Holding

The shebaitship of Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple is heritable and devolves according to law and custom, and the expression 'Ruler of Travancore' in the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 includes the natural successors of the last Ruler.

Summary

The case concerns the management of Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple in Thiruvananthapuram, which has been historically managed by the Travancore royal family. After the integration of princely states, a Covenant in 1949 and the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 preserved the Ruler's control over the temple. The last Ruler died in 1991, and his younger brother claimed to be the 'Ruler of Travancore' to manage the temple. The High Court held that after the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971, which abolished recognition of rulers, no one could claim that status. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the shebaitship (managership) of the temple is a heritable right that devolves according to law and custom, independent of the official status of 'Ruler'. The Court held that the expression 'Ruler of Travancore' in the TC Act includes successors, and the 26th Amendment did not affect the temple's administration. The Court allowed the appeals and directed the constitution of an Administrative Committee headed by the District Judge and an Advisory Committee to manage the temple transparently.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant No.1 can claim to be 'Ruler of Travancore' under Section 18(2) of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 after the death of the last Ruler and after the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971.
Effect of the Covenant of 1949 on the management of the temple.
Effect of the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 on the rights of the Ruler.
Whether the shebaitship of the temple is heritable and devolves according to custom.
Whether Article 363 of the Constitution bars the dispute.
Whether the temple is a public temple and the nature of the Ruler's interest.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. 25, s. 26, s. 290A, s. 291, s. 362, s. 363, s. 363A, s. 366(22)
Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971
Government of India Act, 1935s. 6
Hindu Succession Act, 1956s. 5
Rulers of Indian States (Abolition of Privileges) Act, 1972s. 5
Sree Pandaravaka Lands (Vesting and Enfranchisement) Act, 1971s. 2(k), s. 3
Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950s. 128, s. 15, s. 18, s. 19, s. 2, s. 20, s. 21, s. 22, s. 23, s. 3, s. 33, s. 36, s. 37, s. 4, s. 61, s. 62
Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions (Amendment) Act, 1974
Travancore Interim Constitution Act, 1123s. 1, s. 2, s. 4
Wealth Tax Act, 1957s. 5(1)(iv)

Subjects

ShebaitshipRulerTemple managementCovenantConstitution (26th Amendment)Hindu Religious EndowmentsSuccessionEscheatArticle 363Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions ActSree Padmanabhaswamy Temple

Judgment

974 [2020]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 9 S.C.R. 974 [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRs. & ANR.
v.
STATE OF KERALA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 2732 of 2020)
B JULY 13, 2020
[UDAY UMESH LALIT AND INDU MALHOTRA, JJ.]
Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 –
Chapter III of Part-I, Sections 18 to 23 – Constitution of India –
Arts. 363 and 366 (22) – Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple –
C
Shebaitship or the managership of the temple – There are many
versions as regard to the origin and how the temple was set up,
however, every version accepts that the King of Travancore had a
role in the administration of the temple – After a major fire incident
occurred in the year 1686, it was the king who re-constructed the
D temple and installed a new idol and took full control of the temple –
Since then the management of the temple was with the king of
Travancore – Thereafter, a Covenant was entered into by the rulers
of Travancore and Cochin with the Government of India on
27.05.1949 and 29.05.1949 respectively – Art. VIII(b) of the
Covenant preserved the administrative right of the ruler of
E
Travancore in respect of the Sree Padmanabhswamy temple – The
Constitution of India made certain provisions with regard to privy
purse payable to the rulers in terms of any Covenant entered into
by the ruler of the State – Soon after the coming into force of the
Constitution, the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions
F Act, 1950 was enacted and Chapter III of Part-I of the same
comprising of Sections 18 to 23 deals specifically with Sri
Padmnabhaswamy temple – Then came the Constitution (Twenty Sixth
Amendment) Act, 1971 which deleted Arts. 291 and 362 and inserted
Art. 363A which now expressly stipulates, inter-alia, that any person
who was recognised as ruler or successor, and all rights, liabilities
G
and obligation in respect of Privy purses stand extinguished – On
19.07.1991, the ruler who had executed the Covenant passed away
– Since then, the appellant no. 1, younger brother of the deceased
ruler had been exercising all the functions as ‘Ruler of Travancore’
with respect to the affairs of the temple – A writ petition was filed by
H
974
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRs. & ANR. v. 975
STATE OF KERALA & ORS.

a advocate before the High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto A
directing appellant no. 2, the Executing Officer (appointed by the
ruler of Travancore as per covenant) to show the authority under
which he was holding the post of Executing Officer of the temple –
Thereafter, another writ petition was filed by the appellants referring
to the relevant Articles of the Covenant – Also, there were civil suits
B
pending, which challenged the authority of the appellants herein
with the affairs of the temple – Whether the appellant no.1-younger
brother of the last ruler of Travancore could after the death of the
last ruler on 19.07.1991 claim to be the ‘ruler of Travancore’ within
the meaning of the term contained in s.18(2) of the 1950 Act to
claim ownership, control and management of the Sree C
Padmanabhaswamy Temple – The High Court held that neither
appellant no. 1 nor any of the successors of his family can claim
control or management of the temple u/s. 18(2) of the 1950 Act and
the State Government was directed to constitute a body corporate
or trust or other legal authority to take control of the temple –
D
Aggrieved, the appellants filed appeal before the Supreme Court –
Held: The Supreme Court has laid down that when the idol is
installed and the temple is constructed or an endowment is founded,
the shebaitship is vested in the founder and unless the founder himself
has disposed of the shebaitship in a particular manner or there is
some usage or custom or circumstances showing a different mode E
of devolution, the shebaitship like any other species of heritable
property follows the line of inheritance from the founder, and it is
not open to the Court to lay down a new rule of succession or alter
the rule of succession – In the instant case, the shebaitship or the
managership of the temple passed on to the succeeding kings, coming
F
from the royal family of Travancore and represented a continuous
and unbroken line of successive shebaits from the original founder
– The Art. VIII of the Covenant acknowledged and accepted in the
latter part of Sub-Article (b) of Art. VIII of the covenant that the
administration in respect of the temple was already vested in the
ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore – Therefore, when the G
Covenant was entered into by the Ruler of the Covenanting State of
Travancore, apart from other incidents which normally follow the
rulership, he was holding the office of Shebait of the Temple and
represented a continuous and unbroken line of successive Shebaits
traced from the original founder – Insofar as the Constitution
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976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 is concerned, despite this
amendment, the private properties of the ruler would continue to be
available for normal succession and devolution in accordance with
the law and custom – Though the concepts such as Ruler or Rulership
have ceased to operate, succession to the Gaddi as an incident may
still operate – So, the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act,
B
1971 did not affect the administration of the temple – Therefore,
the death of the last ruler who signed the Covenant would not in
any way affect the Shebaitship of the Temple held by the royal family
of Travancore, that after such death, the shebaitship must devolve
in accordance with the applicable law and custom appearing in
C Chapter III Part-I of the 1950 Act must include his natural successors
according to law and customs.
Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 –
Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple – Constitution of Administrative
Committee and Advisory Committee – A Note was given by the
D appellants about the composition an Administrative Committee and
an Advisory Committee to take care of the affairs of the Temple – It
was suggested, inter-alia, that the Administrative Committee shall
consist of five members: a) a retired Indian Administrative Service
Officer of the rank of Secretary to Government of Kerala to be
nominated by the Trustee in consultation with Government of Kerala
E who shall be the Chairperson of the Committee; (b) one member
nominated by the trustee; (c) one member nominated by the
Government of Kerala; (d) one member nominated by the Ministry
of Culture, Government of India; and (e) the Chief Thantri of the
temple – Held: The suggestions made by the appellants in their Note
F with regard to the constitution of the Administrative Committee and
the Advisory Committee is accepted subject to the modification with
respect to the Chairperson of the Administrative Committee – A minor
change in the Administrative Committee is made – Instead of a retired
Indian Administrative Service Officer of the rank of Secretary to
the Government of Kerala as the Chairperson of the Administrative
G Committee, in the interest of justice, the District Judge,
Thiruvananthapuram shall be the Chairperson of the Administrative
Committee.
Words and Phrases :‘Shebait’ – meaning of – The expression
Shebait is derived from “Sewa” which means service and shebait,
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SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRs. & ANR. v. 977
STATE OF KERALA & ORS.

in literal sense, means one who renders “sewa” to the idol or a A
deity.
Disposing of the matters, the Court
HELD: 1. In the backdrop of the facts and circumstances
on record, the issues concerning the status and entitlement of
the appellant No.1 including the relationship vis-a-vis the Temple B
are concerned, the controversy can be considered under the
following five segments:-
A] Situation obtaining before and upto the date when the
Covenant was entered into in May 1949.
B] Effect of the Covenant that was entered into in May C
1949.
C] Effect of the Constitution of India as it stood before the
Constitution (Twenty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 and of the
provisions of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions
Act, 1950 (TC Act). D
D] Effect of the Constitution (Twenty-Sixth Amendment)
Act, 1971.
E] Effect of the death of the person who had signed the
Covenant as the Ruler of Travancore. [Para 50][1078-C-E]
E
2. A] Situation obtaining before and upto the date when the
Covenant was entered into in May 1949
2.1 Though there may be different accounts and beliefs with
regard to the origin and how the Temple was set up, every version
accepts that the King of Travancore had a role in the
administration of the Temple to begin with, and that he was the F
one who re-constructed the Temple after a major fire that
occurred in the year 1686, and installed a new idol and took full
control of the Temple. The King of Travancore was thus
responsible for setting up the Temple, in the form that it stands
today, and it was the King who installed the new idol, and since G
then the management of the Temple, till the Covenant was signed,
had always been with the Kings of Travancore. [Para 54][1080-
G-H; 1081-A]

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978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A 2.2. Tested on any parameter, such as historical accounts,
popular and customary beliefs, certain practices connected with
the rituals and affairs of the Temple that mandatorily require the
presence and participation of the Ruler, deep involvement of the
members of ruling family and their connection with the Temple
and Sri Padmanabhaswamy at various stages of their lives, “The
B
Thrippati Danam” and its significance, and long recognised and
accepted fact that the management of the Temple had always been
with the Ruler, leads this Court to conclude that for centuries,
the Temple had been under the exclusive management of
successive Rulers from the ruling family of Travancore and that
C the Rulers of Travancore, till the signing of the Covenant, were
in the capacity as Managers or Shebaits of the Temple.
[Para 60][1085-G-H; 1086-A-B]
2.3 As laid down by this Court in various decisions, when
the idol is installed and the temple is constructed or an endowment
D is founded, the shebaitship is vested in the founder and unless
the founder himself has disposed of the shebaitship in a particular
manner or there is some usage or custom or circumstances
showing a different mode of devolution, the shebaitship like any
other species of heritable property follows the line of inheritance
from the founder; and it is not open to the Court to lay down a
E new rule of succession or alter the rule of succession. It has also
been laid down that the shebaitship has the elements of office
and property, of duties and personal interest blended together
and they invest the office of the shebait with the character of
proprietary right. It has further been laid down that the shebait
F is the custodian of the idol, its earthly spokesman and the human
ministrant; is entitled to deal with the temporal affairs and to
manage the property of the idol; and even where no emoluments
are attached to the office of the shebait, he has the right or interest
in the endowed property which has the characteristics of a
proprietary right. [Para 73][1110-G-H; 1111-A-B]
G
2.4 If the instant case is considered on the touchstone of
these settled principles, it is clear that after the major fire that
occurred in the year 1686, the Temple was reconstructed and a
new idol was installed by the then King of Travancore and since
then right upto the day the Covenant was signed, the management
H of the Temple had always been with the Kings of Travancore.
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRs. & ANR. v. 979
STATE OF KERALA & ORS.

The shebaitship or the managership of the Temple passed on to A
the succeeding Kings, coming from the royal family of Travancore.
This chain was unbroken till the then Ruler of Travancore signed
the Covenant in May 1949. [Para 73][1111-C]
2.5 This Court must thus conclude that as on the day when
the Covenant was entered into by the Ruler of the Covenanting B
State of Travancore, apart from other incidents which normally
follow the rulership, he was holding the office of Shebait of the
Temple and represented a continuous and unbroken line of
successive Shebaits traced from the original founder; and being
a Shebait of the Temple, he was having all the rights and interest C
as laid down by decisions of the Courts. [Para 74][1111-F-G]
3. B] Effect of the Covenant that was entered into in May
1949
3.1 Sub-Article ‘b’ of Article VIII used the expression “now
vested in trust in the Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore” D
and thus acknowledged the factum that the administration in
respect of the Temple, Sri Pandaravaga properties and all other
properties and funds of the Temple was already vested in the
Ruler of Covenanting State of Travancore. Sub-Article ‘b’ further
contemplated that with effect from the appointed day, the E
administration of the Temple, Sri Pandaravaga properties and all
other properties and funds of the Temple would be subject to the
control and supervision of the “Ruler of Travancore”. This Sub-
Article was the centre of debate and fulcrum of submissions by
the counsel appearing for various parties. [Para 77][1114-D-E]
F
3.2 What then would be the import of the expression “the
Ruler of Travancore” in the latter part of Sub-Article ‘b’ of Article
VIII is the question that needs to be addressed.
The only place in the Covenant where the person who
signed as the Ruler of the Covenanting State would continue to G
enjoy his erstwhile powers as the Head of that Covenanting State,
was Article XXI. The references as “the Ruler of the Covenanting
State” and as the Ruler of Travancore or as “the Ruler of Cochin”

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980 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A in rest of the Articles, were only by way of reference to the person
concerned, and not by way of reference to or because of his official
capacity as the Ruler. This gets fortified by proviso to Sub-Article
‘d’ of Article VIII, in terms of which “the Ruler of Cochin” would
continue to exercise regulation and control with respect to rituals
and ceremonies in certain temples. Upon the Covenant coming
B
into effect, he had lost his capacity as the Head of the erstwhile
State of Cochin. Thus, the retention of the powers under said
proviso in him was not because he had any official status as Head
of the State after the appointed day in terms of the Covenant but
only with a view to describe and locate the person concerned. A
C person answering the description in said proviso would continue
to exercise such power. Similar thought can, therefore, be validly
entertained that the description in the latter part of Sub-Article
‘b’ of Article VIII was only to refer to or locate the person.
Furthermore, the historical background and the
D association of the royal family with the Temple and the nature of
Shebaitship held by a successive line of Rulers from time to time,
were such that the Covenant designedly let the management of
the affairs of the Temple – with the royal family, and in the hands
of the Ruler of Travancore, principally because his official capacity
or status as the erstwhile Head of the State apparently had nothing
E
to do with the capacity as Shebait of the Temple.
It is also pertinent to note here that other Devaswoms
and Endowments in the erstwhile State of Travancore also used
to be under the control of the erstwhile Ruler of Travancore.
Going by the Travancore Interim Constitution Act, though such
F control was to be retained by the ruling family, the Covenant
expressed clearly to the contrary. Sub-Article ‘c’ of Article VIII
acknowledged that administration with respect to said other
Devaswoms and Endowments and other properties was earlier
under the management of the Ruler of the Covenanting State of
G Travancore. It, however, stated that with effect from the
appointed day in terms of the Covenant, such management would
now vest in Travancore Devaswom Board. This part also finds
mention in the relevant paragraphs of the White Paper.
Thus, wherever the official capacity of the Head of the
H State was responsible for enabling the Ruler to be in charge of
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRs. & ANR. v. 981
STATE OF KERALA & ORS.

the management or administration, upon ceasing to have such A
capacity, the erstwhile Ruler would have nothing to do with the
management of such other Devaswoms or Endowments. In
contrast, the case with respect to the Temple and other properties
referred to in Sub-Article ‘b’ stands on a completely different
footing. [Para 79][1115-F-H; 1116-A-C; 1119-D-F]
B
3.3 In the premises, it must be held that the expression
“the Ruler of Travancore” used in the latter part of Sub-Article
‘b’ of Article VIII was only by way of reference and the purport of
said Sub-Article was not to invest the said authority and power
because he was the Ruler or enjoyed and represented any official
status. [Para 79][1119-H] C

3.4 The Article VIII of the Covenant not only acknowledged
and accepted the factum that the administration with respect to
the Temple, its properties, as well as with respect to Pandaravaga
properties, had already vested in “the Ruler of the Covenanting
State of Travancore”, but the said Article expressly continued D
the same status and stipulated that such administration shall be
conducted subject to the supervision and control of “the Ruler
of Travancore”. [Para 81][1121-A-B]
4. C] Effect of the Constitution of India as it stood before
the Constitution (Twenty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 and of E
the provisions of TC Act
4.1 Art. 291 of the Constitution of India dealt with Privy
Purses payable to the Rulers and stipulated that if under any
covenant or agreement entered into by the Ruler of any Indian
State, any sums were guaranteed or assured by the Government F
of the Dominion of India to be paid as Privy Purse, the sums in
that behalf would be charged on and paid out of the Consolidated
Fund of India and that the sums so paid to any Ruler would be
exempt from all taxes on income. Article 362 of the Constitution
of India stipulated that in the exercise of the power of Parliament, G
or of the Legislature of a State, to make laws or in the exercise of
their respective executive powers, due regard shall be had to
the guarantee or the assurance given under any such covenant
or agreement, as was referred to in Art. 291 of the Constitution
of India, with respect to personal rights, privileges and dignities
of the Ruler of an Indian State. H
982 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A Art. 366(22) defined the expression “Ruler” to mean, inter
alia, one who had signed the Covenant referred to in Article 291
and who, for the time being, was recognized by the President of
India to be the Ruler of that State and would include successor to
such Ruler. It may be stated here that there is no dispute that
the Ruler of Travancore who signed the Covenant was recognized
B
by the President of India to be the Ruler of Travancore. Article
363, which has remained unamended, speaks of “Bar to
interference by Courts in disputes arising out of certain treaties,
agreements etc.” [Para 82][1121-D-G; 1122-A]
4.2 Soon thereafter, the TC Act came into force. The
C relevant provisions of the TC Act have already been extracted
earlier. Chapter III of the TC Act specifically dealt with Sree
Padmanabhaswamy Temple and matters pertaining to the
administration of the Temple. Said Chapter III of the TC Act is
consistent with the latter part of Sub-Article ‘b’ of Article VIII of
D the Covenant and stipulates inter alia that the administration of
the Temple, Sri Pandaravaga properties and all other properties
and funds of the Temple “vested in trust in the Ruler of
Travancore” and the sum of Rs.6 lakhs contributed in terms of
Sub-Section 1 of Section 18 of the TC Act shall be conducted,
“subject to the control and supervision of the Ruler of
E Travancore” by an Executive Officer appointed by him. Said
Chapter III did not confer any right or benefit for the first time,
where none existed earlier but gave statutory recognition to what
was acknowledged and accepted in the latter part of Sub-Article
‘b’ of Article VIII of the Covenant to be the continuing status.
F Section 20 of the TC Act then deals with the constitution of Sree
Padmanabhaswamy Temple Committee, which is also in tune with
said Article VIII of the Covenant. [Para 83][1122-B-D]
4.3 Insofar as the present segment is concerned, it must,
therefore, be concluded that the relevant provisions of the
G Constitution of India as well as that of the TC Act did not, in any
way, upset or abridge the status enjoyed by the Ruler of
Travancore as Shebait of the Temple and also did not, in any
manner, adversely impact the right of administration vested in
the Ruler of Travancore. As a matter of fact, the relevant

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SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 983
STATE OF KERALA & ORS.

provisions of the TC Act afforded statutory flavour to the status A
contemplated by Article VIII of the Covenant. [Para 86][1130-F-
G]
5. D] Effect of the Constitution (Twenty-Sixth Amendment)
Act, 1971
5.1 The assurances and guarantees given in the covenants B
or agreements entered into with various Rulers normally had
four elements; i) that certain sums shall be payable to the Rulers
by way of Privy Purses; ii) that certain properties mentioned as
private properties of the Ruler would vest in the Ruler in his
personal capacity; iii) that succession to the Gaddi would go strictly C
by the prevalent law and custom; and iv) that personal rights,
privileges and dignities enjoyed by the Rulers and in some cases
by the members of the family of the Ruler, would continue to be
available. [Para 91][1137-B-C]
5.2 Out of the aforesaid four elements, the elements (i) D
and (iv) were covered by Articles 291 and 362 as they stood before
being deleted. The effect of such deletion has been discussed
and dealt with. The elements (ii) and (iii) are normal incidents
which were not within the scope of said Articles 291 and 362.
Despite the Constitution (Twenty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971,
the private properties of the Ruler would continue to be available E
for normal succession and devolution in accordance with the law
and custom. Though concepts such as Ruler or Rulership have
ceased to operate, succession to the Gaddi as an incident may
still operate. For instance, there could be a sword or any other
ceremonial weapon, or a sarpech, or heirloom jewellery, which F
must go by rule of primogeniture, as against the normal way of
succession with regard to other personal properties. All such
incidents have not been terminated. [Para 92][1137-D-F]
5.3 These four elements were covered by Articles XIV, XV,
XVII and XVI respectively in the Covenant in the present case. G
However, apart from the said four assurances, the Covenant also
dealt with an additional and important aspect in Article VIII(b).
It accepted and acknowledged that the administration with
respect to the Temple, Sri Pandaravaga properties, and the

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984 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A property of the Temple which was also vested in the Ruler of the
Covenanting State would continue to be conducted in the manner
stipulated therein, subject to the control and supervision of the
Ruler of Travancore. The effect of such Article and the fact that
such vesting was not in the capacity as Ruler has already been
dealt with. It has also been concluded that the expression “The
B
Ruler of Travancore” was only to locate and describe the person
who would be in control and supervision of the administration.
[Para 93][1137-H; 1138-A-C]
5.4 In the premises, this Court must conclude that the
Constitution (Twenty -Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 did not in
C any way impact or affect the administration of the Temple, Sri
Pandaravaga properties and the properties of the Temple, which
continued to be under the control and supervision of the Ruler of
Travancore. [Para 94][1138-C-D]
6. E] Effect of the death of the person who had signed the
D Covenant as the Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore
6.1 In the instant case, since the Shebaitship had vested in
the Ruler of Travancore, not in his official capacity, the normal
incident of heritability must get attached to the office of such
Shebaitship in accordance with governing principles of succession
E and custom. Therefore, when it comes to the matter concerning
the administration of the Temple, Sri Pandavaraga properties and
the properties of the Temple, the expression “the Ruler of
Travancore” as appearing in Chapter III of Part I of TC Act must
mean the successor in accordance with the prevalent law and
F custom. In the process one need not go to the definition of Ruler
either under Art. 366(22) or under Art. 363 of the Constitution of
India. Consistent with the principles that have been culled in the
various established judgments of the Courts after the death of
the person who was in control and supervision of the
administration, the heritable interest must devolve in accordance
G with the customary rights. [Para 105][1142-G; 1143-A-B]
6.2 In the circumstances, this Court holds that the death of
the last ruler who had signed the Covenant, would not in any way
affect the Shebaitship of the Temple held by the royal family of
Travancore; that after such death, the Shebaitship must devolve
H in accordance with the applicable law and custom upon his
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 985
STATE OF KERALA & ORS.

successor; that the expression “Ruler of Travancore” as A
appearing in Chapter III of Part I of the TC Act must include his
natural successors according to law and custom; and that the
Shebaitship did not lapse in favour of the State by principle of
escheat. [Para 107][1147-C-D]
7. The provisions of the TC Act with respect to the B
administration of the Temple are clear:-
A. Under Section 18(2), the administration shall be
conducted. “Subject to the control and supervision of the Ruler
of Travancore, by an Executive Officer appointed by him.”
B. “Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple Committee” C
composed of three members nominated by the Ruler of
Travancore in terms of Section 20 is to advise the Ruler of
Travancore in the discharge of his functions.
The Statute has thus vested the power of appointing the
Executive Officer and of forming the Advisory Committee, in the D
Ruler of Travancore.
In the Note, the appellants have stated:-
(i) “The Trustee shall delegate his powers of administration
under Section 18(2)” to the Administrative Committee which
E
“shall administer the Temple through an Executive Officer to be
appointed by the Committee”.
(ii) On all policy matters, the Trustee shall be guided by
the advice of the Advisory Committee. [Para 113][1156-C-F]
8. Having given anxious consideration to the rival F
suggestions, the composition of the Committees as suggested
by the appellants (Note adverted in detail in paragraph 47 of the
judgment) deserves acceptance, especially in light of the
conclusions arrived by this Court that the Managership or the
Shebaitship of the Temple continues with the Family. As against
the administration contemplated by Chapter III of Part I of the G
TC Act in the hands of the Ruler of Travancore in absolute terms,
the course now suggested by the appellants is quite balanced.
The Composition of the Administrative Committee as suggested
is broad based and would not be loaded in favour or against the
H
986 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A Trustee. However, considering the fact that the present interim
Administrative Committee headed by the District Judge is in
seisin for the last more than five years, and various District Judges
as Chairpersons of the Committee conducted themselves quite
well, in view of this Court, a minor change in the Administrative
Committee suggested by the appellants in their Note is called
B
for. Instead of a retired Indian Administrative Service Officer of
the rank of Secretary to the Government of Kerala as the
Chairperson of the Administrative Committee, in the interest of
justice, the District Judge, Thiruvananthapuram shall be the
Chairperson of the Administrative Committee. Needless to say
C that the present Chairperson of the Interim Administrative
Committee shall continue to be the Chairperson so long as he
holds the post of the District Judge, Thiruvananthapuram. The
composition of the Advisory Committee will ensure that the
administration of the Temple is conducted in a fair and transparent
manner. [Para 114][1156-F-H; 1157-A-C]
D
Revathinnal Balagopala Varma v. His Highness Shri
Padmanabha Dasa Bala Rama Varma (since deceased)
and Others (1993) 1 Suppl. SCC 233 : [1991] 3 Suppl.
SCR 30; The Commissioner, Hindu Religious
Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha
E Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt [1954] SCR 1005;
M. Siddiq (dead) through LRs v. Mahant Suresh Das
and Others (Ram Janmabhumi Temple Case) (2020) 1
SCC 1; Maharaja Pravir Chandra Bhanj Deo Kakatiya
v. The State of Madhya Pradesh [1961] 2 SCR 501;
F Rani Ratna Prova Devi v. State of Orissa and Another
[1964] 6 SCR 301– followed.
Mahant Sital Das v. Sant Ram and Others AIR 1954
SC 606; His Holiness Digya Darshan Rajendra Ram
Doss v. Devendra Doss (1973) 1 SCC 14 : [1973] 2
G SCR 911; Profulla Chorone Requitte v. Satya Chorone
Requitte (1979) 3 SCC 409 : [1979] 3 SCR 431;
Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick [1951] SCR
1125; Kutchi Lal Rameshwar Ashram Trust Evam Anna
Kshetra Trust v. Collector, Haridwar (2017) 16 SCC
418 : [2017] 9 SCR 766 – relied on.
H
Deep Chand and Others v. State of U.P. and Others
[1959] 2 Suppl. SCR 8; Sawai Tej Singhji of Alwar v.
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 987
STATE OF KERALA & ORS.

Union of India (1979) 1 SCC 512 : [1979] 2 SCR 62 – A
held inapplicable.
Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India
(1971) 1 SCC 85 : [1971] 3 SCR 9; Raghunathrao
Ganpatrao v. Union of India (1994) 1 Suppl. SCC 191:
[1993] 1 SCR 480; Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. B
General Electric Company and Ors. (1984) 4 SCC 679:
[1985] 1 SCR 432; Bala Shankar Mahashankar
Bhattjee and Others v. Charity Commissioner, Gujarat
State (1995) 1 Suppl. SCC 485 : [1994] 2 Suppl. SCR
687; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. The State of
Rajasthan and Others [1964] 1 SCR 561; National and C
Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of
Greater, Bombay (1969) 1 SCC 541 : [1969] 3 SCR
565; Desh Bandhu Gupta and Co. and Others v. Delhi
Stock Exchange Association Ltd. (1979) 4 SCC 565 :
[1979] 3 SCR 373 – referred to. D
Gossamee Sree Greedharreejee v. Rumanlolljee
Gossamee 16 M.I.A.137 : (1889) L.R. 16 I.A. 137;
Ganesh v. Lal Behary (1935-36) 63 I.A. 448; Bhaba
Tarini Debi v. Asha Lata Debi AIR 1943 PC 89 : (1943)
ILR 2 P.C. 137; Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal v. E
Balusami Ayyar and Ors. AIR 1922 PC 123 –
referred to.
Manohar Mukherjee v. Bhupendra Nath Mukherjee
and Ors. I.L.R (1993) 60 Cal. 452 – referred to.
“Sree Padamanabhaswamy Temple” authored by F
Princess Aswathi Thirunal Gouri Lakshmi Bayi –
referred to.
“History of Sri Padamanabhasvami Temple till 1758”
by Dr. A.G. Menon – referred to.
G
“The Hindu Law of Religious Endowments and
Charitable Trusts” Edited by Hon. P.B.
Gajendragadkar, former Chief Justice of India –
referred to.

H
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A White Paper on the Indian States prepared in July 1948
and updated in March 1950 by the Government of India,
Ministry of States – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[1971] 3 SCR 9 referred to Para 16
B
[1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 30 followed Para 22(a)
[1993] 1 SCR 480 referred to Para 22(b)
[1985] 1 SCR 432 referred to Para 42
[1979] 3 SCR 431 relied on Para 43
C
[1951] SCR 1125 relied on Para 43
[1959] Supp 2 SCR 8 held inapplicable Para 45
[1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 687 referred to Para 45
D [1954] SCR 1005 followed Para 65
[1973] 2 SCR 911 relied on Para 67
(2020) 1 SCC 1 followed Para 69
[1964] 1 SCR 561 referred to Para 70
E [1961] 2 SCR 501 followed Para 98
[1964] 6 SCR 301 followed Para 98
[1969] 3 SCR 565 referred to Para 104
[1979] 3 SCR 373 referred to Para 104
F [2017] 9 SCR 766 relied on Para 106
[1979] 2 SCR 62 held inapplicable Para 110 (I)(iii)
CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL/INHERENT JURISDICTION
: Civil Appeal No. 2732 of 2020.
G From the Judgment and Order dated 31.01.2011 of the High Court
of Kerala at Ernakulam in Writ Petition (C) No. 36487 of 2009.
With
Civil Appeal No. 2733 of 2020, Writ Petition (C) No. 518 of 2011
and Contempt Petiton (C) No. 493 of 2019 in SLP(C) No. 12361 of
H 2011.
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 989
STATE OF KERALA & ORS.

Krishnan Venugopal, Arvind P. Datar, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, A
P. N. Ravindran, Sr. Advs., Kuriakose Varghese, V. Shyamohan, Gaurav
Ray, Udai Rathore, Surya Prakash, Pratap Venugopal, Ms. Surekha
Raman, Ms. Viddushi, Akhil Abraham Roy, Sahil Singh, M/s. K.L. John
& Co., J. Sai Deepak, Suvidutt M.S., Avinash K. Sharma, Ms. Shaktiki
Sharma, Ms. Smita Pandey, Yogesh Kumar, G. Prakash, Jishnu M.L.,
B
Ms. Priyanka Prakash, Ms. Beena Prakash, P.B. Suresh, Karthik
Jayashankar, Vikrant Yadav, Rajat Nair, B.K. Satija, Raj Bahadur, V. K.
Sidharthan, Karri Venkata Reddy, Ms. Anil Katiyar, P. S. Sudheer, Rishi
Maheshwari, Ms. Anne Mathew, Bharat Sood, Ms. Shruti Jose, N.P.
Rakeesh Panicker, Ranbir Singh Yadav, Nishad L.S., Ms. Anzu K.
Varkey, Ms. Manju Jetley, M.K.S. Menon, Shashank Menon, Vishnu C
Sharma, K. R. Sasiprabhu, Nishe Rajen Shonker, Mrs. Anu K. Joy, Alim
Anvar, Reegan S. Bel, Ms. Usha Nandini V., Biju P. Raman, M.S. Vishnu
Sankar, Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, Ms. Deepti R. Mehrotra, Ankit Agarwal,
Venkita Subramoniam T.R, Rahat Bansal, Varun Mudgal, Rajesh Kumar,
Ms. S. Geetha, Ms. Smitha Rani, Abid Ali Beeran P., Sarath S. Janaradnan,
D
R. Sathish, Mohan Das K.K., B. Rajesh, Anupam Lal Das, Balaji
Srinivasan, Sumit Attri, Ranjan Kumar, M. P. Devanath, K. Rajeev,
Gautam Narayan, M. P. Vinod, Ms. Liz Mathew, Ramesh Babu M. R.,
Advs. for the appearing parties.
Dr. M. Velayudhan Nair, Party-in-Person.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.
1. Leave granted in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.11295 of
2011 and Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.12361 of 2011.
F
2. Sree Chithira Thirunal Balarama Varma who as Ruler of
Covenanting State of Travancore had entered into a Covenant in May
1949 with the Government of India leading to the formation of the United
State of Travancore and Cochin, died on 19.07.1991. His younger brother
Uthradam Thirunal Marthanda Varma and the Executive Officer of Sri
Padmanabhaswamy Temple, Thiruvananthapuram (hereinafter referred G
to as ‘the Temple’) as appellants 1 and 2 respectively have filed these
appeals challenging the judgment and order dated 31.01.2011 passed by
the High Court1 in Writ Petition (Civil) No.36487 of 2009 and in Writ
Petition (Civil) No.4256 of 2010.
1 The High Court of Kerala at Ernakulum H
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A A) Writ Petition (C) No.36487 of 2009 was filed by one T.P.
Sundara Rajan, a practising Advocate praying that the High Court be
pleased to issue a Writ of Quo Warranto directing the appellant No.2
herein to show the authority under which he was holding the post of
Executive Officer of the Temple and that the State be directed to take
immediate steps to administer the Temple on the lines of Guruvayoor
B
Devaswom. The Writ Petition was filed by the licensee of premises
belonging to the Temple, against whom the management had taken steps
for eviction.
B) Thereafter Writ Petition (Civil) No.4256 of 2010 was filed by
the present appellants. After referring to relevant Articles of the Covenant
C entered into between the Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore
and the Central Government which Covenant is dealt with in extenso
hereinafter, it was submitted:-
“Acknowledging the terms contained in the Covenant the
Government of the United State of Travancore and Cochin enacted
D Act 15 of 1950, the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions
Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act’) which was later
acknowledged by the State of Kerala, as evidenced by later
amendments making specific provisions in relation to Sree
Padmanabhaswamy Temple and its properties and its
E administration. Chapter II of Part I of the Act deals with the
Travancore Devaswom Board, Section 2(c) defines the
incorporated and unincorporated Devaswom, which says that
‘incorporated Devaswoms’ means the Devaswoms mentioned in
the schedule 1 and ‘unincorporated Devaswoms’ means those
Devaswoms including Hindu Religious Endowments whether in
F or outside Travancore which were under the management of the
Maharaja of Travancore and are separately dealt with.
… … …
7. The right of the Maharaja that existed prior to the execution of
G the Covenant Ext. P1, which is nothing but the sovereign right, to
control and supervise the administration of the Temple, the
Pandaravaka properties etc. are insulated from they being made
the subject matter of attacks before Courts, including The Supreme
Court by Article 363 of the Constitution-Construing the Article
the Supreme Court has held that no dispute touching the subject
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 991
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

matter of a covenant etc., shall be entertained by courts including A
the Supreme Court. The only remedy is the one prescribed by
Article 143.
… … …
10. The above-mentioned rights, privileges, status etc. of the 1st
petitioner vis-à-vis of the Padmanabhaswamy temple the 2nd B
petitioner, guaranteed by the Central Government, as discernible
from Ext. P1 and preserved and protected by Article 363 of the
Constitution, notwithstanding, a few members of the public with
the backing of certain political parties, have filed a representative
Suit O.S. 625/2007 for a permanent prohibitory injunction C
restraining the second petitioner from opening the six Kallaras
(cellars) inside the Nalambalam.”
The Writ Petition prayed that Original Suit Nos.625 of 2007, 1618
of 2009 and 1831 of 2009 be transferred by the High Court to itself and
the same be disposed of on the basis of the preliminary issue regarding D
maintainability.
i) Original Suit No.625 of 2007 was filed in the Court of Subordinate
Judge, Thiruvananthapuram alleging that the plaintiffs (respondents 3
and 4 in appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No.12361 of 2011) were
aggrieved by the state of affairs prevailing in the Temple and prayed, E
inter alia, for following reliefs:-
“A. A decree of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the
defendants, his agents, henchmen or any other person claiming to
have any right in the affairs or the Temple from opening the six
Kallara (cellars) inside the nalambalam which is plaint B schedule F
herein or take any articles from the Cellar in any form, in any
manner or for any purpose or act in any manner detrimental to
the interest of the deity or the devotees.
B. To pass a decree of mandatory injunction removing all articles
brought inside the temple that is plaint A schedule by the 2nd
G
defendant against the customs, practice and traditions at his own
expenses or in the alternative permit the plaintiffs to remove the
same at their own expenses and to recover the same from the
defendants and their assets.
… … …
H
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A PLAINT SCHEDULE PROPERTIES
PLAINT “A” SCHEDULE
Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple situated inside the Fort Area
with eight entrances spread over a sprawling 7.04 acres of land
together with numerous buildings, temples and all other things
B attached thereto of Vanchiyoor Village, Trivandrum Taluk,
Trivandrum District.
PLAINT “B” SCHEDULE
a. Kallara No.1 on the southern side of the Nalambalam inside
C the chandanamandapam.
b. Kallara No.2 on the South west corner outside the
chandanamandapam inside the nalambalam.
c. Kallara No.3 on the north western side inside the
Nalambalam.
D
d. Kallara No.4 on the northern side inside the Nalambalam
e. Kallara No.5 inside the Sreekovil on the northern side next
to the idol for Vishwaksenar.
f. Kallara No.6 inside the Sreekovil on the south eastern corner
E towards the exit gate to Thekkedom Narasimhamoorthy
Temple.”
ii) Original Suit No.1618 of 2009 was filed by one of the employees
of the Temple and prayed:-
“(A) To declare that Defendants 3 & 4 have no authority to act
F as office bearers of Sree Padmanabha Swami Temple as it is
legally held that they have no authority to occupy their positions,
… … and for the same, necessary directions may be given to
Defendants 1 & 2 about their illegal occupation.
(B) To pass a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction
G restraining the 3rd and 4th Defendants from forcibly obstructing
the plaintiff from discharging her duties as an employee which
she is carrying out for the past 20 years or from doing any act
which is detrimental to the interest of the Plaintiff in doing her
lawful work and for which the Defendants 3 & 4 have no legal
authority.
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 993
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

(C) To pass a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining A
the 3rd and 4th defendants from doing any act which affects her
job as a Computer Operator in Ticket Counter attached to Sree
Padmanabha Swami Temple.”
iii) Original Suit No.1831 of 2009 was filed in the Court of Munsiff,
Thiruvananthapuram by General Secretary of “Sree Padmanabhaswamy B
Temple Staff Organisation” (respondent No.6 in appeal arising out of
SLP (Civil) No.12361 of 2011) claiming following reliefs:-
“A. To pass a decree declaring the orders, no.5/SPST/09 dated
10.06.2009 and 14.07.2009 issued by the 2nd defendant creating
the post of “Administrative Officer” and thereby posted the 3 rd C
defendant in the said post, as void and non est, since it was done
by the 2nd defendant without any authority, by manifestly flouting
the Rules prevailing in the Temple and without legal sanctity.
B. To pass a decree of mandatory injunction directing the 2nd
defendant to remove the 3rd defendant from the post to which he D
has been assumed charges, failing which the 3rd defendant may
be removed by the intervention of this Hon’ble Court.”
3. In the Suits, the authority of the appellants herein to be associated
with the affairs of the Temple was under challenge, while the very
maintainability of the Suits was questioned by the appellants. The basic E
issue that arose for consideration was framed by the High Court in the
judgment under appeal as:-
“The Central issue arising in these two connected W.P. Is is
whether the younger brother of the last Ruler of Travancore could
after the death of the last Ruler on 20.07.1991 claim to be the F
“Ruler of Travancore” within the meaning of that term contained
in Section 18(2) of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious
Institutions Act, 1950 (hereinafter called “the TC Act”) to claim
ownership, control and management of the ancient and great
Temple in Kerala namely, the Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple
located in Trivandrum.” G
The High Court concluded that after the definition of ‘Ruler’
appearing in Article 366 (22) of the Constitution of India was amended
by the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971, the appellant
No.1 could not claim to be in control or management of the Temple as
H
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A successor to the last Ruler. The High Court thereafter issued the following
directions:-
“i) There shall be a direction to the State Government to
immediately take steps to constitute a body corporate or trust or
other legal authority to take over control of the Sree
B Padmanabhaswamy Temple, it’s assets and management and to
run the same in accordance with all the traditions hitherto followed.
This shall be done within a period of three months from now.
ii) There will be an order of injunction against petitioners in W.P.(C)
No.4256/2010 who are respondents 3 and 5 in the other W.P.(C)
C against opening of any of the Kallaras or removing any of the
articles from the Temple. However, they are free to use such of
the articles required for rituals, ceremonies and regular poojas in
the Temple until Temple is taken over by the Authority as stated
above.
D iii) There will be direction to the authority constituted by the
Government to open all Kallaras, make inventory of the entire
articles and create a Museum and exhibit all the treasures of the
Temple for the public, devotees and the tourists to view the same
which could be arranged on payment basis in the Temple premises
itself. The first petitioner in W.P.(C) No.4256/2010 and the
E successors from the Royal Family should be permitted to
participate in the rituals in the Temple like the Arattu Procession,
which is symbolic of the presence of the “Padmanabhadasa” in
the Festival.
iv) Considering the valuables and treasures in the Temple, the
F Government should consider handing over security of the Temple
to a team of Police or atleast provide assistance to the Temple
security staff.
The Government should ensure that the opening of Kallaras
(storage places) and the preparation of inventory are done by a
G team of responsible and honest officers either from the
Government or from the authority constituted to manage the
Temple in terms of the directions above so that there should not
be any allegation of pilferage or manipulation. Inventory should
be prepared in the presence of the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.4256/
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 995
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

2010 or their agents towards proof of the items taken over from A
their custody.”
The appellants, being aggrieved, are in appeal.
4. The history of the Temple was set out by the High Court during
the course of its judgment, and some of the relevant extracts of the
discussion were:- B

