SRI JEYARAM EDUCATIONAL TRUST AND ORS.versusA.G. SYED MOHIDEEN AND ORS.

                     [2010] 1 S.C.R. 1127


     SRI JEYARAM EDUCATIONAL TRUST AND ORS.                           A
                            v.
           A.G. SYED MOHIDEEN AND ORS.
             (Civil Appeal No. 852 of 2010)
                      JANUARY 22, 2010
                                                                      B
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN AND K.S. RADHAK~ISHNAN, JJ.]

      Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - s.92 - Interpretation of,
 with reference to issuance of notification by State Government
- Jurisdiction of District Courts to try suits uls. 92 in pursuance   C
of the said Government notification which empowered
 Subordinate Courts in the State to entertain suits uls.92 -
 Held: The provisions of s. 92 do not give room for interpreting
 the word "or" used in the section as substitutive, so as io lead
 to an interpretation that when the Government notified any           D
 other court, such notified court alone had jurisdiction and not
 the District Court - Insofar as suits u/s.92 are concerned,
District Courts and Sub-ordinate Courts had concurrent
jurisdiction without reference to any pecuniary limits - Tamil
Nadu Civil Courts Act, 1873 - s.12.                                   E
     Words and Phrases - Word "or" used in s. 92 CPC -
Interpretation of - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - s.92.

     Interpretation of Statutes - Legislative object - Held: A
court as an interpreter cannot alter or amend the law - It can        F
only interpret the provision, to make it meaningful and
workable so as to achieve the legislative object, when there
is vagueness, ambiguity or absurdity.

     Respondents filed suit against the appellants uls.92
CPC. The suit was filed before the District Court situated            G
in the State of Tamil Nadu. Appellants nos.2 to 4 filed a
memo before District Court stating that having regard to
an earlier decision of the Madras High Court in the case
                              1127                                    H
    1128    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010) 1 S.C.R.


A of P. S. Subramanian*, the District Court did not have
  jurisdiction to entertain any suit under s.92 CPC and,
  therefore, the suit be transferred to the Principal
  Subordinate Judge. The memo was rejected by the
  District Court which held that it had jurisdiction to
8 entertain the suit as the value of the suit was Rs.1 O lakhs.
  The order passed by the District Court was upheld by the
  High Court.

       Before this Court, it was contended by the appellants
  that on a true interpretation of s.92 CPC, the District
C Court as well as the Principal Civil Court of original
  jurisdiction in a district had jurisdiction to try suits
  relating to public trusts till 8th March, 1960, having regard
  to the provisions of s.92 CPC; but once on 8th March,
  1960, the State Government issued a notification in
D exercise of its powers under s.92 CPC empowering the
  Courts of Subordinate Judges in the State to entertain
  suits under s.92, the District Court ceased to have
  jurisdiction to try suits under the said section.

E      In support of their contention, the appellants relied
  upon the decision of the Madras High Court in the case
  of P. S. Subramanian* wherein it was held that the word
  "or" occurring between the words "may institute a suit
  in the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction" and "in
F any other court empowered in that behalf by the State
  Government" in s. 92 CPC, should have to be read as
  substitutive and not as disjunctive or alternative.

       The question which arose for consideration in the
  present appeal was whether the District Court had the
G jurisdiction to try a suit under s.92 CPC.

        Dismissing the appeal, the Court
        HELD: 1.1. It is now well settled that a provision of a
    statute should have to be read as it is, in a natural
H
 SRI JEYARAM EDUCATIONAL TRUST AND ORS. v. 1129
            A.G. SYED MOHIDEEN
manner, plain and straight, without adding, substituting         A
or omitting any words. While doing so, the words used
in the provision should be assigned and ascribed their
natural, ordinary or popular meaning. Only when such
plain and straight reading, or ascribing the natural and
normal meaning to the words on such reading, leads to            B
ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which
were not obviously intended by the Legislature or the
Lawmaker, a court should open its interpretation tool kit
containing the settled rules of construction and
interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning of the             c
provision. While using the tools of interpretation, the
court should remember that it is not the author of the
Statute who is empowered to amend, substitute or delete,
so as to change the structure and contents. A court as
an interpreter cannot alter or amend the law. It can only        D
interpret the provision, to make it meaningful and
workable so as to achieve the legislative object, when
there is vagueness, ambiguity or absurdity. The purpose
of interpretation is not to make a provision what the
Judge thinks it should be, but to make it what the
legislature intended it to be. [Para 6] [1135-F-H; 1136-A-       E
CJ
     1.2. Section 92 CPC provides that a suit under that
section can be instituted "in the Principal Civil Court of
original jurisdiction or in any other court empowered in F
that behalf by the State Government". When Section 92
CPC is read in a normal manner, it means that the suits
under section 92 should be filed in the district court or
in the sub-ordinate court. When the language is clear and.
unambiguous and when there is no need to apply the G
tools of interpretation, there is no need to interpret the
word 'or', nor any need to read it as a substitutive word,
instead of its plain and simple meaning denoting an
'alternative'. [Para 7] [1136-C-E]
     1.3. It is clear from section 92 CPC that the legislature   H
    1130 "'SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 1 S.C.R.


