SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITEDversusTUFF DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED

                        [2017] 12 S.C.R. 933



         SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED                            A
                                    v.
              TUFF DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED
                  (Civil Appeal No. 15036 of2017)
                       SEPTEMBER 20, 2017                               B

          [A. K. SIKRI AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.)
       Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - s.25(a) - Arbitral
tribunal appointed with the consent of the parties, directed the
respondent-claimant to file its statement ofclaim - Statement ofclaim
not filed by respondent -Arbitral tribunal tem1inated the proceedings
                                                                         c
uls.25(a) - Application filed by respondent before arbitral tribunal
praying for recall of order terminating the proceedings, stating the
reasons for non-filing of the statement of claim - Appellant
questioned the maintainability of said application on the ground
that arbitral tribunal has become functus officio in view oftemiination D
of the proceedings u/s.25(a), hence the arbitral tribunal cannot
recall its order terminating the proceedings - Arbitral tribunal
accepted the preliminary objection raised by appellant and rejected
respondents application holding that in view of the order
terminating the proceedings, he cannot pass an order recommencing E
the arbitration proceedings - Revision petition filed by respondent,
allowed by High Court which held that arbitral tribunal has power
to recall its own order and remitted the matter back to arbitral
tribunal to decide the application filed by respondent on merits -
On appeal, held: Arbitra/ tribunal does not become functus officio
after passing order u/s.25(a) - There is no lack of jurisdiction in F
arbitral tribunal to recall the earlier order, terminating the
proceedings, on sufficient cause being shown - Jn the instant case,
arbitral tribunal committed error in holding that it has no jurisdiction
to recall its order terminating the proceedings u/s.25(a) - Arhitral
tribunal to consider the application filed by respondent for recall G
of order terminating the proceedings.
      Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - ss.23(1), 25(a) -
Non-filing of statement of claim by claimant within the time as
contemplated u/s.23(1) - Arbitral Tribunal if obligated to terminate
the proceedings -Held: On sufficient cause being shown by a
                                                                        H
                              933
934             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2017] 12 S.C.R.


A claimant, even though the time to file the statement of claim u!s.23(1)
                                                                               -
  has expired, it is not obligatory for the arbitral tribunal to terminate
  the proceedings u!s.25(a).
             Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Proceedings under
       - Nature of - Held: Arbitration is a quasi judicial proceeding,
B      equitable in nature or character which differs from a litigation in a
       Court.
            Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Arbitral Tribunals -
       Constitution of - Discussed.
             Arbitration and Conciliation Act, I 996 - Object of enactment
 c - Discussed.
              Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Arbitral Tribunals -
      · Procedural review - Power of - Held: A quasi-judicial authority is
        vested with the power to invoke procedural review.
 D       Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Termination of
   proceedings u!s. 25(a), if covered u!s.32(2)(c) - Held: Cl. (c) of
   sub.sec.(2) of s.32 contemplates two grounds for termination, i.e.,(i)
   where arbitral tribunal find~ that the continuation of proceedings
   has become unnecessary or (ii) impossible- Howeve1~ s.25
   contemplates a situation where arbitration proceedings have not
 E been started as the claimant fails to file his statement of claim -
   Thus, the eventuality as contemplated uls.32 shall arise only when
   the claim is not terminated u!s.25(a) and proceeds further -
   There.fore, the words 'unnecessary' or 'impossible' as used in
   s.32(2)(c) cannot be said to be covering a situation where
 F proceedings are terminated in de.fault of the claimant uls.25(a).
         Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or.9, 1'.l 3- Setting aside
   decree ex-parte against defendant - Applicability of, to arbitration
   proceedings - Arbitral tribunal appointed with the consent of the
   parties - On the first sitting of the arbitral tribunal, it directed the
 G respondent-claimant to file its statement of claim - Respondent
   neither present on the next date nor filed the statement of claim -
   Further time granted by arbitral tribunal - Respondent did not
   appear on the next date as well nor filed the statement of claim -
   Arbitral tribunal terminated the proceedings uls.25(a) - Held:
   Principles underlying Or.9, d 3 can be invoked by the arbitrator -
 H
    SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF                        935
              DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED

Further. in the instant case, there is nothing on record to indicate   A
that parties agreed to the contrary - Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 - s.19.
      Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - s.19 - Interpretation
of- Held: S.19 provides that arbitral tribunal shall not be bound
by the rules of procedure as contained in Civil Procedure Code, B
however, it cannot be read to mean that arbitral tribunal is
incapacitated in drawing sustenance from any provisions of Civil
Procedure Code - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
      Dismissing the appeal, the Court
      HELD: 1.1 The arbitration is a quasi judicial proceeding, C
equitable in nature or character which differs from a litigation in
a Court. The power and functions of arbitral tribunal arc statutorily
regulated. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code vests into the
Civil Court jurisdiction to entertain and determine any civil
dispute. The constitution of tribunals has been with intent and D
purpose to take out different categories of litigation into the
special tribunal for speedy and effective determination of disputes
in the interest of the society. Whenever, by a legislative enactment
jurisdiction exercised by ordinary civil court is transferred or
entrusted to tribunals such tribunals are entrusted with statutory
power. The arbitral tribunals in the Arbitration and Conciliation E
Act, 1996 arc no different, they decide the lis between the parties,
follows Rules and procedure conforming to the principle of natural
justice, the adjudication has finality subject to remedy provided
under the 1996 Act. Section 8 of the 1996 Act obliges a judicial
authority in a matter which is a subject of an agreement to refer F
the parties to arbitration. The reference to arbitral tribunal thus
can be made by judicial authority or an arbitrator can be appointed
in accordance with the arbitration agreement under Section 11 of
the 1996 Act. [Para 12) [944-G-H, A-CJ
       1.2 Section 25 contemplates a situation when the claimant       G
fails to communicate his statement of claim within the time as
envisaged by Section 23, the arbitral tribunal has to terminate
the proceedings. This section thus contemplates a situation where
arbitration proceeding has not been started. The most important
words contained in Section 25 are "where without showing
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936           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2017) 12 S.C.R.