“4. Before proceeding to consider the legal issues raised and the
jurisdiction of the lower courts and that of this Court which are
also issues raised before us based on Article 363 of the Constitution,
we have to briefly state the history of the Sree Padmanabha Swamy
Temple. Even though the origin of the Temple is shrouded in C
antiquity and different versions are stated by different Authors,
the modern history of this Great Temple starts with Anizham
Thirunal Marthandavarma who established the modern Travancore
State which was previously known as Venad. For over 200 years
prior to the re-establishment of the Princely State and taking over D
of management of the Temple and the State by Marthandavarma,
the Temple was under the control of “Ettarayogam” (group of
eight and a half) consisting of seven pottis (Brahmins), one Nair
chieftain and the King who had only half a vote, whereas all others
had one vote each. While the committee of Potties controlled the
Temple, the properties of the Temple were managed by Ettuveettil E
Pillamars, the 8 Nair chieftains belonging to eight big families
spread over in different villages of the State. The King was a low
key functionary in the Committee managing the Temple and he
had only a very limited authority with half a vote……
….The Ettuveettil Pillamars with the help of Brahmins in F
management of the Temple plotted against Marthandavarma
becoming the King and they tried to instal the previous King’s son
as the new King in deviation of the practice of the nephew of the
King namely, Marthandavarma becoming the King. However, in
the protracted battle that followed between the heir to the throne G
namely, Marthandavarma and his loyalists on the one side and the
Ettuveettil Pillamars, the Brahmins, and the King’s son’s loyalists
on the other side, Marthandavarma succeeded……
…Marthandavarma took over full control of the State and the
Padmanabha Swamy Temple and it is he who reconstructed the
H
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A Temple which was in bad shape after a major fire that took place
years back and installed a new idol. In fact, the King surrendered
his Kingdom to the presiding Deity namely, Padmanabha Swamy
and declared himself the Dasa or servant of the Lord and assumed
the name “Padmanabhadasa”. Marthandavarma ruled Travancore
from 1729 to 1758 and after him also the Temple continued to be
B
under the direct management and control of the King.”
(Emphasis added)
5. The act of surrender or dedication of the entire kingdom to
Sree Padmanabhaswamy as referred to by the High Court has been
C described in a book2 titled “Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple” authored
by Princess Aswathi Thirunal Gouri Lakshmi Bayi as under:-
“Thrippati Danam – 5th of Makaram 925-ME/1750 AD
Fifth Makaram 925 ME/19th or 20th January 1750 AD (Wednesday
asterism Revait) stood witness to the act of a sublime dedication,
D the ultimate offering possible for a crowned head, carried out in
supreme devotion – the Thrippati Danam.3
Like Arjuna before the Kurukshetra War and Emperor Ashoka
after the Kalinga War, the futility of battles as a means to an end
and the conscious feeling that the Travancore he created was
E built on a foundation of sacrifice of the liver and limbs of countless
numbers who fell due to him and for him, deeply disturbed and
distressed the Maharaja4. Along with the love which offered
Marthanda Varma no satiation however much he might submit to
his Lord, this trauma also activated him to surrender to God the
F Thiruvithamcoor (Travancore) stretching from Kanyakumari to
Paravoor which he had won and made.
Before this dedication certain religious ceremonies like Poorna
Kalasa Homam, invoking the Deity, and so on were performed,
followed later by Mahabhishekam.5 Maharaja Anizhom Thirunal
Marthanda Varma arrived at the appointed time in the morning
G
2 Published by Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan
3 1. Mathilakam Records.
2. Dr. A. G. Menon – ‘History of Sri Padmanabhasvami Temple Till 1758’
3. Many historical works (too many to be listed.
4 Sree Uthradom Thirunal Marthanda Varma Maharaja of Travancore

H 5 Dr. A.G. Menon – ‘History of Sri Padmanabhasvami Temple Till 1758’
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 997
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

accompanied by all male and female members of his family, his A
trusted Dewan Ramayyan and other officials. In the presence of
the Swamiyar, members of the yogam and Brahmins, the Maharaja
is submitted to Sree Padmanabha Prajapati by Deed of Gift
carrying his signature, his entire State of Travancore along with
his total right on it thereof by placing the Crown, the royal umbrella,
B
the twin white chauries (fans), the Manikandha; which were all
symbols of royalty along with some Thulasi leaves on the
Mandapam. Last but most significant, his famous sword, which
had lashed its unleashed valour in countless battle fields, the
unquestioned insignia of sovereign authority which the King valued
the most, was also placed with utmost reverence by the Maharaja C
on the step of the Ottakkal Mandapam leading to the sanctum.
Then the King received the sword back from the high priest and
returned to the Palace after worship. His directive that any further
conquest of territory brought under the rule of Travancore by his
successors should also be surrendered to Sree Padmanabha
D
Swamy was accepted and scrupulously adhered to with deep
respect by the later generations.”
The English Translation of the Original Deed of Dedication which
was drawn up in Malayalam is as under:-
“We, Thrippappoor Keezhperur Veera Bala Marthanda Varma, E
Mootha Thiruvati (Senior member) of Thrippappoor and Sree
Pandarakaryam Cheyvarkal, have this day, Wednesday the 5th
day of the month of Thai, the seventh day of the bright lunar
fortnight with Saturn residing in the eighth sign and Jupiter in the
twelfth, Kollam 925, transfer by absolute gift and dedication, to
endure as long as the Sun and Moon shall last, all the lands and F
functions appertaining thereto together with all rights and dignities,
positions of honour and all other possessions that we have been
hitherto enjoying as of right within the territories between the
Thovala Fort in the East and the Kavana River in the West, in
favour of Perumal Sree Padmanabha Perumal. In token whereof G
we have this day executed this deed of absolute gift and
dedication.”
Before dealing with “Thrippati Danam” or Dedication as stated
above, the Author had stated:-
H
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A “The Royal Family had always been famous for the abundance
and lavish nature of the gifts and offerings the members poured
at the feet of Sree Padmanabha Swamy down the ages, from the
hoary past to the pulsating present. These varied from small or
routine offerings to ones of considerable value but there seems to
be no offering in the known religious history of the world which
B
merits any comparison in the sheer magnitude of emotional and
devotional worth, to the Thrippati Danam6 submitted by Sree
Anizhom Thirunal Maharaja Marthanda Varma on the fifth day
of the month of Makaram 925 ME/19th or 20th of January 1750
AD. Tradition had it all along, even before this Act, that the male
C members of the Royal Family, at the age of one, were laid on the
Ottakkal Mandapam and surrendered to Sree Padmanabha
Swamy as his own, gaining for them the supreme title of ‘Sree
Padmanabha Dasa.’7 Those were individual submissions whereas
this collective offering of the entire State by Marthanda Varma
stands all by itself. Thenceforth he ruled the land as the Dasa
D
(slave) of Sree Padmanabha Swamy in letter and spirit.”
6. After having observed that the Temple continued to be under
the direct management and control of the Kings of Travancore, the High
Court made following observations about the other Devaswoms and the
Temple:-
E
“While the Great Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple was directly
under the control of the Travancore King, all the major temples in
Travancore were under private ownerships. Every temple had
large extent of properties, but all such properties were in the hands
of tenants who were not properly paying rent or revenue. During
F
6
1. Thrippati Danam mean the Danam made on the holy step. This offering was done
by the King along with other emblems of the royalty, when he, after certain rituals
placed his royal and historic sword, the symbol of sovereign authority, on the step of
the Ottakkal Mandapam connecting the sanctum and made over the entire State of
Travancore to Perumal Sree Padmanabha Perumal as ‘Sarva Samarpana Danam’ –
G total gift submission (Anything placed on this Mandapam becomes Temple property).
2. Mathilakam Records – Churuna 21, Ola 89.
3. V. Nagam Aiya – The State Manual of Travancore
4. P. Shangoonny Menon – A History of Travancore
7 Two common misconceptions exist,

1. That the Sree Padmanabha Dasas came into being with Thrippati Danam and
2. That the title of Sree Padmanabha Dasa rests only with the seniormost male
H member of the family. As is clear form above both are incorrect.
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 999
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

the reign of Travancore by the two Ranis successively namely, A
Gouri Lakshmi Bhai (1810-15) and Gouri Parvathy Bhai (1815-
29), Colonel Monroe was the British resident in Travancore. He
virtually usurped the powers of the Diwan and the weak Ranis
were not able to resist him. Colonel Monroe found that the only
way to augment the revenue of Travancore State is to bring the
B
entire temples under the State’s control and in turn, restore the
properties that belong to the temples to the control of the State. It
is under his advice Gouri Lakshmi Bhai issued the Proclamation
on 17.9.1811 whereby all the major Hindu temples in Travancore
were brought under the King. Thereafter the temple properties
were also restored to the State and the temples and the lands C
were brought under the Land Revenue Department. This resulted
in improved collection of revenue from the lands and there was
considerable augmentation and stability of the State finances. In
fact, vast extent of properties of the Sree Padmanabhaswamy
Temple were also restored to it and the financial position of this
D
temple also improved. The temple had such surplus that in the
19th century for the needs of the State, Travancore Kings used to
steadily borrow funds from the Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple
on repayment basis and the loans were repaid with interest. Ever
since the major temples and their lands were brought under the
control of the Queen through the Proclamation above referred E
issued in September 1811, the arrangement continued until the
taking over of the Government temples by the Travancore
Devaswom Board under the TC Act of 1950. The only change
that happened in between was during the rule of Sree Moolam
Thirunal Ramavarma who handed over the temples and the
F
properties from Revenue Department of the State to the
Dewaswom Department of the Government, from which it was
taken over by the Travancore Devaswom Board on it’s constitution.
From the history of the temples in Travancore which we have
taken from the book written by Dr. R. Madhu Devan Nair and
published by the Travancore Devaswom Board, what is clear is G
that for over one and a half centuries the temples were under the
Government Departments and thereafter under the Devaswom
Board constituted under the TC Act.
So far as the Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple is concerned, the
only difference is that the temple was under the direct control of H
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A the Travancore King. However, this temple was also treated as a
State/public temple and was never regarded as private property
of the Travancore King or as his family property. The system of
the Travancore King running the Temple continued during the
period of the last ruler who was the King from 1931 to 1949 when
the Agreement of Accession was signed integrating the Princely
B
States of Travancore and Cochin as one and bringing the
Travancore-Cochin as Part B State under the Constitution.
Government of India was also a signatory to the Agreement of
Accession signed between the Kings of Travancore and Cochin
constituting the Travancore Cochin State. An authentic statement
C about the history, status and position of this Temple is available in
the book “Integration of Indian States” written by Sri. V. P. Menon
who played an important role in the integration of Indian States
and who represented Union Government as a signatory to the
Travancore-Cochin Accession Agreement...”
D (Emphasis added)
7. Mr. V. P. Menon who was the Constitutional Advisor to the
Governor General till 1947 and Secretary to the Ministry of States played
a stellar role in the integration of the princely States into the Dominion of
India. In his book titled, “Story of Integration of the Indian States”, Mr.
E Menon dealt with “Travancore – Cochin” in Chapter XIV and he wrote:-
“The ruling family of Travancore traces its descent from the ancient
Chera kings of South India. In later historic times, Travancore
was split up into a number of petty principalities. The consolidation
of these into a single State was the achievement of Rajah
F Marthanda Varma, who ruled in the first half of the eighteenth
century. He brought the whole of Travancore under his sway,
established order and settled the country. In January 1750, he
formally and solemnly dedicated the State to Sri Padmanabha,
the tutelary deity of his family; and he and his successors have
ever since ruled as ‘Dasas’, or servants of that deity. The present
G ruler, Sir Rama Varma8 succeeded to the gaddi in 1924 at the
age of twelve and was invested with full ruling powers in
November 1931. During his rule the revenues of the State were
8His titles are: Major-General. Sri Padmanabha Dasa, Vanchipala, Sir Bala Rama Varma,
Kulasekhara Kiritapati, Manney Sultan, Maharaja Raja Rama raja Bahadur, Shamsher
H Jang.
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1001
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

nearly quadrupled from a little over Rs. 2.5 crore to over Rs. 9.5 A
crore.
The present Maharajah of Cochin, Sir Rama Varma, is, on the
other hand, well advanced in age. In fact, for over a century, the
Maharajahs of Cochin had all been fairly old when they succeeded
to the gaddi. The ruling family of Cochin claims to be directly B
descended from Cheraman Perumal, who once ruled Kerala.
Hyder Ali and later Tippu Sultan overran the territories of Cochin
in the latter half of the eighteen century, and this brough about an
alliance with the English East India Company when, in 1791, the
Maharajah agreed to become their tributary.
C
The ruling families in both the States follow the
Marumakkathayam law, or the law of inheritance through the
female line. The Maharajah, assuming that he has no brother, is
succeeded by his sister’s eldest son. This is generally the law
followed by the majority of the Malayalam-speaking Hindus in
both States. D

.… … …
He added that he governed the State on behalf and as a servant
of Sri Padmanabha and that he attached great importance to this
position being maintained; that if no satisfactory solution on these E
points was possible, and if the Government of India still insisted
on the integration of the two States he would rather abdicate than
act against his convictions.
… … …
Lastly, he felt that on account of the dedication of the State to Sri F
Padmanabha and the special loyalty and devotion which the rulers
of Travancore owed to that deity, it would not be possible for him
to take the usual oath of office as Rajpramukh.
… … …
I reached Trivandrum on 21 May and had several meetings with G
the Maharajah. I told him that, with goodwill on both sides, there
was no reason why we should not come to an agreement. The
first hurdle was the Maharajah’s inability to take the oath of office
as head of the State. The devotion of the present Maharajah to
H
1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A Sri Padmanabha borders on fanaticism; he rules the State not as
its head but as a servant of the tutelary deity.
… … ….
A problem peculiar to Travancore-Cochin related to the properties
attached to temples, called Devaswoms. It is necessary to give
B some explanation of the history of the Devaswoms in each of
these States.
Travancore had been ruled by an unbroken line of Hindu kings
from the earliest times and had retained throughout the centuries
its essential character of a Hindu State. The most important temple
C in this State has always been, and still is, the Sri Padmanabha
temple, richly endowed and possessing very extensive landed
properties. These were originally managed by a Yogam (or Synod)
of eight hereditary trustees and the ruler, but at the beginning of
the eighteenth century the Yogam was ousted and the
D administration of the temple together with its properties was taken
over entirely by the ruler. Thereafter the temple properties became
intermixed with the properties of the State. The State continued
however to contribute to the maintenance of the temple and the
religious ceremonies. This state of affairs continued until the time
of the integration of the two States.
E
Apart from this temple, there were a large number of Devaswoms
in the State founded and endowed by the people and managed by
ooralars, or trustees. From ancient times, the Maharajah had
Melkoima rights (the right of superior authority or overlordship)
over the trustees. Before 1811, the State had no direct concern in
F the management of these temples; in that year Colonel Munro,
the then British Resident for Travancore and Cochin, assumed
the Dewanship and, in exercise of the Melkoima right of the
Maharajah, took over the management of the Devaswoms in
Travancore. Three hundred and forty-eight major and 1,123 minor
G Devaswoms with all their properties, were thus taken over for
management. Even then their income was considerable. In course
of time, the management of yet more was assumed.
A good deal of agitation was excited on the ground that the
Government of the State were spending less on the maintenance
of the temples and on the religious ceremonies than the amount of
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1003
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

revenue which accrued from the Devaswom properties and that A
they were appropriating the balance of the income to themselves.
In the end, the legal position was put beyond doubt by the issue of
a proclamation by the Maharajah whereby the Government of
the State accepted the obligation of maintaining the temples in an
efficient condition, and all lawsuits against them were barred. In
B
1946, the Maharajah issued another proclamation which fixed the
amount payable every year to the temples at a figure of not less
than Rs.25 lakhs and reserved the right of making further
contributions if necessary from the State revenue. Finally, in 1948,
immediately before the grant of responsible government, a
proclamation was issued by which a yearly sum of Rs.50 lakhs C
was fixed for the maintenance of all the temples in the State,
other than the Sri Padmanabha temple which was to receive Rs.1
lakh annually.
Hindu opinion in the State was unanimous in holding not only that
the continued payment of the existing allotments should be D
guaranteed, but also that adequate compensation should be given
in respect of the properties taken over by the Government and
the profits derived from them. The annual contribution thus claimed
ranged from Rs.1 Crore to Rs.2 Crore. Obviously, this plea could
not be accepted; at the same time it was impossible to decline the
obligation of maintaining these temples, the State having taken E
over all their properties.
I discussed the question with the ministries, as well as with the
Maharajah of Travancore. Eventually we came to an agreement
by which the annual payment of Rs.51 lakhs made to the temples
by the Travancore Government would be continued and out of F
this amount a sum of Rs.6 lakhs would be contributed annually
for the maintenance of the Sri Padmanabha temple.
The most difficult issue related to the administration of this grant.
After prolonged discussion it was agreed that the administration
of the Sri Padmanabha temple should be conducted under the G
control and supervision of the Maharajah through an executive
officer to be appointed by him. It was decided that there should
be a committee of three Hindu members nominated by the
Maharajah to advise him; and that one of the three should be
nominated on the advice of the Hindu members of the Council of H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A ministers. With regard to the other temples in Travancore, a body
to be called the Travancore Devaswom Board would be set up.
This Board would consist of three Hindu members, one of whom
would be nominated by the Maharajah, one elected by the Hindus
among the Council of Ministers and one by the Hindu members
of the Legislative Assembly of the Union.
B
In Cochin, unlike Travancore, the properties of the temples were
administered separately as a ‘reserved subject’ by the, Maharajah;
but after the grant of responsible government, he appointed the
Premier of the State to act in his personal capacity as the chief
executive authority for Devaswoms. The Poornathrayeesa temple
C at Trippunithura is the temple of the ruling family and the Maharajah
asked for the control of the rituals and ceremonies in this temple,
as well as for those in the Pazhayannur temple. I agreed to this
request. It was decided to set up a Devaswom Board in Cochin
on the same lines as in Travancore. As the Devaswom properties
D had remained separate, there was no necessity to make any special
grant from State revenues. The landed properties of the temples,
I should add, are subject to the land revenue and tenancy laws of
the State just like any other landed properties.
These decisions were subsequently incorporated in the covenant.
E Later on, when the Constitution of India was being finalized, a
provision was included to safeguard the payment to the temples
in Travancore by making it charged and non-votable by the
Legislature of the Union.
It must be emphasized here that this provision in the covenant
F relating to Devaswoms brought about a far-reaching social reform
in both States. These two States had been the seat of an orthodoxy
not found in any other part of India except Malabar. The Temple-
entry reform in Travancore recognized to a certain extent the
place of harijans in the Hindu society; but under the covenant, the
Harijans would gain a measure of control of the temples through
G their representatives in the Legislature and in the ministry and
would also be able to hold posts in the Devaswom Department
which had hitherto been denied to them.
The press had been kept fully informed of the progress of the
discussions and during one of my press conferences, there were
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1005
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

some criticism regarding the provision for maintenance of the A
temples in Travancore. I pointed out to the critics that the properties
of the temples taken over by the Travancore State Government
had increased many times in value and yielded an income greater
than the amount of contribution provided in the covenant. If the
contribution was considered undesirable or excessive, the State
B
would have no option but to return the properties to the temple.
The State could not have it both ways, by refusing to return the
properties while at the same time refusing to maintain the
Devaswoms.”
Mr. V.P. Menon thus adverted to the issues: that after dedication
in January 1750, Raja Marthanda Varma and his successors ruled as C
“Dasas” or servants of the deity Sri Padmanabhaswamy; that the ruling
families of Travancore and Cochin followed the Marumakkathayam
lawor the law of inheritance through the female line; that an agreement
was arrived at, by which annual payment of Rs.51 lakhs made to the
temples by the Travancore Government would be continued, and out of D
said amount a sum of Rs.6 lakhs would be contributed annually for the
maintenance of the Temple; that the administration of the Temple should
be conducted under the control and supervision of the Maharaja of
Travancore through an Executive Officer appointed by him; and that as
against such contribution the value of the properties of the temples taken
over by the State Government was far greater. He also referred to the E
stand of the Ruler of Cochin with respect to the rituals and ceremonies
in the Poornathrayeesa Temple at Trippunithura.
8. On 10.08.1947 a Proclamation was issued by the Maharaja of
Travancore which stated:-
F
“WHEREAS our Ancestors and Ourselves have, as devotees of
Sri Padmanabha, been ruling over the State of Travancore during
many centuries and our sole concern has been the welfare and
happiness of our subjects whom we have been associating with
us and propose further to associate with us in the administration
of the State; G
And Whereas it has become necessary, in the events that have
happened to regulated the succession to the Throne of Travancore,
to determine other questions incidental thereto, to regulate and fix
the civil list of ourselves and the members of Our Royal Family
and to make provision for certain other purposes, H
1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A And Whereas in respect of succession, adoption, marriage, and
other matters, our royal family has from time immemorial ecognized
and observed the Marumakkathayam law as modified by custom
and usage in Our Royal Family,
We are pleased to Command and Enact as follows-
B 1. The succession to the Throne of Travancore shall be in
accordance with the Marumakkathayam law as modified
by the custom and usage prevailing and ecognized in Our Royal
Family from time immemorial.
2. In case the Sovereign, on the date of His succession, under
C the age of eighteen years, then , until he attains the age of
eighteen years, and where the Sovereign is incapacitated by
serious illness, the powers and authorities belonging to the
Sovereign of Travancore shall be exercised in the name and
on behalf of the Sovereign by a Council of Regency consisting
D of three of the senior most members of Our Royal Family,
who are above eighteen years of age, or of such lesser number
of members as may be available.
3. Provided always that the Council shall not be entitled to change
the rule or order of succession or otherwise to hinder or delay
E the assumption of ruling powers by the rightful heir to the
Throne.”
9. It may be mentioned at this stage that Section 6 of the
Government of India Act, 1935 dealt with “Accession of Indian States”
while certain expressions including “Ruler” were defined in Section 311(1)
F thereof. The expression “Ruler” was defined as under:
“311. (1) In this Act, and unless the context otherwise requires, in
any other Act the following expressions have the meaning hereby
respectively assigned to them, that is to say :–
… … …
G “Ruler” in relation to a State means the Prince, Chief or other
person recognized by His Majesty as the Ruler of the State.”
After Independence, the India (Provisional Constitution) Order,
1947, omitted said Section 311(1). Section 6 which was retained, was to
the following effect:-
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1007
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

“6 – (1) An Indian State shall be deemed to have acceded to the A
Dominion if the governor-General has signified his acceptance of
an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler thereof whereby
the Ruler on behalf of the State:-
(a) Declares that he accedes to the Dominion with the intent
that the Governor- General, the Dominion Legislature, the B
Federal Court and any other Dominion authority established
for the purposes of the Dominion shall, by virtue of his
Instrument of Accession, but subject always to the terms thereof,
and for the purposes only of the Dominion, exercise in relation
to the State such functions as may be vested in them by order
under this Act; and C

(b) assumes the obligation of ensuring that due effect is given
within the State to the provisions of this Act so far as they are
applicable therein by virtue of the Instrument of Accession.
(2) An Instrument of Accession shall specify the matters which D
the Ruler accepts as matters with respect to which the Dominion
Legislature may make laws for the State, and the limitations, if
any, to which the power of the Dominion Legislature to make
laws for the State, and the exercise of the executive authority of
the Dominion in the State, are respectively to be subject.
E
(3) A Ruler may, by a supplementary Instrument executed by him
and accepted by the Governor-General, vary the Instrument of
Accession of his State by extending the functions which by virtue
of that Instrument are exercisable by any Dominion authority in
relation to his State.
F
(4) References in this Act to the Ruler of a State include references
to any persons for the time being exercising the powers of the
Ruler of the State, whether by reason of the Ruler’s minority or
for any other reason.
(5) In this Act a State which has acceded to the Dominion is
G
referred to as an Acceding State and the Instrument by virtue of
which a State has so acceded, construed together with any
supplementary Instrument executed under this section, is referred
to as the Instrument of Accession of that State.

H
1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A (6) As soon as may be after any Instrument of Accession or
supplementary Instrument has been accepted by the Governor-
Genera] under this section, copies of the Instrument and of the
Governor-General’s acceptance thereof shall be laid before the
Dominion Legislature and all courts shall take judicial notice of
every such Instrument and acceptance.”
B
10. The Travancore Interim Constitution Act, 1123 came into force
on 24.03.1948. Sections 1, 2 and 4 of said Act were:-
“1. (1) This Act may be called the Travancore Interim Constitution
Act, 1123.
C (2) It shall come into force at once.
(3) It shall remain in force until the new Constitution Act framed
by the Representative Body comes into force.
2. In this Act ‘Our Government’ means the Maharaja of
D Travancore exercising the executive authority of the Travancore
State in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
… … …
4. The following subjects, namely,
(a) Our Palace and Our Royal Family and all matters connected
E therewith, including Sri Pandaravaka,
(b) Devaswoms, Hindu Religious Endowments and matters
connected therewith, shall be under our exclusive control and
supervision and shall not, in any respect, be within the scope or
purview of the Council of Ministers or the Legislative
F Assembly.”
11. The aspects referred to by Mr. V.P. Menon find clearly
reflected in the Covenant entered into by the Maharajas of Travancore
and Cochin with the Government of India. Mr. V.P. Menon had signed
the Covenant on behalf of the Government of India. The Covenant signed
G by the Maharajas of Travancore and Cochin on 27.05.1949 and
29.05.1949 respectively (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Covenant’) as
Rulers of the respective Covenanting States had twenty-two Articles
and the relevant portions of the Covenant were:-

H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1009
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

“THE COVENANT A
ENTERED INTO BY THE RULERS OF TRAVANCORE AND
COCHIN FOR THE FORMATION OF THE UNITED STATE OF
TRAVANCORE AND COCHIN
WE, the Rulers of Travancore and Cochin, do hereby, with the
concurrence and guarantee of the Government of India, enter B
into the following Covenant.
Article I
As from the first day of July, 1949, the States of Travancore and
Cochin shall be united in, and shall form, one State, with a common C
executive, legislature and judiciary, by the name of the United
State of Travancore and Cochin.
Article II
In the succeeding Articles of this Covenant, the first day of July,
1949, is referred to as the appointed day, the States of Travancore D
and Cochin are referred to as the Covenanting States, and the
United State of Travancore and Cochin is referred to as the United
State.
Article III
As from the appointed day, E

(a) all right, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler of
either of the Covenanting States which appertain or are
incidental to the Government of the State shall vest in the
United State;
F
(b) all duties and obligations of the Ruler of either of the
Covenanting States pertaining or incidental to the Government
of that State shall devolve on the United State, and shall be
discharged by it; and
(c) all the assets and liabilities of either Covenanting State shall G
be the assets and liabilities of the United State.
Article IV
(1) There shall be a Raj Pramukh for the United State.
(2) The present Ruler of Travancore shall be the first Raj
Pramukh and shall be entitled to hold office during his life- H
time.
1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A (3) In the event of a permanent vacancy arising in the office of
the Raj Pramukh by death, resignation or any other reason,
such vacancy shall be filled in such manner as the Governer
General of India may prescribe.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Article, if the Raj
B Pramukh is by reason of absence or illness or for any other
reason unable to perform the duties of his office, those duties
shall until he has resumed them be performed in such manner
as the Governor General of India may prescribe.
… … …
C Article VI
Subject to the provisions of this Covenant, the executive authority
of the United State shall be exercised by the Raj Pramukh either
directly or through officers subordinate to him; but nothing in this
Article shall prevent any competent legislature of the United State
D from conferring functions upon subordinate authorities or be
deemed to transfer to the Raj Pramukh any functions conferred
by any existing law on any court, judge or officer or any local or
other authority in either of the Covenanting states.
Article VII
E
(1) There shall be a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the
Raj Pramukh in the exercise of his functions save as provided
in Articles XII and XIII.
(2) The Ministers shall be chosen by, and shall hold office during
the pleasure of, the Raj Pramukh.
F
Article VIII
(a) The obligation of the covenanting State of Travancore to
contribute from its general revenues a sum of Rs.50 lakhs every
year to the Devaswom fund as provided for in the Devaswom
G (Amendment) Proclamation, 1123 M.E., and a sum of Rs.1 lakh
every year to Sri Pandaravaga referred to in proviso (a) to sub-
section (1) of Section 23 of the Travancore Interim Constitution
Act 1123 M.E., shall, from the appointed day, be an obligation of
the United State and the said amounts shall be payable therefrom
and the Raj Pramukh shall cause the said amounts to be paid
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SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1011
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

every year to the Travancore Devaswom Board and the Executive A
Officer (referred to in sub-clause (b) of this article) respectively.
(b) The administration of Sri Padmanabhaswamy Temple, the Sri
Pandaravaga properties and all other properties and funds of the
said temple now vested in trust in the Ruler of the covenanting
State of Travancore and the sum of Rs.1 lakh transferred from B
year to year under the provisions of clause (a) of this article and
the sum of five lakhs of Rupees contributed from year to year
towards the expenditure in the Sree Padamanabhaswamy Temple
under sub-clause (c) of this Article, shall, with effect from the
first day of August 1949, be conducted, subject to the control and
supervision of the Ruler of Travancore, by an Executive Officer C
appointed by him. There shall be a Committee known by the name
of the Sree Padmanbhaswamy Temple Committee composed of
three Hindu Members, to be nominated by the Ruler of Travancore
to advise him in the discharge of his functions. Suits by or against
the Sree Padamanbhaswamy Temple or in respect of its properties D
shall be instituted in the name of the said Executive Officer.
(c) The administration of the incorporation and unincorporated
Devaswoms and of Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments
and all their properties and funds as well as the fund constituted
under the Devaswom Proclamation 1097 M.E. and the surplus E
fund constituted under the Devaswom (Amendment)
Proclamation, 1122 M.E. which are under the management of the
Ruler of the covenanting State of Travancore and the sum of
Rs.50 lakhs transferred from year to year under clause (a) shall
with effect from the first day of August 1949 vest in a Board
known by the name of the Travancore Devaswom Board. An F
annual contribution of Five lakhs of Rupees shall be made by the
Travancore Devaswom Board from the aforesaid sum of Rs.50
lakhs towards the expenditure in the Sree Padmanabhaswamy
Temple.
(d) The administration of the incorporated and unincorporated G
Devaswoms and Hindu Religious Institutions which are under the
management of the Ruler of the covenanting State of Cochin under
Section 50 G of the Government of Cochin Act, XX of 1113 M.E.,
or under the provisions of the Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions
Act, I of 1081 M.E., and all their properties and funds and of the H
1012 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A Estates under the management of the Devaswom Department of
the covenanting State of Cochin, shall with effect from the first
day of August 1949 vest in a Board known by the name of the
Cochin Devaswom Board.
Provided that the regulation and control of all rituals and ceremonies
B in the temple of Sree Poornathrayeesa at Trippunithura and in the
Pazayannore Bhagavathy temple at Pazayannore shall continue
to be exercised as hither to by the Ruler of Cochin.
(e) The Board referred to in sub-clause I of this article shall consist
of three Hindu Members, one of whom shall be nominated by the
C Ruler of the convenanting State of Travancore, one by the Hindu
among the Council of Ministers, and one elected by the Hindu
members of the Legislative Assembly of the United State.
(f) The Board referred to in sub-clause (d) of this article shall
consist of three Hindu Members, one of whom shall be nominated
D by the Ruler of the covenanting State of Cochin, one by the Hindus
among the Council of Ministers, and one elected by the Hindu
Members of the Legislative Assembly of the United State.
(g) Each of the aforesaid Boards shall be a separate body corporate
having perpetual succession and a common seal with powers to
E hold and acquire properties and shall by its name sue and be sued.
(h) Subject to the provisions of this article, the constitution, powers
and duties of the Boards aforesaid shall be such as may be
determined hereafter by law enacted by competent authority.
Article IX
F
The Raj Pramukh shall, within a fortnight of the appointed day,
execute on behalf of the United State an Instrument of Accession
in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of the Government
of India Act, 1935, and in place of the Instruments of Accession
of the Covenanting States; and he shall by such Instrument accept
G as matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may
make laws for the United State all the matters mentioned in List I
and List III of the Seventh Schedule to the said Act, except the
entries in List I relating to any tax or duty;
Provided that nothing in this Article shall be deemed to prevent
H the Raj Pramukh from accepting by a Supplementary Instrument
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1013
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

any or all of the entries in the said List I relating to any tax or duty A
as matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may
make laws for the United State; and in doing so the Raj Pramukh
may specify the limitations, if any, subject to which the power of
the Dominion Legislature to make laws for the United State in
respect of such matters and the exercise of the executive authority
B
of the Dominion in the United State are respectively to be subject.
Article X
(1) There shall be a Legislature for the United State consisting
of the Raj Pramukh and the Legislative Assembly.
(2) All persons, who, immediately before the appointed day, are C
members of the Representative Body of Travancore or the
Legislative Assembly of Cochin, shall on that day become
members of the Legislative Assembly of the United State.
(3) If immediately before the appointed day any vacancy exists
in the membership of the Representative Body of Travancore D
or the Legislative Assembly of Cochin, it shall be deemed to
be a vacancy in the membership of the Legislative Assembly
of the United State; and any such vacancy and any vacancy
that may occur after the appointed day shall be filled in the
same manner as it would have been filled if this Covenant E
had not been entered into.
(4) The Legislature of the United State shall subject to the
provisions of this Covenant have full power to make laws for
the United State, including provisions as to the Constitution
of the United State, within the framework of this Covenant F
and the Constitution of India.
Article XI
Until a Constitution framed or adopted by the Legislature comes
into operation, the Raj Pramukh shall have power to make and
promulgate Ordinances for the peace and good government of G
the United State or any part thereof, and any Ordinance so made
shall for the space of not more than six months from its
promulgation have the like force of law as an Act of the
Legislature, but any such Ordinance may be controlled or
superseded by any such Act.
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1014 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A Article XII
If at any time before a Constitution framed or adopted by the
Legislature comes into operation, the Raj Pramukh is satisfied
that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the United
State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of
B this Covenant, he may, with the prior concurrence of the
Government of India, by Proclamation-
(a) declare that his functions shall, to such extent as may be
specified in the Proclamation, be exercised by him in his
discretion;
C (b) assume to himself all or any of the powers vested in or
exercisable by any authority or body within the United
State;
and any such Proclamation may contain such incidental and
consequential provisions as may appear to him necessary or
D desirable for giving effect to the objects of the Proclamation,
including provisions for suspending, in whole or part, the operation
of any provisions of this Covenant or of any other constitutional
provisions relating to any authority or body in the United State:
Provided that nothing in this Article shall authorize the Raj
E Pramukh to assume to himself any of the powers vested in or
exercisable by a High Court, or to suspend, either in whole or in
part, the operation of any law relating to a High Court.
… … …
Article XIV
F
(1) The Ruler of each Covenanting State shall be entitled to receive
annually from the revenue of the United State for his privy purse
the amounts specified against that Covenanting State in the
Schedule:
G Provided that the sums specified in the Schedule in respect of the
Ruler of Travancore shall be payable only to the present Ruler
and not to his successors for whom provision will be made
subsequently by the Government of India.
(2) The said amount is intended to cover all the expenses of the
H Ruler including expenses on residence and ceremonies and shall
neither be increased nor reduced for any reason whatsoever.
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1015
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

(3) The United State shall pay the said amount to the Ruler in four A
equal instalments at the beginning of each quarter in advance.
(4) The said amount shall be free of all taxes whether imposed by
the Government of the United State or by the Government of
India.
Article XV B

(1) The Ruler of each Covenanting State shall be entitled to the
full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties (as
distinct from State properties) belonging to him immediately before
the appointed day.
C
(2) He shall furnish to the Government of India in the Ministry of
States before the 1st day of September 1949 an inventory of all
immovable property, securities and cash balance held by him as
such private property.
(3) If any dispute arises as to whether any item of property is the
D
private property of the Ruler or State property, it shall be referred
to such person as the Government of India may nominate in
consultation with the Ruler of Travancore or Cochin as the case
may be, and the decision of that person shall be final and binding
on all parties concerned.
Article XVI E
The Ruler of each Covenanting State, as also the member of his
family, shall be entitled to all the personal privileges, dignities and
titles enjoyed by them, whether within or outside the territories of
the State, immediately before the 15th day of August, 1947.
Article XVII F
(1) The succession, according to law and custom to the gaddi of
each Covenanting State and to the personal rights, privileges,
dignities and titles of the Ruler thereof is hereby guaranteed.
(2) Every question of disputed succession in regard to a
Covenanting State shall be decided by the Raj Pramukh after G
referring it to the High Court of the United State and in accordance
with the opinion given by the High Court.
… … …

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1016 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A Article XXI
Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding provisions
of this Covenant, the Rulers of Travancore and Cochin shall
continue to have and exercise their present powers of suspension,
remission or commutation of death sentences in respect of any
B person who may have been or is hereafter sentenced to death for
capital offence/committed within the territories of Travancore or
Cochin as the case may be.”
At the end, Schedule mentioned the amounts of Privy Purses
whereafter the signatures were appended.
C “S C H E D U L E
Covenanting States and Privy Purse amounts.
Rs.
Travancore 18 lakhs.
Cochin 2,35,000.
D In confirmation of the above Covenant we append our
signatures, on behalf of ourselves, our heirs and successors.
Sd/ -
Trivandrum, 27.5.49 MAHARAJA OF TRAVANCORE
E Sd/ -
Trippunithara, 29.5.49 MAHARAJA OF COCHIN
The Government of India hereby concur in the above
Covenant and guarantee all its provisions. In confirmation whereof
Mr. Vapal Pangunni Menon, Advisor to the Government of India
F in the Ministry of States, appends his signature on behalf and with
the authority of the Government of India.
Sd/-
ADVISER TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
G MINISTRY OF STATES.”
12. The Constitution of India made certain provisions with regard
to privy purse sums payable to the Rulers in terms of any covenant or
agreement entered into by the Ruler of the State before the
commencement of the Constitution, as also with regard to the rights and
H privileges of Rulers of Indian States. In terms of Article 238 (10), which
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1017
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

Article has since then been repealed by the Constitution (Seventh A
Amendment) Act, 1956, it was provided that a sum of Rupees 51 lakhs
(fifty one lakhs), as provided in the Covenant, shall be paid to the
Devaswom Board. Articles 291, 362, 363 and 366(22) as they stood
before the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 were:-
“Art.291:Privy Purse sums of Rulers- Where under any B
covenant or agreement entered into by the ruler of any Indian
State before the commencement of this Constitution, the payment
of any sums free of tax has been guaranteed or assured by the
Government of the Dominion of India to any ruler as such as
privy purse:
C
(a) Any sums shall be charged on and paid out of the
Consolidated Fund of India; and
(b) The sums so paid to any Ruler shall be exempt from all
taxes on income.
… … … D
Art.362: Rights and Privileges of rulers of Indian States.-
In the exercise of the power of Parliament or of the Legislature
of a State to make laws or in the exercise of the executive power
of the Union or of a State, due regard shall be had to the guarantee
or assurance given under any such covenant or agreement as is E
referred to in Article 291 with respect to the personal rights,
privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State.
… … …
Art. 363: Bar to interference by courts in disputes arising
F
out of certain treaties, agreements, etc.- (1) Notwithstanding
anything in this Constitution but subject to the provisions of Article
143, neither the Supreme Court nor any other Court shall have
jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty,
agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar
instrument which was entered into or executed before the G
commencement of this Constitution by any ruler of an Indian State
and to which the Government of the Dominion of India or any of
its predecessor Governments was a party and which has or has
been continued in operation after such commencement, or in any
dispute in respect of any right accruing under or any liability or
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1018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A obligation arising out of any of the provisions of this Constitution
relating to any such treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement,
sanad or other similar instrument.
(2) In this Article-
(a) “Indian State” means any territory recognised before
B the commencement of this Constitution by His Majesty or the
Government of the Dominion of India as being such a State;
and
(b) “Ruler” includes the Prince, Chief or other person
recognised before such commencement by His Majesty or the
C Government of the Dominion of India as the Ruler of any Indian
State.
… … …
Art.366: Definitions- In this Constitution, unless the context
D otherwise requires, the following expressions have the meanings
hereby respectively assigned to them, that is to say –
1) to 21) ... ... ...
22) Ruler in relation to an Indian State means the Prince, Chief or
other person by whom any such covenant or agreement as is
E referred to in Clause (1) of Article 291 was entered into and who
for the time being is recognized by the President of India as the
ruler of the State and includes any person as the successor of
such Ruler.
23) to 30) …..”
F 13. Soon after the coming into force of the Constitution, the
Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 (hereinafter
referred to as “the TC Act”) was enacted to make provision for the
administration, supervision and control of incorporated and unincorporated
Devaswoms and of other Hindu Religious Endowments and Funds. Part
G I of the TC Act comprising of Sections 2 to 60 extends to Travancore,
while Part II comprising of Sections 61 to 130 extends to Cochin and
Part III extends to the whole of the State except Malabar area.
13.1 Section 2 defines expressions ‘Hindu’ and ‘Hindu Religious
Endowment’ as :-
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1019
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

“(aa) “Hindu” means a person who is a Hindu by birth or by A
conversion and professes the Hindu religion:
Provided that a hindu member to be nominated or elected
to the Board under Section 4 shall be a person who believes in
God and temple worship and who shall make an oath before the
Secretary of the Board to that effect in the form prescribed by B
the Government for the purpose before he enters upon his office;
(b) “Hindu Religious Endowment” means-
(i) every Hindu temple or shrine or other religious
endowment dedicated to, or used as of right by, the Hindu
community \or any section thereof; and C

