SR. TEWARIversusUNION OF INDIA AND ANR.

                        [2013] 8 S.C.R. 988


A                           SR. TEWARI
                                 v.
                    UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.
               (Civil Appeal No.4715-4716 of 2013)
                           MAY 28, 2013
B
         [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]

        Service Law:

c      Quantum of punishment - Judicial review of -
  Permissibility - Held: If the punishment awarded is
  disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct, it would be
  arbitrary and thus violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution - If
  the penalty imposed by the authority. shocks the conscience
0 of the Court, it can substitute its own penalty - In the facts of
  the present case, the punishment of compulsory retirement
  on the delinquent officer shocks the conscience of the Court
  as it does not commensurate with the offence of misconduct
  whi<;h was not of a serious nature - Hence the punishment
E imposed is substituted to punishment of withholding of two
  increments for one year without having cumulative effect.

       Judicial Review - Scope of - Court can exercise power
  of judicial review, if the impugned order suffers from malafide,
  dishonest or corrupt practices - Court does not have
F expertise to correct administrative decision - Court should
  exercise such power in furtherance of public interest and not
  merely on making out of a legal point - Scope of judicial
  review is limited to the process of making the decision and
  not against the decision itself.
G
       Appellant-an IPS officer, when posted on deputation
  with Border Security Force (BSF), disciplinary
  proceedings were initiated a!Jainst him. Eight charges
  were framed against him. Inquiry Officer, in its report
H                                988
     S.R. TEWARI v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.              989


 stated that charge No. 3 was fully proved, charge Nos. 4       A
 and 6 were partially proved while rest of the charges were
 not proved. Disciplinary Authority passed the order of
 punishment of dismissal from service. Administrative
 Tribunal directed his reinstatement. High Court, however,
.set aside the judgment of the Tribunal holding that only       B
charge Nos. 4 and 6 stood proved, and hence directed
 Union of India to pass fresh orders in respect of those
charges. Review petition of the appellant was dismissed
by High Court.

     During pendency of the present appeal, Union of            C
India, having lost its appeal in this Court, against the
order of the High Court, reinstated the appellant and
imposed a penalty of withholding two increments for one
year without cumulative effect. But on the advice of
UPSC, imposed punishment of compulsory retirement.              D
This Court asked the appellant to make representation
and asked Union of India to decide the same and to place
it before this Court before giving effect to it. Union of
India, after considering the representation, imposed
punishment of compulsory retirement and also gave               E
effect to the order rather than placing it before this Court.
Appellant filed contempt petition.

    The question for consideration, therefore, was
whether the punishment of compulsory retirement was             F
proportionate to the delinquency proved; and whether
Union of India wilfully disobeyed the order of this Court
directing it not to give effect to the punishment order
immediately and to place the same before the Court.

    Disposing of the appeal and the contempt petition,          G
the Court

     HELD: 1.1. The court can exercise the power of
judicial review if there is a manifest error in the exercise
of power or the exercise of power is manifestly arbitrary       H
    990    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 8 S.C.R.


·A or if the power is exercised on the basis of facts which
   do not exist and which are patently erroneous. Such
   exercise of power would stand vitiated. The court may be
   justified in exercising the power of judicial review if the ,
   impugned order suffers from ma/a fide, dishonest or
 B corrupt practices, for the reason, that the order had been
   passed by the authority beyond the limits conferred upon
   the authority by the legislature. Thus, the court has to be
   satisfied that the order had been passed by the authority
   only on the grounds of illegality, irrationality and
 c procedural impropriety before it interferes. The court
   does not have the expertise to correct the administrative
   decision. Therefore, the court itself may be fallible and
   interfering with the order of the authority may impose
   heavy administrative burden on the State or may lead to
   unbudgeted expenditure. [Para 14] [1005-F-H; 1006-A-B]
0
       Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay and Ors. v.
  Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. and Ors. AIR 1984 SC 1182:
  1983 (3) SCR 773; Tata Cellular v. Union of India AIR 1996
  SC 11: 1994 (2) Suppl. SCR 122; People's Union for Civil
E Liberties and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 2004 SC
  456: 2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 860; State of N.C. T. of Delhi and
  Anr. v. Sanjeev alias Bittoo AIR 2005 SC 2080: 2005 (3) SCR
  151 - relied on.

F      1.2. The court must act with great caution and should
  exercise such power only in furtherance to public interest·
  and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The
  court must always keep the larger public interest in mind
  in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or
G not. The court must keep in mind that judicial review is
  not akin to adjudication on merit by re-appreciating the
  evidence as an appellate authority. Thus, the court is
  devoid of the power to re-appreciate the evidence and
  come to its own conclusion on the proof of a particular
H charge, as the scope of judicial review is limited to the
      S.R. TEWARI v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.                 991


 process of making the decision and not against the                  A
 decision itself and in such a situation the court cannot
 arrive on its own independent finding. [Paras 15 and 17]
 [1006-D, F-G]

      Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. and Ors.   8
 AIR 2000 SC 801: 2000 ( 1) SCR 505; High Court of
 Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v. Udaysingh s/o
 Ganpatrao Naik Nimbalkar and Ors. AIR 1997 SC 2286: 1997
 (3) SCR 803; Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v.
 Mohd. Nasrullah Khan AIR 2006 SC 1214: 2006 (1) SCR
 911; Union of India and Ors. v. Manab Kumar Guha (2011)             C
 11 sec 535: 2011 (3) SCR 272 - relied on.

