SRINIVASA GOPALversusUNION TERRITORY OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH (NOW STATE)

                        SRINIVASA GOPAL                                            A
                               v.
            UNION TERRITORY OF ARUNACHAL PRADESH
                          (NOW STATE)

                                   JULy 18, 1988
                                                                                   B
      [SABYASACHI MUKHARJI ANDS. RANGANATHAN, JJ.)
-~                                                                     •
            Constitution of India, 1950-Art. 21-inordinate delay of 9-1/2
      years in proceeding with criminal prosecution for rash and negligent
      driving-Proceedings quashed-Quick justice is a sine qua non of Art.
      21.                                                                          c
            Cr. P. C. 1973-Sections 468 and 473--Taking cognizance after
""'   expiry of the period of limitation-When permissible?

            Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulation 1945-
                                                                                   D
      Section 32-Applicability of Cr.P. C. 1973 to Arunachal Pradesh.

            The appellant was driving a jeep which met with an accident and
      one of the occupants died and another sustained grievous injuries.
      According to the Police, the accident was attributable to rash and ,negli·
      gent driving of the appellant. He was charge-sheeted under section 279
                                                                                   E
      IPC read with sections 304-A/338 IPC and a report was submitted to the
      Deputy Commissioner on 22nd November 1976. The Magistrate held
      that cognizance was taken on 22nd Novell)ber, 1976 itself. The appel-
      lant moved the High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. read with Art.
      227 of the Constitution.
                                                                                   f
            The High Court held that the investigations started on 22nd
      November, 1976 on the registration of the case and were completed on 8th
      September, 1977, and cognizance was taken on 31st March, 1986 when
      the Deputy Commissioner passed an order for issuing summons to the
      appellant. The High Court quashed the charges against the appellant
      and remitted the case to the Magistrate for considering it afresh.
                                                                                   G
            This appeal by special leave is against the High Court Judgment.
      It was contended before this Court that since cognizance was taken in
      1986, it was barred by section 468 Cr.P.C. On behalf oftbe Respondent
      it was contended that the provisions of Cr .P.C. do not apply to the State
      of Arunachal Pradesh.
                                                                                   H

                                         477
~
    478         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A         Allowing the appeal, this Court,

           HELD:l.l Section 473 Cr.P.C. provides that any Court may take
    cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it
    is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the
    delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary to do so in the
B   interest of justice. Taking cognizance means judicial application of
    mind of the Magistrate to the facts mentioned in the complaint with a
    view to taking further action. l484E-H]

          Tula Ram and others v. Kishore Singh, [1977) 4 SCC 459, refer-
    red to.
c         1.2 As regards the contention that Cr .P .C. is not applicable to
    the State of Arunachal Pradesh, the High Court rightly held thats. 32
    of the Assam Frontier (Administration of Justice) Regulations, 1945, on
    which reliance was placed, should be guided by the spirit of the Code
    and it will be proper to throw out a complaint if there was inordinate or
D   undue delay, which was not explained. [4830-E)

          State of Punjab v. Sa_rwan Singh, [1981) 3 SCR 349, referred to.

          1.3 Statutes of limitation have legislative policy behind them.
    They shut out belated and dormant claims in order to save the accused
E   from unnecessary harassment. They also save the accused from the risk
    of having'to face trial at a time when bis evidence might have been lost
    because of the delay on the part of the prosecution. A bar bas been
    prescribed under section 468 Cr .P.C. and there is no reason why the
    appellant should not be entitled to it iu the facts and circumstalices of
    this case. [484A-C]
F
          Surinder Mohan Vikal v. Ascharaj Lal Chopra, [1978) 2 SCC
    403, relied on.

          Kathamuthu v. Balammal, [1987) Crl. L.J. 360; Ghansham Dass
    v. Sham Sunder Lal, [1982) Crl. L.J. 1717 and Vijay K1tmar Agarwal/a
G   v. State of Assam, [1986) l GLR 421, referred to.

