Holding

The transferred daily‑wage employees are deemed to have been appointed in the Electricity Board’s service from their original dates and are entitled to the benefit of the 28 Nov 1996 regularisation order; denial would contravene Article 14.

Summary

The petitioners were 34 daily‑wage employees of the Cooperative Electric Supply Society who were taken over by the U.P. State Electricity Board on 3 April 1997. They had been appointed before 4 May 1990, the cut‑off date for a Board decision dated 28 November 1996 that sought to regularise all daily‑wage employees who had been working before that date. The petitioners claimed that, having been transferred "in the same manner and position", they should be deemed to be Board employees and thus entitled to the benefits of the 1996 regularisation order. The Board contended that the order did not apply to the transferred employees. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were to be considered as having been appointed in the Board’s service from their original appointment dates, and therefore could not be denied the benefit of the 1996 order without violating Article 14 of the Constitution. The appeal was dismissed, confirming the High Court’s order granting regularisation.

Issues considered

Whether daily‑wage employees transferred from the Society to the Electricity Board are entitled to the benefit of the Board's 28 Nov 1996 regularisation order.
Whether denial of such benefit would violate Article 14 of the Constitution on grounds of discrimination, arbitrariness and unreasonableness.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14

Subjects

regularisationdaily wage employeesservice continuityArticle 14equalitynon‑arbitrarinessgovernment servicetransfer of employeesdiscrimination

Judgment

A U.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD
v.
POORAN CHANDRA PANDEY AND ORS.

OCTOBER 9, 2007
B
[A.K. MATHUR AND MARKANDEY KATJU, JJ;]

Service Law:

c Daily wage employees-Regularization of-Co-operative Electric
Supply Society-Taken over by UP. Electricity Board-Decision of
Board to regularize services of its daily wage employees-Not
implemented in respect ofthe employees oferstwhile Society though
taken over by and working in the Board "in the same manner and
D position"-Their writ petition allowed by High Court-HELD: Writ
petitioners have to be deemed to have been appointed in the service \
ofthe Electricity Board.from the date oftheir original appointment in
the Society-Since they were all appointed in the society before
4.5.1990, they cannot be denied the benefit ofthe decision ofElectricity
E Board dated 28.11.1996 permitting regularization ofits employees who
were working before 4. 5.1990-To take a contrary view would violate
Article 14 of the Constitution-Jn the instant case many of writ
petitioners have been working.from 1985 i.e. ·they have put in about
22 years' service and it will surely not be reasonable iftheir claim for ;f
F regularization is denied even after such a long period of service-
Hence apart from discrimination, Article 14 of the Constitution will
also be violated on the ground ofarbitrariness and unreasonableness
ifemployees who have put in such a long service are denied the benefit
of regularization and are made to face the same selection process
which fresh recruits have to face-Constitution ofIndia-Article 14.
G ·y
Constitution of India, 1950:
Article 14-Reasonableness in executive action-Decision ofUP.
Electricity Board to regularize services ofits daily wage employees-

H 920
U.P. STATEELECTRICITYBOARDv. POORAN 921
CHANDRA PANDEY
Not implemented in respect ofemployees oferstwhile Society taken A
over by the Board and working with it-HELD: Reasonableness and
non-arbitrariness is part of Article 14-lt follows that the
government must act in a reasonable and non-arbitrary manner
otherwise Article 14 would be violated-Uma Devi's* case is to be
read in conformity with Article 14 and it cannot be read in a manner B
which will make it in conflict therewith-No doubt, Maneka
Gandhi's** case does not specifically deal with the question of
y regularization of government employees, but the principle of
reasonableness in executive action and the law which it has laid
down, is ofgeneral application-Often Uma Devi's case is being c
applied by Courts mechanically without seeing the facts of a
particular case-A little difference in facts or even one additional
fact may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a
decision-Precedent.
*Secretary, State ofKarnataka & Ors. v. Uma Devi (3) & Ors., D
[2006] 4SCC1, Explained and distinguished.
**Maneka Gandhi v. Union ofIndia & Anr., AIR (1978) SC
597, followed.
State ofOrissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, AIR (1968) SC 647; E
Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat & Ors., [1987] 1 SCC
213; Bhuvnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd, [2003]
2SCC111 and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. NR.
Vairamani & Anr., AIR (2004) SC 4778, referred to.
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3765
of 2001.
From the Judgment and final Order dated 3.1.2000 of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow in Special
'f Appeal No. 364 (SB) of 1998. G
Aneesh Mittal, Subrajyoti Borthakur and Sunil Kumar Jain for the
Appellant.
S.R. Singh, Ashwani Garg and Vijay Kumar for the Respondents.
H
)&..
922 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R. \