     1.3. Where the holders of public offices have
forgotten that the offices entrusted to them are a sacred
trust and such offices are meant for use and not abuse.              D
Where such trustees turn to dishonest means to gain an
undue advantage, the scope of judicial review attains
paramount importance. [Para 16] [1006-E]

    Krishan Yadav and Anr. v. State of Haryana and Ors.              E
AIR 1994 SC 2166: 1994 (4) SCC 165 - relied on.

       2. In the instant case, on charge No.4, the High Court
  has committed a factual mistake observing that 'M' had
  been appointed by appellant as a regular teacher with
  retrospective effect. In fact there is no evidence that            F
· appellant had appointed him or regularised him, as 'M'
  was already in service for a period of 10 years. Same
  remained the position in respect of charge No.6 as the
  High Court mis-directed itself as it considered the case
  as if the charge against the appellant had been taking two         G
  vehicles; one his official car and another an escort,
  though there had been no such charge levelled against
  the appellant. The High Court while dealing with the
  review petition on charge No.4, did not consider the fact
  that the appointment of 'M' as a Head Master, was a                H
    992    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A unanimous decision of the Board and not that of the
  appellant alone. The High Court also did not correct the
  mistake in its original judgment regarding the usage of
  two vehicles. (Para 12) (1004-G-H; 1005-A-C]

        3.1. If the punishment awarded is disproportionate to
8
    the gravity of the misconduct, it would be arbitrary, and
    thus, would violate the mandate of Article 14 of the
    Constitution. (Para 18) (1007-B]

         3.2. In exercise of the powers of judicial review, the
C   court cannot "normally" substitute its own conclusion or
    penalty. However, if the penalty imposed by an authority
    "shocks the conscience" of the court, it would
    appropriately mould the relief either directing the
    authority to reconsider the penalty imposed and in
D   exceptional and rare cases, in order to shorten the
    litigation, itself, impose appropriate punishment with
    cogent reasons in support thereof. While examining the
    issue of proportionality, court can also consider the
    circumstances under which the misconduct was
E   committed. In a given case, the prevailing circumstances
    might have forced the accused to act in a certain manner .
    though he had not intended to do so. The court may
    further examine the effect, if the order is set aside or
    substituted by some other penalty. [Para 19) [1007-H;
F   1008-A-C]

       Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1987 SC
  2386; Union of India and Anr. v. G. Ganayutham (dead by
  Lrs.) AIR 1997 SC 3387; State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v.
  J.P. Saraswat (2011) 4 SCC 545; Chandra Kumar Chopra v.
G Union of India and Ors. (2012) 6 SCC 369; Registrar General,
  Patna High Court v. Pandey Gajendra Prasad and Ors. AIR
  2012 SC 2319; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors.
  AIR 1996 SC 484; V. Ramana v. A.P.S.R. T.C. and Ors. AIR
  2005 SC 3417; State of Meghalaya and Ors. v. Mecken
H Singh N. Marak AIR 2008 SC 2862; Depot Manager,
     S.R. TEWARI v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.               993


A.P.S.R. T.C. v. P. Jayaram Reddy (2009) 2 SCC 681 Union         A
of India and Ors. v. Bodupalli Gopalaswami (2011) 13 SCC
553; Sanjay Kumar Singh v. Union of India and Ors. AIR
2012 SC 1783; Union of India and Ors. v. R. K. Sharma AIR
2001 SC 3053 - relied on.
                                                                 B
     3.3. While exercising the power of judicial review,
Court cannot interfere with the punishment merely
because it considers the punishment to be
disproportionate. Only in extreme cases, which on their
face, show perversity or irrationality, there could be
judicial review and courts should not interfere merely on        C
compassionate grounds. [Para 23] [1009-G-H]
     3.4. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be
held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at
by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking          0
into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The
finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against
the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously
defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a
decision is arrived at, on the basis of no evidence or           E
thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable
person would act upon it, the order would be perverse.
But if there is some evidence on record which is
acceptable and which could be relied upon, the
conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the
findings would not be interfered with. Hence, where there        F
is evidence of malpractice, gross irregularity or illegality,
interference is permissible. [Para 24] [1010-A-D]
     Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration AIR 1984
SC 1805; Ku/deep Singh v. Commissioner of Police and Ors.
                                                                 G
AIR 1999 SC 677; Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao and Ors. v.
State of Andhra Pradesh thr. Secretary AIR 2010 SC 589;
Babu v. State of Kera/a (2010) 9 SCC 189 - relied on.
   3.5. In the present case, so far as charge No.4 is
concerned, the matter was considered by a Board                  H
    994      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2013] 8 S.C.R.

