Holding

The Supreme Court held that the earlier determinations of title and the deemed cancellation of the grant barred KIC's later suit, and the trial court erred in rejecting the plaint without regard to res judicata, leading to the appeal being allowed.

Summary

The appellants, owners of agricultural land since 1929, sued for declaration of title and injunction against Karnataka Industrial Corporation (KIC). KIC claimed title based on a 1968 government grant and filed a separate suit for injunction, which was dismissed along with the appellants' suit, the courts holding the grant was ineffective and the appellants' title was perfected. KIC later filed another suit seeking declaration of ownership, which the trial court rejected as non‑maintainable; the High Court set aside that rejection, holding the trial court should have issued summons before deciding maintainability. The Supreme Court examined whether the earlier judgments on title and the deemed cancellation of the grant barred KIC's later suit under res judicata and CPC Order II Rule 2, and whether a trial court could suo motu reject a plaint. It held that the earlier determinations precluded KIC’s claim, the trial court erred in rejecting the plaint without considering res judicata, and therefore set aside the High Court judgment, allowing the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether the earlier judgments declaring the grant to KIC cancelled and affirming the appellants' title bar KIC's later suit for declaration of ownership under the principle of res judicata.
Whether Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, prevents KIC from filing a subsequent suit for declaration after omitting such relief in its earlier suit for injunction.
Whether a trial court may suo motu determine the maintainability of a plaint and reject it before issuing summons.
Whether a suit for injunction can include a determination of title when the title issue has already been finally decided.
Whether the grant to KIC was deemed cancelled, thereby depriving KIC of any title to the suit schedule property.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order II Rule 2, s. Order II Rule 2(2), s. Order VII Rule 11

Subjects

res judicataCivil ProcedureInjunctionDeclaration of titleDeemed cancellationProperty lawKarnataka Industrial CorporationOrder II Rule 2Order VII Rule 11

Judgment

[2021] 9 S.C.R. 521 521

SRI LANKAPPA & ORS. A
v.
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No.7545 of 2021)
DECEMBER 08, 2021 B
[UDAY UMESH LALIT AND S. RAVINDRA BHAT, JJ.]
Suit – Declaration of title and possession – The appellants
had filed a suit seeking declaration of title and injunction in respect
of the suit schedule property – The appellants case was that they
C
were owners in possession of the suit schedule property – It was
alleged by the Karnataka Industrial Corporation (KIC) that by order
dated 25.03.1968, the Karnataka Government had granted the suit
schedule property to it, for non-agricultural use, and the appellants
sought to interfere with KIC’s possession – During the pendency of
the appellant’s suit, KIC filed suit claiming injunction to restrain D
the appellant from disturbing its possession of the suit schedule
property – Both the suit were tried together – The trial Court held
that appellants were able to establish their continued, unhindered
and unhampered possession, cultivation and enjoyment of the suit
schedule property since 1929 and they had perfected their title
E
against the Karnataka Government in 1963 – Hence, the Karnataka
Government had no rights and title over the suit schedule property
on the date of grant i.e. on 25.03.1968 – The grant in the favour of
the KIC was ineffective – Aggrieved, the KIC filed appeal, which
was dismissed – Second appeal filed by KIC was also dismissed by
the High Court – Appeal before the Supreme Court was again F
dismissed, therefore, the matter attained finality – In 2018, the KIC
filed another suit for declaration that it was the absolute owner of
the suit schedule property – The plaint of the KIC in the subsequent
suit was rejected by the trial Court, considering all the previous
facts and history of the litigation – However, the High Court set
G
aside the order rejecting plaint and held that in the circumstances
of the case, it was incumbent upon the trial Court to issue summons,
and its suo motu determination on the maintainability of the suit
before such issuance was erroneous – On appeal, held: In the instant
case, KIC sought only a permanent injunction inits first suit –
H
521
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A However, it is a fact of equal importance that the appellants had
consistently agitated KIC’s title and KIC was a party to those
proceedings – All the Courts concurrently held that the grant, on
which KIC based its possession, was deemed to be cancelled –
Therefore, KIC could, by no procedure known to law,claim in
another suit, that it was the absolute owner by virtue of the self-
B
same grant, which was deemed to have been cancelled – The trial
Court therefore cannot be faulted with for holding that the question
of title was directly in issue in the previous proceedings, and merely
because it resulted in findings adverse to KIC, it could not escape
being bound by those findings – Thus, the impugned judgment of
C the High Court is set aside.
T. Aravindandam and Others v T. V. Satyapal & Anr
1977 (4) SCC 467 : [1978] 1 SCR 742; Ramrameshwari
Devi and Others v Nirmala Devi &Ors (2011) 8 SCC
249 : [2011] 8 SCR 992; Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi
D Reddy (2008) 4 SCC 594 : [2008] 5 SCR 331;
AlkaGupta v Narendr Kumar Gupta 2010 (10) SCC 141
: [2010] 11 SCR 756; Vithalbhai (P) Ltd., v Union Bank
of India (2005) 4 SCC 315 : [2005] 2 SCR 680; M.
Nagabhushana v State of Karnataka & Others (2011)
3 SCC 408 : [2011] 2 SCR 435 – referred to.
E
Case Law Reference
[1978] 1 SCR 742 referred to Para 12
[2011] 8 SCR 992 referred to Para 12

