Holding

Under Section 3(3) of the Karnataka Act, the detaining authority becomes functus officio upon State Government approval, and representations must be made to the State Government; therefore the detention order stands.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined a habeas corpus petition challenging a detention order passed under the Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot‑Leggers, Drug Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1985. The order was issued on 7 Oct 2005, approved by the State Government on 11 Oct 2005, and the detenu submitted a representation to the detaining authority. The Court held that under Section 3(3) of the Act the detaining authority becomes functus officio once the State Government approves the order, and any representation must be made to the State Government, not the detaining authority. Consequently, the High Court’s dismissal of the petition was affirmed. The appeal was dismissed, leaving the detention order valid.

Issues considered

The effect of State Government approval under Section 3(3) on the detaining authority’s power to consider representations.
Whether a representation made to the detaining authority after approval is valid.
Whether the detention order complies with Article 22(5) of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

General Clauses Act, 1897s. 21

Subjects

preventive detentionrepresentationfunctus officioKarnataka ActSection 3(3)habeas corpusArticle 22(5)detention order

Judgment

A SRI ANAND HA NUMA THSA KA TARE
v.
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE AND ORS

OCTOBER 19, 2006

B [ARIJITPASAYAT ANDC.K. THAKKER,JJ.]

Karna/aka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bool-leggers, Drug
Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers
C Act, 1985:

ss. 3(2), 3(3) and 13-Revocalion ofdetention order-Order ofdetention
Approved by Stale Government-Thereafter, representation to detaining
authority-Held, order of detention can be revoked only on the basis of a
representation made to the appropriate authority-Detaining authority
D becomes June/us officio the moment approval is accorded by State
Government-In grounds of detention fi1rnished to detenu on the date of
detention itself it was specifically indicated that if he wanted to represent to
the State Government, he was lo submit the representation directly to the
Government through the Superintendent of Jail.

E A detention order under sub-section (2) of s. 3 of the Karnataka
Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot-Leggers, Drug Offenders,
Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1985
was passed on 7.10.2005. The detenu was taken into custody the same day
and he was furnished with grounds of detention. The detaining authority
submitted a report to the Government which, on 11.10.2005, passed an order
F under s. 3(3) of the Act approving the detention. The order of detention was
challenged in a habeas corpus petition before the High Court. Meanwhile the
Government referred the matter to the Advisory Board which approved the
order of detention. Accepting the said report, the Government passed an order
under s. 13 of the Act. The High Court dismissed the petition.
G
In the present appeal it was contended the that the representation given
by the detenu to the detaining authority ought to have been referred for
consideration of the State Government and the detaining authority should not
have dealt with the same as it had becomefunclus officio the moment the State
Government·accorded approval to the order of detention.
H 622
SRI ANAND f!ANUMA Tf!SA KA TARE 1·. ADDITIONAL DlSTRICTMAGISlRATE 623
Dismissing the appeal, the Court A
HELD: I. Under Section 3(3) of the Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous
Activities of Boot-Leggors, Drug Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral
Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1985, the approval of the State
Government is mandatory. A reading of sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the
Act make it clear that the order of detention under s. 3(2) becomes operative B
the moment it is passed. But it ceases to be operative unless it is approved
within 12 days. Therefore, the Detaining Authority becomes functus officio

- the moment the approval is accorded by the State Government It is to be noted
that the order of detention can be revoked only on the basis of a representation
to the appropriate authority. This fact is relevant. [628-E-G; 630-D[ C
Veeramani v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994[ 2 SCC 337, held inapplicable.

Kamleshkumar Jshwardas Patel v. Union of India and Ors., JT (1995)
3 639, distinguished.

State of Maharashtra and Ors. v. Santosh Shankar Acharya, [2000) 7 D
sec 463, referred to.
2. It is undisputed that in the grounds of detention it was specifically
indicated to the detenu that if he wanted to represent to the Government of
Karnataka he was to submit the same directly to the Government through the E
Superintendent of the Cetral Jail in which he was detained. (634-C)

R. Keshavav. M.B. Prakash and Ors., (2001[ 2 SCC 145; Union ofIndia
v. Paul Manickam and Anr., [2003[ 8 SCC 342; Union of India and Anr. v.
Chaya Ghoshal (Smt.) and Anr., (2005( 10 SCC 97 and R. Keshava v. M.B.
Prakash and Ors., (2001) 2 sec 145, relied on. F
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. I 080 of
2006.