A did not want to go by the general rule contained in section
    15 CPC that every suit shall be instituted in the court of
    the lowest grade competent to try it, in regard to suits
    relating to public Trusts. The intention of the law makers
    was that such suits should be tried by the District Court.
B At the same time, the law makers contemplated that if
    there was heavy work load on the District Court, the State
    Government should be enabled to empower any other
    court (within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the
    whole or any part of the subject matter is situate), also
c to entertain such suits. Therefore, the word "or" is used
    in the ordinary and normal sense, that is to denote an
    alternative, giving a choice. The provisions of section 92
    do not give room for interpreting the word "or" as a
    substitutive, so as to lead to an interpretation that when
    the Government notified any other court, such notified
0
    court alone will have jurisdiction and not the District
    Court. If the intention was to substitute the Court
  · empowered by the State Government in place of the
    Principal Civil Court of Original jurisdiction, instead of the
E words 'may institute a suit in the Principal Civil Court of
    original jurisdiction or in any other court empowered in
    that behalf by the State Government', the following words
    would have been used in the section: 'may institute a suit
    in the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, or when
    any other court is empowered in that behalf by the State
F Government, then in such court empowered by the state
    government,' or 'may institute a suit in the court noti{ied
    by the state government.' [Para 8] [1136-F-H; 1137-A-b]

       1.4. The provisions of section 12 of the Tamil Nadu
G Civil Courts Act, 1873 specifying the pecuniary limits of
  District Courts and Sub-ordinate Courts, is subject to the
  provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In view of the
  express provisions of section 92 CPC specifying the
  courts which will have jurisdiction to entertain suits
H under that section, neither the provisions of sections 15
Sfl JEYARAM EDUCATIONAL TRUST AND ORS. v. 1131
 ,         A.G. SYED MOHIDEEN
to 20 of CPC nor the provisions of section 12 of the Civil A
Courts Act  will  apply to such suits. Section 92, CPC is a
self contained provision, and conferment of jurisdiction
in regard to suits under that section does not depend
upon the value of the subject matter of the suit. Therefore,
insofar as the suits under section 92 are concerned, the B
District Courts and Sub-ordinate Courts will have
concurrent jurisdiction without reference to any
pecuniary limits. The District Judge had held that he had
jurisdiction because the value of the subject matter was
Rs.10 lakhs, apparently keeping in view, section 12 of the C
Civil Courts Act. It is made clear that the pecuniary limits
mentioned in section 12 of the Civil Courts Act, do not
apply to suits under section 92 of the Code. In fact, if
section 12 of the Civil Courts Act is applied to decide the
jurisdiction of courts with reference to suits under
section 92 of the Code, it will then lead to the following D
anomalous position: The District Court will have
jurisdiction if the value of the subject matter exceeds Rs.5
lakhs. The Sub-ordinate Court will have jurisdiction where
the value of the subject matter exceeds Rs.1 lakh but
does not exceed to Rs.5 fakhs. That would mean that a E
suit under section 92 of the Code, where the subject
matter does not exceeds Rs.1 lakh, cannot be filed in any
court as section 92 confers jurisdiction only on District
Court and Sub-ordinate Courts. This obviously was not
intended. Be that as it may. [Para 9J [1137-E-H; 1138-A- F
DJ
    1.5. The decision of the High Court in the case of P.S.
Subramanian ignores the earlier decisions of that court
and decisions of othel' High Courts which have                 G
consistently taken the view that where jurisdiction is also
conferred on any other court by the State Government by
a notification (under Section 92 CPC or under any similar
provision), then that court and the District Court will have
concurrent jurisdiction. [Para 1OJ [1138-D-E]
                                                               H
    1132    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 1 S.C.R.