(ii) every other Hindu endowment or foundation, by
whatever local designation known, and property, endowments and
offerings connected therewith, whether applied wholly to religious
purposes or partly to charitable or other purposes, and every
express or constructive trust by which property or money is vested D
in the hands of any person or persons by virtue of hereditary
succession or otherwise for such purposes:
but shall not include any Hindu religious institution belonging
to and under the sole management of a single family:
E
Provided that, where the Management of religious institution
has passed into the hands of several branches by division among
the members of the original family, the institution may nevertheless
be considered as being in the management of a single family for
the purpose of this Part.
F
Explanation - The expression “hereditary succession” shall
include succession to a “Guru” by a disciple by nomination or
otherwise;”
13.2 Chapter II of Part I deals with “The Travancore Devaswom”.
Sections 3, 4 and 15 appearing in said Chapter II are:-
G
“3. Vesting of administration in Board.- The administration
of incorporated and unincorporated Devaswoms and of Hindu
Religious Endowments and all their properties and funds as well
as the fund constituted under the Devaswom Proclamation, 1097
M.E. and the Surplus Fund constituted under the Devaswom
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1020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A (Amendment) Proclamation, 1122 M.E. which were under the
management of the Ruler of Travancore prior to the first day of
July, 1949, except the Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple, Sree
Pandaravaka properties and all other properties and funds of the
said temple, and the management of all institutions which were
under the Devaswom Department shall vest in the Travancore
B
Devaswom Board.
4. Constitution of the Travancore Devaswom Board.- (1)
The Board referred to in Section 3 shall consist of three Hindu
members, two of whom shall be nominated by the Hindus among
the Council of Ministers and one elected by the Hindus among
C the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Kerala..
(2) The Board shall be a body corporate having perpetual
succession and a common seal with power to hold and acquire
properties for and on behalf of the incorporated and unincorporated
Devaswoms and Hindu Religious institutions and Endowments
D under the management of the Board.
(3) The Board shall by its name sue and be sued and the Secretary
to the Board shall represent the Board In such suits.
… … …
E 15. Vesting of jurisdiction in the Board.- (1) Subject to the
provisions of Chapter III of this Part, all rights, authority and
jurisdiction belonging to or exercised by the Ruler of Travancore
prior to the first day of July, 1949, in respect of Devaswoms and
Hindu Religious Endowments shall vest in and be exercised by
F the Board in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
(2) The Board shall exercise all powers of direction, control and
supervision over the incorporated and unincorporated Devaswoms
and Hindu Religious Endowments under their jurisdiction.”
13.3 Chapter III of Part I comprising of Sections 18 to 23 deals
G specifically with “Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple” and said Sections
are to the following effect:-
“18. Administration by Executive Officer. - (1) Out of the
amount of forty-six lakhs and fifty thousand rupees provided for
payment to the Devaswom Fund in Article 290-A of the
H Constitution of India, a contribution of six lakhs of rupees shall be
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1021
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

made annually towards the expenditure in the Sree A
Padmanabhaswamy Temple.
(2) The administration of the Sree Padmanabhaswamy temple,
the Sree Pandaravaga properties and all other properties and funds
of the said temple vested in trust in the Ruler of Travancore and
the sum of six lakhs of rupees mentioned in sub-section (1) shall B
be conducted, subject to the control and supervision of the Ruler
of Travancore, by an executive officer appointed by him.
19. Suits by or against Executive Officer. - Suits by or against
the Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple or in respect of its properties
shall be instituted in the name of the said Executive officer. C
20. Constitution of the Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple
Committee. - There shall be a Committee known by the name
of the Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple committee to advise the
Ruler of Travancore in the discharge of his functions. The
Committee shall be composed of three Hindu members who shall D
be nominated by the Ruler of Travancore and shall hold office for
such term as he may determine.
21. Chairman of the Committee. - (1) The Ruler of Travancore
shall nominate one of the members to be the Chairman of the
Committee. E
(2) The Committee shall meet at least one in quarter in Trivandrum.
(3) The members of the Committee shall be paid such travelling
allowance and siting for as the Ruler of Travancore may from
time to time determine.
F
22. Secretary of the Committee. - (1) The Executive Officer
of the Temple shall be the Secretary to the Committee.
(2) The Secretary shall convene the meetings of the Committee
on such dates as may fix in consultation with the Chairman. He
shall, after consulting the Chairman to the Ruler of Travancore,
prepare the age and give the members notice of the day of time G
when the meeting is to be held and of business to be transacted
thereat.
(3) A copy of the minutes of the proceedings every meeting shall
be communicated by the Chairman to the Ruler of Travancore.
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1022 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A 23. Existing arrangements regarding properties and
collection to continue. - Until other arrangements are made,
the existing arrangements regarding the management of the Sree
Pandaravarga Properties and the collection of revenues therefrom
shall continue as heretofore.”
B 13.4 Chapter IV of Part I deals with Incorporated and
Unincorporated Devaswoms and Section 33 appearing in said Chapter
reads:-
“33. Budget and Administration Report.-(1) The Board shall in
each year prepare a budget for the next financial year showing
C the probable receipts and disbursements of the incorporated and
unincorporated Devaswoms and Hindu Religious institutions under
the management of the Board during that financial year. The
Board shall also within two months of the commencement of each
financial year submit to the Government9 such number of copies
of the budget so prepared as the Government may direct.
D
(2) The Board shall in each financial year prepare an annual
administration report of the working of the Board during that year
and shall within three months of the commencement of the next
financial year submit to the Government9 such number of copies
of the said report as the Government10 may direct.”
E
13.5 Sections 36 and 37 dealing with power of Devaswom
Commissioner to call for periodical accounts and assumption of
management of Hindu Religious Endowments by Board appear in Chapter
V of Part I and are as follows: -

F “36. Devaswom Commissioner’s powers to call for
periodical accounts, etc.- It shall be competent to the
Devaswom Commissioner by a notice to call upon the trustees or
managers of any Endowment falling under the definition in Section
2, clause (b) to submit periodical accounts of income and
expenditure or lists of properties, jewels, vessels, furniture or other
G things belonging to the Endowments under their charge or depute

9 By Amendment to the TC Act effected in 1974, the expression “the Government”

stood substituted for the expression “The Ruler of Travancore”
10 By same Amendment, the expression “the Government” was substituted for the

H expression “the Ruler”
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1023
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

any officer of the Devaswom Department to examine and verify A
the same.
It shall also be competent to the officer so deputed to call upon
the trustees and managers by a notice to furnish him with all the
accounts or other records or information he may require for the
purpose of examination and verification and also to assist him in B
the examination of accounts and movable property.
The notice shall be served in the manner prescribed by the Code
of Civil Procedure for the time being in force for the service of
summons.
Where the officer deputed under this Section finds that any C
movables are likely to be removed or misappropriated, he shall
make an immediate report to the Devaswom Commissioner taking
such steps for their temporary safe custody as may be necessary.
On receipt of such report, the Devaswom Commissioner may,
after hearing the parties concerned, pass such orders as he may D
think proper.
Any trustee or manager who wilfully or contumaciously disobeys
any order passed by the Devaswom Commissioner or any notice
issued under this Section shall be deemed to have committed an
offence under Section 181 of the Travancore Penal Code and he E
shall be liable to be prosecuted therefor.
“Trustee” shall mean, for the purposes of this Chapter the person
or persons in whom the administration of the affairs of a religious
endowment is vested in trust of holding any property in trust
therefor, by whatever designation such person or persons may be F
known.
37.Assumption of management of Hindu Religious
Endowments by Board.- (1) The Board may assume the
management of Hindu Religious Endowments in the following
Cases:-
G
(a) On the application and the request by a majority
consisting of not less than two-thirds of the trustees, or of the
donors in cases where the donors have reserved to themselves
the power of appointing and dismissing trustees.
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1024 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A (b) On the refusal of the trustees to continue in the
trusteeship or on their own admission of incapacity to continue in
the trust management.
(c) In cases where the Ruler of Travancore had the right to
take part in the management by appointment of certain officers
B or servants according to existing usages, if the trustees have failed
to carry on their duties properly and in the best interests of the
institution.
(d) In cases where the Ruler of Travancore had the right to
succeed to the right of management, in part, by reason of escheat
C of trustees, if the remaining trustees have failed to carry on their
duties properly and in the best interests of the institution.
(e) In cases of proved mismanagement although the
institutions do not fall under clause (c) or clause (d) of this sub-
section.
D Explanation. - The word “donors’ includes the legal
representatives of the donors.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) the Board
may, instead of assuming management, exercise such
superintendence in the management over any institution to which
E this Part applies as to best fulfil the objects of the trust, if the
trustees have failed to carry on their duties properly and in the
best interests of the institution.
(3) The Board may make rules for the purpose of carrying into
effect the provisions contained in sub-section (2)
F
(4) Any person deeming himself aggrieved by an order of
assumption passed on any of the grounds mentioned in clause (c),
(d) and (e) of sub-section (1) of this section may, within a period
of six months from the date of the publication of the order of
assumption in the Kerala Government Gazette, institute in the
G District Court, within whose jurisdiction the subject matter is situate,
a suit against the Board to set aside such order:
Provided that subject to the result of the suit, if any, the order of
assumption shall be final.”

H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1025
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

13.6 Section 61 appearing in Part II defines expressions “Founder”, A
“Hereditary Trustee” and “Hindu” as :-
“(3) “founder” shall include his legal representatives;
(4) “hereditary trustee” shall mean the trustee of an
institution, succession to whose office devolves by hereditary right
or is regulated by usage or is specifically provided for by the B
founders so long as such mode of succession is in force;
(4A) “ Hindu” means a person who is a Hindu by birth or
by conversion and professes the Hindu religion:
Provided that a Hindu member to be nominated or elected C
to the Board under Section 63 shall be a person who believes in
God and temple worship and who shall make an oath before the
Secretary of the Board to that effect in the form prescribed by
the Government for the purpose before he enters upon his office.”
Section 62 states :- D
“62. Vesting of administration in the Board.- (1) The
administration of incorporated and unincorporated Devaswoms
and Hindu Religious Institutions which were under the
management of the Ruler of Cochin immediately prior to the
first day of July, 1949 either under Section 50G of the
E
Government of Cochin Act, XX of 1113, or under the provisions
of the Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, I of 1081, and
all their properties and funds and of the estates and all institutions
under the management of the Devaswom Department of
Cochin, shall vest in the Cochin Devaswom Board.
F
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions contained in sub-section(1)
the regulation and control of all rituals and ceremonies in the
temple of Sree Poornathrayeesa at Trippunittura and in the
Pazhayannur Bhagavathy temple at Pazhayannur shall continue
to be exercised as hitherto by the Ruler of Cochin.”
Section 128 states:- G

“128.Board to exercise powers under Proclamation of
1094.- The powers vested in the Government and the Diwan
by Proclamation dated the 13th day of Edavam 1094 as
amended by Proclamation, VII of 1120, shall be vested in and
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1026 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A exercised by the Board and the said Proclamation shall have
effect as if for the words “our Government” and “Our Diwan”
occurring therein the words “the Cochin Devaswom Board”
were substituted.”
14. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 enacted by the Parliament
B to amend and codify the law relating to Intestate Succession among
Hindus came into force on 17.06.1956. Section 5 of said Act reads:-
“5.Act not to apply to certain properties.–This Act shall not
apply to—
(i) any property succession to which is regulated by the Indian
C Succession Act, 1925, by reason of the provisions contained in
section 21 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954;
(ii) any estate which descends to a single heir by the terms of any
covenant or agreement entered into by the Ruler of any Indian
State with the Government of India or by the terms of any
D enactment passed before the commencement of this Act;
(iii) the Valiamma Thampuran Kovilagam Estate and the Palace
Fund administered by the Palace Administration Board by reason
of the powers conferred by Proclamation (IX of 1124) dated 29th
June, 1949, promulgated by the Maharaja of Cochin.”
E
15. The Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 deleted Part
VII comprising of Article 238, but inserted Article 290A into the
Constitution. Said Article 290A is to the following effect:-
“290A. Annual payment to certain Devaswom Funds.- A sum
of forty-six lakhs and fifty thousand rupees shall be charged on,
F
and paid out of, the Consolidated Fund of the State of Kerala
every year to the Travancore Devaswom Fund; and a sum of
thirteen lakhs and fifty thousand rupees shall be charged on, and
paid out of the Consolidated Fund of the State of Tamil Nadu,
every year to the Devaswom Fund established in that Sate for the
G maintenance of Hindu temples and shrined in the territories
transferred to that State on the 1st day of November, 1956, from
the State of Travancore-Cochin.”
The sum assured in the Covenant and as reflected in Article 238
was Rupees 51 lakhs. However, after the reorganization of the States,
H control with respect to certain Devaswoms falling in its territories vested
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1027
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

with State of Madras (now State of Tamil Nadu) and as such there was A
modification in the amount allocable to Devaswoms in the State of Kerala
as successor to the erstwhile State of Travancore and Cochin.
16. Orders11 passed by the President of India declaring that the
Rulers of Indian States ceased to be recognized as Rulers of respective
Indian States, gave rise to challenge on behalf of the Rulers and was B
dealt with by this Court in Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union
of India12. By a majority of 9:2, the Constitution Bench of this Court
declared the orders passed by the President of India to be illegal. At this
stage, the following reference to the administration of the Temple and
the right of the Ruler of Travancore in terms of Article VIII(b) of the
Covenant in the Judgment of K.S. Hegde, J. may be noted:- C

“186. In respect of the administration of Padamanabhaswamy
Temple the right of the Ruler of Travancore was preserved under
Article VIII(b) of the covenant. Similarly the existing rights of
the Rulers of Travancore and Cochin as regards the management
of certain temples and funds were preserved. They were also D
given a right to nominate some members to some of the statutory
Boards. From the foregoing it is seen that under the various
covenants, several rights in addition to the right of receiving privy
purses had been created in favour of the Rulers of some of the
covenanting States.” E
(Emphasis added)
17. Soon thereafter the Parliament enacted the Constitution
(Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 which came into force on
28.12.1971. It omitted Articles 291 and 362; inserted new Article 363A;
and amended the definition of Ruler appearing in clause 22 of Article F
366. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for said Amendment was
as under:-
“The concept of rulership, with privy purses and special privileges
unrelated to any current functions and social purposes, was
incompatible with an egalitarian social order. Government have, G
therefore, decided to terminate the privy purses and privileges of
the Rulers of former Indian States. It is necessary for this purpose,
apart from amending the relevant provisions of the Constitution,
11 Dated 06.09.1970 and published in the Gazette of India of 19.09.1970.
12 (1971) 1 SCC 85 decided on 15.12.1970 H
1028 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A to insert a new Article therein so as to terminate expressly the
recognition already granted to such Rulers and to abolish privy
purses and extinguish all rights, liabilities and obligations in respect
of privy purses. Hence this Bill.”
Article 363A and Article 366 (22), after the Amendment read as
B under:-
“363A. Recognition granted to Rulers of Indian States
to cease and privy purses to be abolished.- Notwithstanding
anything in this Constitution or in any law for the time being in
force-
C (a) The Prince, Chief or other person who, at any time
before the commencement of the Constitution (Twenty-sixth
Amendment) Act, 1971, was recognized by the President as the
Ruler of an Indian State or any person who, at any time before
such commencement, was recognized by the President as the
D successor of such Ruler shall, on and from such commencement,
cease to be recognized as such Ruler or the successor of such
Ruler;
(b) On and from the commencement of the Constitution
(Twenty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1971, privy purse is abolished
E and all rights, liabilities and obligations in respect of privy purse
are extinguished and accordingly the Ruler or, as the case may
be, the successor of such Ruler, referred to in clause (a) or any
other person shall not be paid any sum as privy purse.
… … ...
F Article 366 (22)
(22) “Ruler” means the Prince, Chief or other person who, at any
time before the commencement of the Constitution (Twenty-sixth
Amendment) Act, 1971, was recognised by the President as the
Ruler of an Indian State or any person who, at any time before
G such commencement, was recognised by the President as the
successor of such Ruler;”
18. State of Kerala enacted Sree Pandaravaka Lands (Vesting
and Enfranchisement) Act, 1971. Section 2(k) defines “Temple” to mean
Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple and Section 3 of the Act is to the
H following effect:-
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1029
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

“(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract or A
in any judgment, decree or order of court, with effect on and from
the appointed day,-
(a) all rights, title and interest of the Temple in all Sree
Pandaravaka lands held by landholders shall stand estinguished;
(b) All rights, title and interest of the Temple in all Sree B
Pandaravaka Thanathu lands, except those referred to in sub-
section (2), shall vest in the Government;
(c) every building which immediately before the appointed
day belonged to the Temple and was then being used as an office
in connection with the administration of the Melkanganam branch C
of the Sree Pandaravaka Department and for no other purpose,
shall vest absolutely in the Government free of all encumbrances.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub-section, “building”
includes the site on which it stands and any land appurtenant
thereto. D
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to the lands
specified in the Schedule.
(3) The Government may, on being satisfied that any Sree
Pandaravaka Thanathu land is absolutely indispensable for the
E
maintenance, upkeep and use of the Sree Padmanabha Swamy
Temple, or any temple attached thereto, direct, by notification in
the Gazette, that the rights, title and interest in respect of such
land shall cease to vest in the Government and thereupon such
rights, title and interest shall re-vest in the Sree
Padmanabhaswamy Temple. F
(4) If any question arises as to whether any building falls or does
not fall within the scope of sub-section (1), it shall be referred to
the Government whose decision thereon shall be final and shall
not be liable to be questioned in any court of law.”
19. The Parliament enacted the Rulers of Indian States (Abolition G
of Privileges) Act, 1972 (‘1972 Act’, for short) “to amend certain
enactments consequent on derecognition of Rulers of Indian States and
abolition of privy purses, so as to abolish the privileges of Rulers and to
make certain transitional provisions to enable the said Rulers to adjust
progressively to the changed circumstances”. The Statement of Objects H
and Reasons stated:-
1030 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A “With the derecognition of Rulers and the abolition of privy purse,
the historical considerations on the basis of which special privileges
were given to Rulers of Indian States have ceased to be valid and
the indefinite continuance of those privileges would be indefensible.
However, in order to enable the former Rulers to adjust
progressively to the changed circumstances on account of the
B
abolition of privy purse, it appears necessary to make special
provisions. Some of the privileges of the former Rulers have been
provided for by certain enactments. This Bill seeks to amend those
enactments in the manner indicated below.
2. The immunity of a Ruler of an Indian State from criminal
C prosecution or civil suit under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1898 and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is being limited to
acts and omission of such Ruler before the 26th January, 1950
(clauses 2 and 3 of the Bill), and by way of consequential change,
Section 168 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 is being
D omitted (clause 4 of the Bill).
3. The exemptions under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 in respect of
the one residence and heirloom jewellery of each former Ruler is
being limited for his lifetime. Further, the exemption in respect of
heirloom jewellery recognized by the Central Government is being
E made subject to conditions similar to those applicable at present in
the case of heirloom jewellery recognized by the Central Board
of Direct Taxes (clause 5 of the Bill).
4. The existing exemption under the Gift-tax Act, 1958 in respect
of the gifts made out of privy purse is being withdrawn (clause 6
F of the Bill).
5. It is also proposed to amend the Income-tax Act, 1967 to provide
for exemption of any ex-gratia payments made by the Central
Government consequent on the abolition of the privy purse and
for the omission of the provision providing for exemption in respect
G of privy purse. Power is being taken to amend certain notifications
issued under Section 60A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and
continued by Section 297 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, with a
view to suitably modifying the notifications insofar as they relate
to exemptions in favour of Rulers (clause 7 of the Bill).”

H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1031
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

One of the provisions which was amended was Section 5 of the A
Wealth Tax Act, 1957. Section 5 of 1972 Act stated :-
“In the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, in Section 5, in sub-section (1),—
(a) in clause (iii), for the words “any one building in the occupation
of a Ruler declared by the Central Government as his official
residence”, the words, brackets and figures “any one building in B
the occupation of a Ruler, being a building which immediately
before the commencement of the Constitution (Twenty-sixth
Amendment) Act, 1971, was his official residence by virtue of a
declaration by the Central Government’’ shall be substituted with
effect from the 28th day of December, 1971; C
(b) to clause (iv), the following provisos shall be added,
namely: —
“Provided that in the case of jewellery recognised by the Central
Government as aforesaid, such recognition shall be subject to the
following conditions, namely: — D
(i) that the jewellery shall be permanently kept in India and
shall not be removed outside India except for a purpose and
period approved by the Board:
(ii) that reasonable steps shall be taken for keeping the jewellery
E
substantially in its original shape;
(iii) that reasonable facilities shall be allowed to any officer of
Government authorised by the Board in this behalf to examine
the jewellery as and when necessary; and
(iv) that if any of the conditions hereinbefore specified is not F
being duly fulfilled, the Board may, for reasons to be recorded
in writing, withdraw the recognition retrospectively with effect
from the date of commencement of clause (b) of section 5 of
the Rulers of Indian States (Abolition of Privileges) Act, 1972
and in such a case, wealth-tax shall become payable by the
Ruler for all the assessment years after such commencement G
for which the jewellery was exempted on account of the
recognition.
Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (iv) of the foregoing
proviso, the fair market value of any jewellery on the date of the
H
1032 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A withdrawal of the recognition in respect thereof shall be deemed
to be the fair market value of such jewellery on each successive
valuation date relevant for the assessment years referred to in
the said proviso:
Provided further that the aggregate amount of wealth-tax payable
B in respect of any jewellery under clause (iv) of the foregoing
proviso for all the assessment years referred to therein shall not
in any case exceed fifty per cent of its fair market value on the
valuation date relevant for the assessment year in which
recognition was withdrawn;”
C It may be stated here that clause (iv) in Sub-Section 1 of Section
5 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 before such addition stood as under:-
“jewellery in the possession of any Ruler, not being his personal
property, which has been recognized before the commencement
of this Act by the Central Government as his heirloom or, where
D no such recognition exists, which the Board may, subject to any
rules that may be made by the Central Government in this behalf,
recognize as his heirloom at the time of his first assessment to
wealth-tax under this Act.”
20. In 1974, State of Kerala passed Travancore-Cochin Hindu
E Religious Institutions (Amendment) Act, 1974 amending inter alia Section
33 of TC Act as under:-
“In section 33 of the principal Act, for the words “the Ruler of
Travancore” and “the Ruler”, in both the places where they occur,
the words “the Government” shall be substituted.”
F Between 1974 and 1991, and even thereafter, various amendments
were made to the TC Act but Chapter III of Part I of the TC Act has
remained unamended.
21. On 19.07.1991, Sree Chithira Thirunal Balarama Varma, who
had executed the Covenant as Ruler of the Covenanting State of
G Travancore, passed away. Since then, the appellant No.1 Uthradam
Thirunal Marthanda Varma had been exercising all functions as “Ruler
of Travancore” with respect to the affairs of the Temple till the Judgment
was passed by the High Court in the present case.
22. Apart from the decision of this Court in Madhav Rao Jivaji
H Rao Scindia 12,two cases having some relevance to the present
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1033
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

controversy were dealt with by this Court during 1991-1994. Those cases A
were:-
a) On 28.11.1991 a Bench of three Judges of this Court rendered
its decision in Revathinnal Balagopala Varma vs. His Highness Shri
Padmanabha Dasa Bala Rama Varma (since deceased) and others13
and connected matters. The properties which were described as private B
properties by the Ruler of Travancore, the details of which were part of
the inventory appended to the Covenant entered into on 27.05.1949,
were subject matter of ceiling proceedings taken under the Kerala Land
Reforms Act, 1963. The proceedings resulted in declaration that 191.23
acres out of the holding held by the respondent No.1 in the said matter
were surplus over the permissible extent. The decision was challenged C
by the members of the family submitting inter alia that those properties
were tarwad properties and ought to be treated as belonging to different
families which constituted independent units in the tarwad and as such,
said properties were divisible amongst said appellant and respondents
Nos.1 to 34 in equal shares. It was accepted by this Court that the D
succession would be governed by Marumakkathayam Law. It was
observed in the leading judgment by N.D. Ojha, J.:-
“62. That respondent 1 was a sovereign and the properties in
dispute as held by the sovereign rulers from time to time were
impartible has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the E
appellant before us. What has been urged by him, however, is
that the properties in dispute belonged to a tarwad and were as
such joint Hindu family properties and the attribute of impartibility
applied to them because by custom only the eldest member of the
family could be the ruler and to maintain his dignity and status it
was necessary to make these properties impartible. F

63. In this connection it has to be kept in mind that the mode of
succession of a sovereign ruler and the powers of such a ruler
are two different concepts. Mode of succession regulates the
process whereby one sovereign ruler is succeeded by the other.
It may inter alia be governed by the rule of general primogeniture G
or lineal primogeniture or any other established rule governing
succession. This process ends with one sovereign succeeding
another. Thereafter what powers, privileges and prerogatives are
to be exercised by the sovereign is a question which is not relatable
13 1993 Supp (1) SCC 233 H
1034 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A to the process of succession but relates to the legal incidents of
sovereignty.”
(Emphasis supplied)
It was then concluded that the properties in Suit were not joint
family properties, but were the personal properties of the said respondent
B No.1.
In his concurring opinion, Ranganathan, J. agreed with the
conclusions arrived at in the majority judgment. It was observed by
Ranganathan, J. as under:-

C “9. One of the factual aspects on which reliance is placed by the
learned counsel for the appellant for claiming a family origin to
the Ruler’s properties is that the properties of the rulers have
passed on from one ruler to the next even though the latter was
not a direct lineal descendant. It is urged that, if the properties
had been the personal properties of the ruler, they would have
D devolved on his personal heirs on his death. In my opinion, this is
not a very helpful argument. All the properties held by a monarch
or ruler devolve by the rule of primogeniture, there being no
distinction in this regard between his personal properties and those
held by him as ruler. But this need not necessarily be lineal
E primogeniture. It could be general primogeniture, the successor
to the rulership being determined according to some prevalent
custom. The properties will devolve on the successor so decided
upon. The fact that the successor is determined on the basis of
marumakkathayam law no doubt causes the properties to devolve
on the next karnavan who succeeds to the rulership. But this
F does not necessarily lead to the inference that the properties held
by the Ruler are the properties of a tarwad. The devolution is by
succession from ruler to ruler and not one by way survivorship
under the marumakkathayam law due to one karnavan taking
the place of a deceased predecessor. This circumstance does
G not, therefore, in my opinion, establish the appellant’s claim.”
(Emphasis added)
b) The validity of the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment)
Act, 1971 was under challenge in this Court and by its Judgment dated

H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1035
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

04.02.1993 in Raghunathrao Ganpatrao vs. Union of India14 the A
Constitution Bench of this Court rejected the challenge. We shall deal
with the challenge to said Amendment and the decision of this Court in
Raghunathrao Ganpatrao14 later.
23. In the backdrop of these circumstances and developments,
the stand taken by the State in the concerned Suits as well as in the Writ B
Petition may now be considered. It was submitted on behalf of the State
that the Temple had always been accepted as that of Travancore Palace.
A) In its Written Statement filed in O.S. No.625 of 2007, the
State had submitted:-
“As per the TCHRI Act 1950, Chapter III is headed as ‘Sree C
Padmanabha Swami Temple’ by which sections 18 to 23 specifies
the right of the Ruler of Travancore in owing and administering
the temple. As per the said Act, Administration of Sree
Padmanabha Swamy Temple and Sree Pandaravaka properties
and all other properties and funds of the said temple is vested in D
trust in the Ruler of Travancore and under the control and
supervision of the Ruler of Travancore by an Executive Officer
appointed by him. The said Chapter III of the Travancore Cochin
Hindu Religious Institutions Act emphatically declares the right of
the Ruler of Travancore in owning and administering the Sree
Padmanabha Swamy Temple. The provisions of the Travancore E
Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act 1950 backed by the
Covenant is guaranteed by the Constitution of India in the Art
363(1).
7. It is humbly submitted that there are several great temples in
Kerala, which are not under the administrative control of F
Travancore Devaswom Board or Cochin Devaswom Board or
under any Devaswom Committees. Famous temples like
Chakkulathukavu Bhagvathy Temple, Mannarasala Sree Nagaraja
Temple are a few examples of such family temples. There are
also many temples owned by private Trustees and local organization G
of Hindus too like the Attukal Bhagavathy Temple, Pazhavangadi
Ganpathy Temple etc. Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple is also
such a family temple trust owned and managed by the Travancore

14 1994 Supp (1) SCC 191 H
1036 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A Palace, and protected by the specific provision of the Travancore
Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act.
8. It is submitted that the question whether the present Maharaja
falls within the definition of Ruler of Travancore or not is a different
matter not directly connected with the moot question. The only
B question to be considered is whether there is any public and
compelling ground for the Government or Travancore Devaswom
Board to take over the administration of Sree Padmanabha Swamy
Temple. The legal technicalities and procedures arise only once
the need for take over is established. The traditional and customary
belief that has been for long recognized and accepted is that Sree
C Padmanabha Swamy Temple belongs to “Sree Padmanabha
Dasas”, the Royal family head of Travancore Palace and they
command high regard respect and esteem form the public. In the
case of Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple, there seems no valid
reason for Government to interfere in the administration of the
D temple. The administration of the temple has not broken down
nor is there any other allegation of a major nature, which forces
Government to interfere in the administrative affairs of the temple.
There is no vaild necessity or public purpose, which requires
Government to take over the temple. In such a circumstances,
Government do not desire to interfere or take over the
E administration of Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple which is
traditionally and historically accepted as the temples of Travancore
Palace. In the light of the above facts it is submitted that the
averments raised in the suit may be dismissed.
Hence, it is humbly submitted that, since this suit is
F unnecessarily instituted, the Hon’ble Court may be pleased to
accept the written statement filed by the Addl. 3rd respondent and
the suit may be dismissed with costs to these defendants.”
B) In its affidavit in reply in W.P. (Civil) No.36487 of 2009, the
State submitted:-
G
“5. It is submitted that, as per the TCHRI Act, 1950, Chapter III
is headed as Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple by which Section
18 to 23 specifies the right of the ruler of Travancore in
administering the temple. As per the provisions of the said Act,
administration of Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple and Sree
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1037
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

Pandaravaka properties and all other properties and funds of the A
temple is vested in trust in the Ruler of Travancore and under the
control and supervision of the Ruler of Travancore by an Executive
Officer appointed by him. The said Chapter III of the TCHRI
Act emphatically declares the right of the ruler of Travancore in
administering the Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple.
B
6. It is humbly submitted that there are several great temples in
Kerala which are not under the administrative control of
Travancore Devaswom Board or Cochin Devaswom Board or
under any Devaswom Committees. Famous temples like
Chakkulathukavu Bhagavathy Temple Mannarassala Sree
Nagaraja Temple are a few examples of such temples which is C
run by particular family. There are also many temples owned by
private trustees and local organisations of Hindus like the Attukal
Bhagavathy Temple, Pazhavangadi Ganapathy Temple etc. Sree
Padmanabha Swamy Temple is essentially a temple trust managed
by the Travancore Palace as per the terms of Chapter III of D
TCHRI Act and protected by the specific provisions of TCHRI
Act.
7. It is submitted that the question whether the 5th respondent
falls within the definition of Ruler of Travancore or not, is a different
matter. The question to be considered is whether – there is any E
public necessity and compelling ground for the Government to
take over the administration of Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple.
It is submitted that all other questions pertaining to the legal
technicalities and procedures arise only when the need for take
over is established.
F
8. It is submitted that the traditional and customary belief that has
been for long recognized and accepted is that Sree Padmanabha
Swamy Temple belongs “Sree Padmanabha Dasas”, the royal
famiy head of Travancore Palace and they command high regard,
respect and esteem from the public. In the case of Sree
Padmanabha Swamy Temple, there seems no valid reason for G
the Government to interfere in the administration of the temple.
It is submitted that, the administration of the temple has not broken
down nor is there any other allegation of a major nature which
forces the Government to interfere the administrative affairs of
the temple. There is no valid necessity or public purpose which H
1038 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A requires the government to take over the temple. In such a
circumstance, the Government do not desire to interfere or take
over the administration of the Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple
which is traditionally and historically accepted as the temple of
Travancore Palace. It is submitted that the Government have
already filed a detailed written statement in OS 625/2007 pending
B
on the file of Principal Sub Court, Thiruvananthapuram. None of
the grounds raised in the Writ Petition are sufficient to hold that
the interference by the government in the administration of the
temple is called for.
So, it is most humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased
C to uphold the above contention and dismiss the above writ petition.”
24. After considering rival submissions, the High Court in its
judgment under appeal observed:-
“Admittedly the Ruler of Travancore i.e. the late Sri. Chithira
D Thirunal Balarama Varama who ruled Travancore as King for 18
years (1931 to 1949) and who was the Rajapramukh of
Travancore-Cochin for six years thereafter and who managed
the Padmanabhaswamy Temple until his death on 20.7.1991, never
claimed that the Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple was the family
Temple of the Royal Family or as individual property of himself.
E In fact, he succeeded in a Suit filed by one of the family members
during his life time seeking partition of the assets of the Royal
Family as properties of the joint family. The last Ruler’s contention
that he was not a Karanavan of the family and the Royal Family
was not a joint family were accepted at all levels of litigation
F including the Supreme Court. Even though the last Ruler executed
a detailed will bequeathing his personal properties, he had not
included the Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple as his personal
property or dealt with the same in the Will. Admittedly the Great
Temple was although in history recognized as a public Temple run
with it’s own income, contributions from the State and offerings
G from devotees. The King ruled the State and managed the temple
as a State temple and he was also a traditional participant in the
rituals and ceremonies of the temple; mainly in the Arattu festival.
Both in the Covenant namely Article VIII(b) of the Accession
Agreement and in Section 18(2) of the TC Act what is stated is
H that the “Temple is vested in trust in the Ruler of Travancore.”
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1039
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

Obviously if Temple was the family property of the Royal Family A
or the private property of the King, then there was no need for
specific provision in the Accession Agreement or in the TC Act
providing for vesting of the Temple in trust in the hands of the last
Ruler of Travancore. The conspicuous word used to qualify vesting
is “in trust” which means that it is for the benefit of somebody.
B
The beneficiaries obviously are the devotees, the State and the
public at large and all those who have an interest in the Temple.
So much so, we have to necessarily conclude that the last Ruler
was only a trustee who has retained the control of the Temple for
the benefit of the devotees, the State and the public at large. Section
18(1) of the TC Act which provides for continuous funding of the C
temple by the State Government at the rate of Rs.6 lakhs annually
clearly establish that this is a public temple, though during the life
of the last Ruler, he was allowed to manage the same. In this
context the term “Ruler” used in the Covenant of Accession
Agreement and in Section 18(2) of the TC Act probably has only
D
a literal meaning to describe Sree Chithira Thirunal Balarama
Varma who was the last Ruler of Travancore and the signatory to
the Accession Agreement. If at all “Ruler” has a technical meaning,
certainly in the absence of a definition in the TC Act which was
enacted after the Constitution came into force, the definition
contained in the Constitution namely, Article 366(22) has to be E
adopted. Obviously the first petitioner in W.P.(C) No.4256/2010
or his successors of the Royal Family will not come within the
description of “Ruler” as defined under Article 366(22) of the
Constitution and the only persons who answers the definition is
the last Ruler and after him no one can acquire that status which
F
is not heritable. So much so, we hold that neither the said petitioners
nor any of the successors of his family can claim control or
management of the Temple under Section 18(2) of the TC Act
after the death of the last Ruler.”
With regard to the submission based on Article 363 of the
Constitution, it was observed:- G

“So far as the contention of the first petitioner in W.P. (C) No.4256/
2010 that Article 363 bars the jurisdiction of courts including the
High Courts and Supreme Court with regard to dispute arising
under agreement executed by Rulers of Princely States of India,
H
1040 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A we have based on the Constitution Bench decision abovereferred
and in view of the specific provisions of Chapter III contained in
the TC Act and going by the contention of first petitioner in W.P.(C)
No.4256/2010 itself, found that the claim of the said petitioner or
any of his family members over the Temple have to be found not
under the provisions of Covenant of Accession Agreement, but
B
under the provisions of Section 18(2) of the TC Act and Article
366(22) of the Constitution. Since we are considering the rights, if
any, of the first petitioner in W.P.(C) No.4256/2010 based on the
provisions of the Constitution and the provisions of Chapter III of
the TC Act, Article 363 of the Constitution does not stand in our
C way and this court has full and complete jurisdiction to decide all
matters arising in these two W.P.(C)s., which, though are interparty
cases, are essentially in the nature of public interest litigations,
wherein this court is called upon to decide the claim of an individual
over a Great Temple against the claim of the devotees, public and
the State as a whole on the other side.”
D
It was further observed:-
“In this case it is the case of the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.4256/
2010 itself that the provision of the Covenant regarding the vesting
of management of the Padmanabhaswamy Temple in Trust in the
E last Ruler of Travancore in the Accession Agreement is
incorporated in Section 18(2) and so much so, the last Ruler
managed the Temple not by virtue of the provision in the Covenant,
but by virtue of the statutory provision contained in Chapter III of
the TC Act. In fact, during the period of management of the
Temple by the last Ruler, the entire contributions payable by the
F State was paid to the Temple and there is no dispute on that. The
feeble contention raised by the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.4256/
2010 that the Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple is a family temple
of the Roayl family of Travancore can only be styled as absured
because in several judgments of this court this Great Temple is
G recognized as a “public temple” and in fact, it was the most famous
Temple in the erstwhile Princely State of Travancore. In fact, a
Division Bench of this court vide judgment in O.P. No.18309/
2000 (produced as Ext.P1 in W.P.(C) No.36487/2009)
categorically held that Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple is a public
temple which is one of the Mahakshetra of the Hindus and if
H there is any complaint by any worshiper of the Temple, that will
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1041
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

be considered by this court and the court will try to do justice. A
The claim of the first petitioner in W.P.(C) No.4256/2010 that he
became the Ruler of Travancore on the death of the last Ruler
has no basis at all after the Twenty Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution. We have already found above that the successors
of the last Ruler including the first petitioner in WPC No.4256/
B
2010 does not fall within the definition of “Ruler” under Article
366(22) of the Constitution. In fact, after the Twenty Sixth
Amendment of 1971, the President of India also ceases to have
authority to recognize any person as the Ruler of Indian State or
a successor of such Ruler. So much so, in our view, the contention
of the first petitioner in W.P.(C) No.4256/2010 that he being C
brother of the last Ruler becomes the Ruler of Travancore after
the death of the last Ruler, is only absurd. In other words, on the
death of any person who remained recognized by the President
as Ruler prior to the commencement of the Constitution will not
have any successor in the capacity as Ruler of the State. What
D
Article 366(22) seeks to achieve is to abolish the status of Ruler
and under this definition clause, the status of Ruler and under this
definition clause, no one can acquire the status of Ruler after the
commencement of the Constitution much less through succession.
In short “Ruler” is not a status that could be acquired through
succession. Therefore, after death of the last Ruler on 20.7.1991, E
there is no Ruler in the erstwhile State of Travancore. So much
so, we hold that the first petitioner in W.P.(C) No.4256/2010 who
is the 5th respondent in the connected W.P.(C), cannot step into
the shoes of the last Ruler to claim management of the Sree
Padmanabhaswamy Temple by relying on the powers conferred F
under Section 18(2) of the TC Act.”
In paragraphs 8 and 9 the High Court observed:-
“8. We have to, therefore, proceed to consider what should be
done to save the Temple and to protect the interest of the
devotees and the public at large who have great faith in this G
Great Temple which is also recognized as a structure of
Archaeological importance by the 6 th respondent in
W.P.(C)No.36487/2009. In this context it is worthwhile to refer
to the decision of the Supreme Court in 2007(7) SCC 482 where
in the Supreme Court has held as follows: H
1042 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A “The properties of deities, temples and Devaswom Boards,
require to be protected and safeguarded by their trustees/
archakas/ shebaits/ employees. Instances are many where
persons entrusted with the duty of managing and safeguarding
the properties of temples, deities and Devaswom Boards have
usurped and misappropriated such properties by setting up false
B
claims of ownership or tenancy or adverse possession. This is
possible only with the passive or active collusion of the authorities
concerned. Such acts of “fences eating the crops” should be
dealt with sternly. The Government, members or trustees of
boards/trusts and devotees should be vigilant to prevent any
C such usurpation or encroachment. It is also the duty of courts
to protect and safeguard the properties of religious and
charitable institutions from wrongful claims or
misappropriation.”
Since the deity is a perpetual minor in the eye of law, the court
D has jurisdiction to protect it and this court has in the judgment in
O.P. No.18309/2000 held that Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple
being a public temple this court has jurisdiction as parent patriae.
All public temples in the erstwhile State of Travancore are now
managed by the Travancore Devaswom Board under the TC Act.
Government is also funding temples in terms of provisions contained
E in Article 290-A of the Constitution. In fact, substantial amount
of contribution is paid by the Government under the provisions of
the TC Act to the Devaswom Board and to the Sree
Padmanabhaswamy Temple separately. After the death of the
last ruler of Travancore, the present Ruler happens to be the State
F Government and so much so, by operation of Section 18(2) of the
TC Act, the temple on death of the last Ruler reverts back to the
State for administration by it. Obviously the State being secular
cannot run a temple and so much so, it is for them to constitute a
trust or statutory body like the Guruvayur Devaswom to administer
the Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple. The stand taken by the
G Government has not role in the matter and like other private temples
run in the State, Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple is also run by
an individual with the help of Executive Officer and Advisory
Board constituted by them.
Government obviously has not answered the query raised by the
H court as to whether the present management has legal authority
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1043
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

to run the Temple and if not, what is the step to be taken by the A
Government to arrange for management of the Temple. According
to the Government, the Temple is fairly well run and there is no
need for the Government to interfere in the matter. We do not
thing the approach of the Government is fair, reasonable or legal.
We have concluded above that the provision in Chapter III of the
B
TC Act was only to give effect to the provision in the Accession
Agreement whereby the Ruler of Travancore wanted to retain
control of the Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple during his life
time. In the absence of any provision in the Covenant or in the
TC Act to vest the Temple in the next senior member of the Royal
Family after the death of the Ruler of Travancore, the Temple C
and its properties and assets will revert back and vest in the State
Government under Articles 295 or 296 of the Constitution.
Obviously if separate provision was not made in the Covenant
and later by incorporation of the same in Chapter III of the TC
Act vesting this Great Temple in trust in the Ruler of Travancore, D
it would have gone under the management of the Travancore
Devaswom Board or probably a separate authority would have
been created by the Travancore-Cochin Government to run the
Temple. When there is no provision in the TC Act for succession
of management from the Ruler of Travancore on death of the
Ruler, the provisions of law will take over the situation. E