F [2008] 5 SCR 331 referred to Para 15
[2010] 11 SCR 756 referred to Para 15
[2005] 2 SCR 680 referred to Para 20
[2011] 2 SCR 435 referred to Para 20
G CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.7545
of 2021.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.01.2020 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Regular First Appeal No.14 of 2019
(DEC/INJ).
H
SRI LANKAPPA & ORS. v. KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL 523
CORPORATION & ORS.

Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Sr. Adv., S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Ms. Bina A
Madhavan, L. M. Chidanandayya, Ms. Akanksha Mehra, Ms. Pritha
Suri, Ms. Aarzoo Aneja, Ms. Ira Mahajan, M/s Lawyer S Knit & Co.,
Advs. for the Appellants.
Ms. Kiran Suri, Sr. Adv., Haridas Bhat, Amith S. J., Rajvir Singh
Bhati, Ms. Shahnaz Rahman, Harisha S. R., Advs. for the Respondents. B
The Order of the Court was passed by
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. Special leave granted. The appellants are aggrieved by a
judgment and order of the Karnataka High Court1 which allowed the C
regular first appeal filed by the first respondent (Karnataka Industrial
Corporation, hereafter called “KIC”).
2. The appellants had filed a suit2 seeking declaration of title and
injunction in respect of suit properties as stipulated in the schedule 3
(hereafter called “Suit Schedule Property”) which were 11 acres and 16 D
guntas of agricultural land. Muninarayana Gowda, Putta s/o Ramanna,
Sampath s/o Hanumantharayappa, Raja s/o Mangamma and KIC were
impleaded as respondents. The appellant’s case was that Chowdappa,
their grandfather, was granted the Suit Schedule Property by order dated
22.10.1929 passed by the Amaldar, Bangalore South Taluk, and that
after his death, his heirs and the appellants were owners in possession E
of the Suit Schedule Property. It was alleged by KIC (the fifth
respondent), a partnership firm, that by order dated 25.03.1968, the
Karnataka Government had granted the Suit Schedule Property to it, for
non-agricultural use, and the appellants sought to interfere with KIC’s
possession. KIC resisted the suit alleging, inter alia, that it was the F
absolute owner in possession of “Khatha No. 290 formerly Sy. No. 30
measuring 11 acres 16 guntas in extent situated at Thalaghattapura
village, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk and it is the suit
schedule property”.
3. During pendency of the appellant’s suit [hereafter called the
G
“1995 Suit”] KIC filed O.S. No.21/1996 (hereafter called “KIC Suit-I”)
1
Dated 22.01.2020 by the principal Bench at Bengaluru in RFA No. 14/2019.
2
O.S. No.388/1995, before the Court of II Munsiff, Bangalore Rural District.
3
Sy.No. 30, measuring 11 acres 16 guntas situated in Talaghattapura Village, Uttarahalli
Hobli, Kanakapura Main Road, Bangalore South Taluk.
H
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A claiming injunction to restrain the appellant from disturbing its possession
of the Suit Schedule Property. In its suit, it was alleged inter alia, that:
“3. The plaintiff is the owner in possession of Sy. No. 30
measuring 11 acres 16 guntas in extent, situate at
Talaghattapura village, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bangalore South
B Taluk.
4. It has been converted for non-agricultural use for the
purpose of establishing a Table Moulded Brick Factory.
DOCUMENT NO. 2 (two) and DOCUMENT NO. 3 (Three) is
the certified copy of the Index of Lands. The plaintiff is in
C exclusive possession of the property mentioned above,
hereinafter called ‘Suit Schedule Property’. After conversion,
the Katha number of the schedule property is 290 and it has
been assessed to payment of tax to Talaghattapura Orama
Panchayat, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk. Up-
to-date taxes have been paid in respect of the suit schedule
D property.
1. **********
In view of the aforesaid orders in the other suits, the
defendants are trying to dispossess the plaintiff-firm from the
E possession of the land in question and are trying to trespass
on the suit schedule property. Defendants have no right, title
and interest in the suit schedule property and they are not the
owners of the suit schedule property and they are not and
were not in possession of the suit schedule property at any
point of time.
F
10. The aforesaid documents completely establish that the
plaintiff is the owner in possession of the suit schedule
property. As the land in question is converted for non-
agricultural use and katha number is given by the
Panchayath, RTC is not being written in respect of the suit
G property….”
4. Both suits, i.e., the 1995 Suit and KIC Suit-I were tried together
and disposed of by common judgment4. It was held by the trial court that
the appellants herein could establish “their continued, unhindered and
4
H Dated 31.01.1998, Ld. First Add. Civil Judge (Junior) at Bangalore.
SRI LANKAPPA & ORS. v. KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL 525
CORPORATION & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