          2. In the instant case, the broad facts that emerge are that the
    alleged offence took place in November, 1976, and until the High
    Court's order in August, 1987 no investigation bad taken place. The
    offence is of rash and negligent driving. It is, as such, neither a grave
H   and heinous offence nor an offence against the community as such,


                                                                                   .
            S. GOPAL v. UNION TERRITORY [MUKHARJI I.I                 479

though all criminal offences are crimes against society. It is not neces-    A
sary in the facts and circumstances of the case to deeide, whether· cogni-
zance was properly taken, whether the extension of-period of limitation
under.section 473 must precede taking of the cognizance.ofthe offence,
and whether cognizance in this case was taken on 8th September, 1977
as held by the learned Magistrate or on 31st March, 1986 as held by
the High Court. Having regard to the "ature of offences there is             B
enormous delay in proceeding with the criminal prosecution by the
respondent 9\lz years for a trial for rash and negligent driving is too
long a time. Quick justice is a sine qua non of Article 21 of the
Constitution. Keeping a person in suspended animation for 9\lz years
without any case at all cannot be with the spirit of the procedure
established by law. [4840-G]
                                                                             c
      [This Court set aside the order of the High Court and quashed
the proceedings against the appellant.] [485A-B]

     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 385 of 1988.                                      D

     From the Judgment and Order dated 14.8.1987 of the Guwahati
High Court in Criminal Revision No. 303 of 1986.

      R. Ramachandran for the Appellant.
                                                                             E
     B. Datta, Additional Solicitor General, Kitty Kumar Marylar
and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Respondents.
      ·,
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. Special leave granted. The F
appeal is disposed of by the order passed herein.

      On 20th of November, 1976, the appellant was posted in the. State
of Arunachaf Pradesh as an Executive Engineer (Elect). An accident
took place in the jeep which was alleged to have been driven by the
appellant. The accident took place within the Bomdila Police Station G
in Arunachal Pradesh. In the said accident one of the occupants, J .K.
Jain, Assistant Engineer (Elect) died and another S. Karim, driver
sustained grievous injuries. According to the police the accident is
attributable to rash and negligent driving of the appellant. As per the
case file, Shri R.B. Singh, Sub-Inspector submitted a report to the
Deputy Commissioner, Bomdila on 22nd November, 1976, who H
    480        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                I19881 Supp. 1 S.C.R.
A  accorping to the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence
   under section 32(c) of Regulation I of 1945 and the police registered
   the case. The learned Magistrate held that cognizance was taken on
   22nd November, 1976. This finding, however, was not sustained by the
   High Court. The police is alleged to have registered the case and took
B up investigations and submitted the chargesheet in September, 1977
   which, however, appears to have been placed before the Deputy Com-
   missioner on 31st March, 1986, and it was on that date that the cogni-
   zance of the offence was taken, according to the High Court. The
   learned Magistrate in his order stated that the reason why report could
   not be placed before the Court promptly merited detailed probing,
   which showed that cognizance was taken on 22nd November, 1976 by
c the competent authority but the court proceedings thereof commenced
   on 31st March, 1986. The appellant was chargesheeted under section
   279 read with section 304A/338 of the Indian Penal Code. According
   to the appellant cognizance was only taken on 31st March, 1986. The
   first question, therefore, in this case is: when was the cognizance
o taken. By the order of the learned Magistrate, the appellant was
   directed to appear on the next date of hearing, that is on 8th
  •september, 1986. The order was passed on 14th July, 1986.

          Challenging the said order, the appellant moved the High Court
    of Gauhati under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read
E   with Article 227 of the Constitution for quashing the charges framed
    by the Magistrate 1st Class, Bomdila. The High Court in its judgment
    and order dated 14th August, 1987 held that the investigation started
    on 22nd November, 1976 on the registration of the case under sections
    279, 304A and 338 of the l.P.C. and the investigation was completed
    on 8th September, 1977 and cognizance was taken on 31st March, 1986
F   when the Deputy Commissioner passed the follotving order: "Records
    perused. Issue summons to t~e accused to appear at Kameng on 9th
    May, 1986." Therefore, the first question that arises'is, when was the
    cognizance taken, on 22nd November, 1976 or 31st March, 1986. The
    High Court held that cognizance was taken on 31st March, 1986. The
    offence under section 279 is punishable with imprisonment for a term
G   not exceeding 6 months, or with fine, or with both. Offence under
    section 304A is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding
    2 years, or with fine, or with both. Offence under section 338 is punish-
    able with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years, or with fine
    or with both. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the period of limita-
    tion for taking cognizance of the offences would be three years. Sec-
H   tion 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
               S. GOPAL v. UNION TERRITORY [MUKHARJI, J.[                 481