A · sufficient cause - the claimant fails to communicate his statement
    of claim". Under Section 23(1), the claimant is to state the facts
    supporting his claim within the period of time agreed upon by the
    parties or determined by the arbitral tribunal. The question of
    termination of proceedings thus arises only after the time agreed
B upon between the parties or determined by the arbitral tribunal
    comes to an end. When the time as contemplated under Section
    23(1) expires and no sufficient cause is shown by the claimant
    the arbitral tribunal shall terminate the proceedings. The question
    of showing sufficient cause will arise only when the claimant is
    asked to show cause as to why he failed to submit his claim within
C the time as envisaged under Section 23(1) or the claimant, on his
    own, before the order is passed under Section 25(a) to terminate
    the proceedings comes before the arbitral tribunal showing
    sufficient cause for not being able to submit his claim within the
    time. In both the circumstances, i.e. when a show-cause notice is
    issued to the claimant or claimant of his own shows cause for
o· non-filing the claim within the time the, arbitral tribunal shall take
    a call on terminating the proceedings. In the event, the claimant
    shows a sufficient cause, the arbitral tribunal can accept the
    statement of claim even after expiry of the time as envisaged
    under Section 23(1) or grant further time to the claimant to file a
E claim. Thus, on sufficient cause being shown by a claimant even
    though time has expired under Section 23(1), it is not obligatory
    for the arbitral tribunal to terminate the proceedings. The
    conjunction of the wording "where without showing sufficient
    cause" and "the claimant fails to communicate his statement of
    claim" would indicate that it is a duty of the arbitral tribunal to
F inform the claimant that he has failed to communicate his claim
    on the date fixed for that and requires him to show-cause why the
    arbitral proceedings should not be terminated? Opportunity to
    show sufficient cause for his failure to communicate his claim
    statement can only be given after he has actually failed to do so.
G · [Para 19] [947-B-H; 948-A)
      Whether in a case, as in the present case, where claimant failed
      to file a statement of claim and has failed also to show-cause before
      an order of termination of proceedings is passed, claimant is
      entitled to show-cause subsequent to the termination of
 H    proceedings?
    SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF                        937
              DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED

       1.3 When the arbitral tribunal without sufficient cause being A
shown by the claimant to file the claim statement can terminate
the proceedings, subsequent to termination of proceedings, if
the sufficient cause is shown, there is no impediment in the power
of the arbitral tribunal to accept the show-cause and permit the
claimant to file the claim. The Scheme of Section 25 of the Act
                                                                         B
clearly indicates that on sufficient cause being shown, the
statement of claim can be permitted to be filed even after the
time as fixed by Section 23(1) has expired. Thus, even after
passing the order of terminating the proceedings, if sufficient
cause is shown, the claims of statement can be accepted by the
arbitral tribunal by accepting the show-cause and there is no lack C
of the jurisdiction in the arbitral tribunal to recall the earlier order
on sufficient cause being shown. [Para 20)948-C-D)
       1.4 After terminating the proceedings under Section 25(a),
the arbitral tribunal can recall the said order on sufficient cause
being shown and the arbitral tribunal docs not become functus           D
officio after passing an order under Section 25(a). The arbitral
tribunal can recall the order terminating the proceedings under
Section 25(a) and re-commence the proceedings. [Paras 30, 32]
[954-B-C, D-E)
      Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited v. Jyothi Turbopower             E
      Services Private Limited & Ors. 2017 (1) Arb. LR 289
      (Madras); Awasthi Construction Co. v. Govt. Of NCT
      of Delhi & Am: 2013 (l) Arb. LR 70 (Delhi)(DB); ATV
      Projects India Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. &
      Am: 200 (2013) DLT 553 (DB) - approved.
                                                                        F
Whether termination of proceedings, in the present case, under
Section 25(a) can be treated to be covered bv Section 32(2)(c) ?
      2.1 Section 32 contains a heading "Termination of
Proceedings". Sub-section(2) enumerates the circumstances
when the arbitral tribunal shall issue an order for the termination
                                                                    G
of the arbitral proceedings. Sub-clause(c) contemplates two
grounds for termination, i.e.; (i) the arbitral tribunal finds that
the continuation of the proceedings has for any other reason
become unnecessary or (ii) impossible. The eventuality as
contemplated under Section 32 shall arise only when the claim is
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938           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2017] 12 S.C.R.


A   not terminated under Section 25(a) and proceeds further. The
    word 'unnecessary' or 'impossible' as used in clause (c) of Section
  . 32(2) cannot be said to be covering a situation where proceedings
    are terminated in default of the claimant. The word unnecessary
    or impossible has been used in different contexts than to one of
    default as contemplated under Section 25(a). Sub-section (3) of
B
    Section 32 further provides that the mandate of the arbitral
    tribunal shall terminate with the termination of the arbitral
    proceedings subject to Section 33 and sub-section (4) of Section
    34. Section 33 is the power of the arbitral tribunal to correct any
    computation errors, any clerical or typographical errors or any
c   other errors of a similar nature or to give an interpretation af a
    specific point or part of the award. Section 34(4) reserves the
    power of the Court to adjourn the proceedings in order to give
    the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral
    proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of
    arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the
D
    arbitral award. On the termination of proceedings under Sections
    32(2) and 33(1), Section 33(3) further contemplates termination
    of the mandate of the arbitral tribunal, whereas the aforesaid
    words are missing in Section 25. When the legislature has used
    the phrase "the mandate of the arbitral tribunal shall terminate"
E in Section 32(3), non-use of such phrase in Section 25(a) has to
    be treated with a purpose and object. The purpose and object
    can only be that if the claimant shows sufficient cause, the
    proceedings can be re-commenced. [Para 21) [948-E-H; 949-A-C)
    Power of procedural review of arbitral tribunals. Applicabilitv of
F Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to arbitration proceedings.
            3.1 When a review is sought due to a procedural defect,
      such power inheres in every tribunal. A quasi-judicial authority
      is vested with the power to invoke procedural review. There
      cannot be a dispute that the power exercised by the arbitral
 G    tribunal is quasi-judicial. In view of the provisions of the 1996
      Act, which confers various statutory powers and obligations on
      the arbitral tribunal, no distinction is found between the statutory
      tribunal constituted under the statutory provisions or Constitution
      in so far as the power of procedural review is concerned. Section
      19 provides that arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the rules
 H    of procedure as contained in Civil Procedure Code. The words
    SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF                       939
              DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED

"arbitral tribunal shall not be bound" are the words of amplitude     A
and not of a restriction. These words do not prohibit the arbitral
tribunal from drawing sustenance from the fundamental principles
underlining the Civil Procedure Code or Indian Evidence Act
but the tribunal is not bound to obsen·e the provisions of Code
with all of its rigour. Section 19 cannot be read to mean that        B
arbitral tribunal is incapacitated in drawing sustenance from any
provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. Arbitral tribunal has power
to review on sufficient cause being shown. As per sub-clause (2)
of Section 19 the parties arc free to agree on the procedure to be
followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting its proceedings.
Principles underlying Order 9 Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure,       C
1908 can very well be invoked by the arbitrator. There is nothing
on record to indicate that parties agreed to the contrary. [Paras
14, 23-26) [950-A-D; 951-E-F; 952-A; 945-F-G]
      Mis. Senbo Engineering Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors.
      AIR 2004 Patna 33 - approved.                                   D
      Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial
      Tribunal & Ors., (1980) Supp SCC 420; Kapra
      Mazdoor Ekta Union v. Bir/a Cotton Spinning and
      Weaving Mills Ltd. & Am: (2005) 13 sec 777; Nahar
      Industrial Enterprises Limited v. Hong Kong and                 E
      Shanghai Banking Corporation (2009) 8 SCC 646 -
      relied on.
      3.2 In the present case, the arbitral tribunal had rejected
the application of the claimant seeking recall of order terminating
the proceedings taking the view that after an order is passed by      F
him terminating the proceedings, he cannot pass the order
recommencing the arbitration proceedings. The arbitral tribunal
committed an error in holding that it has no jurisdiction to recall
an order terminating the proceedings under Section 25(a). [Para
33) (954-E-F]
                                                                      G
      PMA Shukkur v. Muthoot Vehicle (2010) Arb. LR 121
      (Kcrala) - not ap1>roved.
      Anil Sood v. Presiding Office1; Labour Court II (2001)
      10 sec 534; La/it Kumar V. Sanghavi v. Dharamdas V.
      Sanghavi & Ors. (2014) 7 SCC 255 - referred to.
                                                                      H
940             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 12 S.C.R.



A                              Case Law Reference
      AIR 2004 Patna 33                           approved          Para 26
      c2014) 7 sec 255                            referred to       Para 7
      (1980) Supp sec 420                         relied on         Para 21
B· (2005) 13 sec 111                              relied on         Para 24
      (2009) 8 sec 646                            relied on         Para 25
      AIR 2004 Patna 33                           approved          Para 26
      c2001) 10 sec 534                           referred to       Para 27
 c    2013 (I) Arb. LR 70 (Dclhi)(DB)             approved          Para 28
      2007 (2013) D LT 553 (DB)                   approved          Para 9
      2017 (1) Arb. LR 289 (Madras)               approved          Para 30
      (2010) Arb. LR 121 (Kerala)                 not approved Para 30
D
           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 15036
      of2017.
            From the final Judgment and Order dated 13.02.2015 of the High
      Court at Calcutta in C.O. No. 3190 of 2012.
 E.         Jayant Bhushan, Sr. Adv., Shantanu Ghosh, Raghunath Ghosh,
      S.K. Verma, Advs. for the Appellant.
           Rakesh Dwivedi, Sr. Adv.( AC), Ms. Sansriti Pathak, Adv. for the
      Respondent.
             The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
 F
             ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. Leave granted.
             I. This appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 13.02.2015
      of the Calcutta High Court by which the High Court in exercise of
      jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution oflndia has set aside
 G    the Order passed by the arbitral tribunal by which the arbitral tribunal
      had refused to recall its Order dated 12.12.20 l l terminating the arbitration
      proceedings on account of non filing of the claim by the claimant.
             2. The undisputed facts of the case are: -
           The respondent filed an application under Section 11 of the
 H · Arbitration and Conciliation Act, I 996 (hereinafter referred to as "the
     SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF                               941
     DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

1996 Act") for referring the dispute to arbitrator on the strength of contract A
entered with appellant. Dw·ing pcndency of the application under Section
11 with consent of the parties, Sri Baskar Sen, Senior Advocate, Bar-at-
Law was appointed as Arbitrator. The application under Section 11 of
the 1996 Act was thus dismissed as not pressed. One-man arbitral tribunal
entered into reference and called for the first sitting of the arbitral tribunal
                                                                                 8
on 27.08.2011. Both the parties appeared on 27.08.20 l l on which date
m:bitral tribunal had directed the respondent to file the statement of claim.
       3. Subsequently, 19th November was fixed on which date the
claimant was absent. The arbitral tribunal directed for filing statement
of claim by 9th December. On 9th December, the claim could not be
filed by respondent and by order dated 12.12.2011, tribunal terminated          C
the proceedings under Section 25(a) by making the following
observations: -
        ·· ... It appears that the claimant is not interested to proceed
       with the reference. No cause has been shown as to why they
       have not filed their Statement of Claim in spite of repeated D
       opportunities being given to them. ]11 view of Section 25(a) of
       the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 the Arbitrator,
       therefore, has 110 alternative but to terminate the proceedings.
       The arbitration proceedings in respect of the dispute in which
       Tuff Drilling Private Limited is the claimant which arose out
                                                                         E
       of the agreement dated 21st January, 2008 pertaining to 1500
       HP diesel electric rig is thus terminated. .. "
       4. The Claimant filed an application dated 20.01.2012 praying for
recall of the order dated 12.12.2011 with further prayer to condone the
delay in filing the statement of claim by granting necessary extension of
time. In the application, reasons for non-filing of the statement of the F
claim and for non-appearance of the claimant on 19.11.2011 and
12.12.2011 were stated in detail. The application filed by the claimant
was objected by the appellant. The appellant questioned the maintainability
of the application dated 20.01.2012 on the ground that arbitral tribunal
has become functus officio in view of termination of the proceedings G
under Section 25(a), hence the arbitral tribunal cannot recall its order
terminating the proceedings. The arbitral tribunal heard both the parties
and by an order dated 26.04.2012 accepted the preliminary objections of
the appellant holding that in view of order terminating the proceedings,
he cannot pass an order recommencing the arbitration proceedings. The
application of the respondent claimant was thus rejected. Aggrieved by H
942             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 12 S.C.R.


