Supreme Court of India
STATE (NCT OF DELHI)versusAHMED JAAN
- Citation
- 2008 INSC 929
- Decided
- 12 August 2008
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
Delay of over one year can be condoned where the State provides a plausible explanation, as "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be given a liberal, justice‑oriented construction.
Summary
The State of NCT of Delhi filed a criminal revision petition against the discharge of Ahmed Jaan, who was charged with offences under Sections 121, 121A, 122, 124A and 120B of the IPC for alleged terrorist activities. The trial court discharged him for lack of prima facie evidence. The State’s revision petition and an application for condonation of delay were dismissed by the Delhi High Court on the ground that the delay in filing and re‑filing was unexplained. The Supreme Court examined whether the delay could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, emphasizing that "sufficient cause" must be given a liberal, pragmatic construction and that the length of delay is not determinative. It held that the State’s explanation for the delay was plausible, that the State is entitled to a reasonable latitude due to its bureaucratic nature, and that the High Court erred by not considering the explanation. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, remitted the matter for a merits‑based hearing, and allowed the appeal.
Issues considered
- Whether the delay in filing and re‑filing the criminal revision petition can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
- Whether the expression "sufficient cause" requires a liberal construction and what factors are relevant, especially when the State is the litigant.
- Whether the High Court erred in not examining the State’s explanation for the delay.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Limitation Actcondonation of delaysufficient causecriminal revisionState as litigantterrorism offencesprocedural delayjustice‑oriented interpretation
Judgment
[2008] 12 S.C.R. 28
A STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
V.
AHMED JAAN
(Criminal Appeal No. 1262 of 2008)
AUGUST 12, 2008
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM
SHARMA, JJ]
Limitation Act, 1963:
C . s. 5 - Condonation of delay - "sufficient cause" - HELD:
It is sufficiency of the cause. which counts, and not length of
delay - Expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal
construction - As regards delay on the part of State, certain
amount of latitude is not .impermissible - Expression "suffi-
D cient cause" should be considered with pragmatism in justice
oriented approach rather than technical detection of sufficient
cause for explaining every day's <lelay - Matter remitted to
High Court to decide the criminal revision on merits - Sug-
gestions made to prevent delay in State litigation - Adminis-
E tration of justice - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 401.
A charge-sheet was filed against the respondent-ac-
cused for commission of offences punishable u/ss 121,
121-A, 1.22, 124-A and 120-8, IPC. The trial court, by its
order dated 30.10.1998,. discharged the accused holding
F . that prima facie there was no evidence against the ac-
cused. The revision petition filed in ~003 by the State +
along with an application for condonation of delay was
dismissed by the.High Court as time barred.
In the instant appeal filed by the State, it was con-
G tended for the appellant that the order of the trial court
directing discharge of the accused was unsustainable
both on facts and in law; and the High Court did not even
consider the explanation furnished for the delay.·
Allowing the appeal, the Court
H 28
STATE (NCT OF DELHI) v. AHMED JAAN 29
....,,,
+- HELD: 1.1 The proof by sufficient cause is a condi- A
tion precedent for exercise of the extraordinary discre-
tion vested in the court. What counts is not the length of
the delay but the sufficiency of the cause; and shortness
of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into
account in using the discretion. What constitutes suffi- B
cient cause cannot be laid down by hard and fast rules.
The expression "sufficient cause" should receive a lib-
eral construction. [para 7-8] [33,G; 34,C,D]
N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy AIR 1998 SC 3222;
New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra 1975 (2) SCC c
84Q; Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari AIR 1969 SC
575; Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi 1979
(4) SCC 365; Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan 1969 (2) SCC
770; State of Kera/a v. E. K. Kuriyipe 1981 Supp SCC 72;
Mi/avi Devi v. Dina Nath (1982 (3) SCC 366; 0. P Kathpalia D
v. Lakhmir Singh 1984 (4) SCC 66; Collector Land Acquisi-
~ tion v. Katiji 1987 (2) SCC 107; Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra
1987 Supp SCC 339; and G Ramegowda, Major v. Sp/. Land
Acquisition Officer 1988 (2) SCC 142 - relied on.
Brij lndar Singh v. Kanshi Ram ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 E
(PC) - referred to.
1.2 No separate standards to determine the cause
laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to
prove strict standards of sufficient cause. Equally, the F
State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual.