We have already found that under the definition clause in the
Constitution (Article 366(22)), neither the first petitioner in W.P.
(C) No.4256/2010 nor any of the members of the Royal Family
which ruled Travancore prior to integration, answers the description
of “Ruler” and so much so, relatives of the late King have no right F
over the Temple.
So much so, in the literal sense and by virtue of the operation of
Articles 295 and 296 of the Constitution, the Temple vests in State
Government through succession or escheat or atleast as the present
Ruler of the State. Therefore, Government necessarily have to G
make arrangement for creation of authority, statutory or otherwise,
to take over management and for running the Temple. In our view,
the opinion of the State about private temples in the State, conveyed
to us in court by the Government Pleader, itself is not going to
advance any public interest. Ever so many private temples have H
1044 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A assumed great importance and have accumulated wealth which
is nothing but contribution from the devotees and public. Wherever
public money is collected by temples and religious institutions, we
feel Government has a duty to ensure that such public institutions
are accountable to the devotees. We feel it is high time regulatory
measures are made in the State to prevent plundering of the public
B
money in the name of God and faith. Public money collected in
trust for the Deity or for religious institutions, should never be
allowed to be diverted for personal gains and if it is permitted, the
same amounts to permission to carry on business in faith or in the
name of God. The question is whether the Government should
C allow religion and faith to be made a business activity by private
individuals or trusts. We are constrained to observe that the attitude
of the Government in this matter is not helpful to the interest of
the State or to the devotees or to the public at large. We have
already noticed that besides being a Hindu Temple, where people
ardently worship, the Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple is a
D
building of great architectural value and it’s treasures are worth-
preserving and protected and exhibited for the public to view the
same. The operation of Section 18(2) of the TC Act after the
death of the last Ruler of Travancore should not lead to any
orphanage for the temple as we have already found that neither
E the first petitioner in W.P.(C) Nol.4256/2010 nor any of his family
members get any right in management or control of the Sree
Padmanabhaswamy Temple. So much so, Government being the
successor to the assets and institutions of the erstwhile Princely
State of Travancore, it is the duty of the Government to make
arrangement in the same way once State-run temples were handed
F
over to Devaswom Boards.
9. It is a well known fact that the Temple has immense treasures,
some of which are centuries old and are highly valuable by virtue
of it’s antique value and it’s price in terms of the value of precious
metals like gold, silver and stones used in the making. Even though
G we directed the present management to produce the inventory
prepared by the last Ruler, about which there is a mention in the
book written by the previous Ruler’s niece namely, Smt. Gouri
Lakshmibhai, they refused to produce the same. Some registers
produced in the Court were thoroughly incomplete and unreliable.
H In view of the public claim made by the last Ruler’s brother who
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1045
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

is presently managing the Temple that the treasures belong to the A
Royal Family of Travancore, the injunction granted by the Sub
Court against opening any of the Kallaras (storage place in the
Temple) and removal of any valuable item, should continue in
force and we order so. However, the management is free to use
such of the items which are required for the regular rituals and
B
ceremonies in the Temple. In our view, there is no purpose in
keeping the treasures of the temple acquired by it in the course of
several centuries as a mystery and if all the storage rooms
(Kallaras) are opened and the treasures are exhibited in a Museum
to be set up in the Temple Compound, the glory of the Temple and
the State will get a boost and probably the Great Temple will C
become a major tourist attraction and income earner. The authority
constituted by the Government should also verify the inventories
previously prepared and check whether any item is lost from the
custody of the Temple and if so, proceed to identify the persons
who have taken away the same and take steps to restore it to the
D
Temple.”
With these conclusions, the directions as quoted hereinabove were
issued by the High Court.
25. Challenging the decision of the High Court, the appellants in
the Special Leave Petition, from which the first of the instant Appeals E
arise, inter alia, raised following grounds :-
“C. The petitioner submits that the temple and its properties, as
prescribed by the Covenant dated 1st July 1949, ought to remain
vested in Trust and the Petitioner, being the senior-most male
member of the Royal family, will hold and administer the same as F
the Trustee of the Temple, through an Executive Officer.
D. As opposed to the tenor, in which the entire impugned judgment
proceeds, the Petitioner, in the past, has donated considerable
amount of money, as and when it was required, for the smooth
functioning of the temple and conduct of rituals and festivals. It is G
submitted that the Petitioner has always supplied the deficit as
and when required by the temple. In fact, in 1686 AD, when the
entire temple was burnt to the ground, the predecessor of the
Petitioner, Marthanda Varma, rebuilt the temple in its entirety over
a period of 15 years.
H
… … …
1046 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A F. Because the Division Bench has failed to notice that the Sree
Padmanabhaswamy Temple and its properties (also called “Sree
Pandaravaka”) remained vested in the presiding deity of the
Temple, Sree Padmanabha, even before the TrippadiDanam of
the State (that is, surrender of the State to the Lord by H.H.
Anizham Thirunal Marthanda Varma Maharaja in the year 1750).
B
The hereditary trusteeship of the Temple remains with the Ruler
of Travancore, and the original concept of trusteeship remains
unaffected; this being fortified by the absence of any enactment
depriving the Family of its trusteeship.
… … …
C
Despite a large proportion of these endowments having been made
by the erstwhile Royal family of Travancore, and that Lord
Padmanabha is considered the family deity of the erstwhile Royal
family, the Petitioner asserts that the Padmanabhaswamy temple
is a public temple, and no claim can probably be made by the
D Petitioner or anyone to owning the temple or its treasures. The
Petitioner as the Padmanabhadasa merely seeks to recover the
right as a trustee of the temple to manage and administer it, which
has unfortunately been taken away by the impugned judgment
and vested, in the State Government as the successor ‘Ruler’.
E The Petitioner retains the right to perform all the traditional rituals
and ceremonies in the same manner as has been performed for
hundred years.”
26. In its Order dated 02.05.2011, this Court directed:-
“Interim stay of direction (i) of the 2 impugned judgment which
F directs taking over the assets and management of Sree
Padmanabhaswamy Temple, Thiruvananthapuram.
Interim stay of directions (ii) to (iv) of the impugned judgment
subject to the following interim directions:
(a) There shall be a detailed inventory of the articles/valuables/
G
ornaments in Kallaras described as (a) to (f) in the Second
Schedule to the Plaint in O.S. No.625/2007 on the file of the Sub-
Judge, Thiruvananthapuram. The inventory shall be held in the
presence of the following observers:-

H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1047
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

(i) Two observers appointed by this Court namely, Justice M.N. A
Krishnan and Justice C.S. Rajan, retired Judges of Kerala High
Court.
(ii) The first petitioner and second petitioner.
(iii) A senior officer of the State Government, namely the
Secretary, Devaswom Department or his nominated B
representative.
(iv) A senior officer nominated by the Secretary, Department
of Archeology, Ministry of Culture, Government of India, who
is stationed at Kerala.
C
(v) The PIL petitioner (first respondent).
Justice M.N. Krishan shall be in charge of organising the
inventory, fixing of schedules. The entire expenditure of inventory
shall be met by the petitioners. He is also authorised to seek police
security at the time of such inventory. The observers shall decide D
upon the procedure and documentation of the inventory including
videographing and photographing the articles.
(b) In regard to the articles in Kallaras (c) and (d) used for regular
rituals and the ornaments etc. in Kallaras (e) and (f) said to be in
the custody of Periya Nambi and Thekkedom Nambi, the existing
E
practices, procedures and rituals may be followed in regard to the
opening and closing of the Kallaras and using the articles therein.
As far as Kallaras (a) and (b), which is reportedly not opened for
more than a century, they shall be opened only for the purpose of
making inventory of the articles and then closed and sealed again.
F
(c) The inventory shall be filed in this Court and copies of the
inventory be given to all participating parties and observers.
(d) The existing temple security shall be further strengthened by
additional security from the local police.
(e) The first petitioner and his family shall be entitled to participate G
in all temple festivals and rituals as hitherto before.”
27. The Order passed by this Court on 21.07.2011 noted the stand
of the State and of the appellants as under:-
“The State of Kerala in its affidavit dated 14.7.2011 has declared
its stand on the issues as follows: - H
1048 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A Ownership :
All articles found in the Kallaras of Shree Padmanabha Swami
Temple (including objects of value gold ornaments, precious stones
and antiques) belong to the deity (Temple) and neither the State
Government nor the family of ex-rulers of Travancore can have
B any claim over them.
Storage/Exhibition :
The ornaments/antiques are not suitable or sufficient for creating
a separate museum. All the articles being property of the temple,
should remain within the confines of temple premises. It is neither
C practical nor advisable to remove them from the temple environs.
Security :
A senior officer of the rank of Additional Director General of
Police has been put in special charge of the security of the temple.
D A control room has been made operational. A special team of
Police officers has been entrusted with the task of studying the
security requirements. Ensuring adequate security for the temple
is the primary responsibility of the government and it will do
everything necessary for acquisition of the state-of-the art security
systems (which are least obtrusive and most effective) and install
E them shortly. The temple will be guarded round-the-clock.
Commandos have been posted to guard the gates.
2. The petitioners (Sri Marthanda Varma the sole trustee and the
Executive Officer of the temple) have expressed their views in
the affidavit dated 14.7.2011 filed by the Executive Officer:-
F
Ownership :
All articles, ornaments, valuables, precious stones, antiques without
exception found in the Kallaras belong to the Presiding Deity of
Shree Padmanabhaswamy Temple and neither Mr. Marthanda
Varma nor his family members have any claim over them. Mr.
G Marthanda Varma merely administers the property/assets of the
deity and the temple as the Trustee.
Storage/Exhibition :
The articles found in Kallara ‘A’ can be segregated into three
H categories:
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1049
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

(i) Articles having historic/heritage/artistic value considered A
“priceless”, can be kept in the Kallara itself, and taken out
periodically for being exhibited on special occasions, within the
temple premises for the benefit of the devotees and general public.
(ii) Even articles which have only some historic/ heritage/artistic
value, and cannot be considered to be ‘priceless’ shall also be B
kept in the safe custody in the Kallara.
(iii)Articles having monetary value but no historic/heritage/artistic
value, could be disposed of and the proceeds used for purchasing
immovable properties, for renovation and maintenance of the
temple and for education including establishment of a ‘Veda C
Pathasala’ and a ‘Thanthirika Peedom’ for imparting training and
grooming temple priests.
Inventory :
Videography and photography of the articles in Kallara ‘A’ may
be avoided, as the inventory has already been completed. But if it D
is found that videography/photography is necessary for completing
the inventory, the same may be carried out strictly under the
supervision and the films/cartridges shall be deposited in a sealed
cover so that unauthorized copies are not made.
As the primary object of the inventory is to ascertain what is E
available and not disposal or sale, there is no need to have a
valuation. However the services of a conservationist or expert in
antiques may be availed for categorizing the articles and completing
the inventory in a scientific manner.
Security arrangements : F
While installing security systems, in particular CCTVs and other
electronic devices, care should be taken in regard to two aspects.
First is that the customs/traditions of the temple should be respected
and taken note of. Second is that worship by the devotees should
not be disturbed. The Police personnel on security duty, when G
inside the temple, should be unobtrusive and comply with the dress
code of the temple.
… … …

H
1050 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A 4. After considering the submissions made during arguments and
the suggestions in the affidavits, we find that action is required in
the following areas :
(a) A detailed inventory of the articles in Kallaras A and C to F
with videography/photography shall have to be completed under
B the supervision of an Expert Committee. The videographer/
photographer employed for this purpose shall have security
clearance from the local Police authorities.
(b) The services of Experts/Conservationists shall have to be
availed so that handling the articles at the time of inventory or
C disturbing the environment in which they were stored in the
Kallaras for centuries does not affect the articles.
(c) Adequate and proper arrangements will have to be made for
security. This would involve not only policing the premises but
also having security measures/systems as also provision of a strong
D room/vaults/steel lining in the Kallaras with the assistance of a
security expert.
5. To achieve the aforesaid results, we hereby constitute the
following Expert Committee to advise regarding inventory,
conservation and security :
E (1) Dr. C. V. Ananda Bose, : Co-ordinator
Director General of National Museum and
Vice-Chancellor,
National Museum Institute
F New Delhi.
(2) Prof. Dr. M.B. Nair, : Member
Head of Conservation Department,
National Museum Institute
G
New Delhi.
(3) Nominee of the Director, Archaeological : Member
Survey of India (from its science/research wing).

H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1051
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

(4) Nominee of the Governor of Reserve Bank of India :Member A
who is an Expert from its security wing.
(5) The Executive Officer of the Temple : Member
6. The said Expert Committee is entrusted with the following
responsibilities: B
(a) To organize the inventory by videography/ photography of the
articles in Kallaras A, C to F, and supervise such inventory and
arrange for proper storage of the articles in the respective Kallaras
after completion of the inventory.
(b) To examine and categorise the articles into three groups: (i) C
Articles/ornaments having historic/heritage/ artistic/antique value.
(ii) Articles that are required for regular use in the temple for
religious purpose. (iii) Articles and ornaments which cannot be
considered to be having any historic/heritage/artistic/antique value,
but having merely a monetary value. D
(c) To draw up long term and short term measures for preservation,
conservation, maintenance of the articles/ antiques in Kallaras of
the Temple.
(d) Prepare a scheme for providing security measures in the temple
premises and in the Kallaras. E
(e) Examine whether any of the articles are worthy of exhibition
for the benefit of the devotees and if so examine the feasibility of
creation of a high security museum within the temple premises or
the adjoining museum.
(f) Examine and give an opinion whether it is necessary to open F
Kallara ‘B’ at this stage.
7. In view of the constitution of the said Expert Committee, there
is no need to continue the large Committee of Observers. In place
of the seven member Observer Committee earlier appointed, the
following smaller Overseeing Committee is appointed to supervise G
and guide the working of the Expert Committee and to complete
the inventory and continue as Observers :
(i) Justice M.N. Krishnan. -Co-ordinator

H
1052 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A (ii) Mr. Marthanda Varma (or his special nominee) - Member
(iii) Secretary, Devaswom Department of - Member
Government of Kerala (or his special nominee).”
28. The Expert Committee constituted by this Court made an
B interim report, and furnished some additional information, based on which
following directions were passed by this Court in its Order dated
22.09.2011:-
“We have examined the interim report dated 17.8.2011 of the
Expert Committee and the additional information submitted on
C 12.9.2011. Having considered the said report and the submissions
of the parties, the following interim directions are issued:
SECURITY MEASURES
1.1) The Expert Committee has identified thirteen security issues
and suggested sixteen security measures to be put in place. A
D copy thereof has already been made available to the State
Government and the Temple Administration. The state government
has submitted the Security Technical Committee Report putting
forth an Integrated and Multi-Layered Security System for the
Temple, for our perusal. In view of security concerns, we do not
propose to extract either the security issues raised or the security
E
measures suggested by the Expert Committee or the secured
measures proposed by the state government.
1.2) The state government has submitted that it has the expertise
and capability to provide the necessary security measures; and it
is ready and willing to provide the same at its cost. The state
F
government has assured that it would spare no effort or cost to
provide the best security cover and has stated that there is no
need to indent the service of any central security force like CRPF
as suggested by the Expert Committee, for strengthening the
security. Having examined the Security Technical Committee
G Report furnished by the state government and its assurance to
put in place an Integrated Multi-layered Security System for the
Temple in a time-bound manner, we are satisfied that the state
government would be in a position to execute the security plan.
There is no need for the state government to requisition the services
of any central security agency.
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1053
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

1.3) The state government shall take note of the sixteen security A
measures that have been suggested by the Expert Committee in
its Interim Report dated 17.8.2011 and promptly implement the
Integrated Multi-layered Security System explained and suggested
in its Security Technical Committee Report. In implementing the
security system, the state government will take note of temple
B
traditions, customs and practices, and accommodate the views of
the temple administration as far as possible and feasible.
WORK PLAN
2.1) The Expert Committee has suggested ‘Digital Archiving of
Temple Antiques’ (for short ‘DATA’) to achieve the following : (i) C
Recording of detailed information after examination and assigning
an Antique Identification Number/Code; (ii) to store the information
in a computerized Data Base; (iii) recording of a 3D image of the
object and link it to the data base. The Expert Committee is
permitted to implement the said ‘DATA’ procedure.
D
2.2) The Expert Committee has recommended appointment of 6
Kerala State Electronic Corporation (KELTRON), a state
government undertaking with technical expertise from Vikram
Sarabhai Space Centre (VSSC), an unit of Department of Space,
for implementing the work plan. Having regard to the security
concerns and approval of the said agency by the state government, E
we accept the suggestion that the ‘DATA’ work should be executed
by the said government undertaking instead of inviting tenders
from private agencies.
2.3) KELTRON has estimated the cost of executing the work to
be Rs.3,16,35,000/- made up of Rs.1,65,35,000/- for hardware, F
Rs.40,00,000/- for software, and Rs.1,11,00,000/- for services and
miscellaneous items. The cost appears to be very high and far
exceeds the figures shown in the Interim Report. The feasibility
of borrowing/hiring the equipment can be considered. The software
cost and servicing cost requires drastic reduction. However, G
KELTRON being a state government undertaking and VSSC, the
technical expert being a unit of Department of Space, the Expert
Committee may proceed to entrust the work to KELTRON after
involving the state government in the process of negotiations relating
to cost and the schedule of payment. We do not propose to
H
1054 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A approve the said price. As the state government has to bear the
expenditure involved, it will take the final decision on the pricing
after negotiations, in consultation with the Expert Committee. The
state government shall nominate a Nodal Officer for this purpose,
failing which the Secretary, Devaswom Department shall be the
Nodal Officer.”
B
29. On 23.08.2012, Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned Senior
Advocate was appointed Amicus Curiae to assist the Court. The
learned Amicus Curiae in his report dated 01.11.2012 made
suggestions with regard to conservation, renovation and restoration.
During the course of his report, the learned Amicus Curiae made
C the following observations:
“29. In this context, it may be necessary to mention that the Sree
Padmanabha Swamy Temple is an integral part of the traditions
of the Royal family of the erstwhile State of Travancore and also
the people of Kerala (including the residents of the ancient city of
D Thiruvananthapuram). It is interesting to note that Ashwathi
Thirunal Gouri Lakshmi Bayi (one of the members of the Royal
family), in her book Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple published
by the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, interestingly refers to the Prakrit
version and the final Sanskrit version of Sree Anandapuram from
E Syanandoorapura. The Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple is
connected to twenty four holy teerthams and is also linked with
certain other temples, many of which are in the State of Tamil
Nadu. It may be noted that even today, Mathilakom records or
the palm leaves scrolls which recorded the ancient history of the
Temple and that of the erstwhile State of Travancore are available
F in the Temple premises and in the Kerala State Archives.
30. It must also be noted that the idol of Lord Padmanabha is
made using katu sharkara yogam (a complex mixture of 8 natural
ingredients) in which 12008 Salagramas were filled in. This idol
made using katu sharkara yogam was consecrated in the year
G 1739 under the aegis of the erstwhile ruler of Travancore, Veera
Marthanda Verma (1706-1758). Salagrama is not a mere stone
but a stone of longstanding tradition and spiritual potency in which
it is believed that Hari or Lord Vishnu resides (hence, yatha
salagrame hari). Thus, Eashwara or god manifests Himself in
H saguna forms in various ways – in the Salagrama as Vishnu, in
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1055
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

the lingam as Shiva and in the chakra as Devi (Mother Goddess). A
Usually, when 12 salagrama shilas are worshipped, it equals the
potency of a mahakshetram or a great temple. Therefore, the
sanctity of Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple is a thousand fold.
… … …
34. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to mention that the B
Travancore Royal family is also called the Venadu Raja Vamsha
which is the off-shoot of Chera roya lineage and the Ayi royal
dynasty, and has always regarded Lord Padmanabha Swamy as
their tutelory Deity and this is confirmed by many historical records
where Lord Padmanabha is addressed as C
‘yadavendrakuladaivatam’ or the family Deity of yadavakshatriyas
(the present Travancore royalty); thereby confirming that Sree
Padmanabha Swamy is the ‘kuladaivta’ of the entire family. It
may be noted that devotees other than royalty have worshipped
Lord Padmanabha Swamy as their ‘ishta daivta’ or God of one’s
personal choice. D

35. It was in 1731 A.D. that the first King of the erstwhile
Travancore Royal family, Sree Veera Marthnda Varma, was
anointed. He was succeeded by Rama Varma (1758-1798).
Moreover, the Royal family consisted of deeply devoted members
who were dedicated to the Temple and who believed that their E
lives centred around Sree Padmanabha Swamy. In 1750 A.D.,
the entire State of Travancore was gifted to this Deity by a Deed
and the Rulers became servants of the Lord, calling themselves
as Padmanabhadasa. It may also be noted that many of the
Maharajas were great composers of shlokas as well as music. In F
fact, many of the Rulers were protectors of the Vedas and the
vedic tradition. Further, the Temple was governed by a council of
trustees called Ettara Yogam headed by the King.
36. One of the greatest Kings of the Royal family was Sri Swathi
Thirunal Maharaja Rama Varma (1813-1846) who was a great G
patron of the arts, literature, music and modern science. He was
an extraordinary King who presented an incorruptible system of
governance, framed the first code of regulations of Travancore,
advanced English education, contributed to a collection of rare
manuscripts and undertook a large number of social welfare
measures. In fact, Sri Swathi Thirnal is regarded as one of the H
1056 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A four great vidwans of Carnatic music – they being Muthuswamy
Dikshitar, Thyagaraja, Shyamasastry and Swati Thirunal. The
Kings including Sri Swathi Thirunal donated their personal wealth
to the Temple and, as recorded by Dr. Ventkata Subramanya Iyer
in his brilliant book ‘Swathi Thirunal and his music’, during his
eventful life, once when one of his courtesans presented a varnam
B
in his honour, the King directed that it should not be used because
only Lord Padmanabha Swamy must be lauded with music.
… … …
38. In the submission of the Amicus Curiae, this Temple is one of
C the most ancient temples of Maha Vishnu and is priceless. The
Amicus Curiae however noticed that urgent measures are required
for the protection, preservation as well as the proper and effective
management of the Temple. Thus, it may be added that the sprit
underlying the judgment of the Kerala High Court as well as the
various interim orders passed by this Hon’ble Court is to preserve,
D protect and manage the Temple along with inventorying all the
treasures which are contained in the Temple.
39. The Amicus Curiae noted that the various Kallaras or vaults
are an integral part of the Temple structure itself. In order to
show the same, the Amicus Curiae is annexing a copy of a plan
E which indicates where Sree Padmanabha Swamy in the Sreekovil
(sanctum) is residing and there is a mandapam outside and by the
side of Narasimha Murthy is Kallara ‘A’ adjoined by Kallara ‘B’.
While Kallaras ‘C’ and ‘D’ are on the other side of the Sreekovil.
Kallaras ‘E’ and ‘F’ are close to the sanctum. The said map / plan
F is annexed to this report and marked as Annexure B.
40. The treasures which are contained in these Kallaras are the
continued offerings of the Royal family including the offerings of
other devotees. It may also be noted that the priceless jewels are
intended for alankara of the Lord, gold ornaments, gold utensils
G and many priceless treasures are also to be found in these Kallaras,
including priceless gems and coins. Thus, there can hardly be any
doubt that all the treasures of the Temple belong to the Temple
Deity, i.e. to Sree Padmanabha Swamy and nobody can claim
otherwise (in fact, in the temples of South India, it is customary
for people to offer various ornaments of gold and silver in temples
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1057
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

which are then kept separately in those temples). No person must A
be allowed to take the riches of the Temple outside for any
extraneous purpose. The Amicus Curiae is of the opinion that
considering the stand of the State of Kerala as reflected in its
written statement filed in O.S. No.625 of 2007 before the Civil
Court in Thiruvananthapuram and the interaction which the Amicus
B
Curiae had with the Chief Minister, it is clear that the State would
not do anything by which any of the treasures of the Temple are
utilised for any extraneous purpose or for any prupose unconnected
with the Deity/Temple.”
30. In its Order dated 13.02.2013, this Court observed:-
C
“2. Section 20 of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious
Institutions Act, 1950 provides that there shall be a committee to
advise the Ruler of Travancore in the discharge of his functions.
The Committee shall be known as “Sree Padmanabhaswamy
Temple Committee” and composed of three Hindu members
nominated by the Ruler of Travancore. The tenure of the members D
of the Committee may be determined by the Ruler.
3. We are informed by Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel,
that the Committee on January 8, 2013 resolved that the Trustee
may appoint a nominee of his choice to report the conduct of
administration and to act according to the directions by the Trustee E
from time to time.
4. Pursuant to the above resolution, we are further informed that
the Ruler (trustee) has nominated Mr. Adithya Varma as his
honorary nominee to report on the conduct of administration of
Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple and to act according to the F
directions issued from time to time.
5. Mr. K.K. Venugopal also informed us that within 10 days from
today, the Executive Officer shall be appointed along with one
Assistant Executive Officer and as suggested by Mr. Gopal
Subramanium, learned Amicus Curiae, Mr. Gautam Padmanabhan G
shall be appointed as Assistant Executive Officer.
6. We accept the above statements of Mr. K.K. Venugopal.”
By its Order dated 11.12.2013, this Court appointed a Conservation
and Restoration Committee to coordinate with Sri Kanippayyoor Sankaran
H
1058 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A Namboothiripadu and Thantri of the Temple to supervise the conservation,
restoration and renovation work.
After the death of the original appellant No.1 – Uthradam Thirunal
Marthanda Varma, his successor Moolam Thirunal Rama Varma was
impleaded in his place vide Order dated 09.04.2014.
B 31. On 15.04.2014, a further Report was filed by the learned
Amicus Curiae along with his recommendations touching upon various
issues and topics including General Administration, Conservation of
Structures within the Temple, Security Arrangements, Special Audit of
the Temple. He suggested that Special Audit of the Temple be conducted
C for the last 25 years. He also made recommendations with regard to the
security of Temple Property, contents of Kallaras.
32. An Administrative Committee came to be constituted as
reflected in the Order dated 24.04.2014. The Order also directed special
audit of the Temple to be conducted. The Order stated:-
D “Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel for the petitioners
in SLP (C) Nos. 11295 of 2011 and 12361 of 2011 submits that the
Executive Officer and Administrative Officer of the Sree
Padmanabha Swamy Temple (for short “Temple”) have voluntarily
desired to go on leave for four months.
E 2. We accept his statement.
3. Mr. K.N. Satheesh, IAS, Director, Higher Secondary Education,
Government of Kerala is, for the time being, appointed as the
Executive Officer of the Temple until further orders.
4. By way of interim measure, an Administrative Committee to
F
discharge day-to-day functions relating to the Temple is constituted.
The Administrative Committee shall comprise of:
(i) District Judge, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, if he is Hindu and
if he does not happen to be Hindu, then senior most Additional
District Judge of that District. The District Judge or Additional
G District Judge, as the case may be, shall be the Chairman of the
Administrative Committee.
(ii) Tantri S/Shri Satish Namboodiri, Saji Namboodiri, Kuttan
Namboodiri.

H (iii) Chief Nambi of the Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple.
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1059
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

(iv) Two members to be co-opted by the District Judge, one of A
whom shall be co- opted in consultation with the Government of
Kerala.
5. The keys of all the kallaras except kallaras “E” and “F” shall
be handed over to the Chairman of the Administrative Committee
forthwith. B
6. The keys of the two Mudalpadi rooms (designated in the Report
as Kallaras ’G’ and ’H’) shall also be handed over to the Chairman
of the Administrative Committee forthwith.
7. The Administrative Committee shall immediately address the
following issues: C

(a) Protection of Kannikaipura and its surveillance by installing
CCTV cameras and other related issues;
(b) The collection of Kanikkai shall be accounted at least once
a week, preferably every Saturday in the presence of the D
Chairman of the Administrative Committee;
(c) Cleaning of the passage above the Kallaras within the
Sreekovil;
(d) Cleaning of Temple tanks (Mitranandapuram and
Padmateertham) in a time bound manner by a credible agency; E
(e) Improvement in living conditions of police personnels
guarding the Temple;
(f) Any other issue which may be brought to the knowledge of
the Chairman, Administrative Committee by the learned Amicus
Curiae or State Government or Trustee. F

8. A special audit of the Temple and its properties shall be
conducted as early as may be possible, preferably by Shri Vinod
Rai, former Comptroller and Auditor General of India. He will be
at liberty to take services/assistance of any other person/persons
in completion of this task. G

9. Until further orders, no property of the Temple shall be alienated
or transferred or disposed of in any manner whatsoever.”
33. On 06.11.2014, an affidavit was filed by the Chief Secretary
of the State submitting:-
H
1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A “6. It is submitted that Shree Padmanabaswamy Temple
(“Temple”), was initially part of the erstwhile Princely State of
Travancore and successive Rulers in the erstwhile Princely State
of Travancore, considered Lord Padmanabha as their deity. On
16.04.1960, the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions
Act, 1950, was enacted on the basis of Article 8 of the Covenant
B
dated 01.07.1949 entered into between the Rulers of Travancore
and Cochin for the formation of the United State of Travancore
and Cochin.
… … …
C 8. It is thus submitted that, the administration of the Temple, Sree
Pandaravaka properties, all other properties and funds of the
Temple were vested in Trust with the Ruler of Travancore.
9. It is submitted that Sri Chithira Thirunal Maharaja, was the last
Ruler and after his demise on 19.07.1991, the administration of
D the Temple was assumed by his brother, the late Sri Marthanda
Varma, who was the Original Petitioner before this Hon’ble Court,
however now deceased.
… … …

E
12.Further, it was also submitted before the Sub-Court by the
Government that there are so many Temples in the State, for
instance Attukal Bhagavathi Temple in Trivandrum, Chakkulathu
Kavu in Alappuzha District etc. which are managed well by private
or family trusts. Therefore, the Government endorsed and
F supported the stand of the Defendant therein, i.e. the erstwhile
royal Family represented by Sree Marthanda Varma, that the
administration of the Temple shall continue to be conducted by
the erstwhile royal Family.
… … …
G 18. It is submitted in the affidavit dated 23.04.2014, Sree Mulam
Thirunal has inter alia informed this Hon’ble Court in paragraph
8 of the said affidavit as follows:-
“It is only when Valiya Thampuram Sri Utharadom Thirunal
Marthanda Varma decided to file the Special Leave Petition
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1061
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

against the present impugned Judgment of the High Court, that A
he was strongly advised to give up his stand that the temple is
a private temple which vested in the family, and, on the other
hand, to take the stand that the temple is a public temple…”
… … …
20. It is submitted that with the coming into force of the Instrument B
of Accession referred to above, as held by the Hon’ble High Court
in the impugned judgment, the term “Ruler” as appearing in Section
18 in the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act and
Article 290-A of the Constitution of India is not a heritable right to
be continued ad infinitum. With the passing away of the last C
Ruler Sree Chithirathirunal Balaramavarma, Ruler and Rulership
are no more valid and legally sustainable.
21. However, it is categorically submitted that at no point of time
has the Government claimed the wealth to be Government property,
nor do they intend to lay claim ownership of the said property. On D
the other hand, the Government states that the wealth is exclusively
the temple property and it is inalienable except for the benefit of
the temple and the devotees of the temple.
… … …
24. The answering respondent is also prepared to examine the E
feasibility of bringing forward legislation preferably on the lines of
the Guruvayur Devaswom Act, 1978 for the said purpose. As per
the said Act, there is a nine member Committee called the
Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee of which, three are
permanent members. The three permanent members include the F
Zamorin Raja of Calicut, The Karanavan of Mallissery Illam (head
of the Mallissery family) and the Thanthri. Six non-permanent
members are nominated by the Hindus among the Council of
Ministers, which includes a representative of the employees of
the Devaswom and a person belonging to the scheduled caste.
The Government is ready to carry out the necessary study in this G
regard.
25. It is submitted that if the Guruvayur model is replicated in the
case of Sree Padmanabha Swami Temple, then the erstwhile royal
family of Travancore can be given representation in the Managing
H
1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A Committee by reserving one slot on a permanent basis and the
Thanthri could be the other permanent Member.”
34. The Order dated 05.05.2015 passed by this Court noted the
submission of the learned Amicus Curiae that an audit be conducted
with regard to the account of Padmanabhaswamy Temple Trust and its
B properties. It also noted the submission of appellants that a special audit
for the period had already been conducted, but he would not have any
objection in cooperating with Mr. Rai. The Order, therefore, directed:-
“In the circumstances, therefore, we direct that a copy of the
audit report filed on behalf of the Padmanabhan Swamy Trust in
C this court for the period 01.04.2008 shall be forwarded to Mr. Rai
for his perusal and evaluation. We further direct that in case Mr.
Rai upon consideration of the audit already conducted is of the
opinion that a fresh/special audit needs to be conducted for the
period 01.04.2008 onwards he shall be free to undertake that
exercise in which case the Trust shall make available all such
D information and record as may be necessary for completion of
that exercise. Mr. Rai will also do well to raise any query that
may be relevant for completion of the audit to enable the trust to
answer them. We extend the time for completion of the audit till
31.12.2015.
E We permit the State Government to approach the Expert
Committee for scaling down the staff deployed for inventorisation
and archiving of antiques and artifacts by KELTRON and Expert
Committee who may upon consideration of any such request issue
appropriate orders in that regard.
F Mr. Rai has in terms of communication dated 1.04.2015 raised a
demand for a sum of Rs. 45,00,000/- representing the total fee
including expenses etc. for the period up to December, 2015. There
is no objection by any one appearing for the parties to the release
of the said amount in favour of Mr. Rai. We accordingly direct
G the Administrative Committee to release the amount billed by Mr.
Rai.”
35. The Order dated 09.10.2015 noted the submissions with regard
to customary form of awakening Lord Padmanabhaswamy in the
morning, and left the issue to be decided by the religious head of the
Temple as under:-
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1063
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

“… …Having heard learned senior counsel for the parties on this A
aspect of the matter, we are of the opinion that the issue could be
more appropriately left to be examined and resolved by the religious
head of the temple. It is common ground that Tharananellur Sri
Parameswaran Namboodiripad, is the Chief Thanthri of the
temple. In our opinion, and as fairly conceded by learned senior
B
counsel appearing for the parties including Mr. Subramanium,
learned amicus curiae, all matters concerning permissible rituals,
customary practices and pujas to be performed including the mode
of awakening the Lord in the morning ought to be left to be
determined by the Chief Priest (Thanthri) Tharananellur Sri
Parameswaran Namboodiripad in his capacity as the Chief C
Thanthri of the temple. We accordingly do so. We make it clear
that Mr. Subramanium has categorically stated that he had never
mandated any change in the customary practices in the temple
and that it is a matter that can indeed be left to the Chief Priest
(Thanthri) Tharananellur Sri Parameswaran Namboodiripad,
D
mentioned above to determine. It follows that the question whether
verses “Venkatesha Suprabhatam” should or should not be recited
in the morning for awakening the Lord is a matter left to be
determined by the Chief Priest (Thanthri) Tharananellur Sri
Parameswaran Namboodiripad. … …”
36. In March 2016, Report about Special Audit of Sree E
Padmanabhaswamy Temple, its properties and Sree Padmanabha Swamy
Temple Trust was filed by Mr. Vinod Rai, running into two volumes
along with “Major Audit- Observations and Recommendations”.
The Administrative Committee appointed by this Court resolved
on 13.06.2017 as under:- F

“the Committee is in the darkness on the financial position of
the temple. Quarterly budget proposals should be prepared
and communicated to the Committee. Similarly, monthly
accounts statement should be placed before the Committee
before 10th of every succeeding month. The matter will be G
communicated to the Executive Officer.”
The resolution was communicated to the Executive Officer.
37. The Order dated 04.07.2017 passed by this Court noted that
by consensus Mr. V. Ratheesan, IAS, was nominated as Executive
H
1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A Officer and he assumed charge on 18.06.2017. Said Order recorded the
earlier directions issued on 09.05.2017 with regard to the essential repairs
and while constituting Conservation Committee and Selection Committee,
following directions were issued:-
“5. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the rival
B contentions advanced by the learned counsel, we are of the view
that the security arrangements presently in place should be allowed
to continue with the rider that the entire responsibility of securing
the properties and the assets of the temple will remain with the
Superintendent of Police, who is the person in-charge of the
responsibility.
C
6. Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned amicus curiae further pointed
out that the working relationship between the Administrative
Committee and the Executive Officer needs to be clearly defined.
7. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the rival parties
D were agreeable that this Court clarifies, that the Administrative
Committee shall be in-charge of taking policy decisions as well as
in regard to the manner of functioning of the temple, and that, the
directions issued by the Executive Committee shall be implemented
by the Executive Officer. It was also submitted that the Executive
Officer be made Member Secretary of the Administrative
E Committee - to whom he should be answerable. We order
accordingly. We also hereby further direct, that the Executive
Officer as Member Secretary, shall discharge his duties wholetime.
In this behalf, we would make a request to the State of Kerala to
approve the aforesaid arrangement within two weeks from today.
F 8. It was also submitted by the learned amicus curiae, that even
though there is a process in vogue whereby accounts of the temple
and the trust are maintained, yet they are not subjected to any
supervision and control. It was pointed out, that the appointment
of a financial controller would lend credibility to the process of
G incurring expenses and maintenance of accounts. On examining
the instant issue with the concurrence of learned counsel
representing the rival parties, we request the State of Kerala to
nominate a panel of three officers from the Indian Audit and
Accounts Service, to overlook the audit and accounts of the temple,
and to submit quarterly reports to the Administrative Committee,
H for implementation of such suggestions as may be made in the
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1065
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

report. We also hereby direct the same officer, nominated by the A
State Government as has been approved by the Administrative
Committee, to audit the accounts of Shri Padmanabhaswamy
Temple Trust and to submit similar reports to the Administrative
Committee. We, therefore, hereby request the State of Kerala to
submit its panel, for the consideration of the Administrative
B
Committee, within four weeks.
9. The next contention of Mr.Gopal Subramanium, Senior
Advocate and learned amicus curiae was, that an immediate
inspection of the Moolabimbams needs to be carried out, so that
effective repairs can be made to the deity before the onset of
Dakshinayana (which commences from 15/16.07.2017). In this C
behalf, we are aware of the order passed by us on 09.05.2017
wherein we had recorded as under:
“4. A Committee of experts comprising Vezhapparambu
Namboodripad, Satheesh Ezhumtholi and Cheruvally would
undertake a complete inspection of the Moolabimbams and D
advise a suitable course of action. This should be done in
conjunction with Kanipayyoor Shri Krishnan Namboodripad.
The Kadusarkara repairs and repairs to the Moolavigrahas,
referred to in the orders of this Court dated 20.03.2017 and
18.04.2017, must be undertaken conjointly by the said persons, E
in consultation with the Tantris, wherever necessary. They shall
mutually agree on a Chairman, who may be made responsible
for the work undertaken.
5. In the background of the above, the amicus curiae submitted,
that the inspection and repairs may be permitted to be undertaken F
conjointly by the said persons. They will be at liberty to appoint
any artisan/expert, who may have knowledge of Kadusarkara
for the said purpose. The same should be undertaken at the
earliest, without compromising with any customs and rituals at
the Temple. We accept the submissions recorded above, and
order accordingly.” G
10. Since a request to carry out repairs of the deity was personally
made by this Court, we would expect the experts to carry out the
responsibilities vested in them, so that the work commences before
the onset of Dakshinayana. If for some reason, one or the other
H
1066 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A expert is not in a position to undertake the obligations, the
Administrative Committee shall ensure that the same shall be
carried out by the remaining experts. It remains the earnest desire
of this Court, that the repairs of the deity are commenced
expeditiously, as stated above, and are concluded at the earliest.
The suggestions of the experts indicating the manner of carrying
B
out the repairs will be supported financially by the Administrative
Committee. Learned counsel for the rival parties, shall convey to
the experts, the above desire expressed by this Court.
11. Learned counsel for the rival parties are ad-idem that the
responsibility vested with the Overseeing Committee has been
C discharged, and as such, the Committee may be dissolved. We
order accordingly. It was however pointed out, that some of the
responsibilities of the Overseeing Committee were delegated to
the Expert Committee. The Expert Committee has also
substantially completed its task. However, an inventory of the
D Kallara B is yet to be prepared, which shall be prepared only
after express direction of this Court.
12. Finally, at the joint request of learned counsel for the rival
parties, the Conservation Committee is re-constituted as under:
1. Dr.Velayudhan Nair
E
2. Mr.S.Ramamurthy (Archaeologist)
3. Mr.Sharat Sunder R
4. Mr.V.Ratheesan
13. In our motion bench order dated 09.05.2017, we had constituted
F
a Selection Committee for the Sreekovil and other allied works by
recording as under:
“6. It was further submitted, that the Selection Committee, for
the Sreekovil and other allied works, which has been mutually
agreed, should consist of :
G
a. Shri Kanipayyoor Shri Krishnan Namboodripad;
b. Dr. M. Velayuthan Nair
c. Shri S. Ramamurthy (Archaeologist)
d. Shri Sharath Sunder R., (Suggested by Shri KK
H
Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel).
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1067
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

The said committee be permitted to choose the most suitable A
persons, at the best competitive prices and subject to ratification
by the Administrative Committee, award the work. Allowed
as prayed.”
14. It was submitted, that the aforesaid Selection Committee has
not finalised the most suitable persons for carrying out the B
Sreekovil, and other allied works. In order to expedite the
finalisation of choosing the most suitable persons, we consider it
just and appropriate to request and appoint Hon’ble Mr.Justice
K.S.P.Radhakrishnan, a retired Judge of this Court, as the
Chairman of the Selection Committee, contemplated in paragraph
6 of the motion bench order dated 09.05.2017 (extracted above). C
For the responsibility vested in him, Hon’ble Mr.Justice
K.S.P.Radhakrishnan (Retd.) shall be at liberty to fix his own
honorarium and terms and conditions, which shall be honoured by
the temple.”
38. In these appeals we heard Mr. Krishnan Venugopal, learned D
Senior Advocate for the appellant No.1 and Mr. Arvind P. Datar, learned
Senior Advocate for the appellant No.2; Mr. M.K.S. Menon and Mr. J.
Sai Deepak, learned Advocates for the Intervenors supporting the
appellants; Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior Advocate for the State
and Mr. P.B. Suresh, learned Advocate for respondents 3, 4 and 6 in E
appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.12361 of 2011.
39. Mr. Krishnan Venugopal, learned Senior Advocate submitted:-
“A. The Covenant and the Act are not the source of the Trust but
only recognize pre-existing rights of the Ruler to manage the
Temple and regulate that right to the limited extent of providing F
that the Ruler as Trustee shall control and supervise the
administration of the Temple through an Executive Officer and
an Advisory Committee appointed/selected by him.
B. Factually, there is no dispute that it is the Rulers of Travancore
who founded and endowed the Temple and thereafter have G
managed it without interruption for several centuries.”
Reliance was placed on the expressions in Article VIII(b) of the
Covenant and Section 18(2) of TC Act and other material including
excerpts from a book titled “Travancore” by Emily Gilchrist Hatch15 :-
15 Published by Oxford University Press, 1939 H
1068 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A “C. The only requirement for validly creating a Hindu religious
endowment in favour of an idol or temple is that the settlor must
clearly and unambiguously express his intention in that behalf.
D. The Trustee’s relationship with the Temple is in the nature of a
shebaitship which is also a “trust” in its broad and general sense
B as signifying a fiduciary relation under which a person having
control over a property is bound to use that property for specified
objects.”
It was submitted that the appellant No.1 was not making any
claim to the ownership of the Temple but was only seeking his right to
C manage the Temple:-
“E. Shebaitship devolves upon the heirs of the founder absent
any contrary usage or custom.
F. In the present case, the custom and usage by which the
trusteeship of the Temple devolves is the marumakkathayam
D law.”
And lastly it was submitted :-
“G. The definition of ‘Ruler’ in Article 366 (22) is only for purposes
of Constitution and not for any other statute.
E H. The administration of temples by the erstwhile Maharaja of
Travancore was only as a trustee and not by virtue of regal or
sovereign power.”
40. Mr. Arvind P. Datar, learned Senior Advocate submitted that
the judgment under appeal had gone way beyond the pleadings and dealt
F with issues having far reaching consequences in the absence of any
pleadings. He stressed upon the expression “present Ruler” appearing
in Article IV of the Covenant as against the term “Ruler” occurring at
other places in the Covenant and submitted that the term “Ruler” must
mean the Ruler who succeeded to the gaddi as per custom and usage.
He further submitted:-
G
“Article 362 only required the legislature to take note of the
covenants, agreements and other documents, which were signed
with the Rulers while enacting laws. Accordingly, provisions relating
to exemption from taxation, preservation of method of succession
etc. were made to the Income Tax Act, 1922, Income Tax Act,
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1069
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

1961, Wealth Tax Act, 1957 etc. Significantly, section 5(ii) of the A
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 also preserved the Rules of
Succession for Rulers and specifically stated that the provisions
of this Act would not apply to the States which were covered by
the covenants or agreement with the Rulers. Other examples are
provisions in the CPC and Cr.P.C. granting certain exemption to
B
Rulers…….
… … …
It is significant that despite the abolition of the Privy Purses by
the Constitution (26th Amendment) Act, 1971, several of these
exemptions have continued till date. If the concept of Rulers had C
been totally abolished, then there would not have been exemption
from income, property tax, wealth tax etc. to all the 555 Rulers
who signed the covenants or agreements. Such a condition is
wholly untenable. [See The Rulers of Indian States (Abolition of
Privileges) Act, 1972, which continued several benefits to the
“Rulers”.]” D

He then relied upon the provisions of Article 363 of the Constitution
to submit:-
“Therefore, there is a bar under Article 363 to entertain the
dispute. This has not been discussed by the High Court. These E
covenants were signed by the Secretary to the Government of
India and indicated that the covenants are in the nature of an Act
of a State and the municipal court could not have jurisdiction over
any disputes arising out of its terms.
In Sawai Tej Singhji of Alwar v. Union of India16, the bar of F
Article 363 was held to apply even to an eviction suit of certain
buildings referred to in a letter written in pursuance of the Rajasthan
covenant. The suit was filed by the Maharaja. By the same analogy,
the writ petition on the question of Rulership would directly be
covered by the bar under Article 363.”
G
41. Mr. M.K.S. Menon, learned Advocate appearing for some of
the members of the royal family of Travancore as intervenors submitted
that the Constitution, as amended by the Constitution (Twenty Sixth
Amendment) Act, 1971 extinguished the rights, liabilities and obligations
16 (1979) 1 SCC 512 H
1070 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A pertaining to the Privy Purses alone, and would not impact the mode of
succession to the office of a trustee; and that the expression “Ruler of
Travancore” in Section 18 of the TC Act was not to limit the trusteeship
to the “Last Ruler of Travancore”.
42. Mr. J. Sai Deepak, learned Advocate appearing for Intervenors
B including Thantri of the Temple who is stated to be the final authority on
the religious practices and traditions of the Temple and “People for
Dharma” who had intervened and assisted this Court in the Sabrimala
case relied upon documents such as “Kerala Mahatmyam”, Book of
Princess Gouri Lakshmi Bayi2, Book titled “History of Travancore from
the Earliest Times”17 and the “Travancore State Manual”18 to stress the
C special relationship of the Rulers of Travancore as “Padmanabhadasas”
with Sri Padmanabhaswamy. He submitted that the ruling family traces
its lineage to Maharaja Aditya on whom Bhagwan Parshurama is believed
to have bestowed the duty to take care of the Temple and that the role
played by the royal family as descendants of Maharaja Aditya and as
D “Padmanabhadasas” being essential and integral to the very founding
and identity of the Temple, would be fully protected by Articles 25(1)
and 26(b) of the Constitution. He further submitted that “Parashurama
Padhati” being practised by a handful of temples in the World including
the Temple, said Padhati having a distinct identity of its own, and the
people being integrally connected to the Temple would be entitled to
E protection under Article 29(1) of the Constitution. In his submission, Article
VIII of the Covenant is a stand-alone recognition of the relationship
between the Ruler of Travancore and the Temple; that said Article is
neither part of the Privy Purse arrangement under Article XIV nor part
of the personal rights, privileges, dignities and titles of the Ruler as referred
F to in Article XVII of the Covenant; and therefore any development or
operation of law affecting other provisions of the Covenant would not
affect Article VIII of the Covenant. It was further submitted that the
expression “arising out of” in Article 363 of the Constitution being of the
widest amplitude, disputes having any connection with the Covenant
would be beyond the scope of judicial review by virtue of Article 363(1)
G of the Constitution. In support of the submission, reliance was placed on

17 Authored by P. Shungoonny Menon, Dewan Peishcar of Travancore and published
in 1878
18 Authored by V. Nagam Aiya, Dewan Peishcar of Travancore and published in 1906

H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1071
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

the decision of this Court in Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. vs. General A
Electric Company and Ors.19
43. In response, Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior Advocate for
the State submitted that two sets of issues arise for consideration:
A) The true and correct definition of the word “Ruler” in Section
18(2) of TC Act. B

B) Allegations of mismanagement of the Temple.
Since the reports of the learned Amicus Curiae and of Mr. Vinod
Rai were not dealt with by the learned counsel for the appellants in their
opening submissions, Mr. Gupta deferred submissions regarding the C
second issue, till the appellants were heard on the said Reports. As regards
the first issue, he submitted:-
i) The expression “Ruler” was repeatedly used in the Covenant in
the context of head of the State and the expression “Ruler” in Article
VIII(b) must have the same meaning. D
ii) The expression “Ruler” in Section 18 of the TC Act must be
given the same meaning as the one contained in Article 366(22) of the
Constitution and not as referring to senior members of successive
generations of the royal family of Travancore.
iii) The material on record including that concerning dedication of E
the State to the deity by the then Ruler did not satisfy the elements
necessary to constitute an endowment, which would require the
appropriation of specific property for a specific religious or charitable
purpose.
For this proposition, reliance was placed on the decisions of this F
Court in Profulla Chorone Requitte v. Satya Chorone Requitte 20 and
in Angurbala Mullick vs. Debabrata Mullick21.
iv) As the family of the appellant No.1 did not claim any proprietary
right even of a limited nature, there could not have been any shebaitship
in favour of said family at any point of time and at best it would amount G
to hereditary trusteeship.