A     the order of the arbitral tribunal dated 26.04.2012, the claimant
      approached the Calcutta High Court in its revisionary jurisdiction by
      filing C.0.No.3190 of2012. The appellant before the High Court objected
      the maintainability of the application under Article 227 of the Constitution.
      It was further contended before the High Court that after terminating
 B    the proceedings arbitral tribunal had become fimctus officio and had no
      power to recall the order dated 12.12.201 l. The High Court after
      considering the submissions of parties came to the conclusion that arbitral
      tribunal enjoys the power to recall its own order relying on the Patna
      High Court judgment reported in Mis S11ebo E11gi11eering Ltd. Vs. State
      of Bihar and Ors., AIR 2004 Patna 33. The High Court also overruled
 C    the objections of appellant that application under Article 227 by the
      claimant challenging the order dated 12.12.2011 was not maintainable.
      The High Court after entertaining the application under Article 227 held
      that arbitral tribunal has power to recall its own order. The High Court
      set aside the order of the arbitral tribunal and remitted the matter back
D     to the arbitral tribunal to decide the application dated 20.01.2012 filed by
      the respondent on merits. The appellant aggrieved by the judgment of
      Calcutta High Cow"t has come up in this appeal.
           5. This court on 07.07.2015 issued notice and in the meantime
    stayed the operation of the order passed by the Calcutta High Court.
    Although, the respondent was served but none appeared on behalf of
 E the respondent. While hearing the matteron 29 .08.2017, this court noticed
    that question oflaw raised in this case is important one and since no one
    has appeared on behalf of respondent, this court requested Shri Rakesh
  · Dwivedi, Senior Advocate, to assist the court in deciding the issue.
             6. We have heard Shri Jayant Bhushan, learned senior counsel,
 F    assisted by Shri Santanu Ghosh, learned counsel for the appellant. Shri
      Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. Sansriti Pathak,
      learned counsel, has been heard as amicus curiae.
             7. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the arbitral
      tribunal had terminated the proceedings on 12.12.2011 due to non-filing
 G    of claim by the claimant in spite ofopportunities having been granted to
      it. The arbitral tribunal had becomejimctus officio and had no jurisdiction
      to recall the order dated 12.12.2011 on the application filed by the
      respondent claimant to recall the said order. It is further contended that
      against the order dated 12.12.2011 terminating the proceeding application
 H    under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was not maintainable.
    SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF                                943
    DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on judgment of this Court         A
reported in La/it Kumar V. Sanghavi Vs. Dharamdas V. Sanghavi &
Ors., 2014(7) SCC 255 in support of the submissions that Writ Petition
was not maintainable against the order of arbitral tribunal. It is further
submitted by the appellant that remedy if any available to claimant was
to file an application under Section 34 of 1996 Act for setting aside the
                                                                               B
order dated 12.12.2011.
        8. Shri Rakcsh Dwivedi, learned amicus curiae, submits that the
termination of proceedings under Section 25(a) and termination of
proceedings under Section 32(2) arc two different eventualities. When
the proceedings are terminated under Section 32(2), the mandate of the
arbitral tribunal also terminates whereas no such consequence can be           c
read in termination of proceedings tmder section 25(a). Under section
25(a), proceedings arc terminated on default of the claimant to file the
statement of claim. Section 32(3) would not apply to case falling under
section 25(a) of the 1996 Act. The Arbitration Act, 1996 docs not provide
for remedy against the order wider section 25(a). He contends the remedy       D
under Section 34 is not available against such an order unless the order
under Section 25(a) is also treated as an award. Learned amicus curiae
submits that there seems to be legislative gap with respect to 25(a) and
32(2)(c). He submits that it is more appropriate that Order under Section
25(a) be treated as an award so as to make it amenable under Section
34. On the submissions that whether arbitral tribunal can exercise the         E
power akin to principle underlying under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C. Learned
amicus curiae submits that arbitral tribunal can recall an order passed
under Section 25(a) on the principles underlying Order IX Ruic 13 C.P.C.
Learned amicus curiae in support of above submissions has also referred
to j udgmcnts of Patna High Court, Delhi High Court, Madras High Court         F
& Bombay High Court which shall be referred to while considering the
submissions in detail.
       9. Referring to this court's judgment in SPP Vs. Patet
E11gi11eeri11g, it is submitted that the said case has no applicability when
Section 34 and 37 of the 1996 Act are not applicable. It was pointed out       G
by learned amicus curiae that La/it Kumar was a case where
proceedings were terminated under Section 32(2)(c). Learned amicus
curiae has lastly submitted that legislative gap as is apparent in context
of provisions of Section 25(a), 32 and 34 need to be stitched up in light of
the object of the legislation.
                                                                               H
944             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 12 S.C.R.


