subordinate within the meaning of Section 195(3).

Now it is to be noticed that subordination has been given a
special meaning in this section. It is not any superior Court that has
jurisdiction, nor yet the Court to which the "former Court" is
subordinate for, what might be termed, most general purposes, but D
only the Court to which it is subordinate within the meaning of
Section 195(3)."

Meaning of expression "ordinarily" was considered in the aforementioned
fact situation. This Court rejected the view that "ordinarily" would mean "the E
majority of the cases". It was opined :

"In determining the Court or Courts to which an appeal will
ordinarily lie, we have to see which Court or Courts entertain appeals
from that class of tribunal in the ordinary way apart from special
notifications or laws that lift the matter out of the general class. Our F
meaning will be clearer when we tum to the case in hand and examine
the Punjab Courts Act of 1918."

The opinion of the Constitution Bench of this Court was expressed as
appeals from its various decrees and orders lie to different Courts and thus,
the question as regards interpretation of the terms arose in the fact situation G
obtaining therein wherefor this Court had to consider to which of them the
appeal would ordinarily lie. In that case, this Court was considering the
provisions of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 and categorically held that the law
laid down therein was confined to the said Act.

In the State of Andhra Pradesh there is no such statute. The expression Fl
872 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A "genus" used by this Court was kept limited to the extent of nature of the
proceedings, i.e., whether Civil, Criminal or Revenue. This Court had no
occasion to detennine the question with reference to a special statute like the
Land Acquisition Act. The Civil Courts exercise.their jurisdiction not only in
respect of a suit filed before it, they do so under various special statutes. The
hierarchy of the Courts for the purpose of Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure
B Code, therefore, will have to be determined, having regard to the nature of
the proceedings and the statutes under which the same is required to be
detennined. We may immediately notice that the Act makes a distinction
between filing a complaint by a public servant and a court. Whereas Clause
(a) of Sub-Section (l) of Section 195 contemplates administrative subordination,
C Clause (b) contemplates judicial subordinatfon. Each expression used in the
Code, therefore, must be understood upon reading the provisions thereof in
their entirety and not in isolation.

In view of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are, therefore,
of the opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be said to
D have committed,any error in passing the impugned judgment. The appeal is
dismissed accordingly. However, keeping in view the fact that the matter is
pending for long time, we would request the High Court to consider the
desirability of implementing the decision of the Division Bench as expeditiously
as possible. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall
be no order as to costs.

vs. Appeal dismissed.