A consisting of several officers and the appellant could not
  have been selectively targeted for disciplinary action.
  Further, no material could be placed on record that BSF
  had ever formulated a policy for regularisation of a
  temporary teacher as a regular teacher and in such a
B fact-situation, the appellant could not have regularised
  the services of 'M' as a school teacher, even if he had the
  experience of 10 years. (This was not even a charge
  against the appellant nor there was any finding of the
  Inquiry Officer, nor has such a matter been agitated
c before the Tribunal). [Para 25] [1010-E-G]
         3.6. The proved charges remained only charge Nos.4
    and 6 and in both the cases the misconduct seems to be
    of an administrative nature rather than a misconduct of
    a serious nature. It was not the case of the department
D   that the appellant had taken the escort vehicle with him.
    There was only one vehicle which was an official vehicle
    for his use and charge No.6 stood partly proved. In view
    thereof, the punishment of compulsory retirement shocks
    the conscience of the court and by no stretch of
E   imagination can it be held to be proportionate or
    commensurate to the delinquency committed by and
    proved against the appellant. The only punishment which
    could be held to be commensurate to the delinquency
    was as proposed by the Government of India to withhold
F   two increments for one year without cumulative effect. In
    the facts of the present case, the Court directs to
    substitute the punishment of compulsory retirement to
    the punishment proposed by the Union of India i.e.
    withholding of two increments for one year without
G   having cumulative effect. [Para 26] [1011-B-F]
                        Case Law Reference:
          1983 (3) SCR 773        relied on         Para 13
          1994 (2) Suppl. SCR 122 relied on         Para 14
H
    S.R. TEWARI v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.       995


   2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 860 relied on         Para 14   A
   2005 (3 ) SCR 151       relied on         Para 14
   2000 (1) SCR 505        relied on         Para 15
   1994 (4) sec 165        relied on         Para 16
                                                       B
   1997 (3) SCR 803        relied on         Para 17
   2006 (1) SCR 911        relied on         Para 17
   2011 (3) SCR 272        relied on         Para 17
   AIR 1987 SC 2386        relied on         Para 18   c
   AIR 1997 SC 3387        relied on         Para 18
   (2011) 4 sec 545        relied on         Para 18
   (2012) 6 sec 369        relied on         Para 18   D
   AIR 2012 SC 2319        relied on         Para 18
   AIR 1996 SC 484         relied on         Para 19
   AIR 2005 SC 3417        relied on         Para 20
                                                       E
   AIR 2008 SC 2862        relied on         Para 21
   (2009) 2 sec 681        relied on         Para 22
   (2011) 13 sec 553       relied on         Para 22
   AIR 2012 SC 1783        relied on         Para 22   F
   AIR 2001 SC 3053        relied on         Para 23
   AIR 1984 SC 1805        relied on         Para 24
   AIR 1999 SC 677         relied on         Para 24
                                                       G
   AIR 2010 SC 589         relied on         Para 24
   (201 O) 9 sec 189       relied on         Para 24
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
4715-4716 of 2013.                                     H
    996      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A       From the Judgment & Order dated 15.02.2012 of the High
    Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Review Petition No. 102 of 2012.
                                    WITH
    Conmt. Pet. (C) Nos. 180-181 of 2013.
B       P.S. Patwalia, Gaurav Pachnanda, Ravi Prakash, Udita
    Singh, Avni Singh (for Chandra Prakash for the Appellant.

         R.P. Bhat, A.T.M. Rangaramanujam, Rekha Pandey, B.
    Krishna Prasad, G.N. Reddy, B. Debojit for the Respondents.
c         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. Leave granted in SLP(C) Nos.
    22263-22264 of 2012.

D      2. These appeals have been preferred against the
  judgment and order dated 15.2.2012 of the High Court of Delhi
  passed in Review Petition No.102 of 2012; and the order dated
  1.2.2012 in Writ Petition No. 4207 of 2011. By way of this order
  the High Court has allowed the writ petition filed by the Union
E of India - respondent no.1 against the order of the Central
  Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter called the 'Tribunal'), raising
  a very large number of grievances. The appellant was running
  from pillar to post as he had been harassed and penalised for
  no fault of his own and has been awarded a punishment which
F is uncalled for. Thus, he had moved the Tribunal, High Court of
  Delhi and this Court several times.