19 AIR (1985) SC 1156 : (1984) 4 SCC 679
20 (1979) 3 SCC 409
21 AIR 1951 SC 293 : (1951) SCR 1125
H
1072 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A v) Whatever be the nature of relationship between the Ruler of
Travancore and the Temple, right from inception, the office devolved
upon the Ruler in his capacity as a Ruler and not as a private individual
being the senior member of the ruling family of Travancore.
vi) The relationship underwent a change after the enactment of
B the TC Act; it became a statutory office and ceased to be in the nature
of private shebaitship or hereditary trusteeship of any kind.
vii) In any case, such relationship was with the Ruler of Travancore
as Ruler and with the abolition of the concept of Ruler by the Constitution
(Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971, it ceased to have any effect.
C viii) The bar under Article 363 of the Constitution would not get
attracted in the instant case.
With regard to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel
appearing for the Intervenors, it was submitted that in the absence of a
claim by a properly constituted Religious Denomination, there would be
D no question of adjudicating or giving a finding regarding violation of any
rights under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. In his submission,
there would be no occasion to enter into the question whether or not the
Temple is of a Denominational character; and in any case the relationship
between the Ruler of Travancore and the Temple cannot be said to be
E an essential or integral part of the Hindu religion in general.
44. Mr. Gupta, leaned Senior Advocate also submitted a chart
giving details about the expenditure incurred by the State in connection
with the Temple. Leaving out the annual contribution that the State is
required to extend, the Chart shows expenditure incurred in the sum of
F Rs.11,70,11,000/- for the period 2012-2019 as under:-
Y ea r Govt. O rde r N o. Ite m Amount
2012 2. G.O . (R t) Fund to D ig ital A rchiving of 2.5 crores
No.240/20 12/R D Antiq ues a nd artifacts-K eltron
Dated 12.01.2012

3. G.O . (R t) Fund to E xpert C om m itte e Sree 50 lak hs
No.1859/2 012/R D P a danabha Swamy Temple
Dated 29.03.2012
G 4. G.O . (R t) Fund for Stre ngthen ing K allara -A at 54 lak hs
No.6668/2 012/R D Sree P admanabha Swamy Te mp le –
Dated 22.11.2012 Expert C omm ittee
2013 2. G.O . (R t) Visit of P rof. B abu, D elhi U n iversit y 30
No.4426/2 013/R D to P a dmatheertham pond thousand
Dated 02.08.2013
Addit iona l F und to D ig ita l A rchiv in g
3. G.O . (R t) of Antiq ues and artifacts- Keltron 86.39 lakhs
No.6542/2 013/R D
H Dated 09.12.2013
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1073
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

2014 1. G.O. (Rt.) Fund to Expert Committee Sree 1 Crore A
No.1821/2014/ RD Padmanabha Swamy Temple
Dated 07.05.2014

2. G.O. (Rt.) Fund for Strengthening Kallara -A at 67.65 lakhs
No.1843/2014/ RD Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple –
Dated 12.05.2014 Expert Committee
66.16 lakhs
3. G.O. (Rt.) Additional Fund to Digita l Archiving B
No.4308/2014/ RD of Antiques and artifacts – Keltron
Dated 02.09.2014 48 lakhs
Fund allotted to Audit Committee
4. G.O. (Rt.)
No.4980/2014/ RD
Dated 16.10.2014
2015 1. G.O. (Rt.) Renovation of Padma Theertham 1 Crore
No.09/2015/ RD pond C
Dated 05.01.2015

2. G.O. (Rt.) Additional Fund to Digita l Archiving 30.36 lakhs
No.3133/2015/ RD of Antiques and artifacts – Keltron
Dated 18.06.2015
Additional Fund to Digita l Archiving
4. G.O. (Rt.) of antiques and artifacts – Keltron 1.5125
D
No.6506/2015/ RD crore
Dated 05.12.2015
2016 G.O. (Rt) Fund to Expert Committee 10 lakhs
No.608/2016/RD
Dated 27.01.2016
2017 2. G.O. (Rt) Fund to Expert Committee 5 lakhs
No.861/2017/RD E
Dated 02.03.2017

3. G.O. (Rt) Renovation of Mithrananthapuram 1 Crore
No.2057/2017/RD pond
Dated 01.05.2017

4. G.O. (Rt) Sewerline from Ramana Madom near 28 lakhs
No.4555/2017/RD north Nada of the Temple – Water F
Dated 30.10.2017 Authority
2019 1. G.O. (Rt) Digita l Archiving of Antiques and 18 lakhs
No.123/2019/RD artifacts – C- Dit (To Executive
Dated 10.01.2019 Officer)

2. G.O. (Rt) Fund to Expert Committee 5 lakhs
No.124/2019/RD
Dated 10.01.2019 G

Thus, Rs.6,02,16,000/- were spent on Digital Archiving of Antiques
and Artifacts; Rs.1,21,65,000/- were spent on strengthening Kallara ‘A’
at the Temple; Rs.1,20,00,000/- were allotted to the Expert Committee;
Rs.48,00,000/- were allotted to the Audit Committee, while Rs.2,00,00,000/
- were spent on renovation of two ponds. H
1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A 45. Mr. P.B. Suresh, the learned counsel for respondents 3, 4 and
6 in appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.12361 of
2011 submitted:-
i) The Covenants executed by the erstwhile Rulers have no
existence and are not enforceable. Reliance was placed on the decision
B of this Court in Raghunathrao Ganpatrao14.
ii) Sections 18(2) and 20 of the TC Act, being against the principles
and mandate emanating from Article 363A of the Constitution, are not
enforceable. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Deep
Chand and Others vs. State of U.P. and others22.
C iii) Consequently, no declaratory relief could be sought in respect
of statutory provisions which have ceased to be valid.
iv) Exclusive private management of a public temple would be
antithesis to the very character of a public temple. Reliance was placed
on the decision of this Court in Bala Shankar Mahashankar Bhattjee
D and others vs. Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State23.
46. Thereafter, the learned counsel for the parties advanced
submissions with regard to the Reports of the learned Amicus Curiae
and Mr. Vinod Rai. This exercise involved entering into various factual
issues for the first time in this Court. Since no adequate opportunity was
E afforded to various stakeholders involved in the matter, we refrain from
considering the issues arising from said Reports.
47. In the end, a Note was given by the learned counsel for the
appellants about the composition of Committees to take care of the affairs
of the Temple. The Note was essentially in response to the affidavit of
F the Chief Secretary of the State which was filed on 06.11.2014. The
Note suggested constitution of an Administrative Committee and an
Advisory Committee as under:-
“1.The Petitioner, hereinafter referred to as the “Trustee”,is
placing below for the consideration of this Hon’ble Court his
G proposal for the control and supervision of the affairs of Sree
Padmanabhaswamy Temple (the “Temple”). The Petitioner will
file an appropriate undertaking in terms of the proposal with such
modifications as may be directed by this Hon’ble Court.
22 (1959) Supp 2 SCR 8
H
23 (1995) Supp 1 SCC 485
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1075
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

2. The Trustee shall delegate his powers of administration under A
Section 18(2) of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious
Institutions Act, 1950 (the “Act”) to a Committee (the
“Administrative Committee”) which shall administer the
Temple through an Executive Officer to be appointed by the
Committee.
B
3. The administrative Committee shall consist of five members:
a) a retired Indian Administrative Service Officer of the rank of
Secretary to Government of Kerala (“the State Government”)
to be nominated by the Trustee in consultation with Government
of Kerala who shall be the Chairperson of the Committee; C
(b) one member nominated by the trustee;
(c) one member nominated by the Government of Kerala;
(d) one member nominated by the Ministry of Culture, Government
of India; and D
(e) the Chief Thantri of the temple.
4. All members of the Administrative Committee shall be Hindus,
who shall satisfy the requirements under the proviso to Section
2(aa) of the Act, as amended, for being appointed as members of
the Travancore Devaswom Board. E
… … …
8. On all policy matters relating to temple administration including
the matters referred to in paragraph 11 below, the Trustee shall
be guided by the advice of the Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple
Committee constituted under Section 20 of the Act (the “Advisory F
Committee”).
9. The Advisory Committee shall consist of:
(a) A retired High Court Judge who shall be nominated by the
Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and who shall be the G
Chairperson of the Committee.
(b) One eminent person to be nominated by the Trustee; and
(c) A reputed chartered Accountant to be nominated by the
Chairperson in consultation with the Trustee.
H
1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A The provisions in paragraphs 4 and 5 above shall apply equally to
the Advisory Committee.
10. The Advisory Committee shall ensure that regular annual audit
of the finances of the Temple is completed by a reputed accounting firm,
which shall be changed every three years.
B 11. The Administrative Committee shall not take any decision on
the following matters of policy except after obtaining the approval of the
Trustee:
(a) Any expense item exceeding Rs.15 lakhs per month;

C (b) Any one-time expense of Rs.1 Crore;
(c) Any major renovation/expansion of the Temple;
(d) Any changes in the Standard Operating Procedures; and
(e) Any fundamental changes in the character of the Temple that
would affect the religious sentiments of its devotees.”
D
48. On the other hand, the State also submitted a Note stating:-
“It is proposing the following administrative / legal alternative
measures for the administration of Sree Padmanabha Swamy
Temple by forming a Managing Committee on the model of the
E Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee, constituted for
administering the activities of Guruvayur Temple. It is also
submitted that Govt. will enable that Committee to administer the
Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple by amending Chapter III of
the TCHRI Act, 1950.

F The following is extracted from the Preamble of the Guruvayur
Devaswom Act, 1978:
“Nos.211 and 212 of 1930, for the administration of the said Temple,
as modified by the District Court, South Malabar, in O.S. No.1 of
1938, the administration, control and management of the temple
G and its properties and endowments had been vested in the
hereditary trustees, namely, the Zamorin Raja of Calicut and the
Karanavan for the time being of the Mallisseri Illom at Guruvayur;
And whereas the administration and management of the said
Temple and its properties and endowments had deteriorated
and a situation had arisen rendering it expedient to reorganize,
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1077
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

in the interest of the general public, the scheme of Management A
of the affairs of the Devaswom, the Guruvayur Devaswom
Act, 1971, was enacted to provide better management of the
Devaswom in suppression of the said scheme.”
In the present case, it is submitted that owing to a similar ground
of deteriorating condition of the Temple Administration, and B
taking into consideration the rights of the devotees and erstwhile
“Royal Family” through the Padmanabhadasa, the State
proposes the following administrative / legal alternative for the
administration of Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple.
… … … C
3. Constitution of a Committee:
1. The Committee constituted shall consist of 8 members and
shall be composed as follows:
a) The Padhmanabhadasa D
b) The Senior Thantri – ex-officio
c) Not more than 5 members, of whom one shall be a member of
Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe and one shall be a woman
nominated by the Hindus among the Council of Ministers from
among persons having interest in the Temple. E
d) A representative of the employee of the Devaswom nominated
by the Hindus among the Council of Ministers.
2. A person shall be disqualified for being nominated under clause
(c) of sub-section (1), if:-
F
(i) He believes the practice of untouchability or does not profess
the Hindu Religion or believe in temple worship; or
(ii) he is an employee under the Govt. or Devaswom; or
(iii) he is below 30 years of age; or
G
(iv) he is subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in clauses
(a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 5.
3. The members of the Committee shall at it first meeting, elect
one of its members as Chairman.”
H
1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A 49. Before we consider the rival submissions, the unequivocal
stand taken by the appellants in the grounds of appeal that “the Temple
is a public temple and no claim can probably be made by the Petitioner
or anyone to owning the Temple or its treasures” and that what was
being sought was only the right as a trustee of the Temple to manage
and administer it, must be noted at the outset. The said stand was
B
expressly referred to in the Order dated 21.07.2011 by this Court, and
subsequent Orders, and the consideration of the instant case has been
premised on the said stand.
50. In the backdrop of the facts and circumstances on record, the
issues concerning the status and entitlement of the appellant No.1
C including the relationship vis-à-vis the Temple are concerned, the
controversy can be considered under following five segments:-
A] Situation obtaining before and upto the date when the Covenant
was entered into in May 1949.
D B] Effect of the Covenant that was entered into in May 1949.
C] Effect of the Constitution of India as it stood before the
Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 and of the
provisions of the TC Act.
D] Effect of the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act,
E 1971.
E] Effect of the death of the person who had signed the Covenant
as the Ruler of Travancore.
A] Situation obtaining before and upto the date when the
Covenant was entered into in May 1949
F
51. Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.11295 of 2011 from which
the present appeal arises, asserted:-
“1375 to 2011 Recorded evidence shows that the Sri
A.D. (= 550 Padmanabhaswamy Temple,
G To 1186 M.E/ Thiruvananthapuram temple was
Malayalam Era) administered by the Royal Family of
Venad/Travancore.
Recorded evidence shows that the Sri
Padmanabhaswamy Temple,
Thiruvananthapuram temple was
H administered by the Royal Family of
Venad/Travancore.
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1079
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

Sri Padmanabhaswamy temple A
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘temple)
is a famous temple of Lord Vishnu,
located in Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala.
The temple is one of the 108th holiest
abo des (‘D ivya deso ms’) of L ord
B
Vishnu. Divya Desams are the holiest
abodes of the Lord Mahavishnu that are
mentioned in the works of the Tamil
Azhvars (saints). The main deity, Sri
Padmanabhaswamy, is a form of Vishnu
in Anananthasayanam posture (in eternal C
sleep of yognidra) lying on Sri Anantha,
t he h oo d e d s na ke . T h e c it y of
Thiruvananthapuram is named after the
Lord. The word Thiruvananthapuram
literally means “T he la nd of Sree
Anantha Padmanabhaswamy”. As per D
the available literature the temple was
established several millenniums ago.
T he be lie f is t ha t w he n S r i
Vilwamangalam Swamiyar (Divakara
Muni) had a vision of Sree Padmanabha
in the dense woods of Ananthankad, the E
then king of Vanchinad (Travancore)
took initiative to build the temple for the
Lord. Thus, it is said, began the relation
between the Travancore royal family and
the Temple.”
F
52. With regard to the historical account about the establishment
of the Temple, the written submissions filed on behalf of the appellant
No.1 state:-
“18. Although the origins of the temple are shrouded in the mists G
of antiquity, it is believed that the then Maharaja of Travancore
established the Temple in or around 1375. According to the legends
surrounding the Temples set out in Emily Gilchrist Hatch’s book
titled “Travancore” (Oxford University Press, 1939), there are
two separate versions of how the Temple came to be built:
H
1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A (a) ….[A] five headed cobra put the child in a hole in
the tree and spread his hood to provide shelter from the
sun. this child was the incarnation of God Vishnu. The
Pulaya couple daily offered milk and kunjee in a half
coconut shell. The Ruler of Travancore heard of this
and immediately had a temple built at the very place.
B
(b)”…The second story also tells a child… After several
days of wandering in the open country, the hungary,
distressed Swamiyar heard a child’s cry…. As he started
towards the place, he heard again the tingle of waist-
bells and immediately a huge tree fell to the ground.
C There before him lay God Vishnu on his thousand-
headed serprent…. It is said that tree which crashed to
earth was carved into the image of Vishnu over which
the then Raja of Travancore erected a temple.”
In both legends, therefore, it is the Maharaja of Travancore
D who is said to have founded the Temple.
19. After the Temple was engulfed in a huge fire in 1686, the
then Maharaja of Travancore rebuilt the Temple.”
53. The account given by the High Court in para 4 of the judgment
E under appeal states that for over 200 years prior to the re-establishment
of the princely state by Marthand Varma, the Temple was under the
control of ‘Ettarayogam’ (group of eight and a half) including ‘Ettuveettil
Pillamars’ and then refers to the battle between Marthand Varma and
his loyalists on one hand and the Ettuveettil Pillamars on the other,
whereafter Marthand Varma took full control of the State and the Temple.
F The High Court then states, “… it is he (Marthand Varma) who
reconstructed the Temple which was in bad shape after a major fire
took place years back and installed a new idol.”
54. Though there may be different accounts and beliefs with regard
to the origin and how the Temple was set up, every version accepts that
G the King of Travancore had a role in the administration of the Temple to
begin with, and that he was the one who re-constructed the Temple
after a major fire that occurred in the year 1686, and installed a new idol
and took full control of the Temple. The King of Travancore was thus
responsible for setting up the Temple, in the form that it stands today,
and it was the King who installed the new idol, and since then the
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1081
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

management of the Temple, till the Covenant was signed, had always A
been with the Kings of Travancore.
55. It is also asserted in the grounds in support of the appeal, that
the royal family of Travancore had been making endowments in favour
of the Temple and that Lord Padmanabha is considered as the family
deity by the erstwhile royal family. Some of the practices adverted to in B
the Special Leave Petition were as under:-
“… …Historically, the petitioner and his predecessors have had a
very close association with the Padmanabhaswamy temple, and
holds a pre-eminent position in the rituals and practices of the
temple. Some of these are listed below: C
i. From the time a female member of the erstwhile Royal
Family conceives, there are special poojas in the temple at
prescribed periods and recitation of personal prayers;
ii. The Padmanabhadasa and the members of the royal
family escort the idols of Sree Padmanabha, Sree Narasimha D
and Sree Krishna during the ‘Arattu’ procession (Holy Bath
of the Lord) to the beach and perform various rituals;
iii. Every male child born to the erstwhile Royal Family,
after he completes one year, is made a ‘Dasa’ of Lord
Padmanabha before the sanctum sanctorium; E
iv. Every female child, born in the erstwhile Royal Family,
is made a ‘Sevini’ of Lord Padmanabha through prescribed
rituals;
v. Special ceremonies are conducted at the time when male
F
members undergo ‘Upanayanam’ and at the time of
marriage of female members of the erstwhile Royal Family;
vi. The Padmanabhadasa has many obligations and
whenever he breaches them, he imposes a penalty on
himself by way of compulsory offerings to the Lord;
G
vii.The Padmanabhadasa has to take the permission of the
deity when he leaves the town as per custom and by offering
‘pattu’ and ‘kanikka’ (silk and offerings), he also has to
make amends for his absence depending on the length of
absence;
H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A viii. The Padmanabhadasa has an ‘ekantha darshan’ with
the Lord, on all days in the morning hours, and at this time,
except the Nambi, all others are excluded;
ix. Whenever a member of the royal family passes away,
the ‘veerali pattu’ with which the deity is covered is sent
B form the temple to cover the body before cremation;
x. In all temple rituals, the Padmanabhadasa is an obligatory
participant;
xi. When the deity is taken out in procession, the
Padmanabhadasa leads the procession with drawn out
C sword (udaval) alongwith the heir apparent. The
Padmanabhadasa accompanies the deity for the Palliveta
on both the festivals and does the vetta on the behalf of the
deity.”
56. The assertions referred to above were not denied or traversed.
D As a matter of fact, the stand in the affidavits filed on behalf of the State
in the Courts below, accepts the position of the erstwhile royal family
vis-à-vis the Temple and Sri Padmanabhaswamy. The affidavits were
sworn by responsible officers holding the posts of Joint Secretary and
Additional Secretary in the State Government. It was stated in both the
E affidavits;-
“… …There are also many temples owned by private Trustees
and local organization of Hindus too like the Attukal Bhagavathy
Temple, Pazhavangadi Ganpathy Temple etc. Sree Padmanabha
Swamy Temple is also such a family temple trust owned and
F managed by the Travancore Palace … …
… …The traditional and customary belief that has been for long
recognized and accepted is that Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple
belongs to “Sree Padmanabha Dasas”, the Royal family head of
Travancore Palace and they command high regard respect and
esteem form the public. … …”
G
57. Leaving aside the issue of ownership as such status is not
claimed by the appellant No.1 or any of the family members who have
intervened, the fact remains that it is well accepted that the management
of the Temple had all along been in the hands of the ruling family or the
Travancore Palace. As stated by the State, that has been the traditional
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1083
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

and customary belief. Such management has spanned, not for few years A
or decades, but dates back to centuries.
58. The learned Amicus Curiae in his report dated 01.11.2012
had stated about the Temple and some of the erstwhile Rulers of
Travancore as under:-
“29. In this context, it may be necessary to mention that the Sree B
Padmanabha Swamy Temple is an integral part of the traditions
of the Royal family of the erstwhile State of Travancore and also
the people of Kerala (including the residents of the ancient city of
Thiruvananthapuram). It is interesting to note that Ashwathi
Thirunal Gouri Lakshmi Bayi (one of the members of the Royal C
family), in her book Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple published
by the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, interestingly refers to the Prakrit
version and the final Sanskrit version of Sree Anandapuram from
Syanandoorapura. The Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple is
connected to twenty four holy teerthams and is also linked with
certain other temples, many of which are in the State of Tamil D
Nadu. It may be noted that even today, Mathilakom records or
the palm leaves scrolls which recorded the ancient history of the
Temple and that of the erstwhile State of Travancore are available
in the Temple premises and in the Kerala State Archives….
30. It must also be noted that the idol of Lord Padmanabha is E
made using katu sharkara yogam (a complex mixture of 8 natural
ingredients) in which 12008 Salagramas were filled in. This idol
made using katu sharkara yogam was consecrated in the year
1739 under the aegis of the erstwhile ruler of Travancore, Veera
Marthanda Verma (1706-1758). Salagrama is not a mere stone F
but a stone of longstanding tradition and spiritual potency in which
it is believed that Hari or Lord Vishnu resides (hence, yatha
salagrame hari). Thus, Eashwara or god manifests Himself in
saguna forms in various ways – in the Salagrama as Vishnu, in
the lingam as Shiva and in the chakra as Devi (Mother Goddess).
Usually, when 12 salagrama shilas are worshipped, it equals the G
potency of a mahakshetram or a great temple. Therefore, the
sanctity of Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple is a thousand fold.
… … …

H
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A 34. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to mention that the
Travancore Royal family is also called the Venadu Raja Vamsha
which is the off-shoot of Chera roya lineage and the Ayi royal
dynasty, and has always regarded Lord Padmanabha Swamy as
their tutelory Deity and this is confirmed by many historical records
where Lord Padmanabha is addressed as ‘yadavendra
B
kuladaivatam’ or the family Deity of yadavakshatriyas (the present
Travancore royalty); thereby confirming that Sree Padmanabha
Swamy is the ‘kuladaivta’ of the entire family. It may be noted
that devotees other than royalty have worshipped Lord
Padmanabha Swamy as their ‘ishta daivta’ or God of one’s
C personal choice.
35. It was in 1731 A.D. that the first King of the erstwhile
Travancore Royal family, Sree Veera Marthanda Varma, was
anointed. He was succeeded by Rama Varma (1758-1798).
Moreover, the Royal family consisted of deeply devoted members
D who were dedicated to the Temple and who believed that their
lives centred around Sree Padmanabha Swamy. In 1750 A.D.,
the entire State of Travancore was gifted to this Deity by a Deed
and the Rulers became servants of the Lord, calling themselves
as Padmanabhadasa. It may also be noted that many of the
Maharajas were great composers of shlokas as well as music. In
E fact, many of the Rulers were protectors of the Vedas and the
vedic tradition. Further, the Temple was governed by a council of
trustees called Ettara Yogam headed by the King.
36. One of the greatest Kings of the Royal family was Sri Swathi
Thirunal Maharaja Rama Varma (1813-1846) who was a great
F patron of the arts, literature, music and modern science. He was
an extraordinary King who presented an incorruptible system of
governance, framed the first code of regulations of Travancore,
advanced English education, contributed to a collection of rare
manuscripts and undertook a large number of social welfare
G measures. In fact, Sri Swathi Thirunal is regarded as one of the
four great vidwans of Carnatic music – they being Muthuswamy
Dikshitar, Thyagaraja, Shyamasastry and Swati Thirunal. The
Kings including Sri Swathi Thirunal donated their personal wealth
to the Temple and, as recorded by Dr. Ventkata Subramanya Iyer
in his brilliant book ‘Swathi Thirunal and his music’, during his
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1085
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

eventful life, once when one of his courtesans presented a varnam A
in his honour, the King directed that it should not be used because
only Lord Padmanabha Swamy must be lauded with music.”
59. The practices referred to in the earlier paragraph show that
right from the conception of a child upto the death of any member of the
erstwhile royal family, special prayers are offered and certain rituals are B
followed. Every male child born in the erstwhile royal family, is made
“Dasa” of Sri Padmanabhaswamy while every female child is made
“Sevini” through prescribed rituals. Special ceremonies are conducted
at the time of ‘Upanayanam’ of a male member and marriage of a female
member of the erstwhile royal family. Even assuming that these practices
are being or could possibly be followed by other families as well, in C
addition to these features, the facts that the Ruler is an obligatory
participant in various temple rituals; that he has an ‘Ekantha Darshan’
with Sri Padmanabhaswamy on all days in the morning hours where,
except the Nambi, nobody else can remain present; that the Ruler has to
take special permission whenever he leaves the town; and that whenever D
the deity is taken out in procession, the Ruler leads the procession with
the sword drawn out, along with the heir apparent, establish the special
relationship that the erstwhile royal family in general and the Ruler in
particular, have always had with Sri Padmanabhaswamy. The ceremony
of Dedication undertaken by the then ruler in 1750 A.D. bears testimony
to such relationship as well as the deep devotion and sense of complete E
surrender before Sri Padmanabhaswamy. “The Thrippati Danam”, the
translation of which is set out in paragraph 5, shows that “all the lands
and functions together with all rights and dignities, positions of honour
and all other possessions” that the royal family was enjoying hitherto
before, were dedicated to Sri Padmanabhaswamy. Even the royal sword F
was placed with utmost reverence on the Ottakkal Mandapam leading
to the Sanctum, which the King got back from the high priest. Every
further acquisition by the King was always surrendered to Sri
Padmanabhaswamy. The King and his successors thus ruled and
conducted themselves as “Padmanabhadasas” and agents of Sri
Padmanabhaswamy. G

60. Tested on any parameter, such as historical accounts, popular
and customary beliefs, certain practices connected with the rituals and
affairs of the Temple that mandatorily require the presence and
participation of the Ruler, deep involvement of the members of ruling
H
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A family and their connection with the Temple and Sri Padmanabhaswamy
at various stages of their lives, “The Thrippati Danam” and its significance,
and long recognised and accepted fact that the management of the
Temple had always been with the Ruler, lead us to conclude that for
centuries, the Temple had been under the exclusive management of
successive Rulers from the ruling family of Travancore and that the
B
Rulers of Travancore, till the signing of the Covenant, were in the capacity
as Managers or Shebaits of the Temple.
The expression Shebait is derived from “sewa” which means
service and Shebait, in literal sense, means one who renders “sewa” to
the idol or a deity. Every Ruler of Travancore would call himself
C “Padmanabhadasa” i.e. one who is engaged in the service of Sri
Padmanabhaswamy.
61. The Travancore Interim Constitution Act, 1123, which came
into force on 24.03.1948 i.e. before the Covenant was entered into, is
also a factor that points in the direction of the aforesaid conclusion. In
D terms of this Act, all matters connected with Sri Pandaravaka (which
expression admittedly referred to the Temple and the extensive lands
belonging to Sri Padmanabhaswamy) as well as Devaswoms and Hindu
Religious Endowments were stated to be under the exclusive control
and supervision of the Ruler of Travancore. This Act by itself does not
E determine the status of the Ruler of Travancore with respect to Sri
Pandaravaka and the Dewaswoms and Hindu Religious Endowments in
Travancore, but is indicative of the requisite intent on part of the Ruler
of Travancore to retain to himself the matters concerning administration
and management of Sri Pandaravaka and Dewaswoms and Hindu
Religious Endowments.
F
62. Having considered the factual scenario, we must now consider
the legal character and incidents of Shebaitship. On the issue of the
legal position of a Shebait and succession to the office of the Shebait,
some of the leading decisions of the Privy Council and of this Court are
as follows:-
G
a) In Gossamee Sree Greedharreejee vs. Rumanlolljee
Gossamee24 the Privy Council stated:-
“According to Hindu law, when the worship of a thakoor has
been founded, the shebaitship is held to be vested in the heirs of
H
24 16 M.I.A.137 : (1889) L.R. 16 I.A. 137
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1087
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

the founder, in default of evidence that he has disposed of it A
otherwise, or there has been some usage, course of dealing, or
some circumstances to show a different mode of devolution. This
principle is illustrated by the decision in the case of Peet Koonwur
v. Chutter Dharee Singh25, and in the present case some of the
learned Judges of the High Court have affirmed it, while none has
B
expressed dissent from it. One learned Judge thought that the
principle does not apply to this case, because Dowjee was not the
founder of the Calcutta worship. But their Lordships adopt the
view of the other Judges, and holding that the mortal Dowjee was
the founder they must also hold that the Plaintiff is by general law
the shebait of that worship.” C
(Emphasis added)
b) The afore-stated principles were expounded further by the Privy
Council in Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal vs. Balusami Ayyar and
Ors. 26
D
“It is also to be remembered that a “trust,” in the sense in which
the expression is used in English law, is unknown in the Hindu
system, pure and simple. (J.G. Ghose, “Hindu Law,” page 276.)
Hindu piety found expression in gifts to idols and images
consecrated and installed in temples, to religious institutions of
every kind, and for all purposes considered meritorious in the Hindu E
social and religious system: to Brahmans, Goswamis, sanyasis,
etc. When the gift was to a holy person, it carried with it in terms
or by usage and custom certain obligations. Under the Hindu law
the image of a deity of the Hindu pantheon is, as has been aptly
called, a “juristic entity,” vested with the capacity of receiving F
gifts and holding property. Religious institutions, known under
different names, are regarded as possessing the same “juristic”
capacity, and gifts are made to them eo nomine. In many cases in
Southern India, especially where the diffusion of Aryan
Brahmanism was essential for bringing the Dravidian peoples under
the religious rule of the Hindu system, colleges and monasteries G
under the names of mutt were founded under spiritual teachers of
recognized sanctity. These men had and have ample discretion in
the application of the funds of the institution, but always subject to
25 13 Suth. W.R. 396
26 AIR 1922 PC 123 : 48 I.A. 302 H
1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A certain obligations and duties, equally governed by custom and
usage. When the gift is directly to an idol or a temple, the seisin to
complete the gift is necessarily effected by human agency. Called
by whatever name, he is only the manager and custodian of the
idol or the institution. In almost every case he is given the right to
a part of the usufruct, the mode of enjoyment and the amount of
B
the usufruct depending again on usage and custom. In no case
was the property conveyed to or vested in him, nor is he a “trustee”
in the English sense of the term, although in view of the obligations
and duties resting on him, he is answerable as a trustee, in the
general sense, for maladministration.”
C (Emphasis added)
c) In Bhaba Tarini Debi vs. Asha Lata Debi27, while dealing
with the rights of a Shebait, the Privy Council stated:-
“The shebait has certainly a right of property in his office and it
D may be correct to say that he has some sort of beneficial interest
in the debuttar property, but the idol is the owner of the property
and the limit set to the shebait’s power of disposition is set, not to
preserve the interest of the next shebait, but to maintain and
preserve by proper management the endowment or religious
institution.”
E
The following passage from the decision of the High Court (per
B.K. Mukherjea, J.28) which was under appeal, was quoted by the Privy
Council with approval:-
“To me it seems that both the elements of office and property, of
duties and personal interest, are mixed up and blended together in
F
the conception of shebaitship. One of the elements cannot be
detached from the other. The entire rights remain with the grantor
when a deity is founded and it is open to him to dispose of these
rights in any way he likes. If there is no disposition, shebaitship
remains like any other heritable property in the line of the founder
G and each succeeding shebait succeeds to the rights by virtue of
his being an heir to his immediate predecessor and not to the
original grantor. If it is disposed of completely and absolutely in
favour of another person, there remains nothing in the grantor
27 AIR 1943 PC 89 : (1943) ILR 2 P.C. 137
H 28 Later, Chief Justice of India.
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1089
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

except the possibility of a reverter when there is a failure of A
extinction of the line of shebaits indicated by him. If, on the other
hand, the founder has parted with his rights only in a partial manner
for the lifetime of the grantee the residue still remains in him and
his heirs, and on the death of the grantee, the heir of the founder
living at the time is entitled to the shebaitship. If the grantee in
B
such cases happens to be the sole heir of the founder upon whom
the residuary right devolves at the same time and he becomes the
shebait under law as well, then, whether or not we invoke the
technical doctrine of merger or coalescence of the particular estate
with the residue, his position in my opinion is that of an absolute
shebait whose rights devolve upon his heirs and not upon the heirs C
of the founder at his death.”
(Emphasis added)
d) In the decision rendered in May 1951 in Angurbala Mullick21,
a Bench of four Judges of this Court had an occasion to consider the
legal position of a Shebait. In the leading Judgment authored by B.K. D
Mukherjea, J.29, it was observed:-
“The exact legal position of a shebait may not be capable of precise
definition but its implications are fairly well established. It is settled
by the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Vidya Varuti
v. Balusami26 that the relation of a shebait in regard to debutter E
property is not that of a trustee to trust property under the English
law. In English law the legal estate in the trust property vests in
the trustee who holds it for the benefit of cestui que trust. In a
Hindu religious endowment on the other hand the entire ownership
of the dedicated property is transferred to the deity or the institution
itself as a juristic person and the shebait or mahant is a mere F
manager.
But though a shebait is a manager and not a trustee in the technical
sense, it would not be correct to describe the shebaitship as a
mere office. The shebait has not only duties to discharge in
connection with the endowment, but he has a beneficial interest G
in the debutter property. As the Judicial Committee observed in
the above case, in almost all such endowments the shebait has a
share in the usufruct of the debutter property which depends upon
the terms of the grant or upon custom or usage. Even where no
29 As the learned Chief Justice then was H
1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A emoluments are attached to the office of the shebait, he enjoys
some sort of right or interest in the endowed property which
partially at least has the character of a proprietary right. Thus, in
the conception of shebaiti both the elements of office and property,
of duties and personal interest, are mixed up and blended together;
and one of the elements cannot be detached from the other. It is
B
the presence of this personal or beneficial interest in the endowed
property which invests shebaitship with the character of proprietary
rights and attaches to it the legal incidents of property. This was
elaborately discussed by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court
in Manohar Mukherji v. Bhupendra Nath Mukherji 30 and this
C decision of the Full Bench was approved of by the Judicial
Committee in Ganesh Chunder Dhur v. Lal Behary31 and again
in Bhabatarini v. Ashalata27. The effect of the first two decisions,
as the Privy Council pointed out in the last case, was to emphasize
the proprietary element in the shebaiti right, and to show that though
in some respects anomalous, it was an anomaly to be accepted as
D
having been admitted into Hindu law from an early date.
“According to Hindu law,” observed Lord Hobhouse in Gossamee
Sree Greedharreejee v. Rumanlolljee Gossamee 24,when the
worship of a Thakoor has been founded, the shebaitship is held to
be vested in the heirs of the founder, in default of evidence that he
E has disposed of it otherwise, or there has been some usage, course
of dealing, or some circumstances to show a different mode of
devolution.
Unless, therefore, the founder has disposed of the shebaitship in
any particular manner - and this right of disposition is inherent in
F the founder - or except when usage or custom of a different nature
is proved to exist, shebaitship like any other species of heritable
property follows the line of inheritance from the founder.”
(Emphasis added)
63. Soon thereafter, the author of the leading Judgment in
G Angurbala Mullick21, delivered Tagore Law Lectures in August 1951
which were then published in the form of a comprehensive book under
the caption “The Hindu Law of Religious Endowments and Charitable

30 I.L.R.(1933) 60 Cal. 452
H
31 (1935-36) 63 I.A. 448
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1091
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

Trusts”. After dealing with endowments created by dedication of water A
tanks and similar works for general consumption, in the Fourth Edition
of the Book32, it is stated:-
“1.54 Administrators or managers of endowments are
trustees in the general sense:-
With regard to all other types of endowment it is necessary for B
the purpose of carrying out the intentions of the donor that
somebody should be entrusted with the management or
administration thereof. As was observed by Mukherjee. J. in
Manohar vs. Bhupendra30, in ancient times, except in cases of
property dedicated to a brotherhood of ascetics, all endowments C
were administered ordinarily by the founder himself and after his
death by his heirs. This was the case not only with regard to
temples but also in respect of non-religious charitable institutions
like choultries, Sadabratas etc. It was only in case of public temples
that the practice of appointing shebaits was generally resorted to.
But whoever may be the person in whom the duty of administration D
is vested, whether it is the shebait or archaka of a temple or the
Mohant of a religious institution and whether or not such person is
the heir of the original founder, he must be deemed to be in the
position of a trustee with regard to the endowed property. As I
have said already he may not be a trustee in the sense in which E
the expression is used in English law. To quote the language of
the Judicial Committee in Vidyavarathi vs. Baluswami26 as in no
case is the property conveyed to or vested in him he is not a
trustee under the English law’; but it was pointed out by the Privy
Council that in view of the obligations resting on him he is
answerable as a trustee in the general sense. I have already pointed F
out that the word “Trust” in English law involves a highly technical
idea which owes its origin to purely historical circumstances and
of which no parallel exists in any other system of law.”
(Emphasis added)
G
With regard to the nature of rights of a Shebait, the author stated:
“5.1A. Shebait the human ministrant of the deity. – In my
last lecture33, I have dealt with the general features of a religious
32 Edited by Hon. P.B. Gajendragadkar, former Chief Justice of India
33 Chapter 4 – Religious Trusts in favour of Idols (Debutter) H
1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A endowment which is known as Debutter, and which arises on
dedication or gift of property to an idol. It would now be necessary
to enter into details and discuss how a Debutter is managed and
administered. As has been said already, “it is in an ideal sense that
the dedicated property vests in an idol,” and in the nature of things
the possession and management of it must be entrusted to some
B
person as Shebait or manager.
“It would seem to follow,” the Judicial Committee observed in
Prosonna Kumari Debya vs. Golab Chand Baboo,34 “that the
person so entrusted must, of necessity, be empowered to do
whatever may be required for the service of the idol and for the
C benefit and preservation of its property, at least to as great as the
manager of an infant heir. If this were not so, the estate of the idol
might be destroyed or wasted, and its worship discontinued for
want of necessary funds to preserve and maintain them.” This
human ministrant of the deity, who is its manager and legal
D representative, is known by the name of Shebait in Bengal and
Northern India. He is called the Dharmakarta in the Tamil and
Telugu districts, Panchayetdar in places like Tanjore and Urallen
in Malabar. He is the person entitled to speak on behalf of the
deity on earth and is endowed with authority to deal with all its
temporal affairs. As regards the temple property, the manager is
E in the position of a trustee, but as regards the service of the temple
and the duties that appertain to it he is rather in the position of the
holder of an office of dignity35. For convenience I will call the
manager by the general name of Shebait, though I am aware that
a distinction has been made in some cases between a Shebait and
F a Dharmakarta36.
… … …
5.5. Shebaitship is not a mere office, it is property as well.-
But though a Shebait is a manager and not a trustee in the technical
sense, it would not be correct to describe shebaitship as a mere
G office. The Shebait has not only duties to discharge in connection
with the endowment, he has also a personal interest in it. As the

34 (1875) L.R. 2 I.A. 145
35 Ramanathan Chetti vs. Muruguppa - (1906) L.R. 33 I.A. 139
36 See Srinivasa v. Evalappa, L.R. 49 I.A. 237 : AIR 1922 P.C. 325, 33 approving

H Vidyapurma vs. Vidyanidhi (1904) I.L.R. 27 Mad. 435
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1093
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

Judicial Committee pointed out in the above case, in almost all A
Debutter endowments, the Shebait has a share in the usufruct of
the Debutter property, which depends either on the terms of the
grant or upon custom or usage. Even when no emoluments are
attached to the office of a Shebait, he enjoys some sort of right or
interest in the endowed property which has partially at least the
B
characteristics of a proprietary right. You shall see later on37 that
although the Shebait’s power to alienate the Debutter property is
very much limited and can be exercised only when there is a
justifying legal necessity or benefit to the deity, yet he can create
derivative tenures in respect of the endowed property, which even
if not supported by legal necessity cannot be impeached so long C
as he is alive and remains in office. The Shebait therefore has to
some extent the rights of a limited owner. It has now been decided
by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court30 after an elaborate
review of all authorities that shebaitship is property, with regard
to the disposition of which the rule in Tagore vs. Tagore38 is
D
applicable, and this decision has been approved of by the Privy
Council in Ganesh Chandra vs. Lal Behari 31and again in
Bhabatarini vs. Ashalata 27 . In Janki Raman vs.
Koshalyanandan39, the founder of an endowment had provided
that the office of shebaitship should be held by three brothers and
that it should devolve on their heirs. One of the brothers having E
relinquished his right in favour of the other two brothers, it was
held that the devolution of the office was governed by the general
law of succession relating to property, and that a relinquishment
by the holder of an office was not binding upon his heirs and could
not enure beyond his lifetime.
F
5.6A. Shebaitship remains in the founder and his heirs
unless disposed of. - When a deity is installed, the shebaitship
remains in he founder and his heirs. “According to Hindu law,”
thus observed Lord Hobhouse in Gossamee Sree Greedhareejee
vs. Ruman Lalljee24 - and this observation has been reiterated in
numerous cases since then – “when the worship of a Thakoor G
has been founded, the shebaitship is held to be vested in the heirs

37 Chapter 6 (Administration of Debutter: Rights, Duties and Powers of a Shebait)
38 9 B.L.R. 377
39 A.I.R. 1961 Pat. 293
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1094 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A of the founder in default of evidence that he has disposed of it
otherwise, or there has been some usage, course of dealing, or
some circumstances to stow a different mode of devolution.”
Unless therefore the founder has disposed of the shebaitship in
any particular way and except when an usage or custom of a
different nature is proved to exist, shebaitship like any other species
B
of heritable property follows the line of inheritance from the
founder.
… … …
5.31. Extinction of the life of Shebaits. – When the line of
C Shebaits laid down by the founder is extinct, or when the Shebait
to whom a power of nomination is given does not exercise the
power, the managership reverts to the founder who endowed the
property or his heirs40.
In case the line of Shebaits is extinct, there is always an ultimate
D reversion to the founder or his heirs and strictly speaking, no
escheat arises so far as the devolution of Shebaitship is concerned.
But cases may theoretically be concerned where the founder also
has left no heirs; and in such cases the founder’s properties may
escheat to the State together with the endowed property. In very
rare circumstances like these, the right of the State would possibly
E be the same as those of the founder himself, and it would be for
the State to appoint a Shebait for the Debutter property. It cannot
be said that the State receiving a dedicated property by escheat
can put an end to the trust and treat it as secular property.
Some observations occur in the judgment of Muthuswami Ayyar
F and Shephard, JJ. In Mallan v. Purusothoma41, which would
seem to suggest that the Government getting the property by right
of escheat can put an end to an arrangement made by the original
owners under which a certain property was kept undivided for
being used for the worship of a deity. There is, however, no finding
in this case that the property was actually dedicated to the deity,
G
and from the observations of the High Court it appears that there

40 Sabitri Thakurani vs. F.A. Savi, I.L.R. 12 Pat. 359; Jagannath v. Ranjit Singh,

I.L.R. 25 Cal. 354
41 I.L.R. 12 Mad. 287, 291.