From the final Judgment and Order dated 5.4.2006. of the High Court of
Kamataka at Bangalore in Writ Petition (HC) No. 124 of2005. G
K.K. Mani for the Appellant.

Udya Halla, A.A.G., Sanjay R. Hegde and Anil K. Mishra for the
Respondents.
H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 7 S C.R

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. Leave granted.

Appellant calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a
Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court holding that the order of detention
B passed by the Additional District Magistrate and Police Commissioner, Hubli,
Dharwad city, directing detention of one Shri Ramesh Madhusa Bhandage
(hereinafter referred to as the 'detenu') under the Karnataka Prevention of
Dangerous Activities of Boot-Leggers, Drug Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas,
Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1985 (in short the 'Act').
C The habeas corpus petition filed by the appellant who is brother-in-law of the
detenu was dismissed by the High Court.

The order of detention was passed on 7. I0.2005 under sub-section (2)
of Section 3 of the Act and the detenu was taken into custody that very day.
Subsequently, the detenu was furnished with the grounds of detention dated
D 7.10.2005 which were also supplied to him that very day. The Detaining
Authority submitted a report to the Government as required under law within
12 days from the date of order of detention, which passed an order approving
the detention under Section 3(3) of the Act. The order of approval is dated
11. I 0.2005. The aforesaid order of detention was challenged before the High
Court. During the pendency of the proceedings before the High Court the
E Advisory Board to whom the Government had referred the matter also approved
the order of detention. The Government accepted the said report and passed
an order in terms of Section 13 of the Act. The said order of the Government
was not called in question by the detenu. Several points were urged in
support of the habeas corpus petition. Primarily following points were urged ·
F in support of the habeas corpus petition. Firstly, even assuming that the
detenu is a boot-legger within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Act, his
activities cannot be considered as 1ikely to affect adversely the maintenance
of public order. Secondly, the detenu had submitted his reply to the Detaining
Authority who rejected the same. Once the order passed under Section 3(2)
has been approved by the State Government under Section 3(3), the Detaining
G Authority became functus officio and any representation given to the Detaining
Authority ought to have been transmitted to be considered by the State
Government. Thirdly, the proposals made by the Sponsoring Authority were
verbatim reproduced in the grounds of detention. Fourthly, the orders of
acquittal passed by the Criminal Court in respect of two cases were not
H supplied to him. Therefore, subjective satisfaction was affected. Fifthly, there
SRI ANAND HANUMA THSA KA TARE•·. ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE [PASA YAT,J.J 625

was no report of the Forensic Department that the liquor sold or manufactured A
by the detenu was unfit for human consumption. Non-supply of order referred
to above, rendered the order of detention vitiated. If it is held that the
documents are not supplied then the Detaining Authority's decision is based
on irrelevant consideration. The Detaining Authority and the State Government
countered each of the contentions.
B
The High Court did not find any substance in the different grounds
pressed into service and held that the detention was in order. The High Court
referred to Kamleshkumar fshwardas Patel v. Union of India and Ors., JT
(1995) 3 639 which is relied upon by the appellant, and held that the said case
was rendered under the COFEPOSA Act and the provisions are not in pari C
materia. There is no provision in the Act to show that the role of the
Detaining Authority comes to an end after making an order. Under the relevant
provision, that is Section 3(3), the State Government which has empowered
the Detaining Authority assumes the role of the Detaining Authority. The
Detaining Authority made the detenu aware of his right to make representation
to the State Government and, therefore, there was no infraction. D
In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant urged one
point i.e. Detaining Authority became functus officio the moment the State
Government accords approval. Therefore, the Detaining Authority should not
have dealt with the representation and should have referred the matter to the
State Government. E
In response, learned counsel for the State submitted that the High
Court's view about the Detaining Authority not becoming functus officio is
correct and in any event the detenu was intimated of his right to make a
representation which was made and has been appropriately dealt with and in F
any event the detenu did not avail opportunity granted to him to make
representation to the State Government. The High Court's judgment is in
order.

It was pointed out that the judgment of this Court in State of
Maharashtra and Ors. v. Santosh Shankar Acharya, [2000] 7 SCC 463 runs G
counter to Veeramani v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1994] 2 SCC 337 which is a
decision rendered by a Constitution Bench.

