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Supreme Court of India

SRI SURESH KUMAR GOYAL AND OTHERSversusSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER

Citation
2019 INSC 46
Decided
11 January 2019
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

The Supreme Court held that the criminal complaint was an abuse of process and, having satisfied the Rajiv Thapar test, must be quashed under Section 482 CrPC, and the discharge application under Section 245(2) CrPC should be allowed.

Summary

The complainant alleged that the appellants had forged his signature to obtain bonus shares of Reliance companies and refused to return the original shares, leading to a criminal complaint under various IPC sections. The magistrate initially dismissed the complaint, but a revision remanded it, after which the appellants sought quashal of the proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC. The High Court rejected the quashal application, directing the appellants to seek discharge under Section 245(2) CrPC, which was also denied by the magistrate. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the material evidence and applied the test from Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, finding that the defence material was of sufficient quality to rule out the prosecution's allegations and that proceeding to trial would constitute an abuse of process. Consequently, the Court held that the criminal complaint was frivolous and ordered the quashal of the proceedings and allowed the discharge application. Respondent No.2 was ordered to pay costs to each appellant.

Issues considered

  • The appropriateness of exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the criminal complaint before trial.
  • Whether the material placed on record by the appellants satisfies the criteria for quashal as laid down in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor.
  • Whether the criminal complaint constitutes an abuse of process of the court.
  • Whether the application for discharge under Section 245(2) CrPC should be allowed.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Section 482 CrPCSection 245(2) CrPCquash of criminal proceedingsabuse of processshare disputeevidence evaluationjurisdictioncivil‑criminal interplay

Judgment

236                      [2019]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    1 S.C.R. 236                [2019] 1 S.C.R.


A                SRI SURESH KUMAR GOYAL AND OTHERS
                                         v.
                STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER
                         (Criminal Appeal No. 56 of 2019)
                                JANUARY 11, 2019
B
                          [UDAY UMESH LALIT AND
                       DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]
             Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss. 482 and 245(2) –
      Jurisdiction u/s. 482 to quash the proceedings before the
      commencement of actual trial – On facts, allegation that respondent
C
      no.2 purchased shares in his name and appellant no. 2, and
      appellants by forging signature of respondent no. 2, illegally
      procured bonus shares and refused to hand over the original shares
      in their possession – Criminal complaint by respondent no. 2 against
      appellants alleging cheating – Dismissed by the Magistrate, however,
D     in Revision matter remanded back – Application u/s. 482 by
      appellants – Disposed of, by the High Court – Thereafter, appellants
      filing application u/s. 245(2) for discharge – Rejection of, by the
      Magistrate holding that sufficient grounds to frame charges u/s.
      420, 323 and 504 IPC made out – On appeal, held: Shares right
      since the date of acquisition have always been in the custody of
E
      appellant No.1 and the acquisition was from the funds of appellant
      No.1 – Complainant merely alleged that the funds came from his
      bank account but beyond such allegations no material placed on
      record at any stage – Appellants’ stand in their application u/s.245(2)
      quite clear that the shares can be sold in the market and the proceeds
F     can be divided between appellant No.2 and respondent No.2 –
      Appellant no.1 had disowned respondent No.2 and had filed civil
      proceedings seeking appropriate orders – Thus, the present criminal
      complaint is an attempt to wreck vengeance against appellants –
      Criminal complaint is an abuse of the process of court and is to be
      quashed – Orders passed by the courts below set aside and
G
      application for discharge u/s.245(2) allowed – Respondent No.2 to
      pay Rs.25,000/- to each appellant by way of costs for initiating
      frivolous litigation – Costs.
            Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor (2013) 3 SCC 330
            – referred to.
H
                                       236
SRI SURESH KUMAR GOYAL v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                              237