~ The individual would always be quick in taking the deci-
sion whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an
appeal or application since he is a person legally injured
while State is an impersonal machinery working through
G
its officers or servants. It is axiomatic that decisions are
) taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace en-
cumbered with procedural red-tape in decision making
process. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not im-
permissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost
H
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.
A for such default no person is individually affected but what t
in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The ex-
pression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be consid-
ered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather
than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explain-
s ing every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to
and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental
conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption
of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The
co·urt should decide the matters on merits unless the case
c is hopelessly without merit. [para 14] [38,E, G-H; 8-0]
State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. 1996 (3) SCC
132; Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kera/a v. K. V.
Ayisumma 1996 (10) SCC 634; and State of Nagaland v. Lipok
AO and Ors. 2005 (3) sec 752 - relied on.
D
1.3 The Government at appropriate level should con-
stitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal
principles are involved for decision by the courts or
whether cases require adjustment; and should authorise
the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permis-
E sion for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal,
needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer
concerned and he should be .made personally respon-
sible for lapses, if any. [para 14] [38,E-F]
F 1.4 In the instant case, the appellant had indicated the
reasons for the delay in filing and re-filing the revision pe-
tition. The High Court unfortunately did not deal with those
+
·explanations and merely stated that the delay ha5i not been
explained. The High Court was required to examine the
G correctness of the explanation given, keeping in view the
· principles laid down by this Court in several cases. The
explanations offered were plausible and deserved to be
accepted. Accordingly, the impugned order of the High
/" '
Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to it to hear the
H criminal revision on merits. [para 16] [39,C-D]
STATE (NCT OF DELHI) v. AHMED JAAN 31
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J]
, 'r Case Law Reference: A
AIR 1998 SC 3222 relied on para 7
1975 (2) SC~ 840 relied on para 8
ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 (PC) referred to para 8
I
AIR 1969 SC 575 relied on para 8 8
1979 (4) sec 365 relied on para 9
1969 (2) sec 110 relied on para 9
1981 Supp sec 12 relied on para 10
c
1982 (3) sec 366 relied on para 10
1984 (4) sec 66 relied on para 11
1987 (2). sec 101 relied on para 11
1987 Supp sec 339 relied on para 12
D
y
1988 (2) sec 142 relied on para 13
1996 (3) sec 132 relied on para 15
1996 (1 O) sec 634 relied on p~ra 15
2005 (3) sec 752 relied on para 15 E
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1262 of 2008
From the final Judgment and Order dated 10.8.2005 of
the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Revision Peti-
F
~- tion No. 356/2004
8.8. Sin~h, A. Tarique, D.S. Mahra and Anil Katiyar for the
Appellant.
Mohd. Nasir, Mohd, Salim, Rishi Maheshwari and Shally
G
8hasin Maheshwari for the Respondents.
j
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dr. ARljlT PASAYAT, J 1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.
't
A learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court dismissing the '
Criminal Revision Petition (Crl.R.P.No.356/2004) on the ground
that there was inordinate delay in filing and re-filing the revision
petition.
3. Factual position as highlighted by the appellant is as
8 follows:
The respondent, who is a resident of Jammu &, Kashmir,
was apprehended at Sheila Cinema in Delhi on 05.03.1997 on
the basis of information that he belongs to a terrorist outfit
c "Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen' (TUM) of J&K. From a search of his
person and his hotel room, a letter containing instructions re-
garding activities to be carried out in Delhi for collecting money
and arms for freedom of Kashmir was recovered. The letter con-
tained coded information regarding ROX and Grenades as
"ATTA' and 'ANAR' and was allegedly written by one Abu Ibrahim.
0
A personal diary containing telephone numbers of Pakistan and
a sum of Rs.30,000/- suspected to be Hawala money were also
recovered from the respondent. It was found that the respondent
had been frequently coming to Delhi and stayed at Welcome
Guest House and used to make telephone calls to his contacts in
E Pakistan and collected money in Delhi which he used to transfer
to Srinagar through carpet dealer~ at Kashmir and Commission
agents for goats and thus, he actually got transferred Rs.17-1 /4
- · - ~acs through Ghayasuddin and Mohd. Ahad of Srinagar.
F The respondent was charge sheeted under Sections 121 I
121A/122/124-A/120-B of Indian Penal·Code, 1860 (in short
'IPC') on the above allegations of being a member of TUM and
for conspiring in waging war against the Government of India.
The respondent was thereafter tried in the Court of the Addi.
G Sessions Judge, Delhi in Sessions Case No.7/98.
