SRI SIDHHARTH VIYAS &ANR.versusRAVI NATH MISRA & ORS.

                    [2014] 13 S.C.R. 745


               SRI SIDHHARTH VIYAS &ANR.                            A

                               v.
                 RAVI NATH MISRA& ORS.
              (Civil Appeal No. 10529 of 2014)
                                                                    B
                    NOVEMBER 25, 2014
      [T. S. THAKUR, ADARSH KUMAR GOEL AND
                  R. BANUMATHI, JJ.]
      Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting,
Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972- s. 12(3)- Whether s.12(3) of          C
the Act providing for 'deemed vacancy' is applicable to a
situation where the tenant or a member of his family builds,
acquires or otherwise gets a vacant building in the area
concerned afte~ commencement of the tenancy but prior to
application of the Act to the tenancy in question - Held: Object    D
of rent law is to balance the competing claims of the landlord
on the one hand to recover possession of building let out to
the tenant and of the tenant to be protected against arbitrary
increase of rent or arbitrary ~viction, when there is acute         E
shortage of accommodation:..:.. Though, it is for the legislature
to resolve such competing. claims in terms of statutory
provisions,. while interpreting the provisions, the object of the
Act has to be kept in view by the Court - Unless otherwise
provided, a tenant who has already acquired altemative              F
accommodation is not intended to be protected by the Rent
Act- Mere use of present tense in s. 12(3) is not intended to
limit the applicability of the provision to acquisition of
accommodation by the tenant after the Rent Act becomes
applicable - View taken by High Court that acquisition of           G
alternative accommodation by the tenant, prior to
enforcement of the Act, is not c.overed bys. 12(3) is not correct
in law.

                                                                    H
                              745
746         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A           Interpretation of Statutes - Purposive approach vis
      literal approach - Held: Grammar cannot control the
      interpretation of the provision which has to be read in the
      context - Rent control - Rent control legislation -
      Interpretation of- Need for reasonable interpretation.
 B
           Interpretation of Statutes - Proviso - Purpose and
      import of - Held: the scope of proviso is narrower than the
      main provision.
           Mangi Lal v. Addittional District Judge & Others
.C         (1980) Allahabad Rent Cases 55 - partly
           overruled.
           Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behul (2002) 5 SCC
           397 : 2002 (3) SCR 1078; Reserve Bank of India
 D
           v. Peerless General Finance & lnve.stment Co.
           Ltd. & Others (1987) 1 SCC 424: 1987 (2) SCR
           1 ; S. Sundaram Pillai & Others v. R. Pattabiraman
           & Othe'rs (1985) 1sec    591 : 1985 (2) SCR 643-
           relied on.
 E         Goppumal v. Thakurji Shriji Shriji Dwarkadheeshji
           &Another(1969) 1SCC792: 1969 (3) SCR 989;
           Gajanan Dattatraya v. Sherbanu Hasang Patel &
           Others (1975) 2 SCC 668: 1976 (1) SCR 535 -
           referred to.
 F
                           Case Law Reference:
           (1980) ARC 55         partly overruled     Para 5
           1969 (3) SCR 989      referred to          Para 8
 G         1976 (1) SCR 535      referred to          Para 8
           2002 (3) SCR 1078     relied on            Para 12
           1987 (2) SCR 1        relied on            Para 13
           1985 (2) SCR 643      relied on             Para 16
 H
       SRI SIDHHARTHVIYASv. RAVI NATH MISRA                      747


