STATE OF A.P.versusM. RADHA KRISHNA MURTHY

                      [2009] 4 S.C.R. 67


                       STATE OF A.P.                               A
                               V.
               M. RADHA KRISHNA MURTHY
              Criminal Appeal No. 386 of 2002
                       MARCH 6, 2009
                                                                   B
 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY,
                       JJ.]
      Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - ss. 7, 13(2) rw s.
13(1)(d) - Conviction under, for demanding and accepting
bribe - Acquittal by High Court relying on Hari Dev Sharma's C
case that since part of prosecution case version about demand
and acceptance not proved, remaining part of the case cannot
be accepted - Sustainability of - Held: Not sustainable - In
Hari Dev Sharma's case no rule of universal application laid
down that whenever aipart of case relating to demand and D
acceptance is not acceptable, whole case would fail even if
case relating to trap, recovery of money and chemical test by
prosecution is established - When part of prosecution version
relating to demand and acceptance of bribe stands by itself,
ratio of decision not applicable.                             E
     Precedents -Applicability of- General principles - Held:
Courts should not place reliance on decisions without
discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact
situation of the decision on which reliance is placed -
Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's          F
theorems nor as provisions of statute - It must be read in the
context in which they appear to have been stated.
     Prosecution case was that the respondent-Excise
Inspector demanded Rs. 4,000/- as bribe from the G
complainant. It accepted Rs. 2,000/- as bribe.
Subsequently, a trap was laid and accused was caught
receiving bribe from the complainant. Trial court convicted
and sentenced the respondent under sections 7, 13(2)
                              67                                   H
   68       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2009] 4 S.C.R.


A read with sections 13(1)(d) of Prevention and Corruption
  Act, 1988. High Court relying on decision by this Court in
  Hari Dev Sharma vs. State (Delhi Admn.), acquitted the
  respondent since first part of prosecution version about
  demand and acceptance was not proved, the remaining
B part of the case could not be accepted. Hence the present
  appeal.
        Allowing the appeal, the Court
        HELD: 1.1. Courts should not place reliance on
c decisions without discussing as to how the factual
  situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on
  which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are
  neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions
  of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These
  observations must be read in the context in which they
0
  appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not
  to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases
  and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for
  judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the
  discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges
E interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They
  interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be
  interpreted as statutes. [Para 6] [72-G-H; 73-A-B]
        1.2 Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or diffe-
F rent fact may make a world of difference between conclu-
  sions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing
  reliance on a decision is not proper. [Para 8] (73-G-H)
        2. On a bare reading of the judgment in Hari Dev
  Sharma's case, it is clear that no rule of universal
G application was laid down that whenever a part of the case
  relating to demand and acceptance is not acceptable, the
  whole case would fail even if the case relating to trap,
  recovery of money and chemical test by the prosecution
  is established. When part of the prosecution version
H relating to demand and acceptance of bribe stands by
           STATE OF A.P. V. M. RADHA KRISHNA MURTHY               69


    itself, the ratio of the decision does not apply. Unfor- A
    tunately, in the instant case, the High Court lost sight of
    the aforesaid aspects and by placing reliance on the
    aforesaid decision directed acquittal. Thus, the judgment
    of the High Court is clearly unsustainable and is set aside
    and that of the trial court is restored [Paras 5 and 1O] [72- 8
    E-G; 74-D-E]
         Hari Dev Sharma v. State (Delhi Admn.) 1977 (3) SCC
    352 - referred to.
            London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton 1951 AC 737;
      Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. 1970 (2) All ER 294;              C
    · Herrington v. British Railways Board 1972 (2) WLR 537 -
      referred to.
                        Case Law Reference
          1977 (3) sec 352          Referred to.      Para 2            D
          1951 AC 737               Referred to.      Para 6
          1970 (2) All ER 294       Referred to.      Para 7
          1972 (2) WLR 537          Referred to.      Para 7
                                                                        E
          CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
     No. 386 of 2002
         From the Judgement and Order dated 18.07.2001 of the
•   Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal No.
    737 of 1995.                                                        F
          I. Vendata Narayana, 0. Bharathi Reddy, fortheAppellant.
          Subba Rao, for the Respondent.
          The Judgement of the Court was delivered by
                                                                        G
          DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J
          1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned
     Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court directing
     acquittal of the respondent who was convicted by a learned
     Special Judge for SPE and ACB Cases for offence punishable         H
    70        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2009] 4 S.C.R.


