STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD.versusPRASAR BHARTI & ORS.

                            [2016) 3 S.C.R. 118



A                   STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD.
                                     v.
                        PRASAR BHARTI & ORS.
                      (Civil Appeal No. 5252 of2016)
8                              MAY27,2016
             [A.K. SIKRI AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.]
         Sports Broadcasting Signals (Mandatory Sharing with Prasar
    Bharati) Act, 2007 - ss. 3, 2 (b), 2(h) - Sports Broadcast Signals
    (Mandatory Sharing with Prasar Bharti) Rules, 2007 - rr. 5, 2(b),
c   3 - Mandatory sharing of certain sports broadcasting signals -
    Obligations of a Television Broadcasting Organisation - Scope of
    - Appellant shared live broadcast signal of a sporting event-world
    feed with Prasar Bharati - Inclusion of certain enhancing
    "features" such Hawk-eye, ball delivery speed reference, umpire
D   naming graphics, player statistics, score cards, match summary
    graphics, replay graphics etc - Such features contained logos of
    the event sponsors known as "On-Screen Credits" - Logos of
    advertisers contained in the 'world feed' shared by appellant with
    Prasar Bharti, if amounts to advertisement - Held: Logos are
    commercials of the ~ponsors which would be treated as not on~v
E
    advertisements but commercial advertisements - Word 'its' in s. 3
    cannot be given limited meaning by confining it to advertisements
    only of broadcasting service provider - Signals to be shared with
    Prasar Bharati by content rights owner or holder are to be the best
    feed that is provided to broadcast service provider in India and has
F   to be 'free from commercial advertisements - ICC which included
    those advertisements/logos, the feeds have to be without those logos/
    advertisements - If advertisements are also to be included in the
    signals, there has to be sharing of the revenue - When live
    broadcasting signal is shared containing advertisements, those
    advertisements have much larger viewership because of its telecast/
G
    broadcast on Prasar Bharati, rei·enue thereof is to be shared between
    the Broadcaster and Prasar Bharti.
         Dismissing the appeal, the Court
         HELD: 1.1 It is not denied by the appellant that the logos
H
                                     118
     STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI                        119



are of the event sponsors, known as 'On-Screen Credits' in               A
industry parlance. The appellant has it'ielf shown the photographs.
No doubt, such logos or On-Screen Credits may appear at the
time of featuring replays like ball delivery speed and when a player
gets out either when he is bowled, run out or caught or they are
shown while depicting player statistics, scoreboard, match
                                                                          8
summary, graphs, etc. Nonetheless, these are the advertisements
of the sponsors like Pepsi, LG, Fly Emirates, Reli.ance, etc. These
sponsors have entered into arrangement for showing their logo
on the occasions referred. It is also not in dispute that these
sponsors pay for such On-Screen Credits. Insofar as such
sponsors are concerned, their motive in giving these logos to be          c
shown on Television is crystal clear, viz. it is intended to advertise
their company names for commercial motives in mind. These arc,
thus, commercials of the sponsors which would clearly be treated
as not only advertisements but commercial advertisements. Once
 it is held that what is shown are advertisements, the question as
                                                                          D
 to whether these advertisements are shown because of some
arrangement between the organisers of the tournament and the
 sponsors or as a result of arrangement between the broadcasters,
 i.e. the appellant, and the sponsors is immaterial. Section 3 of
 the Sports Act does not make any distinction between the
 aforesaid two kinds of advertisements. What is prescribed, in no         E
 nncertain terms, is that sharing of the live broadcasting signal
 has to be without advertisements. [Para 27] [140-H; 141-A-D]
      1.2 On a plain reading of Section 3 of the Sports Act, it is
accepted that the obligation to share such sports broadcasting
signals is upon the following persons: (i) content rights owner;          F
(ii) content holder; and (iii) television or radio broadcasting
service provider. Any of these categories of persons arc not
allowed to carry a live television broadcast on: (i)' any cable or
direct-to-home network; (ii) radio commentary broadcast in India,
if such television broadcast or radio commentary broadcast
happens to be of sporting events which is of national importance          G
unless such content rights owner or content holder or
broadcasting service provider simultaneously shares the live
broadcasting signals with Prasar Bharati to enable Prnsar Bharati
to re-transmit the same on its terrestrial networks and DTH
networks in such manner and on such terms and conditions as               H
120            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2016] 3 S.C.R.



A     may be specified. [Para 28) [141-E-H; 142-A-B)
            1.3 It becomes apparent from the reading of the Preamble
      of the Act that purpose is to provide access to the largest number
      of listeners and viewers, on a free to air basis, of sporting events
      of national importance. This task is given to Prasar Bharati.
B     Notwithstanding more popularity which the private channels have
      gained over a period of time, coverage of Prasar Bharati is far
      more reaching insofar as Indian population is concerned as it
      reaches almost every nook and corner of the country. Further
      the radio as well as television broadcasting of Prasar Bharat is
      free of cost. It is for this reason that the law in the form of Sports
c     Act is enacted in order to ensure that such sporting events of
      national importance are made available to every citizen of this
      country, irrespective of his/her financial conditions. Section 3,
      thus, aims to achieve two purposes; to provide access to largest
      number of listeners and viewers on a free to air basis. The principle
D     of purposive interpretation, in this context, meant that Prasar
      Bharati was supposed to telecast these matches for the benefit
      of general masses spread through out India, who otherwise do
      not receive signals of private channels like the appellant or are
      not having financial capacity to pay for these channels. Thus, it
      was a larger public interest which was sought to be served and
E     noble objective was kept in mind while enacting the statute;
      insofar as income that is generated from advertisements is
      concerned, which are shown on television or broadcasted on radio,
      the revenue thereof is to be shared between the Broadcaster
      and Prasar llharati. The purpose is obvious. It is the broadcasting
F     service provider who is supposed to share the live broadcasting
      signal with Prasar Bharati, which has the arrangements with the
      advertisers and, thus, takes money from those who book their
      advertisements to be broadcasted on television or radio.
      However, when the signals are shared with Prasar Bharati enabling
      it to simultaneously retransmit the same on its terrestrial
G     networks or DTH networks, the vicwership/audienee gets
      multiplied as the reach is to much larger section of citizenry
      through Prasar Bharati. Therefore, Section 3(1), in the first
      instance, mandates that the sharing of live broadcasting signals
      with Prasar Bharati has to be 'without its advertisements'.
      Exception is, however, made in sub-section (2) of Section 3 which
H
     STAR SPORTS !NOIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI                  121