    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.               A
10529 of 2014.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 07-05-2007 of the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ
Petition No. 47201 of 2002.
                                                                 B
    J.N. Dubey, Sr. Adv., Anurag Dubey, Ms. Anu Sawhney,
Meenesh Dubey, S.R. Setia, Advs. for the Appellants.
     H.C. Kharbanda, T.N. Saxena, Vipin Kumar Saxena, Yash
Pal Dhingra, Ad vs. for the Respondents.
                                                                 c
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
     ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J. 1. Leave granted.
      2. This appeal has been preferred against the Judgment
and Order dated 7th May, 2007 of the High Court of Judicature    D
at Allahabad, Civil Side in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition
No.47201 of 2002.
      3. The question for consideration is whether Section
12(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short "the Act")      E
providing for 'deemed vacancy' is applicable to a situation
where the tenant or a member of his family builds, acquires or
otherwise gets a vacant building in the area concerned after
commencement of the tenancy but prior to application of the
Act to the tenancy in question.                                  F
       4. Brief reference to facts giving rise to the question is
necessary. The accommodation in question was let out for
residential purpose w.e.f. 1st June, 1981 and was assessed
for house tax for the first time on 1st October, 1983. Under G
Section 2(2) of the Act, the Act which otherwise came into force
on 15th July, 1972; was not applicable to the building during
ten years from the date on which its construction was
completed. The construction is deemed to be completed, inter
alia, on the date on which the first assessment of letting value H
748           SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A is made by the local authority concerned, which in the present
  case was 1st October, 1983. Thus, the Act became applicable
  to the accommodation in question in the year 1983. On 7th
  June, 1987, the tenant purchased another residential house
  bearing number 198 at Safipur-11, Kanpur Nagar.
B
         5. The City Magistrate, Kanpur, in his capacity as Rent
  Controller, vide Order dated 5th September, 2002, declared
  the premises in question to be vacant under Section 12(3) of
  the Act on account of purchase of residential house by the wife
c of the tenant in the year 1987. The tenant filed Civil
  Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.47201 of 2002 against the
  Order of the Rent Controller declaring the premises in question
  to be vacant and also the subsequent order dated 301h
  September, 2002 releasing the accommo~ation in favour of
o the landlord under Section 16 of the Act. The High Court
  accepted the petition holding that no vacancy can be declared
  if the tenant or his family member purchased the house before
  the Act became applicable. Reliance was placed on a Five-
   Judge Full Bench of the High Court in Mangi La/vs. Additional
E District Judge & others. 1. It is against the said Order that
   the present appeal has been preferred.
              6. We have heard learned counsel forthe parties.
         7. The Act provides forthe regulation of letting and rent
 F and the eviction of tenants from certain classes of buildings
   situated in urban areas and for matters connected therewith.
   Reference to all the provisions of the Act may not be necessary
   for adjudication of the issue involved, except to Section 12
   which provides for deemed vacancy of a building in certain
 G cases. Section 12(3) reads as follows :
              "12(1)
                 (2)

 H    1
          (1980)Allahabad Rent Cases, 55
       SRI SIDHHARTH VIYAS v. RAVI NATH MISRA                      749
              [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

       (3) In the case of a residential building, if the tenant A
     or any member of his family builds or otherwise
     acquires in a vacant state or gets vacated a residential
     building in the same city, municipality, notified area or
     town area in which the building under tenancy is situate,
     he shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the B
     building under his tenancy:
     Provided that if the tenant or any member of his family
     had built any such residential building before the date
     of commencement of this Act, then such tenant shall           c
     be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building
     under his tenancy upon the expiration of a period of
     one year from the said date.
     Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section-
                                                                   D
     (a) a person shall be deemed to have otherwise
     acquired a building, if he is occupying a public building
     for residential purposes as a tenant, al/ottee or licensee;
     (b) the expression "any member of family", in relation
     to a tenant, shall not include a person who has neither       E
     been normally residing with nor is wholly dependent on
     such tenant."
      8. Learned counsel for the appellant-landlord submits that
under the scheme of the Act, the above provision should be F
interpreted to mean that a tenant who has already acquired
another residential building in the same city, is not entitled to
protection against eviction even if such acquisition is before
commencement or applicability of the Act, as the object of the
Act is to protect a needy person and not a person who has G
already acquired another building. No doubt the expression
"builds or otherwise acquires in a vacant state or gets
vacated' may give an impression that the provision is
applicable in respect of acquisition after the Act becomes
                                                                  H
750           SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A applicable, the context and the scheme of the Act clearly
    indicate that any acquisition of alternative accommodation by
    the tenant after commencement of the tenancy is covered by
    the provision This becomes clear when reference is made to
    the proviso which purports to be more beneficial to the tenant
B in giving extra protection to the tenancy for one year from the
    date of commencement of the Act. The proviso clearly refers
  · to a situation where the tenant had built the alternative
    accommodation before the commencement of the Act. The
    scope of proviso is always narrower than the main provision.
C He submitted that the Full Bench judgment has been wrongly
    relied upon by the High Court for the contrary view and if so
    read, the same does not lay down correct law. Reference has
    also been made to Judgments of this Court in Goppuma/vs.
     Thakurji Shriji Shriji Dwarakadheeshji & another2 and
D
     Gajanan Dattatraya vs. Sherbanu Hasang Patel &others 3
     which have been referred to in the Full Bench Judgment.
         9. Learned counsel for the respondent-tenant opposed
   the above submission. According to him, on a plain reading,
 E Section 12(3) can apply only if acquisition of alternative
   premises by the tenant is after the Act becomes applicable. In
   the present case, the Act became applicable only in the year
   1993 and prior thereto, by virtue of Section 2(2), the building
   was exempted from the operation of the Act. He, thus, supports
 F the view taken by the High Court.
          10. We have given due consideration to the rival
      submissions.
          11. The object of rent law is to balance the competing
 G claims of the landlord on the one hand to recover possession
   of building let out to the tenant and of the tenant to be protected
   against arbitrary increase of rent or arbitrary eviction, when
      2
          (1969) 1   sec 792
      3 (1975) 2     sec 668
 H
       SRI SIDHHARTH VIVAS v. RAVI NATH MISRA                    751
              [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