By order dated 30.10.1998 in Sessions Case No.7/98,
the learned Addi. Sessions Judge discharge? the accused at
the threshold, holding that prima facie there was no legal evi-
dence to show that the respondent has committed any of the
H alleged acts.
STATE (NCT OF DELHI) v. AHMED JAAN 33
[DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J]
=\
• t
Aggrieved, the appellant tried Criminal Revision Petition A
356/2004, along with anapplication for condoning the delay in
filing the petition. After filing the revision petition, the Registry of
the High Court raised certain objections, and the file was re-
ceived back in the Department for curing the defects. Unfortu-
nately, due to paucity of space, the file got mixed up with other B
files in the office of. the Standing Counsel, and was traced only
~
in June, 2003. The revision petition was thereafter re-filed along
with an application for condonation of delay in re-filing.
The High Court dismissed Crl. Rev. Petition No.356/2004
and Crl. M.A. No. 5227/2004 by judgment dated 10.8.2005, c
being of the view that there was unexplained delay in filing and
re-filing the revision petition.
4. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that
the High Court did not even deal with the explanations given by
D
the appellant in explaining the delay. The summary rejection by
the High Court holding that delay has not been properly ex-
plained was not correct. It is pointed out that the conclusions of
learned trial Judge directing discharge are unsustainable both
on facts and in law.
E
5. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand
submitted that merely because the allegations were serious in
nature, the order impugned before the High Court does not re-
quire interference as it is blemishless. Learned trial Judge rightly
noted that there was no evidence of criminal conspiracy against F
-~ him and therefore his discharge was rightly directed.
6. At this juncture, it is stated, at this length of time it would
not be proper to set aside the order of High Court.
7. The proof by sufficient cause is a condition precedent for
G
exercise of the extraordinary discretion vested in the court. What
counts is not the Ieng.th of ~he delay but the sufficiency of the cause
and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken
into account in using. the discretion. In N. Balakrishnan v. M.
Krishnamurthy (AIR 1998 SC 3222) it was held'by this Court that
H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.
A Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice l
to the parties. The provision contemplates that the Court has to go
"
in the position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay
can be said to have been resulted from the cause which he had
adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the peculiar
B circumstances of the case is sufficient. Although no special indul-
gence can be shown to the Government which, in similar circum-
stances, is not shown to an individual suitor, one cannot but take a r
I
practical view of the working of the Government without being un-
duly indulgent to the slow motion of its wheels.
c 8. What constitutes sufficient cause cannot be laid down
by hard and fast rules. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti
Misra (1975 (2) SCC 840) this Court held that discretion given
by Section 5 should not be defined or crystallised so as to con-
vert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expres-
D sion "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. In
Brij lneiar Singh v. Kanshi Ram (ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 (PC2 it
was observed that true guide for a court to exercise the discre-
tion under Section 5 is whether the appellant acted with rea-
sonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. In Shakuntala
E Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari (AIR 1969 SC 575) a Bench of
three Judges had held that unless want of bona tides of such
inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protec-
tion of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown
out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned.
F 9. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi
(1979 (4) sec 365) which is a case of negligence of the coun-
sel which misled a litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy,
the default in delay was condoned. In Lala Mata Din v. A.
Narayanan (1969 (2) SCC 770), this Court had held that there
G is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is
always sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is always a
~
question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a
device to cover an ulterior purpo$e. In that case it was held that
the mistake committed by the counsel was bona fide and it was
H not tainted by any mala fide motive.
STATE (NCT OF DELHI) v. AHMED JAAN 35
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J]
.... ~ 10. In State of Kera/av. E. K. Kuriyipe (1981 Supp SCC A
72), it was held that whether or not there is sufficient cause for
condonation of delay is a question of fact dependant upon the
facts and circumstances of the particular case. In Milavi Devi v.
Dina Nath (1982 (3) SCC 366), it was held that the appellant
had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of B
limitation. This Court under Article 136 can reassess the ground
~
and in appropriate case set aside the order made by the High
Court or the Tribunal and remit the matter for hearing on merits.
It was accordingly allowed, delay was condoned and the case
was remitted for decision on merits. c
11. In 0. P Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh (1984 (4) SCC
66), a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal to con-
done the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would
be a ground to condone the delay. Delay was accordingly con-
doned. In Collector Land Acquisition v. Katiji (1987 (2) SCC D
-...,,.,'
107), a Bench of two Judges considered the question of the
limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that Section 5
was enacted in order to enable the court to do substantial jus-
tice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The ex-
pression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic to enable the E
court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves
the ends of justice - that being the life-purpose for the existence
of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court
has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters insti-
tuted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have F
~ percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. This
Court reiterated that the expression "every day's delay must be
explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be ·
made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense
pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical con-
G
siderations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial
justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim
to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-
deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occa-
sioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or
H
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.