A            10. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for
      the appellant and learned amicus curiae and have perused the record.
      From the submissions, following issues arise for consideration in this
      Civil Appeal:-
            !) Whether arbitral tribunal which has terminated the proceeding
B     under Section 25( a) due to non filing of claim by claimant has jurisdiction
      to consider the application for recall of the order terminating the
      proceedings on sufficient cause being shown by the claimant?
           2) Whether the order passed by the arbitral tribunal under Section
    25(a) terminating the proceeding is amenable to jurisdiction of High Court
c . under Article 227 of the Constitution ofindia'!
            3) Whether the Order passed under Section 25( a) terminating the
      proceeding is an award under the 1996 Act so as to amenable to the
      remedy under Section 34 of the Act?
              11. The law ofArbitration was earlier governed by the Arbitration
D     Act, l 940. The Law Commission ofindia and several other organisations
      expressed opinion that the 1940 Act needs extensive amendments to
      make it more responsive to contemporary requirements. In the wake of
      rise in commercial litigation both at domestic and international level, a
      need was felt for a comprehensive law to deal the subject. The United
 E    Nations Organisation on International Trade Law (UNCILTRAL)
      adopted a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration in the
      year 1985. Taking into consideration domestic arbitration as well as
      international commercial arbitration, Parliament enacted the Arbitration
      and Conciliation Act, 1996. Main objective for introducing the legislation
      was to make provision for an arbitral procedure which is fair, efficient
 F    and capable of meeting the needs of the specific arbitration. In Section
      2 of the Act, arbitral tribunal has been defined to mean a sole arbitrator
      or a panel ofarbitrators. The arbitral tribunal was entrusted with various
      statutory functions, obligations by the enactment.
             12. The arbitration is a quasi judicial proceeding, equitable in nature
 G    or character which differs from a litigation in a Court. The power and
      functions of arbitral tribunal arc statutorily regulated. The tribunals are
      special arbitration with institutional mechanism brought into existence
      by or under statute to decide dispute arising with reference to that
      particular statute or to determine controversy referred to it. The tribunal
 H    may be a statutory tribunal or tribunal constituted under the provisions of
     SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF                                  945
     DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

the Constitution ofindia. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code vests             A
into the Civil Court jurisdiction to entertain and determine any civil dispute.
The constitution of tribunals has been with intent and purpose to take out
different categories oflitigation into the special tribunal for speedy and
effective determination of disputes in the interest of the society. Whenever,
by a legislative enactment jurisdiction exercised by ordinary ci vii court is
                                                                                  B
transferred or entrusted to tribunals such tribunals are entrusted with
statutory power. The arbitral tribunals in the statute of 1996 are no
different, they decide the !is between the parties, follows Rules and
procedure conforming to the principle ofnaturaljustice, the adjudication
has finality subject to remedy provided under the 1996 Act. Section 8 of
the 1996 Act obliges a judicial authority in a matter which is a subject of       C
an agreement to refer the parties to arbitration. The reference to arbitral
tribunal thus can be made by judicial authority or an arbitrator can be
appointed in accordance with the arbitration agreement under Section
11 of the 1996 Act.
       13. After noticing the objective of the enactment, we now reve1t           D
to issues which have arisen in these appeals.
Issue No. I
       14. Chapter V of the Act deals with the conduct of arbitral
proceedings. Section 18 provides "the parties shall be treated with
equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity to present his          E
case. Section 18 contains the principle of natural justice to give full
opportunity to paities to present their case.
       15. Section 19 of the Act provides for determination of rules of
procedure. Sub-clause (1) of Section 19 provides that the arbitral tribunal
shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or the Indian             F
Evidence Act, 1872. The words "arbitral tribunal shall not be bound" arc
the words of amplitude and not of a restriction. These words do not
prohibit the arbitral tribunal from drawing sustenance from the
fundamental principles underling the Civil Procedure Code or Indian
Evidence Act but the tribunal is not.bound to observe the provisions of           G
Code with all of its rigour. As per sub-clause (2) of Section 19 the parties
are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal
in conducting its proceedings.
      16. Section 23 deals with claim and defence. Section 24 deals
with hearing and written proceedings.
                                                                                  H
946            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017) 12 S.C.R.


A            17. Section 25 deals with default of a party which provision is up
      for interpretation in this case and is as follows:
            "25. Default of a party.-Unless otherwise agreed by the
            parties, where, without showing St!fJlcient cause,-
            (a) the claimant faifs to communicate his statement of claim
B           in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 23, the arbitral
            tribunal shall terminate the proceedings;
            (b) the respondent fails to communicate his statement of
            defence in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 23, the
            arbitral tribunal shall continue the proceedings without
c           treating that failure in itself as an admission of the allegations
            by the claimant and shall have the discretion to treat the right
            of the respondent to file such statement of defence as having
            been forefeited;
            (c) a party fails to appear at an oral hearing or to produce
 D          documentary evidence. the arbitral tribunal may continue the
            proceedings and make the arbitral award on the evidence
            before it."
            18. Chapter VI deals with Making of Arbitral Award and
      Termination of Proceedings. Section 32 deals with Termination of
 E    Proceedings which is quoted as below:-
             "32. Termination of proceedings.-( 1) The arbitral proceedings
             shall be terminated by the final arbitral award or by an order. of
             the arbitral tribunal under sub- section (2).
             (2) The arbitral tribunal shall issue an order for the termination of
 F
             the arbitral proceedings where-
             (a) the claimant withdraws his claim, unless the respondent objects
             to the order and the arbitral tribunal recognises a legitimate interest
             on his part in obtaining a final settlement of the dispute,

 G           (b) the parties agree on the termination of the proceedings, or
             (c) the arbitral tribunal finds that the continuation ofthe proceedings
             has for any other reason become unnecessary or impossible.
             (3) Subject to section 33 and sub-section (4) of section 34, the
             mandate of the arbitral tribunal shall tenninate with the termination
 H           of the arbitral proceedings."
     SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF                              947
     DRILLING PRNATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