A   under Section 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1 )(d) of the
    Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in short the 'Act'). The
    respondent was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
    for two years and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- with default
    stipulation.
B         2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

          The accused was working as Excise Inspector, Jogipet,
     Medak District and joined in Government service as L.D.C. on
     27-12-1962 in the office of Excise Superintendent. Medak
c   District. Later he was promoted as Excise Sub-Inspector on 2-
     11-1971 and as Excise Inspector on 9-7-1985. He worked as
    Excise Inspector at Jogipet, Medak District from 8-4-1987 to
     15-7-1989. He held Additional charge of the post of Tekmal
    Excise Range. Thus, he is a "public servant" within the meaning
D   of Section 2 (c)(i) of the Act. One Sri Goundla Joginath Goud,
    son of Yella Goud is a resident of Muslapur village. He and his
                                                                         i
    father were running a toddy shop. On 12-6-1989 the accused
    searched the cattle shed of one Surra Narsimlu of Muslapur
    village, situated adjacent to their toddy shop and seized 1 kg.
    of Chloral Hydrate, On 13-6-1989 the accused called Joginath
E   Goud to his office and demanded a bribe of Rs.5,000/- stating
    that he would drop action and threatened that if they do not pay
    the monthly mamools regularly, cases would be booked against
    them. Then the complainant pleaded that he has no connection
    with his father and/or nor with the said case and requested not
F   to book a case against them. After some bargaining the amount
    of bribe was reduced to Rs.4,000/- and accused asked him to
    pay Rs,2,000/- immediately. Accordingly he paid Rs.2,000/- as
    part payment on the same day and the balance was to be paid
    on 19-6-1989. Since the complainant was not willing to pay the
G   balance of Rs.2,000/- he approached the DSP, ACB,
    Nizamabad Range on 16-6-1989 and lodged a complaint on               •
    which the DSP, Nizamabad Range, registered it as a case in
    Crime No:5 ACB-NZB/89 Under Sections 7 & 11 and Section
    13 (1)(d) of the Act. The investigation disclosed that the accused
H   drafted a panchanama for the proceedings conducted in the
              STATE OF A.P. V. M. RADHA KRISHNA MURTHY              71
                        [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT J]

J..
       house of Sri Burra Narsimhulu and seized a plastic bag of 1 Kg A
       of Chloral Hydrate on 12-6-1989 and registered it as a case in
       Cr. No:40/88-89 under Section 34 (a) of A. P. Excise Act against
       Burra Narsimhulu and also against the father of the complainant.
       Further investigation disclosed that the accused after demand
       and part payment sent up a preliminary report on grave crime B
       part-I showing that accused is not traceable and he showed
       official favour by not mentioning the name of the father of the
       earlier demand, the accused demanded and accepted the
....   ba1ance of Rs.2,000/- as gratification other than legal
       remuneration on 19-6-1989 at about 3.40 p.m. from the c
       complainant Joginath Goud at his residence at Jogipet. Medak
       District in the presence of G. Anjaiah Goud and the accused
       was caught red-handed by the ACB in the presence of the
       mediators at 3.50 p.m. on 19-6-1989. The fingers of both the
       hands of the accused yielded positive results when subjected
                                                                        D
,      to Sodium Carbonate test. The tainted amount was recovered
       from the cot in the presence of the mediators. Therefore, the
       Government accorded sanction for prosecution vide G.O. Ms.
       No:757, dated 29-8-1991 Revenue (Excise I) Department and
       accordingly the accused was held liable for punishment under
       the abovesaid sections of law.                                   E