A       * P.S. Subramanian v. K.L. Lakshmanan, 2007 (5) Mad.
    LJ. 921, overruled.
       Annamalai v. Slaiyappa AIR 1935 Mad. 983; Dakor
    Temple Committee v. Shanker/al AIR 1944 Born. 300; R.
    Rama Subbaraya/u Reddiar v. Rengammal AIR 1962
8
    Madras 450; Pazhukkamattom Devaswom v. Lakshmi Kutty
    Amma 1980 Kerala LT 645, approved.

                          Case Law Reference:
        2007 (5) Mad. L.J. 921    overruled           Para 3
c
        AIR 1935 Mad. 983         approved            Para 10
        AIR 1944 Born. 300        approved            Para 10
        AIR 1962 Madras 450       approved            Para 10
D
        1980 Kerala LT 645        approved            Para 10
         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 852
    of 2010.

E       From the Judgment & Order dated 25.4.2008 of the High
    Court of Judicature at Madras in C.R.P. (P.O.) No. 2745 of
    2007.

      V. Prabhakar, Revathy Raghavan, Ramjee Prasad for the
F Appellants.

         Hema Sampath, Sri Ram J. Thalapathy, V. Adhimoolam,
    N. Shobha (NP), V. Balachandran, V. Rama Subramaniam, T.
    Harish Kumar for the Respondents.

G       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J. 1. Leave granted. Heard learned
    counsel for the appellants and respondents. We have also
    heard the learned counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu and
    Registrar General of the Madras High Court to whom notices
H
  SRI JEYARAM EDUCATIONAL TRUST AND ORS. v. 1133
   A.G. SYED MOHIDEEN [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

had been issued in regard to the interpretation of section 92          A
of the Code of Civil Procedure ('Code' for short), with reference
to the State Government Notification No. GOM No.727 dated
8.3.1960.

     2. The respondents instituted a suit (OS No. 13 of 2006)          8
on the file of the Principal District Judge, Cuddalore against
the appellants under Section 92 of Code, seeking a direction
to the second appellant to repay all the amounts spent by him
after 20.6.2005 contrary to the terms of the supplementary deed
of Trust, and also to convene the Trust meeting for approval of        C
the income and expenditure and other consequential reliefs.

      3. Appellants 2 to 4 herein filed a memo before the District
 Court stating that having regard to the decision of the Madras
 High Court in P. S. Subramanian v. K. L. Lakshmanan - 2007
 (5) Mad. L.J. 921, the court did not have jurisdiction to entertain   D
 any suit under section 92 of the Code and therefore the suit
 may be transferred to the file of the Principal Subordinate
Judge, Cuddalore. The learned District Judge rejected the said
 memo by order dated 1.8.2007 holding that he had jurisdiction
to entertain the suit, as the value of the suit was Rs.10 lakhs.       E
The revision filed by the appellants, challenging the said order
of the District Court, was dismissed by the Madras High Court
by the impugned order dated 25.4.2008. The said judgment is
challenged in this appeal by special leave. The only question
that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether a District     F
Court in the State of Tamil Nadu, does not have jurisdiction to
try a suit under section 92 of the Code.

      4. Section 92 relates to public charities. It enables a suit
being filed in the case of any alleged breach of any express or
constructive Trust created for public purposes of a charitable         G
or religious nature, 'in the Principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction or in any other Court/empowered in that behalf by
 the State Government within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the
 Trust is situate'.                                                    H
    1134    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010] 1 S.C.R.


A        (4.1) Section 2(4) of the Code extracted below, while
    defining the term 'district', in effect defines the terms 'district
    court':

         "2(4). 'district' means the local limits of the jurisdiction of
         a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction (hereinafter
B
         called a "District Court"), and includes the local limits of
         the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court."