We shall first deal with the plea taken by learned counsel for the State
about Santosh Shankar Acharya 's case (supra) running countered to
Veeramani 's case (supra). It has been noted that Veeramani 's case (supra) H
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.
....
A was related to a detention under the COFEPOSA Act. In the said case in para
15 it was noted as follows:-

"15. Yet another judgment of this Court relied upon in this context in
Amir Shad Khan v. l. Hmingliana, [1991] 4 SCC 39). That was also
a case under COFEPOSA Act where the detaining authority as well
B as the State Government failed to forward the representation of the
detenu to the Central Government. In that context this Court after
having examined the provisions of Section 11 of COFEPOSA Act
observed thus : (SCC pp. 48-49, para 3)

"It is obvious from a plain reading of the two clauses of sub-section
c (I) of Section 11 that where an order is made by an officer of the
Government, the State Government as well as the Central Government
are empowered to revoke the detention order. Where, however,
detention order is passed by an officer of the Central Government or
a State Government, the Central Government is empowered to revoke
the detention order. Now this provision is clearly without prejudice to
D
Section 21 of the General Clauses Act which lays down that where by
any Central Act a power to issue orders is conferred, then that power
includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like
sanction and conditions, if any, to rescind any order so issued. Plainly
the authority which has passed the order under any Central Act is
E empowered by this provision to rescind the order in like manner. This
provision when read in the context of Section 11 of the Act makes it
clear that the power to rescind conferred on the authority making the
detention order by Section 21 of the General Clauses Act is saved and
is not taken away. Under Section 11 an officer of the State Government
or that of the Central Government specially empowered under Section
F
3( I) of the Act to make a detention order is not conferred the power
to revoke it; that power for those officers has to be traced to Section
21 of the General Clauses Act. Therefore, where an officer of the State
Government or the Central Government has passed any detention
order and on receipt of a representation he is convinced that the order
G needs to be revoked he can do so by virtue of Section 21 .General
Clauses Act since Section 11 of the Act does not entitle him to do
so. If the State Government passes an order of detention and later
desires to revoke it, whether upon receipt of a representation from the
detenu or otherwise, it would be entitled to do so under Section 21

H
of the General Clauses Act but if the Central Government desires to .
~
SRI ANAND HA NUMAlllSAKATARE r. ADDITIONALDISTRICTMAGISTRATE[PASA YAT,J.) 627

revoke any order passed by the State Government or its officer it can A
do so only under clause (b) of Section 11 (I) of the Act and not under
Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. This clarifies why the power
under Section 11 is conferred without prejudice to the provisions of
Section 21 of the General Clauses Act. Thus on a conjoint reading of
Section 21 of the General Clauses Act and Section 11 of the Act it
becomes clear that the power of revocation can be exercised by three B
authorities, namely, the state Government or the Central Government,
the State Government as well as the Ce11tral Government. The power
of revocation conferred by Section 8(f) on the appropriate Government
is clearly independent of this power. It is thus clear that Section 8(f)
of the Act satisfies the requirement of Article 22(4) whereas Section c
11 of the Act satisfies the requirement of the latter part of Article 22(5)
of the Constitution. The statutory provisions, therefore, when read in
the context of the relevant clauses of Article 22, make it clear that they
are intended to satisfy the constitutional requirements and provide for
enforcement of the right conferred on the detenu to represent against
his detention order. Viewed in this perspective it cannot be said that D
the power conferred by Section 11 of the Act has no relation
whatsoever with the constitutional obligation cast by Article 22(5)."

Thereafter, referring to the judgment of this Court in Raziya Umar
Bakshi (Smt) v. Union of India, [1980] Supp SCC 195 it was further
observed as under: (SCC p. 50, para 4) E
"This observation would show that the power of revocation
conferred by Section 11 of the Act has a nexus with the right of
represent:tion conferred on the detenu by Article 22(5) and,
therefore, the State Government when requested to forward a
copy of the representation to the Central Government is under an F
obligation to do so."