enables the broadcasting service provider to even share the A
contents along with advertisements, but subject to the condition
that there has to be a sharing of revenue in the proportion
prescribed in sub-section (2) of Section 3. Thus, when live
broadcasting signal is shared containing advertisements, those
advertisements have much larger viewership because of its
                                                                      H
telecast/broadcast on Prasar Bharati. The benefit of
advertisement in such a case would accrue to those who have
booked the advertisements and the service provider, in such an
eventuality would definitely be in a position to charge much more
from the advertisers. It is a matter of common knowledge that
rates of advertisement go up when circulation thereof is enhanced. c
The application of rule of purposive interpretation would go against
the appellant and in favour of the respondent. [Paras 31, 32) [142-
F-H; 143-A-H)
      1.4 It becomes clear that the sharing of the signals has to be
without any advertisements and if the advertisements are also to
be included in the signals, there has to be sharing of the revenue. D
The Attorney General rightly argued that the word 'its' cannot
be given limited meaning by confining it to advertisements only
of broadcasting service provider. Section 3 which starts with
 negative covenant very expressly puts an embargo to all the three
categories mentioned therein, viz., content rights owner, (ii) E
contents holder as well as (iii) television or radio broadcasting
service provider not to have television broadcast either through
 cable or DTH and not to have any radio commentary broadcast
 unless live broadcasting signal is shared simultaneously with
 Prasar Bharnti. Examined in this hue, it becomes clear that the
words 'without its advertisements' which follow immediately after F
 the words 'unless it simultaneously shares the live broadcasting
 signal' has to be given a meaning that such broadcasting signals
 arc to be without advertisements, whether it is of the content
 rights owner, content holder or that of television or radio
 broadcasting service provider. It is made crystal clear by providing G
 the definition of 'content rights owner' or 'holder' in Ruic 2(b) of
 the Rules, 2007. Ruic 3(3) takes the issue beyond any pale of
 doubt when it mentions that the signals to be shared with Prasar
 Bharati by the content rights owner or holder arc to be the best
 feed that is provided to broadcast service provider in India and
 has to be 'free from commercial advertisements'. Tims, even if H
122           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2016] 3 S.C.R.


A     it is ICC which has included those advertisements/logos, the feeds
      have to be without those logos/advertisements inasmuch as
      nobody can dispute that the content rights owner are content
      holder, i.e, ICC in the instant case has included those logos/
      advertisements from purely commercial angle. Thus, the
      arrangement between the ICC and the appellant, is totally
B
      inconsequential. [Para 33] (144-B-GJ
             Executive Engineer, Southern Electricity Supply
             Company of Orissa Limited (Southco) and Another
             vs. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill (2012) 2 SCC 108:2011
             (15) SCR 211; Davis vs. Sebastian (1999) 6 SCC
c            604: 1999 (1) Suppl. SCR 612; V.B.Raju vs. Union
             of India and Others 1980 (Supp) SCC 513: 1981
             SCR 599; Secretary, Ministry of Information &
             Broadcasting, Govt. of India and Others vs. Cricket
             Association of Bengal and Other(l995) 2 SCC 161:
D            1995 (1) SCR 1036 - referred to.
                             Case Law Reference
          2011 (15) SCR 211              referred to        Para 12
          1999 (1) Suppl. SCR 612 referred to               Para 13
E
          1981 SCR 599                   referred to        Para 14
          1995 (1) SCR 1036              referred to        Para 21
          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: CIVIL APPEAL No. 5252
      of2016.
 F
           From the Judgment and Order dated 03. I 0.2013 in WPC No. 3611
      of 2013 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi.
           Mukul Rohatgi, AG, A.M., Singhvi, Sudhir Chandra, Arv ind Datar,
      Abhinav Vasisht, Sr. Advs., Sai Krishna Rajagopal, Sidharth Chopra,
G     Ms. Sneha Jain, Ms. Ruby Singh Ahuja, Mani sh Kumar, Shiv am Singh,
      L. Ahmed, Ms. Sarni Dutt, Ms. Akanksha Munjal, Gopal Singh, Nikhil
      Nayyar, Rajeev Sharma, Ms. Radhalakshmi, Harshvardhan Jha, Adarsh
      Upadhyay, Radha Rangaswamy, Ms. Ranjeeta Rohatgi, Abhinav Mukerji,
      Gopal Singh, Advs. for the appearing parties.
H
     STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI                               123
                    [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                                 A
     A.K. SJKRI, J. I. Leave granted.
      2. The instant appeal is filed against the impugned judgment dated
October 3, 2013 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of
Delhi in W.P.(C) No. 3611 of 2013 which was filed by the appellant
                                                                                 B
herein. The appeal raises the issue regarding the scope of obligations of
a Television Broadcasting Organisation under the Sports Broadcasting
Signals (Mandatory Sharing with Prasar Bharati) Act, 2007 (hereinafter
referred to as "Sports Act"). We may mention at the outset that under
Section 3 of the Sports Act, a Television Broadcasting Organisation is
prohibited from carrying the live television broadcast of a sporting event       c
of national importance on cable or Direct-to-Home (DTH) networks in
India, unless it simultaneously shares the live broadcasting signals, without
its advertisements, with the Prasar Bharati (respondent No. I) to enable
it to retransmit the same on its terrestrial and DTH network.
      3. In view of the above statutory obligation, the appellant herein         D
sharing the live broadcast signals with respodnent No. I Prasar Bharati
and there is no dispute about the same. The appellant, as a television
broadcaster, is allowed to insert advertisements on its avenue and recoup
its advertisements during a break in live play at various poi11ts during
broadcast, such as, during breaks between overs in a cricket match, at
the fall of a wicket, during drink breaks etc. These advertisements are          E
not included while sharing the live broadcasting signals with Prasar
Bharati. No dispute about this as well.
      4. The problem has, however, arisen in respect of the contents
shared. with Prasar Bharati which, at times, include some kind of
advertisements. According to the appellant, the broadcast signal of a            F
spo11ing event provided by an event organiser, known as the "world
feed" (as the same feed is provided to all broadcasters the world over),
includes the broadcast of the live play of the event as it happens on the
field as also certain "features" which enhance a view's experience, such
a Hawk-eye, ball delivery speed reference, umpire naming graphics,               G
player statistics, score cards, match summary graphics, replay graphics
etc. These features are inse11ed at the site by or at the instance of the
event organiser. Such features invariably contain logos of the event
sponsors known as "On-Screen Credits" in industry parlance. These
"On-Screen Credits" are, however, included while sharing the live
broadcasting signals with Prasar Bharati. Prasar Bharati has taken               H
124             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2016] 3 S.C.R.