there is acute shortage of accommodation. Though, it is for A
the legislature to resolve such competing claims in terms of
statutory provisions, while interpreting the provisions the object
of the Act has to be kept in view by the Court. Unless otherwise
provided, a tenant who has already acquired alternative
accommodation is not intended to be protected by the Rent B
Act.
     12. In Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Behal', this Court
observed:
      "5. It will be useful to state the principles relevant for C
     interpretation of a provision contained in a rent control
     law like the one with which we are dealing. The spurt of
     provincial rent control legislations is a necessary
     consequence of population explosion. In Prabhakaran
     Nair v. State of TN. [(1987) 4 SCC 238] the Court           D
     noticed craving for a home - a natural human instinct,
     intensified by post-war migration of human beings en
     bloc place to place, the partition .of the country and
     uprooting of the people from their hearth and home as
     vital factors leading to acute housing shortage             E
     persuading the legislatures to act and enact rent control
     laws. The Court emphasized the need of making the
     landlord and tenant laws rational, humane, certain and
     capable of being quickly implemented. Benefit of            F
     society at large needs an equalistic balance being
     maintained between apparently conflicting interests of
     the owners of the property and the tenant by inducing.
     and encouraging the landlords to part with available
     accommodation for reasonable length of time to              G
     accommodate tenants without unreasonably restricting
     their right to have the property being restored to them,
     more so, when they genuinely require it. Such limited
     safeguarding of landlords' interest ensures a boost to
• (2002) 5 sec 397                                               H
752   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 13 S.C.R.

A     construction activity which in turn results in availability
      of more houses to accommodate more human souls
      with a roof on their heads. Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., as
      His Lordship then was, articulated the empty truism in
      such words as have become an oft-quoted quotation
B     (SCC p. 262, para 36)-
      "Tenants are in all cases not the weaker sections. There
      are those who are weak both among the landlords as
      well as the tenants."
c     6. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra
      [ (1998) 2 SCC 1) this Court emphasized the need of
      social legislations like the Rent Control Act striking a
      balance between rival interests so as to be just to law.
      ''The law ought not to be unjust to one and give a
D     disproportionate benefit or protection to another section
      of the society." (SCC p. 22, para 29) While the shortage
      of accommodation makes it necessary to protect the
      tenants to save them from exploitation but at the same
      time the need to protect tenants is coupled with an
 E    obligation to ensure that the tenants are not conferred
      with a benefit disproportionately larger than the one
      needed. Socially progressive legislation must have a
      holistic perception and not a short-sighted parochial
      approach. Power to legislate socially progressive
 F
      legislations is coupled with a responsibility to avoid
      arbitrariness and unreasonabi/ity. A legislation
      impregnated with tendency to give undue preference
      to one section, at the cost of constraints by placing
 G    shackles on the other section, not only entails
      miscarriage of justice but may also result in
      constitutional invalidity
      7. In Arjun Khiamal Makhijani .v. Jamnadas C. Tuliani
      [(1989) 4 SCC 612) this Court dealing with rent control
 H
 SRI SIDHHARTH VIYAS v. RAVI NATH MISRA                     753
        [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

