Holding

The Supreme Court held that the mother‑in‑law and husband intentionally set the deceased on fire, constituting murder under Section 302 IPC, while the brother‑in‑law was entitled to the benefit of doubt.

Summary

The case concerned the death of Sudha, who was found burnt in a Delhi flat; the prosecution alleged that her mother‑in‑law Shakuntala and husband Laxman Kumar deliberately set her on fire to avoid dowry demands, while the defence claimed an accidental fire from a kerosene stove. The trial court convicted all three accused of murder under Section 302 IPC and sentenced them to death, but the Delhi High Court acquitted them, finding reasonable doubt. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the admissibility and weight of oral and written dying declarations, the credibility of circumstantial evidence, and the possibility of an accidental fire. It held that the evidence proved intentional setting of fire by Shakuntala and Laxman, rejecting the defence theory, but gave the brother‑in‑law Subhash the benefit of doubt. The Court also considered the scope of an appeal against acquittal under Article 136 and the appropriateness of the death penalty after a two‑year lapse. Consequently, it affirmed the acquittal of Subhash, convicted Shakuntala and Laxman for murder, and reduced their punishment to life imprisonment.

Issues considered

The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was intentionally set on fire, not that the fire was accidental.
The admissibility, reliability, and evidentiary value of oral and written dying declarations under Sections 32 and 162 of the Evidence Act.
Whether the High Court's acquittal can be interfered with under Article 136 of the Constitution.
The appropriate quantum of punishment for a dowry‑related murder after a substantial time lag.
The applicability of circumstantial evidence and judicial notice in establishing the accused's motive and conduct.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161, s. 162, s. 313
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 11, s. 114, s. 145, s. 162, s. 3, s. 32, s. 55
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302

Subjects

murder by burningdowry deathdying declarationcircumstantial evidenceArticle 136appeal against acquittallife imprisonmentIndian Evidence ActIPC 302dowry harassment

Judgment

898

A

STATE DELHI (ADllINISTRATION)
v.
I.AXMAN KOMAR & ORS.
ll SEPTEMBER 23; 1985

[A.N, SEN AND RANGARATH MISRA, JJ.]

A. Murder by burning - No eye witness to testify the act of
setting fire to the deceased or to the defence version of
c deceased's saree catching fire accidently, except the oral testi-·
mony of witnesses who ran to the spot soon after hearing the
cries for help by the deceased, the three statements implicating
the accused as the perpetrators of the crime made by the deceased
before admission in the hospital, the conduct of the accused when
the deceased's clothes were aflame, the alleged torture of the
deceased for sometime preceding the occurrence over demands for
D cash and goods in kind and other circumstances on record -
Circumstantial evidence corroborated by other evidence
Appreciation of evidence taking judicial notice of facts Sections
3, 11, 55 and 114 of the Evidence Act, Indian Penal Code section
302.

B. Dying declarations, relevance of - They can be used as
E corroborative evidence and need not be totally rejected -
Evidence Act section 32 (1).

c. Appeal against acquittal and appeal against conviction,
scope of and the powers of the Supreme Court to-intervene under
Article 136 of the Constitution.
F
D. Sentence - Imposition of proper punishment and passing a
sentence while interfering in an appeal against acquittal by the
Supreme Court - Time lag may be one of the factors to be
consideted.
G Shakuntala and Srinivas have four sons Subhash, Laxman,
Vinod and Ram Avtar and two daughters. They ordinarily live at
Barot about 50 miles from Delhi alongwith their two daughters.
Subhash and his wife· Madhu (DW5), are school teachers at Delhi
and have two minor children. Sometime in May or June, 1979 these
brothers came to live in ground floor flat No. 9B of the Janata
flats in Ashok Vihar area. They purchased the First Floor Flat
No. 90 previously occupied by Deven Dass and his wife . Ishwari r

f
STATE v. LAXMAN KUMAR 899

Devi (PW4) in 1980 and on their request Deven Dass moved over to A
Flat No. 280 in the same srea in September October'80. On
February 16, 1980 Lruonan Kumar was married to Sudha, tbe deceased
and they lived in one of the rooms in flat No. 9B. Sudha was in
the f.;mly way and was expecting to deliver a child towards the
end of ~he first week of December, 1980.
B
A little after 9· p.m. on December 1, 1980, on hearing a
lady's voice crying "llachao Bachao" (Save 0 Save) from flat No.
9B, the neighbours like Jaapal Singh (PWl) ·satish Chopra (PW2)
and Uhwari Devi (PW4) ran to the flat and Tarsem Jain (PWS) who
was near about also came there. PWl saw Lruonan standing at the
entrance door and attempting to close it while Subhash was stand- c
ing with his hand on the latch of the door which opened to the
courtyard. PWl and others who had collected there forced their
way inside and saw Sudha in s, standing position but .aflame. They
attempted to·extinguish the fire first by pulling out ·the saree
from the body of the lady, put a gunny bag lying nearby on the
burning body and later wrapped her up with a blanket brought by D
PW 2 Satish Chopra. When, after 'extinguishing the fire, they
brought Sudha to 'the room. where Shakuntala mother-in-law was
standing,- Sudha made a statement to the effect that it was her
mo~her-in-law who had set her fire after pouring kerosene on her
body. Soon a taxi was brought and the respondents accused took
Sudha for treatment to the Hindu Rao. Hospital. While betng shif-
ted to the taxi, Sudha made another statement to the same effect
aa to the authorship of the crime. Again, when on the way they
picked up Gayatri, one of the ·sisters of Sudha and PW3 and her
husband, she repeated the allegation against her lj!Other-in-law on
seeing her sister PW3 in the taxi. At the suggestion of PW3 Sudha
was taken to St. Stephen's hospital where Sudha was being looked
after for her pre,,,,.ternity care. The witnesses on their own, F
believing that Sudha was being taken to Hindu Rao Hospital, went
there and waited for some time but when they found that Sudha was
not being brought there, they returned to their residences.
However, soon after the distress cry for help, a telephone
message to the.police Control Room with telephone No. 100, that a
lady had been set on fire was conveyed and on this First Infor- G
mation having been duly monitored to the mobile police van around
the area in question, PW 17 was deputed to look into the matter.
Learning that Sudha was shifted to the hospital, PW 17 reached
the hospital straighway for investigation. At the hospital a
written declaration is said to have been made which was proved
and relied on by the defence. Sudha died in the early hours of ll
December 2, 1980.
900 Sill'REME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP;2 S.C.R,
..
,
A
After due investigation the respondents were prosecuted on
a charge of 1J11rder. There is no eye witness to testify to the act
of setting fire to Sudha which is the prosecution case, or to the
factum that of Sudha's saree catching fire accidentaly as alleged
by the defence. At the trial, the prosecution has sought to rely
B upon the oral testimony of witnesses who ran to the spot sooc
after hearing the cries of deceased, the three statements 11111de by
her to the various witnesses implicating the accused persons as
the perpetrators of the crime, the conduct of the accused persons
as deposed to by the witnesses when the deceased's clothes were
aflame, the alleged . torture of the deceased for some time
preceding the occurreQCe over deuiand for cash and goods in kind,
c and other circumstances available on record and examined as many
as 21 wit!leSses.

According to the defence version the deceased, while trying
to lit the brosene stove for heating up milk for one of the
children of Subhaah who was feeling hungry had her saree lit up
by the stove fir.e which led to the incident; that Laxman her
D
husband Wll8 away as he luid accompanied the deceased'& sister up
to the bus stand, that Subhaah and Shakuntala did take reasonable
care to put out the fire. To prove this defence they examined
P'ill, the doctor at the hospital, DW2 (same as PW 18) Record
Keeper of the hospital, llW 3 a neighbour, DW4 the taxi driver and
DWS wife of Subhash and also relied on certain documents.
E
The. trial Judge accepted the prosecution version, nmnely;
(i) the authorship of the crime; (ii) the relationship of the
deceased with Laxman and members of his family having become
strained on account of demands for more dowry and therefore their
decision to do away with her before the child was bom; and (iii)
F
the factum of failure on the part of the accused persons to take
appropriate steps to save the deceased while the fire was put out
by the neighbours P'ils 1, 2, 4 and 5. Accepting the charges and
convicting the respondents of 111.1rder, he was of the view that the
appropriate punishment to be meted was death. He accordingly
sentenced all the respondents to death and as required by law,
G
ref erred the matter to the High Court of Delhi for confirmation
of the death sentence. The respondents challenged their convic-
tion by prefer=ing an appeal.

The reference and the appeal were taken up together for
hearing by the High Court. The High Court differed from the trial
Judge on almost every aspect of the testimony· of the prosecution
H
witnesses, excepting the presence of P'i/s 1, 2, & 5 and their role ,. '
STATE v, LAXMAN KUMAR 901

in extinguishing the fire, accepted the defence version, and A
discharged the reference and allowed the appeal• The respondents
were, therefore, acquitted. Hence the State appeal No.93 of 1984
and the Indian Federation of Woman Lawyers appeal No. 94 of 1984.

Giving the benefit of doubt to the accused Subhash and
while maintaining the conviction of Shskuntala & Laxman for the B
offence of DJJrder ·under section 302 1.p;c. recorded by the
Sessions Judge, allowing the appeal in part by altering the
sentence of death into one of· life imprisonment, the Court,

llELIJ: 1.1 The scope of an appeal against acquittal and the
scope of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to interfere in such a c
matter are well settled. There is no difference between an appeal
against conviction and an appeal against acquittal except that
when dealing with an aPt>eal against s.cquittal the Court keeps in
view the position that the presumption of innocence in favour of
the accused has been fortified by acquittal and if the view adop-
te-i by the High Court is .a reasonable one and the conclusion D
reached by it had its grounds well set on the materials on
record. [929 A-DJ

1.2 Once evidence has been read and the Supreme Court has
proceeded to review the entire material, there is indeed no limi-
tation in law in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 136
of the Constitution for the matter of making a just dedsion. E
[929 D-E]

1.3 In the instant case, on the evidence it ls clear: (i}
that the relationship of the deceased with the members of the
husbands' family had become strained and she had been subjected
to physical as well as mental torture for some time before the F
incident; The physical torture was the outcome of indifference to
her health and the mental torture was on account of demand of
dowry; (ii) that the deceased had not lighted the kerosene atove
that. evening and her wearing apparel had not caught fire
accidently but kerosene had been sprinkled on her clothes and she
had been brought into ·the open space where fire was lit to her G
clothes; (iii) that the deceased died not as an outcome of an
accidental fire but on account of a designed move on the part of
the members of the family of the accused persons to put an end to
her life; and (iv) that the husband and mother-in-law of the
. deceased are responsible for the killing of the deceased
by setting her on fire and therefore comnitted the offence of H
DJJrder and are liable to be convicted for the offence punishable
under section 302 1.p;c., whi.le. the brother-in-law Subhash is

'
902 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP:2 s.c.R.