       (4.2.) Section 9 of the Code provides that the courts shall
  (subject to the provisions of the Code) have jurisdiction to try
C all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their
  cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Sections 15
  to 19 of the Code deal with place of suing. Section 15 requires
  every suit to be instituted in the court of the lowest grade
  competent to try it.
D
          (4.3.) Section 6 of the Code deals with pecuniary
    jurisdiction and provides as follows :

         "6. Pecuniary jurisdiction : Save in so far as is otherwise
         expressly provided, nothing herein contained shall operate
E        to give any Court jurisdiction over suits the amount or value
         of the subject-matter of which exceeds the pecuniary limits
         (if any) of its ordinary jurisdiction."

        (4.4.) Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Courts Act, 1873
F (for short 'Civil Courts Act') empowers the state government to
  fix, and from time to time vary, the focal limits of the jurisdiction
  of any District Court or Sub-ordinate Judge's court under that
  Act. Section 12 of the Civil Courts Act (as amended by
  Amendment Act No.1 of 2004), deals with the jurisdiction of the
G District Judge and the Subordinate Judge is extracted below:

         "12. The jurisdiction of a District Judge extends, subject
         to the rules contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, to
         all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature, of which
         the amount or value of the subject matter exceeds five lakh
H        rupees. The jurisdiction of a Sub-ordinate Judge extends,
 SRI JEYARAM EDUCATIONAL TRUST AND ORS. v. 1135
  A.G. SYED MOHIDEEN [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.)
     subject to the rules contained in the Code of Civil              A
     Procedure, to all like original suits and proceedings, of
     which the amount or value of the subject matter exceeds
     one lakh rupees but does not exceed five lakh rupees."

     (4.5.) By al notification dated 8.3.1960 issued in exercise
                                                                      8
of power under section 92(1) of the Code, in supersession of
the Judicial Department Notification No. 719 dated 17.10.1910,
the Governor of Madras invested all courts of Subordinate
Judges in the State of Madras with jurisdiction under the Code
in respect of suits relating to Trusts created for public purposes    C
of a charitable and religious nature.

      5. The appellants submit that on a true interpretation of
 section 92 of the Code, the District Court as the Principal Civil
 Court of original jurisdiction in a district had ju,risdiction to try
 suits relating to public Trusts till 8.3.1960, having regard to the D
 provisions of section 92 of the Code; and that once the State
 Government issues a notification in exercise of power under
 section 92 empowering courts of the Sub-ordinate Judges to
 entertain suits under section 92, the District Court ceased to
 have jurisdiction to try suits under the said section. In support E
 of their contention, they strongly relied upon the decision of a
 learned Single Judge in the case of P.S. Subramanian (supra)·
wherein it was held that the word "or" occurring between the
words "may institute a suit in the Principal Civil Court of original·
jurisdiction" and "in any other court empowered in that behalf F
by the State Government" in section 92 of the Code, should
have to be read as substitutive and not as disjunctive or
alternative.

     6. It is now well settled that a provision of a statute should
have to be read as it is, in a natural manner, plain and straight,    G
without adding, substituting or omitting any words. While doing
so, the words used in the provision should be assigned and
ascribed their natural, ordinary or popular meaning. Only when
such plain and straight reading, or ascribing the natural and
normal meaning to the words on such reading, leads to                 H
    1136    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 1 S.C.R.


A ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty, or absurdity which were not
  obviously intended by the Legislature or the Lawmaker, a court
  should open its interpretation tool kit containing the settled rules
  of construction and interpretation, to arrive at the true meaning
  of the provision. While using the tools of interpretation, the court
8 should   remember that it is not the author of the Statute who is
  empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so as to change
  the structure and contents. A court as an interpreter cannot alter
  or amend the law. It can only interpret the provision, to make it
  meaningful and workable so as to achieve the legislative object,
C when there is vagueness, ambiguity or absurdity. The purpose
  of interpretation is not to make a provision what the Judge
  thinks it should be, but to make it what the legislature intended
  it to be.

       7. Section 92 provides that a suit under that section can
D be instituted "in the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction
  or in any other court empowered in that behalf by the State
  Government". When it is read in a normal manner, it means that
  the suits under section 92 should be filed in the district court
  or in the sub-ordinate court. When the language is clear and
E unambiguous and when there is no need to apply the tools of
  interpretation, there is no need to interpret the word 'or', nor
  any need to read it as a substitutive word, instead of its plain
  and simple meaning denoting an 'alternative'.