A     exception to the aforesaid inclusion treating the same as "advertisements"
      and, thus, turning it as violative of Section 3(1) of the Sports Act. The
      appellant, on the other hand, has taken the position that in terms of
      Section 3( 1) of the Sports Act, the obligation of a television Broadcaster,
      i.e., the appellant, is limited to sharing of the world feed which it receives
      from the event organizer/owner on as as-is-where-is basis without
B
      advertisements of the television broadcaster, and that the appellant is
      not obliged to remove any On-Screen Credits inserted by the event
      organizer. The appellant contested the stand of Prasar Bharati
      (respondent No. 1) that it is the duty of the appellant to ensure that the
      sponsor logos/On-Screen Credits present ion the world feed, which ios
c     created by or at the instance of the organizer of the event, have to also
      be removed by the appellant.
            5. By the impugned judgment, the High Comi has found favour
      with the contention raised by Prasar Bharati and this view of the High
      Court is the subject matter of challenge in the instant appeal. The !is
D     has travelled to this Court in following factual background.
            6. The appellant (formerly ESPN Software India Private Limited)
      is the sole and exclusive distributor of some sports channels in India.
      These include ESPN, Star Sports, Star Sports 2 and Star Cricket. These
      channels telecast various sporting events such as ICC Cricket, BCCI
E     Cricket, Formula 1, Barclays Premier League Football, ICC Cricket World
      Cup and Wimbledon etc. for telecasting these events, the appellant enters
      into a contract with the sporting events organizers. These broadcasting
      rights have also been acquired from International Cricket Council (ICC)
      to broadcast cricket events organised by ICC for the Indian territory.

 F          7. Keeping in mind the mandate of Section 3 of the Sports Act. the
      appellant informed respondent no. I, i.e., Prasar Bharati on March 07,
      2013 that it would be sharing the live signals with Prasar Bharati of
      cricket matches organised by the ICC. It was followed by another
      letter dated March 14, 2013 wherein the appellant stated that such live
      signals, which the appellant would be sharing with Prasar Bharati, shall
 G    contain certain added features comprising of commercial elements.
      Prasar Bharati replied vide letter dated April 06, 2013 informing the
      appellant that under the law, appellant's obligations is to share the signals
      without any commercials. The appellant responded by stating that under
      the contract with the sporting event organizers, the appellant was
      receiving the feed containing certain advertisements by the organizer of
 H
     STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI                             125
                    [A.K. oIKRI, J.]

the sporting events and, therefore, the signals were transmitted as it is,    A
including those advertisements which were not the advertisements booked
by the appellant. It was also stated that as per Section 3 of the Sports
Act, appellant was to share the live broadcast signal as it is, i.e., the
manner in which it was received by it from the copyright owner of the
broadcast (the sporting event organizer) and, therefore, it did not amount
                                                                               B
to any violation of Section 3 of the Sports Act. It was also contended
that the appellant had no control over the live signals so received. Since
both the parties remain adamant about their respective position, the
appellant approached the High Court of Delhi by way of writ petition
filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking following declarations
and reliefs:                                                                   c
       "(a) a declaration that under the provisions of the Act and the
       Rules framed thereunder, the appellant shall offer to simultaneously
       share with the respondent no. I the same live broadcasting signals
       of sporting events of national importance as provided by the
       appellant to other broadcast network service providers in India,        D
       without insertion of the appellant's commercial advertisements;
       (b) a declaration that the live broadcasting signals of sporting
       events of national importance shared by the appellant with the
       respondent no. I under Section 3 of the Act shall be the best feed
       as received from site with all features inclusive ofany commercials
                                                                               E
       of the event owner and without insertion of any commercial
       advertisements by the appellant.
       (c) a writ of certiorari to quash and set-aside the communication
       dated 06 111 April, 2013 issued by the respondent no. 1;
       (d) hold and declare Rule 5 of the Sports Rules in violative of         F
       Section 3 of the Act and ultra-vires Article 14 of the Constitution;
       ( e) Hold and declare that upon the appellant offering to share t he
       world feed of the relevant matches of the Champions Trophy
       2013 without its commercial advertisement with the respondent,
       it has discharged its obligation under Section 3 of the Act; and        o
       (f) Such other writ, order or direction as the court may deem fit in
       the interest ofjustice."
     8. Insofar as vi res of Rule 5 of the Rules, 2007 is concerned, the
High Court repelled the contention of the said Rule being ultra vires the
provisions of Section 3 of the Sports Act with the reason that this Rule       H
126             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           (2016] 3 S.C.R.



A      simply obliges the content right owner or the holder or a broadcast service
       provider to comply with the statutory provisions of the Act, which in any
       case was the obligation of the broadcaster even if Rule 5 was not to
       exist. Thereafter, the High Court came to the fulcrum of the dispute
       and noted that insofar as plain language of Section 3 of the Sports Act is
       concerned, it categorically casts an obligation on the broadcaster to share
B
       the life broadcasting signals without its advertisements, with Prasar
       Bharati. We would produce the text of Section 3 at this juncture:
             "3. Mandatory sharing of ce1iain sports broadcasting signals -
             (I) No content rights owner or holder and no television or radio
             broadcasting service provider shall carry a live television broadcast
c            on any cable or Direct-top-Home network or radio commentary
             broadcast in India of sporting events ofnational importance, unless
             it simultaneously shares the live broadcasting signal, without its
             adve1iisements, with the Prasar Bharati to enable them to re-
             transmit the same on its terrestrial networks and Direct-to-Home
D            networks in such manner and on such terms and conditions as
             may be specified.
              (2) The terms and conditions under sub-section (I) shall also
              provide that the advertisement revenue sharing between the
              content rights owner or holder and the Prasar Bharati shall be in
              the ratio of not Jess than 75:25 in case of television coverage and
E
              50:50 in case of radio coverage.
              (3) The Central Government may specify a percentag_e of the
              revenue received by the Prasar Bharati under sub-section (2),
              which shall be utilised by the Prasar Bharati for broadcasting other
              sporting events."
 F
            The High Court noted that the arguments of the appel !ant was that
       the contents were to be shared 'without its_ advertisements' which meant
       no advertisements of the Broadcaster and, therefore, this expression did
       not include advertisements inserted in the feed by the event organizer.
       This argument is, however, rejected in the following manner:
G
              "The expression 'unless it simultaneously shares the live
              broadcasting signal, without its advertisements, with the Prasar
              Bharati .... ' with reference to the two words 'its advertisements'
              in the phrase, admits of the phrase having only one meaning and
              not admitting two. The only one meaning that the live broadcast
 1-1          signals have to be without any advertisements for the reason the
     STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI                                127
                    [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