        3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals
    and contempt petitions are as under:-

G      A. The appellant, an IPS Officer of 1982 batch joined the
  service on 1.9.1982, promoted on the post of Deputy Inspector
  General (D.l.G.), and subsequently as Inspector General of
  Police (l.G.) in his cadre of the State of Andhra Pradesh in May
  2001. The appellant was on deputation and was posted as l.G.,
H Frontier Head Quarters, Border Security Force (BSF) (North
     S.R. TEWARI v. UNION OF !NOIA AND ANR.                  997
             [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

Bengal) from 23.6.2005 to 14.11.2006.                               A

      B. The appellant was put under suspension vide order
dated 13.11.2006 as the disciplinary authority decided to hold
disciplinary proceedings. As a consequence thereof, a charge
sheet dated 23.3.2007 containing 8 charges was served upon
                                                                    B
him. The appellant denied all the said charges and therefore,
an Inquiry Officer was appointed. The Department examined a
large number of witnesses and produced documents in support
of its case. The appellant also defended himself and the Inquiry
Officer submitted the report dated 23.12.2008 holding him
guilty, as charge no.3 stood proved fully while charge nos.4 and    C
6 stood proved partly.

      C. The Disciplinary Authority did not agree with one of the
findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer on one charge and held
that charge no.4 was proved fully. In response to the show          D
cause notice issued to the appellant by the Disciplinary
Authority, he submitted a detailed representation against the
disagreement note by the Disciplinary Authority on 10.11.2009.

     D. On being sought, the Union Public Service Commission
                                                                    E
(hereinafter referred to as 'UPSC') gave its advice regarding
the punishment on 20.8.2010. The Central Vigilance
Commission (hereinafter referred to as 'CVC') also gave its
advice in respect of the charges against the appellant on
18.2.2009. After considering all the material, the Disciplinary     F
Authority passed the order of punishment of dismissal from
service on 8.9.2010.

     E. Aggrieved, the appellant challenged the said order of
dismissal by filing OA No.3234 of 2010 before the Tribunal. It
was contested and opposed by respondent no.1. The Tribunal          G
set aside the order of punishment dated 8.9.2010 vide judgment
and order dated 11.2.2011 and directed for reinstatement of
the appellant in service with all consequential benefits.

    F. Aggrieved, respondent no.1, Union of India challenged        H
    998     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A the said order of the Tribunal by filing Writ Petition (C) No.4207
  of 2011 before the High Court of Delhi. The High Court vide
  its judgment and order dated 1.2.2012 set aside the judgment
  and order dated 11.2.2011, passed by the Tribunal and directed
  respondent no.1 to pass a fresh order in respect of charge nos.4
B and 6 as in the opinion of the High Court only the said two
  charges stood proved.

         G. Appellant filed Review Petition No. 102 of 2012 against
    the order dated 1.2.2012, however, the same was rejected vide
    order dated 15.2.2012.
c
        H. Aggrieved, respondent no.1 filed SLP(C) No.14639 of
    2012, challenging the said order of the High Court of Delhi
    dated 1.2.2012. However, the same was dismissed by this
    Court on 9.5.2012.
D
         I. The appellant challenged the same order of the High
    Court dated 1.2.2012 by filing these appeals. In the meanwhile,
    respondent no.1 re-instated the appellant on 23.5.2012 and
    tentatively formed a decision to impose a suitable penalty on
E   the said two charges in view of the order of the High Court dated
    1.2.2012, a penalty of withholding two increments for one
    year without cumulative effect. The-reSpondent no.1 sought
    advice from the UPSC, which videJetter dated 13.8.2012
    advised that the appellant be compulsorily retired. The advice
    given by the UPSC was served upon the appellant and he was
F   asked to make a representation on the sam~

      In the meanwhile, this Court vide order- dated 5.10.2012
  asked the appellant to file a detailed representatiolrbefore
  respondent no.1, who was asked in turn to l)ass a speaking
                                                    m
G and reasoned order within a stipulated period resp~of the
  punishment. However, the order of punishment would not
  be given effect to immediately and the same would be
  placed before this Court on the next date of hearing. In
  pursuance thereof, the appellant submitted the representation
H on 5.10.2012. Respondent no.1 vide order dated 17 .10.2012
     S.R. TEWARI v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.                   999
             [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

passed the order imposing the punishment of compulsory               A
retirement. The said order was given effect to and
communicated to the appellant vide letter dated 19.11.2012.

     J. Thus, the questions that arise for consideration of this
Court are whether the punishment of compulsory retirement            8
awarded by the Disciplinary Authority is proportionate to the
delinquency proved and whether the respondents in the
contempt petitions wilfully violated the order dated 5.10.2012
passed by this Court holding that the punishment should not be
given effect to until it is produced before the court at the time    C
of the next hearing.

      4. Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel appearing
for the appellant has submitted that there has been misreading
of evidence by the High Court of Delhi that charge nos.4 and 6
have been proved fully. The charges were trivial in nature and       D
could not warrant the punishment of compulsory retirement. The
appellant faced departmental proceedings for six years and had
been deprived of being considered for further promotion. He
is due to retire in December, 2013. The appellant remained
under suspension for 11 months and was dismissed from                E
service for about 19 months. He had been granted 'Z' class
protection initially which was subsequently scaled down to 'Y'
category. The appellant was given the said security/protection
even during the period of suspension and dismissal. Even
during that period he had been provided with a bullet proof car      F
and PSOs as he had been facing threats from naxalites.
Therefore, the punishment so imposed is to be set aside.