        19. In the present case, proceedings were terminated vide Order A
dated 12.12.2011 under Section 25(a). After termination of proceedings,
application to recall the said order was filed by claimant on 20.01.2012,
which was rejected by arbitral tribunal on the ground that it has no
jurisdiction to re-commence the arbitration proceedings. Section 25
contemplates a situation when the claimant fails to communicate his
                                                                                B
statement of claim within the time as envisaged by Section 23, the arbitral
tribunal has to terminate the proceedings. This section thus contemplates
a situation where arbitration proceeding has not been started. The most
important words contained in Section 25 are "where without showing
sufficient cause - the claimant fails to communicate his statement of
claim''. Under Section 23(1), the claimant is to state the facts supporting c
his claim within the period of time agreed upon by the parties or
determined by the arbitral tribunal. The question of termination of
proceedings thus arises only after the time agreed upon between the
parties or determined by the arbitral tribunal comes to an end. When the
time as contemplated w1der Section 23( 1) expires and no sufficient cause
                                                                                D
is shown by the claimant the arbitral tribunal shall terminate the
proceedings. The question of showing sufficient cause will arise only
when the claimant is asked to show cause as to why he failed to submit
his claim within the time as envisaged under Section 23( I) or the claimant,
on his own, before the order is passed under Section 25(a) to terminate
the proceedings comes before the arbitral tribunal showing sufficient E
cause for not being able to submit his claim within the time. In both the
circumstances, i.e. when a show-cause notice is issued to the claimant
as observed above or claimant ofhis own shows cause for non-filing the
claim within the time the arbitral tribunal shall take a call on terminating
the proceedings. It is easy to comprehend that in the event, the claimant
shows a sufficient cause, the arbitral tribunal can accept the statement
                                                                                F
of claim even after expiry of the time as envisaged under Section 23( 1)
or grant further time to the claimant to file a claim. Thus, on sufficient
cause being shown by a claimant even though time has expired under
 Section 23(1), it is not obligatory for the arbitral tribunal to terminate the
proceedings. The conjunction of the wording "where without showing G
 sufficient cause" and "the claimant fails to communicate his statement
 of claim" would indicate that it is a duty of the arbitral tribunal to inform
the claimant that he has failed to communicate his claim on the date
 fixed for that and requires him to show-cause why the arbitral proceedings
 should not be terminated'? Opportunity to show sufficient cause for his
                                                                                H
948            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017) 12 S.C.R.



A     failure to communicate his claim statement can only be given after he
      has actually failed to do so. Whether in a case where claimant failed to
      file a statement of claim and has failed also to show-cause before an
      order of termination of proceedings· is passed, claimant is entitled to
      show-cause subsequent to the termination is the question which has
      fallen for consideration.
 B
             20. When the arbitral tribunal without sufficient cause being shown
      by the claimant to file the claim statement can terminate the proceedings,
      subsequent to termination ofproceedings, ifthe sufficient cause is shown,
      wc see no impediment in the power of the arbitral tribunal to accept the
      show-cause and permit the claimant to file the claim. The Scheme of
c     Section 25 of the Act clearly indicates that on sufficient cause being
      shown, the statement of claim can be permitted to be filed even after the
      time as fixed by Section 23( 1) has expired. Thus, even after passing the
      order of terminating the proceedings, if sufficient cause is shown. the
      claims of statement can be accepted by the arbitral tribunal by accepting
D     the show-cause and there is no lack of the jurisdiction in the arbitral
      tribunal to recall the earlier order on sufficient cause being shown.
          21. Section 32 contains a heading "Termination of Proceedings".
   Sub-section ( 1) provides that the arbitral proceedings shall be terminated
   by the final arbitral award or by an order of the arbitral tribunal under
 E sub-section(2). Sub-section(2) enumerates the circumstances when the
   arbitral tribunal shall issue an order for the termination of the arbitral
   proceedings. The situation as contemplated under Section 32(2)(a) and
   32(2)(b) are not attracted in the facts of this case. Whether termination
   of proceedings in the present case can be treated to be covered by
   Section 32(2)(c) is the question to be considered. Sub-clause(c)
 F contemplates two grounds for termination, i.e.: (i) the arbitral tribunal
   finds that the continuation of the proceedings has for any other reason
   become unnecessary or (ii) impossible. The eventuality as contemplated
   under Section 32 shall arise only when the claim is not terminated under
   Section 25(a) and proceeds further. The word 'unnecessary' or
 G 'impossible' as used in sub-clause (c) of Section 32(2) cannot be said to
   be covering a situation where proceedings are terminated in default of
   the claimant. The word unnecessary or impossible has been used in
   different contexts than to one of default as contemplated under Section
   25(a). Sub-section (3) of Section 32 fm1her provides that the mandate
   of the arbitral tribunal shall terminate with the termination of the arbitral
 H
     SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF                                949
     DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

proceedings subject to Section 33 and sub-section (4) of Section 34.            A
Section 33 is the power of the arbitral tribunal to correct any computation
errors, any clerical or typographical errors or any other errors of a similar
nature or to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the award.
Section 34(4) reserves the powerofthe Court to adjourn the proceedings
in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral
                                                                                B
proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral
tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award.
On the termination of proceedings under Sections 32(2) and 33(1 ), Section
33(3) fu1iher contemplates termination of the mandate of the arbitral
tribunal, whereas the aforesaid words are missing in Section 25. When
the legislature has used the phrase "the mandate of the arbitral tribunal       c
shall terminate" in Section 32(3 ), non-use of such phrase in Section 25(a)
has to be treated with a purpose and object. The purpose and object can
only be that if the claimant shows sufficient cause, the proceedings can
be re-commenced.
       22. Learned amicus curiae has referred to judgment of this Court         D
in Grindl<tys B"'ik Ltd. Vs. Central Government Industrial Trib1111al
& Ors., 1980 (Supp) SCC 420. In that case this Court was considering
the power of industrial tribunal to set aside its cx-parte award on being
satisfied that there was sufficient cause. The Comi also noticed that
there was no specific express provision in the Act or the Rules giving
                                                                                E
the tribunal jurisdiction to do so. In Para 6, following was held:-
       "6. We are of the opinion that the Tribunal had the power to pass
       the impugned order if it thought fit in the interest of justice. It is
       true that there is no express provision in the Act or the rules framed
       thereumler giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to do so. But it is a well
       known rule of statutory construction that a Tribunal or body should      F
       be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental
       powers as arc necessary to discharge its functions effectively for
       the purpose of doing justice between the parties. In a case of this
       nature, we are of the view that the Tribunal should be considered
       as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there        G
       is any indication in the statute to the contrary. We do not find any
       such statutory prohibition. On the other hand, there are indications
       to the contrary."
      23. It is true that power of review has to be expressly conferred
by a Statute. This Court in Paragraph 13 has also stated that the word          H
950            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 12 S.C.R.