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SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1095
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

was only a personal arrangement between the co-sharers under A
which it was excluded from partition.”
(Underlined by us)
21
64. In the decision in Angurbala Mullick as well as in the Book
as stated above, reference was made to the Full Bench decision of the
Calcutta High Court in Manohar Mukherjee vs. Bhupendra Nath B
Mukherjee and Ors.30, where one of the issues for consideration was:
whether founder of a Hindu debutter was competent to lay down rules
to govern the succession to the office of Shebait. Asutosh Mookerjee,
J. speaking on behalf of the Bench of five Judges had observed:-
“15. The deity is the recipient of the gift only in an ideal sense; C
the dedicated property belongs to the deity in a similar sense; in
reality the property dedicated is in the nature of an ownerless
thing. In ancient times, except in cases of property dedicated to a
brotherhood of sanyasis, all endowments ordinarily were
administered by the founder himself and after him his heirs. The
idea of appointing a shebait is of more modern growth. When a D
Hindu creates an endowment, its management is primarily in him
and his heirs, and unless he appoints a shebait, he himself fills that
office and in him rests that limited ownership,- notwithstanding
that, on the one hand, he is the donor and, on the other, the recipient
on behalf of the deity, the juridical person-which has to be E
exercised until the property offered to the deity has been suitably
disposed of. … … … This idea of limited ownership is the essence
of the position of the manager or custodian of a dedicated property,
by whatever name he may be called. That this idea is the only
basis on which decisions of the highest authority as regards the
rights and powers of shebaits may be justified will be seen hereafter F
when some of these decisions will be referred to.
… … …
26. Shebaitship in its true legal conception involves two ideas:
The ministrant of the deity and its manager; it is not a bare office
but an office together with certain rights attached to it. A shebait’s G
position towards the debutter property is not similar to that in
England of a trustee towards the trust property; it is only that
certain duties have to be performed by him which are analogous
to those of trustees. … …”
(Emphasis added) H
1096 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A 65. On 16.03.1954, a Bench of seven Judges of this Court speaking
through B.K. Mukherjea, J. 29 held in The Commissioner, Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha
Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt42,inter alia, that what had been laid down
in series of decisions with regard to the rights of a Shebait would apply
with equal propriety to the office of a Mahant. It was stated:-
B
“As regards the property rights of a Mathadhipati, it may not be
possible to say in view of the pronouncements of the Judicial
Committee, which have been accepted as good law in this country
ever since 1921, that a Mathadhipati holds the Math property as a
life tenant or that his position is similar to that of a Hindu widow in
C respect to her husband’s estate or of an English Bishop holding a
benefice. He is certainly not a trustee in the strict sense. He may
be, as the Privy Council26 says, a manager or custodian of the
institution who has to discharge the duties of a trustee and is
answerable as such; but he is not a mere manager and it would
D not be right to describe Mahantship as a mere office. A superior
of a Math has not only duties to discharge in connection with the
endowment but he has a personal interest of a beneficial character
which is sanctioned by custom and is much larger than that of a
Shebait in the debutter property. It was held by a Full Bench of
the Calcutta High Court30 that Shebaitship itself is property, and
E this decision was approved of by the Judicial Committee in Ganesh
v. Lal Behary31 and again in Bhabatarini v. Ashalata27. The
effect of the first two decisions, as the Privy Council pointed out
in the last case, was to emphasise the proprietary element in the
Shebaiti right and to show that though in some respects an anomaly,
F it was an anomaly to be accepted as having been admitted into
Hindu law from an early date. This view was adopted in its entirety
by this Court in Angurbala v. Debabrata21 and what was said in
that case in respect to Shebaiti right could, with equal propriety,
be applied to the office of a Mahant. Thus in the conception of
Mahantship, as in Shebaitship, both the elements of office and
G property, of duties and personal interest are blended together and
neither can be detached from the other. The personal or beneficial
interest of the Mahant in the endowments attached to an institution
is manifested in his large powers of disposal and administration

H 42 (1954) SCR 1005
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1097
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

and his right to create derivative tenures in respect to endowed A
properties; and these and other rights of a similar character invest
the office of the Mahant with the character of proprietary right
which, though anomalous to some extent, is still a genuine legal
right. It is true that the Mahantship is not heritable like ordinary
property, but that is because of its peculiar nature and the fact
B
that the office is generally held by an ascetic, whose connection
with his natural family being completely cut off, the ordinary rules
of succession do not apply.
(Emphasis added)
There is no reason why the word “property”, as used in Article C
19(1)(f) of the Constitution, should not be given a liberal and wide
connotation and should not be extended to those well recognised
types of interest which have the insignia or characteristics of
proprietary right. As said above, the ingredients of both office and
property, of duties and personal interest are blended together in
the rights of a Mahant and the Mahant has the right to enjoy this D
property or beneficial interest so long as he is entitled to hold his
office. To take away this beneficial interest and leave him merely
to the discharge of his duties would be to destroy his character as
a Mahant altogether. It is true that the beneficial interest which
he enjoys is appurtenant to his duties and as he is in charge of a E
public institution, reasonable restrictions can always be placed
upon his rights in the interest of the public. But the restrictions
would cease to be reasonable if they are calculated to make him
unfit to discharge the duties which he is called upon to discharge.
A Mahant’s duty is not simply to manage the temporalities of a
Math. He is the head and superior of spiritual fraternity and the F
purpose of Math is to encourage and foster spiritual training by
maintenance of a competent line of teachers who could impart
religious instructions to the disciples and followers of the Math
and try to strengthen the doctrines of the particular school or order,
of which they profess to be adherents. This purpose cannot be G
served if the restrictions are such as would bring the Mathadhipati
down to the level of a servant under a State department. It is
from this standpoint that the reasonableness of the restrictions
should be judged.”

H
1098 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A 66. Within few months, in the decision in MahantSital Das vs.
Sant Ram and others43 rendered on 08.04.1954, B.K. Mukherjea, J.29
speaking for a Bench of four Judges stated:-
“In the appeal before us the contentions raised by the parties
primarily centre round the point as to whether after the death of
B Kishore Das, the plaintiff or the defendant No.3 acquired the rights
of Mahant in regard to the Thakardwara in dispute. The law is
well settled that succession to Mahantship of a Math or religious
institutions is regulated by custom or usage of the particular
institution, except where a rule of succession is laid down by the
founder himself who created the endowment. As the Judicial
C Committee laid down – Vide Genda Puri v. Chhatar Puri44, in
one of the many cases on this point: “in determining who is
entitled to succeed as Mohunt, the only law to be observed is
to be found in the custom and practice, which must be proved
by testimony, and the claimant must show that he is entitled
D according to the custom to recover the office and the land
and property belonging to it……………… Mere infirmity of
the title of the defendant, who is in possession, will not help
the plaintiff:.”
(Emphasis added)
E 67. In His Holiness Digya Darshan Rajendra Ram Doss v.
Devendra Doss45, a Bench of three Judges of this Court observed:-
“7.In our opinion, the rule of custom should prevail in all cases
and if any aberrations have to be corrected such correction must
take us in the direction of re-establishing the rule of custom. To
F that extent the principle laid down in the case of Annasami Pillai
v. Ramakrishna Mudaliar46 is a correct principle and has to be
followed. That, however, does not resolve the difficulty in this
case. Assuming that Chetan Doss was not a validly appointed
Mahant so that his period of office is to be ignored, the question
G still arises whether in making a reversion to the customary rule of
succession to the office of a Mahant such reversion is to operate
from the point where Chetandoss’ period ended or from the point
43 AIR 1954 SC 606
44 13 Ind App – page 105 (PC)(A)
45 (1973) 1 SCC 14

46 ILR 28 Mad 219
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SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1099
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

when this had commenced. It is only an accident that in this case A
Chetandoss has a very brief period of office so that on his death
it was at least possible to find one surviving disciple of the Mahant
who held the office before Chetan Doss succeeded him. In most
cases if there is a break in the customary rule it may not at all be
possible to revert back to the customary succession if one has to
B
start from the point where the original break had commenced. In
such cases even if it may be possible to revert to the customary
practice, it may not be possible to go back to the point where the
customary line of succession had its original break. Thus, in this
case though it has been possible to trace at least one person who
was a disciple of Narayan Doss after whose death the customary C
practice was broken and the office handed over to an alleged
interloper, even this lone survivor of the original line of succession
is not a person who is competent to become the Mahant by the
immemorial custom of the Mutt. Therefore, it is not possible at all
to re-establish the customary line of succession if one treats the
D
period of Chetan Doss’ Mahantship as altogether non-existing. If
we have to revert to the custom of the Mutt we cannot do so
from the point of time when Narayan Doss died and Chetan Doss
became the Mahant. We have to do so from the point when Chetan
Doss died. After all, Chetandoss has been unquestionably the
Mahant of the Mutt. It is true that on a subsequent re-examination E
of the whole matter, doubts have been cast on his title for the
office but by common acceptance of the Chelas of the Mutt he
had become the Mahant and had remained a Mahant till his death.
Ignoring the fact that he was really the Mahant of this Mutt for a
specific period does not help us to re-establish the rule of custom
F
prevailing in this Mutt. The only possible way in which the old
custom may be re-established is by making a fresh start from the
point of the death of Chetandoss and that can only be done by
allowing Devendra Doss to be the Mahant. The High Court has
come to a clear finding that Devendra Doss is a North-Indian
Brahmin and is therefore fit to hold the office of a Mahant G
according to the custom of this Mutt. The High Court has also
found that he was the senior-most disciple of Chetandoss who
had been the reigning Mahant up to the point of time when the
dispute regarding succession arose. If Rajendra Ram Doss’ right
to become the Mahant be rejected on the ground that Chetandoss
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1100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A was perhaps an interloper the whole line of succession will be
broken beyond repair or redemption, for, once it is accepted that
Rajendra Ram Doss is not a North-Indian Brahmin there is no
other living disciple of Narayan Doss who could restore the original
line of succession. In our view it is not open to us to lay down a
new rule of succession or to alter the rule of succession completely.
B
The only way we can save the custom is by accepting something
as fact which has so far been accepted by everybody concerned
with the Mutt as a fact and which cannot any longer be undone
without demolishing altogether the custom of the Mutt. In these
circumstances we hold that Devendra Doss is entitled to succeed
C Chetan Doss as his senior-most disciple on the strength of the
immemorial custom of this Mutt.”
(Emphasis added)
68. In Profulla Chorone Requitte20, the principles were summed
up by this Court as under:-
D
“20. Before dealing with these contentions, it will be appropriate
to have a clear idea of the concept, the legal character and
incidents of shebaitship. Property dedicated to an idol vests in it in
an ideal sense only; ex necessitas, the possession and management
has to be entrusted to some human agent. Such an agent of the
E idol is known as shebait in Northern India. The legal character of
a shebait cannot be defined with precision and exactitude. Broadly
described, he is the human ministrant and custodian of the idol, its
earthly spokesman, its authorised representative entitled to deal
with all its temporal affairs and to manage its property. As regards
F the administration of the debutter, his position is analogous to that
of a trustee; yet, he is not precisely in the position of a trustee in
the English sense, because under Hindu Law, property absolutely
dedicated to an idol, vests in the idol, and not in the shebait. Although
the debutter never vests in the shebait, yet, peculiarly enough,
almost in every case, the shebait has a right to a part of the
G usufruct, the mode of enjoyment, and the amount of the usufruct
depending again on usage and custom, if not devised by the founder.
(Emphasis added)
21. As regards the service of the temple and the duties that
appertain to it, he is rather in the position of the holder of an
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1101
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

office; but even so, it will not be quite correct to describe A
shebaitship as a mere office. “Office and property are both blended
in the conception of shebaitship”. Apart from the obligations and
duties resting on him in connection with the endowment, the
shebait has a personal interest in the endowed property. He has,
to some extent, the rights of a limited owner.”
B
22. Shebaitship being property, it devolves like any other species
of heritable property. It follows that, where the founder does not
dispose of the shebaiti rights in the endowment created by him,
the shebaitship devolves on the heirs of the founder according to
Hindu Law, if no usage or custom of a different nature is shown
C
to exist. [Gossamee Shree Greedharreejee v. Ramanlaljee.24]
23. Then, there is a distinction between a public and private
debutter. In a public debutter or endowment, the dedication is for
the use or benefit of the public. But in a private endowment, when
property is set apart for the worship of a family idol, the public are
not interested. The present case is one of a private debutter. The D
distinction is important, because the results logically following
therefrom have been given effect to by courts, differently.
24. According to English law, the beneficiaries in a private trust,
if sui juris and of one mind, have the power or authority to put an
end to the trust or use the trust fund for any purpose and divert it E
from its original object. Whether this principle applies to a private
endowment or debutter created under Hindu Law, is a question
on which authorities are not agreed. In Doorganath Roy v. Ram
Chunder Sen47 it was observed that while the dedication is to a
public temple, the family of the founder could not put an end to it, F
but “in the case of a family idol, the consensus of the whole family
might give the (debutter) estate another direction” and turn it into
a secular estate.
25. Subsequently, in Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradhyumna
Kumar Mullick48 the Judicial Committee clarified that the property G
cannot be taken away from the idol and diverted to other purposes
without the consent of the idol through its earthly agents who, as
guardians of the deity, cannot in law consent to anything which
may amount to an extinction of the deity itself.”
47 LR 4 IA 52 : ILR 2 Cal 233
48 52 IA 245 : AIR 1925 PC 139 H
1102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A 69. Recently, the Constitution Bench of this Court in M. Siddiq
(dead) through LRs vs. Mahant Suresh Das and others (Ram
Janmabhumi Temple Case)49 inter alia, dealt with the role and position
of a shebait. After considering the decisions on the point, it was stated:-
“425. Courts recognise a Hindu idol as the material embodiment
B of a testator’s pious purpose. Juristic personality can also be
conferred on a Swayambhu deity which is a self-manifestation in
nature. An idol is a juristic person in which title to the endowed
property vests. The idol does not enjoy possession of the property
in the same manner as do natural persons. The property vests in
the idol only in an ideal sense. The idol must act through some
C human agency which will manage its properties, arrange for the
performance of ceremonies associated with worship and take steps
to protect the endowment, inter alia by bringing proceedings on
behalf of the idol. The shebait is the human person who discharges
this role.
D … … …
429. The recognition of a person or a group of persons as shebaits
is a substantive conferment of the right to manage the affairs of
the deity. A necessary adjunct of the status of a shebait, is the
right to brings actions on the behalf of an idol and bind it and its
properties to the outcomes. The purpose for which legal personality
E
is conferred upon an idol as the material embodiment of the pious
purpose is protected and realised through the actions of the human
agent, that is, the shebait. The shebait is entrusted with the power
and the duty to carry out the purpose of the donor in respect of
the idol and its properties. In the vast majority of cases, a shebait
F is appointed in accordance with the terms of a deed of dedication
by which property is endowed to an idol. It is for the protection of
this property that the law recognises either the donor or a person
named in the deed of endowment as the shebait. In the absence
of an expressly appointed or identified shebait, the law has ensured
the protection of the properties of the idol by the recognition of a
G
de facto shebait. Where a person is in complete and continuous
management of the deity’s affairs coupled with long, exclusive
and uninterrupted possession of the appurtenant property, such a
person may be recognised as a shebait despite the absence of a

H
49 (2020) 1 SCC 1
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1103
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

legal title to the rights of a shebait. This will be adverted to in the A
course of the judgment.
(Emphasis added)
… … …
434. In addition to the duties that must be discharged in relation
to the debutter property, a shebait may have an interest in the B
usufruct of the debutter property. In this view, shebaitship is not
an office simpliciter, but is also property for the purposes of
devolution50. This view has been affirmed by this Court in
Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick21. The controversy
in that case was whether the appellant, as the widow of the shebait, C
was entitled to act as the shebait of the idol instead of the minor
son of the shebait born from his first marriage who was the
respondent. It was contended that the office of shebaitship would
devolve in accordance with the Hindu Women’s Right to Property
Act, 1937. B.K. Mukherjea, J. speaking for a four-Judge Bench
of this Court accepted this contention and held: (Angurbala D
Mullick case21 (AIR p. 296, para 11).
“11. … But though a shebait is a manager and not a trustee in
the technical sense, it would not be correct to describe the
shebaitship as a mere office. The shebait has not only duties to
discharge in connection with the endowment, but he has a E
beneficial interest in the debutter property. As the Judicial
Committee observed in the above case, in almost all such
endowments the shebait has a share in the usufruct of the
debutter property which depends upon the terms of the grant
or upon custom or usage. Even where no emoluments are F
attached to the office of the shebait, he enjoys some sort of
right or interest in the endowed property which partially at
least has the character of a proprietary right. Thus, in the
conception of shebaiti both the elements of office and property,
of duties and personal interest, are mixed up and blended
together; and one of the elements cannot be detached from G
the other. It is the presence of this personal or beneficial interest
in the endowed property which invests shebaitship with the
Approved by the Privy Council in Ganesh Chunder Dhur v. Lal Behary Dhur, 1936
50

SCC OnLline PC 53 : (1935-36) 63 IA 448 and Bhabatarini Debi v. Ashalata Debi, 1943
SCC OnLine PC 1 : (1942-43) 70 IA 57 H
1104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A character of proprietary rights and attaches to it the legal
incidents of property.”
The Court held that a shebait has a beneficial interest in the
usufruct of the debutter property. This beneficial interest is in
the form of a proprietary right. Though the role of the shebait
B is premised on the performance of certain duties for the idol
and the benefits are appurtenant, neither can be separated from
the other. Thus, office and property are both blended in
shebaitship, the personal interest of a shebait being
appurtenant to their duties.51"
C 70. Reliance was however placed by Mr. Gupta, learned Senior
Advocate on the decision of this Court in Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji
Maharaj v. The State of Rajasthan and others52 to submit that mere
right to manage the debutter property when no emoluments were being
drawn by the Manager was not found to be protected under Articles
19(1)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution of India by a Bench of five Judges
D of this Court. This Court, speaking through Gajendragadkar, J. (as the
learned Chief Justice then was) had observed:-
“The temple of Shrinathji at Nathdwara holds a very high place
among the in Hindu temples in this country and is looked upon
with great reverence by the Hindus in general and the Vaishnav
E followers of Vallabha in particular. As in the case of other ancient
revered Hindu temples, so in the case of the Shrinathji temple at
Nathdwara, mythology has woven an attractive web about the
genesis of its construction at Nathdwara. Part of it may be history
and part may be fiction, but the story is handed down from
F generation to generation of devotees and is believed by all of them
to be true.
… … …
The question as to whether a Hindu temple is private or public
has often been considered by judicial decision. A temple belonging
G to a family which is a private temple is not unknown to Hindu law.
In the case of a private temple it is also not unlikely that the religious
reputation of the founder may be of such a high order that the
51 Affirmed in Badri Nath v. Punna, (1979) 3 SCC 71: Profulla Chorone Requitte v.

Satya Chorone Requitte, (1979) 3 SCC 409
52 (1964) 1 SCR 561
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SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1105
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

private temple founded by him may attract devotees in large A
numbers and the mere fact that a large number of devotees are
allowed to worship in the temple would not necessarily make the
private temple a public temple. On the other hand, a public temple
can be built by subscriptions raised by the public and a deity installed
to enable all the members of the public to offer worship. In such
B
a case, the temple would clearly be a public temple. Where
evidence in regard to the foundation of the temple is not clearly
available, sometimes, judicial decisions rely on certain other facts
which are treated as relevant. Is the temple built in such an imposing
manner that it may prima facie appear to be a public temple?
The appearance of the temple of course cannot be a decisive C
factor; at best it may be a relevant factor. Are the members of
the public entitled to an entry in the temple? Are they entitled to
take part in offering service and taking Darshan in the temple?
Are the members of the public entitled to take part in the festivals
and ceremonies arranged in the temple? Are their offerings
D
accepted as a matter of right? The participation of the members
of the public in the Darshan in the temple and in the daily Acts of
worship or in the celebration of festival occasions may be a very
important factor to consider in determining the character of the
temple….
…..If the temple is a public temple, under Hindu Law the idol of E
Shrinathji is a juridical person and so, the ownership of the temple
and all its endowments including offerings made before the idol
constitute the property of the idol….
… … …
F
That takes us to the question as the nature and extent of the
Tilkayat’s rights in regard to the temple property. It is clear that
the Tilkayat never used any income from the property of the temple
for his personal needs or private purpose. It is true that the learned
Attorney General suggested that this consistent course of conduct
spreading over a large number of years was the result of what he G
described as self-abnegation on the part of the tilkayats from
generation to generation and from Tilkayat’s point of view, it can
be so regarded because the Tilkayat thought and claimed that the
temple and his properties together constituted his private property.
But once we reach the conclusion that the temple is a public temple H
1106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A and the properties belonging to it are the properties of the temple
over which the Tilkayat has no title or right, we will have to take
into account the fact that during the long course of the
management of this temple, the Tilkayat has never claimed any
proprietary interest to any part of the usufrcut of the properties of
the temple for his private personal needs, and so, that proprietary
B
interest of which Mr. Ameer Ali spoke in dealing with the position
of the Mahant and the Shebait and to which this Court referred in
the case of commissioner, Hindu Religious endowments,
Madras42is lacking in the present case. What the Tilkayat can
claim is merely the right to manage the property, to create lease in
C respect of the properties in a reasonable manner and the theoretical
right to alienate the property for the purpose of the temple; and be
it noted that these rights could be exercised by the Tilkayat under
the absolute and strict supervision of the Darbar of Udaipur.Now,
the right to manage the property belonging to the temple, or the
right to create a lease of the property on behalf of the temple, or
D
the right to alienate the property for the purpose of the temple
under the supervision of the Darbar cannot, in our opinion, be
equated with the totality of the powers generally possessed by
the Mahant or even the Shebait, and so, we are not prepared to
hold that having regard to the character and extent of the rights
E which can be legitimately claimed by the Tilkayat even on the
basis that he was a Mahant governed by the terms of the Firman,
amount to a right to property under Article 19(1)(f) or constitute
property under Article 31(2).
(Emphasis added)
F Besides, we may add that even if it was held that these rights
constituted a right to hold property their regulation by the relevant
provisions of the Act would undoubtedly be protected by Art.
19(5). The temple is a public temple and what the legislature has
purported to do is to regulate the administration of the properties
G of the temple by the Board of which the Tilkayat is and has to be
a member. Having regard to the large estate owned by the Tilkayat
and having regard to the very wide extent of the offerings made
to the temple by millions of devotees from day to day; the legislature
was clearly justified in providing for proper administration of the
properties of the temple. The restrictions imposed by the Act must,
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1107
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

therefore, be treated as reasonable and in the interests of the A
general public.”
71. In the aforesaid case, this Court was called upon to consider
the matter in the context of challenge to the Nathadwara Temple Act,
1959 (Rajasthan Act 13 of 1959), inter alia, on the grounds that said
Act violated the rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(f), 25(1), 26 (b) B
& (c) and 31(2) of the Constitution. The Act under challenge, enacted
by the State, had sought to change the management which was earlier in
the hands of the Tilkayat. On facts, it was noticed that the petitioner
therein was appointed as Tilkayat (Manager of the Temple) under a
Firman issued by the Rana of Udaipur on December 31, 1934 which
provided that the Udaipur Darbar had absolute right to supervise that C
the property dedicated to the shrine was used for legitimate purpose and
to take any measures for the management of the shrine. It was held by
this Court that said Firman was law by which the affairs of said temple
and succession to the office of the Tilkayat were governed after its
issue. This Court thereafter held:- D
“Having regard to the unambiguous and emphatic words used in
clause 1 of the Firman and having regard to other drastic provisions
contained in its remaining clauses, we are inclined to think that
this Firman made the Tilkayat for the time being a Custodian,
Manager and Trustee, and nothing more. As a Custodian or E
Manager, he had the right to manage the properties of the temple,
subject, of course, to the overall supervision of the Darbar, the
right of the Darbar in that behalf being absolute. He was also a
Trustee of the said property and the word “trustee” in the context
must mean trustee in the technical legal sense. In other words, it
is not open to the Tilkayat to claim that he has rights of a Mahant F
or a Shebait; his rights are now defined and he cannot claim any
higher rights after the Firman was issued.”
(Emphasis added)
In the backdrop of the finding that the Tilkayat could not claim G
rights of a Mahant or a Shebait, the challenge on the grounds that said
Act violated the rights under the Constitution was negated.
On the other hand, after considering the relevant decisions on the
point, in Angurbala Mullick21, this Court had very clearly observed,
that even where no emoluments are attached to the office of the shebait,
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1108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A he enjoys some sort of right or interest in the debutter property which
partially has the character of a proprietary right. In the decision of a
Bench of seven Judges in Shirur Mutt Case42 the decision in Angurbala
Mullick21was referred to with approval. In the recent decision of the
Constitution Bench in M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple Case)49,
the concerned portion from Angurbala Mullick21 was also quoted in
B
paragraph 434.
In the premises, in our view, mere factum that no emoluments are
attached to the office of the Shebait would not make any difference to
the character of the right and interest of the Shebait. Though this
conclusion is based on the decisions referred to above, reference may
C additionally be made to Para 5.5 of the Book titled “The Hindu Law of
Religious Endowments and Charitable Trusts”, 4th Edition edited by
Hon. P.B. Gajendragadkar, former Chief Justice of India, which points
in the same direction.
72. The principles that emerge from the long line of decisions
D referred to in the preceding paragraphs can thus be summed up:-
(i) According to Hindu law, when the worship of a thakoor has
been founded, the Shebaitship is held to be vested in the heirs of
the founder, in default of evidence that he has disposed of it
otherwise, or there has been some usage, course of dealing, or
E some circumstances to show a different mode of devolution.
(Gossamee Sree Greedharreejee vs. Rumanlolljee
Gossamee 24)
(ii) Unless the founder has disposed of the Shebaitship in any
particular manner - and this right of disposition is inherent in the
F founder - or except when usage or custom of a different nature is
proved to exist, Shebaitship like any other species of heritable
property follows the line of inheritance from the founder.
(Angurbala Mullick vs. Debabrata Mullick21)
(iii) The legal character of a Shebait cannot be defined with
G precision and exactitude. Broadly described, he is the human
ministrant and custodian of the idol, its earthly spokesman, its
authorised representative entitled to deal with all its temporal
affairs and to manage its property. As regards the administration
of the debutter, his position is analogous to that of a trustee; yet,
he is not precisely in the position of a trustee in the English sense,
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1109
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

because under Hindu Law, property absolutely dedicated to an A
idol, vests in the idol, and not in the shebait. (Profulla Chorone
Requitte v. Satya Chorone Requitte20)
(iv) Shebaitship in its true legal conception involves two ideas:
The ministrant of the deity and its manager; it is not a bare office
but an office together with certain rights attached to it. (Monohar B
Mukherjee vs. Bhupendra Nath Mukherjee and Ors. 30)
(v) The effect of the decisions in Ganesh vs. Lal Behary31 and
Bhaba Tarini Debi vs. Asha Lata Debi27 as the Privy Council
pointed out in the latter case, was to emphasise the proprietary
element in the Shebaiti right and to show that though in some C
respects an anomaly, it was an anomaly to be accepted as having
been admitted into Hindu law from an early date. (The
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras vs. Sri
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt42)
(vi) It is settled by the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee D
in Vidya Varuti v. Balusami26 that the relation of a Shebait in
regard to debutter property is not that of a trustee to trust property
under the English law. (Angurbala Mullick vs. Debabrata
Mullick21)
(vii) In a Hindu religious endowment the entire ownership of the E
dedicated property is transferred to the deity or the institution
itself as a juristic person and the Shebait or Mahant is a mere
manager. (Angurbala Mullick vs. Debabrata Mullick21)
(viii) In the conception of Mahantship, as in Shebaitship, both the
elements of office and property, of duties and personal interest F
are blended together and neither can be detached from the other.
The personal or beneficial interest of the Mahant in the
endowments attached to an institution is manifested in his large
powers of disposal and administration and his right to create
derivative tenures in respect to endowed properties; and these
and other rights of a similar character invest the office of the G
Mahant with the character of proprietary right which, though
anomalous to some extent, is still a genuine legal right. (The
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras vs. Sri
Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt42)
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1110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A (ix) Even where no emoluments are attached to the office of the
Shebait, he enjoys some sort of right or interest in the endowed
property which partially at least has the character of a proprietary
right. Thus, in the conception of Shebait both the elements of
office and property, of duties and personal interest, are mixed up
and blended together; and one of the elements cannot be detached
B
from the other. It is the presence of this personal or beneficial
interest in the endowed property which invests Shebaitship with
the character of proprietary rights and attaches to it the legal
incidents of property. (Angurbala Mullick vs. Debabrata
Mullick21)
C (x) Succession to Mahantship of a Math or religious institutions is
regulated by custom or usage of the particular institution, except
where a rule of succession is laid down by the founder himself
who created the endowment. (Sital Das vs. Sant Ram and
others43)
D (xi) The rule of custom should prevail in all cases and if any
aberrations have to be corrected such correction must take us in
the direction of re-establishing the rule of custom. (His Holiness
Digya Darshan Rajendra Ram Doss v. Devendra Doss45)
(xii) It is not open to the Court to lay down a new rule of succession
E or to alter the rule of succession completely. (His Holiness Digya
Darshan Rajendra Ram Doss v. Devendra Doss45)
(xiii) In the absence of an expressly appointed or identified Shebait,
the law has ensured the protection of the properties of the idol by
the recognition of a de facto Shebait. (M. Siddiq through LRs
F vs. Mahant Suresh Das and others (Ram Janmabhumi Temple
Case) 49
73. As laid down by this Court, when the idol is installed and the
temple is constructed or an endowment is founded, the shebaitship is
vested in the founder and unless the founder himself has disposed of the
G shebaitship in a particular manner or there is some usage or custom or
circumstances showing a different mode of devolution, the shebaitship
like any other species of heritable property follows the line of inheritance
from the founder; and it is not open to the Court to lay down a new rule
of succession or alter the rule of succession. It has also been laid down
that the shebaitship has the elements of office and property, of duties
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1111
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

and personal interest blended together and they invest the office of the A
shebait with the character of proprietary right. It has further been laid
down that the shebait is the custodian of the idol, its earthly spokesman
and the human ministrant; is entitled to deal with the temporal affairs
and to manage the property of the idol; and even where no emoluments
are attached to the office of the shebait, he has the right or interest in the
B
endowed property which has the characteristics of a proprietary right.
If the instant case is considered on the touchstone of these settled
principles, it is clear that after the major fire that occurred in the year
1686, the Temple was reconstructed and a new idol was installed by the
King of Travancore Shri Marthand Varma and since then right upto the
day the Covenant was signed, the management of the Temple had always C
been with the Kings of Travancore. The shebaitship or the managership
of the Temple passed on to the succeeding Kings, coming from the royal
family of Travancore. This chain was unbroken till the then Ruler of
Travancore signed the Covenant in May 1949.
It may be noted here that on 10.08.1947 a proclamation was issued D
by the Ruler declaring that in matters of succession to the Rulership and
to the throne and for all other purposes, the royal family was governed
by the Marumakkathayam law, as modified by the custom and usage
of the royal family. In a matter raising issues of succession to certain
properties of the Ruler of Travancore, this Court in Revathinnal E
Balagopala Varma13 had found that the devolution in the royal family
was from Ruler to Ruler. The shebaitship of the Temple had also passed
from Ruler to Ruler consistent with the principles of succession otherwise
applicable to the royal family.
74. We must thus conclude that as on the day when the Covenant F
was entered into by the Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore,
apart from other incidents which normally follow the rulership, he was
holding the office of Shebait of the Temple and represented a continuous
and unbroken line of successive Shebaits traced from the original founder;
and being a Shebait of the Temple, he was having all the rights and
interest as laid down by decisions referred to hereinabove. G
75. The questions still remain whether the office of Shebaitship of
the Temple was part of the duties of the Ruler purely in his capacity as
a Ruler, and said office was an incident of his rulership, or such office
was totally unconnected to and independent of the rulership. These
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1112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A questions will be considered along with other questions which arise for
consideration in the next segment.
B] Effect of the Covenant that was entered into in May
1949
76. The Covenant, relevant parts of which are quoted in paragraph
B 11 hereinabove, was entered into by the Maharajas of Travancore and
Cochin for the formation of the United State of Travancore and Cochin
and for purposes set out therein.
A) In terms of Article III, as from the appointed day, all rights,
authority and jurisdiction belonging to “the Ruler” of either of the
C Covenanting States which appertained or were incidental to the
Government of the respective States, vested in the United State. Similarly,
all duties and obligations of “the Ruler” of either of the Covenanting
States pertaining or incidental to the Government of that State devolved
on the United State which would now be discharged by the United State.
D Thus, all functions of the Rulers of either of the Covenanting States
concerning or related to the Government of that State stood vested in or
devolved on the United State.
B) In terms of Article IV “the present Ruler” of Travancore would
be Rajpramukh for the United State and would hold such office “during
E his lifetime”. In terms of Article VI, the executive authority of the United
State would be exercised by the Rajpramukh subject to certain stipulations
in said Article; as per Article VII, the Rajpramukh would be guided by
the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers; while in terms of Article
X, the Legislature for the United State would consist of the Rajpramukh
F and the Legislative Assembly. Article IX then obliged the Rajpramukh to
execute, on behalf of the United State, an Instrument of Accession in
accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of the Government of India
Act, 1935. In terms of Article XXI, the Rulers of Travancore and Cochin
would, however, continue to have and exercise their “present powers”
of suspension, remission or commutation of death sentences.
G
Thus, on the appointed day or the Covenant becoming effective,
a new role or capacity, that of Rajpramukh of the United State, was
assumed by the then Ruler of Travancore. No such role was contemplated
for the then Ruler of Cochin. Their earlier capacities as the Rulers or
Heads of the respective Covenanting States thus stood terminated, save
H and except what was stated in Article XXI, where they could still exercise
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1113
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

their “present powers” of suspension, remission or commutation of death A
sentences. Though, as Rajpramukh, the then Ruler of Travancore would
have executive authority over the United State which would include
areas of the erstwhile Cochin State, his powers, in terms of Article XXI,
were confined to the areas of the erstwhile Travancore State, while the
then Ruler of Cochin, who was not given any function in the United
B
State, would continue to have and exercise “present powers” under
Article XXI in the areas of the erstwhile Cochin State.
C) Article XIV entitled the Ruler of each Covenanting State to
receive Privy Purses from the revenue of the United State. As regards
the Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore, the entitlement was
restricted to “the present Ruler”, and not to his successors. In terms of C
Article XV, the Ruler of each Covenanting State would be entitled to the
full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties. As per Article
XVI, the Ruler of each Covenanting State, as also the members of his
family, would be entitled to all personal privileges, dignities and titles
enjoyed by them, immediately before 15.08.1947. Article XVII assured D
that succession to the Gaddi of each Covenanting State and to the personal
rights, privileges, dignities and titles of the Ruler would be in terms of
law and custom.
Apart from Article IV, the expression “the present Ruler” finds
mention in Article XIV. Articles XIV, XV and XVI conferred certain E
other entitlements in favour of the Rulers of the Covenanting States and
in some cases in favour of the members of family. The succession to the
Gaddi and other incidents stipulated in Article XVII, would be governed
in accordance with law and custom.
D) Article VIII is of importance and significance for the present F
purposes. In terms of Sub-Article ‘a’, the obligation of the Covenanting
State of Travancore to contribute from its general revenue a sum of
Rs.50 lakhs every year to the Dewaswom Board, and a sum of Rs.1
lakh every year to Shri Pandaravaga would, after the Covenant, be the
obligation of the United State. In terms of Sub-Article ‘b’, the
administration of the Temple, Sri Pandaravaga properties and all G
other properties and funds of the Temple now vested in trust in the
Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore and the sum of Rs.1
lakh transferred in terms of Sub-Article ‘a’ and Rs.5 lakhs contributed
every year towards the expenditure of the Temple would be conducted
subject to the control and supervision of the Ruler of Travancore H
1114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A by an Executive Officer appointed by him. In terms of Sub-Article ‘c’,
the administration of the incorporated and unincorporated Devaswoms
and of Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments and all their
properties and funds which were under the management of the Ruler of
the Covenanting State of Travancore would stand transferred and vested
in the Travancore Dewaswom Board. It further dealt with manner of
B
apportionment of the contribution of Rs.50 lakhs as stipulated in Sub-
Article ‘a’. In terms of Sub-Article ‘d’, the administration of the
incorporated and unincorporated Dewaswoms and of Hindu Religious
Institutions which were under the management of the Ruler of the
Covenanting State of Cochin would vest in the Cochin Dewaswom Board.
C However, “the Ruler of Cochin” would continue to exercise regulation
and control of all rituals and ceremonies in respect of two temples
mentioned in the proviso. Sub Articles ‘e’ and ‘f’ thereafter dealt with
compositions of the respective Dewaswom Boards.
77. Sub-Article ‘b’ of Article VIII used the expression “now vested
D in trust in the Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore” and
thus acknowledged the factum that the administration in respect of the
Temple, Sri Pandaravaga properties and all other properties and funds
of the Temple was already vested in the Ruler of Covenanting State of
Travancore. Sub-Article ‘b’ further contemplated that with effect from
the appointed day, the administration of the Temple, Sri Pandaravaga
E properties and all other properties and funds of the Temple would be
subject to the control and supervision of the “Ruler of Travancore”.
This Sub-Article was the centre of debate and fulcrum of submissions
by the learned counsel appearing for various parties.
On one hand, the submissions on behalf of the appellants and the
F Intervenors supporting them, stressed the expression “now vested in
trust” along with the other material on record to emphasize the
acknowledged status of “the Ruler” as Shebait of the Temple as on the
day the Covenant was entered into. They also relied upon the latter part
of the Sub-Article to submit that such status remained unaffected and
G was certainly intended to be continued.
On the other hand, the submissions on behalf of the State and
private respondents sought to emphasize that the continuation of the
status was in favour of “the Ruler” in his capacity as “the Ruler”.
78. According to the Covenant, insofar as the transfer of sovereign
H power and all incidental aspects connected therewith were concerned,
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1115
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

the Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore was involved at two A
stages. Under the first stage, the transfer was contemplated from him in
his capacity as the Head of the Covenanting State of Travancore in
favour of the United State and under the second stage as Rajpramukh
of the United State he was obliged to execute an Instrument of Accession
in terms of Article IX. On and with effect from the appointed day in
B
terms of the Covenant, his role as the Head of the State of Travancore
came to an end and he became the Rajpramukh of the United State, in
whom certain powers and rights got vested by virtue of Articles VI, VII
and X. Theoretically, as Rajpramukh, he could as well be vested with
powers of suspension, remission or commutation of death sentences in
respect of the entire area of the United State but the intent was to retain C
such powers in the erstwhile Ruler of Cochin State, who had no role in
the new dispensation with respect to the United State and for this reason,
Article XXI used the expression “the Rulers of Travancore and Cochin”.
The fact that this was a departure and as an exception to the general
mechanism is evident from the expression “Notwithstanding anything
D
contained in the preceding provisions of this Covenant”. Therefore,
despite generality of the earlier Articles of the Covenant, only with respect
to matters specified in Article XXI, “the Ruler of Travancore” continued
to have the powers which he was enjoying as the Head of the State of
Travancore before the Covenant came into effect. Thus, wherever the
Covenant wanted him to continue to exercise certain powers which as E
Head of the State of Travancore had resided or vested in him, the
Covenant made an express exception and stipulated so.
79. What then would be the import of the expression “the Ruler
of Travancore” in the latter part of Sub-Article ‘b’ of Article VIII is the
question that needs to be addressed. F
A) As discussed above, the only place in the Covenant where the
person who signed as the Ruler of the Covenanting State would continue
to enjoy his erstwhile powers as the Head of that Covenanting State,
was Article XXI. The references as “the Ruler of the Covenanting State”
and as the Ruler of Travancore or as “the Ruler of Cochin” in rest of the G
Articles, were only by way of reference to the person concerned, and
not by way of reference to or because of his official capacity as the
Ruler. This gets fortified by proviso to Sub-Article ‘d’ of Article VIII, in
terms of which “the Ruler of Cochin” would continue to exercise
regulation and control with respect to rituals and ceremonies in certain
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1116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A temples. Upon the Covenant coming into effect, he had lost his capacity
as the Head of the erstwhile State of Cochin. Thus, the retention of the
powers under said proviso in him was not because he had any official
status as Head of the State after the appointed day in terms of the
Covenant but only with a view to describe and locate the person
concerned. A person answering the description in said proviso would
B
continue to exercise such power. Similar thought can, therefore, be
validly entertained that the description in the latter part of Sub-Article
‘b’ of Article VIII was only to refer to or locate the person.
B) Furthermore, the historical background and the association of
the royal family with the Temple and the nature of Shebaitship held by a
C successive line of Rulers from time to time, were such that the Covenant
designedly let the management of the affairs of the Temple – with the
royal family, and in the hands of the Ruler of Travancore, principally
because his official capacity or status as the erstwhile Head of the State
apparently had nothing to do with the capacity as Shebait of the Temple.
D As discussed in the earlier segment, the Shebaitship was always
in the royal family and the Ruler represented the unbroken line of Shebaits.
Not only the excerpts from the book written by Mr. V.P. Menon indicate
the deep sense of attachment and devotion of the ruling family to the
Temple and Sri Padmanabhaswamy, but some reflection in that behalf is
E also to be noticed in the White Paper on the Indian States which was
initially prepared in July 1948 and updated in March 1950 by Government
of India, Ministry of States. It dealt with the United State of Travancore
and Cochin in paragraphs 139 to 145. Paragraphs 141 and 142 dealt
with Devaswoms-Hindu Temples and properties attached to them in the
two States including that of the temple of Sri Padmanabhaswamy as
F under:-
“141. One of the special features of the Covenant is the
arrangement in respect of Devaswoms – Hindu temples – and
property attached to them in the two States including the temple
of Shri Padmanabhaswami the tutelary deity of the ruling family
G of Travavancore. In Travancore alone, apart from this important
shrine, on the maintenance of which the State was spending over
Rs.1 million per annum, there are 348 major Devaswoms and
1123 minor Devaswoms. Large revenues are derived by the State
from the properties which were attached to these Devaswoms
H and provision was made by the State for the maintenance of
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1117
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