                           Case Law Reference                                 A
         (2013) 3 SCC 330          referred to               Para 13
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 56 of 2019.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 29.05.2018 of the High Court          B
of Judicature at Allahabad in Application U/s. 482 No. 22324 of 2011.
      Venkita Subramoniam T.R, Raghvendra Srivastava, Rahat Bansal,
Advs. for the Appellants.
     Tribindh Kumar, Subodh Jha, Amlan Kumar Ghosh, Advs. for the
Respondents.                                                                  C
         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      UDAY UMESH LALIT, J. 1. Leave granted. This appeal
challenges the order dated 29.05.2018 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad dismissing application preferred by the appellants    D
under Section 482 CrPC being Application No.22324 of 2011.
      2. Respondent No.2 filed Complaint No.3804 of 2009 in the Court
    rd
of 3 Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad on 02.12.2009
against Appellant Nos.1, 2 and 3 namely his father, brother and brother-
in-law. The main allegations as set out in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10 of    E
the Complaint were as under:-
         “3. THAT Complainant had purchased 2 folios consisting of 100
         shares of Reliance Industry. 1st folio was in the name of the
         Complainant and accused no.2 and 2nd folio was in the joint names
         of accused no.2 and complainant. The address in these shares is      F
         House no. KC-102/2, Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad. Thereafter Reliance
         company sent to complainant 100 shares in the year 1997 and 200
         shares of their company in this year itself.
         4. THAT all the accused in furtherance of their conspiracy beat
         the Complainant and threw him out of the house along with his        G
         children in the year 1998 for mala fide reasons. They also forged
         signatures of complainant in the years 1997 and 2006 and illegally
         procured bonus shares and when complainant demanded back
         his original shares and bonus shares from them, they misbehaved
         with the complainant and refused to disclose anything to him. The
                                                                              H
238            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 1 S.C.R.


A           complainant is presently living in Chiranjiv Vihar with his children
            for the sake of lives of himself and his children and also to maintain
            peace in the family.
            5. THAT Folio number of the shares is 068119227 and complainant
            is not aware of the number of 2nd folio and he will provide it later
B           on whenever he comes to know of it. Because all the shares are
            in the custody of the accused. Not only this, 100 shares of M/s.
            Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd., belonging to Complainant, are also in
            the custody of the accused.
            7. THAT all the original shares had been handed over to accused
C           no.2 by the complainant after purchasing them for safe custody.
            10. THAT all shares of complainant are in custody of accused
            and cost of the shares is approx. Rs.4.50 Lacs.”
              3. It was thus alleged that the appellants had betrayed and cheated
      Respondent No.2 and were guilty of offences punishable under Sections
D     406, 420, 467, 471, 323, 504, 506, 447 and 448 IPC. However, by his
      order dated 18.06.2010 the 3rd Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
      Ghaziabad found that no ground to summon the appellants for trial was
      made out and the complaint being devoid of merits was liable to be
      dismissed under Section 203 CrPC. The aforesaid order was, however,
E     set aside in Criminal Revision No.179 of 2010 preferred by Respondent
      No.2 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.2, Ghaziabad, who by
      his order dated 11.11.2010 remanded the matter with a direction to pass
      fresh orders after granting an opportunity of hearing to Respondent No.2.
      The appellants being aggrieved, preferred application under Section 482
      CrPC being Application No.9156 of 2011 in the High Court. Said
F     application was disposed of by the High Court on 23.03.2011 observing
      that if the appellants moved an application under Section 245(2) CrPC
      the same be heard and disposed of expeditiously.
            4. Accordingly, an application under Section 245(2) CrPC was
      moved by the appellants. Paragraphs 6 to 15 of the application for
G     discharge dealt with acquisition of shares of Reliance Industries Ltd.
            “6. THAT true and correct position is that an application for
            allotment of 100 debentures of M/s. Reliance Polythene Limited
            was given by the co-applicant, Suresh Goyal in the year 1993.
            This application was filed by him for allotment of shares in the
H
SRI SURESH KUMAR GOYAL v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                         239
              [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