A entitled to the benefit of doubt, his case being on the border
line. [924 A,H, 925 A, 928 A-B,G-H, 929 A-B, 930 B-D]

Barendra :ic.-r Ghosh v. The King l!aperor, 52 I.A. 40
referred to.

B 2 .1 The cause of any person being found aflame with fire
could always be either of the three alternatives, namely, (a)
suicide/self imnolation; (b) accidental fire; and (c) "being put
on fire by someone". In the instant case: (i) the deceased having
been burnt is not in dispute; (ii) the plea of suicide has not
been advanced either by the prosecution or by the defence. Sui-
cide as the reason of death has rightly not been pressed into
C service in as llllCh the deceased, inapite of the fact that she had
been suffering physically without any assistance at the advanced
stage of her pregnancy, was getting prepared to play the role of
mother; (iii) the defence plea of accidental fire has to be
rejected by taking judicial notice of the facts (a) the kerosene
stove was in the open space {b) there was a gas stove in the
kitchen and the same was in order but there was no evidence why
D the gas stove was not used (c) around 9 p.m. of December it
would be unbearably cold outside the house in Delhi. To work the
kerosene stove would take sometime and if milk for the crying
child was immediately necessary, the kerosene stove would not be
the prop"!r heating medium. On the other hand, the gas stove would
haw ae•. ved the purpose better. Not llllCh of gas was likely to be
E consumed for heating the milk, nor even for heating up the food
for brother-in-law Subhash; (d) the deceased did not have any
warm clothings on her person and had only a nylon .saree. Being
pregnant lady at an advanced stage she was expected to keep pro-
perly robed to avert getting ill from exposure to cold, and
therefore, it is not likely that she would have ventured going
F · out to operate the kerosene stove; (e) the deceased being in an
advance stage of pregnancy would have found it difficult to squat
on the floor itself; and (f) it would be natural human conduct
for the decea.sed to have gone to the gas stove in preference to
the kerosene stove. Once the explanation and the defence story of
acccidental fire has been discarded and there being no plea of
G suicide, the prosecution story that fire was set t.o the saree of
the deceased is the only other way in which she 111JSt have been
burnt. [909 B,E-F, 912 E,G-H, 913 A-DJ

3. A dying declaration enjoys almost a sacrosanct status as
a piece of evidence as it comes from mouth of a person who is
H about to die and at that stage of life he is not likely to make a
STATE v. LAXMAN KUMAR 903
•.
false statement. 'Ordinarily. a document as valuable as a dying ·
declaration is supposed to be fool proof and is to incorporate A
the perticulars which it is supposed to contain. Conviction cen-
not be based purely on oral dying declarations, despite earlier
cases of conviction solely based thereon. ·However, oral dying
declarationa cannot be totally rejected and the same can be used
as corroborative material. In the instant case, the alleged
written dying declaration cannot be accepted because the expla- B
nation of PW 17, the police officer who recorded the dying decla-
ration himself contrary to the Delhi Police rules as to why he
was not looking for a Magistrate or a near relation but getting
it endorsed by the doctor as "atteated the ·recorded statement"
and without indicating the time of the statement and without the
signature of the deceased who was an educated person is unconvin;_ c
cing and not reliable: Equally no reliance can be made on the
oral statements made by the deceased until . corroborated with
other evidence. [913 F-G, 914 A,D,G-H, 915 (}-H, 916 A-BJ

Kushal llao Vo State of Bombay, A,I,R, 1958 S,C, 22; llalip
S:lngh & Ors. v. State of POD.jab A.I.Ro 1979 S.C. 1173; P6dda D
llarayana & Ors. v. State of Andhra Ptadesb, [1975J 4 s.c.c. 153;
Sat Piu1. v. Delhi Adminiattatlon (1976 J 1 s.c.R. 727 referred to.

4. In a suitable case of bride bo1rning, death sentence may
not be improper. However, .in the instant case the Trial Judge had
thought it proper to impose the punishment of death but the High
· Court acquitted all the accused. In the fact situation following E
the acquittal in the hands of the High Court and the time lag of
two years since the respondents were acquitted ID.1st be taken into
consideration while imposing a proper punishment. In the instant
case the .Court awarded sentence of imprisonment for life for the
accused. [931 A-CJ
F
OllSl!llVATION

(It is the obligation of every Court to find out the truth
and act according to law once the truth is discovered. In that
search for truth obviously the Court has to function within the
bounds set by law and act on the evidence placed before it. What G
happens outside the Court room when the Court is buay in its
process of adjudication is indeed irrelevant and unless a proper
cushion is provided to keep the proceedings within the court room
dissociated from the heat generated outside the court room either
through the news media or through flutter in the public mind, the
cause of justice is bound to suffer. Mankind has shifted from the H
904 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP;2 s.c.R.

state of nature towards a civilized socieity and it is no longer
A
the physical power of a litigating individual or the might of the
ruler nor even the. opinion of the majority that takes away the
liberty of a citizen by convicting him and making him suffer a
sentence of imprisonment. Allard of punishment following
conviction at a trial in a system wedded to rule of law is the
B
outcome of cool deliberation in the court room after adequate
hearing is afforded to the pai'des, accusations are brought
against the accased, the prosecutor is given an opportunity of
supporting the charge and the accused is equally given an
opportunity of meeting the accusations by establishing his
innocence. It is the outcome of cool deliberations and the
screening of the material by the informed mind of the Judge that
c leads to determination of the lis• If the cushion is lost and the
Court room is allowed to vibrate with the heat generated outside
it, the adjudicatory procP.ss suffers and the search for truth is
stifled.) ·
.,
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 93 and
'
94 of 1984. ,. I'
D
From the Judgment and Order dated 3.11.1983 of the Delhi
High Court in Crl. Appeal No. 131 of 1982 and Murder Reference
No. 1 of 1983.

I
M.S. Gujral, Girish Chandra, R.N. Poddar and Mansoor Ali
E
for the Appellant in Crl. A. No. 93 of 1984.

R.K. Garg, Mrs. Urmila Sirur, M.V. Katarke, Ms. Rani Jeth-
malani, Mrs. Urmila Kapoor and Mrs. C.M. Chopra for the
Appellants in Crl. A. No. 94 of 1984.

F
Rajendra Singh, M.N. Shroff and Dilbagrai Sheti for the
Respondents in both the appeals.

The Judb'lllent of the Court was delivered by

RANGANATH MISRA, J. These two appeals are by special
leave. The Delhi Administation has preferred Criminal. Appeal No.
G
93/84 and the Indian Federation of Women Lawyers and others have
preferred the other Criminal Appeal. Both are directed against
the same judgment of the Delhi High Court acquitting the
respondents of a charge of murder of one Sudha by setting fire to
her• The Trial court had accepted the prosecution case and
H
considering it t? be one of the atrocious dowry deaths, had
sentenced each of the respondents to death. The reference ma.de by
the trial Judge was discharged by the High Court and the appeal
preferred by the respondents was allowed·

I
STATE v. LAXMAN KlJMAK [RANGANATH MISRA, J, J 905

The three respondents are Shakuntala, the mother and two of A
her sons, Subhash Chandra and L<.xman Kumar. Shankuntala is the
wife of one Sriniwas. They have four sons Subhash, Laxman, Vinod
and Ram Avtar, and two daughters. The parents oridinarily live at
Barot about 50 miles away from Delhi along with. the two
daughters. Subhash and his wife Madhu, .OW.5, are school teachers
at Delhi. They have two minor children. Laxman Kmliar was married B
to Sudha over whose death the present case has arisen. Vinod and
Ram Avtar were living with the two elder brothers at Delhi. Some
time in May or June 1979. these brothers came to live in Flat No.
9-B of the Janata Flats in Ashok Vihar area. This flat is in the
ground floor. Flat No.9-D which is the corresponding first floor
falt was previously in occupation of tenant - Deven Dass - whose c
wife Ishwari Devi has·been examined. as PW.4. Some time in 1980,
this flat was purchased by the family of the accused persons and
on their request the tenant shifted to Flat No. 28-D in the same
area about two months before the incident.

On February 16, 1980, Laxman Kumar was married to Sudha. D
After the· marriage Subhash and members of his family (00.5 and.
the two children) started living in one of ·the rooms in the
ground floor while Laxman and Sudha lived in the other in the
same flat. The upper rooms were occupied by the two other bro-
thers, Vinod and Ram Avtar. As it. appears, Shakuntala, the
mother, was oridinarily staying with her husband at Barot but now
and then came· to Delhi and lived the so.ns. E

Sudha's two sisters, Gayatri, P.W.3 and Snehlata, P.w. 6,
were married to Pawan Kumar Goel and Uamodar Dass Gupta, tespec-
ti vely. Pawan Kumar was lj_ving in Premnagar area while· Damodar
Dass lived in Hari Nagar, both parts of Delhi. Sudha was in the
family way and was expecting to deliver a child towards the end F
of the first week of December 198U.

ln Flat No. 9-B there was a small kitchen where a gas
operated stove along with a cylinder was kept. A small portion of
the open space in the courtyard by the side of the kitchen had

'
been covered with asbestos sheets. There also cooking used to be G
done with the help of a kerosene stove as the kitchen was small.
Certain other household materials, including stock of kerosene in
tins were kept there.

A little after 9 P.M. on December 1, 1980, a shout was
heard from Flat No. 9-B. It was a lady's voice crying 'Bachao H
Mchao' (save 0 save). On hearing the cry neigh~urs like Jaspal
90b SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A
Singh, P.w. 1, Satish Chopra, P.W.2 lshwari Devi, P.w. 4 ran to
the flat and P. W. 5 Tarsem Jain who was near about also came
there. P.W. 1 saw Laxman standing at the entrance door and was
attempting to close it while Subhash was standing with his hand
on the latch of the door which opened to the courtyard. He and
others who had collected forced their way inside and saw Sudha in
ll
a standing position but aflame. · The neighbours attempted to
extinguish the fire first by pulling out the saree from the body
of the lady, put a gunny bag lying nearby on the burning body and
when Satish·Chopra brought a blanket, the same was wrapped around
her body. After extinguishing the fire they brought Sudha to the
room where Snakuntala was standing. According to the prosecution
case,Sudha, on seeing the mother-in-law, made a statement to the
c effect that it was she who had set her on fire after pouring
kerosene on her body. Soon a taxi was brought and the three mem-
bers of the family (respondents here) took Sudha for treatment to
the hospital. On the way they picked up P.W.3 and her husband.
Initially the accused persons had decided to take Sudha to Hindu
Rao Hospital ·but on P.W. 3 suggesting that Sudha may be taken to
St. Stephen's Hospital where she was being looked after for her
D pre-maternity care, she was ultimately taken there.