Devaswoms, from time to time, at varying figures. Hindu opinion A
in the State was unanimous that not only should the continued
payment of the existing allotments for the maintenance of
Devaswoms be guaranteed but that adequate compensation should
also be given in respect of the properties of the Devaswoms taken
over by the State since 1912, and the profits derived from them.
B
The annual contribution thus claimed ranged from rupees ten to
twenty millions. The Covenant now provides for a fixed contribution
of Rs.5.1 millions for the maintenance of Devaswoms in
Travancore out of which a sum of Rs.600,000 is to be contributed
towards the maintenance of the Shri Padmanabhaswami temple.
142. The most important departure from the past practice, which C
the provisions of the Covenant regarding the Devaswoms involve,
is that, except in the case of Shri Padmanabhaswami temple, in
the management of which the Ruler will be assisted by an Advisory
Committee, the administration of Devaswoms will vest in two
Boards to be set up in these States on which not only the orthodox D
Hindus but the Harijans also will be represented. This introduces
a far-reaching temple reform in that under the arrangement
prescribed in the Covenant the Harijans will secure a share both
in the control of the temples and appointments in the Devaswoms
Department, a position hitherto denied to them.”
E
It may be mentioned here that said White Paper generally gave
account of all such Covenants entered into by various Rulers of the
erstwhile Indian States and except the Temple of Sri Padmanabhaswamy
which was specifically dealt with in the Covenant that we are presently
concerned with, no other temple in any such Indian State was so
specifically and separately dealt with. In that sense, Article VIII of the F
Covenant has certain unique features.
C) The White Paper also set out, the Covenant entered into by
the Rulers of Gwalior, Indore and certain other States in Central India
for the formation of the United Madhya Bharat which in Sub-Article (2)
of Article VII provided:- G
“(2) Subject to any directions or instructions that may from time
to time be given by the Government of India in this behalf, the
authority –

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1118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A (a) to make laws for the peace and good government of any
scheduled area,
(b) to raise, maintain and administer the military forces of the
United State, and
(c) to control the administration of the fund in Gwalior known
B as the Gangajali Fund and of any other existing fund of a
similar character in any other Covenanting State.
shall vest exclusively in the Raj Pramukh”
The control and administration of the Fund known as Gangajali
C Fund and of any other existing fund of a similar character in any other
Covenanting State thus vested exclusively in the Raj Pramukh. The White
Paper in paragraph 159 (iv) described Gangajali Fund as under:-
“(iv) Gangajali Fund. - This Fund, which has a corpus of
Rs.16,237,000/- was created by the Scindias as a special reserve
D fund for use during grave emergency such as famine. His Highness
the Maharaja of Gwalior has made this fund available for public
benefit. Subject to any instructions or directions from the
Government of India, the authority to control and administer the
fund is vested in the Rajpramukh of Madhya Bharat.”
In terms of aforestated Article VII (2) the vesting was in favour
E
of the Raj Pramukh, and not in favour of any concerned Ruler. The Raj
Pramukh, in terms of Article III of said Covenant was to be elected by
the Council of Rulers. Consequently, though Gangajali Fund was
constituted by the then Maharaja of Gwalior, the control was not vested
in the Ruler of Gwalior, but in the Raj Pramukh. This also meant that the
F vesting was in his official capacity as Raj Pramukh, who could be any
other Ruler, and not strictly the Ruler of Gwalior.
The Madhya Bharat Gangajali Fund Trust Act, 1954 was thereafter
enacted. In terms of Section 6 of said Act, the properties comprising of
the Gangajali Fund vested in the Trustees. In accordance with Section 4
G as it originally stood, the Rajpramukh, the Chief Minister of the State,
and a nominee of the Rajpramukh were designated Trustees. Later there
were amendments to this Section. Section 7 stipulated that the income
from the Fund be released for schemes relating to (a) relief of famine;
(b) medical relief; and (c) education. The Act was repealed in 2003 and
after discharging the liabilities of the Trust, the residue was directed to
H be applied to three educational institutions.
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1119
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

Article VII (2) of said Covenant and the consequential legislation A
are clear indication that even where a Trust was constituted for certain
charitable purposes by the then Maharaja of Gwalior, the administration
of such Trust was not vested in the Ruler of Gwalior. On the other hand,
the Trust, in terms of the Covenant itself, was directed to be vested in
the Raj Pramukh in his official capacity.
B
In comparison, the vesting of administration of the Temple in the
instant case was not only acknowledged by the Covenant to be in trust
with the Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore but such
administration was to continue subject to the control and supervision of
“the Ruler of Travancore” even after the Covenant. This illustration
further emphasizes that “the control and supervision” of the Ruler of C
Travancore was not in any official capacity.
D) It is also pertinent to note here that other Devaswoms and
Endowments in the erstwhile State of Travancore also used to be under
the control of the erstwhile Ruler of Travancore. Going by the Travancore
Interim Constitution Act which is referred to in detail in paragraph 10 D
hereinabove, though such control was to be retained by the ruling family,
the Covenant expressed clearly to the contrary. Sub-Article ‘c’ of Article
VIII acknowledged that administration with respect to said other
Devaswoms and Endowments and other properties was earlier under
the management of the Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore. E
It, however, stated that with effect from the appointed day in terms of
the Covenant, such management would now vest in Travancore
Devaswom Board. This part also finds mention in the relevant paragraphs
of the White Paper as quoted above.
Thus, wherever the official capacity of the Head of the State was F
responsible for enabling the Ruler to be in charge of the management or
administration, upon ceasing to have such capacity, the erstwhile Ruler
would have nothing to do with the management of such other Devaswoms
or Endowments. In contrast, the case with respect to the Temple and
other properties referred to in Sub-Article ‘b’ stands on a completely
different footing. G
In the premises, it must be held that the expression “the Ruler of
Travancore” used in the latter part of Sub-Article ‘b’ of Article VIII
was only by way of reference and the purport of said Sub-Article was
not to invest the said authority and power because he was the Ruler or
enjoyed and represented any official status. H
1120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A 80) A subsidiary issue still needs to be dealt with, and that is
whether the references in said Article were only to the person who was
the Ruler at the time the Covenant was entered into and would not
include successors to said Ruler.
The survey of the concerned Articles of the Covenant as set out
B in paragraph 11 hereinabove shows that wherever special attributes or
rights were designed to be conferred upon and restricted to “the present
Ruler”, the Covenant was quite specific. Articles IV and XIV are clear
instances in that behalf. On the other hand, whenever the person, who
as the Ruler, had signed the Covenant was to be referred, the expressions
used in the Covenant had been “the Ruler of the Covenanting State” or
C “the Ruler of Travancore”. These expressions were only to identify the
person who was the Ruler as stated earlier. Thus, the rights such as the
entitlements to Privy Purses and the ownership, use and enjoyment of
private properties and so also to personal rights, privileges, titles and
dignities were concerned, they were assured to “the Ruler of the
D Covenanting State”. In addition, certain rights were also granted to the
members of the family and succession to the Gaddi, personal rights and
privileges was expressly assured. Whether those rights or entitlements
were intended to be enjoyed by the successor to the person who signed
the Covenant, would depend upon the nature and content of such right
or entitlement. In so far as the right with respect to Privy Purse payable
E to the Ruler of Travancore was concerned, it was expressly limited or
confined to “the present Ruler”, and obviously no successor could claim
such entitlement. But rest of the incidents or entitlements referred to in
said Articles were without such restriction. Additionally, once succession
to the Gaddi of each Covenanting State and to the personal rights and
F privileges etc. was guaranteed in accordance with law and custom by
Article XVII, these incidents were designed to be available for enjoyment
by the succeeding generations or successors according to law and
custom. If the matter is considered purely from the perspective of
Shebaitship of the Temple, or the right of administration referred to in
the latter part of Sub-Article ‘b’ of Article VIII, going by the general law
G of Shebaitship as discussed in the earlier segment, and the succession
according to law and custom, every successor to the Ruler who signed
the Covenant would be entitled to such right. There is nothing in any of
the Articles which even purports to limit or restrict such devolution.

H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1121
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

81. In the circumstances, it must be concluded that Article VIII A
of the Covenant not only acknowledged and accepted the factum that
the administration with respect to the Temple, its properties, as well as
with respect to Pandaravaga properties, had already vested in “the Ruler
of the Covenanting State of Travancore”, but the said Article expressly
continued the same status and stipulated that such administration shall
B
be conducted subject to the supervision and control of “the Ruler of
Travancore”, the meaning of which expression has already been dealt
with and deduced earlier.
C] Effect of the Constitution of India as it stood before the
Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 and of the
provisions of TC Act C

82. We now consider the effect of the Constitution of India on the
status and entitlement of the Ruler of Travancore to the Shebaitship of
the Temple.
Article 29153 of the Constitution of India dealt with Privy Purses D
payable to the Rulers and stipulated that if under any covenant or
agreement entered into by the Ruler of any Indian State, any sums were
guaranteed or assured by the Government of the Dominion of India to
be paid as Privy Purse, the sums in that behalf would be charged on and
paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India and that the sums so paid to
any Ruler would be exempt from all taxes on income. Article 36253of E
the Constitution of India stipulated that in the exercise of the power of
Parliament, or of the Legislature of a State, to make laws or in the
exercise of their respective executive powers, due regard shall be had
to the guarantee or the assurance given under any such covenant or
agreement, as was referred to in Article 291 of the Constitution of India, F
with respect to personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an
Indian State.
Article 366(22)54 defined the expression “Ruler” to mean, inter
alia, one who had signed the Covenant referred to in Article 291 and
who, for the time being, was recognized by the President of India to be G
the Ruler of that State and would include successor to such Ruler. It
may be stated here that there is no dispute that the Ruler of Travancore
who signed the Covenant was recognized by the President of India to be
The Article was repealed by the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971
53

As it stood before it was amended by the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment)
54

Act, 1971 H
1122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A the Ruler of Travancore. Article 363, which has remained unamended,
speaks of “Bar to interference by Courts in disputes arising out of certain
treaties, agreements etc.”
83. Soon thereafter, the TC Act came into force. The relevant
provisions of the TC Act have already been extracted earlier. Chapter
B III of the TC Act specifically dealt with Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple
and matters pertaining to the administration of the Temple. Said Chapter
III of the TC Act is consistent with the latter part of Sub-Article ‘b’ of
Article VIII of the Covenant and stipulates inter alia that the
administration of the Temple, Sri Pandaravaga properties and all other
properties and funds of the Temple “vested in trust in the Ruler of
C Travancore” and the sum of Rs.6 lakhs contributed in terms of Sub-
Section 1 of Section 18 of the TC Act shall be conducted, “subject to the
control and supervision of the Ruler of Travancore” by an Executive
Officer appointed by him. Said Chapter III did not confer any right or
benefit for the first time, where none existed earlier but gave statutory
D recognition to what was acknowledged and accepted in the latter part of
Sub-Article ‘b’ of Article VIII of the Covenant to be the continuing
status. Section 20 of the TC Act then deals with the constitution of Sree
Padmanabhaswamy Temple Committee, which is also in tune with said
Article VIII of the Covenant.
E Two features must be noticed at this stage. Insofar as incorporated
or unincorporated Devaswoms are concerned, consistent with the
stipulations of Sub-Article ‘c’ of Article VIII of the Covenant, the control
and administration in respect of such Devaswoms is vested in Travancore
Devaswom Board as stated in Section 15 of the TC Act. There are
certain machinery provisions which deal with the manner in which the
F affairs of the Devaswom Board would be conducted, with which we
are not presently concerned. Secondly, Sub-Section 2 of Section 62 of
the TC Act, in tune with proviso to Sub-Article ‘d’ of Article VIII of the
Covenant provides that despite the vesting of administration in Cochin
Devaswom Board, the regulation and control of rituals and ceremonies
G in the temples referred to therein would continue to be exercised by the
Ruler of Cochin. Thus, all material and relevant facets emanating from
various provisions of the Covenant pertaining to the administration of
the Temple, Sri Pandaravaga properties and all other properties of the
Temple, so also, the management and control of all other Devaswoms
and religious endowments were dealt with by the TC Act in a manner
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1123
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

which was completely consistent with the relevant provisions contained A
in the Covenant.
84. As stated in paragraph 16 hereinabove, orders passed by the
President of India that Rulers of Indian States had ceased to be recognized
as Rulers of respective Indian States were under challenge in Madhav
Rao Scinda12, in which case the issues regarding the impact of Articles B
291, 362, 363 and 366(22) of the Constitution as well as the effect of
legislative measures brought in pursuance of the provisions of Article
362 were considered by this Court.
With regard to the nature of Privileges enjoyed by the Rulers
Hidayatullah, C.J., in his opinion stated:- C
“23. The Privileges of the Rulers included many items. A
memorandum on these privileges was issued by the Ministry of
States in 1949. It did not contain an exhaustive list but was drawn
up to inform Provincial and Union Governments about them. It
contained an itemised list of 34 Privileges. They included several D
exemptions from the operation of Indian Laws, the enjoyment of
Jagir and personal property of the Rulers and members of their
families, the payment by the States of the marriage expenses of
the brothers and sisters of the Rulers, immunity from some
processes of courts of law, immunity from requisitioning of the
private properties of the Rulers and their families and so on and E
so forth. During the negotiations letters were written to the Rulers
to assure them that the Privy Purse was fixed in perpetuity and
the freedoms enjoyed by them would be continued.”
As regards ‘recognition of a Ruler’ under Article 366(22) the
learned Chief Justice observed: F
“53. …. The obligation to recognise a Ruler is bound up with the
other guarantees contained in Articles 291 and 362. The definition
in Article 366(22) is merely the key to find a particular Ruler……
………
G
72 …This Article renders the certainty of assumption of Rulership
to depend upon recognition and that recognition is worked out
primarily under Covenants and Agreements. The dominant and
immediate purpose and application of the Article depends upon
Covenants and Agreements. I have earlier said that the President
H
1124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A in recognising a Ruler or withdrawing his recognition does not act
arbitrarily but in the light of Covenants and Agreements. All such
instruments mention law and custom of the family except the
Bhopal Agreement where a local statute has to be observed. The
selection of a Ruler’s successor thus has to be worked out under
a Covenant or Agreement. The Article, therefore, has for its
B
dominant purpose the selection of Rulers through the application
of the Covenants and Agreements.”
The learned Chief Justice then concluded
“77. My conclusions on Articles 291, 362 and 366(22) are that
C Article 291 is not a provision relating to Covenants and Agreements
but a special provision for the source of payment of Privy Purses
by charging them on the Consolidated Fund and for making the
payment free of taxes on income. It does not in its dominant
purpose and theme answer the description in the latter part of
Article 363. Article 362 is within the bar of Article 363 because
D its dominant purpose is to get recognised the Covenants and
Agreements with Rulers. However, in so far as the same
guarantees find place in legislative measures the provisions of
Article 362 need not be invoked and the dispute decided on the
basis of those statutes. Such a case may not attract Article 362
E and consequently the bar of Article 363 may not also apply. Article
366(22) is within the description so long as the President in
recognising a Ruler or a successor is effectuating the provisions
of a Covenant or Agreement. It may apply when the discretion
exercised is relatable to his powers flowing from the Covenants
read with the article. However where the President acts wholly
F outside the provisions of Article 366(22) his action can be
questioned because the bar applies to bona fide and legitimate
action and not to ultra vires actions.”
(emphasis added)

G The majority judgment was authored by Shah, J. (as the learned
Chief Justice then was). With regard to Articles 291 and 362, it was
observed:-
“126. Even after the integration of States, the obligations under
the covenants were to be met out of the revenues of the respective
States. The covenants and the various stages through which
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1125
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

ultimate integration was achieved probably remained Acts of State. A
The rights and obligations accruing or arising under those acts of
State could be enforced only if the Union of India had accepted
those rights and obligations. After the Constitution the obligation
to pay the privy purse rested upon the Union of India, not because
it was inherited from the Dominion of India, but because of the
B
constitutional mandate under Article 291. The source of the
obligation was in Article 291, and not in the covenants and the
agreements. Reference to the covenants and agreements in Article
291 was for defining the privy purse: the obligations of the
Provinces in respect of the “Provincially merged States”, and
obligation of the Union of States in respect of the States merged C
in such Unions, ceased by recognition to retain their original
character. The obligation which arose out of the merger agreement
and was on that account an act of State shed its original character
on acceptance by the Constitution. The entity obliged to pay the
privy purse did not after the Constitution remain the same, the
D
source out of which the obligation was to be satisfied was not the
original source; the incident relating to exemption from payment
of tax was vitally altered, and the amount also was in some cases
different. Whereas the liability to pay the privy purse to the Rulers
under the merger agreements was assured by the Dominion
Government, the Constitution imposed upon the Union Government E
a directive to pay the privy purse.
(Emphasis added)
… … …
129.The structure of Article 362 is somewhat different. That Article F
imposes restrictions upon the exercise of legislative and executive
functions. Recognition of the personal rights and privileges of the
Rulers arising out of the covenants is not explicit, but the injunction
that in the exercise of legislative and executive power due regard
shall be had to the guarantees, clearly implies acceptance and
recognition of the personal rights, privileges and dignities. The G
Constitution thereby affirms the binding force of the guarantees
and assurances under the covenants of personal rights, privileges
and dignities, but unlike the guarantee of payment of the privy
purse in Article 291, the guarantee under Article 362 is of the
obligation under the original covenants and agreements executed H
1126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A by the Rulers, barring those regarding which there is express
legislation enacted to give effect to certain personal rights and
privileges e.g., Income Tax Acts, 1922 and 1961, Wealth Tax Act,
1957, Gift Tax Act, 1958, notifications under the Sea Customs
Act, 1878, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898. A Ruler seeking to enforce privileges which
B
parliamentary statutes have recognised relies for right to relief
upon the mandate of the statutes, and not of the covenant.”
(Emphasis added)
The majority Judgment went on to observe: -
C “134. In dealing with the dimensions of exclusion of the exercise
of judicial power under Article 363, it is necessary to bear in mind
certain broad considerations. The proper forum under our
Constitution for determining a legal dispute is the Court which is
by training and experience, assisted by properly qualified advocates,
D fitted to perform that task. A provision which purports to exclude
the jurisdiction of the Courts in certain matters and to deprive the
aggrieved party of the normal remedy will be strictly construed,
for it is a principle not to be whittled down that an aggrieved party
will not, unless the jurisdiction of the Courts is by clear enactment
or necessary implication barred, be denied his right to seek
E recourse to the Courts for determination of his rights. The Court
will interpret a statute as far as possible, agreeably to justice and
reason and that in case of two or more interpretations, one which
is more reasonable and just will be adopted, for there is always a
presumption against the law maker intending injustice and unreason.
F The Court will avoid imputing to the Legislature an intention to
enact a provision which flouts notions of justice and norms of fair
play, unless a contrary intention is manifest from words plain and
unambiguous. The provision in a statute will not be construed to
defeat its manifest purpose and general values which animate its
structure. In an avowedly democratic polity, statutory provisions
G ensuring the security of fundamental human rights including the
right to property will be, unless the contrary mandate precise and
unqualified, be construed liberally so as to uphold the right. These
rules apply to the interpretation of constitutional and statutory
provisions alike.
H … … …
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1127
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

136. Jurisdiction to try a proceeding is barred under the first limb A
of Article 363 if the dispute arises out of the provision of a
covenant: it is barred under the second limb of Article 363 if the
Court holds that the dispute is with respect to a right arising out of
a provision of the Constitution relating to a covenant. A dispute
that an order of an executive body is unauthorised, or a legislative
B
measure is ultra vires, is not one arising out of any covenant under
the first limb of Article 363, merely because the order or the
measure violates the rights of the citizen which, but for the act or
measure, were not in question. The dispute in such a case relates
to the validity of the act or the vires of the measure. Exclusion of
the Court’s jurisdiction by the terms of the relevant words lies in a C
narrow field. If the constitutional provision relating to a covenant
is the source of the right claimed to accrue, or liability claimed to
arise, then clearly under the second limb the jurisdiction of the
Court to entertain a dispute arising with respect to the right or
obligation is barred. We need in the present case express no opinion
D
on the question whether a dispute that an executive act or legislative
measure operating upon a right accruing or liability arising out of
a provision is invalid falls within the second limb of Article 363.
We do not therefore pronounce upon the argument of Mr
Palkhivalla that the dispute whether the recognition of a Ruler is
withdrawn without authority of law is not excluded from the E
jurisdiction of the Courts, because it is not a dispute with respect
to a right accruing under a provision of the Constitution.
(emphasis added)
… … …
138. Article 366(22) is, in our judgment, a provision relating to F
recognition of Rulers: that is the direct and only purpose of the
provision. It is not a provision relating to a covenant. The
qualification of a person being recognized as a Ruler is undoubtedly
that he is a Prince, Chief or other person who had entered into a
covenant or agreement as is referred to in Article 291, or that he
G
is the successor to such a Ruler. Reference to the covenant or
the agreement of the nature mentioned in Article 291 is for
determining who may be recognized as a Ruler. Because of that
reference the provision enacted with the object of conferring
authority upon the President to recognize a Ruler, will not be
deemed one relating to the covenant or agreement. H
… … …
1128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A 143. The source of the right to receive the Privy Purse is for
reasons already stated the constitutional mandate: it is not in the
covenant. Reference to the covenant in Article 291 merely
identifies the sum payable as Privy Purse: it does not make Article
291 a provision relating to the covenant. A dispute as to the right
to receive the Privy Purse, is therefore, not a dispute arising out
B
of the covenant within the first limb of Article 363, nor is it a
dispute with regard to a right accruing or obligation arising out of
a provision of the Constitution relating to a covenant.”
(emphasis added)
C K.S. Hegde, J. in his opinion stated:-
“209. Article 363 has two parts: the first part deals with disputes
arising out of any provisions of a treaty, agreement or covenant,
etc. and the second part with dispute in respect of any right
accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any of
D the provisions of the Constitution, relating to any such treaty,
agreement, covenant, engagement, Sanad or other similar
instrument.
210. Dealing with Articles 362 and 363 this is what the White
Paper says in para 240 (at p. 125):
E “Guarantees regarding rights and privileges.—Guarantees
have been given to the Rulers under the various agreements
and covenants for the continuation of their rights, dignities and
privileges. The rights enjoyed by the Rulers vary from State to
State and are exercisable both within and without the states.
F They cover a variety of matters ranging from the use of the
red plates on cars to immunity from Civil and Criminal jurisdiction
and exemptions from customs duties, etc. Even in the past it
was neither considered desirable nor practicable to draw up
an exhaustive list of all these rights. During the negotiations
following the introduction of the scheme embodied in the
G Government of India Act, 1935, the Crown Department had
taken the position that no more could be done in respect of the
rights and privileges enjoyed by the Rulers than a general
assurance of the intention of the Government of India to
continue them. Obviously, it would have been a source of
perpetual regret if all these matters had been made as
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1129
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

justiciable. Article 363 has, therefore been embodied in the A
Constitution which excludes specifically the Agreements of
Merger and the covenants from the jurisdiction of Courts except
in cases which may be referred to the Supreme Court by the
President. At the same time, the Government of India
considered it necessary that constitutional recognition should
B
be given to the guarantees and assurances which the
Government of India have given in respect of the rights and
privileges of Rulers. This is contained in Article 362, which
provides that in the exercise of their legislative and executive
authority, the legislative and executive organs of the Union
and States will have due regard to the guarantees given to the C
Rulers with respect to their personal rights, privileges and
dignities.”
… … …
212. As seen earlier Article 363 has two parts. The first part
relates to disputes arising out of Agreements and Covenants etc. D
The jurisdiction of this Court as well as of other Courts is clearly
barred in respect of disputes falling within that part. Then comes
the second part of Article 363, which refers to disputes in respect
of any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out
of any of the provisions of the Constitution relating to any E
agreement, covenant etc. We are concerned with this part of
Article 363. Before a dispute can be held to come within the
scope of that part, that dispute must be in respect of a right accruing
under or the liability or obligation arising out of a provision of the
Constitution and that provision of the Constitution must relate to
agreements, covenants etc. F

213. The principal dispute with which we are concerned in these
cases is whether the President has the power to abolish all Rulers
under Article 366 (22). Quite plainly this dispute cannot be held to
be dispute in respect of a right accruing or a liability or obligation
arising under any provision of the Constitution. Herein we are not G
concerned with any right, liability or obligation. We are concerned
with powers of the President under Article 366(22). What is in
dispute is the true scope of the power of the President under
Article 366(22). That dispute does not fall within Article 363. Power
is not the same thing as right. Power is an authority whereas a H
1130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A right in the context in which it is used in Article 363, signifies
property. The fact that the Court’s decision about the scope of
the power of the President under Article 366(22) may incidentally
bear on certain rights does not make the dispute, a dispute relating
to any right accruing under any provision of the Constitution. A
dispute as regards the interpretation of a provision of the
B
Constitution is not a dispute within the contemplation of the second
part of Article 363 as it is not a dispute in respect of any right,
liability or obligation. The contention of the petitioners is that the
impugned orders are ultra vires the powers of the President, hence
null and void. Such a dispute does not come within Article 363.”
C 85. Hidayatulla, C.J., found Article 291 to be a special provision
for the source of payment of Privy Purses and the same thought was
expressed in paragraph 126 by the majority Judgment which also found
the structure of Article 362 to be different. Unlike Article 291, which
itself was the source for payment of Privy Purses, Article 362 stipulated
D that due regard shall be had to the guarantees or assurances given under
any covenant or agreement while exercising legislative or executive
power. Thus, the source for enjoyment of personal rights, privileges and
dignities referred to in Article 362 would be in the statutory provisions
enacted in terms of the obligation spelt out in Article 362. To the extent
any legislative measure was undertaken, or executive power was
E exercised, with due regard to the guarantees or assurances given under
any covenant or agreement, the source would be in such measure or
exercise.
86. Insofar as the present segment is concerned, it must, therefore,
be concluded that the relevant provisions of the Constitution of India as
F well as that of the TC Act did not, in any way, upset or abridge the status
enjoyed by the Ruler of Travancore as Shebait of the Temple and also
did not, in any manner, adversely impact the right of administration vested
in the Ruler of Travancore. As a matter of fact, the relevant provisions
of the TC Act afforded statutory flavour to the status contemplated by
G Article VIII of the Covenant.
The submission that by virtue of Article 363 of the Constitution,
the present dispute could not be entertained shall be considered later.
D] Effect of the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment)
Act, 1971
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1131
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

87. The Statement of Objects and Reasons as well as the nature A
of this Constitutional Amendment; the newly incorporated Article 363A
and the amended definition of Ruler in Article 366(22) have been set out
in paragraph 17 hereinabove. As the Statement of Objects and Reasons
indicated, the concept of rulership with Privy Purses and special privileges
was found to be incompatible with egalitarian social order and as such it
B
was decided to terminate the Privy Purses and privileges of the Rulers
so also it was decided to terminate expressly the recognition already
granted to such Rulers and to abolish Privy Purses and extinguish all
rights and obligations in respect of Privy Purses. This Constitutional
Amendment deleted Articles 291 and 362; and inserted Article 363A
which now expressly stipulates inter alia that any person who was C
recognized to be the Ruler of an Indian State or his Successor, shall,
cease to be recognized, as such Ruler or Successor, and all rights, liabilities
and obligations in respect of Privy Purses stand extinguished. Article
366(22) was also accordingly amended and in terms of the amended
definition, “Ruler” now means, inter alia, the person who was recognized
D
as the Ruler of an Indian State or as a successor to such Ruler, before
the commencement of said Constitutional Amendment. With the deletion
of Article 291, the rights, liabilities and obligations with respect to Privy
Purses stood extinguished. The guiding principles emanating from Article
362 that in exercise of legislative or executive power, due regard shall
be had to the guarantee or assurance given in any Covenant or agreement E
referred to in Article 291 also ceased to exist.
88. Before we consider the impact of said Constitutional
Amendment, we must note how the challenge raised by the co-Ruler of
Indian State of Kurundwad Jr. and successor to the late Ruler of Indian
State of Mysore to said Constitutional Amendment was dealt with by F
the Constitution Bench of this Court in Raghunathrao Ganpatrao14.
At the outset, in para 36 of the leading judgment it was observed:
“36. We are not concerned about the particulars of the agreements
executed by other Rulers of various States.”
Pandian, J. who authored the leading Judgment, referred to G
antecedent facts starting from the Constitution (24th Amendment) Bill,
1970 as well as the challenge raised in Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao
Scindia12 as follows:-
“38. On May 14, 1970, the Constitution (Twenty-fourth
Amendment) Bill, 1970 for abolition of the above said privy purse, H
1132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A privileges etc. conferred under Articles 291, 362 and 366(22) was
introduced in the Lok Sabha by the then Finance Minister, Shri
Y.B. Chavan. The Bill contained three clauses and a short
Statement of Objects and Reasons. The statement reads thus:
“The concept of rulership, with Privy Purses and Special
B Privileges unrelated to any current functions and social
purposes, is incompatible with an egalitarian social order.
Government have, therefore, decided to terminate the Privy
Purses and Privileges of the Rulers of former Indian States.
Hence this Bill.”
C 39. On September 2, 1970 the Bill was voted upon in the Lok
Sabha. But on September 5, 1970 the Rajya Sabha rejected the
same since the Bill failed in the Rajya Sabha to reach the requisite
majority of not less than two-third members present as required
by Article 368 and voting. Close on the heels of the said rejection,
the President of India purporting to exercise his powers under
D clause (22) of Article 366 of the Constitution, signed an Order
withdrawing recognition of all the Rulers in the country en masse.
A communication to this effect was sent to all the Rulers in India
who had been previously recognised as Rulers.
40. This Presidential Order de-recognising the Rulers was
E questioned in Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India12 by filing
writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging it as
unconstitutional, ultra vires and void. An eleven-Judge Bench of
this Court by its judgment dated December 15, 1970 struck down
the Presidential Order being illegal, ultra vires and inoperative on
F the ground that it had been made in violation of the powers of the
President of India under Article 366(22) of the Constitution and
declared that the writ petitioners would be entitled to all their pre-
existing rights and privileges including right to privy purses as if
the impugned orders therein had not been passed. Here, it may be
noted that Mitter and Ray, JJ. gave their dissenting judgment.”
G
While dealing with the decision in Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao
Scindia12 it was observed:-
“60. So far as Article 362 is concerned, it has been held by majority
of the Judges that the said article is plainly a provision relating to
covenants within the meaning of Article 363 and a claim to enforce
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1133
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

the rights, privileges and dignities under the covenants therefore, A
are barred by the first limb of Article 363 and a claim to enforce
the recognition of rights and privileges under Article 362 are barred
under the second limb of Article 363 and that the jurisdiction of
the courts however, is not excluded where the relief claimed is
founded on a statutory provision enacted to give effect to personal
B
rights under Article 362.”
(Emphasis added)
The leading Judgment thereafter observed: -
“74. The agreements entered into by the Rulers of the States
with the Government of India were simple documents relating to C
the accession and the integration and the “assurances and
guarantees” given under those documents were only for the
fixation of the privy purses and the recognition of the privileges.
The guarantees and the assurances given under the Constitution
were independent of those documents. After the advent of the
Constitution, the Rulers enjoyed their right to privy purses, private D
properties and privileges only by the force of the Constitution and
in other respects they were only ordinary citizens of India like any
other citizen; of course, this is an accident of history and with the
concurrence of the Indian people in their Constituent Assembly.
(Emphasis added) E
75. Therefore, there cannot be any justification in saying that the
guarantees and assurances given to the Rulers were sacrosanct and
that Articles 291 and 362 reflected only the terms of the agreements and
covenants. In fact as soon as the Constitution came into force, the
Memoranda of Agreements executed and ratified by the States and Union
F
of States were embodied in formal agreements under the relevant articles
of the Constitution and no obligation flowed from those Agreements and
Covenants but only from the Constitutional provisions. To say differently,
after the introduction of Articles 291 and 362 in the Constitution, the
Agreements and Covenants have no existence at all. The reference to
Covenants and Agreements was casual and subsidiary and the source G
of obligation flowed only from the Constitution. Therefore, the contention
urged on the use of the words ‘guaranteed’ or ‘assured’ is without any
force and absolutely untenable.
(Emphasis added)
… … … H
1134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A 91. After the commencement of the Constitution, in pursuance of
Article 366(22), the Rulers were recognised and they had been
enjoying the privy purses, privileges, dignities etc. on the basis of
the relevant constitutional provisions. Pursuant to the resolution
passed by the All India Congress Committee in 1967, the Union
of India introduced the Twenty-fourth Amendment Bill in 1970 to
B
implement the decision of the All India Congress Committee
favouring removal of privy purses, privileges etc. But the Bill though
passed in the Lok Sabha failed to secure the requisite majority in
the Rajya Sabha and thereby it lapsed. It was only thereafter, the
President of India issued an Order in exercise of the powers vested
C in him under Article 366(22) de-recognising the Rulers and stopping
the privy purses, privileges etc. enjoyed by the Rulers. This Order
passed by the President was the subject-matter of challenge in
Madhav Rao12. The Supreme Court struck down the Order of
the President as invalid as in the view of the Court de-recognition
of the Rulers would not take away right to privy purses when
D
Articles 291 and 362 were in the Constitution. It was only in that
context, the observations which have been relied upon by Mr Soli
J. Sorabjee, were made. The Twenty-sixth Amendment itself was
passed by Parliament to overcome the effect of this judgment.
Now by this Amendment, Articles 291 and 362 are omitted, Article
E 363-A is inserted and clause (22) of Article 366 is amended.
Therefore, one cannot be allowed to say that the abovesaid omitted
articles and unamended clause were the essential part of the
constitutional scheme. So they have to be read only in the context
of a challenge made to the Presidential Order which sought to
render nugatory certain rights guaranteed in the Constitution which
F
were then existing. In any event, the constitutional bar of Article
363 denudes the jurisdiction of any Court in disputes arising from
covenants and treaties executed by the Rulers. The statement of
Objects and Reasons of Twenty-sixth Amendment clearly points
out that the retention of the above articles and continuation of the
G privileges and privy purses would be incompatible with the
egalitarian society assured in the Constitution and, therefore, in
order to remove the concept of rulership and terminate the
recognition granted to Rulers and abolish the privy purses, this
Amendment was brought on being felt necessary.
H (Emphasis added)
… … …
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1135
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

96. Permanent retention of the privy purse and the privileges of A
rights would be incompatible with the sovereign and republican
form of Government. Such a retention will also be incompatible
with the egalitarian form of our Constitution. That is the opinion
of the Parliament which acted to repeal the aforesaid provisions
in exercise of its constituent power. The repudiation of the right to
B
privy purse privileges, dignities etc. by the deletion of Articles 291
and 362, insertion of Article 363-A and amendment of clause (22)
of Article 366 by which the recognition of the Rulers and payment
of privy purse are withdrawn cannot be said to have offended
Article 14 or 19(g) [sic 19(1)(f)] and we do not find any logic in
such a submission. No principle of justice, either economic, political C
or social is violated by the Twenty-sixth Amendment. Political
justice relates to the principle of rights of the people, i.e. right to
universal suffrage, right to democratic form of Government and
right to participation in political affairs. Economic justice is
enshrined in Article 39 of the Constitution. Social justice is
D
enshrined in Article 38. Both are in the directive principles of the
Constitution. None of these rights are abridged or modified by
this Amendment. We feel that this contention need not detain us
anymore and, therefore, we shall pass on to the next point in
debate.”
Mohan, J. in his separate opinion, concurred with the majority E
decision and observed:-
“151. The guarantees in Articles 291 and 362 are guarantees for
the payment of privy purses. Such a guarantee can always be
revoked in public interest; more so, for fulfilling a policy objective
or the directive principles of the Constitution. This is precisely F
what the preamble to the impugned Amendment says. That being
so, the theory of sanctity of contract or the unamendability of
Article 291 or 362 does not have any foundation. The theory of
political justice is also not tenable since political justice means the
principle of political equality such as adult suffrage, democratic G
form of Government, etc.
152. The treaties/covenants/etc. entered into between the Union
of India and the Rulers were as a result of political action. No
justiciable rights were intended to be created. Article 363 as it
stood in its original form spells out this proposition. The rights and H
1136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A privileges in the articles prior to the Twenty-sixth Amendment
were as acts of State of the Government and not in recognition of
the sacrifices of the Rulers. By no means, can it be contended
that these guarantees given to the Rulers were ever intended to
be continued indefinitely.”
B This Court, thus, rejected all the challenges and held the
Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 to be valid.
89. Consequent to the de-recognition of Rulers of Indian States
and abolition of Privy Purses by the Constitution (Twenty Sixth
Amendment) Act, 1971, the Parliament enacted 1972 Act. The relevant
C provisions of 1972 Act are set out in paragraph 19 hereinabove. It sought
to amend certain enactments which had granted privileges to former
Rulers. One such example pertaining to the provisions of the Wealth
Tax Act is set out in detail in said paragraph 19.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons for 1972 Act discloses
D that indefinite continuance of the privileges was found indefensible, but
the withdrawal or cessation would not be immediate “to enable the former
Rulers to adjust progressively.”
Thus, unlike Privy Purses, the termination of which was intended
to be immediate and therefore the source for Privy Purses, namely, Article
E 291 itself was deleted, the deletion of Article 362 by itself would not
result in cessation of every privilege or personal right with respect to
which “due regard” was had while exercising legislative power in terms
of Article 362 before its deletion. The source being in the statutory
enactments, despite deletion of Article 362, if the concerned legislations
continue to remain in operation, the personal rights or privileges could
F still be enjoyed. That is precisely why, on the strength of various statutory
provisions certain benefits in the form of personal rights or privileges are
still available. It is for the concerned legislatures to take appropriate
steps in accordance with law, either to terminate the effect and operation
of extension of such benefits or allow them to operate or lessen the
G extent and cause gradual changes as was sought to be undertaken by
1972 Act.
90. Thus, if the provisions of the TC Act to the extent it enacted
Chapter III of Part I dealing with “Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple”
and related provisions are taken to be an exercise by the concerned
Legislature with “due regard” to the assurances and guarantees in
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1137
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

covenant or agreements in terms of Article 362 as it existed then even A
with deletion of Article 362 the concerned provisions would still be
operative so long as appropriate steps are not taken by the concerned
Legislature.
91. As is evident from the White Paper referred to hereinabove,
the assurances and guarantees given in the covenants or agreements B
entered into with various Rulers normally had four elements; i) that certain
sums shall be payable to the Rulers by way of Privy Purses; ii) that
certain properties mentioned as private properties of the Ruler would
vest in the Ruler in his personal capacity; iii) that succession to the Gaddi
would go strictly by the prevalent law and custom; and iv) that personal
rights, privileges and dignities enjoyed by the Rulers and in some cases C
by the members of the family of the Ruler, would continue to be available.
92. Out of the aforesaid four elements, the elements (i) and (iv)
were covered by Articles 291 and 362 as they stood before being deleted.
The effect of such deletion has been discussed and dealt with. The
elements (ii) and (iii) are normal incidents which were not within the D
scope of said Articles 291 and 362. Despite the Constitution (Twenty
Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971, the private properties of the Ruler would
continue to be available for normal succession and devolution in
accordance with the law and custom. Though concepts such as Ruler or
Rulership have ceased to operate, succession to the Gaddi as an incident E
may still operate. For instance, there could be a sword or any other
ceremonial weapon, or a sarpech, or heirloom jewellery, which must go
by rule of primogeniture, as against the normal way of succession with
regard to other personal properties. All such incidents have not been
terminated. The clear example is in clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of
Section 5 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 which uses the expression F
“jewellery in the possession of any Ruler, not being his personal property”
which had been recognized as his “heirloom”. Such items or properties
which fall in or are connected strictly with element (iii), may descend
along with succession to the Gaddi and by very nature must remain
impartible. On the other hand, if normal principles of succession are G
applied, at any given level of succession, such items or properties
recognized as “heirloom” may be required to be shared amongst more
than one person and would therefore cease to be impartible.
93. These four elements were covered by Articles XIV, XV, XVII
and XVI respectively in the Covenant in the present case. However,
H
1138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A apart from the said four assurances, the Covenant also dealt with an
additional and important aspect in Article VIII(b). It accepted and
acknowledged that the administration with respect to the Temple, Sri
Pandaravaga properties, and the property of the Temple which was also
vested in the Ruler of the Covenanting State would continue to be
conducted in the manner stipulated therein, subject to the control and
B
supervision of the Ruler of Travancore. The effect of such Article and
the fact that such vesting was not in the capacity as Ruler has already
been dealt with. It has also been concluded that the expression “The
Ruler of Travancore” was only to locate and describe the person who
would be in control and supervision of the administration.
C 94. In the premises, we must conclude that the Constitution
(Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 did not in any way impact or
affect the administration of the Temple, Sri Pandaravaga properties and
the properties of the Temple, which continued to be under the control
and supervision of the Ruler of Travancore.
D E] Effect of the death of the person who had signed the
Covenant as the Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore
95. As stated in paragraph 21 hereinabove, Sree Chithira Thirunal
Balarama Varma who had signed the Covenant as the Ruler of the
Covenanting State of Travancore, passed away on 19.07.1991.
E 96. It was submitted on behalf of the State that the said Ruler of
the Covenanting State of Travancore was duly recognized by the
President of India in terms of Article 366(22) of the Constitution as it
stood before the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971,
and that even after the said Amendment, by virtue of amended definition
of Ruler under Article 366(22) he continued to fulfil the criteria, and
F could answer the definition of “Ruler”. It was further submitted that he
was thus, the recognized Ruler of Travancore and in that capacity he
could, during his lifetime have the benefit of Chapter III of Part I of the
TC Act; that after his death, no person or a successor could be recognized
as Ruler of Travancore in terms of Article 366(22), as amended; and as
G such, no person can come within the meaning of expression “Ruler of
Travancore” as used in said Chapter III of Part I, and consequently, no
person or successor could avail of the benefit of various provisions in
Chapter III of Part I of the TC Act.
On the other hand, the submission on behalf of the appellants as
well as the Intervenors supporting them is that for the purposes of said
H
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1139
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