      In view of the orders passed by this court stating that the
punishment order can be passed by the respondents but could
not be given effect to without production before the court stood     G
voluntarily violated. Therefore, the respondents in the contempt
petitions are liable to be punished for wilful disobedience of the
same.

     5. Per contra, Shri R.P. Bhatt, learned senior counsel for      H
    1000    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A the Union of India has vehemently opposed the appeals and
  contempt petitions contending that the said charges stood fully
  proved against the appellant. Being an IPS Officer, he knew
  his responsibilities and no leniency should be granted. The
  order passed by this Court has not voluntarily been violated.
B Therefore, the appeals as well as the contempt petitions are
  liable to be dismissed.

         6. We have considered the rival submissions made by
    learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

C        7. The chargesheet dated 23.3.2007 containing the
    following 8 charges was served upon the appellant under Rule
    8 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969
    for his alleged misconducts during his tenure in BSF, North
    Bengal, on the following counts :-
D
        ( i) Indulged in living with a lady by name Smt.
        Chandrakala, not being his legally wedded wife.

        (ii) Allowed unauthorized interference by Smt. Chandrakala
        in the official functioning of North Bengal Frontier causing
E       premature release of four constables from the Quarter
        Guard.

        (iii) Complete disregard to the rules and without
        jurisdiction, reviewed punishment awarded and mitigated
F       the sentence awarded to No. 86161306 Constable
        Prakash Singh by Frontier Headquarter, BSF South
        Bengal.

        (iv) Favoritism and manipulation in the selection of
        Headmaster, BSF Primary School Kadmatala even though
G       the candidate did not possess essential qualification and
        was not eligible.

        ?(v) Assisted enrolment of a person in BSF from his native
        district, UP by fraudulent means.
H
      S.R. TEWARI v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.                1001
              [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

     (vi) Misuse of official vehicle, arms and ammunition and        A
     BSF personnel during the marriage of his son in Feb. 2006
     at his native place in Balia, UP.

     (vii) Retaining of four BSF Constables for Personal work.

     (viii) Attachment of Shri Prakash Singh, constable with         B
     North Bengal Frontier despite contrary remarks of the
     PSO, North Bengal Frontier.

    8. The Inquiry Officer held that cut of the 8 charges levelled
against the appellant, charge nos.1, 2, 5, 7 and 8 were not          c
proved at all. Charge no.3 was proved fully and charge nos.4
and 6 stood partly proved.

     The Inquiry Officer dealt with the said charges as under:

    I. Charge No.3 stood proved only to the extent of                D
passing an order in a case lying outside the jurisdiction of the
Commanding Officer.

     II. Charge 4 proved partly to the extent of wrong selection
of Head Master and Teacher in BSF Primary School Kadmatala           E
by the Commanding Officer without any favouritism and
manipulation.

    Ill. Charge No.6 stood partly proved to the extent of using
BSF vehicle for private journey outside jurisdiction upto Balia
without prior permission of the Competent Authority.                 F

      9. The Disciplinary Authority dealt with two of the charges
differently:

     Charge No.3: The appellant though not competent to              G
review the punishment awarded to one Sri Prakash in his
capacity as a prescribed officer and thus, it clearly established
the misconduct on the part of the appellant and the charge
stood proved against him.

                                                                     H
    1002    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2013] 8 S.C.R.


A        Charge No.4: Shri S.S. Majumdar did not fulfil the
    eligibility criteria and was not recommended by the
    Selection Board for the post of Head Master and thus, he had
    been favoured by the appellant who appointed him as Head
    Master. Thus, this charge stood proved.
B
        10. All the proved charges were re-examined by the
  Tribunal. After re-appreciating the evidence, the Tribunal dealt
  with charge no.3 observing that entertaining a review petition
  is a quasi-judicial function. It may be without jurisdiction and the
  order passed can be corrected in further proceedings but it
C does not amount to misconduct. The Tribunal took note of the
  finding on charge no.4 that the order of appointment of a
  primary school teacher as well as Head Master in BSF School
  had been without favouritism/manipulation in the selection
  process as recorded by the Inquiry Officer and came to the
D conclusion that the selection was made by the Board having
  various members and not by the appellant alone and it also
  took note of the fact that Shri Majumdar was not appointed as
  a primary school teacher by the appellant, rather he had been
  working in the school for 10 years. Other teachers who had
E been working for more than 7 years were also considered.
  Instead of adducing any documentary evidence the Department
  only examined witnesses in the inquiry. The appellant was
  competent to decide the eligibility criteria for the post of Head
  Master. There was no favouritism or manipulation on the
F part of the appellant. The Tribunal further took note of the
  subsequent developments as under:-