A The Order of the Court was delivered by
ORDER
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
B 2. This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and
order dated 3.1.2000 in SA No. 364/1999 of the Division Bench of the
Allahabad Higl} Court (Lucknow Bench) whereby the Division Bench has
affirmed the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 21.9.1998 in
Writ Petition No. 4027(SS) of 1998.
C 3. By means of the writ petition, 34 petitioners who were daily wage
employees of the Cooperative Electric Supply Society (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Society') had prayed for regularization of their services
in the U.P. State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as 'the Electricity
Board'. It appears that the Society had been taken over by the Electricity
D Board on 3.4.1997. A copy of the minutes of the proceeding dated
3.4.1997 is Annexure P-2 to this appeal. That proceeding was presided
over by the Minister of Cooperatives, U.P. Government and there were
a large number of senior officers of the State government present in the
proceeding. In the said proceeding, it was mentioned that the daily wage
E employees of the Society who are being taken over by the Board will
start working in the Electricity Board "in the same manner and
position".
4. Pursuant to the said proceeding, the respondents herein were
absorbed in the service of the Electricity Board.
F
5. Earlier, the Electricity Board had taken a decision on 28.11.1996
to regularize the services of its employees working on daily wage basis
from before 4.5.1990 on the existing vacant posts and that an examination
for selection would be held for that purpose:
G 6. The contention of the writ petitioners (respondents herein) was
that since the Society had been taken over by the Electricity Board, the
decision dated 28.11.1996 taken by the Electricity Board with regard to
·its daily wage employees will also be applicable to the employees of the
Society who were working from before 4.5.1990 and whose services
H
U.P. STATEELECTRICITYBOARDv. POORAN 923
CHANDRA PANDEY
stood transferred to the Electricity Board and who were working with A
the Electricity Board on daily wage basis.
7. The learned Single Judge in his judgment dated 21.9.1998 held
that there was no ground for discriminating between two sets of employees
who are daily wagers, namely, (i) the original employees of the Electricity B
Board and (ii) the employees of the Society, who subsequently became
the employees of the Electricity Board when the Society was taken over
y by the Electricity Board. This view of the learned Single Judge was upheld
by the Division Bench of the High Court.
8. We are in agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench C
and the learned Single Judge.
9. The writ petitioners who were daily wagers in the service of the
Society were appointed in the Society before 4.5.1990 and their services
were taken over by the Electricity Board "in the same manner and
position". In our opinion, this would mean that their services in the D
Society cannot be ignored for considering them for the benefit of the order
dated 28.11.1996.
10. In our opinion, the proceeding dated 3.4.1997 makes it clear
that the employees of the Society should be deemed to be the employees E
of the Electricity Board with continuity of their service in the Society, and
it is not that they would be treated as fresh appointees by the Electricity
Board when their services were taken over by the Electricity Board. In
this view ofthe matter, the writ petitioners (respondents herein) are entitled
to the benefit of the order of the Electricity Board dated 28.11.1996. F
This view also finds support from the affidavit of Shri Ramapati Dubey,
Chief Engineer, R.P.M.O., U.P. State Electricity Board in which it is
mentioned that "In this way, the Board Order dated 28.11.1996, a copy
of which has been filed as Annesxure No. 5 to the writ petition, has been
complied with and the employees of the Cooperative Electric Supply G
Society have been given the same status and benefit of regularization in
the similar manner as it was given to the employees of the Board".
11. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the decision
of this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. v. Uma Devi
(3) & Ors., [2006] 4 SCC 1 and has urged that no direction for H
924 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 1-0 S.C.R. ---\,

A regularization can be given by the Court. In our opinion, the decision in
Uma Devi's case (supra) is clearly distinguishable. The said decision
cannot be applied to a case where regularization has been sought for in
pursuance of Article 14 of the Constitution.
B ·12. As observed by this Court in State of Orissa v. Sudhansu
Sekhar Misra, AIR (1968) SC 647 vide para 13):-
"A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What
is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation y
found therein nor what logically follows from the various
c observations made in it. On this topic this is what Earl of Halsbury,
LC said in Quinn v. Leathern, (1901) AC 495:
"Now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood (1898)
AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two
observations of a general character which I wish to make, and
D one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every
judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts
proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the
expressions which may be found there are not intended to be
expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by•
E the particular facts of the case in which such expressions
are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority
for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted
for a proposition that may seem to follow logically frOm it Such
a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a
F logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that
the law is not always
. .
logical at all."
13. InAmbica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat & Ors., [1987]
1 SCC 213 (vide para 18) this Court observed:-
G "The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background y
of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case
is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what
logically follows from it."

14. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd,
H·
U.P. STATEELECTRICITYBOARDv. POORAN 925
CHANDRA PANDEY
[2003] 2 SCC 111 (vide para 59), this Court observed:- A
"It is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional
facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value
of a decision. "
15. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. B
NR. Vairamani & Anr., AIR (2004) SC 4778, a decision cannot be relied
on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same Judgment this Court
'( also observed:-
"Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing
as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the c
decision on which reliance is placed. Observations ofCourts are
neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of
the statute and that too taken out of the context. These
observations must be read in the context in which they appear to
have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed D
).
as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute,
it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy
discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define.
Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They
interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted E
as statutes.
In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton, ( 1951 AC
737 at p. 761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:
}"'
"The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating F
the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J. as though they were part of
an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation
appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight
to be given to the language actually used by that most
distinguished judge." G
t In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., [1970] 2 All ER 294
Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin' s speech .... is not to be treated
as if it was a statute definition; it will require qualification in
new circumstances." Megarry, J. in (1971)1 WLR 1062
H
1.L
926 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R. •

A observed: "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved
judgment of Russell L. J. as if it were an Act of Parliament."
And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board, (1972) 2
WLR 537) Lord Morris said:
"There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or
B judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment,
and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made
in the setting of the facts of a particular case."
·y
Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may
make a world of difference between conclusions in two
c cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a
decision is not proper.
The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying
precedents have become locus classicus:
D "Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity
between one case and another is not enough because even a 1 I

single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in
deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide
cases (as said by Cardozo, J.) by matching the colour of one
E case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on
which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to .
another case is not at all decisive."
*** *** *** /
-:f

F "Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the
path ofjustice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim
off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in
thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path of
justice clear of obstructions which could impede it. "
G 16. We are constrained to refer to the above decisions and principles ·r
contained therein because we find that often Uma Devi's case (supra) is
being applied by Courts mechanically as if it were a Euclid's formula
without seeing the facts of a particular case. As observed by this Court
in Bhavnagar University (supra) and Bharat Petroleum Corporation
H
U.P. STATEELECTRICITYBOARDv. POORAN 927
CHANDRA PANDEY
Ltd. (supra), a little difference in facts or even one additional fact may A
make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision. Hence, in
our opinion, Uma Devi's case (supra) cannot be applied mechanically
without seeing the facts of a particular case, as a little difference in facts _
can make Uma Devi's case (supra) inapplicable to the facts of that case.
17. In the present case the writ petitioners (respondents herein) only B
wish that they should not be discriminated against vis-a-vis the original
employees of the Electricity Board since they have been taken over by
y the Electricity Board "in the same manner and position". Thus, the writ
petitioners have to be deemed to have been appointed in the service of
the Electricity Board from the date of their original appointments in the C
Society. Since they were all appointed in the society before 4.5.1990 they
cannot be denied the benefit of the decision of the Electricity Board dated
28 .11.1996 permitting regularization of the employees of the Electricity
Board who were working from before 4.5.1990. To take a contrary view
would violate Article 14 of the Constitution. We have to read Uma Devi's D
! case (supra) in confmmity with Article 14 of the Constitution, and we
cannot read it in a manner which will make it in conflict with Article 14.
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and any judgment, not
even of the Supreme Court, can violate the Constitution.
E
18. We may further point out that a seven-Judge Bench decision of
this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr., AIR (1978)
SC 597 has held that reasonableness and non-arbitrariness is part of
Article 14 of the Constitution. It follows that the government must act in
a reasonable and non-arbitrary manner otherwise Article 14 of the F
Constitution would be violated. _Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) is a
decision of a seven-Judge Bench, whereas Uma Devi's case (supra) is a
decision of a five-Judge Bench of this Court. It is well settled that a smaller
bench decision cannot override a larger bench decision of the Court. No
doubt, Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) does not specifically deal with the G
...,/ question of regularization of government employees, but the principle of
reasonableness in executive action and the law which it has laid down, in
our opinion, is of general application.
19. In the present case many of the writ petitioners have been
working from 1985 i.e. they have put in about 22 years' service and it H
1

928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] IO S.C.R. ' \

A will surely not be reasonable if their claim for regularization is denied even
after such a long period of service. Hence apart from discrimination, Artide
14 of the Constitution will also be violated on the ground of arbitrariness
and unreasonableness if employees who have put in such a long service
are denied the benefit of regularization and are made to face the same
B selection which fresh recruits have to face.
20. For the reasons aforementioned, we find no merit in this appeal.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
RP. Appeal dismissed.
c