unhampered possession, cultivation and enjoyment of the suit A
schedule property since 1929” till date of judgment; and that they had
perfected title against the Karnataka Government in 1963. It was also
held that “Hence, the Govt. had no rights and title over the suit
schedule property on the date of grant i.e., on 25.3.1968”. It was
further held that:
B
“When the Govt. itself has lost the title and right over the suit
schedule property it has no right to grant the suit schedule
property to the 5th defendant. The defendants never in
possession of the suit schedule property.”
5. For the same reason, KIC’s suit was dismissed. It was held C
that the grant in its favour was ineffective, as the Karnataka Government
had no power to issue it, and further that KIC was never in possession.
KIC and the other aggrieved parties (including the other respondents in
the 1995 Suit) appealed this, by preferring R.A. No.31/1998. This common
appeal was disposed of by judgment and decree dated 03.03.1999. The
appellate court noticed that the findings of the trial court in KIC Suit-I D
were unchallenged. KIC had relied on a document to say that the lands
were converted. The appellate court while dismissing the appeal, held
as follows:
“The appellant Corporation contended that the suit land was
got converted by the conversion sanctioned certificate said E
to have been issued by Tahasildar dated 18.12.78 and copy
of the said document is marked as Ex. D4. In my considered
view no reliance can be placed upon Ex. D4 which is much
disputed by the respondents because it is only a Xerox copy
and the appellant has failed to produce the original of the F
same before the Court. On the other hand Ex. Pl is an
endorsement issued by the Assistant Commissioner, Bangalore
dated: 27.5.89 which reveals that the proceedings regarding
conversion of land are not available in the office. Hence, I
find some force in the arguments of the respondent that Ex.
D4 is a got up document. If the suit land was really got G
converted, the appellant could have produced the certified
copies of relevant documents from the Revenue Office. It
appears that Ex. D4 is a fictitious document and there is no
order for conversion of land as contended by the appellant.
Hence the entries made in the relevant R.T.C. records that the H
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A land was converted are incorrect and false. The R.T.C: extracts
for the year 1983-84, 84-85 reveal that 4 acres of land is
under cultivation but the name of cultivator is not mentioned
in cultivator’s column. It is not the case of appellant-that it
cultivated the lands during relevant period. Since the finding
given in O.S. 21/96 remained unchallenged, I am of the
B
considered view that, it is the respondents who are in physical
possession of suit land and trial court is justified in granting
the prohibitory injunction as against the appellant.”
6. The declaration granted in the 1995 Suit by judgment dated
31.01.1998 (that the appellants herein were absolute owners) was set
C aside; however, it was held that KIC’s grant had been cancelled. The
decree of permanent injunction was however, confirmed. KIC had also
preferred a second appeal5 in which the judgment of the first appellate
court in R.A. No.31/1998 was impugned. KIC’s second appeal was
dismissed by judgment dated 16.06.2005, by the Karnataka High Court.
D The High Court categorically held that a deemed cancellation of the
grant of land in favour of KIC had occurred, as due procedure had not
been followed while making the alleged grant. The High Court held:
“In view of the detailed discussion made above, while
answering the substantial question of law raised in favour of
E the respondents, it is held that both the courts below have
rightly come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs/respondents
are in possession of the suit property and thereby rightly
injuncted the appellants frominterfering with the peaceful
possession and enjoyment of the suit property and that there
is deemed cancellation of the grant of land granted in favour
F of the appellants and that due procedure has not been
followed while making alleged grant in favour of the
appellants.”
7. A special leave petition6 was preferred before this Court against
the above judgment of the Karnataka High Court, in which KIC was the
G fifth petitioner. Leave was granted, and the petition was converted into
Civil Appeal No.10086/2010. The civil appeal was dismissed by order
dated 22.11.2017. Therefore, the matter had attained finality.