Sudha appears to have reached the hospital around 9.45 P.M.
The witnesses on their own believing that Sudha was being taken
to Hindu Rao Hospital, went there and waited for some time but
when they found that the lady was not being brought there, they
returned to their residences. Soon after the cry for help had
been heard, a telephone message had been conveyed to the Police
Control Room having Telephone No. 100 that a lady had been set on
fire and this information had been duly monitored to the mobile
police van around the area in question. P.W. 17 was deputed to
look into the matter. lly the time he reached the spot, Sudha had
F already been shifted to the hospital. Therefore, P.W. 17 went
straight to the hospital from there. '

•
It is further case of the prosecution that Sudha made
statements soon after the witnesses gat~ered near the flat itself
pointing to the mother-in-law as the killer. She again made
G statement while she was being sl1ifted to the taxi. When P.W.3 and
her husband came into the taxi on the way to the hospital, she is
alleged to have repeated the statement about the incident. At the
hospital a written declaration is said to have been made on which
the prosecution does not rely but which the defence has proved.

H Sudha died in the early hours of December 2, 1980. After
due investigation the respondellts wer~ prosecuted on a charge of
STAIB v. I.AXMAN KUMAR lRANGANATH MISRA, J.] 907

-- nrurder. There is no eye witness to testify to the act.of setting A
fire to Sudha which is the prosecution case, or to the fact of
Sudha's saree catching fire accidentally as alleged by the
defence. Prosecution has sought to rely upon the oral testimony
of witnesses who ran to the spot soon after hearing the cries of
Sudha, the statements made by Sudha to the various witnesses
implicating. the accused persons as the perpetrators of the crime, B
the conduct of the accused persons as deposed to by the witnesses
when Sudha's clothes were aflame, the alleged torture of Sudha.
, for some time preceding the occurrence over demands- for cash and
goods in kind, and other circl.DUStances available on record.

At the trial the prosecution examined 21 witnesses of whom c
P.Ws. 1, 2, 4 and 5 are neighbours who spoke about the incident
from the stage they saw after being attracted by the cries raised
by Sudha. P.Ws. 3 and 6 are the sisters of Sudha. P.W. 7 is her
mother and PW 8 is the elder brother of Sudha and both of them
lived in Calcutta •. These four witnesses have been examined to
speak about the relationship that existed between Sudha on the D
one side and the husband and other members of his family on the
other. PW.9 is the doctor who conducted the post-mortem
examination. PWs; 10, 11 .and 14 are three constables who had a
role to play in the process of investigation. PW. 12 was the Duty
Officer at Ashok Vihar Police Station at the relevant time. He
was called to prove the papers where the information from the
hospital about Sudha' s death had been recorded. PW. 13 is the
Receptionist at St. Stephen's Hospital who had passed on the
message of Sudha's death to the duty Officer. PW. 15 had received
the message given at 9.15 P.M. on December 1, 1980, about a lady
...I being burnt by fire. PW. 16 is a Draughtsman attached to the
, Crime Branch of the Delhi Police who had measured the different
places in and around the flat where the occurrence took place. F
PW. 17 is the Investigating Officer. PW. 18 is a doctor who had
examined PW. 1 for burn injuries on his person. PW 19 (wrongly
shown in the paperbook as PW 18) was attached to the St.
Stephen's Hospital as a Record Keeper and he produced certain
documents. FW. 20 (wrongly shown as PW.19) was also a Duty
Officer attached to the Ashok Vihar Police Station who on G
receiving the telephone message in the night of December 1, 1980,
had monitored it to the mobile van. FW 21 (wrongly shown as FW.
20) was a formal witness from the Police Malkhana.

According to the defence version, Sudha while trying to lit
the kerosene stove for heating up milk for one of the children of H
Subhash who was feeling hungry had her saree lit up by the stove
908 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP:2 s.c.R.

fire which led to the incident. Laxman was away as he had accom-
-
A
panied Sudha's sister up to the bus stand. Subhash and Shakuntala
took reasonable care to put off the fire. To prove this defence,
they have examined five witnesses being ow.1, the doctor at the
hospital, DW.2 (same person as PW.18), Record Keeper of the
Hospital, DW.3, a .neighbour, IJW, 4, the driver of the taxi and
B DW.S, the wife of Subhash· They have also relied upon certain
documents.

The learned trial Judge accepted the prosecution version·
He believed that Sudha was about to aeliver a child on account of
the advanced stage of pregnancy had become somewhat illlDObile·
Kerosene had been sprinkled on her body with a view to killing
c her and fire was set to her clothes at the time alleged. The
relationship of Sudha with Laxman and members of his family had
become strained on account of demands for more dowry and the
accused had decided to do away with her before the child was
born. He accepted the oral evidence on the side of the prosecu-
tion as to authorship of the crime. He also accepted the prosecu-
tion allegation that the accused persona !.ad not taken
~· -
D appropriate steps and it is the neighbours who put. out the fire.
Accepting the charge and convicting the respondents of 1111rder, he
was of the view that the appropriate punishment to be meted was
death. He accordingly sentenced all the respondento to death and
as required by law, referred the matter to the High Court of
Delhi for·' confirmation of the death sentence. The respondents
E challenged their conviction by preferring an appeal. The
reference and the appeal were taken up together for hearing by
the High Court and the High Court discharged the reference and
allowed t~e appeal. The respondents thus came to be acquit~ed.

The High Court differed from the trial Judge on almost
F every aspect excepting the presence of PWs.1, 2 and 5 and their
role in extinguishing the fire. This is what the High Court
stated :

''We have no hesitation in agreeing with Mr. Teja Singh
that PWs. 1, 2 and 5 had rushed to the rescue of the
deceased on hearing her cries of 'Bachao Bachao'. They
G
had actively helped in extinguishing the fire of the •
deceased, brought her out, and also probably one of
them brought a taxi in which Sudha was taken to the
hospital. PW._2 states that he had gone to the house
of Sardar Ajit Singh and from there telephoned the
H police control room regarding the occurrence. We have
no reason to doubt the correctness of the above state-
ment of P\if,2"
STATE v. I.AXMAN KUMAR l RANGANATH MISRA, J. J 909

The High Court made clean di vision of its judgment into separate A
heads like : (1) Prosecution version of the occurrence; (2)
Motive; (3) Dying declaratios; (4) Medical evidence; (5) Conduct
of the accused; (6) Investigation; and (7) Conclusion. While
dealing ~th the prosecution version of the occurrence, the High
Court extracted substantial portions of the statements given
under section 313, Cr. P.C. by each of the accused persons. B

That Sudha was burnt at the relevant time has never been in
dispute. There could be three alternatives for her being burnt
(1) suicide; (2) accidental fire; and (3) being put on fire. The
plea of suicide has not been advanced either by the prosecution
or by the defence. It is true that Sndha had been suffering c.
physically as found by the learned tr.ial Judge and accepted by
the High Court on account of the fact that there was no one to
assist her in the work at hotne and the entire load came up on
her. Yet, she had withstood all that and within a week or so she
was about to be relieved of the heavy burden she carried on deli-
very of the child. Nature, it is said, processes the instincts of D
the mother to be in such a way that by the time she is about to
deliver the child, a total transformation comes about. The record
does not have any indication that Sudha ever thought of putting
an end to her life. On the other hand, we are led to hold that
like every expecta11.t mother she was looking forward to see the.
fruits of the long waiting and the suffering she had under·gone
for b<:getting the child. There is material that she was preparing .. E
warm clothings for the baby to arrive and getting prepared to
play the role of tnather. Suicide as the re.ason of death has,
therefore, rightly not been pressed into service l~.aving the two
other alternatives of accidental fire as pleaded by the defence
and the intentional killing by burning her as pleaded by the
prosecution, for consideration. F

Laxtnan Kumar in his statement under s. 313 Cr. P.C. had
suggested that Jaspal Singh, PW. l and Satish Chopra, PW. 2 had
formed a group against hitn and his brothers. Subhash has,
however, not stated in that strain. J:A/.5 spoke about dispute with
Jaspal over unauthorised construction and blockage of the water G
passage. PW. 1 Jaspal Singh has not been cross examined in this
regard excepting a bare suggestion at one pl.ace. Jaspal Singh, as
his evidence shows, is on a job which keeps h1tn mostly out of
Delhi and he did not appear to be involved in any politics of the
locality. The anitnosity of the principal prosecution witnesses
which the accused persons wanted to suggest has, therefore, not H
'been established in this case. '
910 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19851 sUPP;2 s.c.a.

A We have already indicated that both the trial Judge as also
the High Court have accepted the fact that PWs. 1, 2 and 5 rushed
to the spot on hearing Sudha 's cry for help. If relationship
between these witnesses on one side and members of the family of
the accused on the other had been strained as alleged, the spon-
taneous response which crune from these witnesses would not have
B been found. We cannot lose sight of the fact that one of the
curses of OXJdern living, particularly in highly urbanised areas
is to have a life cut off from the C0111111lnity so as even not to
know the neighbours. Indifference to what happens around is the
way of life. That being the ordinary behaviour of persons living
in the city, if added to it there was aniOXJsity, these witnesses
would certainly not have behaved in the manner they have. We,
c therefore, are not impressed by the doubts expressed by the High
Court about the veracity of their evidence. these witnesses not
only rushed to the spot but took a leading part in putting out
the fire from Sudha's person and ensured her despatch for medical
assistance at the shortest interval. As expected of a good neigh-
bour, information was given to the police, a blanket was made
available, a taxi was called and human sympathy and assistance to
D the extent possible was extended. If the accusation of aniOXJsity
and illfeeling is not.accepted, these witnesses must be taken to
be not only competent being present at the spot, but also accep-
table in respect of what they say as being truthful witnesses.
The trial Judge had appreciated their evidence that way and we
see no justification for the High Court to have differed from
E that. It is pertinent to notice that PW.l suffered a burn injury
and this is supported by medical evidence. Even the High Court
accepted the position that this injury was suffered when P11 1 was
attempting to put out the fire on Sudha's person.