        "It is rather strange that the same very respondents, who
        were harping upon irregular appointment of Majumdar as
        Headmaster, the same being against the education code,
G
        when the applicant issued them show cause notice for
        termination of services, directed him to withdraw the same
        and permit all of them to continue in service. So much so,
        it was specifically ordered that Majumdar would be
        continued in service."
H
     S.R. TEWARI v. UNION OF INDIAAND ANR.                  1003
             [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

And then recorded the following finding:                            A

    "We accept the contention of the learned counsel for the
    applicant that the respondents are blowing hot and cold
    in the same breath. The applicant, at the most, could be
    jointly held responsible for making selection of Majumdar       8
    on the post of Headmaster, even though he was the best
    amongst the lot to the extent that his appointment was
    against the educational· qualification criteria mentioned in
    the advertisement itself, but for that, as mentioned above,
    he alone could not be held responsible." (Emphasis              C
    added)

On charge no.6, the Tribunal took note of the facts as under:

    "The charge has been partly proved by them completely
    ignoring the explanation furnished by the applicant.            o
    There is thus, an apparent error both on facts and law. The
    respondents completely ignored the defence projected by
    the applicant. Even though, prima facie, we are of the view
    that the explanation furnished by the applicant required
    acceptance, but once, while doing so we will be                 E
    appreciating evidence, we may not do the same."
    (Emphasis added)

And further held as under:

    "On this charge, therefore, the course open may have been       F
    to remit the matter to the concerned authorities, but in the
    peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we refrain
    from doing so, as even if the charge to the extent it stood
    proved, the same requires to be ignored inasmuch as,
    once the applicant was entitled to take the vehicle and         G
    PSOs to Balia, not obtaining prior permission would not
    be a serious issue at all." (Emphasis added)

    11. The High Court while dealing with charge no.3
concurred with the Tribunal that entertaining the review petition
                                                                    H
    1004    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A against the order of punishment could have been without
  jurisdiction but there was no finding by the Inquiry Officer that it
  was intentional. Therefore, there could be a judicial error which
  could be set aside or corrected in appeal or in any other
  proceedings but it did not amount to misconduct. The same
B could not be a subject matter of enquiry as it was not a
  misconduct for want of malafide or any element of corruption
  or culpable negligence on the part of the appellant. In such
  circumstances, it would not be permissible to consider it as a
  misconduct.
c       So far as the appointment of Shri Majumdai:_ as a Head
    Master of the school is concerned, the High Court lietd that the
    appellant was guilty of favouritism shown to Shri Majumdar.

        Charge No.6 related to the allegation of using the vehicle
D from Patna to Balia. The High Court also took note that the
  appellant was granted ·y· category SE>curity, due to threats from
  Naxalites. However, he was not entitled to an escort vehicle for
  his journey from Patna to Balia without permission. And in view
  of the above, the High Court modified the findings recorded by
E the Tribunal.

          12. We have reconsidered the case within permissible
    limits. The case remained limited to the charge nos. 4 and 6
    only as all other charges have lost the significance at one stage
F   or the other, and we have to advert only to the said charges.

       The Inquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority, the Tribunal
  and the High Court have considered all the facts involved herein.
  On charge no.4, the High Court has admittedly committed a
  factual mistake observing that Shri S.S. Majumdar had been
G appointed by appellant as a regular teacher with retrospective
  effect. In fact there is no evidence that appellant had appointed
  him or regularised him as Shri Majumdar was already in service
  for a period of 10 years. Same remained the position in respect
  of charge no.6 as the High Court mis-directed itself as it
H considered the case as if the charge against the appellant had
      S.R. TEWARI v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.                 1005
              [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

been taking two vehicles; one his official car and another an        A
escort, though there had been no suct:l charge levelled against
the appellant.

     The High Court while dealing with the review petition on
charge no.4, did not consider the fact that the appointment of       8
Shri S.S. Majumdar as a Head Master, was a unanimous
decision of the Board and not that of the appellant alone. The
High Court also did not correct the mistake in its original
judgment regarding the usage of two vehicles.

     13. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay & Ors. v.             c
Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1984 SC 1182, this
Court held that various parameters of the court's power of
judicial review of administrative or executive action on which
the court can interfere had been well settled and it would be
redundant to recapitulate the whole catena of decisions. The         D
Court further held:

     "It is a settled position that if the action or decision is
     perverse or is such that no reasonable body of persons,
     properly informed, could come to, or has been arrived at        E
     by the authority misdirecting itself by adopting a wrong
     approach, or has been influenced by irrelevant or
     extraneous matters the court would be justified in
     interfering with the same."