legislation observed that provisions contained in such      A
legislations are capable of being categorized into two:
those beneficial to the tenants and those beneficial to
the landlord. As to a legislative provision beneficial to
the landlord, an assertion that even with regard to such
provision an effort should be made to interpret it in       B
favour of the tenant, is a negation of the very principle
of interpretation of a beneficial legislation.
8. The need for reasonable interpretation of rent control
legislations was emphasized by this Court in Bega c
Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan. {(1979) 1 SCC 273)
Speaking in the context of reasonable requirement of
landlord as a ground for eviction, the Court guarded
against any artificial extension entailing stretching or
straining of language so as to make it impossible or        o
extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for
eviction. The Court warned that such a course would
defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the
facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain
specified grounds. In Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti [(1980) 1 E
SCC 290) this Court has observed, while the rent control
legislation has given a number of facilities to the
tenants, it should not be construed so as to destroy the
limited relief which it seeks to give to the landlord also.
For instance, one of the grounds for eviction which is F
contained in almost all the Rent Control Acts in the
country is the question of landlord's bona fide personal
necessity. The concept of bona fide necessity should
be meaningfully construed so as to make the relief
granted to the landlord real and practical. Recently in G
 Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr Mahesh Chand Gupta {(1999)
 6 SCC 222) the Court has held that the concept of bona
 fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical
 approach instructed by the realities of life. An approach H
754         SUPREME C€lURT REPORTS                 [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A          either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must
           be guarded against.
           9. The rent control legislations are heavily loaded in
           favour of the tenants treating them as weaker sections
           of the society requiring legislative protection against
 B
           exploitation and unscrupulous devices of greedy
           landlords. The legislative intent has to be respected by
           the courts while interpreting the laws. But it is being
           uncharitable to legislatures if they are attributed with
c          an intention that they lean only in favour of the tenants
           and while being fair to the tenants, go to the extent of
           being unfair to the landlords. The legislature is fair to
           the tenants and to the landlords - both. The courts
           have to adopt a reasonable and balanced approach
 D         while interpreting rent control legislations starting with
           an assumption that an equal treatment has been meted
           out to both the sections of the society In spite of the
           overall balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while
           interpreting such of the provisions as take care of the
 E         interest of the landlord the court should not hesitate in
           leaning in favour of the landlords. Such provisions are
            engrafted in rent control legislations to take care of
            those situations where the landlords too are weak and
            feeble and feel humble."
 F
           13. In Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General
      Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. & others 5 , it was observed :
            "33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the
            context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may
 G          well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives
            the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important.
            That interpretation is best which makes the textual
            interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best
      s (1987) 1   sec 424
 H
       SRI SIDHHARTH VIYAS v. RAVI NATH MISRA                       755
              [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

     interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this A
     knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole
     and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase
     by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in
     the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the
     statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, B
     the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take
     colour and appear different than when the statute is
     looked at without the glasses provided by the context.
     With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole
     and discover what each section, each clause, each C
     phrase and each word is meant and designed to say
     as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a
     statute and no word of a statute can be construed in
     isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every D
     word has a place and everything is in its place. It is by
     looking at the definition as a whole in the setting of the
     entire Act and by reference to what preceded the
     enactment and the reasonsfor it that the Court construed
     the expression "Prize Chit" in Srinivasa and we find no E
     reason to depart from the Court's construction."
      14. The Full Bench of the High Court in Mangi Lal
(supra), rightly held that the grammar cannot control the
interpretation of the provision which has to be read in the
context. It will be appropriate to reproduce relevant part of the   F
said Judgment which is as follows:
     "43. The interpretation canvassed on behalf of the
     landlord is only grammatical and so ultra-legalistic. It
     is what is called the literal approach. In Kammins v. G
     Zenith Investments Ltd. (1971) AC 850 Lord Diplock
     drew a clear distinction between the 'literal approach'
     and the 'purposive <ipproach', and used the purposive
     approach to solve the question.
                                                                    H
756        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 13 S.C.R.

A         44. Recently, the House of Lords considered the rules
          of interpretation of statutes in Stock v. Frank Jones
          Tiption Ltd. (1978) 1 WLR 231. In that case Viscount
          Di/home said:
          "It is now fashionable to talk of a purposive construction
 B
          of a statute, but it has been recognised since the 17th
          century that it is the task of the judiciary in interpreting
          an Act to seek to interpret it 'according to the intent of
          them that made it' (Coke 4 Inst 33)."
 c        The better approach is the purposive approach, namely,
          to seek the legislative intent and not be led away by a
          strict literal construction of the words.
          45.    Lord Denning put it very pithily in Seaford
          Count Estates Ltd. v. Asher (1949) 2 KB 281 as under:
 D
          "We do not sit here to pull the language of Parliament
          and of Ministers to pieces and make nonsense of it.
          That is an easy thing to do, and it is a ti ng to which
          Lawyers are too often prone. We sit here : J find out the
 E        intention of Parliament and of Ministers and carry out,
          and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making
          sense of the enactment than by opening it up to
          destructive analysis."
          The Court's function is to clarify the language so as to
 F
          satisfy the legislative intent.
          46.        The word 'has' has been used in the Act in many
          other provision, e.g., section 20 permits a suit for
          ejectment where the tenant 'has sublet'. There the word
 G        'has' may have a different significance, because of, inter-
          alia, its legislative history."
          15. Thus, in our view, mere use of present tense in
    Section 12(3) is not intended to limit the applicability of the
. H provision to acquisition of accommodation by the tenant after.
        SRI SIDHHARTH VIVAS v. RAVI NATH MISRA                  757
               [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