      rules of English grammar guide us that the subject of (the single          A
      sentence) sub-section (1) of Section 3, is 'the content right owner
      or holder or radio broadcasting service provider' and the three
      words 'without its advertisements' are a sub-clause constituting a
      condition and since the three words immediately follow the words
      'live broadcasting signal' they have to be, plainly read, as a condition
                                                                                  B
      concerning the live broadcast service provider; meaning thereby,
      whosoever airs a live television broadcast of sporting events of
      national importance must share the same without any
      advertisements insetied with Prasar Bharati."
      9. The submission of the appellants that it had no control over the
live signals which included the advertisements of the event organizer
                                                                                  c
was also dismissed with following observations:
       "We need not discuss the effect of the petitioner having no control
       over the live signals and the effect of the. legislative provision i.e.
       Section 3( 1), casting an obligation upon the petitioner which is
       impossible of being performed by the petitioner or obliges the             D
       petitioner to violate its contractual obligations with the copyright
       owner of the broadcast, for the reason the same would relate to
       the vi res of Section 3(1) of the Act; and we highlight once again
     . that the vires of Section 3( 1) of the Act has not been cha Ilenged."
     The aforesaid is the central theme of the impugned judgment of the           E
High Court. Though, in addition, the High Court has touched upon certain
other peripheral aspects as well, but that need not be mentioned at this
stage.
     10. The arguments which were advanced by Dr. A.M. Singhvi,
learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant are stated in                  F
summarised form hereinbelow:
        (I) In the first instance, it was argued that 'On-Screen Credits'
put in by the event organizers themselves cannot be treated as
advertisements at all. As these features were the integral part of the
feeds that the appellant was receiving from the organizers for the purpose        G
of broadcasting. These credits were logos of the event sponsors whic;h
were appearing on the screen as per the agreement between the event
sponsors and the event organizers. Following examples are given by tbe
appellants:
                                                                                  H
128   SUPREME COURT REPORTS   [2016] 3 S.C.R.



A




B




c



D




E




 F




G




 H
STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI                        129
               [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

                                                                    A




                                                                    B




                                                                    c



                                                                    D




WEST IMOlES 11 NEW lE.A.lANO
MATCH SUMMARY
               -·-----
                      ""'',,"




                                 .· DSSMIHI
                                ·• ·s MIJRAUfH.ulAH ~='11:,.,-.rl
                                    M SA.MUUS                       F
                                  . 0 811.AVO




                                                                    G




                                                                    H
130            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2016] 3 S.C.R.


A           In the aforesaid photographs LG, Fly Emirates, Reliance and Pepsi
      are the logos of the event sponsors which are embedded in the feeds
      that are received.
           (ll) Taking the aforesaid argument further, it was submitted that in
      any case the appellant gets those logos embedded as it is and has not
B     control over the same. It was argued that while sharing the signals with
      Prasar Bharati, there was no mechanism or methodology to remove
      these logos.
          (Ill) It was submitted that in the aforesaid context, the said logos
    could not be treated as commercial advertisements and the purpose of
c Section 3 of the Sports Act was not to share only those kinds of
    advertisements which were commercial in nature, i.e., book by the
    Broadcaster/appellant from which the appellant had received the revenue
    and generated income. In other words, it was argued that having regard
    to purposive interpretation which was to be given to the expression
    'without its advertisements' the aforesaid logos would not come within
D · the mischief of the aforesaid expression. It is in the same hue, the
    argument of Dr. Singhvi was that not only those advertisements which
    were inserted at the instance of the broadcasting organisation carrying
    live signal in India, were required to be removed as per Section 3 of the
    Sports Act, it was emphatically emphasised that broadcasting
E organizations, like appellants, are only authorised by respective event
    owners, as also under law, to insert advertisements during normal and
    routine breaks in the live play of an event/match, such as end of overs,
    fall ofwicket(s), lunch break, drinks break, injury, rain etc.
            11. It was also argued that there is a distinction between the event/
 F    match as played and the event/match as broadcast. The broadcast of
      an event/match contains not on'ly the live event/match as played on the
      field but also certain enhancement in the form of features. These features
      aid the viewer in better understanding and appreciating the game and as
      such enhance the viewership experience. These features/On-Screen
      Credits are as much a part of the broadcast of an event as the play of
 G    the event itself. As per the appellant, the obligation under Section 3 is to
      simultaneously share the live 'broadcasting signals' which are received
      by an entity carrying the television broadcast in India and not just the live
      'event' itself. However, as a result of the impugned judgment, the
      appellant will be·wmpelled to share the live 'event' and not the live
      'broadcast signal' of the event. The appellant submits that it is not
 H
        STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI                              131
                       [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

practically feasible for a broadcaster to remove the on-screen credits            A
inserted by the event organizer in the live signals and simultaneously
share the same signals (as provided to other service providers such as
cable and private DTH networks) with Prasar Bharati. In the past
when the appellant was compelled to provide a clean feed, the appellant
was constrained to procure a separate feed at a considerable cost as it
                                                                                   B
was not practically feasible for the appellant to remove the insertions of
the event organizer while simultaneously sharing the same feed with
Prasar Bharati. The appellant submits that the mandate of the Act is
simultaneous sharing and not procuring and providing a separate live
feed to Prasar Bharati.
      12. Dr. Singhvi laid emphasis on the words 'simultaneously shares
                                                                                   c
the live broadcasting signals' and submitted that since the obligation was
to share it 'simultaneously' i.e., 'as it is' the sharing of the signals with
logos coming from the organizers were not supposed to be removed.
Another submission of Dr. Singhvi was that Section 3 was expropriate
in nature, i.e. contra proferantem. ln order to buttress this argument,            D
the learned senior counsel argued that the purport of sharing the signals
without advertisement was that ifthe advertisements are also included
along with the other contents, the Broadcaster becomes the beneficiary
of having much larger audience and viewers and, therefore, in such
cases Prasar Bharati wanted its share in such advertisement. In the
instant case when the appellant had not earned any income from these               E
advertisements as these were not booked by the appellant, there was no
question of sharing alleged income. Reference was made to the judgment
of this Court in Executive Engineer, Southern Electricity Supply
Company of Orissa Limited (Southco) and Another vs. Sri Seetaram
Rice Mi/11 wherein rule of purposive interpretation was explained in the           F
following manner:
         "46. "Purposive construction" is certainly a cardinal principle of
         interpretation. Equally true is that no rule of interpretation should
         either be overstated or overextended. Without being overextended
         or overstated, this rule of interpretation can be applied to the          G
         present case. It points to the conclusion that an interpretation which
         would attain the object and purpose of the Act has to be given
         precedence over any other interpretation which may not further
         the cause of the statute. The development of law is particularly
1
    (2012i 2 sec 10s                                                               H
132            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2016) 3 S.C.R.