PW .4 is a lady who had been living in the upper floor Flat
F No. 9-D until about October 1980. Sudha 111USt have had occasion to
know her very intimately because they lived together for about
eight OXJnths. Sudha came from an urban background being a resi-
.dent of Calcutta. In her new setting she must have looked for
some company. ow.5, the only other lady in the family, worked in
/
a School and possibly her relationship with Sudha was not very
G cordial though they lived together. In these circumstances it is
only natural that Sudha would have turned to PW. 4 Ishwari Devi,
for being in friendly terms. The evidence of PW.4 shows that they
were quite close to each other and Sudha used to open her mind to
her every now and then. It is her evidence that even after she
had shifted to her new apartment, they used to meet alOXJst every-
H
r1"'
'I....
STATE v. LAXMAN KUMAR lRANGANATH 111SllA, J • ) 911

A
day. A suggestion was made that PW. 4 had developed animosity
against the accused persons as she and her husband had been
forced to vacate the tenanted premises of Flat No. 9-D. There is
no evidence of any pressure and consequently no ill-feeling.
Knowing the difficulties which the family of the accused faced on
account of want of space, PW. 4 and her husband appear to have
B
volunteered to shift to the new residence. It was also suggested
to this witness that they were owing Rs.185 to the grocery shop
of the accused Laxman and since the money was demanded, strained
relationship had developed. 1'he witness has clearly stated that
the amount had been paid when Laxman had demanded the money about
a month after the death of Sudba. A current credit of the type
from the grocery shop could . be no reason for developing bad
c
relationship. In the circumstances we do not see justification to
hold that PW. 4 had strained relationship with the accused
persons.

l1r. Hajendra Singh, Senior Advocate for the respondents
D
with his usual persuasiveness contended that the evidence of
these witnesses should be rejected as has been done by the lij.gh
Court as each one of them has improved his version by a lot of
embellishment. Statements under s. 161 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure regarding the oral dying declarations made by these
witnesses were to the effect that Sudha had stated that it was
the mother-in-law alone who had sprinkled kerosene on the clothes
E
and set fire to her clothes. But later these witnesses impiicated
the husband and his elder brother as being involved in the
crime. He also contended that the documents contemporaneously
prepared by the police in normal discharge of their duties where
the cause of fire has been mentioned should be preferred to the
oral evidence particularly when the witnesses have substantially
changed their version and in the back.drop of a written dying
declaration attested by the attei:iding doctor. According to Mr.
Singh, there is evidence that there was a meeting over the issue
of Sudha's death held in the morning of the 2nd Uecember, 1980,
in which the 16cal residents participate'd and the conduct of the
witnesses before and after this meeting sharply differed. He
suggested that the stand adopted by the prosecution in regard to
Sudha' s death was obviously evolved at this meeting and one uni-
form stand ~aken at an earlier stage was uniformly changed.after
the meeting. He pleaded that the oral evidence regarding Sudha's
) declarations should be discarded. He also supported the High
Court 1 s finding that the relationship between Sudha and her
paternal relations on one side and Laxman and his relations on
the other was very cordial and, therefore, there could be no
SUPR!lMt COURT N.EPORTS [1985j SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A mbtive for killing the mother-to-be. According to Hr. Singh, once
the neighbours knew, on the basis of Sudha 's declarations, that
she was set on fire by her husband, his brother and mother, they
would not· have permitted Sudha to be taken to the hospital in the
taxi in their company only. We shall deal with these aspects and
his otheF submissions in due course and at the relevant places.
B
The cumulative effect of the evidence of these four wit-
nesses goes to establish that around 9 P.M. on December 1, 1980,
Sudha had shouted for help saying that she was on fire. On' hear-
ing this cry, PW. 2 telephoned the Police Control Room from a
neighbour's telephone and these four witnesses rushed to the
spot. On approaching the flat they found Laxman at the main en-
c trance door trying to close it and Subhash at the connecting door
between the room and the open space partially covered with
asbestos sheets. They found Sudha in a standing posture aflame.
Shakuntala was noticed standing in another room. They forced
thems~lves into the room, came up to Sudha, started removing the
saree on her body which had caught fire and finding a gunny bag
lying on the floor, used the same for putting otf the fire. PW. 2
D managed to get a blanket in which they later wrapped Sudha and
helped her in being removed to the hospital. There is clear evi-
dence that on their own they went Lo the Hindu Kao Hospital
thinking that sudha would be brought there for treatment.

'The evidence also ihdicates that there was a gas stove in
E the kitchen and the same was in order. lt is the defence version
that LJW. 5 had gone to tiarot on November 30, 1980, and respondent
ohakuntala had come the previous day along with Subhash. When
Subhash returned to the house a few minutes before Y at night, J
Sudha wanted to warm up the cooked food for being served to him.
At that point of time, the child of Subhash (the other had gone
F with_ the mother) cried tor ruilk, Shakuntala wanted the milk to be
heated up for the child and asked Sudha to give the milk first
tur the crying child and then attend to Subhash. It is at that
point of time that Sudha wanted to light the kerosene stove. The
kerosene stove was in the open space. Judicial notice can be
taken 'of tht> fact that around .9 P.M. of Uecember it would be
G unbearably cold outside the house in Delhi. To work the kerosene
stove would take sometime and if milk for the crying child was
immediately necessary, the kerosene stove would not be the proper .•
heating medium. On the other hand, the gas stove would have •
served the purpose better. Not much ot gas was likely to be
consumed for heating the milk, nor cveu tor heating up the food
ii for Subhash. We haxe to tak.e note of ... the position that Sudha did .(
STATE v. LAXMAN KUMAR [RANGANATH MISRA, J.] 913

A
not have any warm clothings on her person and as the evidence
shows, she had only a nylon saree. Being a pregnant lady at an
advance stage she was expected to ~ep properly robed to avert
getting ill from exposure to cold. It is, therefore, not likely
that she wouid have ventured going out to operate the kerosene
stove. There is another feature which also must be taken note
B
of. She being in an advanced stage of pregnancy would have found
i t very difficult to squat on fhe floor for operating the
kerosene stove which was on the floor itself. It is the defence
version that the gunny bag was being used for sitting purposes
for operating the stove. That is a conjecture accepted by the
High ,court. There is no evidence worth the name to explain why
the gas stove was not used. In the absence of an explanation as c
to why the gas stove was not being operated for this purpose and
in the setting of events which we have indicated it would be
natural human conduct for Sudha to have gone to the gas stove in
preference to the kerosene stove. In these circumstances we agree
with counsel for the appellants that the defence version explain-
D
ing the manner in which Sudha' s saree caught fire is ndt accept-
able. Once the explanation advanced by the defence that Sudha's
saree caught fire from the kerosene stove is discarded, on the
premises that the same had not been lighted, the prosecution
otory that fire was set to her saree is the only other way in
which she must have been burnt.

Before we refer to the oral evidence, it is aPpropriate to E
deal with the dying declarations are beth oral and written. The
otal dying declaration are said to have been ma.de first inside
the residence; thereafter when Sudha saw PW. 4 (referring to her
as Bobby's mother) and while coming by the taxi to the hospital
after PW. 3 and her husband were picked up. Thi> High Court has
indicated improvements in the evidence with reference to what had F
been stated by Sudha on these occasions. A dying declaration
enjoys almost a sacrosanct status as a piece of evidence as it
comes from mouth of a person who is about to die and at that
stage of life he is not likely to make a false statement. The
evidence has been placed at length before us during the hearing
by counsel for both the parties. We have also read the evidence G
again with a view to forming our own assessment of. it. The fact
that Sudha implicated Shakuntala a~ the person who poured
kerosene on her and lit fire to the clothes is more or less
spoken by every witness. Even Mr. Singh for the respondents in
his submission has agreed that it is so. There is also evidence
that she had indicated Laxman to have actually set fire though at H
a later stage. The role assigned to Subhash was not very
specific.
914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A The other part of the dying declaration is the written one
in the handwriting of PW. 17 and said to have been attested by
IJW.1. This is claimed to have been written at the hospital a
couple of hours after Sudha had been taken there. PW. 17
approached the doctor for requisite permission and IM.l after
examining the condition of Sudha and after being satisfied that
B she was in a fit condition to make a declaration, permitted the
same to be recorded. It.has admittedly been written by PW. 17. It
has not been signed by Sudha though she was literate enough. As
the evidence shows, there is a partial impression of a finger tip
said to be of Sudha on the document. This is said to have been
put with the assistance of the Investigating Officer who recorded
the statement and DW. 1. When the doctor was available there was
C no Justification for the police Officer to record the statement.
PW.17 was specifically asked by the prosecution as to why the
statement was not got recorded by a Magistrate or a doctor. He
gave the following answer :

"So far as the Magistrate is concerned, I thought that
during the night the Magistrate might not be easily
D available and in the mean time the injured might die.
So far as doctor is concerned, generally they refuse
to record a statement and in this case he had so
refused to record the statement himself. He had, how-
ever, asked me to write the same under his
permission."
E
The doctor, IJW.l on the other hand stated :

"I did not suggest or impress upon the police officer
that he should called a Magistrate to record the
statement or her own relation to be present at the
F time of her statement, nor I volunteered to record the
statement myself. It would be incorrect that the
police officer had requested me to record the state-
ment of Sudha and that I had refused to do so."

The explanation of the police officer is, therefore, not accepted
G by the dqctor. The justification advanced by the police officer
for not looking for a Magistrate does not appear to be easily
convincing. At any rate, when the doctor was available, he should
have been requested to record the dying declaration and PW. 17
· should not have taken the job on himself. We are prepared to
prefer the evidence of the doctor to the police officer in this
Ii regard and we, therefore, hold that the police officer did not
STATE v. LAXMAN KUMAR [RANGANATH MISRA, J.• j 915

request the doctor to record the statement and had volunteered to A
do so all by himself~

Though DW.l.has stated that he was present when the state-
ment was made, a lot of argtnnent has been advanced before the
trial Court as also the High Court and even before us about the
manner of attestation made by the doctor. W.l has endorsed: B
"Attested the recorded statement." If the doctor was present and
he had heard the statement being made by Sudha he would have
ordinarily endorsed that the statement had been made to his hear-
ing and has been recorded in his presence. The endors~ent as
made is indicative of the position that a statement had been
recorded and the same was' being attested by the doctor. As main- c
tained, this statement has been given in the intensive care unit
where apart from the petient, the doctor and the police officer,
none else was present. 'lbere is Stmlptuous evidence that relations
of Sudha were available in the hospital premises though not
within the intensive care unit. Both the police officer as also
the doctor were asked to indicate the reason for not calling one D
of those relations to the place when Sudha's statement was being
recorded. In fact, ordinary human conduct would have required
such a relation to be present when the statement was being made,
particularly because it was not known- by then to the police
officer as to what statement Sudha would make in regard to the
cause of her burning.
E
We have already pointed oµt that the document does not bear
the signature of Sudha. Admittedly, burning was to the extent of
70% and there is medical evidence as to which parts of the body
had been affected. There is -riot· any positive evidence that the
palms had been affected so badly that Sudha was not in a position
to use any of her fingers. Nor is there clear evidence that the F
left hand thumb had been so affected that a full impression was
not available to be taken. Mr. Singh has argued with emphasis
that Sudha must have used both her hands to extricate herself
from her wearing apparel when the same was burning and thus both
'· the palms and the fingers including the tips ·must have been
burnt. We do not think in the absence of evidence, such a sub- G
mission should be accepted to explain away either a signature or
thtunb impression in the dying declaration •
•
Added to these features, the time of the statement has not
been indicated in the document. PW. 17 must have known that the
time aspect was very important feature in a document of this ti
', type. Ordinarily, a document as valuable as a dying declaration
916 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP:2 s.c.R.