5
RSA No. 236/1999 before Karnataka High Court.
6
H SLP 15070/2006.
SRI LANKAPPA & ORS. v. KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL 527
CORPORATION & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

8. KIC filed another suit O.S. No. 1168/2018 (hereafter called A
“KIC Suit-II”). In that suit, the following reliefs were claimed:
“(a) declaring that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the
suit schedule property;
(b) directing the defendants Nos. 5 to 27 to deliver possession
of the suit schedule property to the plaintiff; B

(c) to grant permanent injunction restraining the defendant
No. 1 to 4 from deleting the name of plaintiff from revenue
records without due process of law,”
The trial court considered the plaint in KIC Suit-II and rejected C
the plaint, after considering all the previous facts and the history of the
litigation. The trial court observed that:
“In the case on hand, the issue regarding deemed cancellation
of grant was decided by all the courts up to the Hon’ble Apex
Court. It is also significant to note that the finding of the D
Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in RSA 236/99, as to the
title of the plaintiff, based on the alleged grant was directly
and substantially in issue and sad issue was answered in the
Affirmative by the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka. It
appears that challenging the findings of the Hon’ble High
Court of Karnataka, the plaintiff herein filed review petition, E
which was dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka.
Indeed, the plaintiff also approached the Hon’ble Apex Court,
on couple of occasions. The contention of the plaintiff is that
he is in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property
by virtue of the grant and the plaintiff is the owner of the suit F
schedule property. The claim of the plaintiff that the property
was granted by the Government of Mysore, has been
consistently negatived by the Hon’ble Courts. Therefore, this
court cannot entertain the above suit, for the relief of
declaration, once again on the basis of the alleged grant.
Hence, I proceed to pass the following: G
ORDER
The suit of the plaintiff is hereby rejected as not maintainable.”
9. KIC appealed, contending that the rejection of its plaint in KIC
Suit-II was erroneous. The High Court set aside the order rejecting the H
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A plaint, and held that in the circumstances of the case, it was incumbent
upon the trial court to issue summons, and its suo motu determination on
the maintainability of the suit before such issuance was erroneous. The
impugned judgment also held that it was open to a court to reject the
plaint at any stage.
B Arguments Advanced
10. Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, learned senior counsel, urged that
the High Court fell into error, in overlooking the fact that the subject
matter of KIC Suit-II was barred by res judicata as the issues in it
were directly and substantially in issue in both the 1995 Suit and KIC
Suit-I. The decision in that suit had attained finality before this Court in
C Civil Appeal No.10086/2010. Furthermore, the High Court erred in
ignoring that in terms of the mandate of Order II Rule 2 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereafter called “CPC”), KIC, in KIC Suit-I was
bound to include the whole claim which it was entitled to make in respect
of the cause of action and if it omitted tosue in respect of, or intentionally
D relinquished, any portion of its claim, it could not afterwards sue in respect
of the portion so omitted or relinquished. It was argued that being party
to the 1995 Suit, KIC was aware of its claim ownership over the Suit
Schedule Property. Therefore, the omission on KIC’s part in claiming
relief of declaration of ownership in its earlier suit (i.e., KIC Suit-I)
which was tagged with the 1995 Suit, statutorily barred the subsequent
E suit (i.e., KIC Suit-II) for declaration of title under Order II Rule 2(2)
CPC.
11. Learned senior counsel argued that the High Court overlooked
that since the grant issued by the Government of Karnataka was held to
be non-est by the common judgment of the trial court (dated 31.01.1998)
F in the 1995 Suit and KIC Suit I, and that such finding was modified by
the High Court in RSA No. 236/1999 – to the effect that the grant in
favour of Muniswamappa is deemed to have been cancelled – KIC
lacked locus standi to file a suit for declaration on the basis of such
grant. Learned senior counsel also drew attention of this Court to the
High Court’s order in RP No. 493/ 2005 where it confirmed that the
G
grant as claimed by KIC was deemed to have been cancelled, thereby
stripping it off of any right to title to the Suit Schedule Property.
12. Learned senior counsel relied on the decision of this Court in
T. Aravindandam and Others v T. V. Satyapal & Anr7 where this Court
7
H 1977 (4) SCC 467.
SRI LANKAPPA & ORS. v. KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL 529
CORPORATION & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