        8. Assuming that there was any need for applying the
F principles of interpretation, let us next consider whether the word
  'or' was used in section 92 of the Code in a substitutive sense.
  It is cleat from section 92 of the Code that the legislature did
  not want to go by the general rule contained in section 15 of
  the Code that every suit shall be instituted in the court of the
G lowest grade competent to try it, in regard to suits relating to
  public Trusts. The intention of the law makers was that such suits
  should be tried by the District Court. At the same time, the law
  makers contemplated that if there was heavy work load on the
  District Court, the State Government should be enabled to
H empower any other court (within the local limits of whose
 SRI JEYARAM EDUCATIONAL TRUST AND ORS. v. 1137
  A.G. SYED MOHIDEEN [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

jurisdiction, the whole or any part of the subject matter is           A
situate), also to entertain such suits. Therefore, the word "or"
is used in the ordinary and normal sense, that is to denote an
alternative, giving a choice. The provisions of section 92 do not
give room for interpreting the word "or" as a substitutive, so as
to lead to an interpretation that when the Government notified         B
any other court, such notified court alone will have jurisdiction
and not the District Court. If the intention was to substitute the
Court empowered by the State Government in place of the
Principal Civil Court of Original jurisdiction, instead of the words
'may institute a suit in the Principal Civil Court of original         c
jurisdiction or in any other court empowered in that behalf by
the State Government', the following words would have been
used in the section :
      'may institute a suit in the principal Civil Court of original
     jurisdiction, or when any other court is empowered in that        D
      behalf by the State Government, then in such court
      empowered by the state government,'
                                  OR
     'may institute a suit in the court notified by the state          E
     government.'
     9. The provisions of section 12 of the Civil Courts Act
specifying the pecuniary limits of District Courts and Sub-
ordinate Courts, is subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure. In view of the express provisions of section 92             F
specifying the courts whic~ will have jurisdiction to entertain
suits under that section, neither the provisions of sections 15
to 20 of the Code nor the provisions of section 12 of the Civil
Courts Act will apply to such suits. Section 92 is a self
contained provision, and conferment of jurisdiction in regard to       G
suits under that section does not depend upon the value of the
subject matter of the suit. Therefore, insofar as the suits under
section 92 are concerned, the District Courts and Sub-ordinate
Courts will have concurrent jurisdiction without reference to any
pecuniary limits. We find that the learned District Judge had          H
    1138    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010) 1 S.C.R.


A held that he had jurisdiction because the value of the subject
  matter was Rs.10 lakhs, apparently keeping in view, section 12
  of the Civil Courts Act. We make it clear that the pecuniary
  limits mentioned in section 12 of the Civil Courts Act, do not
  apply to suits under section 92 of the Code. In fact, if section
B 12 of the Civil Courts Act is applied to decide the jurisdiction
  of courts with reference to suits under section 92 of the Code,
  it will then lead to the following anomalous position: The District
  Court will have jurisdiction if the value of the subject matter
  exceeds Rs.5 lakhs. The Sub-ordinate Court will have
c jurisdiction where the value of the subject matter exceeds Rs.1
  lakh but does not exceed to Rs.5 lakhs. That would mean that
  a suit under section 92 of the Code, where the subject matter
  does not exceeds Rs.1 lakh, cannot be filed in any court as
  section 92 confers jurisdiction only on District Court and Sub-
D ordinate Courts. This obviously was not intended. Be that as it
  may.
       10. We do not therefore approve the decision of the
  learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in PS
  Subramanian which ignores the earlier decisions of that court
E and decisions of other High Courts which have consistently
  taken the view that where jurisdiction is also conferred on any
  other court by the state government by a notification (under
  section 92 of the Code or under any similar provision), then that
  court and the District Court will have concurrent jurisdiction. We
F may in this behalf refer to the decisions in Annamalai vs.
  S/aiyappa - AIR 1935 Mad. 983, Dakor Temple Committee
  vs. Shanker/al - AIR 1944 Born. 300, R. Rama Subbarayalu
  Reddiar vs. Rengammal - AIR 1962 Madras 450, and
  Pazhukkamattom Devaswom vs. Lakshmi Kutty Amma -
G 1980 Kerala LT 645.
        11. In view of the above, the appeal is dismissed. The
    learned District Judge will proceed to decide the suit
    expeditiously.          ··

H 8.8.8.                                        Appeal dismissed.