A           liberated both from literal and blinkered interpretation, though to a
            limited extent.
           4 7. The precepts of interpretation of contractual documents have
           also undergone a wide-ranged variation in the recent times. The
           result has been subject to one important exception to assimilate
B          the way in which such documents are interpreted by Judges on
           the common sense principle by which any serious utterance would
           be interpreted by ordinary life. In other words, the common sense
           view relating to the implication and impact of provisions is the
           relevant consideration for interpreting a term of document so as
           to achieve temporal proximity of the end result.
c
            48. Another similar rule is the rule of practical interpretation. This
            test can be effectually applied to the provisions of a statute of the
            present kind. It must be understood that an interpretation which
            upon application of the provisions at the ground reality, would
            frustrate the very law should not be accepted against the common
D           sense view which will fu11her such application.
            49. Once the court decides that it has to take a purposive
            construction as opposed to textual construction, then the legislative
            purpose sought to be achieved by such an interpretation has to be
            kept in mind. We have already indicated that keeping in view the
E           legislative scheme and the provisions of the 2003 Act, it will be
            appropriate to adopt the approach of purposive construction on
            the facts of this case. We have also indicated above that the
            provisions of Section 126 of the 2003 Act are intended to cover
            the cases over and above the cases which would be specifically
 F          covered under the provisions of Section 135 of the 2003 Act."
           13. In support of this submission, reliance was placed on the
      judgment of this case in Davis vs. Sebastim1 1, wherein it was held as
      under:
            "8. Now, what is the meaning of the expression "personal use" in
 G          sub-section (8) It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that
            words in a statute shall be given their natural, ordinary meaning;
            nothing should be added to them nor should any word be treated
            as otiose. Two comprehensive expressions "additional
            accommodation" and "personal use" are employed in sub-section
      ----
 H    '(1999) 6 sec 604
     STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI                              133
                    [A.K. S!KRI, J.]

      (8). The expression "additional accommodation" takes in both             A
      residential as well as non-residential buildings. "Personal use" is
      also an expression of wide amplitude. There is nothing in the sub-
      section which restricts the import of that expression. The said
      requirement of sub-section (8) will be complied with on the
      satisfaction of the Controller about bona fide need of the additional
                                                                                B
      accommodation for personal use of the landlord. To what use the
      additional accommodation should be put, is the choice of the
      landlord. In the case ofa non-residential building whether a new
      business should be set up in the additional accommodation or
      whether it should be used for expansion of the existing business,
      is left entirely to the option of the landlord. This, being the           c
      intendment of the legislature, the court cannot impose any
      restriction with regard to the use of the additional accommodation
      from which the eviction of the tenant is sought."
      14. It was next contended that the word 'its' occurring in the
expression 'without its advertisements' was referable to the Broadcaster        D
and, therefore, on the application of the rule ofliteral construction, those
logos which were embedded by the event organizers could not be treated
as the advertisements of the appellant. Dr. Singhvi also endeavored to
take solace from V.B. Raju Vs. Union of India mu/ Otllers3 in support
of his contention that otherwise the word 'its' would be rendered otiose,
ifthe aforesaid interpretation as suggested by the appellant is not made        E
applicable.
     15. The aforesaid submissions of the learned senior counsel for the
appellant were countered by Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned Attorney
General for India. At the outset, he drew our attention to the prayers
made in the writ petition and, in particular, prayers (a) and (b) and           F
submitted that these involve disputed question of facts, viz., whether the
appellant, by sharing the signals/world feed was simultaneously passing
advertisements therein as well? And whether under the given
circumstances, such advertisements were of commercial nature and were
offensive of Section 3 of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder? He           G
submitted that the appellant was trivializing the issue by giving it the
nomenclature of' logo' but the fact remains that those logos were of the
advertisers/sponsors who had given it purely for commercial purposes.
The learned Attorney General referred to the counter affidavit which
'wso (Suppl sec 513                                                             H
134            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2016] 3 S.C.R.


A     was filed in the High Court wherein a specific stand was taken by Prasar
      Bharati that it is the appellant who is inserting commercials in the feed
      and not ICC, as is clear from the following averments made in the counter
      affidavit:
            "Without prejudice to what has been stated above, it is submitted
B            that ion fact it is the appellant who is inserting commercials in the
             feed and not ICC. The answering respondent understands that it
             is the appellant who is producing the feed for and on behalf of
             ICC from the ground. The feed as is generated from the ground
             is free of all commercials. It is thereafter that the commercials
             are inserted. It is another matter that the insertion of commercials
c          . takes hardly a second but the assertion of the appellant that it has
             not control over the insertion is clearly incorrect."
            He then referred to para 26 of the rejoinder affidavit wherein the
      aforesaid assertion of the respondent was denied by the appellant. He,
      thus, argued that these are the disputed questions of facts which could
D     not be gone in a writ petition, and as a consequence in the present appeal,
      his submission was that ifthe appellant wanted to raise pure legal question
      it had to be decided on the premise that the appellant had inserted those
      advertisements and insofar as Prasar Bharati is concerned, it had received
      the feeds with the said advertisements and that was the only basis on
E     which the issue at hand could be decided by applying the legal provisions.
           16. Mr. Rohtagi then referred to the preamble to the Sports Act,
      2007 highlighting the object with which the said Act was enacted and
      submitted that it is that spirit and objective which has to be kept in mind
      while construing the provisions of Section 3 of the Sports Act.
 F          17. Insofar as interpretation that is to be given to the word 'its'
      occurring in the expression 'without its advertisements', he submitted
      that Section 3 mentions three categories, namely, (a) content right owner;
      (b) holder; and (c) service provider. According to him, the word 'its'
      was relatable to any of the aforesaid three categories and, therefore,
G     even if it is presumed that the logos/advertisements in the world feed
      are inserted by the event organizers, that also falls within the mischief of
      the aforesaid provision. Basic idea, according to him, was that the feed
      generated has to be free of ads.
           18. Mr. Rohtagi also referred to the provisions of sub-section (2)
      of Section 3 of the Act to highlight the purpose of sharing the revenue
 H
     STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI                              135
                    [A.K. SlKRJ, J.]