             Copies of documents relied on by the prosecution were
       furnished to the accused. The accused was examined and
..j
       charges under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1 )(d)
       of the Act were framed, read over and explained to him for which   F
       he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
             The prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 7 and filed Exs.P.1
       to P.15 and marked M.Os.1 to 10.
             The trial Court found the evidence to be acceptable and
                                                                         G
  "    directed the conviction. In appeal the High Court held that since
       part of the prosecution version about demand and acceptance
       has not been proved, the remaining part of the case cannot be
       accepted. It was pointed out that according to the prosecution
       an amount of Rs.4,000/- was demanded and accepted and the
                                                                         H
                                          ,,.
    72        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2009] 2 S.C.R.


A first vital part of the prosecution version was that payment of
  Rs.2,000/- said to have been accepted by the respondent is
  not proved, therefore, when the part of the same is not accepted
  the remaining part of the case shall also not be accepted. Placing
  reliance on a decision of this Court in Hari Dev Sharma v. State
B (Delhi Admn.) (1977 (3) sec 352) the conviction as recorded
  was set aside. The High Court found that the prosecution case
  was that there was demand and an amount of Rs.2,000/- was
  paid on 13.6.1989 which has not been proved and with regard
  to the trap conducted by the prosecution while the accused was
c receiving Rs.2,000/- from P.W.1 on 19.6.1989. Even if the trap
  is proved beyond all reasonable doubt, the prosecution version
  cannot be upheld in view of the aforesaid decision of this court.

       3. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant
  submitted that the conclusions of the High Court are without any
D foundation and legal basis.

          4. Learned counsel for the accused on the other hand
    supported the judgment of the High Court contending that the
    decision of this Court in Hari Dev Sharma's case (supra) is
    clearly applicable.
E
        5. On a bare reading of the judgment in Hari Dev Sharma's
  case (supra), it is clear that no rule of universal application was
  laid down that whenever a part of the case relating to demand
  and acceptance is not acceptable, the whole case would fail
F even  if the case relating to trap, recovery of money and chemical
  test by the prosecution is established. When part of the
  prosecution version relating to demand and acceptance of bribe
  stands by itself, the ratio of the decision does not apply.
  Unfortunately, in the instant case the High Court has lost sight of
  the aforesaid aspects and by placing reliance on the aforesaid
G
  decision has directed acquittal.                                      •
       6. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without
  discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact
  situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.
H Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's
        STATE OF A.P. V. M. RADHA KRISHNA MURTHY                   73
                  [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT J.]

theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out A
of their context. These observations must be read in the context
in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts
are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases
and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges
to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant s
to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do
not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their
words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving
Dock Co. Ltd. V Horton (1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac
Dermot observed:                                                         c
      "The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating
      the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J as though they were part
      of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of
      interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract
      from the great weight to be given to the language actually D
      used by that most distinguished judge."
       7. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970 (2) All ER
294) Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin's speech ..... is not to be treated
as if it was a statute definition It will require qualification in new
circumstances." Megarry, J in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed:                E
"One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of
even Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, in
Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord
Morris said:
                                                                         F
     "There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or
     judgment as though they are words in a legislative
     enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial
     utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular
     case."
                                                                         G
     8. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact
may make a world of difference between conclusions in two
cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a
decision is not proper.
                                                                         H
    74         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2009] 4 S.C.R_


A        9_ The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of
    applying precedents have become locus classicus:
           "Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity
           between one case and another is not enough because
           even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect,
B          in deciding such cases, one should avid the temptation to
           decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour
           of one case against the colour of another. To decide
           therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad
           resemblance to another case is not at all decisive."
c              ***                 ***                    ***

           "Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the
           path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim
           off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in
D          thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to
           justice clear of obstructions which could impede it."           •
          10. In that view of the matter the judgment of the High Court
    is clearly unsustainable and is set aside and that of the trial
    Court is restored.
E
           11. The appeal is allowed.

    N.J.                                              Appeal allowed.