Chapter III of Part I, the definition in Article 366(22) would not be the A
governing definition. The matter has to be assessed going by the context
in which the expression had been used in the Covenant and the TC Act.
97. The discussion in the first and second segments hereinbefore
have led us to conclude that as on the day when the Covenant became
effective, the Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore, was holding B
the office of Shebait of the Temple, which was not in his official capacity
as the Ruler; and that the effect of Sub Article (b) of Article VIII was
not to invest any new authority and power in him for the first time because
of his official status, but an acknowledgement of the existing authority
and power already vested in him. It has also been concluded by us that
the expression “Ruler of Travancore” in the Covenant and in the TC C
Act was only to identify the person, and that the official status of the
Ruler of Travancore had no relation with such administration.
The principles emanating from various decisions which were
considered in the first segment have been culled out by us in para 72
hereinabove. If according to the settled principles, the Shebaitship is like D
any other heritable property which would devolve in accordance with
custom or usage, and that the rule of custom must prevail in all cases,
even after the death of the erstwhile Ruler of Travancore in 1991, the
Shebaitship of the Temple being unconnected with the official status of
the person who signed the Covenant, must devolve by the applicable E
laws of succession and custom.
The proclamation issued on 10.08.1947 as referred to in paragraph
8 hereinabove clearly states the applicable principles of succession. The
decision of this Court in Revathiannal13 is also to similar effect. Thus,
going by concerned principles of succession and custom, the successor F
can easily be located.
98. It may be relevant to note here that the TC Act has not defined
the expression “Ruler”, and the definition of Ruler under Article 366
(22) of the Constitution is for the purposes of the Constitution whereas
the expression “Ruler” as defined under Article 363 of the Constitution
G
in inclusive manner is for the purposes of said Article alone. In Maharaja
Pravir Chandra Bhanj Deo Kakatiya vs. The State of Madhya
Pradesh55 the Constitution Bench of this Court had stated:-

55 (1961) 2 SCR 501
H
1140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A “… There is nothing in the provisions of Art. 366(22) which
requires a court to recognize such a person as a Ruler for purposes
outside the Constitution. …”
Similarly, in Rani Ratna Prova Devi vs. State of Orissa and
another56, another Constitution Bench of this Court had observed:-
B “…But it must be remembered that the definitions prescribed by
Art. 366 are intended for the purpose of interpreting the articles
in the Constitution itself, unless the context otherwise requires,
and so, the argument that the definition of the word “Ruler”
prescribed by the Act is inconsistent with the definition prescribed
C by Art. 366 (22), has really no substance or meaning. …”
99. The definitions of ‘Ruler’ in Articles 363 and 366(22) thus do
not ipso facto have any application to the provisions of the TC Act,
unless the TC Act expressly stipulates so or impliedly refers to such
definitions either under Article 363 or under Article 366(22). With the
D deletion of Articles 291 and 362, the scope of definition in Article 366(22)
to find a particular Ruler for conferral of advantages referred to in both
the Articles, has ceased to have any significance. However, the concept
of the Ruler and Rulership, as discussed hereinabove are still relevant
insofar as certain legislations and provisions are concerned. Many of
these legislations, normally define the expression themselves, or by
E reference incorporate the definition as given in Article 363; for example,
Section 87B of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. No such provision
was made in the TC Act. The question therefore, is whether the expression
“Ruler of Travancore” as appearing in Chapter III of Part I of the TC
Act is capable of being understood to include his successors according
F to custom.
100. A perusal at Sections 15, 62 and Chapter III of Part I of the
TC Act clearly shows that these provisions were put on the Statute
Book having “due regard” to the Covenant. Since the source of these
provisions lies in the Covenant, and there being no definition of “Ruler of
G Travancore”, or for that matter “Ruler of Cochin”, one has to consider
the relevant Articles of the Covenant to assess or understand the
significance of the said provisions of the TC Act. Sections 15, 62 and
Chapter III of Part I of the TC Act were enacted principally to give
effect to Article VIII and generally to give effect to the Covenant.

H 56 (1964) 6 SCR 301
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1141
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

101. In the earlier segments, we have already concluded that A
Article VIII had clearly used the expression “now vested in trust in the
Ruler” while speaking about the administration of the Temple, Sri
Pandaravaga properties, and the properties of the Temple. The Covenant
thus, not only acknowledged such status, but in sub-Article ‘b’ of Article
VIII, intended to continue the status where such person would continue
B
to exercise control and supervision over the administration of the Temple.
This was in the backdrop of the long standing association of the ruling
family with the Temple, and the Shebaitship held by the continuous line
of Rulers. The expression “Ruler of Travancore” used in the provisions
of the TC Act must therefore be understood in the same light. As held
earlier, the Covenant never intended to restrict, or do away, with the C
right of administration already vested in the “Ruler of Travancore”, and
such expression was not intended to be confined to the present incumbent,
or the person who had signed as the Ruler of the Covenanting State of
Travancore. Going by the normal incidents of Shebaitship including the
heritability, the context in which the expression was used in Article VIII
D
of the Covenant, and carried in the provisions of the TC Act, it must be
held that such expression must include the successors to the person who
had signed the Covenant.
102. Apart from the Covenant, the expression “Ruler of
Travancore” as used in Chapter III of Part I of the TC Act did not
depend upon any other enactment or instrument to look for the successor E
to the Ruler of Travancore, nor is there any express or implied intendment
to go by the definition of “Ruler” either under Article 363 or 366(22) of
the Constitution. The Covenant speaks of succession, according to law
and custom, and that is how the successor must be identified. As
Hidayatullah, C.J., opined in paragraphs 53 and 7257 of his Judgment in F
Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia12 the definition in Article 366(22) as it
then stood was merely a key to find a particular Ruler, and that the
selection of a successor to the Ruler was required to be worked out
under the Covenant. The method of selecting the successor under Article
366(22) as it then stood was not by way of any different formula or
principle but was rooted in the concerned law and custom. That being G
the underlying principle as available from the Covenant, there would not
be any difficulty in identifying the successor as and when the occasion
arises.

57 Quoted in paragraph 84 hereinabove H
1142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A 103. At the same time, if the submission that the expression “Ruler
of Travancore” in the TC Act must be made dependent on the recognition,
is accepted, it would lead to incalculable inconvenience and prejudice.
First, it was never the intention of the Legislature to make such an
expression dependent upon any recognition. Secondly, there is no power
in the President of India, after the Constitution (Twenty Sixth
B
Amendment) Act, 1971 to grant any such recognition. Thirdly, the
consequence of such an interpretation would mean that the unbroken
line of succession to the Shebaitship would stand terminated making the
entire Chapter III of Part I of the TC Act meaningless and redundant.
Consequently, the administration of the Temple, Sri Pandaravaga
C properties and the properties of the Temple would suffer immense
prejudice. Section 15 of the Act which vested the rights, authority and
jurisdiction in respect of Devaswoms and Hindu Religious Endowments
in the Travancore Board is also inapplicable to Chapter III of Part I.
This would result in a complete void. The Legislature could not be ascribed
of such an intention. On the other hand, the Legislature must be taken to
D
be well aware that the Shebaitship was heritable, and remained in the
royal family for few centuries in an unbroken line of succession. It is for
this reason, consistent with the terms of the Covenant, a special
dispensation was made in Chapter III of Part I of the TC Act.
104. It may be relevant to note that the State in two affidavits
E filed in the Suits as referred to hereinabove, has taken a clear stand that
the Temple is managed by the Travancore Palace. These affidavits were
filed by responsible officers of the State, well after the death of the then
Ruler in 1991. The understanding on part of the State machinery, or the
officials by itself can never be the determining criteria, but that is a
F relevant factor to be taken note of, as observed by this Court in National
and Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater,
Bombay58 and in Desh Bandhu Gupta and Co. and others vs. Delhi
Stock Exchange Association Ltd.59
105. In the instant case, since the Shebaitship had vested in the
G Ruler of Travancore, not in his official capacity, the normal incident of
heritability must get attached to the office of such Shebaitship in
accordance with governing principles of succession and custom.
Therefore, when it comes to the matter concerning the administration of

58 (1969) 1 SCC 541 para 5
H 59 (1979) 4 SCC 565 para 9
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1143
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

the Temple, Sri Pandavaraga properties and the properties of the Temple, A
the expression “the Ruler of Travancore” as appearing in Chapter III of
Part I of TC Act must mean the successor in accordance with the
prevalent law and custom. In the process one need not go to the definition
of Ruler either under Article 366(22) or under Article 363 of the
Constitution of India. Consistent with the principles that have been culled
B
out in para 72 hereinabove, after the death of the person who was in
control and supervision of the administration, the heritable interest must
devolve in accordance with the customary rights.
106. Further, unless and until the line of succession of the
Shebaitship and in-charge of the administration, is completely extinct,
there can be no question of escheat as observed by the High Court. In C
Kutchi Lal Rameshwar Ashram Trust Evam Anna Kshetra Trust v.
Collector, Haridwar60, this Court had an occasion to consider the issue
of escheat in the context of a Public Trust. In that case, after the death
of one Mohanlal in whose name patta of the property was secured, the
Collector had concluded that the property vested in the State Government D
by operation of law. Setting aside the decision of the High Court which
had affirmed the conclusions of the Collector, this Court observed:-
“20. Section 29 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 has been
invoked by the Collector. Section 29 provides as follows:
“29. Failure of heirs.—If an intestate has left no heir qualified E
to succeed to his or her property in accordance with the
provisions of this Act, such property shall devolve on the
Government; and the Government shall take the property
subject to all the obligations and liabilities to which an heir would
have been subject.” F
Section 29 embodies the principle of escheat. The doctrine of
escheat postulates that where an individual dies intestate and does
not leave behind an heir who is qualified to succeed to the property,
the property devolves on the Government. Though the property
devolves on the Government in such an eventuality, yet the G
Government takes it subject to all its obligations and liabilities.
The State in other words does not take the property (at SCC p.
113, para 12) “as a rival or preferential heir of the deceased but
as the lord paramount of the whole soil of the country”, as held in
60 (2017) 16 SCC 418 H
1144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A State of Punjab v. Balwant Singh 61 . This principle from
Halsbury’s Laws of England62 was adopted by this Court while
explaining the ambit of Section 29. Section 29 comes into operation
only on there being a failure of heirs. Failure means a total absence
of any heir to the person dying intestate. When a question of
escheat arises, the onus rests heavily on the person who asserts
B
the absence of an heir qualified to succeed to the estate of the
individual who has died intestate to establish the case. The law
does not readily accept such a consequence. In State of Bihar v.
Radha Krishna Singh63, a Bench of three Judges of this Court
formulated the principle in the following observations:
C “272. It is well settled that when a claim of escheat is put
forward by the Government the onus lies heavily on the
appellant to prove the absence of any heir of the respondent
anywhere in the world. Normally, the court frowns on the estate
being taken by escheat unless the essential conditions for
D escheat are fully and completely satisfied. Further, before the
plea of escheat can be entertained, there must be a public
notice given by the Government so that if there is any claimant
anywhere in the country or for that matter in the world, he
may come forward to contest the claim of the State. In the
instant case, the States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh merely
E satisfied themselves by appearing to oppose the claims of the
respondent-plaintiffs. Even if they succeed in showing that the
plaintiffs were not the nearest reversioners of the late Maharaja,
it does not follow as a logical corollary that the failure of the
plaintiffs’ claim would lead to the irresistible inference that
F there is no other heir who could at any time come forward to
claim the properties.”
… … …
22. In Rambir Das v. Kalyan Das64 a Bench of two learned
Judges of this Court dealt with a case of shebaitship. Citing the
G authority of Justice B.K. Mukherjea’s celebrated Tagore Law
Lectures with approval, this Court took note of the position of law
61 1992 Supp (3) SCC 108
62 4th Edn., Vol.17, Para 1439
63 (1983) 3 SCC 118

64 (1997) 4 SCC 102
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SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1145
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

elucidated in the lectures: (Rambir Das case64, SCC p. 105, A
para 3)
“3. … ‘As shebaitship is property, it devolves like any
other property according to the ordinary Hindu law of
inheritance. If it remains in the founder, it follows the line of
founder’s heirs; if it is disposed of absolutely in favour of a B
grantee, it devolves upon the heirs of the latter in the ordinary
way and if for any reason the line appointed by the donor fails
altogether, Shebaitship reverts to the family of the founder.’”
On the question of escheat, B.K. Mukherjea, J. observes thus:
(SCC p. 106, para 3) C
“3. … ‘As there is always an ultimate reversion to the
founder or his heirs, in case the line of shebaits is extinct, strictly
speaking no question of escheat arises so far as the devolution
of shebaitship is concerned. But cases may be imagined where
the founder also has left no heirs, and in such cases the D
founder’s properties may escheat to the State together with
the endowed property. In circumstances like these, the rights
of the State would possibly be the same as those of the founder
himself, and it would be for it to appoint a shebait for the debutter
property. It cannot be said that the State receiving a dedicated
property by escheat can put an end to the trust and treat it as E
secular property.’”
In other words, even in a situation where a founder or his line of
heirs is extinct, and the properties escheat to the State, the State
which receives a dedicated property is subject to the trust and
cannot treat it in the manner of a secular property. In fact, we F
may note, Section 29 expressly stipulates that the State “shall
take the property subject to all the obligations and liabilities
to which an heir would have been subject”.
23. In deciding this case, this Court must also bear in mind the
settled principle that unless the founder of a math or religious G
institution has laid down the principle governing succession to the
endowment, succession is regulated by the custom or usage of
the institution. This principle was enunciated over six decades
ago by this Court in Sital Das v. Sant Ram43, rendered by B.K.
Mukherjea, J., speaking for a Bench of four Judges: (AIR p. 609,
H
para 9)
1146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A “9. In the appeal before us the contentions raised by the
parties primarily centre round the point as to whether after the
death of Kishore Das, the plaintiff or Defendant 3 acquired
the rights of Mahant in regard to the Thakardwara in dispute.
The law is well settled that succession to Mahantship of a
Math or religious institution is regulated by custom or usage of
B
the particular institution, except where a rule of succession is
laid down by the founder himself who created the endowment.
As the Judicial Committee laid down [Vide Genda Puri v.
Chatar Puri44, IA at p. 105] in one of the many cases on this
point: (SCC OnLine PC)
C ‘… In determining who is entitled to succeed as Mohunt,
the only law to be observed is to be found in the custom
and practice, which must be proved by testimony, and the
claimant must show that he is entitled according to the custom
to recover the office and the land and property belonging to
D it.’
Mere infirmity of the title of the defendant, who is in possession,
will not help the plaintiff.”
… … …

E 25. The principle that the law does not readily accept a claim to
escheat and that the onus rests heavily on the person who asserts
that an individual has died intestate, leaving no legal heir, qualified
to succeed to the property, is founded on a sound rationale. Escheat
is a doctrine which recognises the State as a paramount sovereign
in whom property would vest only upon a clear and established
F case of a failure of heirs. This principle is based on the norm that
in a society governed by the Rule of Law, the court will not presume
that private titles are overridden in favour of the State, in the
absence of a clear case being made out on the basis of a governing
statutory provision. To allow administrative authorities of the
G State—including the Collector, as in the present case—to adjudicate
upon matters of title involving civil disputes would be destructive
of the Rule of Law. The Collector is an officer of the State. He
can exercise only such powers as the law specifically confers
upon him to enter upon private disputes. In contrast, a civil court
has the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon all matters involving civil
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SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1147
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

disputes except where the jurisdiction of the court is taken away, A
either expressly or by necessary implication, by statute. In holding
that the Collector acted without jurisdiction in the present case, it
is not necessary for the Court to go as far as to validate the title
which is claimed by the petitioner to the property. The Court is
not called upon to decide whether the possession claimed by the
B
Trust of over forty-five years is backed by a credible title. The
essential point is that such an adjudicatory function could not have
been arrogated to himself by the Collector. Adjudication on titles
must follow recourse to the ordinary civil jurisdiction of a court of
competent jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908.” C
107. In the circumstances, we hold that the death of Sree Chithira
Thirunal Balarama Varma who had signed the Covenant, would not in
any way affect the Shebaitship of the Temple held by the royal family of
Travancore; that after such death, the Shebaitship must devolve in
accordance with the applicable law and custom upon his successor; that D
the expression “Ruler of Travancore” as appearing in Chapter III of
Part I of the TC Act must include his natural successors according to
law and custom; and that the Shebaitship did not lapse in favour of the
State by principle of escheat.
108. We must now deal with two decisions on which reliance was E
placed by Mr. Suresh, learned counsel for respondent Nos.3, 4 and 6 in
appeal arising from Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.12361 of 2011.
A) In Bala Shankar Maha Shanker Bhattjee and Others vs.
Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State23 the basic issue was whether
Kalika Mataji Temple was a public Trust. The High Court found, inter F
alia, that by Sanad No.19, Scindias in their capacity as sovereign Rulers
had passed on their obligations in respect of the temple to the British
Government by a treaty concluded between them in 1860. After
considering various decisions on the point, the principles were noted by
this Court as under: -
G
“19. A place in order to be a temple, must be a place for public
religious worship used as such place and must be either dedicated
to the community at large or any section thereof as a place of
public religious worship. The distinction between a private temple
and public temple is now well settled. In the case of former the
beneficiaries are specific individuals; in the latter they are H
1148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A indeterminate or fluctuating general public or a class thereof. Burden
of proof would mean that a party has to prove an allegation before
he is entitled to a judgment in his favour. The one or the other of
the contending parties has to introduce evidence on a contested
issue. The question of onus is material only where the party on
which it is placed would eventually lose if he failed to discharge
B
the same. Where, however, parties joined the issue, led evidence,
such evidence can be weighed in order to determine the issue.
The question of burden becomes academic.
20. An idol is a juristic person capable of holding property. The
property endowed to it vests in it but the idol has no beneficial
C interest in the endowment. The beneficiaries are the worshippers.
Dedication may be made orally or can be inferred from the conduct
or from a given set of facts and circumstances. There need not
be a document to evidence dedication to the public. The
consciousness of the manager of the temple or the devotees as to
D the public character of the temple; gift of properties by the public
or grant by the ruler or Government; and long use by the public as
of right to worship in the temple are relevant facts drawing a
presumption strongly in favour of the view that the temple is a
public temple. The true character of the temple may be decided
by taking into consideration diverse circumstances. Though the
E management of a temple by the members of the family for a long
time, is a factor in favour of the view that the temple is a private
temple, it is not conclusive. It requires to be considered in the light
of other facts or circumstances. Internal management of the
temple is a mode of orderly discipline or the devotees are allowed
F to enter into the temple to worship at particular time or after some
duration or after the headman leaves the temple are not conclusive.
The nature of the temple and its location are also relevant facts.
The right of the public to worship in the temple is a matter of
inference.
G 21. Dedication to the public may be proved by evidence or
circumstances obtainable in given facts and circumstances. In
given set of facts, it is not possible to prove actual dedication
which may be inferred on the proved facts that place of public
religious worship has been used as of right by the general public
or a section thereof as such place without let or hindrance. In a
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SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1149
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

public debuttar or endowment, the dedication is for the use or A
benefit of the public. But in a private endowment when property
is set apart for the worship of the family idol, the public are not
interested. The mere fact that the management has been in the
hands of the members of the family itself is not a circumstance to
conclude that the temple is a private trust. In a given case
B
management by the members of the family may give rise to an
inference that the temple is impressed with the character of a
private temple and assumes importance in the absence of an
express dedication through a document. As stated earlier,
consciousness of the manager or the devotees in the user by the
public must be as of right. If the general public have always made C
use of the temple for the public worship and devotion in the same
way as they do in other temples, it is a strong circumstance in
favour of the conclusiveness of public temple. The origin of the
temple, when lost in antiquity, it is difficult to prove dedication to
public worship. It must be inferred only from the proved facts and
D
circumstances of a given case. No set of general principles could
be laid.”
This decision lays down the parameters for testing whether a
particular temple is a private temple, or a public temple, and reiterates
that though the property endowed to it vests in the idol, it has no beneficial
interest in it and that the beneficiaries are worshippers. It also E
acknowledges that in a given case the management of the temple may
be by the members of a family.
The conclusions drawn by us in the present case, are not in any
way inconsistent with this decision and the accepted premise in the present
case is that the Temple is a public temple. F

B) In Deep Chand vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others22,
the questions that arose for consideration were concerning the validity
of a scheme framed by the State pursuant to the provisions of the Motor
Vehicle Act, 1939. Thereafter, Parliament enacted the Motor Vehicle
(Amendment) Act, 1956, which inserted Chapter IVA into the principal G
Act. The matter was tested on the principles of repugnancy as also on
the anvil of Article 13 of the Constitution. The decision in Deep Chand
(supra) thus has no application to the present controversy.

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1150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A 109. Having considered the nature of Shebatiship of the Temple
and the effect of developments such as the Constitution (Twenty Sixth
Amendment) Act, 1971 and the death of the Ruler who has signed the
Covenant, we now turn to the other issues projected by the learned
counsel for various parties.
B I] Bar under Article 363 of the Constitution of India
i) In para 77 of his opinion in Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia12,
Hidayatullah, C.J., had observed that insofar as the guarantees that had
found place in legislative measures, the provisions of Article 362 need
not be invoked and the dispute could be decided on the basis of the
C Statutes which were enacted having due regard to the contents of the
Covenant, and that such a case would not attract Article 362. To similar
effect are the observations made by the Majority Judgment in that
decision in the portions quoted hereinabove. The matter was put beyond
any doubt in para 60 of the leading judgment in Raghunathrao
Ganpatrao14 where the ratio in Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia12
D was dealt with, and it was held that the jurisdiction of the Courts would
not get excluded where relief was found in a statutory provision enacted
in terms of Article 362 of the Constitution. The tenor of the Suits as filed
was to agitate that the expression “Ruler of Travancore” appearing in
Chapter III of Part I of the TC Act ought to be construed in the manner
E suggested by the plaintiffs. The relief was thus founded on the
interpretation suggested by the plaintiffs and therefore would not come
within the bar engrafted in Article 363 of the Constitution. The decisions
of this Court in Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia 12 as well as in
Raghunathrao Ganpatrao14 have clearly ruled out the applicability of
any such bar.
F
ii) As observed in the judgments of Hidayatullah, C.J., and the
majority judgment as well as in the opinion of Hegde, J., in order to get
the bar under Article 363 attracted, the dispute must fall under either of
two limbs of Article 363. Under the first limb the dispute must arise out
of the provisions of the Covenant, whereas under the second limb the
G dispute must be with respect to the right arising out of a provision of the
Constitution relating to the Covenant.
The dispute raised in the Suits in the present case, which were
sought to be transferred to the High Court, had questioned the authority
of the appellant No.1 only from the stand point of the expression “Ruler
H of Travancore” appearing in Chapter III of Part I of the TC Act, and
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1151
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

would not get covered under either of the limbs of Article 363 of the A
Constitution.
iii) The reliance placed on the decision of this Court in Colonel
His Highness Sawai Tej Singhji of Alwar vs. Union of India and
anr.16 was thus completely misplaced. In that case, the Suit was filed by
the Ruler of Alwar praying that three properties namely the Secretariat B
Building, Daulat Khana building and Indra Viman Station be declared as
private properties of said Ruler and that State of Rajasthan be ejected
from those properties or in the alternative be directed to pay rent to said
Ruler. The issue was whether those three properties were accepted to
be private properties of the Ruler. Since the Suit directly related to the
scope of the description of the property in the concerned documents C
pertaining to accession, in view of the bar under Article 363 of the
Constitution, the Suits were found to be not maintainable. A submission
was advanced before this Court that in the “parent” Covenant the property
was described to be the private property of the Ruler, and subsequent
communications including the one dated 14.09.1949, would not operate D
as a bar under Article 363 of the Constitution. In this backdrop the matter
was dealt with by this Court as under:-
“20. Another contention raised by Mr Sharma was that even if
the letter dated September 14, 1949 was held to evidence an
agreement, it was not hit by the provisions of Article 363 of the E
Constitution inasmuch as it was an agreement resulting from the
Rajasthan Covenant which alone, according to him, was the
agreement covered by the article. This contention is also without
substance. Article 363 of the Constitution bars the jurisdiction of
all courts in any disputes arising out of any agreement which was
entered into or executed before the commencement of the F
Constitution by any ruler of an Indian State to which the
Government of India was a party. The operation of the article is
not limited to any “Parent” covenant and every agreement whether
it is primary or one entered into in pursuance of the provisions of
a preceding agreement would fall within the ambit of the article. G
Thus the fact that the agreement contained in the letter dated
September 14, 1949 had resulted from action taken under the
provisions of the Rajasthan Covenant, is no answer to the plea
raised on behalf of the respondents that Article 363 of the
Constitution is a bar to the maintainability of the two suits, although
we may add, that the agreement did not flow directly from the H
1152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A Rajasthan Covenant but was entered into by ignoring and departing
from the provisions of clause (2) of Article XII thereof.”
iv) In the circumstances, we accept the submissions made on
behalf of the State, as well as the concerned respondents, and hold that
the bar under Article 363 of the Constitution of India would not get
B attracted in the present matter, and that the submissions in that behalf
advanced on behalf of the appellants as well as the intervenors supporting
them deserve to be rejected.
II] Submissions on the basis of Articles 25(1) and 26(b) of
the Constitution
C i) The submissions advanced by Mr. Deepak, learned Advocate
for the Intervenors in this connection have been noted out in para 42
hereinabove. However, no such submissions were either advanced before
the High Court, or in this Court, on behalf of the appellants. No factual
foundation was also laid either before the High Court or in the form of
D pleadings by the appellants before this Court.
ii) In the absence of pleadings and requisite issues having been
raised by the competing claimants, it would be extremely difficult to
enter into said issues so raised by Mr. Deepak, learned Advocate and
consider whether the role played by the Royal Family as descendants of
E Maharaja Aditya and as “Padmanabhadasa” is essential and integral to
the very foundation and identity of the Temple. Similarly, the question
whether “Parashurama Padhati” being practiced has a distinct identity
of its own action would also require complete elaboration and assessment
of facts.

F iii) We therefore accept the submissions of Mr. Gupta, learned
Senior Advocate for the State that in the absence of any claim being
raised in a properly instituted proceedings by an identifiable religious
denomination, there would be no question of adjudicating or giving a
finding regarding violation of any rights under Articles 25 and 26 of the
Constitution, and that there would be no occasion to enter into the question
G whether or not the Temple is of a denominational character as projected,
or that the relationship between the “Ruler of Travancore” and the Temple
could be said to be an essential or integral part of the Hindu religion in
general.

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SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1153
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

iv) In the circumstances we refuse to enter into the questions A
raised by Mr. Deepak, learned Advocate for the Intervenors in these
proceedings.
110. The legal issues having been dealt with, we must now consider
what should be the “way forward”. After the decision of the High Court,
various orders were passed by this Court, committees were formed and B
inspections were undertaken. Inventorization has taken place with respect
to most of the Kallaras, the antiques and artifacts of the Temple have
been digitized, and for the last more than 9 years various steps have
been taken under the directions of this Court by all the authorities. The
State has also expended considerable amounts as stated in the tabular
chart referred to in para 44 hereinabove. C

i) Consistent with the stand that the Temple is a public Temple
and that no remuneration at any stage was derived in the past or would
be aimed at in future, a suggestion was made on behalf of the appellants
in the form of a Note in response to the affidavit in reply filed on behalf
of the State. In the said Note, which is set out in detail in Paragraph 47 D
hereinabove, the appellants have suggested the composition of an
Administrative Committee, and of an Advisory Committee. Broadly, it is
suggested that the Administrative Committee be formed comprising of
five Members, the Chairperson being a retired Indian Administrative
Service Officer of the rank of Secretary to Government of Kerala; the E
other four members being (i) a nominee of the Trustee; (ii) the Chief
Thantri of the Temple; (iii) a nominee of the Government of Kerala; and
(iv) a Member to be nominated by the Ministry of Culture, Government
of India. In terms of para 8 of the Note, the Trustee that is to say the
Manager or Shebait of the Temple would be guided by the advice given
by the Advisory Committee. F

ii) On the other hand, the suggestion made on behalf of the State
is to follow the model statutorily enacted for Guruvayoor Devaswom,
and thus the Managing Committee would be of eight Members comprising
of two ex-officio members, namely, Padmanabhadasa and the Senior
Thantri; while the other six Members would be nominated by the Hindus G
among the Council of Ministers; one of them being Member of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes while one being a woman, and
the other being a representative of the employees of the Temple.

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1154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A 111. It may be noted here that the following Committees were
constituted from time to time by this Court.
A) By Order dated 02.05.2011, two observers were appointed
for the purposes of inventorization.
B) By Order dated 21.07.2011, an Expert Committee was
B appointed for the purposes of Inventory, Conservation and
Security.
By same order, Overseeing Committee was also appointed
to supervise and guide the working of the Expert Committee.

C C) The Order dated 13.02.2013 refers to the Temple Committee
in terms of Section 20 of the TC Act to advise the Ruler of
Travancore.
D) By Order dated 11.12.2013, Conservation and Restoration
Committee was appointed for Structural Renovation and
D Restoration.
E) Since the Executive Officer proceeded on leave, an Interim
Administrative Committee was appointed vide Order dated
24.04.2014 for day to day functions relating to the Temple.
F) By Orders dated 09.05.2017 and 04.07.2017, apart from
E reconstituting the Conservation Committee, a Selection
Committee for Sreekovil was also appointed to select the
suitable person having requisite knowledge.
These Committees were constituted at the interim stage of the
proceedings in this Court.
F 112. We may, at this stage, also refer to some of the Reports
submitted by the Administrative Committee appointed by this Court:-
i) In the Report dated 05.01.2018, it was reported that taking
advantage of the fact that an ad hoc committee was at the
helm of the affairs of the Temple, some of the occupants of
G the structures on East Nada, North Gate and Utsava Madom
Building continued to be or were in illegal and unauthorized
occupation and that requisite action to resume the possession
of said structures from such occupants ought to be undertaken.

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ii) In the Report dated 01.01.2020, it was stated that from A
04.01l.2019 to 20.12.2019, the offerings made by the devotees
visiting the Temple, in the ‘Kanikka’ amounted to
Rs.5,68,96,260/- (Rupees Five Crores Sixty Eight Lakhs Ninety
Six Thousand Two Hundred and Sixty Only).
iii) The Report dated 27.05.2020, under the signature of the District B
Judge, referred to the earlier Resolution dated 13.06.2017 and
the direction issued by this Court in its Order dated 04.07.2017
requesting the State to nominate a panel of three officers from
the Indian Audit and Accounts Service (IA &AS) to oversee
the audit and accounts of the Temple and submit quarterly
reports to the Administrative Committee. The Report stated:- C

“I may also report that the Administrative Committee is perfectly
in the darkness regarding the financial position and accounts of
the Temple. Different District Judges discharged duties as
Chairmen of the Administrative Committee during different periods
since the inception of the Committee as per the directions of the D
Hon’ble Supreme Court. So far, the respective Executive Officers,
in charge of the financial matters of the Temple, have not produced
either the budget proposals or the statement of accounts before
the Administrative Committee.
… … … E

The Executive Officer informed me that as the Principal
Accountant General raised queries on the remuneration of the
serving IAAS Officers and the State Government was not in a
position to meet the expenses, the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court could not be complied with. Subsequently, on 18.09.2017, F
the Administrative Committee resolved the following:-
‘(i) The service of an IA & AS Officer is required to oversee
the audit conducted by the Internal Auditor and Statutory
Auditor.
G
(ii) The service of a serving IA & AS Officer is required on
foreign service terms.
(iii) In addition, the services of two non IA & AS Officers,
who are in service, is also required on foreign service
terms to assist the IA & AS Officer.’
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1156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A The Committee also authorized the Executive Officer to take up
the matter with the Government and to bring the developments to
the notice of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
So far, the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to appoint an
IA & AS Officer to oversee the internal audit and statutory audit
B has not been complied with. Still the Committee is in darkness on
the financial position and accounts of the Temple.”
113. The provisions of the TC Act with respect to the administration
of the Temple are clear:-
a) Under Section 18(2), the administration shall be conducted.
C “Subject to the control and supervision of the Ruler of Travancore, by an
Executive Officer appointed by him.”
b) “Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple Committee” composed of
three members nominated by the Ruler of Travancore in terms of Section
20 is to advise the Ruler of Travancore in the discharge of his functions.
D
The Statute has thus vested the power of appointing the Executive
Officer and of forming the Advisory Committee, in the Ruler of
Travancore.
In the Note, the appellants have stated:-
E (i) “The Trustee shall delegate his powers of administration under
Section 18(2)” to the Administrative Committee which “shall
administer the Temple through an Executive Officer to be
appointed by the Committee”.
(ii) On all policy matters, the Trustee shall be guided by the advice
F of the Advisory Committee.
114. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival suggestions,
the composition of the Committees as suggested by the appellants deserves
acceptance, especially in light of the conclusions arrived by us that the
Managership or the Shebaitship of the Temple continues with the Family.
G As against the administration contemplated by Chapter III of Part I of
the TC Act in the hands of the Ruler of Travancore in absolute terms,
the course now suggested by the appellants is quite balanced. The
Composition of the Administrative Committee as suggested is broad based
and would not be loaded in favour or against the Trustee. However,
considering the fact that the present interim Administrative Committee
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SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1157
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headed by the District Judge is in seisin for the last more than five years, A
and various District Judges as Chairpersons of the Committee conducted
themselves quite well, in our view, a minor change in the Administrative
Committee suggested by the appellants in their Note is called for. Instead
of a retired Indian Administrative Service Officer of the rank of Secretary
to the Government of Kerala as the Chairperson of the Administrative
B
Committee, in the interest of justice, the District Judge,
Thiruvananthapuram shall be the Chairperson of the Administrative
Committee. Needless to say that the present Chairperson of the Interim
Administrative Committee shall continue to be the Chairperson so long
as he holds the post of the District Judge, Thiruvananthapuram. The
composition of the Advisory Committee will ensure that the administration C
of the Temple is conducted in a fair and transparent manner.
115. We, therefore, accept the suggestions made by the appellants
in their Note adverted to in detail in paragraph 47 hereinabove with
regard to the constitution of the Administrative Committee and the
Advisory Committee subject to the modification with respect to the D
Chairperson of the Administrative Committee as stated in the preceding
paragraph. The appellant No.1 shall file an appropriate affidavit of
undertaking within four weeks of this judgment in terms of paragraph 1
of the Note and also agreeing to the modification as stated above. The
affidavit of undertaking so filed shall be binding on the appellant No.1
and all his successors. E

Within four weeks of filing of the affidavit of undertaking, both
the Committees shall be constituted and become functional. The
Administrative Committee shall immediately appoint the Executive
Officer. Upon the constitution of the Administrative Committee, the
Interim Administrative Committee appointed in terms of the Order dated F
24.04.2014 shall cease to operate.
In terms of the Note submitted by the appellants the powers of
“the Ruler of Travancore” under Section 18(2) of the TC Act shall stand
delegated to the Administrative Committee while the Advisory Committee
shall be deemed to be the Committee constituted in terms of Section 20 G
of the TC Act. It is made clear that all the members including the
Chairpersons of the Administrative Committee and the Advisory
Committee must be Hindus and fulfil the requirements in Section 2(aa)
of the TC Act.
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1158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A All the other Committees constituted in terms of various orders
passed by this Court shall continue for four months, and it shall be upto
the Advisory Committee to consider whether the services of those
Committees are required or not.
It must also be stated that the present security arrangements as
B deployed by the State Government shall be continued, but the expenses
in that behalf shall be borne by the Temple hereafter.
116. The Administrative Committee and the Advisory Committee
shall do well to discharge all their functions including performance of the
worship of the deity, maintenance of its properties, diligently and in the
C best interest of the Temple, and provide adequate and requisite facilities
to the worshippers; and more particularly:-
(a) Preserve all treasures and properties endowed to Sree
Padmanabhaswamy and those belonging to the Temple.
(b) Protect all tenanted properties and take appropriate measures
D to ensure reasonable returns from such tenanted properties.
(c) Ensure that all rituals and religious practices are performed
in accordance with the instructions and guidance of the Chief
Thantri of the Temple and according to custom and traditions.
In temporal matters, the Committees shall be guided by the
E advice given by the Chief Thanthri. The designation of the
Chief Thanthri shall be done in accordance with the customs
and traditions.
(d) Shall take appropriate steps to return to the State the amounts
expended by the State Government as catalogued in the Chart
F in paragraph No.44 hereinabove.
(e) All the income accruing to the Temple, as well as the offerings
made by the worshippers, shall be expended in the following
manner:
(i) To improve the facilities for the worshippers; and
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(ii) For such religious and charitable purposes as the Advisory
Committee may deem appropriate; and
(iii) In investments that will fetch reasonable returns and
ensure that the properties of the Temple are completely safe
H and secure.
SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. v. 1159
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]

(f) Recover and retrieve any property or funds of the Temple A
which have been put to misuse or have been in unauthorized
occupation or misappropriated.
(g) Shall order audit for the last 25 years as suggested by the
learned Amicus Curiae. The audit shall be conducted by a
firm of reputed Chartered Accountants. The Advisory B
Committee shall also consider what further steps need to be
taken for the preservation of the Temple properties, both
movable and immovable.
(h) Take appropriate steps for conservation of the Temple and its
precincts, as well as for improvement of all the facilities. C
(i) Shall consider whether Kallara B is to be opened for the
purpose of inventorization. The interim orders dated
27.11.2014 and 04.07.2017 passed by this Court had recorded
that Kallara B was not opened, and it was directed that
inventorization with respect to said Kallara B be undertaken D
only after obtaining express orders from this Court. We deem
it appropriate to leave this issue to the best judgement and
discretion of the Committees.
(j) Conduct all the obligations which from time to time were
bestowed on various Committees by this Court including that E
of the Selection Committee for Sreekovil.
(k) Shall file Reports in this Court by the second week of
December, 2020 stating all the developments in brief till then.
The next Report shall be filed after the accounts for the
year ending 31.03.2021 are audited. F
(l) Shall file the audited accounts and the Balance Sheet with
the office of the Accountant General for the State, every
year.
117. In light of the specific submission made by the appellants, the
appellant No.1 and his successors shall not be entitled to draw any G
remuneration for his or their services as the Manager or Trustee. The
Executive Officer appointed by the Administrative Committee shall be
entitled to a modest and reasonable remuneration to be fixed by the
Administrative Committee.
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1160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 9 S.C.R.

A 118. Civil Appeals thus, stand allowed subject to above directions,
without any order as to costs.
119. Writ Petition (Civil) No.518 of 2011 was filed seeking following
principal relief:
“Give directions to the Government of India and the Reserve Bank
B of India to evolve and implement a mechanism whereby the
treasures of Sree Padmanabha Swamy Temple can be preserved
intact, and at the same time be put to proper and profitable use
without possibilities of corrupt dealings, erosion and wastage……”
In view of the aforementioned directions, nothing further is
C required to be done in this Writ Petition. The Writ Petition is accordingly
disposed of.
120. Contempt Petition No.493 of 2019 was filed submitting, inter
alia, that certain statements were made by the Temple Guard; and that
the then Executive Officer was protecting said Temple Guard. Considering
D the nature of allegations, we see no reason to take cognizance of the
same and the Contempt Petition is dismissed.
121. In the end, we must express our sincere gratitude for the
assistance rendered by the learned Amicus Curiae, and also for his
invaluable suggestions and guidance. We are also grateful to all the
E persons and members of various Committees who diligently discharged
their obligations in answer to the suggestions made by this Court from
time to time.

Ankit Gyan Matters disposed of.
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