which was in the ratio of75:25, i.e., 75% for the Broadcaster and 25%          A
revenue was to be given to Prasar Bharati. His submission that the
statutory provision was enacted to compensate Prasar Bharati for
showing the advertisements which were booked by the Broadcaster or
even event sponsors who had earned money therefrom.
      19. Mr. Rohtagi also took aid of Rule 2(b) of the Rules for               B
interpreting Section 3 appropriately and submitted that the words 'content
rights owner or holder' clearly meant all the three aforesaid categories.
In view of Rule 5 of the Rules, he argued that it was the responsibility of
the appellant to take care of ICC even if it is presumed that ICC as
event organizer had given world feed in that manner.
                                                                                c
     20. Proceeding therefrom, the next argument of the learned Attorney
General was that such a provision cannot be treated as expropriately, as
the revenue was shared between the parties.
     21. Concluding his submissions, Mr. Rohtagi referred to the judgment
of this Court in Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcastinf:,            D
Govt. of India and Others Vs. Cricket Association of Bengal and
Otlter' wherein it was held that airwaves are public property. He
submitted that paragraph 78 which was reliedupon by the appellant had
to be read in conjunction with paragraph 79. Both these paras read as
under:
                                                                                E
       "78. There is no doubt that since the airwaves/frequencies are a
       public property and are also limited, they have to be used in the
       best interest of the society and this can be done either by a central
       authority by establishing its own broadcasting network or regulating
       the grant of licences to other agencies, including the private
       agencies. What is further, the electronic media is the most powerful     F
       media both because of its audio-visual impact and its widest reach
       covering the section of the society where the print media does not
       reach. The right to use the airwaves and the content of the
       programmes, therefore, needs regulation for balancing it and as
       well as to prevent monopoly of information and views relayed,            G
       which is a potential danger flowing from the concentration of the
       right to broadcast/telecast in the hands either of a central agency
       or of few private affluent broadcasters. That is why the need to
       have a central agency representative of all sections of the society

'(1995J 2 sec 161                                                               H
136      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2016] 3 S.C.R.


A     free from control both of the Government and the dominant
      influential sections of the society. This is not disputed. But to
      contend that on that account the restrictions to be imposed on the
      right under Article 19(1 )(a) should be in addition to those
      permissible under Article 19(2) and dictated by the use of public
      resources in the best interests of the society at large, is to
B
      misconceive both the content of the freedom of speech and
      expression and the problems posed by the element of public
      property in, and the alleged scarcity of, the frequencies as well as
      by the wider reach of the media. If the right to freedom of speech
      and expression includes the right to disseminate information to as
c     wide a section of the population as is possible, the access which
      enables the right to be so exercised is also an integral part of the
      said right. The wider range of circulation of information or its
      greater impact cannot restrict the content of the right nor can it
      justify its denial. The virtues of the electronic media cannot become
       its enemies. It may warrant a greater regulation over licensing
D
       and control and vigilance on the content of the programme telecast.
       However, this control can only be exercised within the framework
       of Article 19(2) and the dictates of public interests. To plead for
       other grounds is to plead for unconstitutional measures. It is further
       difficult to appreciate such contention on the part of the
 E     Government in this country when they have a complete control
       over the frequencies and the content of the programme to be
       telecast. They control the sole agency of telecasting. They are
       also armed with the provisions of Article 19(2) and the powers of
       pre-censorship under the Cinematograph Act and Rules. The only
       limitation on the said right is, therefore, the limitation ofresources
 F     and the need to use them for the benefit of al I. When, however,
       there are surplus or unlimited resources and the public interests
       so demand or in any case do not prevent telecasting, the validity
       of the argument based on limitation of resources disappears. It is
       true that to own a frequency for the purposes of broadcasting is a
 G     costly affair and even when there are surplus or unlimited
        frequencies, only the affluent few will own them and will be in a
       position to use it to subserve their own interest by manipulating
        news and views. That also poses a danger to the freedom of
        speech and expression of the have-nots by denying them the truthful
        information on all sides of an issue which is so necessary to form
 H
     STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI                              137
                    [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

      a sound view on any subject. That is why the doctrine of fairness        A
      has been evolved in the US in the context of the private broadcasters
      licensed to share the limited frequencies with the central agency
      like the FCC to regulate the programming. But this·phenomenon
      occurs even in the case of the print media of all the countries.
      Hence the body like the Press Council of India which is
                                                                               B
      empowered to enforce, however imperfectly, the right to reply.
      The print media further enjoys as in our country, freedom from
      pre-censorship unlike the electronic media.
      79. As stated earlier, we are not concerned in the present case
      with the right of the private broadcasters, but only with the limited
      right for telecasting particular cricket matches for particular hours
                                                                                c
      of the day and for a particular period. It is not suggested that the
      said right is objectionable on any of the grounds mentioned in
      Article 19(2) or is against the proper use of the public resources.
      The only objection taken against the refusal to grant the said right
      is that of the limited resources. That objection is completely            D
      misplaced in the present case since the claim is not made on any
      of the frequencies owned, controlled and utilised by Doordarshan.
      The right claimed is for uplinking the signal generated by the BCCI/
      CAB to a satellite owned by another agency. The objection,
      therefore, is devoid of any merit and untenable in law. It also
      displays a deliberate obdurate approach."                                 E

      22. We have given our due, deep and pervasive consideration to
the submissions of counsel for both the parties, which they deserve. It is
clear from the contents of the arguments that the contentions are virtually
the same which were projected before the High Court; the only difference
could be that the arguing counsel have projected a melange of much              F
more clarity, deftness and dexterity in their pellucid arguments.
     23. At the outset it needs to be remarked that vires of the provisions
of Section 3 of the Sports Act are not questioned. It is only interpretation
that has to be placed on the said provision, on which the parties have
joined issue. Therefore, we have to ascertain the true meaning and              G
scope of Section 3 of the Act and on attaining this task, answer to the
issue would become available.
     24. We may also mention that though the provisions of Rule 5 of
the Rules were challenged on the ground that these are ultra vi res Section
3 of the Act, after the High Court has negatived this challenge, this           H
138            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2016] 3 S.C.R.