A is supposed to be fool proof and is to incorporate the
particulars which it is supposed to contain. No justifying reason
has been given as to why the time was noted.

The summary of History Sheet, Ext. PW.17/0 indicates that a
pethidine injection was given to Sudha at 10 P:M. and the doctor
B prescribed repetition of it every 8 hours. Judicial notice can be
taken of the fact that after pethidine is given the patient
would not have normal alertness. Appropriate care was not taken
at the trial stage to cross examine JJW.l with reference to this
aspect. We are inclined to agree with counsel for the appellants
that the certificate of DW. l that Sudha was in a fit condition
to make a declaration cannot be given full credit. This Court
c pointed out in Khushal Rao V• State of Bombay A,I.R. [1958] s.c.
22, that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as
another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of
surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles
governing the weighing of evidence; that a dying declaration
which has been recorded by a competent magistrate in the proper
mal).ner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers,
D and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the
declaration, stands on a llll.lch higher footing than a dying
declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer
from all the infirmities of human memory and human character, and
that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the
Court has to keep iri view, the circumstances like the opportunity
E of the dying man for observation, for example, whether there was
sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the
capacity of the man of remember the facts stated, had not been
impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstan-
ces b~yond his control; that the statement has been consistent
throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying
F declaration apart from the official record of it; and that the
statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not
the result of tutoring by interested parties.

In Dalip Singh & Ors •. v. State of l'Unjab, A.LR. [1979] .-
S.C. 1173, this Court has pointed out :
G
''We may also add that although a dying declaration
recorded by a Police Officer during the course of the
investigation is admissible under section 32 of the
Indian Evidence Act in view of the exception provided
in sub-section (2) of section 162 of the Code of Cri-
H
minal Ptocedure, 1973; it is better to leave such
STATE v. LAXMAN KUMAR [RANGANATH MlSRA, J • 1 917

dying declarations out of consideration until and A
unless the prosecution satisfies the court as to why
it was not recorded by a Magistra~e or by a doctor. As
observed by this Court in llunnu Baja v. State of
Madhya Pra<lesh, [1976] 2 s.c.R. 764; A.I.R. 1976 s.c.
2199) the practice of the Iµvestigating Officer him-
self. recording a dying declaration during the course
of investigation ought not to be encou.raged . ........ "

We also find that under the relevant Rules applicab).e to
Delhi area, the. investigating officer is not to scribe the dying
decla~at:j.on, Again, unless the dying declaration is :j.n quest~ofi
and answer form it is very difficult to know to what extent the c
answers have been suggested by questions put. What is necessary
is that the exact statement made by the deceased should be avail-
able to the Court. Considered from these angles, the dying decla-
ration in question is not acceptable. Tpe High Court obvioudy
lost sight of all these aspects when reversing the conclusion of
the trial Court with regard to the document and agreeing to act D
upon it.

Considerable critici"1Jl has been advanced on behalf of th.e
p~osecution to ttie acceptabi.}..ity of this document an· accoun~ of
these draw ba~ks .• When PW. 17 was being examined in Court 1 t~
pr9~ecution with leave of the C9urt asked him specific questions
as if he was being cross-examined with reference to this docq.-
ment. That shows that grave _doubts w.ere ent.ertained by the pr.ose-
cution about the bona fides of this dying declaration, w~ !lave
bestowed considerable thought on this aspect a~ we are led tq
accept the doubts indicated by the trial Court in regard to the
authenticity of this document. We accordingly decline to .!lttach
any importance thereto.

While reJecting the writ~en dy~qg declaration~ we wou+d like
to point out that we are also not prepared to attach fu.1-1
credence to the oral dying declarations. There have beeQ instan-
ces where conviction has been- based solely upon .a dying de~la~a..,.
tion when it has been found- to be totally acceptable. We are_not G
prepared to attach that type .of importance to the ora.1 dying
delcarations in this ·case. ·we shall refer to these oral stat;e:-
ments in the evidence of witnesses when we come to asl?ess _the
o:ral evidence and we are ·af the ·ap"inion that the oral dy~ng
delcarations would be available for use as corrOborative material
H
in this case.
918 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.a.

A The High Court utilised three other documents for finding
out how Sudha caught fire. The first of these documents is the
site inspection note Ext. PW.17/R where it has been indicated:
"lt is alleged that Sudlia, 20 year old wife of Lruanan Kl.m!ar,
resident of 9-H Janata Flats, Phase III, Ashok Vihar, was heating
milk on stove when her clothes caught fire..... The source of this
B information is not known. In the circumstances no importance can
at all be attached to the her say record. The other document is
the admission record of Sudha at the St. Stephen's Hospital, Ext.
PW.18/A. There it has been indicated: "Sustained burns while
heating milk on a stove". The document has .admittedly been signed
by Laxman Kumar, .the husband of Sudha. One can assume that he was
the source of information. Mr. Singh placed the evidence of PW.3,
c sister of Sudha where she said that she had talked to the doctor )
at the Hospital and told her all the details. On the basis of
this evidence, learned Senior Counsel, pleaded to accept PW.3 as
the source of ·the information giving the cause of fire. He also
argued with emphasis that it was for the prosecution to examine
the doctor who had made the endorsement and adverse inference
should have been drawn against the prosecution for with holding
D the witness from the trial. Admittedly, the endorsement was made
by one Dr. ViJaya Kl.m!ar who was then working at the St. Stephen's
Hospital. �. 18 who works in the said Hospital has stated that
Ur. Kumar had left the services and his whereabouts were not
known. In these circlJ:ll!Stances, no adverse inference is drawable.
Nor can we assume that the information regarding th� cause of
E fire was on the basis of what PW. 3 had stated. Since the husband
of Sudha was present and was signing the form, it is legitimate
to assume that the doctor made queries from him and filled up the
form accordingly. Again, as we have said, Sud.ha was alive, the
near relations were not prepared to expose the husband and his
relations to prosecution and even PW.3 may not have stated the
F real cause. No importance, therefore, is also available to be
attached to the narration in the document. The third document is
the report received from the mobile van around 9.44 P.M. where it
was said that a woman named Sudha, aged 20-22 years is said to
have sustained burns by the bursting to stove or she caught fire
accidentally. The stove has been found to be in good order at the
G time of the seizure and this fact goes a long way to indicate
that the allegation of stove bursting was baseless. The source of
the information not being known. no importance is also avai�able
to be attached to this document. Mr. Singh has maintained that
the bursting ot the stove is an erroneous translation of the
actual record. What exactly was said is that there was a sudden
]j
il1cKtr in che keroSene scove ao a reSult of which Sudha 's saree �
STATE v. LAXMAN KUMAR [RANGANATH MISRA, J.] 919

caught fire. Perhaps the critid~ is correct but nothing ulti- A
mately turns on it. At the hearing counsel for the appellants
relied upon the entry in PW. 12/B which was a copy of the record
maintained at the Ashok Vihar Police Station. The entry shows:

"At 9.12 P;M, Shri Nahar Singh has informed from
p;c.R. through telephone that some unknawn person had B
informed from a pubiic call telephone to the effect
that o.:ie lady had been set on fire in a Janata

-
Quarter ..... ..

No importance can be attached to this entry either. We would,
therefore, keep out these documents from consideration while c
considering the case for finding out whether Sudha had &n acci-
dential catch of fire or fire was set on her clothes.

It is appropriate.at this stage that we consider the back-
ground and the existing relationship between the parties with a
view to ascertaining if there was any motive for perpetrating the D
crime.

The evidence in regard to the relationship between · the
parties so as to discover the presence of motive is both or•.l and
documentary. The High Court referred to four letters written by
Sudha to·· Geeta, sister of Laxman. Ext. D-2 is a letter without
date but the contents suggest that it nust have been written some E
tilll!! in the autumn of 1980. The letter indicates that Sudha's
relationship with Geeta was quite close. They appear to be of the
same age group and it is quite possible that while the relation-
ship with the other members of the family was strained, Sudha's
relationship with Geeta was particularly cordial· Such a
situation is not unusual. This letter, however, contains a state- F
ment to the following effect :

'
"Any ·way, I would write to you in detail as now I have
no time to concentrate my mind for writing a detailed
letter."
G
Ext. D.3 is a letter of September 12, 1980. Here again Sudha has
indicated her longing to be close to Geeta. Therein there is a
second sentence reading thus: "Ypu keep yourself happy and need
not worry." Worrying, of course, would be with reference to
Sudha. The High Court has underlined the following sentence of
the letter : H
'
920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.
,
A
"Deedi (sister) please send mother over here after 2
or 3 days as you kno~ that I have not been able to get
any opportunity to have her company here."