      14. The court can exercise the power of judicial review if     F
there is a manifest error in the exercise of power or the exercise
of power is manifestly arbitrary or if the power is exercised on
the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently
erroneous. Such exercise of power would stand vitiated. The
court may be justified in exercising the power of judicial review    G
if the impugned order suffers from mala fide, dishonest or
corrupt practices, for the reason, that the order had been
passed by the authority beyond the limits conferred upon the
authority by the legislature. Thus, the court has to be satisfied
that the order had been passed by the authority only on the          H
    1006    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 8 SC R

A grounds of illegality. irrationality and procedural impropriety .
  before it interferes The court does not have the expertise to
  correct the administrative decision. Therefore, the court itself
  may be fallible and interfering with the order of the authority may
  impose heavy administrative burden on the State or may lead
B to unbudgeted expenditure. (Vide: Tata Cellular v. Union of
  India, AIR 1996 SC 11; People's Union for Civil Liberties &
  Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 456: and State of
  N. C. T of Delhi & Anr. v. Sanjeev alias Bittoo, AIR 2005 SC
  2080).
c       15. In Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. &
  Ors, AIR 2000 SC 801, this Court explaining the scope of
  judicial review held that the court must act with great caution
  and should exercise such power only in furtherance to public
  interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The
D court must always keep the larger public interest in mind in
  order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not.

        16. There may be a case where the holders of public offices
  have forgotten that the offices entrusted to them are a sacred
E trust and such offices are meant for use and not abuse. Where
  such trustees turn to dishonest means to gain an undue
  advantage, the scope of judicial review attains paramount
  importance. (Vide: Krishan Yadav & Anr. v. State of Haryana
  & Ors., AIR 1994 SC 2166).
F      17. The court must keep in mind that judicial review is not
  akin to adjudication on merit by re-appreciating the evidence
  as an appellate authority. Thus, the court is devoid of the power
  to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion
  on the proof of a particular charge, as the scope of judicial
G review is limited to the process of making the decision and not
  against the decision itself and in such a situation the court
  cannot arrive on its own independent finding. (Vide: High Court
  of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v. Udaysingh
  slo Ganpatrao Naik Nimbalkar & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2286;
H Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. Mohd Nasru/lah
     S.R. TEWARI v. UNION OF INDIAAND ANR.                 1007
             [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

Khan, AIR 2006 SC 1214; and Unjon pflndia & Ors. v. Manab          A
Kumar Guha, (2011) 11 SCC 535).

      18. The question of interference on the quantum of
punishment, has been considered by this Court in a catena of
judgments, and it was held that if the punishment awarded is       8
disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct, it would be
arbitrary, and thus, would violate the mandate of Article 14 of
the Constitution.

    In Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1987 SC
2386, this Court observed as under:                                C

     "But the. sentence has to suit the offence and the
    offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It
    should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to
    shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive        o
    evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part
    of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even
    on the aspect, which is otherwise, within the exclusive
    province of the Court Martial, if the decision of the Court
    even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of               E
    logic, then the sentence would not be immune from
    correction. In the present case, the punishment is so
    stringently disproportionate as to call for and justify
    interference. It cannot be allowed to remain uncorrected
    in judicial review." (Emphasis added)
                                                                   F
(See also: Union of India & Anr. v. G. Ganayutham (dead by
Lrs.), AIR 1997 SC 3387; State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. J.P.
Saraswat, (2011) 4 SCC 545; Chandra Kumar Chopra v.
Union of India & Ors., (2012) 6 SCC 369; and Registrar
General, Patna High Court v. Pandey Gajendra Prasad & Ors.,        G
AIR 2012 SC 2319).

    19. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1996
SC 484, this Court after examining various its earlier decisions
observed that in exercise of the powers of judicial review, the
                                                                   H
    1008    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 8 s c R.


A court cannot "normally" substitute its own conclusion or penalty.
  However, if the penalty imposed by an authority "shocks the
  conscience" of the court. it would appropriately mould the relief
  either directing the authority to reconsider the penalty imposed
  and in exceptional and rare cases, in order to shorten the
B litigation, itself. impose appropriate punishment with cogent
  reasons in support thereof. While examining the issue of
  proportionality, court can also consider the circumstances
  under which the misconduct was committed. In a given
  case, the prevailing circumstances might have forced the
c accused to act in a certain manner though he had not intended
  to do so. The court may further examine the effect. if the order
  is set aside or substituted by some other penalty. However, it
  is only in very rare cases that the court might. to shorten the
  litigation, think of substituting its own view as to the quantum
0 of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the
  Competent Authority.               ·

       20. In V. Ramana v. AP.S.R. T.C. & Ors., AIR 2005 SC
  3417, this Court considered the scope of judicial review as to
  the quantum of punishment is permissible only if it is found that
E it is not commensurate with the gravity of the charges
  and if the court comes to the conclusion that the scope of
  judicial review as to the quantum of punishment is permissible
  only if it is found to be "shocking to the conscience of the Court,
  in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards."
F In a normal course, if the punishment imposed is shockingly
  disproportionate, it would be appropriate to direct the
  Disciplinary Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.
  However, in order to shorten the litigation, in exceptional
  and rare cases, the Court itself can impose appropriate
G punishment by recording cogent reasons in support
  thereof.