    names of his sons i.e. Arun Kumar Goyal (i.e. the complainant)       A
    and Devinder Kumar Goyal and for which the said co-applicant
    had given a cheque of his own bank.
    7. THAT thereafter Reliance Polythene Limited issued 100
    debentures of their Company being Debenture Nos. 004959401
    to 004959500 vide Master Folio No.68119227 and Certificate           B
    No.0049595 on the basis of above application of applicant Suresh
    Kumar Goyal on 15.4.1993.
    8. THAT thereafter above said 100 debentures were converted
    by M/s. Reliance Polythene Limited into shares and accordingly
    issued 100 shares bearing Share Nos.154702201 to 154702300 in        C
    the names of Arun Kumar Goyal (i.e. the complainant) and
    Devinder Kumar Goyal vide Master Folio no.68119227 and
    Certificate No.00545523. It is pertinent to mention here that
    conversion of debentures into 100 shares vide Master Folio
    No.68119227 was done by the above said company in pursuance
    of their own policy and no application for this conversion was       D
    ever given by the applicant.
    9. THAT later on M/s. Reliance Polythene Limited merged with
    M/s. Reliance Industries Limited and thereafter 25 shares of this
    company in lieu of above said 100 shares were allotted by the
    company according to their policy bearing Share Nos. 400314745       E
    to 400314769 in the names of Arun Kumar Goyal (i.e. complainant)
    and Devinder Kumar Goyal vide Folio No.68119227 and Certificate
    No.056387476. It is pertinent to mention here that this conversion
    of shares into 25 shares was also done by the Company under
    their own policy. The above shares were issued under Folio           F
    No.68119227.
    10. THAT thereafter M/s. Reliance Industries Limited issued 25
    shares of their company in the names of Arun Kumar Goyal (i.e.
    complainant) and Devinder Kumar Goyal bearing Share
    Nos.400314745 to 400314769 Folio No.68119227 and Certificate         G
    No.056387476.
    11. THAT later on Reliance Industries Limited divided its company
    into 4 companies, whose names are mentioned hereinafter, under
    their Policy and issued 50 shares each in the joint names of Arun
    Kumar Goyal (i.e. complainant) and Devinder Kumar Goyal –
                                                                         H
240     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 1 S.C.R.


A        (a) Reliance Energy Ventures Limited: Folio No.001486420,
         Certificate No. 000148642, Share Nos.0007302483 to
         0007302532 dated 27.1.2006 – Total No. of shares 50.
         (b) Reliance Communication Ventures Limited: Folio
         No.001486420, Certificate No.(Illegible) Share Nos. (Illegible)
B        dated (Illegible) – total no. of shares 50.
         (c) Reliance Resources Limited: Folio No.001486420,
         Certificate No.000148642, Share Nos. 0007302483 to
         0007302532 dated 27.1.2006 – Total No. of shares 50.
         (d) Reliance Capital Ventures Limited: Folio No.001486420,
C        Certificate No.000148642, Share Nos. 0007302483 to
         0007302532 dated 27.1.2006 – Total No. of shares 50.
      12. THAT thereafter 3 new Companies were formed in the names
      of Reliance Capital Limited, Reliance Energy Limited and Reliance
      Power Limited under the Company Policy after merging all the
D     above named 4 companies and following shares were issued in
      the joint names of Arun Kumar Goyal (i.e. complainant) and
      Devinder Kumar Goyal –
         (a) M/s. Reliance Capital Limited: Master Folio No.102341601,
         Certificate No.016334160, share Nos. 0225139303 to
E        0225139305 = 2 Shares.
         (b) M/s. Reliance Energy Limited: Master Folio No.102341601,
         Certificate no. 015734160, share Nos.0213764143 to
         0213764145 = 3 Shares.
         (c) M/s. Reliance Power Limited: Master Folio No.20148620,
F
         Certificate no. (Illegible), share Nos. 23978999076 to
         2397899087 = 12 Shares.
      13. THAT thereafter M/s. Reliance Industries Limited under its
      Company policy issued 50 bonus shares in the joint names of Arun
      Kumar Goyal (i.e. complainant) and Devinder Kumar Goyal vide
G     Folio No.608119227, Certificate No.622733328, Share
      Nos.002226357219 to 00222357268 dated 28.11.2009.
      14. THAT in this manner it would be apparent from the above
      facts that 100 shares of Reliance Industries Co.; 2 shares of
      Reliance Capital Limited; 3 shares of Reliance Energy Limited;
H     and 12 shares of Reliance Power Limited have been issued in the
SRI SURESH KUMAR GOYAL v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                              241
              [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