Relying on these observations it is also contended that it must be
presumed that the detenu can make representation to the detaining
authority also independently and the said authority has to consider
the same irrespective of the decision of the State Government or the G
Central Government on the representation made to them. The above
observations made in Amir Shah case (supra) also do not go to that
extent. In any event Ibrahim Bachu Bafan v. State of Gujarat, [1985]
2 SCC 24 cases arose under the COFEPOSA Act where there is no
specific provision for approval by the State Government. Therefore, H
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A the question whether the detaining authority namely the empowered
officer of the Government can act independently and revoke the
detention order even after the State Government has approved and
affirmed the detention as provided under the other Acts did not arise
directly. In those two decisions the ratio is that the detaining authority
has also the power to revoke the detention order made by it by virtue
B of the power conferred by Section 21 of the General Clauses Act read
with Section I 1 of the COFEPOSA Act and in that context it was
further observed that the power of revocation conferred by Section
11 of the Act has nexus with the right of representation conferred on
the detenu by Article 22(5) and that the State Government when
c requested to forward a copy of the representation to the Central
Government, is under obligation to do so. Therefore the above
mentioned observations in the cases arising under the COFEPOSA
Act do not squarely apply to cases where factually the detention
order made by an empowered officer has been approved by the State
Government as provided for under the other enactments. In such
D cases, in our view, the question of detaining authority revoking the
order after such approval does not arise and the power preserved by
virtue of the provisions under General Clauses Act is no more
exercisable."

E The position is different under the Act. Under Section 3(3) of the Act
the approval of the State Government is mandatory. There is no such provision
in CO FE POSA. A combined reading of Sections 3 and 8 of the CO FE POSA
shows that there are three authorities involved. The approval of the State
Government under the Act is necessary because of Section 3(2) of the Act.
A peculiar situation may arise if representation is made to three authorities.
F Suppose in a given case two of the authorities reject the representation and
one authority accepts it. It is not conceivable that one is bound by the order
of the other. Section 8 of the COFEPOSA deals with different situations and
provides for a hierarchy. There is no such parallel provision in the Act. A
reading of sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act makes it clear that the same
becomes operative the moment it is passed. But it ceases to be operative
G unless it is approved within 12 days. In this connection para 6 of Santosh
Shankar Acharya 's case (supra) is relevant. The same reads as follows:-

"The counsel appearing for the State strongly relied upon the decision
of this Court in Veeramani v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994] 2 SCC 337,
wherein an order of detention had been issued under the provision
H
SRI ANAND HA NUMA TIJSA KA TARE 1·. ADDITIONALDISTRICTMAGISTRATE [PASAY AT,J.J629

of Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, A
Drug-Offenders, Forest-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders
and Slum Grabbers Act, I 982 (hereinafter referred to as "Tamil Nadu
Act"). According to the learned counsel for the State the provisions
of the said Act are in pari-materia with the Maharashtra Act with
which we are concerned in the present appeals and this Court in
Veeramani (supra) had recorded a conclusion that the question of B
detaining authority revoking the order after such approval does not
arise and the power preserved by virtue of the provisions of General
Clauses Act is no more exercisable. In the aforesaid case the Court
considered several earlier decisions of the Court under the provisions
of COFEPOSA and was of the view that the observations made C
therein could not apply to cases arising under other Preventive
Detention Act including the Tamil Nadu Act. Veeramani (supra) also
relied upon the judgment of this Court in State of Maharashtra v.
Sushi/a Ma/at/al Shah, [1988] 4 SCC 490, for the ultimate conclusion.
In our considered opinion this decision does not assist the respondents
in any manner inasmuch as the Court in Veeramani (supra) has D
considered the situation that emerged subsequent to the date of
approval of the order of detention by the State Government and not
prior thereto. As has been stated earlier, it may be difficult to contend
that even after the approval of the order of detention by the State
Government the detaining authority would still be competent to E
entertain and dispose of a representation in exercise of the powers
under Section 2I of Bombay General Clauses Act, but this decision
cannot be said to be an authority to hold that even before the
approval of the order of the detaining authority the detaining authority
does not possess the power under Section 21 of the Bombay General
Clauses Act. Such a conclusion would make the entire provision of F
Section 14 of the Maharashtra Act redundant and otiose. Then again
the Court had fully relied upon the observations of this Court in State
of Maharashtra v. Sushi/a Ma/at/a/ Shah (supra) and the judgment
of Sushi/a Ma/at/al Shah (Supra) has been directly considered and
overruled in the Constitution Bench decision in Kam/esh Kumar's G
case (supra). It would also be appropriate to notice that even in Raj
Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar, [ 1982] 3 SCC I0, though the Court
did not entertain the contention that detaining authority under the
provisions of National Security Act has a right to consider the
representation on the ground that the order of detention had been
H
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A approved by the State Government yet it had been observed that
constitutionally speaking a duty is cast on the detaining authority to
consider the representation which would obviously mean that if such
representation is made prior to the approval of the order of detention
by the State Government. This being the position, it goes without
saying that even under the Maharashtra Act a detenu will have a right
B to make a representation to the detaining authority so long as the
order of detention has not been approved by the State Government
and consequently non-communication of the fact to the detenu that
he has a right to make representation to the detaining authority would
constitute an infraction of the valuable constitutional right guaranteed
c to the detenu under Article 22(5) of the Constitution and such failure
would make the order of detention invalid. We, therefore, see no
infirmity with the impugned judgment of the Full Bench of the Bombay
High Court to be interfered with by this Court. These appeals
accordingly fail and stand dismissed."