According to the High Court, Sudha was longing for the company of
the mother-in-law; otherwise there would be no necessity for that
sentence in the letter. As we propose to deal with this aspect at
B
a time, we shall indicate our conments after we have referred to
the other two letters. The third letter marked Ext. XX is dated
October 17, 1980. Therein again Sudha wanted the mother (of Didi) '
to visit Delhi for 2 or 4 days. Towards the end there is an
indication that Laxman wanted the delivery to be effected at
Delhi. The last letter in the series is Ext. XXX which does not
...
c bear a date. There are two sentences in the letter which we would
like to ~tract in particular :

"I am of the view that blood is thicker than w:ater •• I
would have posted a letter earlier but due to abdomi-
nal ailment I could not do so •.. "

D
The first of the sentences referred to above obviously was meant
for Didi as she had failed to come and the second sentence
referred to her ailment. There is nothing in these letters which
is very material tor the purpose of ascertaining the relationship
that existed between Sudha on one side and members of her
husband's family on the other. Geeta being the daughter of
Shakuntala, the mother-in-law , Sudha as daughter-in-law was not
expected to make complaints against her particularly when the
letters were being sent to J>arot where the mother-in-law was
living. Similarly, a letter written by PW. 8 to Subhash and
Laxman which has been marked as Ext.D-1, dated September 25,
1980, and another written by PW. 8 to Shakuhtala and her husband
(Ext. PW.6/UA of the same date) have also been relied upon by the
-
High Gourt. These letters are letters which PW.8 had written with
reference to the marriage of Ashok (younger brother of PW.8). It
appears that this marriage was negotiated and/or made to
materialise with the assistance of the mem'bers of the family of r
the accused persons and the marriage had been fixed to February
G 12, 1981. In the letter Ext. PW.6/UA written to the parents of
Laxman, PW. 8 had spoken well about the family of the accused
persons. That obviously one would expect when a brother-in-law of
Laxman would be writting to the parents of the sister's husband.
It is customary to wr.ite to elders in that strain. The contents
of these letters may not reflect the true position and any undue
/ ,
Ii >---
- ' '
STATE v. LAXMAN KUMAR [RANGANATH MISJµ., J.]

emphasis on the contents thereof would really be misleading.
921

A
Similarly, there is a letter written by PW.6 to Sudha also dated
September 25, 1980. Therein there is mention: "You need not worry
about anything; everything will be okay ••• I will surely bring
your servant with me •••• " The High Court has relying on these
letters, come to the conclusion that the relationship was good
till middle .of October, 1980, and according to it the apprecia-
B
tion of the position by the trial Judge that the letters
contained intentional flattery was not correct.

There is evidence that the deceased was being made to do
most of the household work notwithstanding the fact that she was
carrying and gradually the time for delivery of the child wss c
nearing. PW.6 had intervened to meet this situation by bringing a
servant who could take Sudha's load to some extent and ease the
position. OW.5, h.9Wever, terminated the services which meant
that Sudha had to take the burden on her. There is evidence that
PW.6 had even gone to the extent of offering the salary of the
servant. That possibly was not appreciated and may have been for
D
good reasons.

Once we come to the conclusion that the letters have really
no material bearing on the point at issue, the oral evidence of

- the four witnesses speaking on the topic has to be referred to.
As pointed out, these four witnesses are PWs. 3 and 6, the two
sisters of Sudha, PW.7 Sudha's mother, and J'W,8 who is Sudha's
brother. PW.3 has stated :
E

"Whenever I used to visit her or she used to visit me,
Sudha always used to complain that she has not been
treated properly, She used to complain about the
harassment by her husband's elder brother Subhash,
F
accused, and his wife and some times by her
mother-in-law, both accused present in court, as they
used to make demand from Sudha for bringing mre money
from b.er brothers and th.ey also used to take 1110re work
from he~·••
G
"On 1.12.80, I had visited her in the house of the
accused at about 7 P:M. and had remained with her for
about an hour. At that time the doctor had advised and
opined that she was likely to deliver within two or
three days. When I was at the house of the accused,
Budha 's mother-in-law, the accused present in the
." Court, made several ch,arges to accuse and malign Sudha.
H
922 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.
• J

A
When I was coming out of the house my sister Sudha
came out with me. She told me that on the previous day
her brother-in-law, i.e. Mr. Vinod younger brother of
Laxman had tried to forcibly remove her gold bangles
when she had refused to hand them over to her in-laws.
She had also told me that Vinod had given a twist to
B
her right wrist. I had noted bluish mark on her wrist.
When I wanted to take her to my house, accused Laxman
and his mother Smt. Shakuntala refused to send her
with me saying that Laxman would be dropping her to my

c
house next morning."

In cross-examination it has been .further brought out: -
"I never saw wife of Subhash pleased with Sudha who
always used to complain even againat her whenever I
used to meet her."

She further said :
IJ
"I had received two or three letters from my brother
from Calcutta requesting me to look after Sudha as she
was not happy in her in-laws' family. I did not

E
preserve those letters."

PW.6 is the other sister of Sudh~. She has said :

"She told me that she was not in a position to do
-
that much of work due to her not having already worked
before her marriage and also because of her being in
the family way. Thereafter she returned to her '
in-laws. After 10 days I went to the house of Sudha in
F
Ashok Vihar and requested Smt. Shakuntala, accused
present in Court, and wife of accused Subhash to
engage a maid servant for washing utensils and I
offered to pay for the same. Sudha arranged for a maid

G
servant who was, however, not paid the wages by the
accused persons and was terminated. Many a time, Sud.ha
had complained to me that Mrs. Subhash used to prepare
meals for the rest of the family and she had to cook
the food for herself later on. When Sudha was carrying
a child for about 5 to 6 months, she told me that her
r

-
in-laws had told her that if she gave birth to a male
Ii
child then they would take a scooter and Fridge for
'Laxman and Rs.10,000 in cash from her brothers. 1 told .> •
STATE v. LAXMAN KUMAR [RANGANATH MISRA, J.] 923
l

her that I would gift a fridge from my side and the
rest would be given by our brothers. On, many occasions A
she had told me that her in-laws were making demand of
a sewing machine although she did not know any stitch-
ing work and she had written a letter to her brother
about which I came to know later."

PW. 7 is an elderly lady aged sixty. Obviously her husband B
was .dead. She has stated that about two months after the marriage
when Sudha waa brought to Calcutta by PW.8, she had stated that
Laxman and the mother-in-law and Subhash have been demanding
Rs.10,000 to Rs.20,000 in caah. PW.8 is Sudha '.s brother. He
lives at Calcutta and is by profession a Commission Agent. His
evidence too was to the effect that Sudha had complained about c
the demand of caah on the occasion of the birth of the first
child. Added to the evidence of these witnesses is the evidence

- of Pw.4. lshwari Devi, as already pointed out, waa a good friend
of Sudha, being a close neighbour and Sudha having very tlllch
liked Bobby, the young child of Ishwari Devi. Ishwari Devi had
been livirig in the upper flat until two ioonths before the D
occurrence and even when she had shifted, Sudha and &he were
meeting almost every day. She has stated :

"Sudha almost d~ily used to visit me and used to
complain to me that she was being maltreated on the
ground of insufficiency of dowry and that her husband
and ioother-in-law used to threaten her for setting her E
on fire."

There is no particular justification as to why PliJ,4 would depose
against the accused persons. Similarly, if there was really no
basis for the accusation, the two sisters of Sudha, her ioother
who was an elderly lady and a widow, and her brother, PW.8, would F
have not falsely implicated Shakuntala, Subhash and Laxman as the
perpetrators of the crime. If Sudha had succumbed to bum
injuries caused by accidental fire, it would have been an event
for tllltual sorrow for every one.in the family both of the.accused
as also of Sudha. We cannot lose sight of the fa.ct that the
marriage of Ashok had already been settled and was an event to G
come on February 2, 1981 Only a couple of ioonths after the
incident. if there waa no f oundstion in the allegation of
mltreatment and harassment of Sudha, the four relations of Sudha
would have really not strained the relationship by maldngfalse
allegations. If it was indeed an accident one would expect
' Ashok's marriage to be performed as fixed so that the tie may be H
maintained. In that event false accusations against the accused
924 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985) SUPP.2 s.c.R.
,
A persons would be wholly out of place. The High Court has
obviously not kept these aspects in view while dealing with the
evidence. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the material on
record is indicative of the position that the relationship of
Sudha with the members of the family in the husband's side was
not cordial.
I!
We .may note here that even the High Court has not brushed
aside the story of demand in the event of a child being born. It
has observed : r
"It may be that in September or October the
mother-in-law or some other members in the family may
c have told the deceased that in case she gave birth to
a male child they would expect a fridge and a scooter
and some cash. It is customary for the Hindus that on

D
the first delivery of a child, particualrly on the
birth of a male child, the parents give presents. The
in-laws or husband may have felt the need of a scooter
and a frigidaire and therefore, wanted the deceased to
demand a frigidaire and a scooter. We find it /
-
impossible to agree with the learned Additional
Sessions Judge that the accused finding no positive
response from the brothers and the sisters of the
deceased regarding their above demand had decided to
kill the deceased. The observation of the Additional
E . Sessions Judge that the accused decided to take the
life of the deceased before the delivery of the child
because after the child was born it would have become
difficult for them to execute the plan is wholly with-
out any basis."

F Perhaps the way the learned Additional Sessions Judge formed his
conclusions on the basis of the evidence was not to be approved
but in our opinion the High r:aurt had really no justification to
condemn the learned Additional Sessions Judge on that score. We
do not approve of the conclusion of the High Court that insuffi- ~
ciency of dowry was made an issue only to creat a motive for the
G crime. As a fact, the relationship had been str~ined. Shakuntala -=
and Madhu had failed to show normal hlUllan considerations towards
Sudha, a young girl who was for the first time going to be a
mother. Both Shakuntala and Madhu had their own experience of
being in the family way in their own time. They, however, forgot
the same and their behaviour towards Sudha during this period did
ti amount to a sort of torture.' Added to the physical strain, the~
STATE v. LAXMAN KUMAR (RANGANATl! MISRA, J.] 925

demands advanced from time to time and the particular emphasis A
with which the same were reiterated as the period of delivery
approached gradually strained the feeling between Sudha and the
members of the husband's family.

We have also come to the conclusion that the High Court
failed to take into account one material aspect whiie B
appreciating the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. It is a
fact that Sudha h!id been burnt and according to the medical
opinion that was . to the extent of 70%. As the evidence shows;
Sudha was in her senses and was capable of talking at the time
when she was being removed to the Hospital or even after she had
been adiilitted as an indoor patient. The two sisters or their
respective husbands had no apprehension that Sudha would not
live. In case Sudha came round, she was to have lived in the
family of her husband; No One interested in the iielfare of Sudha
was, therefore, prepared to make a' statement which might preju-
dice the accused persons and lead to the straining of relation~
ship in an irreparable way; Therefore, the silence or avoidance D
to make a true disclosure about the cause of fire particularly so
long as Sudha was alive, cannot be over emphasised and adverse
inference drawn by the High Court from the conduct of the sisters
was indeed not warranted in the facts of the case.