      joint names of Arun Kumar Goyal (i.e. complainant) and Devinder         A
      Kumar Goyal. These shares were sent by the company at House
      No.KC-102/2, Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad i.e. the address maintained
      in their records. The originals of all the above shares are available
      with Devinder Kumar Goyal. In this manner, it would be apparent
      from the above that neither the applicants nor the complainant
                                                                              B
      have purchased these shares from the open market. All the shares
      have been allotted by the company in lieu of the money paid by
      Suresh Kumar Goyal (i.e. father of Arun Kumar Goyal and
      Devinder Kumar Goyal) although these shares have been issued
      by company in the joint names of Arun Kumar Goyal and Devinder
      Kumar Goyal. None of the applicants had given any application           C
      in writing for collecting bonus shares nor any one of them ever
      attempted to sell any of these shares. Therefore allegation of the
      complainant that applicants have obtained bonus shares by
      cheating and/or by forging his signatures, is patently wrong and
      false and accused emphatically deny the same. (illegible).
                                                                              D
      15. THAT it thus becomes evident from perusal of above facts
      that no shares have been purchased by Arun Kumar Goyal either
      from the Company or from the open market.”
    5. Similarly, the acquisition of shares of M/s. Amrit Vanaspati
Company Ltd. was also dealt with and it was asserted:-                        E
      “18. THAT all the above shares are in joint names. It is pertinent
      to mention here that no one can either sell or transfer the shares
      which are in the joint names nor anyone can change the address,
      unless and until both the shareholders agree and sign for this.
      19. THAT no other shares have been purchased except the above           F
      shares. Therefore, the allegations of complainant that he will
      furnish details/information of one other folio as and when he
      becomes aware of that, are patently wrong, false and baseless
      and applicants emphatically deny such allegations.
      20. THAT it is thus evident from the above facts that all the shares    G
      allotted by M/s. Reliance Industries have been issued in the joint
      names of Arun Kumar Goyal (i.e. complainant) and Devinder
      Kumar Goyal. Resultantly Complainant and Devinder Kumar
      Goyal have equal share in the above shares. Originals of all these
      shares are in the possession of Devinder Kumar Goyal.
                                                                              H
242            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 1 S.C.R.


A           21. THAT similarly shares allotted by M/s. Amrit Vanaspati
            Company are also in the joint names of Arun Kumar Goyal (i.e.
            complainant) and Devinder Kumar Goyal and consequently both
            the complainant and Devinder Kumar Goyal have equal shares in
            them. The originals of these shares are also in possession of
            Devinder Kumar Goyal.
B
            22. THAT Anil Kumar Garg has absolutely nothing to do with this
            case. He is the real Son-in-law of Suresh Kumar Goyal and that
            is why he too has been falsely implicated in this case.
            23. THAT Suresh Kumar Goyal and Devinder Kumar Goyal even
C           offered the Complainant-Arun Kumar Goyal to collect money of
            his half share in the above shares after selling them in the open
            market. But he is not ready for this offer. He is not entitled to
            demand all the shares.”
             6. The application for discharge was rejected by the Additional
D     Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.3, Ghaziabad vide his order dated
      14.06.2011. While so rejecting, it was observed that sufficient grounds
      to frame charges under Sections 420, 323 and 504 IPC were made out.
            7. The aforesaid order was challenged by the appellants by filing
      application under Section 482 CrPC namely Application No.22324 of
E     2011. The High Court noted the contentions on behalf of the appellants
      as under:
            “As applicant no. 1 was not happy with the conduct of the opposite
            party no.2, he disowned him and also filed O.S. No.406 of 2007 in
            the court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ghaziabad for a decree
F           of declaration. A criminal complaint was also initiated by applicant
            no.1 against the opposite party no.2 under Sections 420, 406, 409,
            321, 323, 385, 442 IPC.
                                       ………
            On 2.12.2009, the opposite party no. 2 filed a Complaint Case
G           No.3884 of 2009 against the applicants on the ground that opposite
            party no. 2 had purchased shares from the Reliance Industries in
            the name of complainant and applicant no. 2. It is further alleged
            in the complaint that in the year 1997 and in the year 2006 by
            making forged signature of the complainant bonus shares were
            received by the applicants and original shares were also in the
H
SRI SURESH KUMAR GOYAL v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                                 243
              [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