               "468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of       A
               limitation:
               (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code,
               no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the categ-
               ory specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the
               period of limitation.                                             B
                       (2) The period of limitation shall be-

                       (a) six months, if the offences is pnnishable with fine
               only;

                   (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with impris-       C
               onment for a term not exceeding one year;

                    (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with
               imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not
               exceeding three years."                                           D

          There is, however, a provision for extension of the period of
    limitation in certain cases, where on the facts and circumstances of the
    case, the delay has been properly explained or it is necessary in the
;   interest of justice to do so. This is provided in section 473 of the
    Criminal Procedure Code in the following terms:                          E

               "473 Extention of period of limitation in certain cases -
               Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provi-
               sions of this Chapter, any Court may take cognizance of an
               offence after the e_xpiry of the period of limitation, if it is
               satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case F
               that the delay has been properly explained or that it is
               necessary so to do in the interest of justice."

          It was contended before us that the first question that arises in
    this appeal is: when the cognizance of the offence was taken in this
    case. This Court in Tula Ram and others v. Kishore Singh, [1977) 4 G
    S.C.C, 459 explained the meaning of the words "taking cognizance"
    and held that it means judicial application of mind of the magistrate to
    the facts mentioned in the complaint with a view to taking further
    action. In this connection reference may also be made to the observa-
    tions of this Court in Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police and
    another, [1985) 3 S.C.R. 942. It was held by this Court as follows:      H
     482        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               I1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

                "Now, when the report forwarded by the officer-in-charge
A
                of a police station to the Magistrate under sub-section
                (2)(i) of s. 173 comes up for consideration by the Magis-
                trate, one of two different situations may arise. The r~port
                may conclude that an offence appears to have been com-
                mitted by a particular person or persons and in such a case,
13              the Magistrate may do one of three things:(l) he may
                accept the report and take cognizan9e of the offence and
                issue process or (2) he may disagree with the report and
                drop the proceeding or (3) he may di.reel further investiga-
                tion under sub-section (3) of s. 156 and require the police
                to make a further report. The report may on the other hand
                state that, in the opinion of the police, no offence appears
c               to have been committed and where such a report has been
                ma~e, the Magistrate again has an option to adopt one of
                three courses; ( 1) he may accept the report and drop the
                proceeding or (2) he may disagree with the report and
                taking the view that there is sufficient ground for proceed-
D               ing further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process
                or (3) he may direct further investigation to be made by
                the police under sub-section (3) of section 156.

                But if the Magistrate decides that there is no sufficient
                ground for proceeding further and drops the proceeding or
                                                                                :I
E               takes the view that though there is sufficient ground for
                proceeding against some, there is no sufficient ground for
                proceeding against others mentioned in the First Informa-
                tion Report, the informant would certainly be prejudiced
                because the First Information Report lodged by him would
                have failed of its purpose, wholly or in part.
F
                There can, therefore, be no doubt that when, on a consid-
                eration of the report made by the officer in charge of a
                police station under sub-section (2)(i) of s. 173, the Magis-
                trate is not inclined to take cognizance of the offence and
                issue process, the informant must by given an opportun-
G               ity of being heard so that he can make his submissions to
                persuade the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence
                and issue process."

           The High Court was of the view that really cognizance in this
     case was taken on 31st March, 1986. The High Court ha5 set out the
H    facts on which it is relied. The said finding of the High Court has not
                  S. GOPAL v. UNION TERRITORY [MUKHARJI, J.[              483

      been challenged. The appellant in this case before this Court has pro- A
      ceeded on that basis. Shri B. Datta, Additional Solicitor General con-
      tended that cognizance was taken as early as in September, 1977. It
      was contended before us on behalf of the appellant as it was said before
      the High Court that if the cognizance was taken in 1986, then it was
      clearly beyond the time. If the principles of the Code of Criminal
      Procedure applied, the taking of cognizance of the offence was barred B
      by section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