A on account of mala tides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by
resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not
respected on account of its power to legalise_ injustice on tech-
nical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice
and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach
B from this perspective,· there was sufficient cause for condoning
the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the
State which was seeking condonation and not a private party
was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law
demands that all litigants, including the State as 'a litigant, are
c accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an
even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-
motherly treatm.ent when the State is the applicant. The delay
was accordingly condoned.
12. ·Experience shows that on account of an impersonal .
D machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt
by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the in-
herited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-mak-
ing, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its
part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to ap-
E prove. The State which represents collective cause of the com-
munity, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts,
therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of
the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expres-
sion of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision
F on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in
presenting t~e appeal. Delay as accordingly condoned, the or-
der was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court
for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to
the parties. In Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra (1987 Supp SCC
G 339), this Court had held that the court should not adopt an in-
justice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for con-
donation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was con-
doned and the matter was remitted for expedjtious disposal in
accordance with law.
H 13. In G Ramegowda, Major v. Sp/. Land Acquisition Of-
STATE (NCT OF DELHI) v. AHMED JAAN 37
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J]
... -r ficer (1988 (2) sec 142), it was held that no general principle A
saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel could be laid.
The expression "sufficient cause" must receive a liberal con-
struction so as to advance substantial justice and generally
delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned
in the interest of justice whe~e no gross negligence or deliber- B
ate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seek-
ing condonation of delay. In litigations to which Government is a
party, there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be
ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such
defaults, no person is individually affected, but what, in the ulti- c
mate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Gov-
ernment are collective and institutional decisions and do not
share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The
law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as
for governmental authorities. ,Government, like any other litigant
D
must take responsibility for the acts, omissions of its officers.
But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter
where Government makes out a case where public interest was
shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on
the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were
clearly at cross-purposes with it. It was, therefore, held that in E
assessing what constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of
Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to ex-
elude from the consideration that go into the judicial verdict,
these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the func-
-A tioning of the Government. Govern,ment decisions are prover- F
bially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree
of procedural red-tape in the process of their making. A certain
amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly
sajd that those who bear responsibility of Government must have
"a little play at the joints". Due recognition of these limitations G
i on governmental functioning - of course, within reasonable lim-
its - is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered
unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put
Government and private parties·on the same footing in all re-
spects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Govern- H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 12 S.C.R.
f-
A mental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the deci-
sion-making process. The delay of over one year was accord-
•
ingly condoned.
14. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agen-
cies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of push-
B ing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for con-
siderable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a r-
routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the pro-
cess of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore,
certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals
c brought by the State are lost for such default no person is indi-
vidually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public
interest.The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be
considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather
than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining
D every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and char-
acteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would '>"'
be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach
in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the mat-
ters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No
E separate standards to determine the cause laid oy the State
vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards
of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should
constitute legal cells to examin~ the cases whether any legal
principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether
F cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to
take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. f,-
In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action
should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal
and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if
any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an
G
individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the
decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an ~
appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while
State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers
or servants.
H
STATE (NCT OF DELHI) v. AHMED JAAN 39
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J]
..... ~,,
15. The above position was highlighted in State of Haryana
v. Chandra Mani and Ors. (1996 (3) SCC 132); Special
A
Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kera/a v. K. V Ayisumma (1_996
(10) sec 634) and State of Nagaland v. ·upok AO and Ors.
(2005 (3) sec 752). It was noted that adoption of strict stan-
dard of proof sometimes fail to protract public justice, and it B
would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay
~
in the process of filing an appeal.
16. We find that the appellant had indicated the reasons
for the delay in filing and re-filing the revision petition. The High
Court unfortunately did not deal with those explanations and c
merely stated that the delay has not been explained. The High
Court was required to examine the correctness of the explana-
tion given, keeping in view the principles laid down by this Court .
in several cases. According to us, the explanations offered were
plausible and deserved to be accepted. Accordingly, we set D
....
~ -.
aside the impugned order of the High Court and remit the mat-
ter to it to hear the Criminal Revision on merits. It is made clear
that we have not expressed any opinion on merits.
17. The appeal is allowed.
E
R.P. Appeal allowed.
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