the Rent Act becomes applicable. In the context, the provision A
also covers the situation where the tenant has acquired
alternative accommodation before the applicability of the Rent
Act. This view is further supported by the language of the
proviso. The proviso clearly shows that the provision in question
is not intended to be limited to a situation where alternative B
accommodation is acquired after the Act commences or
becomes operative. The provision also covers a situation
where the alternative accommodation.is acquired prior to that.
The scope of proviso is narrower than the main provision.
                                                                c
     16. In S. Sundaram Pillai & others vs. V.R.
Pattabiraman & others 6 , it was observed:
       "27. The next question .that arises for consideration is
       as to what is the scope of a proviso and what is the ambit
       of an Explanation either to a proviso or to any other D
       statutory provision. We shall first take up the question
       of the nature, scope and extent of a proviso. The well
       established rule of interpretation of a proviso is that a
       proviso may have three separate functions. Normally,
       a proviso is meant to be an exception to something E
       within the main enactment or to qualify something
       enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within
       the purview of the enactment. In other words, a proviso
       cannot be torn apart from the main enactment nor can F
       it be used to nullify or set at naught the real object of
       the main enactment.
       28. Craies in his book Statute Law (7th Edn.) while
       explaining the purpose and import of a proviso states
       at p. 218 thus:                                       G
       "The effect of an exception or qualifying proviso,
       according to the ordinary rules of construction, is to
       except out of the preceding portion of the enactment,
6
    (1985) 1sec591                                              H
758   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 13 S.C.R.


A     or to qualify something enacted therein, which but for
      the proviso would be within it.... The natural presumption
      is that, but for the proviso, the enacting part of the
      section would have included the subject-matter of the
      proviso."
B
      29. Odgers in Construction of Deeds and Statutes (5th
      Edn.) while referring to the scope of a proviso mentioned
                        ..
      the following ingredients:
      "p. 317. Provisos-These are clauses of exception or
c     qualification in an Act, excepting something out of, or
      qualifying something in, the enactment which, but for
      the proviso, would be within it.
      p. 318. Though framed as a proviso, such a clause may
      exceptionally have the effect of a substantive
D
      enactment. "
      30. Sarathi in Interpretation of Statutes at pages 294-
      295 has collected the following principles in regard to a
      proviso:
 E
         (a) When one finds a proviso to a section the natural
         presumption is that, but for the proviso, the enacting
         part of the section would have included the subject-
         matter of the proviso.
 F       (b) A proviso must be construed with reference to the
         preceding parts of the clause to which it is appended.
         (c) Where the proviso is directly repugnant to a
         section, the proviso shall stand and be held a repeal
         of the section as the proviso speaks the latter
 G
         intention of the makers.
         (d) Where the section is doubtful, a proviso may be
         used as a guide to its interpretation: but when it is
         clear, a proviso cannot imply the existence of words
 H       of which there is no trace in the section.
       SRI SIDHHARTH VIYAS v. RAVI NATH MISRA                       759
              [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.]

         (e) The proviso is subordinate to the main section.        A
         (f) A proviso does not enlarge an enactment except
         for compelling reasons.
         (g) Sometimes an unnecessary proviso is inserted
         by way of abundant caution.                                B
         (h) A construction placed upon a proviso which brings
         it into general harmony with the terms of section
         should prevail.
         (i) When a proviso is repugnantto the enacting part,       c
         the proviso will not prevail over the absolute terms of
         a later Act directed to be read as supplemental to
         the earlier one.
         U) A proviso may sometimes contain a substantive
         provision."                                                D
       17. We, thus, hold that the view taken by the High Court
that acquisition of alternative accommodation by the tenant,
prior to enforcement of the Act, is not covered by Section 12(3)
of the Act is not correct in law. The Full Bench Judgment, to E
the extent it supports the said view, also does not lay down
correct law and will stand overruled.
     18. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the
impugned order passed by the High Court and restore the order F
passed by the Rent Controller. No costs.


Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                              Appeal allowed.