A     review is used in two distinct senses. This Court further held that when
      a review is sought due to a procedural defect, such power inheres in
      every tribunal. In Paragraph 13, following was observed:-
            13 ..... The expression "'review'" is used in the two distinct senses,
            namely (I) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied
B           in a court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed
            under a misapprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits when
            the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on
            the face of the record. It is in the latter sense that the comt in
            Patel Narshi Thakershi case held that no review lies on merits
            unless a statute specifically provides for it. Obviously when a
c           review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error
            committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito justitiae
            to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in
            every court or Tribunal."
            24. In Kapra 11-fazdoor Ekta Union Vs. Bir/a Cotton Spinning
D     and Weaving Mills Ltd. & Am~, (2005) 13 SCC 777, this Court again
      held that a quasi-judicial authority is vested with the power to invoke
      procedural review. In Paragraph 19 of the judgment, following was laid
      down:-
            " 19. Applying these principles it is apparent that where a court or
 E          quasi-judicial authority havingjurisdiction to adjudicate on merit
            proceeds to do so, its judgment or order can be reviewed on merit
            only if the court or the quasi-judicial authority is vested with power
            of review by express provision or by necessary implication. The
            procedural review belongs to a different category. In such a review,
 F          the court or quasi-judicial authority havingjurisdiction to adjudicate
            proceeds to do so, but in doing so commits (sic ascertains whether
            it has committed) a procedural illegality which goes to the root of
            the matter and invalidates the proceeding itself, and consequently
            the order passed therein. Cases where a decision is rendered by
            the court or quasi-judicial authority without notice to the opposite
 G          party or under a mistaken impression that the notice had been
            served upon the opposite party, or where a matter is taken up for
            hearing and decision on a date other than the date fixed for its
            hearing, are some illustrative cases in which the power of
            procedural review may be invoked. In such a case the party seeking
            review or recall of the order does not have to substantiate the
 H
    SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF                                951
    DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN.• J.]

      ground that the order passed suffers from an error apparent on           A
      the face of the record or any other ground which may justify a
      review. He has to establish that the procedure followed by the
      court or the quasi-judicial authority suffered from such illegality
      that it vitiated the proceeding and invalidated the order made
      therein, inasmuch as the opposite party concerned was not heard
                                                                               B
      for no fault of his, or that the matter was heard and decided on a
      date other than the one fixed for hearing of the matter which he
      could not attend for no fault of his. In such cases, therefore, the
      matter has to be reheard in accordance with law without going
      into the merit of the order passed. The order passed is liable to be
      recalled and reviewed not because it is found to be erroneous, but       c
      because it was passed in a proceeding which was itself vitiated
      by an error of procedure or mistake which went to the root of the
      matter and invalidated the entire proceeding. In Grindlays Bank
      Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal5 it was held that once
      it is established that the respondents were prevented from               D
      appearing at the hearing due to sufficient cause, it followed that
      the matter must be reheard and decided again."
       25. There cannot be a dispute that the power exercised by the
arbitral tribunal is a quasi-judicial. In view of the provisions of the 1996
Act, which confers various statutory powers and obligations on the arbitral
tribunal, we do not find any such distinction between the statutory tribunal   E
constituted under the statutory provisions or Constitution in so far as the
power of procedural review is concerned. We have already noticed that
Section 19 provides that arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the rules
of procedure as contained in Civil Procedure Code. Section 19 cannot
be read to mean that arbitral tribunal is incapacitated in drawing             F
sustenance from any provisions of Code of Civil Procedure. This was
clearly laid down in Nahar /11d11strial E11terprises Limited Vs. Ho11g
Ko11g a11d Slumgltai Banking Corporatio11, (2009) 8 SCC 646. In
Paragraph 98(n), following was state.d:-
       "(n) It is not bound by the procedure laid down under the Code. It      G
       may however be noticed in this regard that just because the
       Tribunal is not bound by the Code, it does not mean that it would
       not have jurisdiction to exercise powers of a court as contained in
       the Code. "Rather, the Tribunal can travel beyond the Code of
       Civil Procedure and the only fetter that is put on its powers is to
                                                                               H
952            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2017) 12 S.C.R.


A           observe the principles of natural justice." (See Industrial Credit
            and Investment Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Grapco Industries Ltd.)"
          26. We thus are of the view that principles underlying Order 9
   Rule 13 can very well be invoked by the arbitrator. There is nothing on
 · record to indicate that parties have agreed to the contrary. The issue,
B which has arisen for consideration has engaged attention of different
   High Courts from time to time. Patna High Court in Mis. Senbo
   E11gineering Ltd. Vs. State of Biflar & Ors., AIR 2004 Patna 33,
   had occasion to consider the order terminating the proceeding.~ under
   Section 25(a). Patna High Court after considering the provision has
   held that arbitral tribunal has power to review on sufficient cause being
C shown. In paragraph 32, following has been laid down:-
            "32. I find the submissions of Mr. Chatterjee well founded. Mr.
            Chatterjee has relied upon the provisions of the Act itself (that is
            to say, the internal aids to interpretation) in support of the point
            that on sufficient cause being shown, the arbitral tribunal has full
D           authority and power to recall an order under Section 25(a) of
            the Act. I think that one would arrive at the same conclusion on
            the basis of some extemal aids to interpretation."
            27. Referring to judgment of this Coui1 in Gri11dlays Bank Ltd.
      (supm) t111dAnil Sood Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court II, (2001)
 E    10 SCC 534, Patna High Court fm1her laid down in Paragraph 39 as
      given below:-
            "39. The two Supreme Court decisions under the Industrial
            Disputes Act are also a pointer in the direction that the arbitral
            tribunal must be held to have the power of procedural review and
 F          the authority to recall, on sufficient cause being shown, an order
            terminating the proceeding under Section 25(a) of the Act. The
            second question too is, thus, answered in the affirmative and in
            favour of the petitioner."
            28. Delhi High Court in Awtisthi Construction Co. Vs. Govt. Of
 G    NCT ofDelhi & Anr., 2013 (I) Arb. LR 70 (Delhi)(DB) has elaborately
      considered this issue. In Paragraph 17 and 18, following has been held:-
            "17. We may in this regard also notice that the legislature, in
            Section 25, has not provided for termination of proceedings
            automatically on default by a party but has vested the discretion
 H
SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF                          953
DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