       21. In State of Meghalaya & Ors. v. Mecken Singh N.
  Marak, AIR 2008 SC 2862, this Court observed that a Court
H or a Tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has
     S.R. TEWARI v. UNION OF INDIAAND ANR.                   1009
             [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

to record reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment is not    A
commensurate with the proved charges. In the matter of
imposition of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited
and restricted to exceptional cases. The punishment imposed
by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless
shocks the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to           B
judicial review. (See also: Depot Manager, A.P.S.R. T.C. v. P.
Jayaram Reddy, (2009) 2 SCC 681).

      22. The role of the court in the matter of departmental
proceedings is very limited and the court cannot substitute its C
own views or findings by replacing the findings arrived at by
the authority on detailed appreciation of the evidence on record.
 In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for
interference by the court is very limited and restricted to
exceptional cases. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the
                                                                  0
conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review.
The court has to record reasons as to why the punishment is
disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of
justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not
suffice. (Vide: Union of India & Ors. v. Bodupalli Gopalaswami, E
(2011) 13 SCC 553; and Sanjay Kumar Singh v. Union of
India & Ors., AIR 2012 SC 1783).

     23. In Union of India & Ors. v. R.K. Sharma, AIR 2001
SC 3053, this Court explained the observations made in Ranjit F
Thakur (supra) observing that if the charge was ridiculous, the
punishment was harsh or strikingly disproportionate it would
warrant interference. However, the said observations in Ranjit
Thakur (supra) are not to be taken to mean that a court can,
while exercising the power of judicial review, interfere with the G
punishment merely because it considers the punishment to be
disproportionate. It was held that only in extreme cases, which
on their face, show perversity or irrationality, there could be
judicial review and courts should not interfere merely on
compassionate grounds.
                                                                     H
     1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2013] 8 S C.R

A         24. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held
    to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring
    or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration
    irrelevanUinadmissible material. The finding may also be said
    to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence'', or. if the
B   finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice
    of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no
    evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable
    person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if
    there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and
C   which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be
    treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered
    with. (Vide: Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration,
    AIR 1984 SC 1805; Ku/deep Singh v. Commissioner of Police
    & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 677; Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao & Ors.
    v. State of Andhra Pradesh thr Secretary, AIR 2010 SC 589;
0
    and Babu v. State of Kera/a, (2010) 9 SCC 189).

         Hence, where there is evidence of malpractice. gross
    irregularity or illegality, interference is permissible.

E         25. So far as charge no.4 is concerned, the matter was
    considered by a Board consisting of several officers and the
    appellant could not have been selectively targeted for
    disciplinary action. Further, no material could be placed on
    record that BSF had ever formulated a policy for regularisation
F   of a temporary teacher as a regular teacher and in such a fact-
    situation, the appellant could not have regularised the services
    of Shri Majumdar as a school teacher, even if he had the
    experience of 10 year$'. (This was not even a charge against
    the appellant nor there was any finding of the Inquiry Officer,
G   nor has such a m~tter been agitated before the Tribunal).

         It is evident from the record that as per letter dated
    4.4.2013 sent by the Government of India to the appellant
    through the Chief Secretary, Andhra Pradesh, the proposed
    punishment is as under:
H
      S.R. TEWARI v. UNION OF INDIAAND ANR.                  1011
              [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

     "A penalty of withholding two increments for one year           A
     without cumulative effect, be imposed on the appellant as
     a punishment under Rule 6 of the All India Services
     (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969."

      26. The proved charges remained only charge nos.4 and
                                                                     B
6 and in both the cases the misconduct seems to be of an
administrative nature rather than a misconduct of a serious
nature. It was not the case of the department that the appellant
had taken the escort vehicle with him. There was only one vehicle
which was an official vehicle for his use and charge no.6 stood      C
partly proved. In view thereof, the punishment of compulsory
retirement shocks the conscience of the court and by no stretch
of imagination can it be held to be proportionate or
commensurate to the delinquency committed by and proved
against the appellant. The only punishment which could be held
to be commensurate to the delinquency was as proposed by             D
the Government of India to withhold two increments for one year
without cumulative effect. It would have been appropriate to
remand the case to the disciplinary authority to impose the
appropriate punishment. However, considering the chequered
history of the case and in view of the fact that the appellant had   E
remained under suspension for 11 months, suffered the order
of dismissal for 19 months and would retire after reaching the
age of superannuation in December 2013, the facts of the case
warrant that this court should substitute the punishment of
compulsory retirement to the punishment proposed by the Union        F
of India i.e. withholding of two increments for one year without
having cumulative effect.

      In view thereof, we do not want to proceed with the
contempt petitions. The appeals as well as the contempt              G
petitions stand disposed of accordingly.

K.K.T.            Appeals & Contempt Petitions disposed of.