upheld the jurisdiction of trial courts under Order VII Rule 11 CPC in A
rejecting frivolous and vexatious suits. Reliance was also placed on
Ramrameshwari Devi and Others v Nirmala Devi& Ors8 where it
was held that the trial court ought not to have framed an issue on a point
which had been finally determined up to this Court, and further held that
unless the wrongdoers were denied profit or undue benefit from the
B
frivolous litigation, it would be difficult to control such litigations.
13. Ms. Kiran Suri, learned senior counsel for the respondents
herein, urged that KIC Suit-II was not in abuse of the process of any
court of law. Subsequent to the filing of the suit, an application was filed
before this Court. That application was declined. KIC Suit- I was a suit
for bare injunction and the title to the Suit Schedule Property was not C
considered. Therefore, the subsequentsuit (i.e., KIC Suit-II) seeking title
and possession was not barred.
14. Learned senior counsel contended that the civil court had to
mandatorily issue summons tothe respondents; and that maintainability
of the suit could only be considered after such issuance, when it was D
contested by the respondents. However, in this case, before issuance of
the summons to the respondents, the trial court suo moto passed
determination on maintainability of the suit and rejected it as not
maintainable. That order was contrary to law. Consequently, the High
Court was justified in setting it aside. E
15. Ms. Suri relied on the judgment of this Court in Anathula
Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy9 to urge that KIC Suit-I was one for
injunction. There was no occasion for KIC to claim ownership or title to
the Suit Schedule Property. In these circumstances, KIC Suit-II claiming
title and possession was maintainable. She also relied on Alka Gupta v F
Narendr Kumar Gupta10 to say that the courts should not summarily
reject a plaint, on the ground that the judgment in an earlier suit, barred
the later one.
Analysis
16. It is apparent from the above facts that the two suits filed G
earlier – the 1995 Suit and KIC Suit-I – culminated in a decision favourable
to the appellants herein, as KIC’s suit was dismissed. KIC and the other
8
(2011) 8 SCC 249.
9
(2008) 4 SCC 594.
10
2010 (10) SCC 141. H
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A respondents appealed against the decision in the present appellant’s suit;
that appeal was also dismissed. The second appeal preferred by the
parties i.e., RSA No. 236/1999 was dismissed on 16.06.2005. The High
Court pertinently observed and held that the appellants herein were in
possession of the Suit Schedule Property and rightly injuncted the
respondents from interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoyment
B
of the same, holding further that there was deemed cancellation of the
grant of land granted in favour of the respondents herein as due procedure
had not been followed.
17. These findings were challenged in a suit filed by the appellants,
which claimed that they had absolute title to the property. No doubt,
C KIC’s suit claimed injunction; its dismissal, if that were the only
proceeding, would not have precluded a subsequent suit, claiming title.
However, the fact here is that KIC was a respondent in the suit filed by
the appellant (i.e., the 1995 Suit) which expressly sought the relief of
declaration that the appellant was the absolute owner. It was in such a
D context that the question of ‘ownership’, which was directly in issue, in
a proceeding, i.e., a suit, filed before a competent court, was decided.
That decision ruled out KIC’s ownership, holding that there was “deemed
cancellation of the grant of land” before the High Court. All these
facts were disclosed by KIC in the suit filed after this Court dismissed
its civil appeal, thus rendering the judgment in the second appeal final. In
E these circumstances, the issue which remains is whether the trial court
wrongly rejected KIC Suit-II, as found by the impugned judgment.
18. In Anathula Sudhakar, this Court outlined various situations
in which a person claiming possession or injunction can claim relief.
They are set out below:
F
“21. To summarise, the position in regard to suits for
prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property, is as
under:
(a) Where a cloud is raised over the plaintiff ’s title and he
G does not have possession, a suit for declaration and
possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the
remedy. Where the plaintiff’s title is not in dispute or under a
cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession
with a consequential injunction. Where there is merely an
interference with the plaintiff’s lawful possession or threat of
H
SRI LANKAPPA & ORS. v. KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL 531
CORPORATION & ORS. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for A
an injunction simpliciter.
(b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only with
possession, normally the issue of title will not be directly and
substantially in issue. The prayer for injunction will be
decided with reference to the finding on possession. But in B
cases where de jure possession has to be established on the
basis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, the
issue of title may directly and substantially arise for
consideration, as without a finding thereon, it will not be
possible to decide the issue of possession.
C
(c) But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a
suit for injunction, unless there are necessary pleadings and
appropriate issue regarding title (either specific, or
implied as noticed in Annaimuthu Thevar [Annaimuthu
Thevar v. Alagammal, (2005) 6 SCC 202] ). Where the
averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and where D
there is no issue relating to title, the court will not investigate
or examine or render a finding on a question of title, in
a suit for injunction. Even where there are necessary
pleadings and issue, if the matter involves complicated
questions of fact and law relating to title, the court will relegate E
the parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive suit for
declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit for
mere injunction.
(d) Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, and
appropriate issue relating to title on which parties lead F
evidence, if the matter involved is simple and straightforward,
the court may decide upon the issue regarding title, even in a
suit for injunction. But such cases, are the exception to the
normal rule that question of title will not be decided in suits
for injunction. But persons having clear title and possession
suing for injunction, should not be driven to the costlier and G
more cumbersome remedy of a suit for declaration, merely
because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a
claim or tries to encroach upon his property. The court should
use its discretion carefully to identify cases where it will enquire
into title and cases where it will refer to the plaintiff to a more H
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.