D Therefore, the Detaining Authority becomes functus officio the moment
the approval is accorded by the State Government. It is to be noted that the
order of detention can be revoked only on the basis of a representation to
the appropriate authority. This fact is relevant. Further para 17 of R. Keshava
v. MB. Prakash and Ors.. [200 I] 2 SCC 145 is of importance. The same reads
E as follows:

"We are satisfied that the detenu in this case was apprised of his right
to make representation to the appropriate Government/authorities
against his order of detention as mandated in Article 22(5) of the
Constitution. Despite knowledge, the detenu did not avail of the
opportunity. Instead of making a representation to the appropriate
F
Government or the confirming authority, the detenu chose to address
a representation to the Advisory Board alone even without a request
to send its copy to the authorities concerned under the Act. In the
absence of representation or the know ledge of the representation
having been made by the detenu, the appropriate Government·was
G justified in confirming the order of detention on perusal of record and
documents excluding the representation made by the detenu to the
Advisory Board. For this alleged failure of the appropriate Government,
the order of detention of the appropriate Government is neither
unconstitutional nor illegal."
H
SRI ANAND HA NUMA TIISA KA TARE'" ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE(PASAYAT. J.J63 J

At this juncture it would be relevant to take note of paras 17 to l 9 of A
Union of India v. Paul Manickam and Anr., (2003] 8 SCC 342. They read as
follows:

"17. Coming to the question whether the representation to the President
of India meets with the requirement of law it has to be noted that in
Raghavendra Singh v. Superintendent, District Jail, Kanpur and B
Ors., (1986] 1 SCC 650 and Rumana Begum v. State ofAndhra Pradesh
and Anr., [ 1993] Supp. 2 SCC 341 it was held that a representation to
the President of India or the governor, as the case may be, would
amount to representation to the Central Government and the State
Government respectively. Therefore, the representation made to the C
President of India or the Governor would amount to representation to
the Central Government and the State Government, but this cannot be
allowed to create a smokescreen by an unscrupulous detenu to take
the authorities by surprise, acting surreptitiously or with ulterior
motives. In the present case, the order (grounds) of detention
specifically indicated the authority to whom the representation was to D
be made. Such indication is also part of the move to facilitate an
expeditious consideration of the representations actually made.

18. The respondent does not appear to have come with clean hands
to the Court. In the writ petition there was no mention that the
representation was made to the President; instead it was specifically E
stated in paragraph 23 that the representation was made by registered
post to the first respondent on 11.5.2000 and a similar representation
was made to the second respondent. Before the High Court in the writ
petition the first and the second respondent were described as follows:

"!.State of Tamil Nadu F
Rep. By its Secretary,

Government of Tamil Nadu,

Public (SC) Department, Fort St. George,
G
Chennai, 600 009.

2. Union of India,

Rep. By its Secretary
H
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A Ministry of Finance,

Department of Revenue, New Delhi."