             It was submitted before the High Court of Gauhati and reitera-
      ted before us that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure do
      not apply to the State of Arunachal Pradesh. In this connection
      reliance was placed on section 32 of the Assam Frontier (Administra-       C
      tion of Justice) Regulation, 1945. Section 32 of the Regulation pro-
      vides that the High Court, the Deputy Commissioner and the Assistant
      Commissioner shall be guided in regard to procedure by the principles
      of the Code of Criminal Procedure so far as these are applicable to the
      circumstances of the District and consistent with the provisions of the
      Regultion. ·There are exceptions to section 32. Those exceptions are       D
      irrelevant for the present purpose. The High Court held, and in our
      opinion rightly, that section 32 of the said Regulation should be guided
      by the spirit of the Code and it will be proper to throw out a complaint
      if there was inordinate or undue delay, which was not explained.
      Indeed, this Court in State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh, [1981] 3 S.C.R.
      349 observed at page 351 of the report that the object of the Criminal     E
      Procedure Code in putting a bar of limitation on prosecutions was
      clearly to prevent the parties from filing cases after a long time, as a
      result of which material evidence may disappear and also to prevent
      abuse of the process of the court by filing vexatious and belated pro-
      secutions long after the date of the offence. This Court reiterated that
      the object which the statutes seek to subserve is clearly in consonance    F
      with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the
      Constitution. Shri Raju Ramachandran submitted that the exercise of
      the power under section 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code extend-
      ing the period of limitation by condoning the delay in launching the
      prosecution, should precede the taking of cognizance of the offence.
      Reliance was placed on the Bench decision of the Madras High Court         G
'i'   in Kathamuthu v. Balammal, [1987] Cr!. L.J. 360. It was held by the
      Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Ghansham Dass v.
      Sham Sundar Lal, [19821 Cr!. L.J. 1717 that cognizance taken by the
      Magistrate without deciding the point in limitation was beyond his
      jurisdiction. In this connection, reliance may be placed to the decision
      of this Court ill Surinder Mohan Vikal v. AscharajLal Chopra, [19781       H
    484         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                I 1988) Supp. 1 S.C.R.

    2 S.C.C. 403 where at page 407 of the report, while dealing with the
A
    provisions of section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this
    Court observed that it is hardly necessary to say that statutes of limita-
    tion have legislative policy behind them. For instance, they shut out
    belated and dormant claims in order to save the accused from unneces-
    sary harassment. They also save the accused from the risk of having to
8   face trial at a time when his evidence might have been lost because of
    the delay on the part of the prosecutor. As has been stated, a bar to the
     taking of cognizance has been prescribed under section 468 of the
    Code of Criminal Procedure and there is no reason why the appellant
    should not be entitled to it in the facts and circumstances of this case.
    Our attention was also drawn to the case of Vi jay Kumar Agarwal/a v.
     State of Assam, I1986) 1 GLR 421, where the Court held that taking of
c   cognizance without condoning delay was bad and without jurisdiction.

         The High Court in the instant judgment under appeal held that
  ·this aspect of the matter was not considered by the Magistrate and the
   High Court quashed the charges against the appellant and remitted the
D ·case to the Magistrate for considering the case afresh. In the instant
   case, the broad faots that emerge are that the alleged offence took place
   in November, 1976, and until the High Court's order in August, 1987
   no investigation had taken place. The offence is of rash and negligent
   driving. It is, as such, neither a grave and heinous offence nor an
   offence against the community as such, though all criminal offences
E are crimes against society.

        It is not necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case to
  decide, whether cognizance was properly taken. It is also not neces-
  sary to decide whether the extension of period of limitation under
  section 473 must precede or taking of the cognizance of the offence. It
F is also not necessary to decide whether cognizance in this case was
  taken on 8th September, 1977 as held by the learned Magistrate or on
  31st March, 1986 as held by the High Court." Having regard to the
  nature of offence there is enormous delay in proceeding with the crimi-
  nal prosecution by the respondent~9 1h years for a trial for rash and
  negligent driving, is too long a time. Quick justice is a sine qua non of
G Article 21 of the Constitution. Keeping a person in suspended anima-
  tion for 91/i years without any cause at all-and none was indicated
  before the learned Magistrate or before the High Court or before us,
  cannot be with the spirit of the procedure established by law. In that
  view of the matter, it is just and fair and in accordance with equity to
  direct that the trial or prosecution of the appellant to proceed no
H further. We do so accordingly.
                   S. GOPAL v. UNION 1ERRITORY [MUKHARJI, J.I                   485

              In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the     A
        proceedings cannot be proceeded any further. We allow the appeal,
        set aside the order of the High Court of Gauhati. dated 14th August,
        1987 and quash the proceedings against the appellant. The proceed-
        ings against the appellant are hereby quashed.
                                                                                      B
        G.N.                                                    ~   Appeal allowed.




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