A comprehensive declaratory suit, depending upon the facts of
the case.”
19. In the present case, KIC no doubt sought only a permanent
injunction in its first suit. However, it is a fact of equal importance that
the appellants-herein consistently agitated KIC’s title. KIC was a party
B to those proceedings. All the courts concurrently held that the grant, on
which KIC based its possession, was deemed to be cancelled. Therefore,
KIC could, by no procedure known to law, claim in another suit, that it
was the absolute owner by virtue of the self-same grant, which was
deemed to have been cancelled. The trial court therefore cannot be
faulted with for holding that the question of title was directly in issue in
C the previous proceedings, and merely because it resulted in findings
adverse to KIC, it could not escape being bound by those findings.
20. It is noticeable that the High Court, in the impugned judgment,
has considered Vithalbhai (P) Ltd., v Union Bank of India11where it
has been held that a plaint can be rejected at any stage. Furthermore, it
D has also been ruled in M. Nagabhushana v State of Karnataka &
Others12 that the principle of res judicata is fundamental to the judicial
system. Having regard to the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion
that the impugned judgment (in holding that despite the fact that in the
previous proceedings the issue of title stood concluded, the trail court
E had to proceed with the suit) is clearly in error.
21. For the above reasons, the impugned judgment is hereby set
aside; the appeal is allowed, without order on costs.

Ankit Gyan Appeal allowed.
F

G

11
(2005) 4 SCC 315.
12
H (2011) 3 SCC 408.