19. As noted supra, for the first time in the review application it was
disclosed that the representation was made to the President of India
and no representation was made to the State of Tamil Nadu or the
B
Union of India who were arrayed in the writ petition as parties. This
appears to be a deliberate attempt to create confusion and reap an
undeserved benefit by adopting such dubious device. The High Court
also transgressed its jurisdiction in entertaining the review petition
with an entirely a new substratum of issues. Considering the limited
c scope for review the High Court ought not to have taken into account
factual aspects which were not disclosed or were concealed in the writ
petition. While dealing with a habeas corpus application undue
importance is not to be attached to technicalities, but at the same time
where the court is satisfied that an attempt has been made to deflect
the course of justice by letting loose red herrings the Court has to
D
take serious note of unclean approach. Whenever a representation is
made to the President and the Governor instead of the indicated
authorities, it is but natural that the representation should indicate as
to why the representation was made to the President or the Governor
and not the indicated authorities. It should also be clearly indicated
E as to whom the representation has been made specifically, and not in
the manner done in the case at hand. The President as well as the
Governor, no doubt are constitutional Heads of the respective
Governments but day to day administration at respective levels are
carried on by tht< Heads of the Department-Ministries concerned and
designated officers who alone are ultimately responsible and
F accountable for the action taken or to be taken in a given case. If
really the citizen concerned genuinely and honestly felt or interested
in getting an expeditious consideration or disposal of his grievance,
he would and should honestly approach the really concerned authorities
and would not adopt any dubious devices with the sole aim of
G deliberately creating a situation for delay in consideration and cry for
relief on his own manipulated ground, by directing his representation
to an authority which is not directly immediately concerned with such
consideration."

Paras 17 to 19 of Union of India and Anr. v. Chaya Ghoshal (Smt.) and
H Anr., (2005] 10 sec 97 are also relevant. They read as follows:
SRI ANAND HA NUMATI!SA KATARE 1·. ADDITIONAL DISTRICT MAGISTRATE [PASAYAT, J.] 63 J

"17. While dealing with a habeas corpus application undue importance A
is not to be attached to technicalities, but at the same time where the
court is satisfied that an attempt has been made to deflect the course
of justice by letting loose red herrings the Court has to take serious
note of unclean approach. Whenever a representation is made to the
President or the Governor instead of the indicated authorities, it is but
natural that the representation should indicate as to why the B
representation was made to the President or the Governor and not the
indicated authorities. It should also be clearly indicated as to whom
the representation has been made specifically. The President as well
as the Governor, no doubt are constitutional Heads of the respective
Governments but day to day administration at respective levels are C
carried on by the Heads of the Department-Ministries concerned and
designated officers who alone are ultimately responsible and
accountable for the action taken or to be taken in a given case. If
really the citizen concerned genuinely and honestly felt or is interested
in getting an expeditious consideration or disposal of his grievance,
he would and should honestly approach the really concerned authorities D
and would not adopt any dubious devices with the sole aim of
deliberately creating a situation for delay in consideration and cry for
relief on his own manipulated ground, by directing his representation
to an authority which is not directly/immediately concerned with such
consideration. E
18. Where, however, a person alleging infraction of personal liberty
tries to act in a manner which is more aimed at deflecting the course
of justice than for protection of his personal right, the Court has to
make a deliberate balancing of the fact situation to ensure that the
mere factum of some delay alone is made use of to grant relief. If a F
fraud has been practiced or perpetrated that may in a given case
nullify the cherished goal of protecting personal liberty, which obligated
this Court to device guidelines to ensure such protection by balancing
individual rights and the interests of the nation, as well.

19. In R. Keshava v. MB. Prakash and Ors., (200I] 2 SCC 145 it was G
observed by this Court as follows:

"We are satisfied that the detenu in this case was apprised of his
right to make representation to the appropriate Government/
authorities against his order of detention as mandated in Article
22 (5) of the Constitution. Despite knowledge, the detenu did not H
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 7 S.C.R.

A avail of the opportunity. Instead of making a representation to
the appropriate Government or the confirming authority, the detenu
chose to address a representation to the Advisory Board alone
even without a request to send its copy to the authorities
concerned under the Act. In the absence of representation or the
knowledge of the representation having been made by the detenu,
B the appropriate Government was justified in confirming the order
of detention on perusal of record and documents excluding the
representation made by the detenu to the Advisory Board. For
this alleged failure of the appropriate Government, the order of
detention of the appropriate Government is neither rendered
c unconstitutional nor illegal".

It is undisputed that in the grounds of detention it was specifically
indicated to the appellant that if he wanted to represent to the Government
of Karnataka he was to submit the same directly to the Government through
the Superintendent of the Central Jail in which he is detained.
D
Above being the factual position, the judgment of the High Court is
irreversible. The appeal is sans merit and is dismissed.

RP. Appeal dismissed.