        possession of the applicants. In spite of demand same has not            A
        been handed over to the complainant. It is further alleged in the
        complaint that applicants with mala fide intention on 9.10.2007
        sent a letter to the company which was received to the company
        on 10.10.2007 and thereafter complainant on 15.8.2009 and
        17.8.2009 sent mails to the company in this regard.
                                                                                 B
        It is submission of the learned counsel for the applicants that shares
        were purchased by the applicant no. 1, although they were also in
        the name of opposite party no.2. At no point of time any forgery
        has been committed and preparation of any act cannot be termed
        as forgery.”
        8. However, the High Court observed that in a petition under             C
Section 482 CrPC disputed questions of fact could not be gone into and
whether the shares were purchased by the appellants or by Respondent
No.2 was a matter of evidence and as such no interference was called
for. The aforesaid application was thus dismissed by the High Court on
29.05.2018, which decision is presently under challenge.                         D
        9. In support of the appeal, it was submitted that the instant
complaint was a counter blast after Appellant No.1 had disowned
Respondent No.2 by issuing an advertisement in the newspaper and
swearing an affidavit to that effect; and after he had filed a civil suit
seeking injunction against Respondent No.2 from coming to the house              E
of the appellants and causing any hindrance; and after a criminal complaint
was filed by the Appellant No.1 against Respondent No.2. It was
submitted that as disclosed in the application under Section 245(2) CrPC,
the entire funding for acquisition of the shares in question had come
from Appellant No.1 in the year 1992-1993 when Respondent No.2 was
a youngster aged about 24 years. In support of the assertion that the            F
acquisition was from the funds of Appellant No.1, the photocopies of the
concerned bank accounts were also placed on record. On the other
hand, the learned counsel for Respondent No.2 reiterated the submission
that the issue of ownership was essentially a question of fact which had
to be decided in the pending complaint and that the matter ought not to
                                                                                 G
be entertained in an application for discharge. In support of the
submission that Respondent No.2 had acquired those shares from his
own funds, reliance was placed upon a typewritten extract showing debit
entries of Rs.1250/-, Rs.1250/- and Rs.500/- dated 04.05.1993,
08.06.1994 and 15.10.1994 which extract was however without any
details.                                                                         H
244               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 1 S.C.R.


A            10. This Court adjourned the matter to enable the parties to arrive
      at an amicable settlement whereafter the appellants agreed to withdraw
      all the cases filed by them against Respondent No.2 on the condition
      that similar such cases filed by Respondent No.2 against them also be
      withdrawn, giving quietus to all the proceedings between the parties.
      Respondent No.2, however, did not agree to the proposal.
B
              11. The thrust of the allegations in the complaint is that the shares
      in question were acquired from the funds of the complainant, though
      they have always stood in the names of the complainant and his brother.
      It is also accepted that the shares have always been in the custody of
      the father i.e. Appellant No.1. Beyond mere allegation that the funds
C     for acquisition came from his bank account, nothing has even been
      suggested by the complainant. The entries dated 04.05.1993, 08.06.1994
      and 15.10.1994 relied upon by him are much after the issuance of 100
      debentures by Reliance Polythene Ltd. on 15.04.1993. As detailed in
      the application under Section 245(2) CrPC the basic acquisition was
D     these 100 debentures which investment, with the passage of time, got
      converted and progressed to the present level. The complainant was
      not even aware of these details. The allegations of beating and
      intimidation are of the year 1998 and completely devoid of any substance.
      The question is: are these aspects sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction to
      discharge the appellants or should the appellants be made to go through
E     the rituals and rigour of trial.
            12. While dealing with the jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to
      quash the proceedings at the stage of issuance of process, or at the
      stage of committal, or at the stage of framing of charges, that is to say
      before the commencement of actual trial, in the light of material placed
F     on record by the accused, this Court in Rajiv Thapar and Others v.
      Madan Lal Kapoor1 laid down as under:-
               “28. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section
               482 CrPC, must make a just and rightful choice. This is not a
               stage of evaluating the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations
G              levelled by the prosecution/complainant against the accused.
               Likewise, it is not a stage for determining how weighty the
               defences raised on behalf of the accused are. Even if the accused
               is successful in showing some suspicion or doubt, in the allegations
               levelled by the prosecution/complainant, it would be impermissible
      1
H         (2013) 3 SCC 330
SRI SURESH KUMAR GOYAL v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                                245
              [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