We crune across sumptuous reference to statements of
witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal E
Ptocedure during investigation in the judgment of the High Court.
Jt is interesting to notice that the High Court found fault, and
very rightly, with the trial Court for using such statements as
evidence; yet, it fell into the same error and freely referred to
such statements for coming to findings on material aspects. It is
unnecessary to indicate reference to specific instances at length F
but one or two illustrative occasions we would like to point out

"The husband of !'\Vs. 3 and 6 in their statements to
the police on 2nd December, 1980, have ·stated that the
relations between Sudha and her husband were cordial." G

The husbands have not been examined as witnesses at the trial.
Similarly the High Court extracted in extenso the inquest state-
ments as if they were evidence proper. Section 162(1) of the Code
of Criminal Ptocedure provides :
H
"No statement made by any person to a police officer
926 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.
.•
A in the course of investigation under this chapter,
shall, if reduced to writing, be signed by the person
making it, nor shall any such statement or any record
thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or
any part of such statement or record, be used for any
purpose, save as hereinafter provided, at any inquiry
ll or trial in respect of any offence under investigation
at the time when such statement was made :

Provided that when any witness is called for the r
prosecution in such inquiry or trial whose statement 0
has been reduced into writing as aforesaid, any part
of his statement, if duly proved, may be used by the
c accused, and with the permission of the Court, by the
prosecution, to contradict such witness in the manner
provided by section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act,
uin ... "
>
This Court pointed out in Pedda llarayaoa & Ors. v. State of
Aodhra Pradesh, [1975] 4 s.c.c. 153, that a statement recorded by
D the police officer during investigation is inadmissible in ,.
evidence and the proper procedure is to confront the witness with
the contradictions when they are examined and then ask the
Investigating Officer regarding the contradictions. This Court
reiterated the position in Sat Paul V• Delhi Mmfnistration,
Ll976j l s.c.R. 727, by again pointing our that the statement
E made to a police officer during the investigation can be used
only for the purpose of contradicting the prosecution witnesses :'·
under s. 145 of the Evidence Act. It cannot be used for the
purpose of cross-examination. The mandate of the law of procedure '
and the law laid down by this Court have obviously been overlook-
ed by the trial Court as also the High Court although the High
F Court was cognizant of the legal position and had found fault
with the trial Court. We would like to point out that the trial
Court has marked large portions of the statements recorded by the
police without con.finding to the actual contradiction. If
attention had been bestowed at the appropriate stage, this
situation would not have arisen.
G
We shall now refer to the evidence regarding Sudha' s burn-
ing. It has already been indicated that the evidence consists of
statements of l.'Ws. l, 2, 4 and 5. These are neighbours. The High
Court has found three of these witnesses to have been present and
we have already indicated that PW. 4 was also attracted to the
1;1 spot by the cries raised by Sudha. Mr. Singh, it may be noted,-'
STATE v. LAXMAN KUMAR [RANGANATH MISRA, J •I 927

challenged this finding of the High Court but we .see no force in
1 the challenge. These witnesses, ac.cording to the ·High Court, caine
A
and helped in putting out the · fire and expeditiously removing
Sudha to the hospital. We hav'e already indicated our reasons for
accepting the evidence of these witnesses as being trustworthy.
The learned trial Judge who had occasion to see the demeanour of
the witnesses, believed them to be truthful and the .reasoning ·B
advanced by the High Court to discard the evidence has been
\ rejected by us. On the evidence of these witnesses .it follows
that at the time then PW. l caine, Subhash was standing at the
door connecting the room with the outer covered space where Sudha
had been aflame. Undue importance was given by the High Court to
the fact that there was no smell of kerosene on the head or hair- c
of Sudha. Sudha had been. found in a standing posture by these
witnesses when her wearing apparel was burning. There is some
evidence that the clothes emanated the smell of kerosene. At no
stage Sudha had even suggested that kerosene had been poured or
sprinkled on her head. The observation of the High Court that if
.kerosene had been poured on her body or over the wearing apparel D
the burns would have been of a greater dimension is not a
conclusion based upon. expert evidence. The medical examination
conducted does not appear to have been made keeping this aspect
in view. Admittedly, every part of the body had not been equally
burnt. Therefore, it is quite possible that presence of kerosene
on the wearing apparel had damaged certain parts of the body more
than the other parts. Non-presence of kerosene on the head is not E
a material feature and presence of smell in the clothes
probabilises the prosecution case that on Sudha's clothes
kerosene had been sprinkled. The suggestion that the gunny bag
and the clothes had come in contact with kerosene leaking from
the stove is indeed not acceptable in the absence of evidence
that Sudha had squatted on the floor while using the kerosene F
stove. We have already found that Sudha had not lighted the
kerosene stove that evening. Evidence that the stove was leaking
when lighted is of no assistance to explain the presence of
kerosene in the gunny bag as well inssmch as we have rejected
the plea of lighting of the stove. Mr. Singh has placed some
passages from Taylor's Medical Jurisprudence in support of his G
submission that in view of the medical evidence that Sudha' s
burns were either of .the first or . the second degrees, use of
kerosene which would have aggravated the burns was untnie. We are
not 1111ch impressed by this argument. How 1111ch of kerosene was
sprinkled is not known. For how long Sudha actually burnt is also
not exactly known. To work backwards from the injured condition H
of Sudha' s . body may not in the premises lP..ad to a correct
conclusion.
928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.
•
One more feature which nmst be duly taken note of at this
A point is the place where Sudha was found af lane. Admittedly it
was not the room where she lived but it was the covered space on
the back side. Once we have rejected the defence plea of
accidental fire while heating milk with the kerosene stove,
Sudha' s presence ln the outer space at that time is not natural.
Sudha was apperently brought to that place from the room to be
B put· on fire so that the articles in the rooms would not be
damaged and there would be the minimum of loss to property.

The evidence of the witnesses clearly indicates that the
accused persons appeared to be indifferent even when Sudha had
been aflame. If the mother-in-1(1.W was really interested in a
child being born to Sudha an event likely to happen within a few
c days thereafter she would have been· the most disturbed person at
the sight of fire on the body of Sudha. Similarly, Laxman tmlSt
have been terribly upset and would not have been leaving any
stone unterned to bring safety to Sudha. The evidence of the
prosecution witnesses is indicative of the position that there
was no sense of grief or anxiety in their conduct and, therefore,
the neighbours who gathered had to take the lead in the matter .,
D for providing relief to her.

There is some amount of.discrepancy in the evidence of the
witnesses in regard to the details and Mr. Singh highlighted this
aspect in his submission. It is common human experience that
different persons admittedly seing an event give varying accounts
E of the same. That is because the perceptiveness varies and a
recount of the same incident is usually at variance to a
r
considerable extent. Ordinarily, if several persons give the same
account of an event, even with reference to minor details, the
evidence is branded as parrotlike and is considered to be the
outcome of tutoring. Having read the evidence of these witnesses
F with great care, we are of the view that t~e same has the touch
of intrinsic truth and the variations are within reasonable
limits and the variations instead of providing the 3round for
rejection, add to the quality of being near to truth. On the ,·
evidence, therefore, we come to these conclusions : (1) the
relationship of Sudha with the members of the husband's family
G had become strained and she had been subjected to physical as
well as mental torture for some time before the incident; the
physical torture was the outcone of indifference to her health
and the mental torture was on account of demand of dowry; ( 2)
Sudha had not lighted the kerosene stove that evening and her
wearing apparel had not caught fir~ accidently but kerosene had "
H
l
STATE v. LAXMAN KUMAR [RANGANAT!I MISRA, J.] 929

been sprinkled on her clothes and she had been brought into the A
open space where fire was llt to her clothes. Thus Sudha died not
as an outcome of an accidental fire but on account of a designed
move on the part of the members of the family of the accused
persons to put an end to her life. Mr. Singh has pleaded
forcefully that we should not interfere with the judgment of
acquittal as it is based on a reasonable view of the matter B
merely by reappreciating the evidence. The scope of an appeal
against acquittal and the scope of this Court's jurisdiction in
such a matter are well settled. The preponderance of judicial
opinion in this Court is that there is no difference between an
appeal against conviction and an appeal against acquittal except
when dealing with an appeal against acquittal the Court keeps in c
view the position that the presumption of innocence in favour of
the accused has been fortified by acquittal and if the view
adopted by the High Court is a reasonable one and the conclusion
reached by it had its grounds well set on the materials on
record, the acquittal may not be interfered with. Upon reading
the record and after hearing learned counsel we are of the view D
that the judgment of the High Court cannot have the immunity
which Mr. Singh claimed. Once evidence has been read and this
Court has proceeded to review the entire material, there is
indeed no limitation in law in the exercise of the jurisdiction
under Article 136 of the Constitution for the matter of making a
just decision.
E
Now comes the time to find out as to who are the persons
responsible for the killing of Sudha. We have already indicated
that OW. 5 had been taken to Barot by Subhash and on his return
he brought Shakuntala to Delhi. Subhash appears · to . have been
living in a different room. Though they were living under the
same roof, there does not appear to have been 111.1ch of cordiality F
and close relationship between Subhash and Laxman; each one
appeared to be living in his own world within the small premises.
It is significant that Subhash had made a statement as reiterated
by the prosecution witnesses that he had nothing to do with what
-.. happened to Sudha and on that ground had declined to enter into
the taxi when Sudha was being removed to the Hospital. Even such G
. a statement had been repeated earlier. It is true that the
prosecution witnesses have suggested that Subhash was closing the
door when they wanted to enter the back space. Subhash has
explained that he was trying to avoid the spread of fire. Keeping
these aspects in view, we are inclined to treat his case somewhat
differently from that of the husband and the mother-in-law of H
"' Sudha.
\
930 SUPREM>: COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPf.2 s.c.R.

A
Mr. Garg appearing for the appellants in Criminal Appeal No.
94/84, had emphatically relied upon the observations of the
Judicial Ccmmittee in the case of Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. The
King l!mperor, 52 I.A. 40, and contended that in view of the fact
that Subhash stood and waited exhibiting a conduct of
indifference when positive action for help to Sudha was
warranted,_ he must be imputed with sufficient motive and be
ranked at par with the accused persons. We are , however,
prepared to give him the benefit of doubt treating his case to be
on the border line. His acquittal by the High Court, therefore, ·'
shall not be interfered with. As far as the mother-in-law is
concerned, the ..posi_ti.on is very different. Sudha in her dying •
declarations made contemporaneously as deposed to by the
c witnesses had stated that kerosene ·had been poured by the
mother-in-law and fire had also been lit by her. This has been
repeated by her more than once before she reached the hospital
except that she assigned that lighting of fire to her husband. We
have already dealt with this aspect of the matter and have come
to the conclusion that though we. would not have been prepared to
base the conviction on the oral dying declaratiOns alone, such
D
dying declarations, in our opinion, were not to be totally
rejected and the same can ~ used as corroborative material.