A     argument was not persisted in this Court. Therefore, we have also to
      proceed in the matter, keeping in view the provisions of Rule 5 of the
      Rules. We may, however, hasten to add the reason given by the High
      Court in repelling the argument that Rule 5 of the Rules is ultra vires
      Section 3 is well founded even otherwise. With the aforesaid preliminary
      remarks, we proceed to analyse the arguments and discuss the issue
B
      involved.
           25. Provisions of Section 3 of the Act have already been taken
      note of. We would like to quote hereunder, the text of Section 2(b) which
      defines 'broadcasting' along with Section 2(d) and Section 2(h) which
      provide definitions of' broadcasting networks service' 'content' as wel 1
c     as Rules 2(b), 3 and 5.
            "(b) "broadcasting" means assembling and programming any form
            of communication content, like signs, signals, writing, pictures,
            images and sounds, and either placing it in the electronic form on
            electro-magnetic waves on specifie frequencies and transmitting
D           it through space or cables to make it continuously available on the
            carrier waves, or continuously streaming it in digital data form on
            the computer networks, so as to be accessible to single or multiple
            users through receiving devices either directly or indirectly; and
            all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions;
E           (d) "broadcasting networks service" means a service, which
            provides a network of infrastructure of cables or transmitting
            devices for carrying broadcasting content in electronic form on
            specified frequencies by means of guided or unguided electro-
            magnetic waves to multiple users, and includes the management
 F          and operation of any of the following:
             (i) Teleport/Hub/Earth Station,
             (ii) Direct-to-Home (DTH) Broadcasting Network,
             (iii) Multisystem Cable Television Network,
G            (iv) Local Cable Television Network,
             (v) Satellite Radio Broadcasting Network,
             (vi) any other network service as may be prescribed by the Central
             Government;
 H           (h) "content" means any sound, text, data, picture (still or moving),
STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI                             139
               [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

other audio-visual representation, signal or intelligence of any         A
nature or any combination thereof which is capable of being
created, processed, stored, retrieved or communicated
electronically;
5. The Central Government shall take all sµch measures, as it
deems fit or expedient, by way ofissuing Guidelines for mandatory        B
sharing of broadcasting signals with Prasar Bharati relating to
sporting events of national importance:
Provided that the Guidelines issued before the promulgation of
the Sports Broadcasting Signals (Mandatory Sharing with Prasar
Bharati) Ordinance, 2007( Order 4 of2007), shall be deemed to             C
have been issued validly under the provisions of this section.
 Rule 2(b) 'content rights owner or holder' ·shall mean a person
 for the time being having or holding the broadcasting rights in
 respect of a sporting event of national importance within the
 territory oflndia;                                                       o
 Rule 3 3 Sharing of Sports Broadcasting Signals with Prasar
 Bharati. (1) Every content rights owner or holder and television
 or radio broadcasting service provider intending to carry a live
 television broadcast on any cable television network or Direct-to-
 Home network or intending to make a radio commentary broadcast           E
 in India, of a sporting event of national importance shall at least
 forty- five days prior to the proposed date of telecast or broadcast,
 inform the Prasar Bharati about the same and offer to share the
 live signals in the manner and on such terms and conditions as are
 hereunder specified.
                                                                          F
 (2) The content rights owner or holder and television or radio
 broadcasting service provider shall provide the live signals to the
 Prasar Bharati at the Master Control Room of Doordarshan or as
 the case may be, the Master Control Room of All India Radio, at
 its own cost.
                                                                          G
 (3) The signals to be shared with the Prasar Bharati by the content
 rights owner or holder, shall be the best feed with all features as
 that of provided to a broadcast service provider in India, free
 from commercial advertisements.
 (4) The signals referred to in sub-rules (2) and (3) shall include
                                                                          H
140            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2016] 3 S.C.R.



A           signals of the pre-live event and the post-live event coverage.
            (5) The Prasar Bharati shall not be under any obligation to carry
            the logo of any channel available in India.
            (6) The Prasar Bharati shall have all the rights to generate, pre,
            post and intermission progra.-iiming.
B
            (7) The Prasar Bharati shall have the right to retransmit the signals
            on its terrestrial and Direct-to-Home networks including the AM
            and FM Channels of the All India Radio.
            Rule. 5 - Responsibility of a television or radio channel broadcasting
c           the sporting event. If the television or radio broadcasting service
            provider is different from the content rights owner or holder, it
            shall be its duty to ensure that adequate arrangements for
            compliance with the provisions of the Act and the rules are made,
            at the time of acquisition of the rights from the content rights
            owner or holder."
D
           26. It is a common case of the parties that the "world feeds" which
      the appellant shares with Prasar Bharati is covered by the definition of
      'broadcasting' under Section 2(b) of the Act and in that sense the appellant
      provides broadcasting network service as defined in Section 2(d) of the
      Act. Further, the 'world feed' would amount to 'content' under Section
E     2(h) of the Act. It is these contents which are to be mandatorily shared
      by the appellant with Prasar Bharati. However, at the same time such
      contents have to be 'without its advertisements'.
            27. First thing which we need to deliberate upon is as to whether
      the logos of the advertisers contained in the 'world feed' shared by the
F     appellant with Prasar Bharati amounts to 'advertisement'. As noted
      above, the plea of the appellant in this behalf is that since the broadcast
      signal of the sporting event provided by the event organiser (ICC in the
      instant case) includes these logos and the appellant is supposed to share
      the same as it is with Prasar Bharati, it would not be treated as
      advertisements. It is also argued that these are not commercial
G
      advertisements as the appellant is not getting any revenue from the
      sponsors. To our mind, this is a specious argument to ward off the situation
      with which the appellant is confronted with. It is not denied by the
      appellant that these logos are of the event sponsors, known as 'On-
      Screen Credits' in industry parlance. The appellant has itself shown the
H     photographs thereof which have been reproduced by us above. No
     STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI                               141
                    [A.K. SIKRI, J.)

doubt, such logos or On-Screen Credits may appear at the time of                A
featuring replays like ball delivery speed and when a player gets out
either when he is bowled, run out or caught or they are shown while
depicting player statistics, scoreboard, match summary, graphs, etc.
Nonetheless, these are the advertisements the sponsors like Pepsi, LG,
Fly Emirates, Reliance, etc. These sponsors have entered into arrangement
                                                                                 B
for showing their logo on the occasions referred to above. It is also not
in dispute that these sponsors pay for such On-Screen Credits. Insofar
as such sponsors are concerned, their motive in giving these logos to be
shown on Television is crystal clear, viz. it is intended to advertise their
company names for commercial motives in mind. These are, thus,
commercials of the sponsors which would clearly be treated as not only           c
advertisements but commercial advertisements. Once we hold that what
is shown are advertisements, the question as to whether these
advertisements are shown because of some arrangement between the
organisers of the tournament and the sponsors or as a result of
arrangement between the broadcasters, i.e. the appellant, and the
                                                                                 D
sponsors is immaterial. Section 3 of the Sports Act does not make any
distinction between the aforesaid two kinds of advertisements. What is
prescribed, in no uncertain terms, is that sharing of the live broadcasting
signal has to be without advertisements.
      28. On a plain reading of Section 3 of the Sports Act, we are inclined
to agree with the submission of Mr. Rohatgi that the obligation to share         E
such sports broadcasting signals is upon the following persons: (i) content
rights owner; (ii) content holder; and (iii) television or radio broadcasting
service provider. Any of these above categories of persons are not
allowed to carry a live television broadcast on:
     (i) any cable or direct-to-home network;                                    F

     (ii) radio commentary broadcast in India,

                                   if
     such television broadcast
                                                                                 G
                                   or
     radio commentary broadcast
      happens to be of sporting events which is of national importance
                                   unless
                                                                                 H
142             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2016] 3 S.C.R.