    to discharge the accused before trial. This is so because it would          A
    result in giving finality to the accusations levelled by the prosecution/
    complainant, without allowing the prosecution or the complainant
    to adduce evidence to substantiate the same. The converse is,
    however, not true, because even if trial is proceeded with, the
    accused is not subjected to any irreparable consequences. The
                                                                                B
    accused would still be in a position to succeed by establishing his
    defences by producing evidence in accordance with law. There is
    an endless list of judgments rendered by this Court declaring the
    legal position that in a case where the prosecution/ complainant
    has levelled allegations bringing out all ingredients of the charge(s)
    levelled, and have placed material before the Court, prima facie            C
    evidencing the truthfulness of the allegations levelled, trial must
    be held.
    29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction
    of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash
    the initiation of the prosecution against an accused at the stage of        D
    issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage
    of framing of charges. These are all stages before the
    commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would
    naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested
    in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred
    to hereinabove, would have far-reaching consequences inasmuch               E
    as it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without
    allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a
    determination must always be rendered with caution, care and
    circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section
    482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material         F
    produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion
    that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable
    facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace
    the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused;
    and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and
    overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations       G
    levelled by the prosecution/ complainant. It should be sufficient to
    rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the
    prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any
    evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should
    not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted,
                                                                                H
246      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2019] 1 S.C.R.


A     being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material
      relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a
      reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the
      accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience
      of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under
      Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that
B
      would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends
      of justice.
      30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs,
      we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity
      of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the
C     power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC:
      30.1.Step one: whether the material relied upon by the accused
      is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling
      and impeccable quality?

D     30.2.Step two: whether the material relied upon by the accused
      would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled
      against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and
      overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the
      material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss
      and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false?
E
      30.3.Step three: whether the material relied upon by the accused
      has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the
      material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the
      prosecution/complainant?
      30.4.Step four: whether proceeding with the trial would result in
F
      an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of
      justice?
      30.5. If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial
      conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such
      criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section
G
      482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the
      accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise
      be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arising
      therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not
      conclude in the conviction of the accused.”
H
SRI SURESH KUMAR GOYAL v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                              247
              [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

       13. In the present case the shares in question, right since the date   A
of acquisition have always been in the custody of Appellant No.1. The
material on record is absolutely clear that the acquisition was from the
funds of Appellant No.1. The complainant has merely alleged that the
funds came from his bank account but beyond such allegations no material
has been placed on record at any stage. The stand taken by the appellants
                                                                              B
in their application under Section 245(2) CrPC is quite clear that the
shares can be sold in the market and the proceeds can be divided between
Appellant No.2 and Respondent No.2. If Respondent No.2 is insisting
on having complete ownership in respect of the concerned shares, the
matter must first be established before a competent forum. We have
considered the material on record through the steps indicated in Rajiv        C
Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor (supra) and are convinced that the instant
case calls for interference under Section 482 CrPC. Further, from the
facts that Appellant No.1 had disowned Respondent No.2 and had filed
civil proceedings seeking appropriate orders against them, we are also
convinced that the present criminal complaint is nothing but an attempt
                                                                              D
to wreck vengeance against the father, brother and the brother in law of
the complainant. The instant criminal complaint is an abuse of the process
of Court and is required to be quashed.
       14. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the orders passed
by the Courts below and allow the application for discharge under Section
245(2) CrPC in complaint No.3804 of 2009 on the file of third Additional      E
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad.
        15. Since we have found that the initiation of complaint was not a
bona fide exercise, we direct Respondent No.2 to pay a sum of
Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) within two months from
today to each of the appellants by way of costs for initiating frivolous      F
litigation.


Nidhi Jain                                                  Appeal allowed.

                                                                              G




                                                                              H


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