We are not prepared to accept Laxman's ·plea of alibi. He had
pleaded that he had gone along with PW.3 upto the bus stand and
by the time he returned the incident had taken place. Laxman was
E
present arid his conduct of iridifference doe.s exhibit his compli-
City. In fact, when Laxman was available. in Delhi, without his
active association Shakuntala could not have managed the event
all by herself. We are, therefore, of the definite view that
Shakuntala and Laxman are responsible for the killing of Sudha by
setting her on fire. They have, therefore, colnm.itted the offence
F
of murder arid are liable to be convicted for the offence punish-
able under section.302 of the Indian Penal Cede as has been found
by ~he trial Court. Mr. Singh had very ably attempted to persuade
as to accept the position that when admittedly PW.3 had come to
the house that evening, it would be normal to expect Laxman to go
with her upto the bus stand when she was returning to her
G
residence. He also cOIIDllended to us to accept the evidence of the
taxi driver LM.4 who stated that Laxman app~ared in the scene
after the taxi had come to the spot. We have pondered over this
submission for quite some time but we find the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses who saW Lruanan standing at the front door
H more acceptable.

I
STATE v. 1AXMAN KUMAR [RANGANAm MISRA, J. J 931
j

The next relevant aspect for consideration is what should be A
the proper punishment to be imposed. The.learned trial Judge had
thought it proper to impose the punishment of death. Acquittal
intervened and almost two years have elapsed since the respon-
dents were acquitted and set at liberty by the ·High Court. In a
suitable case of bride burning, death .sentence may not be
improper. But in the facts. of the case and particularly on B
account of the situation following the acquittal in the hands of
the High Court and the time lag, we do not think it .would be
proper to restore the death sentence as a _necessary corollary to
' the finding of guilt. We accordingly allow both the appeals
partly and direct that the two. respondents, Smt. Shakuntala and
Laxman Kumar shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life. Both c
the appeals against Subhash stand dismissed and his acquittal is
upheld. Steps shall be taken by the trial Judge to give effect to
this judgment as promptly as feasible.

Before we part with these appeals we may .refer to some
portions of the judgment of the High Ccourt under the heading D
'Conclusion' . The High Court observed :•
• •
"The sentence of- death awarded to three persons
including a woman in a wife burning case was given
wide publicity both by the national and international
news media. The verdict of acquittal which we are
about to deliver .is bound to. cause flutter in the E
public mind more par_ticulaily arongst women's social
0 bodies and·- organisations·. we are_' performing our cons-
titutional duty. Judges.have no special means ?f find-
ing out the truth. We ·entirely depend on the evidence
produced o~ reco.rd and :do our . best to discovei: the
truth within the limi_tations laid down by law. Judges F
are hwnan beiilgs arid can err-. The satisfying factor is
. that we are not the final Couri: and there is a Court
:above us and ff our judgment is wrong it shall be set
right."

What the High Court had visualised has perhaps partly come to G
happen but the way the High Court took cover of the existence of
a higher forum is not available to.us as law does not prescribe
another forum beyond this Court •. We are, however, disturbed by
the fact that the High Court took notiCe of publicity through the
news media and indicated its apprehension of flutter in . the
public mind •. It is the obligation of every Court to find out the H
...._ truth and act according. to law once the truth is discoyered. In
932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A that search for truth obviously the Court has to function within
the bounds set by law and act on the evidence placed before it.
What happens outside the Court room when the Court is busy in its
process of adjudication is indeed irrelevant and unless a proper
cushion is provided to keep the proceedings within the court room
dissociated from the heat generated outside the court room either
B through the news media or through flutter in the public mind, the
cause of justice is bound to suffer. Mankind has shifted from the
state of nature towards a civilized society and it is no longer
the physical power of a litigating individual or the might of the '
ruler nor even the opinion of the majority that takes away the
liberty of a citizen by convicting him and making him suffer a
sentence of !mprisonment. Award of punishment following convic-
C tion at a trial in a system wedded to rule of law is the outcome
of cool deliberation in the court room after adequate hearing is
afforded to the parties, accusations are brought against the
accused, the prosecutor is given an opportunity of supporting the
charge and the accused is equally given an opportunity of meeting
the accusations by establishing his innocence. It is the outcome
of cool deliberations· ~nd the screeninr of the material by the
D informed mind of the Judge that leads to determination of the •
lis. If the cushion is lost and the Court room is allowed to
vibrate with the heat generated outside it, the adjudicatory
process suffers and the search fqr truth is stifled.

In the penultimate and the last paragraphs the judgment ofr
E the high Court it has been said as follows :

"We appreciate the auxiety displayed by some of the
women organisations in cases of wife burning a crime
to be condemned by one and all and if proved deserving
the severest sentence. The evil of dowry is equally a
F matter of concern for the society as a whole and
should be looked upon contemptuously both on the giver
and the taker. lbis evil is in vogue in our society
since time innnem.orial and shall take time to be
curbed. The social and economic conditions are the ,
main enemy of woman desparation sometime compelling
G her to commit suicide. These evils prevailing in our
society have to be fought at different levels. Once
economic independence comes in women the evil of dowry
will die a natural death. Without education economic
independence cannot be achieved and, therefore, educ?-
tion ·at all levels of the society upper class, middle
classes, lower classes is a must. We hear of no wife ..,.
burning cases in western co"Untries, obviously because
women there are economically independent.
STATE v. LAXMAN KUMAR [RANGANATll MISRA, J.] 933

A
The Courts cannot allow an emotional and sentimental
feelings to come into the judicial pronouncements•
Once sentimental and emotional feelings are allowed to
enter the judicial mind the Judge is bound to view the
-evidence with a bias and in that case the conclusion
may also be biased resulting in some cases in great B
injustice. The cases have to be decided strictly on
evidence howsoever cruel or horrifying the crime may
be. All possible chances of innocent man being convic-
ted have to be ruled out. There should be no hostile
atmosphere against an accused in court. A hostile
atmosphere is bound to interfere in an unbiased c
approach as well as a decision. This has to be avoided
at all costs. We are sorry for the above diversion but
it has become necessary in this case."

With the opinion in the ultimate paragraph of the jud!;inent
we agree. But we have not been able to see any reason as to why D
the High Court was obsessed with the ideacthat the diversion
became necessary in the case. It cannot be gainsaid that the
• Court must proceed to discharge its duties uninfluenced by any
extraneous consideration.

Debate has no place in a judgment though invariably a dabate E
precedes it and a judgment may occasion a debate. Every one in
the country - whether an individual or an organisation should
co!".tribute to social metabolism. It is our considered opinion
that this Court has obligation within reasonable " limits and
justifying bounds to provide food for thoughts which may help
generate the proper social order and hold the community in an
even form. The High Court was of the view that the evil of dowry F
in our society has been prevailing from time immemorial. This
does not seem to be correct. In the olden days in. the Hindu
connnunity dowry in the modern sense was totally unknown. Man and
woman enjoyed equality of status and society looked upon women as
living goddesses. Where ladies lived in peace, harmony and with
dignity and status, Gods were believed to be roaming about in
human form. When a bride was brought into the family i t was G
considered to be a great event and it was_looked upon as bringing
fortune into the family not by way of dowry but on account of the
grace the young lady carried with and arjund her •

•
The High Court has indicated that once education and
.... economic independence for women are aChieved, the evil of dowry H
would meet a natural death. There seems to -be force in what the
934 SUPl\EME COURT REPORTS !1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.
•
A High Court has said. We propose to add a few concluding
paragraphs to our judgment to highlight our concern about the
evil.

Marriage, according to the community to which parties
belong, is sacramental and is believed to have been ordained in
B heaven. The religious rites performed at the marriage alter
clearly indicate that the man accepts the woman as his better-
half by assuring her protection as guardian, ensuring food and
necessaries of life as the provider, guaranteeing companionship
as the mate and by resolving that the pleasures and sorrows in
the pursuit of life shall be shared with her and Dharma shall be
observed. If this be the concept of marriage, there would be no
c scope to look for worldly considerations, particularly dowry.

Every marriage ordinarily involves a trans-plant. A girl born
and brought up in her natural family when given in marriage, has
to leave the natural setting and come into a new family. When a
tender plant is shifted from the place of origin to a new
setting, great care is taken to ensure that the new soil is suit-
lJ able and not far different from the soil where the plant had
hitherto been growing; care is- taken to ensure that there is not
much of variation of the temperature, watering facility is
assured and congeniality is attempted to be provided. When a girl
is transplanted from her natural setting into an alien family,
the care expected is bound to be more than in the case of a
plant. Plant has life but the girl has a more developed one.
Human emotions are unknown to the plant life. In the growing
years in the natural setting the girl - now a bride - has formed
her own habits, gathered her own impressions, developed her own
aptitudes and got used to a way ·of life. In the new setting some
of these have to be accepted and some she has to surrender. This
F process of adaptation is not and cannot be one-sided. Give and
take, live.and let live, are the ways of life and when the bride
is received in the new family she must have a feeling of welcome
and by the fond bonds of lOve and affection, grace and
generosity, attachment and consideration that she may receive in ,
the family of the husband, she will get into a new mould; the
G mould which.would last for her life. She has to get used to a new
set of -relationships - one type with the hUsband, another with
the parents-in-law, a different one with the other superiors and
yet a different one with the younger ones in the family. For this
she would require loving ·guidance. The elders in the family,
including the mother-in-law, are expected to show her the way.
H
The husband has to stand as a mountain of support ready to
STATE v •. LAXMAN KUMAR [RANGANATll MISRA, J. ] 935

protect her and espouse her cause'where she is on the right and, A
equally ready to cover her either by pulling her up to protecting
her willingly taking the responsibility on to himself when she is
at fault. The process has to be a natural one and there has to be
exhibition.of cooperation and willingness from every side. Other-
wise how would the transplant succeed.
B
There is yet another aspect which we think is very germane,
Of late there is a keen competition between man and woman all the
world over. There has been a.feeling that the world has been a
man dominated one and women as a class have been trying to raise
their heads by claiming equality. We are of the view that woman
must rise and on account of certain virtues which Nature has
c
endowed them with to the exclusion of man, due credit llllSt be
given to women as possessors of those exclusive qualities. It is
the woman who is capable of playing the more effective role in
the preservation of society and, therefore, she has to be respec-
D
ted. She has the greater dose of divinity in her and by her
gifted qualities she can protect the society against evil. To
that extent woman have special qualities to serve society in due
• discharge of the social responsibility. While all these are true
and the struggle for upliftment has to continue, can it be
forgotton that men and women in the human creation are complemen- E
tary to each other and it is only when a man and a woman are put
together that a unit is formed? One without the other has no
place in the COlllllllnity of homosapiens. Therefore, in a world
where man and woman are indispensable to each other and the
st'ltus of one depends upon the existence and longing of the
other, to what extent is competition between the two justifiable
F
is a matter to be debated in a cool and healthy setting.

S.R. Appeal part'iy allowed.