 in the arbitral tribunal to, on sufficient cause being shown condone A
 such default. We are of the view that no distinction ought to be
 drawn between showing such sufficient cause before the
 proceedings are terminated and after the proceedings are
 terminated. If the arbitral tribunal is empowered to condone default
 on sufficient cause being shown, it matters not when the same is B
 shown. It may well nigh be possible that the sufficient cause itself
 is such which prevented the party concerned from showing it
 before the proceedings terminated. It would be a pedantic reading
 of the provision to hold that the arbitral tribunal in such cases also
 stands denuded. Once the legislature has vested the arbitral tribunal
 with such power, an order of termination cannot be allowed to c
 come in the way of exercise thereof.
 18. There is another reason for us to hold so. The emphasis of
 the Arbitration Act is to provide an alternative dispute resolution
 mechanism. The provisions of the Act ought to be interpreted in a
 manner that would make such adjudication effective and not in a D
 manner that would make arbitration proceedings cumbersome. A
 view that the arbitral tribunal is precluded, even where sufficient
 cause exists, from reviving the arbitral proceedings and the only
 remedy available to a party is a writ petition and which remedy is
 available only in the High Court often situated at a distance from
 the place where the parties are located, would be a deterrent to
                                                                       E
 arbitration. It is also worth mentioning that Section 19(2) of the
 Act permits the parties to agree on the procedure to be followed
 by the arbitral tribunal. The parties may, while so laying down the
 procedure, provide for the remedy of review/revival of arbitral
 proceedings and which agreement would be binding on the arbitral F
 tribunal. If the arbitral tribunal in such a situation would be
 empowered to, on sufficient cause being shown, revive the arbitral
 proceedings, we see no reason to, in the absence of such an
 agreement hold the arbitral tribunal to be not empowered to do
 so. If it were to be held that such power of review/recall is not
 available to an arbitral tribunal, the arbitral tribunal would not be G
 competent to set aside an order wider Section 25(b) also,
 compelling the respondent against whom proceedings have been
 continued, to file a writ petition, making the continuation of
 proceedings before the arbitral tribunal a useless exercise."
                                                                     H
954              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 12 S.C.R.


A             29. The Delhi High Court again reiterated the same principle in
       ATV Projects India Ltd. Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Anr.,
       200(2013) Delhi Law Times 553 (DB).
             30. The Madras High Court in Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited
       Vs. Jyothi Turbopower Services Private Limited & Ors., 2017(1)
B      Arb. LR 289 (Madras) again took the view that after terminating the
        proceedings under Section 25(a), the arbitral tribunal can recall the said
      · order on sufficient cause being shown and the arbitral tribunal does not
        become functus officio after passing an order under Section 25(a). The
        Madras High Court has agreed with the view expressed by the Division
        Bench of the Delhi High Comt as noticed above.
c
             31. A contrary view has also been expressed by certain High
       Courts. The Kerala High Court in PMA Shukkur v.:~.111uthoot Vehicle,
       (2010) Arb. LR 121 (Kera/a), held that the power to set aside an ex-
       partc award vests in the Court, and the arbitrator does not have any
       concurrent power to set aside an ex-parte award.
D
              32. We endorse the views of Patna High Court, Delhi High Court
       and Madras High Court as noted above, in so far as they have held that
       the arbitral tribunal after termination of proceedings under Section 25(a)
       on sufficient cause being shown can recall the order and re-commence
       the proceedings.
 E
            33. In the present case, the arbitral tribunal has rejected the
  . application of the claimant by order dated 26.04.2012 taking the view
    that after an order is passed by him terminating the proceedings, he
    cannot pass the order recommencing the arbitration proceedings. In view
    of the above discussions, we are of the view that the arbitral tribunal
 F committed an error in holding that it has no jurisdiction to recall an order
    terminating the proceedings under Section 25(a). The arbitral tribunal
    having not considered the cause shown by the claimant in its application,
    it is in the ends of justice that the arbitrnl tribunal be asked to consider
    the application filed by the claimant dated 20.01.20 l Z·praying for recall
 G of the order dated 12.12.2011 and to grant extension for filing the
    statement of claim.
              34. Coming to Issue No. 2 and 3, in view of what we have said
       regarding Issue No. 1 that arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to consider an
       application for recall of order terminating the proceedings under Section
 H     25(a), it is not necessary for us to enter into Issue No. 2 and 3 for
    SREI INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE LIMITED v. TUFF                                955
    DRILLING PRIVATE LIMITED [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

purposes of this case. For deciding the present Ci vii Appeal, our answer      A
to Issue No.l is sufficient to dispose of the matter.
       35. In result, the appeal is dismissed. The interim order dated
07.07.2015, granting stay on the operation of order dated 13.02.2015
passed by the High Com1 stands discharged and the arbitral tribunal
shall now proceed to decide the application of claimant-respondent dated       B
20.01.2012 expeditiously. The parties shall bear their own costs.
       36. We place on record our appreciations for the valuable
assistance rendered by Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Sr. Advocate appearing as
amicus.


Divya Pandey                                               Appeal dismissed.