A     such content rights owner or content holder or broadcasting service
      provider simultaneously shares the live broadcasting signals with Prasar
      Bharati
      to enable Prasar Bharati to re-transmit the same on its terrestrial networks
      and DTH networks
B     in such manner and on such terms and conditions as may be specified.

           29. The guidance for laying down the terms and conditions that can
      be specified on which sharing of the broadcasting signals has to take
      place with Prasar Bharati, is mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 3,
c     which specifically mentions that such terms and conditions shall also
      provide that advertisement revenue sharing between the content rights
      owner or holder and Prasar Bharati shall be in the ratio of 75:25 in the
      case of television coverage; and 50:50 in the case of radio coverage.
      Section 4 of the Sports Act, 2007 provides for penalties in case of any
      violations of the terms and conditions as may be specified under Section
D     3 subject to the condition that amount of a pecuniary penalty shall not
      exceed I crore.
           30. The preamble of the Act which gives an idea of the purpose
      behind enacting this statute reads as under:

 E           "An Act to provide access to the largest number of listeners and
             viewers, on a free to air basis, of sporting events of national
             impo11ance through mandatory sharing of sports broadcasting
             signals with Prasar Bharati and for matters connected therewith
             or incidental thereto. "

 F         31. ft becomes apparent from the aforesaid reading of the Preamble
      that purpose is to provide access to the largest number of listeners and
      viewers, on a free to air basis, of sporting events of national importance.
      This task is given to Prasar Bharati. Notwithstanding more popularity
      which the private channels have gained over a period of time, coverage
      of Prasar Bharati is far more reaching insofar as Indian population is
 G
      concerned as it reaches almost every nook and corner of the country.
      Further the radio as well as television broadcasting of Prasar Bharat is
      free of cost. ft is for this reason that the law in the form of Sports Act is
      enacted in order to ensure that such sporting events ofnational importance
      are made available to every citizen of this country, irrespective of his/
H     her financial conditions.
      STAR SPORTS INDIA PVT. LTD. v. PRASAR BHARTI                                 143
                     [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

     32. Section 3, thus, aims to achieve two purposes:                            A
      (a)to provide access to largest number of listeners and viewers on
a free to air basis. The principle of purposive interpretation, in this context,
meant that Prasar Bharati was supposed to telecast these matches for
the benefit of general masses spread through out India, who otherwise
do not receive signals of private channels like the appellant or are not            B
having financial capacity to pay for these channels. Thus, it was a
larger public interest which was sought to be served and noble objective
was kept in mind while enacting the statute;
      (b)insofar as income that is generated from advertisements is
concerned, which are shown on television or broadcasted on radio, the               C
revenue thereof is to be shared between the Broadcaster and Prasar
Bharati. The purpose is obvious. It is the broadcasting service provider
who is supposed to share the live broadcasting signal with Prasar Bharati,
which has the arrangements with the advertisers and, thus, takes money
from those who book their advertisements to be broadcasted on television
or radio. However, when the signals are shared with Prasar Bharati                  D
enabling it to simultaneously retransmit the same on its terrestrial networks
or DTH networks, the viewership/ audience gets multiplied as the reach
is to much larger section of citizenry through Prasar Bharati. Therefore,
Section 3( I), in the first instance, mandates that the sharing of live
broadcasting signals with Prasar Bharati has to be 'without its                     E
advertisements'. Exception is, however, made in sub-section (2) of
Section 3 which enables the broadcasting service provider to even share
the contents along with advertisements, but subject to the condition that
there has to be a sharing ofrevenue in the proportion prescribed in sub-
section (2) ofSection 3. As aforesaid, when live broadcasting signal is
shared containing advertisements, those advertisements have much larger             F
viewership because of its telecast/broadcast on Prasar Bharati. The
benefit of advertisement in such a case would accrue to those who
have booked the advertisements and the service provider, in such an
eventuality would definitely be in a position to charge much more from
the advertisers. It is a matter of common knowledge that rates of                   G
advertisement go up when circulation thereof is enhanced. When we
keep in mind the aforesaid twin objectives of the Act, the answer to the
 issue raised becomes obvious. The application of rule of purposive
 interpretation would go against the appellant and in favour of the
respondent.
                                                                                    H
144               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2016] 3 S.C.R.


A           33. With this, we advert to the next question, namely, whether the
      word 'its' refers to the advertisements that are booked only by the
      broadcasters, namely, the appellant in the instant case? Let us now
      understand the meaning of the word 'its' occurring in the obligation cast
      upon the broadcasting service provider to share the Iive broadcasting
      signals 'without its advertisements'. From our aforesaid discussion, it
B
      becomes clear that the sharing of the signals has to be without any
      advertisements and ifthe advertisements are also to be included in the
      signals, there has to be sharing of the revenue. The learned Attorney
      General has rightly argued that the word 'its' cannot be given limited
      meaning by confining it to advertisements only of broadcasting service
c     provider. Section 3 which starts with negative covenant very expressly •
      puts an embargo to al I the three categories mentioned therein, viz., content
      rights owner, (ii) contents holder as well as (iii) television or radio
      broadcasting service provider not to have television broadcast either
      through cable or DTH and not to have any radio commentary broadcast
      unless live broadcasting signal is shared simultaneously with Prasar
D
      Bharati. Examined in this hue, it becomes clear that the words 'without
      its advertisements' which follow immediately after the words 'unless it
      simultaneously shares the live broadcasting signal' has to be given a
      meaning that such broadcasting signals are to be without advertisements,
      whether it is of the content rights owner, content holder or that of television
E     or radio broadcasting service provider. It is made crystal clear by providing
      the definition of 'content rights owner' or 'holder' in Rule 2(b) of the
      Rules, 2007. Rule 3(3) takes the issue beyond any pale of doubt when it
      mentions that the signals to be shared with Prasar Bharati by the content
      rights owner or holder are to be the best feed that is provided to broadcast
      service provider in India and has to be 'free from commercial
 F    advertisements'. Thus, even if it is ICC which has included those
       advertisements/logos, the feeds have to be without those logos/
       advertisements inasmuch as nobody can dispute that the content rights
       owner are content holder, i.e, ICC in the instant case has included those
       logos/advertisements from purely commercial angle. Thus, the
G      arrangement between the ICC and the appellant, is totally
       inconse_q uential.
             34. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion would be to conclude
       thatthere is no merit in the instant appeal which is, accordingly, dismissed
       with costs.
H     NidhiJain                                                    Appeal dismissed.